Regional Organizations and Peace Enforcement in Comparative Regional Perspective

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Author’s Address

Anja Jetschke
University of Göttingen
Platz der Göttinger Sieben 3
D-37073 Göttingen
Email: anja.jetschke@sowi.uni-goettingen.de
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Introduction

When does the UN intervene in conflicts and when do ROs intervene? Do regional organizations challenge their role as outlined in the Charter of the United Nations, or do they follow international legal requirements? A number of interventions actually suggest this, such as NATO’s military intervention in Kosovo in 1999 without proper authorization by the UN Security Council (UNSC). Do regional organizations only take over a larger share of military interventions, or do they also challenge the very regulation of peace enforcement and peacekeeping measures, as outlined most importantly in the UN Charta of 1945?

Since the 1990s, the international military interventions by regional organizations to re-establish peace and security either in the form of peace enforcement or peacekeeping actions have greatly increased in numbers. These efforts have been encouraged by various Secretary-Generals of the United Nations, who have called in key documents, such as the “Agenda for Peace” by Boutros-Boutros Ghali for a greater involvement of regional organizations in such efforts (UN Secretary-General 1992). Moreover, military interventions are no longer primarily conducted to prevent interstate conflicts from escalating into threats to international peace and stability, but to prevent intrastate conflicts from destabilizing neighboring countries (Heldt and Wallensteen 2006). As Heldt and Wallensteen (2006) have documented, regional organizations intervene much more frequently in intrastate conflicts than in interstate conflicts. International and regional organizations thus deeply interfere into a countries’ sovereignty. Given the resurgent interest in regionalism and regionalization, scholarly and practitioners’ attention has turned to the enhanced role of regional organizations and their relationship in this regard to the United Nations (Abass 2004; Lombaerde et al. 2012). Moreover, a number of data gathering efforts take place seeking to collect systematic evidence on the role of regional organizations in the issue area of security (Heldt and Wallensteen 2006; Powers and Goertz 2011; Sousa 2012 (unpublished)).

1 I would like to thank the students of the seminar „Regional organizations and security“ held at the University of Göttingen during the Summer Term 2013 for lively discussions on the subject and Hannah Becker and Fabian Rasem for their research assistance. An earlier version of the paper has been presented at the Workshop “Overlapping Regionalism” organized by the Research Group “Europe’s Transformative Power” at the FU Berlin and at the IR Research Colloquium at the University of Oxford. I thank the participants for very constructive comments on the earlier versions.
A vast literature has focused on the relationship between regional organizations and the United Nations and the distribution of responsibility between them, covering a broad range of topics. The literature has focused on large-scale changes in the distribution of peace enforcement and peacekeeping operations of the United Nations (Abass 2004; Findlay 2002; Heldt and Wallensteern 2006; Kühne 1998; Mullenbach 2005; Weiss et al. 2001). Global governance approaches look at the activities of the UN and regional organizations from the perspective of “subsidiarity”, i.e. the sharing of responsibility among these two actors according to a functional logic inherent in the provision of global security (Arend 1996; Griep 2012; Knight 1996; O’Brien 2000; Peck 1998; Peou 1998). A related literature embedded in the debate between neorealism and constructivism is concerned with the question of the legitimacy of RO interventions in IR and asks how considerations for the legitimacy of interventions shapes the relationship between the UN and ROs (Barnett 1995; Coleman 2007).

In answering these questions, the paper makes a three arguments: First, since the 1990s, regional organizations have indeed taken over a much larger share of military interventions that were earlier under the prerogative of the UN. Military interventions have ‘regionalized’ in important ways: We are witnessing a movement from individual state or ad-hoc-coalitions of states interventions toward regional interventions; and we are witnessing a move from UN interventions to regional interventions, although this movement is less pronounced. Importantly, however, this trend shows some interesting regional variation. Some regions, like Southeast Asia and Latin America, remain free of military interventions by regional organizations, whereas others, such as Eurasia, remain free of UN interventions. Finally, the paper argues that for the time being, the regionalization of military interventions does not indicate a challenge of the collective security system established after World War II. With very few exceptions, military interventions by regional organizations take place within the framework of the UN Charter and do not challenge its provisions.

In making these arguments, the paper goes beyond existing studies tackling the phenomenon of military interventions by regional organizations. The paper improves the analytical framework provided by Bellamy and Williams (Bellamy and Williams 2005) and links it to an analysis of the UN Charter provisions for military interventions. By doing so, it becomes possible to better determine whether the regionalization of military interventions indicates only a quantitative rise in the number of interventions or whether it denotes also a qualitative change: Regional organizations challenging the UN collective security system. Moreover, the
paper expands Bellamy and Williams’ (2005) analysis of 34 interventions to 209 military operations conducted between 1948 and 2012. The paper’s analytical framework is also able to provide a more differentiated view of the regionalization trend identified, most importantly, by Heldt and Wallensteen (Heldt and Wallensteen 2006).

The paper is organized as follows: The first part summarizes the key findings of the relevant existing literature on military interventions by regional organizations. The second part presents the legal situation according to the UN Charter regulating the relationship between the UN and regional organizations in maintaining international/regional security. The third part presents an activity profile of the activities of the UN, individual states and regional organizations across regions. This profile is based on an original dataset of 209 interventions and four categories of interventions: peace enforcement, peacekeeping, observation and other missions. This allows us– in a first cut of the data – to describe emerging patterns of the distribution of responsibility between the UN and other actors including regional organizations as well as between regional organizations.

**LITERATURE REVIEW**

Only few studies attempt to focus on the legality of interventions by ROs or the regional variation of such interventions in a systematic way (notable exceptions are Bellamy and Williams 2005; Coleman 2007). Despite some efforts to collect data on the regional variations of interventions (Heldt and Wallensteen 2006), data on the distribution of such interventions and their legality can still be improved. A serious issue seems to be a conceptual fuzziness on how to define peacekeeping, making difficult to evaluate whether or not RO interventions actually challenge the UN or not. Three more recent examples, which present excellent studies on the new interventionism and the dynamic between the UN and regional organizations, illustrate this lacuna.

Katharina P. asserts that “virtually all contemporary peace enforcement operations take place within the framework of an international organization.” (Coleman 2007: 4) She makes a distinction between the legality of peace enforcement operations – if it takes place with an official mandate of the UNSC or an RO –, and the legitimacy of an intervention – if states and regional organizations act outside the UN framework but within some regional framework to seek the approval of an international community (Coleman 2007: 41-60). An example of the first type is the ECOWAS 2003 intervention in the Ivory Coast, which had a UN mandate; an example of the latter the NATO intervention in Kosovo, which had no UNSC mandate. The fact that regional organizations act without mandate does not mean that they act out of self-
interest or do not care about legitimacy. Coleman is primarily interested in distinguishing motivations for peace operations: “The key criterion of legitimacy is that the intervention should serve the international system, distinguishing peace enforcement operations from both purely self-serving and purely humanitarian interventions.” (Coleman 2007: 45) She defines peace enforcement as “military interventions explicitly justified by intervening states as aimed at ending a violent conflict within the host country in order to maintain or restore international, regional or local peace and security” (Coleman 2007: 7), which is a broader definition than the one used here, which delimits peace enforcement actions to military interventions without the consent of the affected parties (Kühne 1998: 90; United Nations 2014). While this does not significantly alter the relevance of her argument, namely that all interventions take place in international organizations and makes it even stronger, it might bias her discussion of legitimacy seeking behavior: This is so because observations that she classifies as unauthorized peace enforcement might actually be peacekeeping actions not requiring a legal mandate of the UN. This demonstrates that there is clearly the need for a better specification of what constitutes legal peace enforcement or peacekeeping operations.

Alex Bellamy and Paul D. Williams (Bellamy and Williams 2005) discuss shifting patterns of interventions conducted by the UN, regional organizations and states with them aim of finding out whether there has been a regionalization of interventions, as indicated by the increasing presence of ROs as actor in peace operations. Based on 16 UN-mandated peace operations between 1948 and 2004 and 18 non-UN-mandated peace operations between 2003 and 2004 they make several interrelated arguments: First, although regional organizations are emerging as important actors in peace operations, individual states or groups of states remain important agents of military interventions, be it in the form of regional hegemons or former colonial states such as Great Britain or France (Bellamy and Williams 2005: 167-70). Moreover, inferring from the number of UN-mandated and UN-conducted peace operations and their relative size they argue that there is still a place in the world of peace operations for the UN: “[C]learly, the demand for UN peace operations remains.” (Bellamy and Williams 2005: 167)

Bellamy and Williams equally develop an instructive typology of peace operations by mandate (UN or not UN-authorized) and implementing agency (individual states, coalitions of the willing, regional arrangements) and classify their earlier interventions according to this typology (Bellamy and Williams 2005: 172). They find that an important number of interventions take place without UN authorization and are conducted by individual states or coalitions of the willing. However, an evaluation of peace operations should not only take
legal mandate into consideration, but also the effectiveness of peace operations in establishing stable peace. Each of the types of peace operations (UN, RO, individual states) faces different challenges in terms of legality, legitimacy and effectiveness. Finally, based on three peace operations (British intervention in Sierra Leone 2000, coalition of the willing intervention in the Solomon Islands, AU intervention in Burundi) they assess how the type of mandate and the particular actor constellation affect the effectiveness in terms of success in accomplishing the operation’s mandate and contribution to stable peace (Bellamy and Williams 2005: 179-92). They find that while the number of non-UN-mandated interventions is rising and individual states figure prominently in such interventions, these do not undermine the UN’s global mission because most of them did not violate the UN charter system, which allows interventions by force with UN authorization or with the consent of the host state. Right to the contrary, the interaction between states, ROs and the UN should be seen as mutually beneficial.

Bellamy and William’s discussion is inspiring and their typology will be utilized for tracking the distribution of actors across different types of interventions. Yet, their discussion of the effects of the emergence of other types of actors on the UN system misses a crucial point that is relevant for an assessment of the transformation of the UN peace and security system: It neglects that peacekeeping and observation missions, which do not use of force to coerce a state or operations having the consent of the parties, do not require a UN-mandate and – according to the UN Charter – can be legally conducted by either ROs, individual states or coalitions of the willing. Therefore, such interventions by definition cannot undermine the legitimacy of the UN-led system, because they are an integral part of the collective security system anyway (see below for a discussion). Here, the distinction between regionalization as a quantitative increase of interventions and regionalization as a qualitative change of the collective security system is important.

Birger Heldt and Peter Wallensteen (2006) equally provide an instructive study on global and regional patterns of interventions between 1948-1990. They are particularly interested in finding out whether there is a trend toward regionalization in the sense that regional organizations take over more peace operations and what the driver of such a trend might be. Based on a database of peace operations, their study reveals several central findings: First, there has been a substantial increase in UN- and non-UN-led peace operations after 1990. Second, regional organizations intervene much more frequently in intra-state conflicts than in inter-state conflicts and that therefore there appears to develop a differentiation of activities according to functional mandates. Third, they find that a number of peace operations have
occurred without a mandate by the UN: “[T]he UN deployed 42 operations in intrastate conflicts, while non-UN actors deployed 50, of which 28 were welcomed, authorized, endorsed, commended or approved by UN Security Council Resolutions” (Heldt and Wallensteen 2006: 17). Fourth, there are regional variations regarding peace operations: There is „something about some regions makes them more or less likely to allow/require the UN to establish peacekeeping operations. What is it about these regions that may explain this pattern?” (Heldt and Wallensteen 2006: 21) While Heldt and Wallensteen provide the first systematic database on peace operations, their analysis also suffers from the missing distinction between peace enforcement actions and peacekeeping actions as defined by international law. This distinction, however, would have improved their ability to assess whether there is, indeed, a regionalization or de-regionalization trend in peace operations and their discussion of the distribution of responsibility between the UN and regional organizations, since the Charter provisions might increase the probability of either the UN or ROs conducting such operations.

In sum, the question of the relationship between the UN and regional organizations is an important one. It has also become evident, however, that the answer to the questions of whether regional organizations intervene more frequently or not, or whether they do so without legal mandate or not, or whether they do so illegally but legitimately appear heavily dependent on the international legal requirements for such interventions.

**Regional Organizations within the Collective Security System of the UN**

Regional organizations receive a prominent role in the United Nations Charter due to the fact that two regional organizations, the Organization of American States (OAS) (more precisely its predecessor organization, the Congress of Panama) and the League of Arab States existed before the UN came into existence in 1945. Members of these two regional organizations worked quite hard during the negotiation process of the Charter to ensure that regional organizations are given a prominent place in the Charter (Arend 1996). The result is Chapter VIII of the Charter stating:

“Nothing in the present Charter the existence of regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as are

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2 See Griep (2012: 60-66) for an overview.
3 However, regional organizations were already mentioned as important pillars of global security in article 21 of the Statute of the League of Nations of 1919: “Nothing in this Covenant shall be deemed to affect the validity of international engagements, such as treaties of arbitration or regional understandings like the Monroe doctrine, for securing the maintenance of peace.” League of Nations (1919) The Covenant of the League of Nations (Including Amendments adopted to December, 1924), Paris.
appropriate for regional action, provided that such arrangements or agencies and their activities are consistent with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations.” (United Nations 1945: Chap VIII, Art 52, 1) Accordingly, regional organizations actively contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security. They constitute the regional pillars of security. How is the relationship between regional organizations and the UN designed?

Chapter VIII of the UN Charter makes a useful distinction here between the peaceful resolution of conflicts and peace enforcement actions.

The realm of the *peaceful resolution of conflicts* is regulated in Art 52 of the UN Charter (UNC), which de facto establishes a priority role of regional organizations over the UNSC, thereby making the UNSC subsidiary to regional organizations. This strong role of RO’s is justified by the fact that the mandate of regional organizations is specifically designed to relieve the UNSC in the area of security governance (Kühne 1998).

States that are members of regional organizations even have a specific obligation to seek a peaceful resolution within the regional organization first, and to do so to a greater extent compared to other states that are not members of an RO, before they turn to other actors. Hence, being a member of a regional organization is not only a cheap signal, it constraints the available means of conflict resolution for its member states, as they have to resort to a regional organizations first, and need to exhaust all means of conflict resolution there, before they can turn to the UNSC (Kühne 1998: 58). To accomplish their goals, the UNC gives regional organizations considerably leeway in choosing those measures they deem appropriate – with the important exception of peace enforcement measures.

Regional organizations can therefore in principle use all measures that are generally referred to as peace maintaining or peacekeeping measures. These are generally defined as measures that are undertaken with the prior consent of affected parties. “The prior consent of affected parties is the decisive characteristic of peacekeeping measures.” (Kühne 1998: 90, own translation). It is precisely the absence of the consent of affected parties that turns a peacekeeping measure into a coercive one and characterizes peace enforcement measures.

The UNSC assumes a subsidiary role to regional organizations conditional that regional organizations have the capability and willingness to solve conflicts by themselves, and that the conflict does not escalate into a threat to international peace and security.
Moreover, the UNSC has the right to intervene in such efforts any time to establish whether a conflict constitutes a potential threat to international peace and stability and if a regional organization proves unsuccessful in dealing with a conflict (UNC, Chap VI, Art 36 (1)). It can even do so, if not all regional efforts to solve a conflict have been exhausted, yet (Chap VI, Art 33). The UNSC can intervene and assume responsibility for the management of a conflict only if a regional conflict resolution becomes unlikely.

This distribution of authority is different in the case of peace enforcement actions, which are generally measures against the will of a state or affected parties. In this case, Chapter VIII UN Charter, Article 53 (1) provides a subsidiary role of regional organizations vis-à-vis the UNSC, which are obliged to seek a specific mandate of the UNSC if they want to go beyond measures for the peaceful resolution of conflicts. This regulation not only constrains regional organizations, it also empowers them as they can resort to enforcement measures, provided that they have succeeded to get a UNSC mandate (Kühne 1998: 72). Thus, in contrast to measures for the peaceful resolution of conflicts (Article 52), Article 53 of the UN Charter clearly establishes a constitutional superiority of the UN over regional bodies. A key function of Article 53 (1) thereby is to prohibit regional organizations from undertaking autonomous peace enforcement actions (Griep 2012: 65).

By the same token, regional peace enforcement actions are dependent on a potential veto by the members of the UNSC and can be blocked by states that are not part of the region (Griep 2012: 65), as can be seen in the case of Syria after 2011. The heart of the collective security system is therefore prior UNSC authorization. According to Simma, it is “universally accepted that a Security Council authorization granted under chapter VII establishes a sufficient basis for the legality of the use of armed force employed in conformity with the respective Council Resolution(s). Conversely, any threat or use of force that is neither justified as self-defense against an armed attack nor authorized by the Security council must be regarded as a violation of the UN Charter.” (Simma 1999: 2)

Article 2(4) of the United Nations commits all member states to „refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state“. This prohibition is of a comprehensive nature. „Hence, universal ius cogens, like the prohibition embodied in Article 2(4), cannot be contracted out of at the regional level.“ (Simma 1999: 4) The Charter prohibition of the threat or use of armed force is binding on states both individually and as members of international organizations, be they regional or international, as well as on those organizations themselves.
The UN Charter does not explicitly regulate the timing of authorization of peace enforcement measures by the by the UNSC. Hence, whether or not such an authorization needs to take place before or afterwards a regional organization undertakes peace enforcement measures is controversial from an international legal perspective.

The UNC has principally designed the relationship between ROs and the UNSC in a way that ROs cannot circumvent the UNSC in cases of peace enforcement. Thus, the UNSC assumes authority no matter whether the regional organizations explicitly acknowledge the authority of the UNSC and independently of whether they define themselves as regional organization or not. Any regional agreement that acts like the UNSC and assumes similar functions is hence a regional organization according to Chapter VIII UNC. An additional rule applies: for all measures pertaining to the peaceful resolution of conflicts, the activities of regional organizations are limited to their region, i.e. their members. As soon as they wish to assume responsibility outside their region, they again require a mandate of the UNSC, even in the case of measures for the peaceful resolution of conflicts. These regulations are principally intended to ensure that a regional organization indeed assumes a role as a pillar of global security and that it does not act outside its ambit.

Some of the literature on regional organizations frequently refers to peacekeeping efforts indiscriminately (to refer to both peacekeeping and peace enforcement efforts) or claims that the distinction is not clear according to the UNC. We believe that this is not true. The UNC clearly delineates what regional organizations and their member states are supposed to do. At the same time, we do not mean to say that regional organizations comply with the UNC all of them time or most of the time. In fact, the interesting empirical question is indeed whether regional organizations comply at all with the UNC. But in order to evaluate compliance, it is necessary to have a clear set of standards against which interventions by ROs can be measured.

In sum, the treaty relationship described above indicates a clear distribution of responsibility, which is useful for conceptual purposes. Therefore, the different missions of the UN and ROs are defined as follows.

*Peace enforcement missions (ENFO)* are defined here as missions that do not have the prior consent of affected state parties. Peace enforcement measures thus generally require a mandate of the UNSC.
Peacekeeping missions (*KEEP*) are defined as missions with the prior consent of affected parties that aim to mediate between two or more conflicting parties, and may include the deployment of military personnel. These can be measures to monitor a peace or ceasefire agreement between two conflict parties and they frequently involve the use of force to guarantee the integrity of the mission (such as use of arms for self-defense purposes).

Observation missions (*OBSR*) are defined as missions having the prior consensus of affected parties that aim to mediate between two or more conflicting parties, usually to monitor a truce or peace agreement but do not involve armed personnel.

Other missions (*OTHER*) refer to training missions with the consent of affected parties, political missions or humanitarian missions that primarily involve the building up of institutional capacities for elections, etc.

Table 1: Definition of intervention categories

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Consent of affected party/parties</th>
<th>Conflict mediation</th>
<th>Use of military force</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ENFO No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KEEP Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Limited: self-defense / integrity of mission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OBSR Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OTHER Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

To evaluate whether RO’s indeed seek a mandate of the UNSC and to categorize interventions further, it is useful to further distinguish between who mandates an intervention and who implements it. In principle, the UN, ROs or individual states can act as mandating authorities and all three agents can act as implementing agents. However, since geographical subsidiary bodies cannot delegate to bodies higher in the hierarchy, it is unlikely – but not impossible – that we will see cases of delegation from ROs or ISs to either regional organizations or the UN (although this has been attempted once). Therefore, a diagonal appears in those cells.

This leads to the following combination of authorizing and implementing bodies, which we refer to in the dataset as ‘intervention types’ (*inttype*):

Table 2: Types of intervention

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Implementing Body</th>
<th>UN</th>
<th>RO</th>
<th>IS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mandating Agent</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Because peace enforcement missions legally require a Chapter VII mandate, peace enforcement missions that do not have the consent of the government (and a Chapter VII mandate) are not considered legal from the perspective of international law.

One could thus extend the table to combine intervention types and intervention categories and evaluate them according to their legality. The following table therefore also includes information on the types of missions that each of the combination of actors can undertake according to international law.

Table 3: Definition of intervention categories and legally possible types of interventions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Consent of affected party</th>
<th>Conflict mediation</th>
<th>Use of military force</th>
<th>Possible types of intervention</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ENFO</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Only UN-VII type</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KEEP</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Limited: self-defense / defense of the mandate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OBSR</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OTHER</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The next sections provide an activity profile of regional organizations a) regarding intervention patterns across regions b) regarding the type of interventions after 1990, and c) regarding the four intervention categories over time.

FREQUENCY OF INTERVENTION CATEGORIES OVER TIME
The data shows interesting variation of interventions by either the UN, regional organizations or individual and groups of states over time (see figures 1 and 2, annex). The number of interventions by single or individual states, be it either in the form of self-mandated interventions (ISIS) or mandated by regional organizations (ROIS) has substantially declined. Especially interventions by single states or Ad-Hoc-Coalitions constituted a relatively large share of overall interventions before 1990. Although the number of interventions has substantially increased after 1990, the corresponding number of ISIS and ROIS interventions has decreased. In fact, no interventions have been delegated to individual states by ROs, so that the category of ROIS interventions disappears after 1990. The UN, however, has mandated a substantial amount of individual state interventions. In terms of percentage
changes, almost 30 percent of all interventions have been implemented by individual or ad-hoc coalitions of states before 1990. After 1990, this number gets halved (14 percent). And whereas regional organizations account for 23 percent of all interventions before 1990 (ROIS, RORO), after 1990 they account for 44 percent of all interventions, thereby doubling the number of interventions. In contrast, the number of UN led interventions remains roughly the same (before 1990: 48 %; after 1990: 42%). This confirms Bellamy and William’s (2005) finding that individual states remain important actors for such interventions.

If we focus on the distribution of intervention types (ENFO, KEEP, OBSR, OTHER) by category (UN, RO, IS) another development becomes evident: The overwhelming majority of all interventions are indeed legal. Since 1990, only four peace enforcement operations have taken place, which did not have either a UN-mandate or the consent of the affected state. These were NATO’s intervention in Kosovo (1999), the ECOWAS intervention in Liberia (1999), the intervention of an Ad-Hoc-Coalition consisting of South Africa and Botswana in Lesotho (1999) and the AU intervention in the Comoros in 2008, which lacked the consent of the government but also did not have a UNSC mandate. Almost one third of all peace enforcement operations have been UN-mandated but RO-implemented peace enforcement operations. However, the UN still figures quite prominently in the category of peacekeeping, which is the traditional realm of activity by regional organizations. This could be a matter of the higher capacity of UN operations relative to ROs. It might suggest, however, that there is a demand for the development of capacity on a regional level.

Table 4: Interventions by Type and Category

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Inttype</th>
<th>ISIS</th>
<th>RORO</th>
<th>UNIS</th>
<th>UNRO</th>
<th>UNUN</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ENFO</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KEEP</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OBSR</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OTHER</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>162</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In sum, what is observable is a much higher activity of regional organizations as compared to individual states and the UN after 1990. Hence, there is a regionalization trend. Yet, this trend does not necessarily indicate a challenge of the collective security system of the UN Charter. This would be indicated if regional organizations would conduct non-mandated military interventions.
**Changes in the Pattern of Interventions by Types**

A number of changes in the categories of interventions can be observed as well. First, interventions before 1990 are largely restricted to enforcement, peacekeeping and monitoring missions. After 1990, a new category emerges that of „other“ interventions. This category involves training missions, capacity building and police missions, which were not part of the toolbox of RO’s before 1990.

Second, the number of interventions per category changes as well, with much more enforcement missions after 1990. In terms of absolute number, these increase by six times, even if in terms of frequency in percent, this amounts just to a doubling of the share relative to all missions. The number of peacekeeping missions increases from 18 before 1990 to 48 after 1990, indicating a de facto decrease of missions from 38 percent before 1990 to 30 percent after 1990.

The number of observer missions also decreases substantially. Whereas half of all missions before 1990 were observer missions, they constitute only one fourth of all missions after 1990. This may indicate that there has been a shift in two directions. From observer and peacekeeping to enforcement and „other“ missions. In other words, there appears to be an upward scaling and downscaling of missions after 1990. On the other hand, it might just indicate a shift of observer missions to other missions: Observer and other missions after 1990 together account for 50 per cent of all missions. Before 1990, observer missions accounted for 50 per cent of all missions.

Table 5: Types of interventions after 1990

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Intervention Type</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ENFO</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>10.64</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>19.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KEEP</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>38.30</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>29.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OBSR</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>51.06</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>27.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OTHER</td>
<td>38</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>23.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>47</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
<td><strong>162</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Figure 1: Categories of Interventions as percentage of all interventions (Left: 1945-1989; right: 1990-2011)*
INTERVENTION PATTERNS BY REGIONS

Based on this categorization, the intervention patterns show some interesting regional variation. This variation does not come to a surprise by area specialists, but it is nevertheless interesting in comparative perspective.

In terms of the numbers of interventions, Southern of Sahara Africa (SSA) counts by far the largest number of interventions. More than half of all interventions (75 of 162) after 1990 occurred in this region. The region with the second largest numbers of interventions is Europe, accounting for 29 out of 162 interventions. The Middle East and North Africa (MENA), Latin America and Southeast Asia follow these two regions and account for 13, 12 and 10 interventions respectively. Central and South Asia, as well as Eurasia and the Pacific account for less than 10 interventions each.

Table 6: Distribution of intervention types in all categories over regions (after 1990)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Inttype</th>
<th>CSA</th>
<th>EUR</th>
<th>EURA</th>
<th>LAC</th>
<th>MENA</th>
<th>PAC</th>
<th>SEA</th>
<th>SSA</th>
<th>Total</th>
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<td>17</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>16</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>48</td>
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<tr>
<td>OBSR</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>45</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>OTHER</td>
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<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>Total</td>
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<td>29</td>
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<td>12</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>162</td>
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</table>

In the case of Africa, the types of interventions are distributed fairly evenly, with enforcement, peacekeeping, observer and other missions each accounting for approximately a fourth of all interventions. Also, if the type of intervention is considered, Europe fairly matches the number of peacekeeping operations of SSA. However, many of these interventions have actually occurred in Africa.
The following table 5 provides an overview of the regional distribution of Ad-Hoc, RO and UN interventions. Such a comparison is quite interesting for area specialists wanting to know how ‘their’ region fares regarding military interventions. Heldt and Wallensteen’s observation is relevant here, that there is „something about some regions that makes them more or less likely to allow/require the UN to establish peacekeeping operations.“ (Heldt and Wallensteen 2006: 21)

Table 7: Distribution of intervening agents over regions (after 1990), category of peacekeeping missions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agent</th>
<th>EUR</th>
<th>EURA</th>
<th>LAC</th>
<th>MENA</th>
<th>PAC</th>
<th>SEA</th>
<th>SSA</th>
<th>Total</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>RO</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>9</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>22</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The intervening organizations are: Europe: CIS, EU, NATO; Eurasia: CIS; MENA: GCC; SSA: AU, CEMAC, ECOWAS, EU, IGAD

Only two regions show all categories of interventions, i.e. Africa and Europe. In Eurasia and the MENA regions, all peacekeeping missions are regional missions. In Latin America and Southeast Asia, by contrast, all peacekeeping missions are either UN missions or missions conducted by Ad-Hoc-Coalitions. Hence, the ‘regional’ is absent in Latin America as well as Southeast Asia, at least if it comes to peacekeeping missions.

This pattern becomes more pronounced as we shift to peace enforcement missions. Now, Eurasia disappears from the landscape altogether. The CIS has a monopoly over peace operations including peacekeeping, but it does not go beyond peacekeeping. Conversely, in Europe, NATO has effectively monopolized peace enforcement missions. No other actor engages in them in this region. In Latin America and Southeast Asia, the ‘regional’ is again absent, all peace enforcement missions are conducted by either the UN or Ad-Hoc-Coalitions.

Especially from a comparative perspective, it would be highly interesting to explain these patterns. IR theories offer a range of possible explanations – starting from the absence/presence of a regional hegemon to power differentials within the region or dominant regional ideas. This is not a focus of this paper at the moment, however.
Table 8: Distribution of intervening agents over regions (after 1990), category of peace enforcement missions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agent</th>
<th>CSA</th>
<th>EUR</th>
<th>LAC</th>
<th>MENA</th>
<th>SEA</th>
<th>SSA</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ad-Hoc Coalition</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RO</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The implementing organizations are: Central and South Asia: NATO; Europe: NATO, MENA: NATO; SSA: AU, ECOWAS, EU

These patterns are completely in line with the mandates of the regional organizations: OAS and ASEAN both do not have a peacekeeping mandate. Only the regional organizations in Africa have a peacekeeping and peace enforcement mandate. What is interesting here is that Eurasia and Southeast Asia are both regions that highly regard non-intervention principles and the sovereignty of their member states. Yet, the intervention patterns are quite different. In Eurasia, we find regional peacekeeping missions conducted by the CIS, whereas these are absent in Southeast Asia.

If we focus on the category of peace enforcement missions, many of the regional organizations, which assume some role in the category of peacekeeping, disappear. This is the case for CEMAC and IGAD in Africa, and for the Gulf Cooperation Council in MENA. In Europe, only NATO ‘survives’ as implementing agent.

Interestingly, the EU now appears as a stronger implementing agent for peace enforcement in SSA, whereas NATO appears as implementing agent in Central and South Asia (Afghanistan) and MENA. Eurasia disappears from the landscape of peace enforcement missions. In the cases of NATO and the EU these interventions have occurred as part of UN mandated peace enforcement. Therefore, the EU and NATO in the case of peace enforcement do not appear to act as regional organizations but as sub-contractors for the UN. Arguably, these missions have also occurred in regions in which NATO and the EU have interests.

Two insights that might be gained from the distribution of intervention categories and the types of actors is the relevance of capacity and of willingness. Some regional organizations have developed a capacity to conduct peace enforcement and peacekeeping missions. Where they have done so, they provide a thorough match for UN activities. This becomes apparent in the case of Africa, where more than 50% of all peace enforcement actions have been implemented by regional organizations. Some regional organizations appear to have the
capacity to engage in peace enforcement missions, but they lack the mandate to do so. This appears to be the case in Eurasia. And some regions neither have the willingness nor the capacity to set up a regional peacekeeping capacity. In this regard, Southeast Asia is highly instructive. Here, a peacekeeping capacity was discussed in 2004 when the ASEAN Charter was deliberated (Morada 2009). And after the cyclone Nargis that hit Myanmar in 2008, the international community discussed an international intervention in Myanmar given the hesitancy of the then military government to accept international support for the suffering population (Haacke 2009). Yet, overall responses to R2P – which heavily draws on the above mentioned framework for the interaction between ROs and the UN – has received mixed responses in Southeast Asia (Caballero-Anthony and Chng 2009), making it very unlikely – in the absence of recurring transnational conflicts – that ASEAN will set up its own peacekeeping force. The history of intervention in Southeast Asia rather suggests a path of UN-led peacekeeping.

CONCLUSION
This paper has shed light on the patterns of interventions of peacekeeping and peace enforcement missions by the UN and RO, and their regional variation. It has been able to confirm some of the patterns that have been identified by the qualitative and quantitative literature before: A major trend is the ‘regionalization’ or military interventions. Regional interventions have remarkably increased since 1990 and the importance of interventions by individual states has decreased to the advantage of interventions by regional organizations. However, not all regions have been equally influenced by this trend. Latin America and Southeast Asia have been largely unaffected by the trend, whereas other regions have actually monopolized interventions, most importantly Eurasia, but also Europe. Regional patterns show some interesting variations that need explanation.

Finally, the paper has demonstrated that regional organizations, in fact, adhere to the provisions of the UN Charter. The number of non-mandated peace enforcement missions is very small, most interventions are mandated or – in the case of peacekeeping – do not require a mandate. The preliminary data presented here allows for a further investigation of important questions relating to peace operations conducted by either the UN, ROs or individual states, as well as the relationship between the UN and ROs. An obvious question is, for example, why some regional organizations develop a mandate for peacekeeping or even enforcement actions and others not. What does the shift of interventions from individual states to ROs imply for ROs? These and other questions require further improving the data and the
establishment of systematic correlations between, for example, the number and types of conflicts and intervention categories.

REFERENCES


