**Historical Reconciliation with Reciprocal Non-domination: A Forward-looking Approach to Inherited Responsibility in the North East Asia**

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**Prologue**

On 31 January 2013, Japanese Premier Shinzo Abe declared in the Lower House that he would refrain from carrying out his long-standing plan to revise the 1993 statement of Chief Cabinet Secretary Yohei Kono which acknowledged that the Japanese military had been directly or indirectly involved in the mobilization of the ‘comfort women’ before and during World War II. Nevertheless, Yohei Kono had good reason to say – as he did in an interview to Associated Press on 29 June 2013 – that Abe was actively trying to revise not only his 1993 statement but also the 1995 statement of Premier Tomiich Murayama which officially apologized for Japan’s wartime aggression and her colonial atrocities. Indeed, it has become increasingly obvious that Abe’s long-standing desire to revise these statements is intertwined with his plan to reshape Japan as a strong economic and military power in Northeast Asia, and his recent steps toward amending Japan’s pacifist constitution. Consequently, many observers anticipate that Abe will eventually take measures to revise these self-critical statements, rather than use them as a basis for achieving historical reconciliation with China, South Korea, and Japan’s other neighbors.

Alarmed by this trend, both China and South Korea have lashed out at Abe’s endeavors to discard the earlier official apologies for Japan’s wartime atrocities. On 15 August 2013, at the ceremony of National Liberation Day, South Korea’s President Park Geun-hye publicly denounced Abe and his cabinet members for downplaying Japan’s wartime atrocities, urging Japanese politicians to acknowledge Japan’s responsibility for the ‘comfort women’ case and other historical wrongdoings. Since then, she has further intensified her criticism of the Japanese government. For instance, on September 30th, during her meeting with the U.S. Secretary of Defense, she highlighted the lack of trust between Japan and South Korea, and mentioned: “Japanese politicians continue to insult the comfort women, rather than to apologize to them” (Donga daily, 1 October 2013). Since September 2012, when Japan nationalized the Senkaku (Diaoyu) Islands, Chinese President Xi Jinping has taken a similar stance against Abe and his cabinet. He purportedly refused to engage in high-level talks with Japan, and when he met Abe at the G-20 summit in September 2013, he called upon Japan to “handle appropriately the disputes over the Diaoyu Islands and historical wrongdoings” (Xinhua News, 6 September 2013).
Abe’s ‘technical’ negation of Japan’s responsibility for historical wrongdoings certainly hinders the process of ‘thick’ reconciliation in Northeast Asia, which should be based on mutual trust in a reflective and deliberative engagement in history (Crocker 1999:60-61). Notably, Abe attempted to redefine ‘coercion’ with regard to the forceful mobilization of comfort women by claiming that “no documentation exists that directly indicates the so-called coercive recruitment by the military or the authorities” (Asahi Shimbun, 1 February 2013). The statement he made in the Upper House over the question of ‘aggression’ (8 May 2013) was another exercise in semantic ambiguity, and as such, it triggered new disputes between Japan and the neighboring countries (Asahi Shimbun, 9 May 2013). Therefore, it appears likely that the conception with which Abe intends to replace the Murayama statement will stimulate yet a retrograde dispute over Japan’s responsibility for historical wrongdoings, rather than a forward-looking process of historical reconciliation.

On the basis of these observations, this paper presents ‘reciprocal non-domination’ as a regulative principle for accomplishing a forward-looking historical reconciliation in Northeast Asia. Specifically, the paper intends to achieve the following aims: First, by analyzing the official apologies made by Kono and Murayama in the context of inherited responsibility, I lay out briefly which deficiencies of their efforts were inimical to the objective of accomplishing a ‘thick’ reconciliation between Japan and South Korea. Second, by juxtaposing the specific implications of ‘shame’ in Northeast Asian cultures with the psyche of victimhood underneath the Japanese nationalist backlash against external demands for an official apology, I argue that those modes of rectification which are preoccupied with a nationalistic shaming or a power-based realpolitik can actually harm the mutual trust that might otherwise enable a broader population to accomplish a ‘thick’ reconciliation in Northeast Asia. Third, by elaborating ‘reciprocal non-domination’ as a future-centered regulative principle that encourages both victims and wrongdoers to take a non-ethnocentric deliberation about historical reconciliation, I suggest a bilateral or multilateral compact with reciprocal non-domination as a viable solution for the forward-looking realization of thick reconciliation between the Northeast Asian countries.

**Japan’s Official Statements of Apology Reconsidered**

Of Japan’s official apologies for its colonial atrocities and wartime injustices, the two most important ones were the Kono statement (1993) and the Murayama statement (1995). While the latter was more comprehensive, the former has been appreciated more widely in the neighboring countries, especially China and South Korea. It is not because the former showed how to convert its words of apology into policy measures in specific. Actually, neither the first nor the second statement was followed by concrete government measures. Rather it is because of the clarity and openness of the Kono statement about ‘comfort women’ which can stand in a sharp contrast with Abe’s semantic ambiguity over ‘coercion’
and ‘aggression.’ The Kono statement used very specific terms, such as ‘coercion’ and ‘the involvement of military authorities,’ with which the neighboring countries can directly challenge Abe’s technical denials. At the very least, the Kono statement has been regarded by the neighboring countries as a good instrument to point out what has been wrong with Abe’s conservative stance on Japan’s historical responsibility.

However, in view of ‘inherited responsibility,’ the neighboring countries should reconsider the instrumentality of the Kono statement in maintaining Japan’s legal liability for colonial atrocities and wartime injustices. What I mean by ‘inherited responsibility’ here is that “the descendants of perpetrators bear some responsibility for a past harm and should contribute to its remedy” (Kwak & Nobles 2013, 4). In this context, the two dimensions of intergenerational responsibility should be examined in the first place when we apply it to rectifying a specific historical injustice in the past. The first dimension is the question of the ‘agent’ bearing the inherited responsibility for historical injustices, and the second dimension is the question of ‘scope’ of recompense with which the victims can be rehabilitated (Kwak 2010). Given these two dimensions, it is not surprising that despite its apparently factual admission in the Kono statement (see below), the Japanese Government continues to reject legal liability for the comfort women case.

(a) The then Japanese military was, directly or indirectly, involved in the establishment and management of the comfort stations and the transfer of comfort women.
(b) As actions have been brought to court in Japan and interests have been shown in this issue outside Japan, the Government of Japan shall continue to pay full attention to this matter, including private researched related thereto.

As we can see from (a), the Kono statement designates the Japanese military as the perpetrator bearing legal liability for the comfort women case. Therefore, on its surface, it appears to be a proper acknowledgement of Japan’s responsibility for its historical injustices. However, the concept of the ‘state’ does not fully clarify the continuation of responsibility from the past to the present and into the future. Thus the Kono statement leaves a room for the Japanese government to claim that there is no shared or continued identity between the imperial state responsible for the historical injustices and the current Japanese government. Even if the Japanese government acknowledges its responsibility, it may assert that Japan’s responsibility was already fulfilled through the international treaties, such as the 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty and the 1965 Treaty on Basic Relations between Japan and the Republic of Korea. Thus, if we address the intergenerational responsibility for the comfort women in this way, not only the Japanese government but also Japanese citizens can be expected to disregard this issue. In this context, one may interpret that what (b) signifies is not a legal or political obligation to be held by the Japanese government but a rhetorical excuse to justify the government’s role as a by-stander or a helper in the law-suits.
In contrast, the Murayama statement appears to be more appropriate to define Japan’s legal or political responsibility for historical injustices. As analyzed by Kazuhiko Togo (2013), the Murayama statement seems to take the inherited responsibility for historical injustices with sincerity by designating ‘nation’ as well as ‘state’ as the agent who should take Japan’s responsibility for colonial and historical atrocities. However, it is less clear how we should interpret ‘nation’ (國民) as an actor to encompass not only government officials but also ordinary citizens.

(a) Our task is to convey to younger generations(若い世代) the horrors of war, so that we(私たち) never repeat the errors in our history.

(b) Guided by this conviction, the government(政府は) has launched the Peace, Friendship and Exchange Initiative, which consists of two parts promoting: support for historical research into relations in the modern era between Japan and the neighboring countries of Asia and elsewhere; and rapid expansion of exchanges with those countries. Furthermore, I(私は) will continue in all sincerity to do my utmost in efforts being made on the issues arisen from the war, in order to further strengthen the relations of trust between Japan and those countries.³

If ‘nation’ as a collective commonality refers to “all who, in some way or other, participated in Japan’s acts during the period of colonial rule and aggression” (Togo 2013, 5), it should have clearly mentioned ‘nation’ (國民) or ‘citizen’ (市民) as an actor bearing the inherited responsibility for historical injustices. But as we can see from (a), when it precisely mentions the inherited responsibility for colonial and wartime atrocities, the statement does not signify ‘nation’ or ‘citizen’. Instead, the statement uses the term of ‘we,’ whereby it still leaves the question of the agent unspecified. Furthermore, we can hardly figure out who is responsible for managing follow-up policy measures in the future. As we can see from (b), the Murayama statement refers to ‘the cabinet government’ as an actor, and this cannot guarantee an irrevocable resolution in the parliamentary political system. It further downgrades the political significance by using the personal pronoun ‘I,’ and thereby making its apology arguably personal.

Nevertheless, the Murayama statement has its own merits to be reconsidered in the context of inherited responsibility. Firstly, the statement clarifies that Japan’s responsibility for historical injustices before and during World War II should be inherited by the next generation. In this respect, it delivers a forward-looking apology for historical injustices, whereby we can take account of ‘Japan’ in the context of inherited responsibility whose responsible actor should continue to exist regardless of the passage of time. Secondly, the Murayama statement confirms the inherited responsibility as a collective responsibility. The main objection to the idea of inherited responsibility is based on the liberal concern that the perpetrators’ children should be able to choose whether or not to assume responsibility for historical wrongdoings.⁴ At this juncture, the Murayama statement helps us to conceive that the very existence of advantages and disadvantages that are driven by historical injustices can constitute a sufficient reason to oblige every individual in a political community to
redress the losses of the victimized party. Finally, despite its ambiguity, the Murayama statement used the term ‘nation’ (國民) rather than ‘nation’ (民族), and thus it provides us with a concept of political entity which can be used interchangeably with ‘citizen.’ Commonality imagined by nation (民族) may provide us with a rationale for inherited responsibility (cf. Miller 1995, 72-73), but the fulfillment of restorative justice can be made feasible through actual politics, rather than through imaginative ties. Since the interchangeability of ‘nation’ with ‘citizen’ is also utterly possible in the Northeast Asian countries, we can start from the assumption that ‘national duty’ (國民義務) in the statement can be construed as ‘civic’ responsibility with which citizens may assume inherited responsibility without suppressing their individual dignity.

Politics of ‘Shame’ versus Politics of ‘Realism’

Before getting into the conception of reciprocal non-domination, we need to examine the problems of ‘national’ responsibility whose appropriate actor bearing inherited responsibility is ‘nation’ (民族) in the Northeast Asian countries. As we can see from Abe’s complaint that “the Kono statement put dishonor on the back of Japan” (Asahi Shimbun 1 February 2013), there is a tendency in the Northeast Asian countries to associate the question of historical injustice with national pride and national shame. Specifically, the conservative right in Japan stresses that its wartime atrocities should not be singled out for worldwide criticism, because these atrocities, including the operation of comfort stations, were inevitable during the war (Ikuhiko 2007, 14-18). Such feelings of ‘victimization’ are reinforced whenever the neighboring countries criticize Japan or demand an official apology (Shin et al. 2007, 1-14). South Korea is a good example in this regard. Since the feminine gender has frequently been depicted in the ‘comfort women’ discourse as the property of the nation, demand for a ‘perfect’ apology has been interpreted as the process of restoring national pride and lost chastity (Herr 2013; Soh 2007, 27-30; Yang 1998). In this context, the advocacy of ‘national’ responsibility over historical injustices can be degenerated into a ‘nationalist’ movement which intends to give more priority to the restitution of national pride than to the restitution of the victim’s human dignity.

There are two epistemological dispositions which reside deeply in the psyche of victimhood underneath the dangers of appealing to national responsibility for historical injustices in Northeast Asian countries. One is the politics of shame, while the other is the politics of realism. The former has been used by the neighboring countries in terms of restorative justice, while the latter has produced profound effects on the formation of “conservative right” movement in Japan. More precisely, the former is relevant to the continuing demand of a ‘fully satisfactory’ apology or contrition which is being made by the victims and their helpers in the neighboring countries, whereas the latter refers to the justification of historical wrongdoings which has been an element of the Japanese nationalist backlash against the politics of apology. Despite differences in their origins and directions, these epistemological
dispositions are similar to one another in the sense that they aggravate, rather than alleviate, tensions between Japan and its neighbors.

Certainly, in the context of inherited responsibility, the politics of shame is more appropriate than the retributivist system of criminal punishment that is based on the principle of *jus talionis* (the damage must be returned, in both kind and degree, upon the offender). First, compared to the retributive view whose mode of restorative reparation is based on individual atonement, the politics of shame is more affordable to the idea of inherited responsibility, which endorses a collective responsibility. Actually, as we can see from the statement that Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao’s made during his official visit to Japan (*Asahi Shimbun* 21 April 2007), the neighboring countries presuppose the need for apology or contrition in a holistic sense for achieving historical reconciliation between Japan and her neighboring countries. In this respect, the retributive view, according to which the actor bearing historical responsibility are likely restricted to a relatively small number of perpetrators, cannot facilitate a thick reconciliation between Japan and the neighboring countries. Secondly, the politics of shame is better suited for the current era of human rights which has strengthened demands for ‘moral’ contrition on historical injustices. The development of an international human rights regime enhances moral responsibility in rectifying historical injustices, whereby Japan is pressured by the neighboring countries to emulate the German mode of reconciliation which was accompanied with the sincere acts of moral penitence (Berger 2008). Thus, the politics of shame can receive more appreciation from the neighboring countries than the retributivist view which harbors a suspicion over the re-educative effect of moral remorse.

One of the main objections to the politics of shame is related to the Japanese nationalist backlash against official apologies. Actually, the political risks of applying the politics of shame to Japan are really high. Any act of official apology or moral contrition can trigger a nationalist backlash in Japan, and thus it can ultimately undermine popular support not only for that specific Japanese government but also for the historical reconciliation process itself. This line of practical reasoning has been frequently observed in Abe’s technical denial of ‘coercion’ in mobilizing the comfort women. For instance, during the LDP presidential election campaign, Abe declared that he felt intense ‘humiliation’ because of the Kono statement:

The Kono statement put dishonor on the back of Japan by indicating that the military stormed into houses, kidnapped women, and turned them into comfort women (*Asahi Shimbun* 1 Feb. 2013, emphasis added).

That is, Abe understands Japan’s responsibility for historical wrongdoings along the line with the sense of shame, which involves being negatively evaluated by oneself. On the one hand, his configuration of ‘dishonor’ shows that he has a moral standard with which he cannot justify all what Japan did before and during World War II. On the other hand, his
abhorrence of the Kono statement conveys the fact that he does avoid finding a moral fault from the historical injustices done by the previous generations. Such feelings of ‘dishonor’ or ‘shame’ are often expressed in the propaganda of conservative nationalists who reacted to the Kono statement with collective as well as individual indignation (Togo 2010). Shortly put, an important task of the politics of shame faces is to evade a possible nationalist backlash, for otherwise it cannot be a useful instrument for restorative justice and historical reconciliation in Northeast Asia.

In a similar vein, Jeniffer Lind argues that official apology or moral contrition need not be the prerequisite for historical reconciliation in the Northeast Asia. Taking traditional realism back into discussion, she claims that the effects of apologies which can be different in accordance with culture and politics have been exaggerated too much without systematic investigation (Lind 2008, 181-186). By the same token, she suggests later that since Japanese strategic environment after the Cold War is nothing to do with historical reconciliation, Japan does not have to snuggle into the politics of apology in the Northeast Asia (Lind 2009, 363). Likewise, having declared that the historical disputes between the Northeast Asian countries do not cause any serious economic and strategic loss, Victor Cha argues that although the act of apology is imperative for peaceful coexistence, historical reconciliation will be induced by “material imperatives for cooperation” (Cha 2003, 58-59).

What is missing in these realist analyses is a regulative principle with which reconciliation can proceed even if there is no strategic or material motivation for cooperation. As we can see from the territorial disputes between Japan and its neighbors, a reason that currently induces countries to cooperate with each other may become a catalyst for a serious dispute tomorrow. In other words, strategic cooperation driven by realist motivations is a precarious mode of reconciliation that cannot last for a long time. Actually, historical reconciliation requires a long process of persuasion (Bar-Tal & Bennink 2004). To make historical reconciliation feasible, not only political leaders but also citizens must change their beliefs, attitudes, and emotions about historical injustices. Without such changes, strategic suggestion for a peaceful resolution can implement only the law of jungle, according to which a state can gain control of reality only through power. Certainly, the politics of shame is unsatisfactory unless it is combined with a principle by which it can avoid triggering a nationalist backlash in Japan. However, without a regulative principle which steers material motivations for conflict toward a peaceful resolution, any initiation of various measures to establish cooperation in Northeast Asia cannot pave a way to a ‘thick’ reconciliation.

**Reciprocal Non-domination and Historical Reconciliation**

We shall face squarely the historical facts as described above, instead of evading them, and take them to heart as lessons of history. We hereby reiterated our firm determination never to repeat the same mistake by forever engraving such issues in our memories through the study and
teaching of history.7

As we can see above, the Kono statement adopted a forward-looking approach to historical reconciliation. That is a promise that Japan will not commit the same mistake again. While this stance was likely to induce the neighboring countries to pursue a similar policy of reconciliation, a unilateral apology for the historical injustices done by the previous generation evoked a nationalist backlash at home. This is why Abe resorted to such a technical remorse whose verbatim quote of the Murayama statement tones down its sincerity by using the term ‘regret’ (申し訳) instead of ‘apology’ (お詫び) (Risa 2009, 97-98). In other words, the likely problems of applying the politics of shame to Northeast Asian cultures illuminate the imperative strategies for promoting historical reconciliation.

Taking these factors into consideration, the republican theory of public shaming is attractive in various aspects. Amongst other things, it is less disapproval model in the sense that the principal aim of republican public shaming is not simply the reduction of wrongdoing but the actualization of non-domination.8 On the one hand, republican theorists are quick to spot what would be a fatal flaw in the utilitarian view of criminal punishment whose restorative justice aims at increasing overall utility by moral contrition (Braithwaite 2000; Pettit 1997b). For instance, Philip Pettit expresses concern about the probability that a utilitarian punishment allows the penal state to wield power arbitrarily over offenders, and thereby to run a risk of introducing another problem of domination (Pettit 1997b, 4). On the other hand, the republican theory of public shaming challenges the retributivist view of criminal punishment as well. In this regard, republican theorists emphasize the possibility of unequal and disproportional treatment of offenders, ushering all into a situation in which the retributivist conceptualization of crime is likely to demonize offenders (Pettit 1997a, 154). Therefore, they require a deliberation which is grounded in ‘forgiving,’ rather than ‘cruelty,’ and which is ‘deliberation,’ instead of ‘fear.’ At this juncture, the politics of shame can be addressed in a way of actualizing non-domination, whereby public shaming will be operated in terms of the deterrence of similar injustice through the reformation of the offender.

With respect to historical reconciliation, one more thing to be considered in the Northeast Asian context is that the republican theory of public shaming is too individualistic to encompass a situation in which shaming can be hardly differentiated from stigmatizing.9 It becomes salient when they explain sanction as a resource of regulation. For instance, Pettit says that “sanctions are based on self-interest, so that it is the person themselves and not someone else – even someone they care for – who is penalized or reward” (Pettit 1997a, 212). At this juncture, the republican theory of public shaming does not appear to be compatible with the fundamental fact that feelings of dishonor and impropriety can be experienced differently in different cultural contexts. Specifically, in Confucian cultures where the feelings of individual dignity depend on continued relationships with one’s group, a sense of shame can be felt not simply because of one’s own transgressions but also because of the acts of friends or other members of the group with which one’s reputation is interwoven. In an individualistic setting, compliance with social standards is perceived as something
motivated by self-interest or self-reflection in one's own eyes. In a collectivistic setting, however, compliance is guided by value introjection or bounded solidarity in which one's self-reflected motivations or incentives are extensively determined by group expectations. What the republican theory of publish shaming overlooks is the probability that the sense of shame is different in societies where group-oriented behavior is more highly valued than individuality.

Admittedly, in collectivistic cultures, the republican theory of public shaming should be employed together with a regulative principle which can guarantee the condition of non-domination where all have the capacity to check and monitor the arbitrary use of power. Republican theorists recognize the need for regulative principle which has been described with ‘constitutional provision’ (Petit 1997a, 95). However, it should extend further to consider the principle of reciprocal non-domination as a crucial means to guard public shaming against stigmatization and humiliation. Certainly, shame can be both of internal and external origin. But, as Bernard Williams points out in his analysis of the Homeric Greeks, shame(aidōs) requires the internalization of others whose evaluations the agent can respect (Williams 1993, 75-102). This is even more so in Northeast Asian cultures where shame is chiefly conveyed by one's disappointment of not having achieved social ideals. Therefore, the politics of shame in collectivistic cultures has a negative impact on the non-domination of those marginalized as well as that of the persons accused of crimes. In brief, in collectivistic cultures, public shaming may not achieve any other result but generating a feeling of having a stigma on one's face and having lost one's own dignity.

Given these, I argue that reciprocal non-domination must be a regulative principle for historical reconciliation with the politics of shame in the Northeast Asian context. Here, reciprocal non-domination is not the first principle from which the rest of criminal policies are derived. Instead, it should be a principle that serves two roles. First, it guides thinking in the ongoing deliberation in which both offenders and victims consider the requirements of justice in the case of particular historical injustices in specific contexts. Second, it shows the need for other principles to fill the content of a deliberation process. I agree with the idea that an official apology needs to be at the core of restorative justice regarding inherited responsibility for historical injustices. However, I wish to add reciprocal non-domination as a regulative principle that ensures non-domination to both the perpetrator as well as the victim in their deliberation, whereby a discursive control can facilitate reconciliation without nationalist backlash.

Concerning historical reconciliation, I expect that reciprocal non-domination, as a regulative principle, may serve three roles. Firstly, reciprocal non-domination functions as a condition under which to establish a discursive stance between individual states in conflict over particular offences. Here, reciprocal non-domination could function as guidelines which protect each party from being subjected to the arbitrary will of others, legitimize legal and
institutional interference, and simultaneously draw the limits of this interference. For instance, if a perpetrator was able to pressure a victim to forgive a historical injustice, this situation, seen through the lenses of reciprocal non-domination, would appear as a problem of inequality between powerful and weak actors.

Second, reciprocal non-domination not only creates a deliberative stance but also compels the participants to follow the outcome of discursive control. If we can simply reject decisions resulting from deliberation on the grounds that the involved parties will inevitably have dissimilar and contrary opinions, the deliberative stance itself becomes meaningless and useless. However, if the result of discursive control can also be regulated by reciprocal non-domination, the participants can insist on reciprocal non-domination as a minimal condition and an investigation standard during the discursive control. For instance, if an offender refuses to accept the decision that it must acknowledge his/her transgression and apologize to the victim, the third parties in the deliberation process will recognize that the offender violates the principle of reciprocal non-domination. In this sense, reciprocal non-domination can form, maintain, and modify a discursive control.

Finally, reciprocal non-domination should include the process of internalizing non-domination as a normative principle. The minimal standard to reach an agreement through deliberation is reciprocity, which entails the identification of one’s status with that of one’s counterpart. However, reciprocity cannot be achieved automatically; it is shaped through the experience of non-domination. In addition, reciprocity cannot be limited by the two-party relationship in which political leaders interact with one another. Reciprocity needs to include the relationship between political leaders and their citizens. Therefore, in the issue of historical reconciliation, the internalization of non-domination should replace that of social customs or populist demands. In this context, the republican theory of public shaming can shape a culture of forgiving which will bring about the reconciliation between the victims and the offenders on the one hand and between the offenders and the rest of citizens in a society on the other hand.

Epilogue

With the exponential increase of exchanges in population and materials, the post-Cold War period calls for the creation of a regional community that transcends the boundary of homogeneous nation-states. Various efforts to establish a European Union-like regional community are being invested in East Asia. Yet, the bilateral relations between the Northeast Asian countries also show tendencies to the contrary. Since 2008, there have been regular trilateral discussions between the South Korean, Chinese, and Japanese political leaders about the creation of a regional community, but the aforesaid suggestions to establish a Northeast Asian community were as often devices of the rhetorical and diplomatic game
played by the powers involved as proposals made in earnest.

The stagnation of historical reconciliation in Northeast Asia is one of the reasons of why the various diplomatic and scholarly efforts do not seem to be sufficient to meet the demands of constructing a regional identity. The opposing views and memories of historical injustices reproduce and aggravate national conflicts between the Northeast Asian countries, and nationalism constitutes a major obstacle in the process of achieving peaceful coexistence in the region. Certainly, there have been various endeavors to start a dialogue about textbooks and other historical issues, and to share different experiences, perceptions and knowledge. However, these attempts were not sufficiently fruitful to promote a culture of peace; instead, they often generated cynical pessimism. In this context, I suggest that the combination of historical reconciliation with reciprocal non-domination might be a viable approach to solve past and current problems, and to construct a shared understanding in the region. Hereby, I briefly summarize the policy implications which appear to be feasible.

**Official Apology:** The Japanese government should provide an official apology for historical injustices, including the comfort women case. From the perspective of the victims, such apologies often appear as mere lip-service. In contrast, Japanese citizens suffer from the external demands for apologies, and ask why they should continue to apologize for historical injustices that occurred long before. Nevertheless, an official apology is imperative in terms of civic responsibility with reciprocal non-domination, since it can open a public discourse on wrongdoings by the previous generation and help citizens take historical injustices more seriously. Even if we acknowledge that responsible citizens can call upon their governments to apologize to victims and compensate them, it would be equally important to realize that political leadership has a crucial role in persuading fellow citizens to actively participate in assuming Japan’s inherited responsibility.

**Forward-Looking Bilateral or Multilateral Compact:** Current civic endeavors for historical reconciliation in Northeast Asia are not so much forward-looking. Here the term ‘forward-looking’ signifies a future-oriented standpoint that aims simultaneously to restitute past victims and prevent the occurrence of inhuman actions in the future. As the case of the comfort women shows, unilateral advocacy of restitution or retribution by the neighboring countries is prone to elicit some form of a nationalist backlash in Japan. Under such circumstances, demands for an official apology and restitution can be helpless in the face of flimsy realism aimed at justifying war crimes. At this juncture, what we need is a regulative principle that can be equally applicable to the victim countries that committed analogous historical injustices (like the atrocities of South Korean troops during the Vietnam War). In other words, there is a desperate need for a forward-looking reciprocity through which the Northeast Asian countries can not only restitute past victims but also prevent future inhuman actions. In this context, I believe that the principle of reciprocal non-domination can help organize a bilateral or multilateral promise of the two sides to engage in a process
of reconciliation.

Multilateral and Non-ethnocentric Deliberation: The nationalist advocacies of retribution in South Korea and China have much in common with their Japanese counterparts in their efforts to find their philosophical and sociopolitical grounds, such as the law of the jungle. Even scholarly deliberations for historical reconciliation between the Northeast Asian countries have gradually gravitated toward the virulent antagonism spurred by strong nationalism. At this juncture, the multilateral and non-ethnocentric deliberation for historical reconciliation must be equipped with a safety device that secures a more open and democratic debate about irreconcilable understandings. In addition, we need the political persuasion of inherited responsibility that encourages citizens to participate voluntarily in a deliberative stance to resolve historical injustices. I believe that reciprocal non-domination can be a regulative principle that is conducive to regulate differences in opinions and power status between the victimized and perpetrating parties. Multilateral and non-ethnocentric deliberation coordinated by reciprocal non-domination would become a future-oriented and conflict-regulating mechanism through which present disputes over historical injustices would be resolved, and citizens not directly related to such conflicts would readily join in the deliberation process to prevent history from repeating itself.

References


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1 In this paper, regarding the intergenerational responsibility for historical injustice committed by previous generations, I follow the definition of David Miller (2007), whose conception of ‘national’ responsibility argues that historic injustices are perpetrated by peoples, rather than by states. Miller defines the intergenerational responsibility for historical wrongdoings as “inheriting” responsibility (Miller 2007, 135-161). Criticizing what Miller signifies by ‘national’ or ‘nation,’ I use the term ‘inherited,’ instead of ‘inheriting,’ for the following reasons. First, I intend to show that national identity is not the sole collective commonality with which the inheritance of intergenerational responsibility can be construed. Second, I wish to avoid granting a communitarian intuition in which having a collective identity automatically justifies an obligation for taking intergenerational responsibility for historical injustices.


3 Statement by Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama at [http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/press/pm/murayama/9508.html](http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/press/pm/murayama/9508.html);

4 According to liberals, a political agent is potentially free from the guilt of his/her father, and thus responsibility can be imposed only by personal choice or with consensus (Abdel-Nour 2003). This argument is question-begging, since it attributes responsibility wholly to individual choice. In other words, according to this argument, perpetrators or their children can choose whether to assume responsibility or not, whereas the victims or their descendants do not have any opportunity to escape from the sufferings caused by historical injustices. In contrast,
there is a communitarian argument, according to which inherited responsibility should be collectively taken, because human beings are socially interdependent and spiritually embedded in the common interests of a political community (Crawford 2007; May 1987; Zimmerman 1985; Feinberg 1970). This argument is also question-begging in the sense that individuals can be subordinated to collective goods or objects. In addition, it is doubtful whether the mere fact of one's membership would elicit sincere feelings to assume responsibility for the past injustices which are not directly related to the present generation.

National responsibility is considered one of the most elaborate theories in inherited responsibility because a nation can assume responsibility regardless of the passage of time. In this case, the common national identity is viewed as a source of continuity (Tamir 1993; Miller 1995). Based on the continuity between past generations and subsequent ones, inherited responsibility is explained as accountability of share (Miller 2007; Butt 2008), active association with the past stemming from national pride, and the affection of descendants for their ancestors (Wheeler, 1997).

This is not to say that the simplistic typology of Ruth Benedict (‘shame-based primitive culture’ versus ‘guilt-based civilized culture’) is applicable to this case. Instead, I am of the opinion that the different dynamics of shame in particular cultures should be introduced in our discussion about historical reconciliation. Based on the traditional retributivist view of shame and guilt, in which punishment should be regarded as an atonement for guilt at a crime rather than shaming of an individual in person, Ruth Benedict defined Japanese culture as a ‘shame-based culture’ whose moral emotions originate primarily from external sanctions (Benedict 2005[1946], 222). As Takeo Doi points out (Doi 2001 [1973]), her simplistic typology ignores the sense of shame (haji,恥) whose association of social expectations is interwoven with individual aspirations.

The concept of liberty as non-domination has been developed by the so-called neo-Roman theorists, such as Quentin Skinner, Philip Pettit, and Maurizio Viroli. Using Machiavelli’s notion of libertà, they articulate liberty as, for example, “I am free to the degree that no human being has the arbitrary power to interfere with me even if I lack the will or the wisdom required for achieving self-mastery.” See Philip Pettit (1997a).

For Kantian retributivists who understand criminal justice along the distinction between ‘guilt’ and ‘shame,’ the republican theory of public shaming, which seeks moral contrition from the offender, cannot be justifiable even if it can promote a moral re-educative effect. For instance, Martha Nussbaum complains that the republican theory of public shaming confuses shame with guilt, and that “the punishments [Braithwaite] defends should actually be regarded as atonements for guilt at an act, rather than shaming of an individual” (Nussbaum 2004, 371). True, she also acknowledges that “some forms of shame indeed have a positive ethical value” (Nussbaum 2004, 176). By offering guilt as a more appropriate method of maintaining criminal justice, she nevertheless questions of how public shaming can generate a restoration without stigmatization or humiliation (Nussbaum 2004, 172-221 & 229).

We can hardly deny that shame – for example can kui, 憤愧 – in its true sense of ‘respect for ideals’ can facilitate a healthy identification with social values (Geaney 2004; Bedford and Hwang 2003, 127). Nevertheless, in Northeast Asian cultures, public shame cannot be ideally situated to reintegrate the offender into the community.