A Shifting Relationship Between Development and Security? Emerging Powers, Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Fragile States

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Introduction

The last two decades have witnessed fundamental shifts in international economic dynamics and the gradual reshaping of global political relationships and collaborations. Emerging powers such as China, India, Brazil, and Arab Gulf states have been playing a much more prominent role in the global economy. To demonstrate their new economic clout and aspirations for global leadership, these emerging powers have also begun playing a much more prominent role in international peacekeeping and in providing development and humanitarian assistance to countries in the Global South. They have also become important donors, investors and diplomatic and trading partners for countries affected by fragility, violence and conflict.\(^1\) Despite the recent slowdown of economic growth in China, Russia and South Africa, and the political and economic crisis in Brazil, there is little reason to expect that this trend will shift over the long term.

Although scholars have explored emerging donors’ development assistance policies, significantly less attention has been devoted to their role in post-conflict and conflict-affected states. This paper, which draws on the preliminary conclusions of a collaborative project,\(^2\) explores, one of the most important but least understood dimensions of this new assertiveness – emerging donors’ assistance to conflict-affected states and countries emerging out of civil war. The paper also investigates

\(^1\) World Bank. *2011 World Development Report*

\(^2\) The project, “Globalizing Reconstruction: Emerging Powers and Post-Conflict Settings,” directed by the paper’s author and funded by the United States Institute of Peace, brought together 8 scholars who investigated the role of Arab Gulf States, China, Brazil, India, Russia, South Africa and Turkey in providing assistance to post-conflict states.
how emerging donors conceptualize the nexus between security and development
and how these complement or contrast with those of traditional donors.

There are a number of challenges of investigating the role of emerging
donors in post-conflict settings. One is the paucity of data. Unlike traditional donors
who report to OECD DAC, most emerging donors do not share information through
DAC mechanisms. Many also do not collect and report data systematically. Often
they disburse assistance not through a single agency but rather through a variety of
institutions, making it more difficult to track allocated funds. Finally, the
cooperative ventures emerging donors establish with recipient countries often do
not conform to how development assistance is measured by DAC donors, rising
questions about what should be considered development assistance.

Another challenge is one of terminology. The term “emerging donor” used in
this paper is problematic. Most of these donors are not new. Many have been
providing development assistance since the 1960s and are themselves
uncomfortable with this term. An alternative term, “rising donors” while avoiding
the problem of characterizing these donors as new, is also imprecise and does not
acknowledge that some of these donors, like China, Russia and India, have been
significant global powers for some time. Equally problematic is the terminology of
“development assistance” or “aid” as well as “recipient” These donors, unlike
traditional donors conceptualize their relationships in collaborative, non-
hierarchical ways and therefore avoid using these terms. In other words, although
the paper will use this terminology, it is important to keep in mind that these terms are contested and not altogether accurate.

One of this paper’s conclusions is that emerging donors are sympathetic to some aspects of the liberal peacebuilding model that has dominated traditional donors’ approaches to post-conflict reconstruction in the past couple of decades as well as challenge it in significant ways. Although there are significant differences among emerging donors that will be addressed in this paper, overall, both emerging and traditional donors are interested in addressing poverty as well as in creating conditions that are favorable to foreign direct investment and trade in conflict-affected states. Where most of them challenge the liberal peacebuilding framework tends to relate to issues they view as affecting state sovereignty, and in relation to conditionalities or promotion of particular political reforms. These differences between traditional and emerging donors are a reflection of their different histories and experiences with their own development trajectories. Most emerging donors have experienced colonial domination and try to avoid replicating such hierarchical relationships when establishing collaborations with conflict-affected states. At the same time, many emerging donors have been in the past or continue to be conflict-affected states themselves. These experiences with their own conflicts, also shapes how they conceptualize relationships with states affected by violence.

The paper is organized as follows. First, I briefly review the extant literature on post-conflict reconstruction. Next, I discuss some of the challenges of exploring the role that emerging donors are playing in conflict affected environments. Next, I
discuss how emerging donors have approached their assistance to other countries of the Global South in general and conflict-affected states in particular, highlighting differences among emerging donors as well as shifts that have occurred in their approach over time. In the following section, I discuss the emergence of the development security nexus as understood by traditional donors and contrast this with how emerging donors are conceptualizing this nexus.

The Challenge of Post-Conflict Reconstruction

Recent studies increasingly acknowledge the growing role of emerging powers in development and humanitarian assistance. However, our collective knowledge of their engagement in post-conflict settings is limited—particularly with regard to the question of how these donors conceptualize the relationship between development and security in fragile environments.

Emerging donors’ assistance provision is of course not new and can be traced back to the early 1960s and the formation of the Non-Aligned Movement. Led by countries such as Egypt, India and Indonesia, the Movement sought to chart an independent path for countries emerging from colonialism and who did not want to align with either the United States or the Soviet Union in the intensifying Cold War between the two superpowers. At the core of this movement and its opposition to imperialism and foreign domination was the principle of non-interference in domestic affairs of member states and the respect for their autonomy and state sovereignty.
Nonetheless, there is a consensus that these donors are now playing a much more significant role in assistance provision. This new prominence is reflected in the new global partnership agreements that were hammered out between traditional and emerging donors at the High Level Forum for Aid Effectiveness in Busan, South Korea in 2012.3

A number of key findings emerge from the literature that examines the growing importance of emerging donors. First, how emerging donors define, disburse, and report aid is significantly different from traditional donors4. Second, emerging donors’ policies and strategic objectives, economic interests, assistance provision philosophies and priorities are diverse.5 Traditional donors have been concerned about the potential negative consequences of emerging power’s development assistance on recipient countries’ political, social and environmental standards. Available evidence suggests that these concerns are often exaggerated.6

Third, emerging donors’ public rhetoric masks much more complex rationales for aid provision and the modalities of assistance programs’ implementation. This rhetoric prioritizes solidarity, cooperation and mutual support and the principle of non-interference in internal affairs of other states.

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4 Mawdsley 2011
Emerging donors largely eschew the language of assistance and conditionalities used by traditional donors preferring to frame these relationships in collaborative and cooperative terms. Patterns of emerging donor assistance, however, reveals a much more nuanced picture and points to the existence of multiple agendas and interests driving their decisions about where to funnel money, deepen trade relations, and encourage the entry of private investors.

Until quite recently most studies of post-conflict reconstruction paid relatively little attention to the growing role of emerging powers. The key debates focused on the effects of the liberal peacebuilding model; on the power imbalances between traditional donors and post-conflict countries; and on various technical issues such as sequencing of policies and reform efforts as well as donor coordination. As a recent Saferworld report puts it, in much of this literature, there has been an underlying assumption that the “international community is

7 D. Rowlands, Emerging Donors in International Development Assistance. PBDD Reports, January 2008
composed of like-minded actors with global leverage and legitimacy in the countries in which they intervene.”\(^\text{12}\) Although this likely overstates the commonalities and similarities among traditional donors, with the growing prominence of emerging donors, this assumption is even weaker and the development and humanitarian assistance landscape has become even more complex.

Despite growing number of studies on emerging donors’ development and humanitarian assistance, there have been few studies that have attempted to more systematically examine their engagement with conflict-affected states and their policies regarding post-conflict reconstruction and peacebuilding. Those studies that have looked at their role in such settings, suggest a number of patterns. First, emerging donors are clearly playing a much more significant role in peacebuilding and peacekeeping operations and looking to shape the content of these operations rather than simply providing troops as was the case in the past.\(^\text{13}\) Second, these donors are increasingly paying greater attention to countries outside of their immediate geographic neighborhood and looking to establish a more global presence.\(^\text{14}\) Third, there are significant differences among emerging donors in areas

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\(^{14}\) Sultan Barakat and S. A. Zyck, “Gulf State Assistance to Conflict-Affected Environments,” the Centre for the Study of Global Governance, University of York, 2010; Rudd and Viken 2011; Paul Amar, “Global South to the Rescue: Emerging
of assistance focus and the modalities of assistance delivery. Fourth, the growing involvement of emerging donors in post-conflict countries is creating tensions between the principle of non-interference in recipient countries’ internal affairs and the interest in preventing resumption of conflict. Finally, when engaging with post-conflict states, emerging powers use very different terminology than traditional donors, generally refusing to refer to these states as fragile or failing states.

**Changing Landscape of Assistance to Post-Conflict States**

The emerging donors are an extremely diverse group and include new economic powerhouses such as China and Brazil, as well as growing economies like India, South Africa, Turkey, Russia and Arab Gulf states. These emerging donors are forging partnerships outside of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) framework and are now playing a much more significant role in development and humanitarian assistance provision. In 2004 for instance, the India-Brazil-South Africa (IBSA) Dialogue Forum established the IBSA Trust Fund for the Poverty and Hunger Alleviation aimed at strengthening South-South cooperation and disseminating best practices in promoting development and

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16 Campbell et al. 2012

17 More recently Brazil has been experiencing a deepening economic crisis.
fighting poverty. \textsuperscript{18} More recently, with the establishment of the Beijing Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and the New Development Bank (NDB), they are focusing on providing alternative sources of development and infrastructure financing to those available through West-dominated financial institutions. The NDB is operated by Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa and is set up “to foster greater financial and development cooperation” between the five. In 2014, Brazil, Russia, India and China accounted for 41.4 percent of global population and 25 percent of global GDP. Unlike the World Bank, where votes are weighed according to the capital share the member state provides, every member of the NDP will have one vote and none will have veto power. \textsuperscript{19} The BRICS see this bank as providing an alternative source of financing so that countries do not need to only rely on the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. \textsuperscript{20}

The emerging donors growing prominence is reflected in the new global partnership agreements that were hammered out between traditional and emerging donors at the High Level Forum for Aid Effectiveness in Busan, South Korea in 2012 the key role that they played in the debates about the design of Sustainable

\textsuperscript{18} The India, Brazil and South Africa Facility for Poverty and Hunger Alleviation (IBSA Fund) - IBSA Trust Fund (http://ssc.undp.org/content/ssc/library/solutions/partners/expo/The_India_Brazil_and_South_Africa_Facility_for_Poverty_and_Hunger_Alleviation_IBSA_Fund__IBSA_Trust_Fund.html)

\textsuperscript{19} http://ndbbrics.org

\textsuperscript{20} As Kandapur Vaman Kamath, the director of NDP, put it, “Our objective is not to challenge the existing system as it is but to improve and complement the system in our own way.” \textit{BBC News}, July 21, 2015 (www.bbc.com/news/33605230)
Development Goals (SDGs) which the United Nations adopted in September 2015, and their key role on the UN Peacebuilding Commission.\textsuperscript{21}

Assembling accurate data on how much emerging donors are providing and what kind of sectors and projects they support is difficult. Unlike the traditional donors who report to the Donors Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Development Co-Operation Directorate of the OECD, most emerging donors do not share information through DAC mechanisms.\textsuperscript{22} Many emerging donors are not collecting and reporting data systematically. Often emerging donors disburse assistance not through a single agency but rather through a variety of institutions, making it more difficult to track allocated funds. Finally, the cooperative ventures emerging donors establish with recipient countries often do not conform to how development assistance is measured by DAC donors. As the 2011 \textit{Africa Economic Outlook} report pointed out, developing countries pursue very different strategies than traditional donors, and their assistance “combines commercial and development interests on financing modalities (...) Export credits play an increasingly large role in relations between Africa and its developing country partners. Emerging partners also use what is called mixed credits i.e. a financing package that combines concessional rate and market rate loans.”\textsuperscript{23} In other words, in this new donor landscape it is not at all clear what exactly should be counted as aid. Further complicating the pictures is

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item Many emerging donors did not contribute to the development of the DAC reporting mechanisms and therefore see little reason to participate in the organization.
\item \textit{Africa Economic Outlook} 2011, 52.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
that details about new trade, investment and lending arrangements between emerging donors and recipient countries are also often difficult to come by.

While in comparison to the traditional donors most emerging donor levels of assistance are still relatively small, the volume of assistance over the last decade has rapidly increased. For instance, between 2000 and 2009 South Korea’s development assistance (excluding bilateral debt relief) grew from $233.31 million to $825.8 million or more than 250 percent. Its bilateral assistance to Sub-Saharan Africa grew especially rapidly, increasing by 465 percent. By 2010 its development assistance amounted to $1.2 billion. Turkey’s development assistance between 2002 and 2012, increased from about $73 million to $3.3 billion. Brazil’s bilateral and multilateral aid according to some estimates reached $1 billion in 2010. India’s assistance increased 400% between 2004 and 2014, reaching $6 billion by 2015. According to some estimates China’s worldwide pledged aid grew from $1.7 billion to $189 billion annually between 2001 and 2011 according to one estimate. These numbers, however, need to be treated with caution. Because emerging donors do not report to the DAC (with the exception of South Korea) and because their assistance portfolio looks very differently than those of traditional donors, the estimates of these disbursements can vary widely between different sources.

Differences Between Emerging Donors and Shifts Over Time

Initially, emerging donors’ assistance focused primarily on their immediate geographic region. Thus, Russia focused in particular on Central Asia countries that used to be part of the Soviet Union; India has funneled much of its assistance to Afghanistan, Sri Lanka, and Nepal; Brazil was an important actor in reconstruction of Haiti; South Africa has concentrated overwhelming majority of its aid in Sub-Saharan Africa and in particular the Congo; and the Arab Gulf countries prioritized assistance to Somalia, Sudan and the Occupied Palestinian Territories.\(^{27}\) China, on the other hand, focused on other countries in Asia, such as Myanmar and Cambodia.

Over the past decade or so, most emerging donors have looked to expand their reach, paying greater attention to countries outside of their immediate geographic neighborhood and looking to establish a more global presence.\(^ {28}\) India, Brazil, Turkey the Arab Gulf States and in particular China have significantly expanded their footprint in sub-Saharan Africa. The Arab Gulf states also provide assistance to countries with large Muslim populations outside of the Middle East, for instance Bosnia-Herzegovina and Tajikistan.


Although some emerging donors, for example India, have long provided significant number of peacekeeping troops, over the last decade, one of the key changes has been their growing involvement in United Nations peace operations. For instance, between 2001 and 2010, Brazil, China, India and South Africa’s share of deployed personnel in these operations has increased from 5 percent to 15 percent. In 2013, China was contributing more troops and police to UN peacekeeping operations than any other permanent member of the Security Council. At the same time, it has become more willing to commit combat troops to these missions. Today more often than in the past, they emerging donors are sending their peacekeeping troops to areas outside their immediate neighborhood. At the same time, emerging donors are looking to shape the peacebuilding and peacekeeping policies and have become very active in the United Nations Peacebuilding Commission. However, the growing involvement of emerging donors in UN peacekeeping and peacebuilding operations should not be seen as a sign that these donors fully approve of the current UN approach to conflict-affected and post-conflict countries. China for instance, believes that the UN has relied too heavily on the Western peacebuilding model, focusing too much on demobilization.

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30 China dispatched 700 infantry troops to South Sudan in 2015.
32 de Coning and Pradash, 2016.
and governance issues while neglecting economic reconstruction processes and paying insufficient attention to the particularities of local contexts.\textsuperscript{33}

At the same time, emerging donors have also become more engaged in conflict-affected and post-conflict countries by forging bilateral relationships and by working through regional and multilateral fora. In many cases what pushes them to intervene in conflict-affected settings is a mix of economic and security interests. In other words, concern with supporting stability in conflict-affected contexts is often driven by interest in accessing markets and resources of these states rather than a concern with conflict prevention or post-conflict reconstruction and peacebuilding per se. At the same time, for many emerging donors, the key to ensuring stability and long-term peace is ensuring sustainable economic development. Thus, their own commercial interests and the promotion of economic development in conflict-affected states is symbiotic.

Emerging donors, however, are a diverse set of countries and their policies and strategic objectives, economic interests, assistance provision philosophies and priorities also differ.\textsuperscript{34} India’s often focuses primarily on infrastructure development, education, and health as well as technical cooperation. Brazil tends to


target agricultural development, especially leveraging its expertise in tropical agriculture and provides technical training, as well as public health. South Africa often supports government capacity development projects and democracy promotion. China emphasizes infrastructure development; Turkey humanitarian assistance and developing social infrastructure, while Russia primarily supports health, education and food security projects.

Arab Gulf states, and in particular Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Qatar, have tended to support infrastructure development and reconstruction projects. Historically, most of the assistance from Arab Gulf States has been provided in the form of soft loans and grants and has been administered either directly to governments or through regional financial institutions and national funds. There are both formal governmental institutions as well as more informal organizations through which assistance is channeled. The former category includes such institutions as the Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development, Abu Dhabi Fund for Development, and the Saudi Fund for Development. In the latter there are various “quasi non-governmental and ad hoc donor institutions, which while formally private, disburse assistance from and in the name of the state.”

Most emerging donors, as their relationships with and engagement in states emerging out of conflict deepens, have also begun to more explicitly articulate their views on the relationship between security and development. Furthermore, these approaches seem to be also shifting over time, often in response to the experience of

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35 The levels of assistance provided by Bahrain and Oman are small.  
36 Barakat and Zack, 10.
engagement in conflict-affected states and the need to adjust policy preferences to the realities on the ground. China, which initially appeared to largely think of security and development as separate and distinct categories, has moved toward more explicitly linking the two.\textsuperscript{37} Its growing engagement with conflict-affected states has also begun shifting its views on non-interference. While non-interference remains China’s official policy, it has increasingly engaged in international mediation efforts, for instance in Darfur. In 2012 a new “Initiative on China-Africa Cooperative Partnership for Peace and Security,” was introduced. It provides funds to “help strengthen Africa’s indigenous capabilities for maintaining peace and security” and has become part of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC).\textsuperscript{38} More recently, China has been wiling to channel significant fund toward peacebuilding activities. In 2015 for instance, President Xi Jinping committed $1 billion to supporting UN Peacebuilding programs and $10 million to Africa Union’s peace and security operations.

India, Brazil and South Africa are also making these linkages more explicit. Brazil’s policy sees a need to balance development, peace and solidarity. It views most of its support for peacebuilding activities through the lens of South-South cooperation aimed at reducing social vulnerabilities that contribute to conflict,


while respecting state sovereignty and non-conditionality. Its most extensive interventions in post-conflict settings have been in Guinea-Bissau and Haiti where it sought to integrate work on reconciliation and establishing security with supporting economic development.\textsuperscript{39}

India prioritizes consolidating peace, rebuilding trust in the state, and strengthening governance.\textsuperscript{40} However, India does not make a distinction between development assistance and assistance to conflict-affected states or for post-conflict reconstruction projects.\textsuperscript{41} Its engagements with conflict-affected states in its immediate neighborhood, for instance Sri Lanka and Nepal, however, have been shaped not just by principles of South-South cooperation and respect for state sovereignty but also by its own security concerns.\textsuperscript{42}

South Africa, drawing on its own experience with transition from apartheid to democracy, is especially interested in accelerating socio-economic development and promoting reconciliation. Unlike India, South Africa has placed peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction as a central focus of its foreign policy. The 2011 White Paper on South Africa’s Foreign Policy lays out the government’s plan to “continue to play a leading role in conflict prevention, peacekeeping, peace-building,

\textsuperscript{40} Sherman, Gleason, Sindhu, Jones, 2011, 3.
and post-conflict reconstruction." It has focused much of its assistance on supporting post-conflict peacebuilding efforts in Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and South Sudan. These interventions have had mixed results. As the economic malaise in South Africa has deepened, the government has struggled to justify to an increasingly skeptical public the why the country's scarce resources should be devoted to continuing these engagements.

Turkey's assistance to fragile states has increased from $94 million in 2004 to $1.5 billion in 2012, an increase of 1540 percent. In other words, two thirds of its foreign assistance targets fragile states, with funds flowing to such conflict-affected states as Afghanistan, Pakistan, Kyrgyzstan, Iraq, Myanmar and Somalia. Turkey frames this humanitarian assistance as stemming from its Islamic values and argues that it is “undertaken for the ‘love of God and with no hidden agendas’” and is thus apolitical and done in close collaboration with local actors in recipient states.

Although most emerging donors have, over time, expanded the geographic reach of their engagement with conflict-affected and post-conflict states, how these relationships are pursued, the priorities and policies vis-à-vis those states in the donors’ immediate geographic neighborhood and outside of it tend differ.

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46 Tank, 2016.
affected states located close to the donor country, are more likely to be viewed through a security and geostrategic lenses. (give a few examples here: India, Russia, Turkey for instance)

**The Security-Development Nexus**

Debates about processes of reconstruction after civil war are embedded within a broader debate about the relationship between security and development. Although both traditional and emerging donors have come to see the importance of the linkage between security and development, how this should be translated into policies remains distinct.

Although in the last two decades traditional donors have come to pay particular attention to the nexus between security and development, concerns about the relationship between conflict, especially violent conflict, and economic development go back to the end of World War II when the international community grappled with the challenge of post-conflict reconstruction in Europe and the crumbling of colonial empires. Two issues came to dominate the international agenda: the rebuilding of countries devastated by the war and the economic and political development of the newly independent states of Africa and Asia. What linked them together was the perception that future violence and wars could be prevented by ensuring economic development and international financial stability. New institutions were established, most important the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (the World Bank), the International Monetary Fund and the United Nations in order to guarantee the flow of funds for
reconstruction and development projects, availability of short-term loans to prevent financial crises and the provision of a forum for peaceful resolution of international disputes and conflicts.

With the end of the Cold War in the early 1990s how the international community viewed the relationship between development and security fundamentally transformed. First, with the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the relationship between Russia and the United States within the United Nations’ Security Council improved while at the same time the number of civil war spiked, making the organization both more willing and more able to expand UN’s peacekeeping, peace-enforcing and peace-building activities. The scope of the international community’s interventions in domestic conflicts implied a redefining state sovereignty norms and an expansion of the legitimate domain for external intervention. As Doyle points out, “Member states endorsed a radical expansion in the scope of collective intervention. Matters once legally preserved from UN intervention such as civil conflicts and humanitarian emergencies within sovereign states became legitimate issues of UN concern.”

At the same time, security and development came to be seen by many within the United Nations and the World Bank as well as other traditional donors, as interrelated and mutually reinforcing. In order to break this conflict trap and establish conditions for durable peace required enabling these societies to generate

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sustainable economic growth. This perceived link between poverty, inequality and lack of development and violent conflict was at the center of the Millennium Development Goals adopted by the United Nations in 2000:

More than a billion people -- one-sixth of the world's population -- live in extreme poverty, lacking the safe water, proper nutrition, basic health care and social services needed to survive. The consequences of this poverty reach far beyond the afflicted societies. Poverty, inequality and disease are chief causes of violent conflict, civil war and state failures. A world with extreme poverty is a world of insecurity. 49

Thus, since the end of the Cold War, the UN, traditional donors, like the United States and the United Kingdom, the World Bank and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) have come to see development and security as deeply linked, mutually dependent and reinforcing. 50 In 2001, the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty in its report The Responsibility to Protect argued that, “there is a growing recognition world-wide that the protection of human security (...) must be one of the fundamental objectives of modern international institutions.” 51

The September 11, 2001 attacks on the Twin Towers in New York City and on the Pentagon strengthened the perceived link between development and security

49 http://www.unmillenniumproject.org/who/index.htm
among traditional donors even further. Conflict was no longer a problem of the poor, of the developing world, of the global “zones of war.” The attacks brought violence directly into what seemed like the safe and comfortable “zones of peace” of the advanced post-industrial democracies. The dominant discourse now came “in the magic mantra of mutual vulnerability of the developed and the underdeveloped world.”\textsuperscript{52} It suggested that the failed states of the Global South and their conflicts posed a danger not just to those residing within these states but rather to the global community writ large by spreading “the virus of disorder.”\textsuperscript{53} The 2002 United States National Security Strategy underscored that, “America is now threatened less by conquering states than we are by failing ones.”\textsuperscript{54} At the same time the definition of security begun to widen to now include human, economic, food and environmental security. The fear of disorder further expanded the scope of acceptable interventions and the extent to which international community was willing to shape and mold the economic, political, legal and social structures of these conflict affected and fragile states. The focus on the nexus between security and development has resulted in changes in the types of programs and activities that both bilateral and multilateral donors are engaged with some “traditionally associated with security rather than development, and vice versa.”\textsuperscript{55}

\textsuperscript{53} Turner and Pugh.
The concern with the impact of state fragility on global security was reflected in the proliferation of lists of fragile states, such as the OECD’s *States of Fragility* annual report,\(^{56}\) the convening by the World Bank of the annual *Fragility, Violence and Conflict Forum*, the publication by the World Bank the *Development Report 2011: Security, Development and Conflict*, and debates at the World Economic Forum about the nature of state fragility.\(^{57}\) More recently, this concern with security and development has been reflected in the policy of Countering Violent Extremism. As President Obama noted in his remarks in February 2015, \(^{58}\)

> We must address the grievances that terrorists exploit, including economic grievances (...) poverty alone does not cause a person to become a terrorist, any more than poverty alone causes someone to become a criminal (...) But when people -- especially young people -- feel entirely trapped in impoverished communities, where there is no order and no path for advancement, where there are no educational opportunities, where there are no ways to support families, and no escape from injustice and the humiliations of corruption -- that feeds instability and disorder, and makes those communities ripe for extremist recruitment.\(^{58}\)

**The Security-Development Nexus and Emerging Donors**

The linking of security and development by traditional donors has come under scrutiny from a wide range of critics. Duffield for instance has argued that rather than seeking to improve the lives of people within these fragile states, these expanding interventions are rather designed as way for the Global North to exert

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\(^{56}\) Because there was little agreement about how to assess and classify fragility, often different states appeared on these different lists.

\(^{57}\) Anne-Lise Klausen, “What is State Fragility?” World Economic Forum, April 1, 2015 (https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2015/04/what-is-a-fragile-state/)

political control and contain what is seen as threat of spreading disorder. Uvin, on the other hand, connected the new politics of post-conflict reconstruction to neocolonialism during which “in the name of a totalizing, missionary-style ideology (based on a deeply romanticized vision of the situation ‘at home’) foreigners are encouraged to make deeply interventionist life and death decisions for other societies, unbound by outside control, unconstrained by procedure, unaffected by outcomes.” The security-development nexus has also been criticized for its legitimizing of extensive interventions in states that are deemed fragile by the Global North and for securitizing development. This securitization, critics argue, can be seen most explicitly in the counterinsurgency strategies that U.S.-led coalitions have pursued in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Despite various critiques of the development-security nexus, it has become a key way in which traditional donors have approached assistance to conflict-affected and fragile states. What about emerging donors? Have they also approached conflict-affected states through this linking of security with development? First although emerging donors have tended to eschew using terms such as state fragility and have voiced concerns about how assistance policies with conditionalities affect

state sovereignty, there are also important differences among emerging donors’ approaches to providing assistance to conflict-affected states. Furthermore, these policies appear to have shifted over time at least in the case of some donors.

Although traditional donors regarded them with unease, emerging donors growing international role translated into an invitation to participate in debates about international cooperation, coordination and aid effectiveness. While emerging donors have been involved in some of the debates about reforming how development assistance is provided, they have nonetheless remained wary of OECD-generated development assistance frameworks. For instance the 2005 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness that emerged out of an international forum attended by both donors and recipient countries “promised a revised aid system, with commitments to improve ownership, alignment, harmonization, results and mutual accountability.” A number of emerging donors including Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, South Africa, Brazil, China, and Turkey participated in the forum. This meeting was followed by the Accra Agenda for Action in 2008 in which again both traditional and emerging donors participated. Most emerging donors are listed as adhering to both the Paris Declaration and Accra Agenda. Nonetheless, emerging donors have not endorsed the New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States adopted


63 A full list of countries adhering to both can be found at http://www.oecd.org/dac/effectiveness/countriesterritoriesandorganisationsadheringtothepearsdeclarationandaaa.htm
during the 2011 Busan conference on aid effectiveness. Brazil, China and India did sign on to the Busan Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation but only after “demanding the insertion of language distancing non-OECD donors from concrete commitments.”

South Africa and Indonesia have been invited to participate as observers in the OECD Working Party on Aid Effectiveness and China and Brazil in OECD-sponsored International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding (IDPS) which provides a forum for discussing with the g7+ group of fragile states, donors and civil society groups. Despite these invitations, emerging powers have been absent from deliberations of the International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding.

In other words, although the emerging donors participated in many of the forums where new aid architecture was being developed, provided funds to various multilateral organizations for both development and humanitarian assistance, and contributed increasing numbers of troops to United Nations peace operations, this ...

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64 Fritz Nganje, “Southern Voices: Two-Way Socialization Between Traditional and Emerging Donors Critical for Effective Development Cooperation,” Africa Close Up, January 6, 2014, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars (http://africaupclose.wilsoncenter.org). The Peacebuilding and Statebuilding goals that form the New Deal focus include: Legitimate politics (foster inclusive settlements and conflict resolution); security (establish and strengthen people’s security); justice (address injustices and increase people’s access to justice); economic foundations (generate employment and improve livelihoods); and revenue and services (manage revenue and build capacity for accountability and fair service delivery), European Commission, Conflict, Fragility and Development.


66 For a full list of participating countries see http://www.pbsbdialogue.org/en/id/participating-countries-and-organisations/
did not imply that they shared similar understanding about the security-
development nexus as traditional donors.

In September 2015 the international community formally adopted the Sustainable Development Goals at the United Nations meeting in New York City. The SDGs formally replaced the Millennium Development Goals and represented a shift in how development at the global level was conceptualized and signaled a shift in the relationship between Global North and Global South. In particular, the debates around the content of SDGs indicated the growing importance of emerging donors in the debates about global development architecture. Although the negotiations over SDGs aimed at making the process more inclusive and integrating voices from the Global South into the debates (unlike in the case of MDG negotiations which were much more top down), in reality the ability of many delegations from the Global South to participate on an equal footing with those from the Global North was constrained by limited resources. Nonetheless emerging donors played an important role in the negotiations. The debates within the Open Working Group were often quite contentious with sharp divisions around such issues as reproductive rights, climate change, rule of law, sustainable consumption, and modes of implementation among others. These conflicts mirrored the broader divide in how traditional and emerging donors as well as recipients of aid, view the global development architecture. In particular, the attitudes about the appropriate relationship between assistance and good governance conditionalities continue to diverge between traditional and emerging donors, with the former favoring them
while the latter continuing to view them as unnecessary and unwelcome interference in domestic policies.67"

One of the key contentious issues in the negotiations around the SDGs was Goal 16: Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions. The goal explicitly linked issues of economic development and the reduction of violence.68 For many at the negotiating table, in particular from the Global South there were deep concerns that the linking of development and security would inevitably lead to the securitization of the development agenda, “with aid being used to advance the national security agenda


68 In it's final, adopted version Goal 16 reads: “Peace, stability, human rights and effective governance based on the rule of law are important conduits for sustainable development. We are living in a world that is increasingly divided. Some regions enjoy sustained levels of peace, security and prosperity while others fall into seemingly endless cycles of conflict and violence. This is by no means inevitable and must be addressed.

High levels of armed violence and insecurity have a destructive impact on a country’s development, affecting economic growth and often resulting in long standing grievances among communities that can last for generations. Sexual violence, crime, exploitation and torture are also prevalent where there is conflict or no rule of law, and countries must take measures to protect those who are most at risk.

The Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) aim to significantly reduce all forms of violence, and work with governments and communities to find lasting solutions to conflict and insecurity. Strengthening the rule of law and promoting human rights is key to this process, as is reducing the flow of illicit arms and strengthening the participation of developing countries in the institutions of global governance.” (http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/sdgoeverview/post-2015-development-agenda/goal-16.html)
of particular States, rather than to promote development for people." There were also concerns about the framing of this goal providing an opportunity for some donors to violate recipient countries’ sovereignty. There were also concerns that “peace-related targets could translate into new aid conditionalities.”

Some of the most recent public statements of emerging donors regarding the linkage between security and development have come at the United Nations Security Council meeting held shortly after the terrorist attacks in Paris in November 2015. They highlight some of the persisting key differences between traditional and emerging donors. At the meeting, Chinese Ambassador Liu Jieyi, affirming the long-standing principal of non-interference and respect for state-sovereignty, stated that,

The present world is far from peaceful. Regional conflicts are spreading and the root causes have yet to be eliminated (...) The imbalance in international development is striking. The path to achieving lasting peace and common prosperity is long. Establishing a new type of international relationship centered around win-win cooperation and building a community of common destiny for humankind is a fundamental guarantee for promoting peace and development and eliminating the root causes of conflicts around the world (...) All countries must be treated equally and their sovereignty and territorial integrity must be respected. There should be no intervention in the internal affairs of other countries and the rights of other countries to independently choose their social systems and development paths should be respected.

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70 Ibid.
The Russian Ambassador Churkin’s views, during the same debate, hinted at some of the tensions in how traditional and emerging donors continue to view the relationship between security and development,

Despite its [the topic of that day’s discussion]innocuous appearances, poses, in our view, certain risks for the Security Council. On the one hand, it does not take much imagination to understand that there is a definite link between security and development. The danger lies in making that an absolute truth in a hasty attempt to craft some sort of universal approach to resolving problems in the context of security and development (...). Excessive focus on any one aspect of security means that we lose sight of many others, including territorial, ideological, historical, religious, psychological, environmental and technological aspects (...). The development of States is a process that cannot be forced into implementation. There is no one right answer. The process can be assisted but not imposed.  

Ambassador Churkin quite also explicitly critiqued the statebuilding model advocated by traditional donors and the interference in domestic affairs of states, highlighting the potential “destructive impact of both sides of the equation [security and development].” For his part, the Brazilian Ambassador Antonio de Aguiar Patriota noted that,

Brazil has long upheld the notion that development and security are closely interconnected, mutually reinforcing and central to the achievement of lasting peace (...). However, the relationship between security and development cannot be understood from a simplistic perspective. We should clearly reject any notion that poverty itself might constitute a threat to peace. One should not lose sight of the fact that the gravest threats to international peace and security, including world wars, have historically risen from tensions between developed industrial nations. Militaristic agendas and the unilateral use of force are far more significant sources of instability than poverty per se (...). Understanding and tackling the root causes of conflict are a key step in preventing the emergence of new hostilities (...). Some challenges are particularly frequent, including economic and social inequality,

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disputes regarding ownership of land and natural resources, human rights violations, the insufficient participation of women and the marginalization of minorities and vulnerable populations (...) Discerning the root causes of a particular conflict is a complex endeavor that should not be confused with the attainment of a development agenda. The first silo to be broken down by this debate is the erroneous perception that only developing countries need to build peaceful and inclusive societies.73

The Indian Ambassador, Mr. Bishnoi, concurred with the assessment that peace and development are interconnected, with absence of development often contributing to a sense of relative deprivation which may drive conflict. However, he saw an the causes of current conflicts elsewhere,

The greatest threat to peace and security comes from violent extremism and religious fanaticism, not from the absence of social and economic development (...) We need to also acknowledge that it is the absence of State authority, or weak State authority, that provides the breeding ground for extremist organizations to operate.74

Only Turkey’s representative voiced support for a more comprehensive approach to addressing cycles of conflict. These need to include, Ambassador Cevik argued, the promotion of the rule of law and promotion of human rights, good governance and institutional building, security sector reform as well as addressing political and economic causes of conflict, noting that, “Inequality, not just of incomes but also of opportunities, is a source of social and political instability.”75 These recent statements underscore the key differences both among emerging donors and

75 Statement by Ambassador Cevik at the United Nations Security Council 7561st meeting, November 17, 2015. It will be interesting to see if these positions begin shifting in light of the tightening of political space in Turkey in recent months.
between emerging and traditional donors regarding the security-development nexus.

**Conclusion**

Emerging donors are playing a much more significant role than just a decade ago in providing humanitarian and development assistance, including to countries affected by conflict. It is important to underscore, however, that many of these emerging donors, such as Russia or Arab Gulf States, have been donors for a long time, and others India in particular, has been providing peacekeeping troops to UN operations for decades. Nonetheless their current levels of engagement are unprecedented.

As this paper noted, there are a number of challenges in assessing the level of that engagement since most emerging donors are not members of DAC, often do not have a single agency charged with providing development assistance and their assistance portfolios look quite different from traditional donors, and include for instance including exports credits and soft loans. These factors combined often make it difficult to accurately assess their levels of involvement.

Nonetheless, some key conclusions can be drawn. First, while initially most emerging donors channeled assistance primarily towards their immediate geographic neighborhood, over time their reach expanded and assistance now goes to a broader array of states. Second, although emerging donors often frame their relationships with recipients of aid in collaborative terms that eschew the notions of hierarchy they see in traditional donors’ engagement with developing countries, the
motives for their provision of financing are varied and include economic, political and strategic objectives. Third, there are significant differences among emerging donors themselves.

When it comes to emerging powers engagement with conflict-affected states, emerging donors like traditional donors are interested in supporting poverty-reduction and encouraging conditions favorable to foreign direct investment. However, they are much more focused on technical assistance rather than capacity building and their funding tend to be bilateral providing and tend not to support civil society organizations, something that traditional donors do. On the other hand, emerging donors tend not favor conditionalities and tying assistance to good governance reforms or environmental policies although some, like Brazil and South Africa do support strengthening democratic practices.

Finally, although emerging and traditional donors both see a link between security and development there remain profound differences in how that linkage should be understood. While there are also differences among emerging donors in how they conceptualize the relationship between security and development, one of the common concerns is about securitization of development policies and seeing poverty as the sole cause of global conflicts.