Varieties of Patron-Client State Relationship:
The U.S. and Southeast Asia

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The United States (US) was one of the two superpowers during the Cold War and after the eventual demise of Soviet Union, consolidated its supremacy as sole hegemon of the world. US relations with many regions and many states have been extensively studied upon and in Asia, the relationship mostly dealt with China, Japan and South Korea. US patron relationship to Northeast Asia is relatively stable, durable, one consisting of visible and tangible security transactions such as military bases still stationed in South Korea and Japan. There is a wealth of literature to be found pertaining to Northeast Asia but US relationship with Southeast Asia is lacking compared to its neighbors.

This paper starts with the following questions: Does a patron-client state relationship actually exist between the US Southeast Asia? Why is there a lack of patronage compared to one displayed in Northeast Asia? Is there room for maneuver for clients? How does US patronage change over time and in what way? The first part of this paper will briefly review previous literature on patron-client relationships. Second, key concepts of patron-client state relationships and the 6 types of relationships will be enumerated. Third, these relationships will be applied to three periods: 1965-67, 1975, 1985-87 in three countries: Indonesia, Philippines and Thailand to examine the trend of US patronage. Finally, implications and future modifications of this theory to Southeast Asia will be discussed.

Patron-Client Relationship in Literature

Patron-client relationship is not a fresh concept in the eyes of anthropology, sociology and even politics. In fact, individuals in any given society, experience the core of this interpersonal relationship in forms of kinship or friendship between family and friends, or trust (solidarity) between other members of their community and society. Eisenstadt and Roniger argue that friendships, kinships and patron-client relationships are particularistic, personal, and voluntary and fully institutionalized, meaning there is an “interrelation between solidarity and instrumental obligations (Eisenstadt 1980, 6).”

Scott’s paper deals with the concept of personal, voluntary, institutionalized relationship of exchange and reciprocity into the realm of domestic politics, especially in Southeast Asia. Here, patron-client relationship is defined as “a special case of dyadic ties involving a largely instrumental friendship in which an individual or higher socioeconomic status (patron) uses his own influence and resources to provide protection or benefits, or both, for a person of lower status (client), who, for his part reciprocates by offering general support and assistance, including personal services, to the patron” (Scott 1972, 92).
There are three features apparent in this relationship: first, there is an imbalance in exchange between two partners which expresses and reflects the disparity in their relative wealth, power and status; second, this kind of dyad is face-to-face and personal; and third, these ties are whole person relationships rather than explicit, impersonal-contract bonds. The link is thus flexible and can exist over long periods of time (Scott 1972, 92).

Hicken also mentions 4 key concepts of patron-client relationship: contingency, hierarchy, iteration and volition. All patron-client relationships share a degree of contingent or reciprocal exchange both immediate and in the coming future. Asymmetric alliances or hierarchy is not necessary in this relationship although Landé defined the relationship as “an alliance between two persons of unequal status, power or resources each of whom finds it useful to have as an ally someone superior or inferior to himself (Hicken 2011, 292; Schmidt 1977, xx).”Iteration is also a necessary to define patron-client relationship since this dyadic relationship is by its nature ongoing and both sides anticipate future interactions while making the decisions that will influence them in the present. Although there can never be a fully “voluntary” relationships, patron-client relationship is bound by a certain “degree of voluntary compliance” on both parties (Hicken 2011, 294).

Shoemaker and Spanier expand the subjects of patron-client relationship from politicians and constituents to states. “Patron-client state relationships are primarily aimed at enhancing their respective security” and security transactions are the most evident and pervasive (Shoemaker & Spanier 1984, 14). The client principally seeks technology sophistication, and numbers in the supply of weapons by the patron, as well as security guarantees that the patron can provide, often at no expense to the client (Shoemaker & Spanier 1984, 14). The patron seeks specific types of goals to further its efforts vis-à-vis its principal competitors (Shoemaker & Spanier 1984, 15). There are two sources of leverage the patron has at its disposal: client must obtain training from the patron in order to operate its weapons effectively and since weapons require spare parts and replacements, the patron retains control over the client. Patron client state relationships are differentiated from other theories such as dependency theory because economic or political development is not the focusing agenda (Shoemaker & Spanier 1984, 15).

In Shin’s “Dynamics of Patron-Client State Relations in Northeast Asia”, social relations in a society are expanded into the arena of international politics where “security transfers” by states is the prime exchange commodity. The nature of security transfer means the patron has an advantage over the client while the client has to play a crucial role in the region the patron is commanding influence in. While the patron exercises superior power in its own sphere of influence and expects client’s acquiescence, it also has to strive maintain its status and ability as a patron (Shin 1993, 180-84). In terms of changes in the client state’s character, Shin examines the changes in the country’s autonomy, capability and legitimacy during the Lee Sung-man, Chang Myun and Park Jung-hee administration.

Carney differentiates patron-client relationships with dependency relationships where the former is structurally harmonious and willingly dependent, dyadic, differentiated general exchange and direct power exchange from patron to client, existence of common goal (state survival), economic and military assistance as positive and negative inducements, broad scope of relationship that encompasses military as well as political, economic and cultural aspects, and state-to state relationship. The latter is structurally conflicted, systemic relationship based on coercion, differentiated market exchanges with direct power exchange from least developed countries to most developed countries, market process acts
as positive or negative inducements, limited scope of relationship, and market and social relationship (Carney 1989, 43).

While the bulk of the literature on patron-client state relationships focused on US or Soviet Union’s relations with other client states, Ciorciari’s paper on Sino-Cambodian partnership discusses strategic and normative factors that prevent China’s cultivation of strong patron-client relationships. China’s patronage comes in the form of economic investment, political protection and strategic military support while Cambodia reciprocates with easy resources and labor as well as diplomatic and political support. Although the Cold War has ceased and the bipolar power relations has long gone, there may be room for explaining regional powers increasing their influences such as China or Russia exhibiting patron-client relationships and showing the expansion of client’s needs from security transfers to cultural or economical arenas.

The Patron-Client State Relationship: Theoretical Considerations

A Patron-client state relationship is differentiated from other bilateral alliances or dependent relationships since it requires a security or military transaction and the nature of the relationship is voluntary and continual. There are also three distinct key elements: difference in military capabilities, client’s role and consistent association. First, in order to establish a patron-client relationship, the client should have inferior military capabilities than their patron. Thus, it relies on its patron for its security and survival, making “the principle security transfers between patron and client unidirectional in nature (Shoemaker & Spanier 1984, 13).” Second, the client position, in relation to the patron’s competitors, is important to the patron. This is illustrated by the patron trading specific funds and items of military equipment for concessions from the client that will readily translate into advantages over the patron’s opponents (Shoemaker & Spanier 1984, 13). This in turn allows the client to exert a modicum of influence over its patron. Third, a recognizable, apparent and consistent association (regardless of duration) between the patron and client should exist (Shoemaker & Spanier 1984, 13).

Shoemaker and Spanier present 6 types of patron-client relationships that are influenced by the patron’s goals and the client’s perception of its threat environment. The patron enters this relationship with several goals that are common: to increase its advantage over its opponents be it its superior systems manifested in the client, lager and tightly connected associations with its client state, or enhanced military capabilities by control client’s crucial piece of territory. The client enters the relationship semi-voluntarily because is also influenced by the need to survive. The client is the weaker state and needs patronage in order to provide the security it is not capable of. If the client is facing high levels of threat, it will be more susceptible to the patron’s demands and if facing low levels of threat, will be less amenable and will demand concessions from the patron in order to meet the patron’s wants.

The patron has three different but important goals that it wishes to pursue: ideology, international solidarity and strategic advantage. In ideological goals, the patron uses the client-state as a model or example of its “superior” system. Thus the patron does not tolerate deviations from the client and demands rigid adherence to its policies. Often this is characterized by changes in the client’s political,
economic and social system. However, since the patron has to provide a great deal of resource in order to “remake” the client in its image but often does not receive any material or tangible benefits, this type of goal is not highly valued.

The patron seeks to achieve international solidarity by grouping its client(s) into its sphere of influence. This shows the international community that the client is associated with the patron and is manifested by client’s show of support towards patron in the form of UN voting or international agreements. The patron is less rigid with the client does not control the client’s domestic politics or foreign policies as it does with ideological goals. The patron is able to receive more visible directly measureable and tangible benefits from the client than ideological goals.

The patron seeks strategic advantages from the client by controlling an important piece of the client’s territory and is characterized by the patron building military bases or facilities military in nature. This is to deny the patron’s opponent from accessing or using the territory as well as gaining a military advantage. Since the client’s cooperation is vital in allowing patron access, the patron allows considerable freedom in domestic and international activities as long as it does not obstruct the patron’s goals. The patron will highly value this relationship because it derives a directly visible and measurable advantage (military and political) and will contribute it the patron’s own security.

Types of Patron-Client State Relationships

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Client’s Threat Environment</th>
<th>Patron Goals</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ideology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>Patron-centric</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Patron and Client Indifference</td>
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</table>

There are 6 types of relationships that Shoemaker and Spanier use to explain the flow of influence and the changes in the trend of the patron-client relationship. Patron-centric, patron-prevalence and influence parity are types of relationships where the patron exerts higher degrees of influence in that order. Patron and client indifference, client-prevalence, and client-centric relationships display decreasing influences of the patron and increasing demands from the client.

The following three relationships are characterized by high threat environments from the client. Therefore Shoemaker and Spanier described the principle differentiating variable as patron’s goals (Shoemaker & Spanier 1984, 37). First, patron-centric relationships are characterized by high control from the patron and high-threat environment for the client. The client is dependent on the patron for its security while the patron may not reap high benefits. Therefore the patron will “extract significant ideological concessions” from the client as payment (Shoemaker & Spanier 1984, 26). Indications of such relationship from the patron’s perspective are increase in arms shipment while the client displays
rapid and massive governmental turmoil with individuals favorable to the patrons seizing power. This relationship is short as the patron does not want to be entangled in the client’s problems while the client does not wish to remain dominated by the patron for an extended period of time. Second, patron-prevalence relationship is also characterized by patron’s increased control and client’s high threat environment. The client will often demand weapons or some sort of direct security assistance. Indications of such relationship are formal agreements or treaties between patron and client to show client’s solidarity for the patron (Shoemaker & Spanier 1984, 30). The third type of relationship, influence parity, is the most beneficial for the client since it receives strategic advantage over its opponent in the form of territorial military influence. Indications of this relationship are displayed by “dramatic and rapid change” where the patron may perceive client’s threat environment to be dangerous to its interests or seek to increase its influence (Shoemaker & Spanier 1984, 34).

The fourth, fifth and sixth type are characterized low threat environment of the client and this led to reduced accommodations of the patron’s demands on the client’s standpoint. The fourth relationship is patron and client indifference, where both parties believe neither is benefiting from this relationship. Although the patron seeks ideological concessions and direct influence over the client’s domestic and international policies, the client does not comply since it does not see a high level of threat. The patron also does not give assistance or support. Such types of relationships “drift along at the edge of relevance” and both parties are neither helpful nor dangerous to one another (Shoemaker & Spanier 1984, 38). The fifth type of relationship is client-prevalence in which the patron seeks international solidarity from the client. This means the patron has more to gain from the client than in the ideological goals. However, the client does not actively pursue the relationship due to its threat environment and will exhibit higher influence on the patron and will demand greater concessions than previous relationships. Lastly, the sixth type is client-centric where the client has the most influence on the patron of all six relationships and has the “greatest access to the patron’s political and military resources” (Shoemaker & Spanier 1984, 42). The patron wishes to gain strategic advantage over its opponents but the client is not as invested in the relationship due to the lack of threat environment. The client is often able to negotiate with the patron from “a position of strength” (Shoemaker & Spanier 1984, 42).

While Shoemaker and Spanier identify only two dimensions of client’s threat environment perception, high and low, adjustment has been made to show a more detailed degree of client’s perception. The addition of a ‘partially low’ threat environment shows the wane of patronage, but it does not mean it completely diminished. They typology remains the same, but the degree of the patron and client indifference, client-prevalence and client-centric relationship is different. During this period of ‘partially low’ threat environment, clients do not face dire security threats that could endanger their survival as they did in the previous period, but they still rely on the patron due to internal or external threats. In the low threat environments, clients perceive that threat environment is low due to diminished tensions or conflicts. By examining the trend of US patronage in Southeast Asia from 1960 to 1990, there were three crucial periods where the client’s threat environment changed: 1965-67, 1975 and 1985-87. Naturally, the Vietnam War had an impressive influence not only to US and Vietnam, but also to its bordering neighbors: Cambodia, Laos and Thailand as well as distant neighbors Indonesia and the Philippines. The countries closest to mainland China and Vietnam would feel the highest threat environment during the war and the US would seek to use those countries to gain strategic advantage over Soviet Union or China. After the war ended with North Vietnam’s victory and the fall of Saigon in 1975, clients would feel a lower degree of threat environment due to the end of the war but still would
continue ties with the US due to the continued existence of Communist influences that threatened their security. It was not until 1987, when most countries deemed the threat environment low enough. It is also the point where client perceives that the patron may no longer be able to provide the necessary security guarantees.

Data and Methods

This paper is a focused, structured research of the trends of US patronage towards its Southeast Asian clients. The trend of US patronage was measured by the amount of military assistance in three criteria: the amount (in US dollars) of military assistance the patron provided, the amount (in US dollars) of foreign military sales delivered to the client and the total amount of arms import by the client. Data from the USAID shows military aid is a direct and visible aid US can give to its client. It increases during times of crises and as the threat environment of the client rises. Military aid is also given to the client as a “carrot” when it complies with the patron’s demands such as deploying clients troops in a war the patron is involved in. Foreign military sales are also a type of security assistance where the patron sells military devices and services to countries vital to its interest. Although the US provides some sort of security assistance globally, it has provided extensive amounts of military sales to certain key countries during a specific time period. The US Arms Export Control Act, 22 U.S.C. § 2751 states:

“the policy of the United States to facilitate the common defense by entering into international arrangements with friendly countries which further the objective of applying agreed resources of each country to programs and projects of cooperative exchange of data, research, development, production, procurement, and logistics support to achieve specific national defense requirements and objectives of mutual concern.”

Arms exports, from the patron to the client, indicate the patron is supplying visible resources such as missiles or aircrafts which are directly essential to the client’s security. Also, the higher the proportion of arms being imported from the patron highlights high reliance on the patron and the strength of the relationship. Examination of military aid trends from 1960 to 1987, discounting Vietnam due to US engagement and subsequent withdrawal during the Vietnam War, yielded 5 Southeast Asian countries that received significant security transfers: Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand. Of the five, countries that received security transfers consisting of consistent and sizable military aid were chosen. Indonesia, Philippines and Thailand all received continued amounts of military aid, negotiated substantial amounts of foreign military sales and imported majority of their arms from the US.

Southeast Asia after the World War II: Historical Backgrounds

After the World War II, many Southeast Asian countries gained liberation from their colonizers and
started the transition towards modern nation-states. Indonesia, Philippines and Thailand had experiences of foreign invasion and like many developing states, went back and forth between a military-dominant government and a more democratic administration. Experience with imperialist countries also shaped each state’s willingness to join the US bloc against the Soviet Union in the early 1950s. Indonesia was careful not to be exploited by another powerful state after gaining independence in 1949 from the Netherlands, its former colonizer. Since then Indonesia’s foreign policy pursued three objectives: defense of the nation’s independence against perceived threats, mobilization of resources for economic development from other countries, and achieve purposes related to domestic political competition (Wilcox et al. 1972, 116). For the first half of the 1960s, Sukarno leaned towards an anti-imperialist front and adopted a confrontational stance against imperial powers such as the Dutch concerning West Irian and the British concerning Malaysia. He also rejected foreign aid believing it to be another form of Western countries trying to dominate Indonesia.

The Philippines reverted back to its former colonizer, the US, after 1954 and granted it major concessions such as the Laurel-Langley agreement, which allowed US citizens to invest in the Philippines with equal rights as a Filipino citizen. Throughout most of 1950s and 1960s, “Philippine foreign policy was a mirror image of American policy, or an American policy with a lag-time of five to ten years (McCloud 1995, 198; Wilcox et al. 1972, 218).” Philippine was the only Southeast Asian member, other than Thailand, in the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization.

After WWII, Thailand’s fears of land-based threats emanating from the East were reinforced between 1949 and 1954 when the Chinese Communist Party emerged the victor of the Chinese civil war, the military successes of Ho Chin Minh in Vietnam and the specter of Communism spreading throughout East and Southeast Asia (Chin 1987, 78). Thailand feared “externally inspired subversion and separatism in the northeastern region of the country” and these security threats spurred Bangkok to ally itself with the US from the early 1950s (Chin 1987, 78). This relationship culminated in the signing of the Manila Pact and the establishment of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) in 1954. Bangkok also permitted its bases and facilities to be utilized by the US for military operations in Indochina (Chin 1987, 78).

Both Thailand and the Philippines displayed signs of patron-client relationships with the US even before the beginning of the Vietnam War. This is illuminated by the high level of threat environment Philippine believed itself to be in the aftermath of WWII. Philippine would be amenable to hefty demands from the US in order to preserve its security. Philippine modeling its political, foreign policies in the shape of US and signing the Laurel-Langley agreement which meant favorable treatment towards the US despite disadvantages towards Filipino citizens show it was exhibiting patron-centric relationship. Thailand also displayed influence parity relationship as the victory of the Chinese Communist Party meant a high level of threat environment where Communism could spread into its borders. Also, insurgents with Communist roots threatened the regime’s stability. Therefore Thailand permitted use of its military bases and facilities in return for security transactions such as military assistance.

[Figure 1] Military Aid and Foreign Military Sales Delivered
During the three periods of changes in 1965-67, 1975, 1985-87, security transfer in terms of military aid was the higher than any other military assistance for all three countries. Military aid declined a few years before 1965, but quickly rose again afterwards with Thailand receiving $176 million in 1965, $293 million in 1966 and $384 million in 1967. Philippines received $132 million in 1965, $139 million in 1966 and $180 million in 1967 while Indonesia around $7 hundred thousand in 1965 and $13 million in 1967. According to DSCA Fiscal Year Series, foreign military sales did not account for a significant amount during this period.

Military aid and foreign military sales show the same trend after the end of the Vietnam War; starting to increase from 1974, reaching its peak in 1976 and decreasing afterwards. Many of US’s East Asian allies feared US would no longer aid them with the withdrawal of US troops from Vietnam. The sudden increase of military aid in 1976 was meant to reassure US allies of its commitment while the drop in military aid afterwards shows US interest in the region was decreasing. Subsequently, Thailand received $136 million in 1974, $144 million in 1975, $467 million in 1976 and $146 million in 1977 in military aid while receiving $5 million, $9 million, 26 million and 17 million respectively in foreign military sales. Indonesia received $77 million in 1974, $70 million in 1975, $211 million in 1976 and $122 million in military aid while receiving $146 thousand, $8 million, $11 million and $25 million in foreign military sales. Philippines received $103 million in 1974, $122 million in 1975, $207 million in 1976 and $114 million in 1977 while receiving $1.6 million, $5 million, $19 million and $31 million
respectively in foreign military sales.

From 1985 to 1987, there was a significant decrease in military aid with the US-China détente in 1972 and Regan’s foreign policy shifting to a smaller government. Thailand received $194 million in 1985, $153 million in 1986 and $4 million in 1987 while receiving $11.7 million, 11.1 million and 9 million in foreign military sales. Philippine received $51 million in 1985, $4 million in 1986, and $17 million in 1987 while receiving $16 million, $36 million and $31 million in foreign military sales. Indonesia received $64 million in 1985, $38 million in 1986 and $3 million in 1987 while receiving $17 million, $12 million and $22 million in foreign military sales. Philippine was the only country to receive an increase in military aid in 1987 due to its domestic political situation. The long-time ally of US, Marcos, had to step down from office in 1986 because of human rights violations, signifying the decrease in aid from 1985 to 1986. After the new civilian administration was established, US increased the amount of military assistance (although not the same amount it had granted before) to display the continued strength of the US-Philippine alliance.

[Table 2] Arms Import from US (%): SIPRI Database

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total Arms Imported</th>
<th>Indonesia</th>
<th>Philippines</th>
<th>Thailand</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1960-1965</td>
<td>11% (Soviet 73%)</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>96%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966-1970</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>97%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971-1975</td>
<td>84%</td>
<td>82%</td>
<td>82%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976-1980</td>
<td>36% (Netherlands 25%)</td>
<td>81%</td>
<td>57%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981-1985</td>
<td>24% (United Kingdom 21%)</td>
<td>77%</td>
<td>46% (Italy 13%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986-1990</td>
<td>23% (Netherlands 34%)</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td>58% (China 16%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total arms imported from the US changed over the years with a steady decrease in import from the 1960s. Indonesia remained the most independent by importing from the Soviet Union in the early 1960s, from the Netherlands in the late 1970s and from the United Kingdom in the early 1980s. Before Suharto came into power, Sukarno leaned towards an anti-imperialist stance with US accounting for 11% of its arms exports while importing the majority of arms from the Society Union. Thailand imported majority of its arms from the US from 1960 until 1985 when it first started importing arms from China. Philippines heavily relied on importing arms from the US until 1985 and even when imports declined, US still accounted for more than 50% of its arms import in the late 1980s.
Within the patron-client state relationship, all three countries maintained similar types of relationships even when the threat environment changed. On April 1975, US withdrew its troops from Vietnam and clients had to reevaluate US’s patronage since US withdrawing its assistance from the region was a vital question to their security. Although the three regions shared commonalities such as shared history of foreign invasion, the foreign policies they pursued diverged. After the war, a highly authoritarian government seized power in 1965 in all three countries and remained in power for more than a decade. Philippine had Marcos as president from 1965 to 1976 and in Indonesia Suharto remained in power from 1966 to 1998. Although Thailand adopted a Western constitutional democratic monarchy in 1932, the government went through periods of military junta rule to civilian administration. However, the level of US patronage differed because of each country’s domestic situation.

Indonesian economy under Sukarno declined since they already had massive debt to begin with, but its leader feared reliance, such as foreign economic aid provided by Western states. In 1966, Sukarno stepped down and his successor, Suharto changed his predecessor’s anti-imperialist policy and opened doors to foreign aid. Indonesia’s greatest challenge was not Communist insurgents but economic development. Thailand’s geographical condition resulted in multiple invasions from the northern parts of its borders. Communist insurgents within its territory and the external environment of neighboring Communist countries spurred Thailand to maintain a much closer relationship with the US than Indonesia. Philippine had former relations with the US as its colony which may have influenced its decision to maintain a close association. However, the long reign of Marcos from 1965 to 1986 allowed him to dictate the direction of the Philippine foreign policy for over 20 years. Marcos used US’s needs for Philippines military bases to receive legitimacy and continue his regime. The US also condoned his slightly unorthodox regime if it meant continued use of Subic Bay and Clark Air Force Base.

The First Period, 1965-67

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Table 3: Patron-Client Typology Modified

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Client’s Threat Environment</th>
<th>Ideology</th>
<th>International Solidarity</th>
<th>Strategic Advantage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>High (1965-67)</td>
<td>Patron-centric</td>
<td>Patron-prevalence</td>
<td>Influence Parity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>Philippines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partially Low (1975)</td>
<td>Patron and Client Indifference</td>
<td>Client-prevalence</td>
<td>Client-centric</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>Philippines Thailand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low (1985-87)</td>
<td>Patron and Client Indifference</td>
<td>Client-prevalence</td>
<td>Client-centric</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>Philippines</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The year 1965 was a turning point for the three countries since they shared a powerful commitment towards anti-Communism: an anti-Communist, pro-West Suharto regime seized power in Indonesia, pro-US Marcos was elected, and the insurgency led by the Communist Party of Thailand. After the September 30th coup by the military with ties to the Communist Party and the fall of Sukarno led to the abandonment of anti-imperialist, anti-Western policies.

**Indonesia: Patron-prevalence in the form of Multilateral Economic Assistance**

US objective towards Indonesia in 1965-67 was simple: not to let the Communist bloc influence it. In the June 1966 Memorandum from the President’s Special Assistant to President Johnson, it clearly states US concern over Sukarno regime becoming closer to China and the Communist bloc. US’s goals were international solidarity with Indonesia but the nature was not military but economic. From the telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Indonesia on June 1967, US assistance is through providing debt relief via IMF with other countries. In a paper prepared in the Department of State for the National Security Council in 1967, US does not wish to involve itself with Indonesia insomuch as it solely providing for Indonesia’s financial assistance. The paper mentions that Indonesia’s need for foreign assistance is high, therefore needs the help of many nations. ¹

The change of regime from Sukarno to Suharto brought on change of attitude towards foreign aids and the Suharto regime announced it would seek economic cooperation from both Western and socialist countries to facilitate economic development (Weinstein 1976, 226-8). Suharto regime did not lean left like his predecessor, Sukarno, and there was a decided chill in the Soviet Union-Indonesia relationship while US-Indonesia relationship became closer than the previous regime. This is characterized by the sudden increase of military aid from $0 in 1966 to $13 million, $25 million and $27 million in 1967, 1968, and 1969. Although there was increase in the amount, it was considerably lower than Thailand or Philippines due to the economic focused nature of the US-Indonesia relationship.

**Philippines: Influence parity**

During 1965-67, US wished to gain Philippine’s support in the Vietnam War, renegotiate the Laurel-Langley agreement and continue using of military bases in Philippine. The newly elected Marcos regime wanted results on the Philippine Veterans Claims Agreement, bilateral trade and defense support system. This relationship can be characterized as influence parity since US policy towards Philippine focused on securing bases and fostering the Philippine armed forces’ military capability to defend the

¹ The fact that different documents follow up on the policy recommendations and actual implementations mentioned in these documents show the importance of these documents as insights into US policy objectives as patron.
bases, especially from anti-US demonstrations on Philippine’s involvement in the Vietnam War (Blitz 2000, 104). As such, this leaves room for Philippines to make demands from its patron. Not only did Philippine’s military aid from the US increase from $132 million in 1965 to $139 million in 1966 and $180 million in 1967, according to the Information Memorandum from the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs to Secretary of State Rusk in 1967, US agreed to pay a settlement on the World War II Philippine veteran claims, reached a negotiation on bilateral textile agreement and decided to equip Marcos with engineering construction battalions. However, Philippine also had to send around 2000 men (Philippine civic Action Group) to Vietnam and updated the base negotiations with the signing of Rusk-Ramos agreement in 1966.

**Thailand: Influence parity**

Throughout most of 20\textsuperscript{th} century, especially in the 1950s and 1960s, Thailand policy followed a propensity to lean away from China and to cultivate relations with any states that opposed China (McCloud 1995, 208). The Thai government had expressed concerns toward Communism as early as 1933 by passing anti-Communist laws to counter Communist based insurgencies (Chin 1987, 79). After the insurgency led by the Communist Party of Thailand in 1965, the Royal Thai Government had no choice but to ally itself with the US. Internally it had to deal with Communist insurgents while internationally it feared the Vietnamese Communist guerillas would infiltrate its borders and spread Communism within its territory. Escalation of the Second Indochina War in 1964 and the vulnerability of its security due to its geographical condition spurred Thailand to foster an influence parity type of patron-client relationship with the US. In 1964 Thailand granted US access to its military bases such as the Utapao air base and by 1968 was host to 45,000 US military personnel and committed 11,000 of its own troops to the war effort in South Vietnam (Storey 2013, 127). This meant that Thailand was much more amenable to US demands than Philippines due to imminent security threats. However, US military aid increased from $176 million in 1965 to $293 million in 1976 and $384 million in 1967 while arms import increased from $89 million, $109 million and $151 million respectively. This is because according to a March 1965 telegram from the embassy in Thailand to the Department of State, US also regarded Thailand as “an integral and vital part of our current operational military complex in Southeast Asia.” The telegram illustrates Thailand’s strategic military advantage since US relied on Thailand bases to conduct operations in Laos and South Vietnam. Although Thailand was susceptible to US demands due to Communist insurgents, in another telegram in August 1965, US was also concerned and placed importance on increasing AID police programs as part of their counterinsurgency efforts. Of the three countries, Thailand received the most military assistance which shows that this relationship was much more beneficial to the US, in fighting the Vietnam War, than Philippine or Indonesia.

**The Second Period, 1975**

The proclamation of the Guam Doctrine in 1969, Nixon’s visit to Beijing in 1972 and the fall of Saigon in 1975 made the three countries reevaluate US’s capabilities as a patron and sought to exert
influence on the patron as well as create new ties. Renewed ties with China and the dismantlement of SEATO showed the demolition of communist frontline in Southeast Asia.

**Indonesia: Client-prevalence in the form of Economic Assistance**

US wished to continue the amicable relationship with Indonesia which is characterized in the memorandum from Kissinger to President Ford in 1975 where Kissinger urges restoring developmental lending towards Indonesia as a gesture of goodwill. He argues this gesture will “provide a political leverage which a much larger sum could not attain later.” Due to destabilization of Indochina, US withdrawing from Vietnam, and several Southeast Asian countries leaning towards China, US tried to continue international solidarity with Indonesia. This is also clear in another Memorandum from Kissinger to President Ford in 1975 where he proposes a joint US-Indonesia Consultative Commission. Military aid of $70 million in 1975 increased to $211 million in 1976 and then suddenly decreased to $122 million in 1977 while foreign military sales increased from $8 million to $11 million and $25 million. The sudden increase of military aid in 1976 is a response to US withdrawing from Vietnam and was meant to reassure its ally of US’s continued support. Although military aid directly drops in the subsequent year, foreign military sales increased to supplement the declining aid.

However, Indonesia continued to maintain an “independent and active” foreign policy where it neither fully aligned with US nor Soviet Union. Indonesia showed signs of desiring a bigger role in the region, especially at the ASEAN Bali Summit in 1976, where the principle of ‘non-interference in the internal affairs of one another’ was adopted. This concept is directly in line with Indonesia’s foreign policy objectives since it proposes that “national security lies not in military alliances or under military umbrella of any great power, but in self-reliance deriving from domestic factors such as economic and social development, political stability and a sense of nationalism (Acharya 2001, 58).”

**Philippines: Client-centric**

On December 1975, Presidents Marcos and Ford held a joint communiqué where they discussed the end of the Laurel-Langley agreement and the US-Philippines Bases Agreement. Both presidents agreed that US use of Philippine military bases “should be conducted in the clear recognition of Philippine sovereignty (United States Department of State 1980, 866).” In 1976, despite the human rights goals of the Carter administration, who wanted to stipulate the “institutionalization of human rights as an element of foreign policy” US continued support for the Marcos regime (Blitz 2000, 129-132). US pursuing an active relationship with the authoritarian Marcos regime despite Carter’s goals for achieving a standard in human right especially pertaining to foreign aid meant Philippine’s military bases were a critical and vital interest to the US. US-Philippine relationship during this period would be considered as client-centric and as such military aid increased from $12 million in 1975 to $20 million in 1976 and $11 million in 1977 while foreign military sales increased significantly from $5 million to $19 million and $31 million respectively. Although US was withdrawing from the region, there is little difference in the amount of military aid in 1975 and 1977 and the foreign military sales increased 6 times the amount in 1975 to assure Philippine of US’s commitment.
Thailand: Client-centric

After the end of the Vietnam War, the Royal Thai Government asked for withdrawal of US troops by the end of 1976. However, the confrontation between the Royal Thai Government and the Communist Party of Thailand (CPT) escalated in 1975 after the fall of Indochina to Communists and the violent coup on October 6th 1976 which “sent droves of students and intellectuals into the countryside to join the CPT.” At the height of its influence, between 1975 to 1978, the CPT controlled around 14,000 to 15,000 armed troops, had direct control over 400 villages and was able to exert indirect control over more than 6,000 villages (Chin 1987, 80). There were also sporadic but continued insurgencies and armed separatist movements in the south led by the Communist Party of Malaya (Chin 1987, 80). In the National Intelligence Estimate in January 1975, US also estimated that Thailand will accept US military presence due to security reasons but will ultimately seek reduction in US forces. Military aid to Thailand also increased from $144 million in 1975 to $457 million in 1976 but promptly declined to $146 million while foreign military sales increased from $9 million to $26 million but declined to $17 million. However, arms import increased from $32 million to $31 million and finally $46 million.

The Third Period, 1985-87

Détente between US and Soviet and the Regan administration’s preference for a smaller government meant further withdrawal of US from Southeast Asia, and the three countries struggled to consolidate new ties, revise old ties or carve out a larger role for itself.

Indonesia: Client-prevalence? Indifference

Indonesia had consistently desired a greater role in the Southeast Asian region and the ASEAN. Indonesia took the opportunity to carve out a larger role during the negotiations of the Third Indochina War by sending the Military Chief to Hanoi in 1984, where he pronounced that Indonesia did not view Vietnam as a threat to Southeast Asia (Weatherbee 2008, 83). In July 1987 the Indonesian and Vietnamese Foreign Minister proposed a joint statement to separate the international aspects from the internal levels of conflict (Weatherbee 2008, 84). However, by this period US decreased military aid from $64 million to $38 million and $3 million from 1985 to 1987. This exhibits more of patron and client’s mutual indifference type but the US-Indonesian relationship during this period does not fit the ideological goal of the patron.

Philippines: Client-centric

US president and the Congress conflicted over their support for the Marcos regime in light of

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its continued violation of human rights. Although Regan wanted the aid in 1985 to exceed that of the previous year, Congress wanted a $15 million reduction in security assistance (Blitz 2000, 171). In 1986, although the new Aquino administration promised to allow US use of the military bases until 1991, it also showed signs of moving away from its long-term patron with the Philippines Constitutional Commission “rejecting the insertion of a ‘bases-free’ clause into the new Constitution” preventing the US from renewing the uses of Subic Bay and Clark Field (Acharya 1987, 5). Consequently, military aid went from $51 million in 1985 to a pittance of $4 million in 1986 to $17 million in 1987. Arms exports seemed to bolster the decreasing military aid since it increased from $16 million in 1985 to $36 million in 1986 probably to supplement the total military assistance.

**Thailand: Client-prevalence or Cooperative relationship?**

Thailand has continually requested US aid in countering Vietnamese military incursions by providing emergency military assistance but US responded only after Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia in 1979. During this period Thailand also started importing arms from in 1985 (13 million dollars) but formal import of arms from China started from 1987 of 125 million dollar worth of arms. Military aid decreased from $194 million in 1985, $153 million in 1986 and $4 million in 1987 but US objectives seem to lean toward international solidarity rather than total withdrawal of patronage. The signing of the Memorandum of Understanding in 1985 and negotiation of setting up a War Reverse Stockpile in 1986 (Ramsay 1988, 119 See Jackson) shows the structure of patronage is no longer in paying large sums of military aid but seems to move toward mutual cooperation and training.

**Concluding Remarks**

Patron-client theory was clearly a useful theoretical concept during the early periods of the Cold War when patron’s ideological goals or strategic advantages were clearly visible. The policy objectives of preventing any of the three states from fostering good relationships with China or Soviet Union was unacceptable and US handed out military assistances in the 1960s in the form of financial all the while urging its clients to either participate in the Vietnam War by sending troops or at least stay away from Communist China. However, the theory becomes less suitable as the time period changed from 1965 to 1975 due to the rapidly changing events in the Indochina area and the different agendas of its clients. Even US’s staunchest allies: Thailand and Philippine were worried- at least the leadership worried- that too much reliance on the US could be harmful in the long run. This was why many Southeast Asian countries participated in the makings and continued meetings of the ASEAN. 1985 showed further deterioration of the Cold War environment and consequently the patronage of the US because it had already started détente with China leaving only one Communist country, the Soviet Union, to contend with in the region. During this period US’s objectives cannot be divided into three goals nor can one separate them into neat sections since the ideological competition was not as fierce as before.

Changing crisis and conflict such as the terrorist attack on September 11th or in Bali in 2003 brought on a sudden increase in US military assistance dealing with counterterrorism that may create new threat
environment for East Asian countries. In recent events, former Communist oriented country such as Myanmar emerged with a liberal administration from its long political turmoil and former US allies such as Thailand found benefits in leaning towards rising China. This may yet again change the threat environment and may once again bring old and new patrons contending for supremacy in the region.
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