**Reassessing the Concept of Peace in the Concert of Europe: A European Model of Security Based upon Cooperation of States against People**

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The concept of peace is a paradoxical notion for IR discipline. Major IR theories discuss the concept from the perspectives of the paradigms that they suppose and usually the concept of peace appears as an environment which either conflict does not exist or simply appears harmless for an achieved order. Not surprisingly, in case of IR, the concept of peace is generally defined in close relation with the concept of war. So basically, peace studies either focus on disturbance of peace by an outbreak of war or a post-war development to achieve order which has been broken by the recent conflict. The former is the subject of the field which focuses on "the causes of war" and the latter is quite about "peace building". However these topics represent the processes in which peace is broken or achieved.

The primary aim of this paper is to analyze the structure of a concept of peace which has been specifically designed for security. Though Concert of Europe was an achievement that had been organized by the end of the Napoleonic Wars and yet it was a post-war order that achieved a level of great power based collective security for Europe, it was structured on transnational security definitions, rather than international ones. This major characteristic of the Concert was often over shadowed by state based conservative theories which focuses on interaction between states or simply define states are the primary actors of IR. From a different perspective, this paper would focus on the interaction of the states in founding common grounds to define a common enemy: their subjects or simply the people they govern.

This paper does not persist on xan argument on reaching a universal definition for the concept or peace.[1] On the contrary, defining the concept will be omitted. Instead the specific dynamics that are given by Oliver P. Ricmond in his study "Peace in International Relations" as the characteristics of the way peace is generally thought and deployed in IR will be taken in to account to form the basis of analysis.[2]

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[1] Several definitions may be found for Peace in Christopher E. Miller, **A Glossary of Terms and Concepts in Peace and Conflict Studies**, Ed: Mary E. King, 2nd Edition, University for Peace, p.55-56.

[2] These characteristics are as follows:
1. Peace is always aspired to and provides an optimum, though idealistic, point of reference;
2. It is viewed as an achievable global objective, based on universal norms;
3. It is viewed as a geographically bounded framework defined by territory, culture, identity and national interests;
4. It is presented as an objective truth, associated with complete legitimacy;
5. It is related to certain ideology or political or economic framework;

**Concert of Europe: Restoration in Peace or Reconstruction for Peace?**

Concert of Europe represents an era of the 19th century in which major European states cooperated to resolve their conflicts through negotiation rather than employing use of arms. Usually IR theories consider this era as the triumph of diplomacy rather than use of war and give special interest to the interaction of major powers in gathering meetings to solve problems between them. The concert was basically a hierarchy in which five major powers form the core of the European political system.[3] The other European states were considered as secondary. Especially the realist theory is keen to find models of conflict prevention and resolution between the major states in forms of balance of power or actor representation. Indeed the concert rested on delicate checks and balances of interests between the great powers of post Napoleonic Europe which derived from the Congress of Vienna. Although subjected to academic debate, It is suggested that the Holy Alliance and the Quadruple Alliance (which transformed to Quintet in 1818) were the basis of the system and also these agreements are referred to construct the structure which the concert rested on.[4]

Though historical approaches on the Concert of Europe refer to topics as balance of power, the rise of international law, the emergence of international institutionalism, all these concepts appear to be subjects of academic debate. One such controversy is Taylor-Schroeder debate.[5] While Taylor argues that post-Vienna alliances aimed to restore the pre-Napoleonic balance of power of the European political system which the scheme finally developed to a great power rivalry finalized by the First World War; Schroeder argued that the post-Napoleonic European system was transformed from the classical balance of power to a sort of hierarchy which great powers construct a form of political equilibrium, transforming the balance to a level of cooperation.[6] Thus Taylor's approach presents basis

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6.  It is viewed as a temporal phase;
7.  It is based upon state or collective security;
8.  It is based upon local, regional or global forms of governance, perhaps defined by a hegemonic actor or a specific multilateral institution;
9.  It is viewed as a top-down institutional framework or a bottom up civil society-oriented framework;
10. There needs to be little discussion of the conceptual underpinnings of peace because it is one ideal liberal form,
11. Most thinking about peace in IR is predicated on preventing conflict, and at best creating an externally supported peace, not creating a self-sustaining peace.

Oliver P. Richmond, **Peace in International Relations**, London, Routledge, 2008, p. 8.

[3] F.R. Bridge and Roger Bullen, **The Great Powers and the European System**, London, Longman, 1980, p.2.

[4] Tim Chapman, **Congress of Vienna**, London, Routledge, 1998, p. 60.

[5] T.C.W. Blanning, "Paul Schroeder's Concert of Europe", **The International History Review**, Vol. 16, No. 4 (Nov., 1994), pp. 701-714.

[6] See, A.J.P.Taylor, **The Struggle for Mastery in Europe 1848-1918**, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1953, Paul W. Schroeder, **The Transformation of European Politics**, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1994. Also see: Paul Schroeder, "A. J. P. Taylor's International System", **The International History Review**, xxin. 1: March 2001, p p . 1-27; " Did the Vienna Settlement Rest on a Balance of Power?", **The American Historical Review**, Vol. 97, No. 3 (Jun., 1992), pp. 683-706; " The Nineteenth Century System: Balance of Power or Political Equilibrium?", **Review of International Studies**, Vol. 15, No. 2, Special Issue on the Balance of Power(Apr., 1989), pp. 135-153;

for Anglo-Saxon realist international relations theorization, on the contrary Schroeder's argument stands quite related to European political science doctrine. Here referring to an old echo may draw a line between, Quoting from Robert Mowatt:

"There are two outstanding points of the Congress of Vienna. In the first place, it was not a "Peace Congress", because peace had already been made at Paris, and all the questions at issue between France and the Allies had been definitely settled. The state of war had ceased both in fact and in law, and France, when the Congress of Vienna met, could claim to associate with other Powers as regular member of the European States-system.

The second outstanding point is that the Congress of Vienna did not meet to make a new world out of the old; if anyone had said that in twenty years of warfare the old European system had collapsed beyond repair, the Congress Powers would have denied it; they believed that the old European system had been a stable thing which on the whole had satisfied the needs of mankind, both for law and for liberty; and so they meant not to reconstruct a new system but to restore the old."[7]

Analyzing Mowat's lines, two important results may be pointed out. First, as seen above, almost all historical approaches refer the achievements of Vienna settlements as state centric. Any achievement during the construction of the concert came to life by the effort of European states, for the sake of the European states and with the involvement of the European states to reach an environment in which no state seek any self interest which may harm others own. In such an understanding states, European states, hold their grounds as the main actors, players of European politics which had been challenged by the chaos of French revolution. Second, as Mowat pointed out, post-Vienna was a process, first an attempt of restoration of a previous system which turned out to be a reconstruction of a new one. Here lays the mystery, what was it that the system had suffered? What was restored than reconstructed?

"Restoration" has an attribution to the history of the Congress of Vienna as it is referred to the reforming of the French monarchy (twice) after the abdication of Napoleon. In fact apart from France many other monarchies that were brought down by Napoleon were restored. Perhaps it should be noted that though Napoleon was an important anti-hero of monarchy biased Europe, it was in that sense his title as well as himself were the primary threats to the system. As "Emperor" of the "people"- not the king of his subjects-, he led a crusade against the monarchies of the "holy" and almost transformed two thirds of Europe and it was in same sense, European monarchies fought back to beat a man of revolution against the previous order rather than a revolutionary state.[8]

Perhaps it would be proper to indicate that Concert of Europe was an establishment over the damaged Westphalian system which could not adapt itself to the rapid deterioration of the monarchial legitimacy by the French Revolution. When France became a republic in 1793, other European states

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"Balance of Power and Political Equilibrium: A Response", **The International History Review**, Vol. 16, No. 4 (Nov., 1994), pp. 745-754.
[7] Robert B. Mowatt, **A History of European Diplomacy 1815-1914**, London, Edward Arnold & Co., 1922, p 4-5
[8] Henry Kissinger, **A World Restored Restored**, London, Phoenix Press, 1957, p. 176.

which were institutionalized with royal family ties were helpless to communicate with her in traditional ways of diplomacy. The common diplomatic values that had helped to work out in nearly every crisis since 1648, which were based on Monarchy kinship, were utterly disturbed. The crisis was a loss in the sense of Westphalian diplomacy. As diplomacy lost its power of communication, war remained the only instrument to communicate with a different identity. The Revolutionary Wars of the first coalitions clearly marked that it was impossible for monarchies of Europe to find terms of peace that could rest on a strong basis by using the old means which they had been using since 1648.

Worse than the idea of people ruling themselves, an idea of usurper fared far worser for European monarchies. When Napoleon declared himself as "Emperor", he was anything else but a royal. Once again royal houses of Europe were hapless to communicate with a ruler who claims to take his power from people and revolution. For other royals, Napoleon was not legitimate. So he seek legitimacy by arms and while doing that, he took the legitimacy he rested on to any new territory he won, thus destroying the old rule and building his own scheme.[9] By 1810, almost 2/3 of Europe was transformed to a Napoleonic spectrum of Napoleonic kings and national states. Even when the treaty of Chaumont which pawed way to Congress of Vienna was signed, Napoleonic states still stood strong.

Focusing on the Congress of Vienna, the meeting aimed at the reshaping the map which Napoleon redesigned on national terms. The Rhine Federation, Duchy of Warsaw and the Kingdom of Italy were such entities. Though the intention of the Congress was reshaping the map in a way which can both fulfill the interest of the major powers and yet keeping them in cooperation against any further attempt for a hegemony over Europe. However Napoleon's escape from Elba and his hundred days proved that the spirit of nationalism and revolution was still present effectively. Therefore his final defeat and abdication was followed by declarations of anti-Napoleonic statements. These were the Holy Alliance and later the Quadruple Alliance which the former was based on arguments of legitimacy crowned by an extreme conservative spirit and the latter on diplomatic cooperation on isolating France who still seemed prone to nationalist and revolutionary spirit.

Signed on 18 September 1815, the Holy Alliance was a proclamation of the three East European monarchies which rested on the royal houses of Habsburg, Hohenzollern and Romanov. The scheme of the alliance was proposed by Alexander I of Russia and appeared as a manifesto of absolute monarchy as its content refers to a spectrum from divine right of the kings that appear in Holy Scriptures to Christianity's value system in which a king should rule with justice and love his subjects as the shepherd of his flock or father of his family.[10] The alliance was proposed as a spiritual bonding of the three sects of Christianity through bonding three absolute monarchs through fraternity. By the

[9] Stephen J. Lee, **Aspects of European History**,London, Routledge, 1982,  p. 18.
[10] Mowat, ibid, p. 23, 24; Norman Rich, **Great Power Diplomacy**, New York, McGraw-Hill, 1992, p. 25-26.

contract they made, all three monarchs accepted each other as equals and as brothers and promised to rule their subjects in ways of Christianity's charity, justice, peace and promised to stay in bond to help each other to fulfill the role given to them by God. In such bonding, the parties accepted to employ any forceful measurement only in case of helping one another.

The content of the Holy Alliance was clearly a manifesto on the legitimacy of the absolute monarchy's sovereignty over the people who had recently lived quite different experiences from the beginning of the French Revolution and through the experience of the Napoleonic Wars. Almost all European powers were forced to muster huge armies to fight against the citizens in arms of French Republic and then Napoleon's French Empire. Such an experience had transformed the submissive subjects of the monarchial regimes to a higher consciousness of liberty and to a sense of nationality. It was in that sense the eastern monarchies found a common ground which they sense the same enemy, not in form of a state or a ruler but a bunch of ideas that had been spread all around by the previous experiences. Thus peace had to be developed on this very same common ground by building an anti-liberal and anti-nationalist bloc against the any attempt that would come within the people that monarchies rule. As the three monarchs of Russia, Austria and Prussia formed the foundation of the contract, all European states was called to adhere the principals of the contract and in doing so be accepted to the accord as equals. Except England who could not fit to rhetoric of the alliance as it was a liberal monarchy, all the others responded positively to the call and signed the alliance. After the restoration of the French monarchy, the Holy Alliance was the second successful formation of restoration and in that very same sense its content was the basis which peace was built upon. In a final attempt, England was made fit to the new peace through Quadruple Alliance that was signed on 20 November 1815, which refer France as a rouge state for European peace but has no other content about what Holy Alliance was based on. Finally, peace was brought back to Europe.

**Analyzing the European Peace in post Vienna Era**

To analyze the framework of the peace which persisted in the post Vienna status quo in Europe, the basic characteristics that were put forward by Oliver Richmond would give satisfactory results. In that sense his proposed sequence will be fallowed.

1) Peace is always aspired to and provides an optimum, though idealistic, point of reference:

In case of Concert of Europe, Congress of Vienna was the peace building congress because peacemaking was already achieved by the previous Chaumont Treaty and Paris Treaty. Even the hundred days of Napoleon did not make any difference and the Second Paris Treaty marked the final peace of the Napoleonic Wars. Therefore Congress of Vienna gathered not in a sense of finishing a

conflict but rather constructing a stable post conflict order. Though the Quadruple Alliance may be regarded as the final formation of the great power club with the inclusion of Britain to the European system, the characteristics of the system was already defined by the contents of the Holy Alliance. Thus, the Holy Alliance acted as the point of reference for the fundamentals of the new peace that was being established. While referring Christian values and in a way Christian political hierarchy, the primary signatory monarchies constructed a sense of conservatism by overruling the basic concepts of French Revolution and Napoleon: equality, liberty and fraternity of the people which would have forced the legitimacy of the absolute monarchies of Europe, if they were pronounced by their subjects. Instead of such universal mottos, equality, fraternity of monarchs were proposed but liberty was limited to the values of Christianity which kings should be just and in that sense every king ought to help other to fulfill his role. The primary and idealistic reference of peace in the Concert of Europe was on the legitimacy of the absolute monarchs who based their sovereign rights on divine values of Christianity.[11]

2) Peace is viewed as an achievable global objective, based on universal norms:

The conditions which prepared the Holy Alliance presented a chaotic breakdown of the Westphalian state system. Since 1648, European states developed instruments for interaction that had been associated with monarchial relations through marriages of houses. As monarchs reigned supreme, European system turned in to power hierarchy in which five major royal houses dominated the continent's balance of power. 18th Century's dynastic wars created a system of balance which no state can dominate the system single handily. Therefore five great powers rose to play part as the major actors: Britain, France, Russia, Austria, Prussia and Russia.

However the structure, which the European system was based on, was disturbed by the French Revolution and finally brought down by Napoleon's imperial reign. Except Russia and England, almost all European states suffered under Napoleon's yoke. Napoleon had misplaced traditional monarchies, replaced them by constitutional regimes, redrew the borders which remain intact for hundred years and subdued great powers to himself by unequal treaties, stripping their ability to act for their own interest. By the treaty of Tilsit in 1806, Prussia became a lost its status as a great power and by the treaty of Schönbrunn in 1809, Austria met the same end. By 1810, the hierarchy and balance of the previous era was utterly destroyed.[12]

It was in that sense Congress of Vienna gathered to create a new peace which would omit Napoleon's deeds. Though such was the intentions, the victors was aware that the European map was utterly changed by the creation of Napoleonic client states which were based on constitutional regimes

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[11] Kissinger, ibid, p. 189.
[12] Lee, ibid, p.22.

and above all established in some extent on national sense. Such a situation necessitated a radical redrawing of the map by destroying these formations. In that sense, the decision makers of the congress referred to the monarchial values of the previous system as the universal norm. Therefore before the removal of the Napoleonic states from the map, the previous monarchial regimes that were removed by Napoleon were restored to their thrones. Such a restoration reformed a vision of the pre French Revolution Europe where all states were familiarized to share the same type of regime in which they used to interact flawlessly. In such a sense, restoration also meant the restoration of the norms of the pre French Revolution European system.[13]

It is needed to be stated that the monarchial restorations were movements from above. Though there were obvious nationalist and liberal predispositions in almost any state in Europe, there was no intention of asking the consent of the people who were supposed to be the submissive subjects. This was why the Holy Alliance strongly referred to the Christian values for legitimization of the restored and ongoing monarchies.

3) Peace is viewed as a geographically bounded framework defined by territory, culture, identity and national interests:

The geographically bounded framework of peace in case of Concert of Europe was somehow driven by both individual and common interests of the four powers of Europe, namely Britain, Russia, Austria and Austria. In case of both individual and common interests the power distribution between the major European powers was problematic. The flanking super powers of the concert were the strongest thus had the maximum means, in terms of geography and material, to exercise their "power". As Britain emerged with a chain of important station islands that could control the whole sea lanes which enabled the British navy becoming not the only major naval arm on the world but also a system control instrument; an instrument which Britain will regularly use in the forthcoming system crises. Same was true with Russia but from a different perspective. Covering nearly 1/3 of the Eurasian continent and relying upon a massive population and the strongest land force, Russia could exercise her "power" in any land around it. Thus the means that made Britain and Russia "super powers", also made them "world powers".

Despite the vision that these two super powers had, the triple powers located on the center of the continent were clearly locals. France's lost overseas assets in the Congress of Vienna gave Britain a distant advantage over the command of the seas. Also being the most mistrusted partner of the new order, France was politically isolated. Imprisoned on the center of the continent and surrounded by problematic regions which had to be handled in some kind policies so they do not affect her inner

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[13] For more information on restorations in Europe see, Schroeder,**The Transformation of European Politics**, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1994, pp. 495-516.

structure, Austria was and had been the central power of European politics. However a steady decline since the Thirty Years War was in progress which had shrunk the old kingdom's political choices to a minimum. Prussia was the weakest link, the most small and also looking the most unfortunate state both in means and in comparison with the central powers. The only chance of her survival -a unification of the German states- had been frustrated in the outcome of the Congress of Vienna in which a German Confederacy was created upon lands that Prussia had claimed her sphere of influence.

In such a structure of power distribution it was obvious peace would be limited to a geographical definition. Such a definition emerged on dropping the individual claims and joining a common one. In that sense, both Britain and Russia joined the concert in case of continental issues. Britain synchronized herself to the continental peace but fallowed her own way on issues on non continental problems, as in the case Spanish claim on her ex-Latin American territories. Russia made it obvious that her interests on Ottoman territory were not to be discussed on any level. Prussia backed from any attempt on German Unification. It could be claimed that the peace of the concert was stuck between the east of the English Channel and the west of Vienna. Out of these borders, it was a matter of individual interactions. The scope of the concert was enclosed to Europe only and from the east of Vienna the consensus was not valid. The concert was also a land based enterprise and nothing was mentioned about the seas. The Concert promised to act in unison for the fundamentals of the post Vienna peace but only within the geographical scope that was commonly accepted. That was why it was called the Concert of Europe.

The decision makers in Vienna in 1815, clearly defined a geography and a culture for the new peace that was being established, both by during the course of the congress, by the supplementary accords. In that sense Quadruple Alliance formed the power equilibrium in which four major powers, though differing in power potentials, recognized each other positions as such, thus forming a great power club over the hierarchy in Europe. Their consent was over one main principle that is to create a common norm to be accepted by all which could surpass their individual interests. This norm was preserving the status quo and not to act individually but to act together or refer to each other instead, if any kind of threat to status quo both to individual or common interests appear.[14] However there was a sharp division in understanding the nature of this norm. The signatory monarchies labeled a conservative identity to peace through restoration which Britain could not synchronize herself with her liberal framework. Thus the signature of Quadruple Alliance synchronized Britain by labeling France as the anti-system component and leaving the conservative notion of the Holy Alliance aside. In such an understanding the framework of post Vienna peace found basis on two notions, first conservative against liberalism and nationalism (Russia, Austria and Prussia), second hostile to any power who has any will to change the status quo (Britain). By the Congress of Aux la Chapelle in 1818, France was

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[14] Bridge and Bullen, ibid, p. 4.

given a choice to accept the second notion and by her positive approach, she also was accepted to the Great Power Club as the fifth great power of Europe. It could be said with the inclusion of France in 1818 to the concert, it was clear that a sense of collective security was achieved as all major powers relied on accepting the common norm.

Apart from geography and national interests, peace of the concert was obviously a matter of culture and identity. The context of the Holy Alliance claimed that peace would reign between the Christian kings of Europe, thus any member should fit these definitions. The primary signatories of the Holy Alliance represented Catholicism, Protestantism and Orthodoxy and in that sense excluded others. In such a sense European peace and concert was formed in to an identity of Christendom.[15] However this achievement was closely related Russia's individual ambition to exclude Ottoman Empire out of the concern of the concert.

4) It is presented as an objective truth, associated with complete legitimacy

As mentioned before in the previous characteristics 1 and 2, Holy Alliance drew the lines of objective truth and legitimacy on Christian values and divine rights of monarchies. By the restorations of the older regimes to the throne, this was evidently achieved by 1820. However this would prove to be problematic as the measures taken would not stop the revolutions of 1820,1830 and 1848 which would tumble down the system and transform the states of Europe, eventually leading to the emergence of constitutional regimes and the change of the map by nationalist unifications.

5) It is related to certain ideology or political or economic framework:

It should be stated that the elite who gathered together in Vienna in 1815 were all bureaucrats of the previous system based on monarchic values and the hierarchy of the states that had prevailed after the Napoleonic wars were all some kind of monarchies. So the new system which was to be worked on in Vienna was supposed to be administered with monarchic values. The new system supposed to work on the glory of Kings, managed by the Kings' men and this should be done in a way such the states should be represented in the name of royal families. There was a sharp return to the equality of sovereigns as sovereignty rested on royal blood and all royal families enjoyed a divine legitimacy to rule their subjects. Perhaps this may be the one of the reasons why Schroeder labels the Concert of Europe not as a balance of power between Britain and Russia but a political equilibrium of all great powers that were accepted as such.[16] After the Congress final act was declared and the Concert was on

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[15] Henry A. Delfiner, "Alexander I, The Holy Alliance and Clemens Metternich: A Reappraisal", *East European Quarterly*, 2003, Vol:37, No:2, pp. 127-150, p.133.

[16] Paul Schroeder, "Did the Vienna Settlement Rest on a Balance of Power?", p 694-695

its way, all the states in Europe were governed by some kind of monarchy and there was not to be any other regime within European hierarchy until the emergence of the Second Republic.

6) Peace is viewed as a temporal phase:

The view of peace as a temporal phase in case Concert of Europe is twofold. On one side it had an intrastate dimension and on the other side it has an intestate dimension.

The intrastate dimension should be examined through the rise and fall of absolutism. Peace building in Vienna was a precarious process and Napoleon's hundred days proved that the spirit of that was introduced after the French Revolution was still quite alive at least in France. More than that the proposed restorations of the older monarchies and the dissolution of the constitutional Napoleonic states were measures imposed above. Therefore a threat of reaction from was ever present from 1815 onwards. Austrian Chancellor Metternich took the upper hand countering against any opposition for absolutism. However even he was aware that masses who called for liberalism could not be kept at bay for so long but he believed that such reform could only be introduced by the rulers, any attempt from below meant revolution. He was not alone. Tsar Alexander was the champion of the idea of counter revolution on international basis. He was keen on building an international police force to be used against any revolutionary attempt within the borders that the concert was present as in the case of Troppau Protocol in 1820.[17] Between 1820 and 1822, three conferences (Troppau, Laibach and Verona) took place by the involvement of five major powers of Europe to discuss about the measures to be taken against revolutions in Naples and in Spain which had broke out in demands for constitutional regimes. The final decisions were interstate interventions which Austria and France took the field. However in 1830, Britain and France intervened in favor of Belgium's uprising which was clearly nationalist, liberating Belgium from Holland. In 1833 with the signature of Munchengratz Agreement, which referred to the content of the Holy Alliance, Russia, Austria and Prussia agreed to support each other by any necessary means to surpass any revolutionary effort regardless of being liberal or national in character within their borders. Though this protocol provided Russian assistance to Austria in 1848 in case of Hungarian Revolution, the peace which was based on quintal understanding of the concert was so disturbed that no evidence of the absolutist spirit of Vienna remained. By the revolutions of 1848, except Russia, almost all states of the concert were transformed to constitutional regimes.

The interstate level of the temporal phase of the Concert of Europe should be examined through the clash of common and individual interest of the major European powers. Vienna accords aimed at preserving the peace by compelling the major powers of Europe to congresses in which each

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[17] L.C.B. Seaman describes the protocol as the main statement of the Holy Alliance, L.C.B. Seaman, **From Vienna to Versailles**, London, Methuen and Co. Ltd., 1955, p.12-13.

can negotiate their own individual interest until a common point of view is reached through meditation. This was a proven instrument of the Westphalian system to end wars, however in the case of Concert of Europe such meetings were gathered as a potential danger of conflict occurs. Thus use of arms was left as the last resort. The interstate dimension of peace relied on diplomacy as the powers were keen to stay away from a multisided major European war. The concert was a consensus but limited to an era which the power distribution was assumed to stay as it was.[18] The individual efforts of Britain and France during the Belgian revolution and in Charlist Wars during 1830's injured the consensus which the Quintal Alliance rested on, effectively dividing European Concert to two blocs, liberal West and Conservative East, diminishing the collective spirit.

## 7) Peace is based upon state or collective security

All this structural analysis leads to one single proposition that what came out of Congress of Vienna was an effort simply to restore the so called balance of power that had existed in the pre French Revolution European political map. In fact the alliances that had crowned the Final Act of Vienna clearly represented what Hedley Bull had described as "contrived balance of power", a balance that comes out of "conscious policies".[19] Lee simply states that "The Concert of Europe is the term used to describe various attempts made by the major powers to co-operate, after 1815, in settling possible causes of conflict between themselves in order to prevent the possibility of another large-scale war."[20] Even though the hierarchy of the old system took possession of the fight against an enemy who threatens to redistribute the roles of the actors within the system and successfully won it, there was not much success in preventing the damage which was caused by the echoes of the French Revolution and what Napoleon tried to materialize of these. So in Vienna major powers varying in status and skills came together for not only securing peace against an oppressor or not only trying to find themselves a way to handle things without intervening military assets, but trying to secure themselves from the outcome of a new map and more a new community of people that they need to govern. In other words, revolution was the main threat to the major powers, a stronger threat than a large scale European war. The main evidences of the threat that forced the major powers to cooperate can be found in the establishment of the coalitions and the alliances that formed the backbone of the Concert of Europe. The Quadruple Alliance and the Holy Alliance which were signed during the Congress clearly pointed one common enemy in different versions. One was the material version that is France, which Talleyrand managed to obtain from Alexander I in the first Peace of Paris that her nation is not responsible for the deeds of Napoleon and proved to be so wrong in the following 100

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[18] Quoting from Seaman: "The fault of the Vienna statesmen is not that they put the clock back in 1815 ( at least they did so in the sense that Napoleon may be said to have caused it to move fast); their error was that they hoped to keep the clock stopped at 1815 for the next half of the century", ibid, p. 6.
[19] Hedley Bull, **The Anarchial Society**, London, The McMillan Press Ltd., 1978 (2nd ed.), p 104
[20] Lee, ibid., p 37

days that led to Waterloo and to the Second Peace of Paris, and the other abstract version was the map of Europe which Napoleon tailored by not the older traditions of monarchies but rather with a sense of nationalism and self-determination.

The fundamentals of peace that were put in to accord in Vienna were not only a simple matter of diminishing the echoes of the French Revolution and Napoleon's deeds. There was also the problem of creating a status quo to suit the territorial changes in the map of Europe. Contrary to the individual interests of the other powers of the concert which possibly stood had the potential to create further conflicts, Austria's individual interests laid in the maintenance of the post Vienna status quo. Her central position on the map which made her multinational population vulnerable to any nationalist claim that could rise within her scope. Also Habsburg monarchy had developed a stratified structure within her borders which was based on feudal terms rather than national. Therefore any territorial gains would have brought further problems on terms of nationalisms but on the other hand Austria was in need of checking and if possible oppressing both liberal and national claims around her territories in an effort to secure her from possible inner uprisings. On these terms, she was willing to be the designer and prosecutor of the fundamentals of the post Vienna peace. Thus, Austria took the whole burden to act as mediator of the new peace but such a burden surpassed her power. It was the success of the concert that the members had the sense that they needed to construct an imitation of force on behalf of Austria. However such a construction necessitated cooperation. Therefore the concert found a common interest in giving up individual interests in favor of the common one.

8) Peace is based upon local, regional or global forms of governance, perhaps defined by a hegemonic actor or a specific multilateral institution

It is usually stated that Clemens von Metternich of Austria was the architect of the Concert. This is fairly true, if the Concert is viewed as an obstacle against any claims to absolutism. But it would also be true to analyze the concert as an enterprise of European powers who have founded themselves in an atomized state of interests. The Congress showed that all the states, even France, had got what they wanted somehow and the collaboration that had united the anti-French bloc was not a necessity anymore. Britain and Russia had other interests elsewhere and the central European states were finally settled in a new uneasy peace. The problem rested on building a consensus which in one hand would appease the major powers for focusing their own egocentric interests without creating conflict, and on the other hand still maintain the hierarchy which points every actor's own role within the system. To solve the puzzle there is a need to look from a new point of view to post Vienna map of Europe and analyze it once again.

Most balance of power theorists find it essential that there should be a manager or a balancer of the balance within the system. This actor needs to be a strong player and needs to enter balancing coalitions to counter any threatening single actor or coalition of actors. In other words, peace should be constructed by the guidance of a hegemonic actor to initiate a system of values to create a reference of common interest. There is a strong tendency to observe Britain the 19th century as the balancer of the post Napoleonic balance of power established after 1815. However there had been constant arguments upon the structure of the system and its characteristics as a "balance". Though there is enough evidence that British foreign policy in many times put up fairly good balancing acts, the system was a based on consensus rather than countering oppositions. The consensus was on Austria's "responsibilities" and it was Metternich's both success and perhaps only choice to put on Austria's back such a burden. In such a sense, it could be put forward that The Concert of Europe rested on a set of Austrian responsibilities within the defined geography of the concert: Austria was the politically primary and geographically central actor who was supposed to check Prussia's intensions in uniting the German states, Piedmont's intentions to unite Italy and check France's continental ambitions. Austria was the only European state who could put forth a set of interests that could be shared by other powers, though either in a positive or a negative manner. The major powers were keen in keeping central Europe under control and secure their backs while their imperial ambitions rested on other horizons, so if Austrian interest were to sustain the environment that they projected, it was rational for them to give back up. Even though French and Prussian ambitions clashed with Austria's, these states were to be the weakest of the hierarchy in the early days of the concert, thus they could perform their role in the hierarchy until they get the power to overrule it. So the Austrian interests were to be in benefit for everyone. On the contrary, Metternich was well aware that the concert was the only chance of Austria's survival as a great power. So he tailored a careful design, a material map and an abstract set of values for which all members of the hierarchy could find some positive side for their own.

The problem that Metternich faced was the lack of a common cause that would put the European state in a consensus for cooperation. So Metternich carved out a value system that could be summarized in two terms: Anti-liberalism and anti-nationalism by giving reference to absolutism. The first two were to serve for Russia's point of view and the latter was for Britain who would not accept such a phrase against liberalism but is ambitious to take part in the European hierarchy through accepting the endurance of the monarchial system as her regime type suited the proposed fundamentals. As can be seen the references that Metternich used was well fit to put two super powers in a conjunction with Austria's interests. It was also his genius to sustaining the interests of Austria that seem to collide with the lesser members' of the hierarchy by securing them with the consent of the more powerful members of the hierarchy.

To press the lesser members of the hierarchy in to the consensus, a new map and a set of alliances was also designed by Metternich. A German Confederation was established that should rest

on an Austrian-Prussian duality that should serve as a barrier against a German unification and against any French ambitions over Catholic German States; Austria was to hold Northern Italy to check any attempt to unify Italy.[21] These responsibilities were too much for a state whose capabilities had been greatly weakened in terms of all but diplomacy. So the responsibilities of Austria were needed to be shared, at least supported. The Quadruple Alliance was the British support and grant for sharing Austria's burden, The Holy Alliance was the Russia's and Prussia's. By the Conference of Aix La Chappelle in 1818, France was included to the consensus to share the burden. This was the map that was tailored by Metternich with the expense of giving Austria the role of managing the Concert but taking the burden of sustaining it.

At this point, Schroeder's arguments over the structure of the Concert of Europe gains importance and a reference had to be made in this concern. As Schroeder rejects the proclaims of the balance of power theory labeling the 19th century European system as a balance of power, he refers this period as a political equilibrium of great powers.[22]  If the Concert of Europe is taken in to consideration, it would be vague to determine the structure of this system as a balance of power and it may lead to false ends for defining the status of being a "great power". The "great power" definition that is needed to be found in the first place is clearly relevant with the characteristics of the outcome of the Congress of Vienna and the diplomatic pacts and alliances that had completed its venture. The Concert at the first glance seemed to be a balance of power; however it did not fit much to any definition of the theory. It could be argued that bipolarity might be observed as Britain and Russia was the extremist super powers but as long as the area, that the Concert was covering, is concerned, these two powers were not antagonists but rather collaborators. There was no multipolarity either, as the hierarchy was not flexible for the states to seek individual gains within the system's domain. The Concert was indeed a unipolarity in which all the states accepted a common value pack and a rigid hierarchy and the definition of the great power status is very related with this aspect of the system. The states forming the hierarchy were all great powers regardless of their capacities but they were accepted so because of their mutual recognition of this "great power" status on each other. It could be said that great power status was a recognition from above and in order this status to be granted to another, it was important that there should be a mutual approval of the states who were accepted as the Great Powers.

9) Peace is viewed as a top-down institutional framework or a bottom up civil society-oriented framework

The nature which the concert of Europe was clearly a top-down institutional framework clearly based on absolute rule of monarchs. In such any bottom up claim appeared as hostile to peace. In such

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[21] Bridge and Bullen, ibid, p. 27-28.
[22] Schroeder, Paul W., "The Nineteenth Century System: Balance of Power or Political Equilibrium? , Review of International Studies, Vol. 15, No. 2, Special Issue on Balance of Power, (April 1989), pp 135-153

a sense peace was based on cooperation of states against assumed threats that are probable to appear within the space which they claim to govern. Such an understanding was idealized in Metternich who believed that sovereignty which was embodied in monarchy may not be divided and any reform may be introduced from only above, not by the wish of the society that is being governed. Therefore as in the case of uprisings in Naples and in Spain in 1820, any claim for constitutional reform was assumed not as local demands for reform but direct threats against international peace.

10) There needs to be little discussion of the conceptual underpinnings of peace because it is one ideal liberal form:

It is hard to suggest that the underpinnings of peace had a unique definition for all the members of the Concert of Europe; however, each was keen on protecting what come out of it: status quo within a defined space. From the onset of the Congress of Vienna, almost all attendants had their individual interests but they were hesitant to insist on any of them as a continuation to war seemed further chaos. This was the main motivation of peace building and on international level, all the powers of the concert was keen on a cohesive action based on diplomacy rather than use of arms. However such a cohesive understanding needed collective comprehension of a set of values which each member of the concert can suit itself. Therefore, peace was built upon backing up from individual interests in favor of a common one. As mentioned previously the context of the Holy Alliance   determined the underpinnings of peace for the Eastern monarchies in a conservative manner that rests on absolutism. Further, the Quadruple and the Quintet Alliances brought the Western liberals who could not fit the context of absolutism but found a common understanding for the maintenance of the post Vienna status quo.

The cooperation, which the underpinnings of the peace had suggested, reached its peak from1818 to 1822 at which all powers of the concert found grounds to present their individual contributions in multilateral congresses but the division between the conservatives and liberals stood strong. Also there was a power shift within the great powers. The decline of Austria fouled her position as a balancer. Also though cooperated willingly but within their own perceptions on issues within the geography of Europe that the concert defined, both Britain and Russia was hesitant to form blocs of their understandings. Worse both powers proved to be less responsible and self oriented in supporting Austria's central role within the concert. This was evident in the Greek and Belgian uprisings. Though Metternich managed to sustain the concert by appointing a German King to the recently liberated Greece and therefore broadening the geography of the concert; the liberation of Belgium by British and French intervention destroyed the cohesive understanding of the post Vienna peace utterly and divided Europe essentially to liberal and conservative blocs.

Finally, it needs to be suggested that the conservative underpinnings of the peace of the concert was against the evolution of the economic and social structures of the member states. Though absolutism proved a though obstacle against liberal and then national expressions that rose within the societies of Europe, the monarchial regimes failed to suit the rapid social and economic changes within the space of their sovereignties. Symbolized in Metternich's name, the absolutist practice rested on only using force against the masses. Though the monarchies succeeded in cooperating in use of force against any opposition from the people, they were ineffective on decreasing the tensions that nourished not because of their inability to react but their inability to solve. As the cooperation was scarified to the individual interests, each power was left alone to struggle with the oppositions that developed within their borders. In 1848, only the most liberal Britain and the most conservative Russia bypassed the revolutions but all the others suffered in which Austria took the heaviest toll. Apart from Russia, as almost all   regimes in Europe changed from absolute to constitutional regimes, the fundamentals of post Vienna peace was no more valid.

11) Most thinking about peace in IR is predicated on preventing conflict, and at best creating an externally supported peace, not creating a self-sustaining peace.

Post Vienna peace which developed as the basis of international cooperation of the Concert of Europe was based on institutionalization of the fundamentals which were closely related with preserving the continuation of regimes that initiated the cooperation. Therefore references to absolutism were intentionally made to form a cohesive group which was assumed to maintain a spirit of common values and therefore settle on a common interest. In such an understanding, the issue of preventing international conflict was left on collective action against any oppression against the cooperation and against the common interest on which the cooperation was build. In that sense, the peace had intrastate and interstate levels which the former presented that each member should be guaranteed to maintain her regime to sustain her group identity and the latter supposed that members sharing the same identity should act upon the preservation of the cooperation to sustain the cooperation which the fundamentals of peace necessitated.

It was evident that any change of regime in any member of the concert would create problems. This was evident in case of the government change in France in which Bourbon monarchy was replaced with Orleans monarchy in 1830 as the international intervention was prevented by the new monarchy who proclaimed that the new government strictly accepted the content of the Quintet Alliance of 1818.[23] However as mentioned before, the revolutions of 1848, utterly destroyed the structure of post Vienna peace as the regimes of Europe transformed to constitutional regimes as the common identity rested on the similarity of the regimes was no more present.

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[23] Rich, ibid, p. 58.

**Epilogue: Security through cooperation: a two level analysis**

The eleven characteristics of the peace on which the European concert collectively indicate that the cohesive behavior of the members of the concert rested on their vulnerabilities to the threats that might appear in intrastate and interstate levels. Therefore they had a tendency to go on a consensus in which any member would be satisfied by a set of fundamentals that stem out of the prevention of common possible threats on both levels.

On the intrastate level, the European concert aimed at securing her actors' legitimacy, sovereignty and integrity by clear references to the Christian values that had dominated European societies' political behavior until French Revolution. Such a reference to religion is closely related with the St Augustinian sense of obedience to any ruler as long as order is achieved. However the context of the Holy Alliance clearly presented references to the 18 century monarchial absolutism which was based on absolute sovereignty of the kings who claim to take their legitimacy from God. Sovereignty could not be divided or shared as it was given to the chosen one through holy ways. Therefore people were merely subjects and were not supposed to take part in the governance of the states which were on the verge of being reorganized on the map. It was clear that such an approach was closely related to the emergence of the liberal and nationalist ideas of the French Revolution which were spread around Europe during Napoleonic Wars. Almost all European monarchies felt the pressure to mobilize their populations to stand against Napoleon's multinational citizens in arms, creating armies of subjects in arms. Such an experience prepared an environment in which the subjects gained a degree of political consciousness. Though Napoleon was defeated the ghost of the French Revolution prevailed in almost any part of Europe and it was in that sense the signatory monarchies intentionally took the upper hand to restore a system which would put the liberal and national consciousness under   pressure within the designed physical borders of the absolute monarchies. Therefore security meant that each individual actor should maintain its governance exactly in the way that was defined by the founding agreement in that case the Holy Alliance and any change meant a broken component of the system that needed to be fixed.

The interstate level of the security of the European concert was closely related with the intrastate level. Robert Jervis described the characteristics of the Concert of Europe as:

"In essence, the concert was characterized by an unusually high and self-conscious level of cooperation among the major European powers. The states did not play the game as hard as they could; they did not take advantage of others' short-run vulnerabilities. In repeated plays of the Prisoners' Dilemma, then, each state cooperated in the expectation that the others

would do the same. Multilateral and self-restrained methods of handling their problems were preferred to the more common unilateral and less restrained methods."[24]

As Jervis pointed out that the European states hesitated to take advantage of their short-run vulnerabilities in favor of cooperation. Such an attitude was closely related with the situation that had been reached in post Vienna status quo. Though the restoration unified the regime types of European states on absolute monarchy, the power distribution between the European states varied sharply. Such a power distribution made it possible for the stronger states to seek their individual goals and this kind of structure clearly symbolized multi polarity in which stability is weak. As any governmental change in any member of the system was accepted as a threat to security, interstate intervention was accepted as legitimate. Despite the legitimacy of intervention the individual interests of the stronger powers made such actions problematic. Therefore further cautions were taken during and after the Congress of Vienna in forms of accords which institutionalized the interstate cooperation for security. The Quadruple and Quintet Alliances and the various congresses represented the formation of the great power club in which each member accepted the fundamentals of the status quo that derived from the maintenance of the integrity of the actors within the designed system and in such an understanding regardless of their power capacity, each member was recognized as an equal to the others.

In other words, Concert of Europe of became a hegemony in which the hegemon was not one power but a group of powers who contributed themselves to a designed peace that rested on the legitimacy of conservatism to defy any intrastate or interstate attempt to destroy the absolutist rule of monarchies in an arbitrary defined European borders.

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[24] Robert Jervis, "From Balance to Concert: A study of International Security Cooperation", **World Politics**, Vol. 38, No. 1. (Oct., 1985), pp. 58-79.