Russia as anti-preneur and/or entrepreneur of international norms

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Abstract

Since Crimea’s annexation in 2014 it’s easy to find tons of analysis about Russia, its role and its place in the contemporary international scenario. The questions raised about "Putin’s Russia" are many, from doubts about a possible imperialism, if Russia is a democracy or not among others. In an international scenario in which there is a prevalence of certain political order, Russia sometimes doesn’t seem to fit into some expected patterns. One way to observe a broadcasting standards and this process can go from the domestic standards and are taken at the international level by actors that are entrepreneurs, or from an optical on the macro level, that is, from ideas and shared values we create what are standards to maintain international stability or build a new parameter of acceptable behavior.

1) Introduction

As used in contemporary Russian Federation is not a difficult task to find the most diverse analyzes about this state, it is not hard to find newspaper stories, academic articles and various books on the Russian Federation (LIGHT, 1995; COLIN, 2007; Kasymov, 2012;

1 According to Bloomfield (2014), norm entrepreneurs seek changes in international standards from the promotion of new standards, while the anti-preneurs actors resist changes in international standards as they engage in a process of resistance and maintaining the current status quo.

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The reasons for Russia, especially the "Putin's Russia", is in the media so often has the most varied motivations, because since the end of the Cold War, the Russian Federation is in situations, often controversial, the same way there is much speculation about this country, given its characteristics, and political positions, which at times seem contradictory, as an example its distinctive position in the case of Libya and Syria. Underlining the "contradictory" aspects are believed to be relevant here to demonstrate empirically what we call incongruous actions.

Especially, since the annexation of Crimea in 2014, many are the analyzes that come about Russia, its role and its place in the international arena. In a scenario of the prevalence of certain political and economic systems, in which there are certain requirements of international law and its derivatives, the Russian Federation does not seem to integrate the existing rules of global governance, including issues such as humanitarian interventions, for example, that will be the focus in this work. However, what appears to be contradictory in the Russian approach with regard to humanitarian intervention is exactly what may be featured in the survey, because at the same time that the Russian Federation supports the imperative of international law and multilateral action through the United Nations system, the same held the intervention in Ukraine unilaterally, but still tries to justify his action with legal foundation.

According to the Russian government, the population would be the new government's victim established in Ukraine, and decides to intervene on behalf of humanitarian issues. However, the case of the Russian intervention in Crimea has generated a debate about the legality of the act, because the intervention would be illegitimate and illegal, according to the rules that guide humanitarian interventions (Adelman, 1992). However, according to the Russian government, the intervention that took place in Ukraine in 2014 was legitimate, and aimed to maintain humanitarian issues, as argued in an interview by President Vladimir Putin soon after the speech, in which he explains and justifies intervention:

"As you may know, we have decided to organise work in the Russian regions to aid Crimea, which has turned to us for humanitarian support. We will provide it, of course. I cannot say how much, when or how – the Government is working on this, by bringing together the regions bordering on Crimea, by providing additional support to our regions so they could help the people in Crimea. We will do it, of course. [...] Our approach is different. We proceed from the conviction that we always act legitimately. I have personally always been an advocate of acting in compliance with international law. I would like to stress yet again that if we do make the decision, if I do decide to use the Armed Forces, this will be a legitimate decision in full compliance with both general norms of international law, since we have the appeal of the
legitimate President, and with our commitments, which in this case coincide with our interests to protect the people with whom we have close historical, cultural and economic ties. Protecting these people is in our national interests. This is a humanitarian mission. We do not intend to subjugate anyone or to dictate to anyone. However, we cannot remain indifferent if we see that they are being persecuted, destroyed and humiliated. However, I sincerely hope it never gets to that. [...] As for “getting involved in his fate” – we did this on purely humanitarian grounds. Death is the easiest way for getting rid of a legitimate president, and I think that is what would have happened. I think they would have simply killed him. Incidentally, the question arises: what for? [...]” (PUTIN, 2014)

This particular case also stressed the point that the Russian government could be using the intervention concepts humanitarians in order to legitimize its actions in Crimea as one of the arguments used for intervention was to protect Russian nationals. However, once again the Russian government does not succeed in fulfilling the requirements to use the Responsibility to Protect (R2P), as the standard suggests the use of certain procedures and rules that fit not be applied to the case of the Russian intervention in the Ukrainian territory, and suggest the norms of humanitarian intervention. Bring the analysis of Kersten (2014), which goes against the rhetoric of the Russian government:

“Enter Russia’s justification for intervening in Crimea. According to the speaker of the Duma, Russian President Vladimir Putin has been authorized to “use all available means to protect the people of Crimea from tyranny and violence.” Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov similarly evoked R2P rhetoric in stating that “we are talking here about protection of our citizens and compatriots, about protection of the most fundamental of the human rights”. This is not the first time Russia has deployed R2P-style rhetoric to justify military incursions. In its 2008 invasion of Georgia, senior Russian officials maintained that their actions were justified on the basis of the country’s responsibility to protect Russian nationals in South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Others saw the invocation of R2P as a disingenuous political plot to justify violating Georgia’s sovereignty. Today, Russia finds itself in a very similar position. But is Ukraine really a case for R2P? Russia’s actions are hypocritical insofar as they undermine a principle Moscow deems to be holy in international relations and international law: the inviolability of state sovereignty. Russia has been adamant that any intervention to stop suffering and violence in Syria had to be approved by the Security Council. Now, as a response to unknown and unclear threats to Ukrainian Russians, Moscow appears more than willing to unilaterally throw Ukraine’s sovereignty to the wind.”

After this brief introduction of empiria of this research it will be divided into three stages. First will be exposed the central concepts based on the literature on standards essentially the concepts of humanitarian intervention will be brought, the concepts of norms entrepreneurs and anti-entrepreneurs norms, localization and subsidiarity and finally the concept of "life cycle" of Finnemore

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and Sikkink (1998). In a second step, the movement will try to understand how is the Russian approach on the concept of humanitarian intervention. The last step of this research will be to articulate the concepts proposed and considered relevant to address, directly, the humanitarian intervention of the Russian government in Ukraine, and thus open to the possibility of finding gaps in the literature standards that maybe do not give account to explain Russia's actions in the empirical case.

2) **Norms entrepreneurs and/or norms anti-preneurs**

In this section of this research, one of the main intent is to perform the practical definition of theoretical concepts to be used here and the attempt to instrumentalize the concepts set forth above to analyze the empiria proposal. There is no pretension to exhaust all the literature and all possible prospects that could be used here, but the main purpose, of this section is to address some of the main figures on the dynamics of international standards, and thus try to organize the debate about the available literature. Here, one of the principal concerns is the literature mapping, with the objective of this to grant conceptual basis for the empirical study that will follow. Thus, it is important in this section bring the concepts and definitions so that in a second time to show their applicability and relevance to this research, as well as their strengths and weaknesses.

Therefore, in order to understand the object of this research one of the steps to be followed is, first, to map what are the guiding concepts for research. In a second step, it is important to "disentangle" these concepts so that it reaches the weaknesses and strengths of each of the concepts, and then you can put them available to the instrumentalization of them for research.

I) Humanitarian interventions: one of the main concepts to be used by this research is the humanitarian intervention. Even though it is known that humanitarian intervention is a very contested concept, so it is known that it is difficult to arrive at a single conclusion about the same. However, it is not one of the primary concerns of working up a discussion about the debate on humanitarian intervention, but put a concept that can be exploited. Thus, it will use the concept of humanitarian intervention Adelman (1992):
“the use of physical force within the sovereign territory of another state by other states or the United Nations for the purpose of either the protection of, or the provision of emergency aid to, the populations within that territory” (p. 18).

It is worth emphasizing the importance of bringing this definition of humanitarian intervention, because it comprises a multilateral character to this practice, stressing the role of the UN in the process, ie, has a qualitative multilateral, not just quantitative, as any grouping national states can be characterized as a multilateral action. However, we seek to emphasize the qualitative multilateral with the involvement of the United Nations for the occurrence of a humanitarian intervention.

II) Norms Dynamics: The approach on the dynamics of Russian foreign policy and its search for a role and place in the international arena, may be related to the creation and dissemination of standards in the international system. According to the work Finnemore and Sikkink (1998), a way to watch the norms diffusion is that this process can from domestic standards that are brought to the international level by entrepreneurs actors, or from a perspective at the macro level, or from ideas and shared values are created standards which maintain international stability and build a new acceptable behavior parameter (p. 894). According to Bloomfield (2014) norm entrepreneurs are those actors who seek to somehow put into practice in the new international scenario rules. As an example, the author Gareth Evans as a norm entrepreneurs of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) endeavor to undertake the standard of responsibility to protect as a new standard of global governance. However, the author draws attention to the actors who resist the regulatory changes that often are little analyzed, called by Bloomfield (2014) of norms-antipreneurs. For Bloomfield, the anti-preneurs norm defend the status quo of standard of state sovereignty, so they are largely suspicious about the application of R2P, especially regarding the former colonies who is afraid of the interventionist doctrines.

Also in Bloomfield (2014), it is of great importance to bring the norms diffusion studies both norms entrepreneurs as the anti-preneurs norms for some reasons. The norms studies are quite dynamic, and these are some of the reasons to try to understand both sides, where the standards are undertaken and when they fail, it is important to bring a different view of a possible normative linearity (p. 7). The dynamics of normative studies move this analysis in more than one direction, in general, because this section is not intended to address any specific norm, thus,
the entrepreneurs and the anti-preneurs agents are not necessarily on opposite sides. It is believed that entrepreneurs and anti-preneurs can complement the studies of norms diffusion, because it is here that the rules can be modified even after its internalization, i.e., this may lead to believe that the rules suffer challenges that may be coming from the domestic, international scope or the interaction thereof. This statement also includes a point for this study, not necessarily anti-preneurs will bring negative feedback to a certain standard, because its resistance to a particular standard can generate your change and possible adaptation even to other protesters. It is worth noting an important aspect of anti-preneurs highlighted by Bloomfield (2014), these actors not only question the standards in the domestic or regional level, but also take their discontent to global forums (p. 8).

To Bloomfield (2014), strategic questions can justify a challenge to an anti-preneurs, but it will have to convince other actors about its defense, there is a need for justification, and in a second movement the anti-preneurs need to provide a solution (p. 11).

III) Localization and subsidiarity: in this sense it is to bring the meaning of these concepts and some of the differences between them posed by Acharya (2011p 97-99):

Localization is to bring external ideas to the local scene. Subsidiarity is focused on the relationship with what comes out in terms of fear of domination, for example.

• On localization, the actors are norm takers. Subsidiarity local actors may reject the standards.

• The localization, standards are brought to the local level. Subsidiarity, local actors can export local regulations that can support international standards in order to meet the standards raised by great actors.

• In the Localization local actors redefine international standards and accept that may be useful to you. Subsidiarity local actors reject external ideas of great actors.

• The localization applies to all players, big or small. The subsidiarity applies only to peripheral actors, smaller and weaker, in order to maintain its autonomy, because for these actors there is a perception of domination.

Here, by bringing the main characteristics of the location and subsidiarity the intent is to demonstrate that, in fact, not only small and weak actors are likely to engage in subsidiarity, it is
intended to demonstrate that the Russian Federation, in order to place itself as a counter-hegemonic actor in the international system, also does. At the same time, it is necessary to point out that, especially in the analysis of the case of Moscow, subsidiarity and localization are not processes mutually exclusive, but can be complementary, which is a gap that should be investigated in the proposed research problem. In view of the alleged paradoxicality of Russian foreign policy, complementation between subsidiarity and localization rules can work for the Russian government as a tool to leverage its national interests (WELDES, 1999).

Even taking into account the analysis of Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) on norms, as the authors point out that the actors do not create new rules if they are against their own national interests, may be something material or ideational, as the commitment values. Considering that, given the choices of the Russian government in recent years, we can see that Russia does not act only as a spoiler, but also engages in international standards, playing by the rules, and emphasizes, as can be seen in several presidential speeches and official documents, the importance that the Russian government offers to multilateralism, for example. To illustrate this point, it should bring excerpts from the official document of the Russian Federation government on its foreign policy guidelines, following:
2. The Concept is based on the Constitution of the Russian Federation, federal laws, the universally recognized principles and rules of international law, international treaties to which the Russian Federation is a party, the Decree by the President of the Russian Federation on measures to implement the foreign policy of the Russian Federation (No. 605 of 7 May 2012), as well as the National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation for the period up to 2020, the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation, statutory acts of the Russian Federation regulating activities of federal authorities in the area of foreign policy, and other similar instruments. e) developing mutually beneficial and equal bilateral and multilateral partnership relations with foreign states, interstate associations, international organizations and forums on the basis of respect for independence and sovereignty, pragmatism, transparency, multi-vector approach, predictability and non-confrontational protection of national interests; promoting broad international cooperation based on the principle of non-discrimination and facilitating the formation of flexible non-bloc network alliances with Russia’s active involvement; c) reaffirms its unwavering policy towards developing multilateral political and legal frameworks for a universal and stable regime of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, other weapons of mass destruction and means of their delivery; stands for compliance with the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, as well as the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction; actively participates in multilateral export control regimes as well as in international efforts to control trafficking in dual-use materials and technologies; encourages an early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty; comes out in favor of establishing a global missile non-proliferation regime on the basis of a legally binding agreement, and universalizing obligations under the Treaty between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles;

28. Russia follows a policy aimed at creating a stable and sustainable system of international relations based on international law and principles of equality, mutual respect and non-interference in internal affairs of states. The system aims to provide reliable and equal security for each member of the international community in the political, military, economic, informational, humanitarian and other areas.

29. The United Nations should remain the center for regulation of international relations and coordination in world politics in the 21st century, as it has proven to have no alternative and also possesses unique legitimacy. Russia supports the efforts aimed at strengthening the UN’s central and coordinating role. This implies:

a) ensuring the inviolability of key provisions and principles of the UN Charter, building the UN capacity in every possible way to allow for a reasonable streamlining of the UN with new world realities while preserving its inter-state nature;

b) further improving the effectiveness of the UN Security Council, which bears the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, and making this body more representative as part of reasonable reforms in the UN while ensuring due efficiency of its processes. Any decisions on the expansion of the Security Council should be based on a general consensus of the UN Member States. The status of the five permanent members of the Security Council should be preserved. (Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation, Approved by President of the Russian Federation V. Putin, on 12 February 2013)\(^4\)

Thus, it is interesting to note the collaboration of Verduyn (2015) for this analysis, given that it brings a third form of agency, is critical to the separation of norm entrepreneurs and anti-preneurs norm, it would be kind ideas. That is, to Verduyn (2015 p.4), dealing with actors entrepreneurs or anti-preneurs is something unreal, as would two extremes, not reflecting that, in fact, can be seen. In this sense, the author brings criticism to these two extremes that considers types ideas, and puts a third type of actor who would be between the two extremes what he calls "creative resistors". These actors, "creative opposition" would be closer to the anti-preneurs because resist regulatory changes and changes to them would be mere adjustments to preserve the status quo from superficial actions.

Furthermore, we realize that an actor can exercise in duplicity being both anti-preneurs and entrepreneurs. This can be checked in the dichotomy between theory adopted from the norm and the form of interaction of an actor. The same gains the ability to act according to the norm and swindling it at the same time. Thus, it creates a "moral hazard", considering that the actor can support standard and disrupt it the same. The role of Russia in the Crimea can support this process, considering that the Moscow government used the standard created and positively valued to justify their actions, but his actions were against the norm. The analysis made here, is that the positivate whole life cycle of a norm creates a space for dichotomous actions where given actor can use the standard to protect internationally and still can disrupt it. Moral hazard is to create a tool that allows players to manipulate the norm, using it not to fulfill it.

IV) norms: given that one of the guiding points of this research is the role of standards in international relations, more specifically, the impact of the rules on decision-making of national states, here, the Russian Federation, it is important to bring the definition norms to be used, how they work and how they can be changed, are some of the aspects to be highlighted. For this purpose, it will be placed on the analysis of proposed rules, broadly, by Martha Finnemore.

First, in the work of Finnemore e Sikkink de 1998, the concept of norm is: “There is general agreement on the definition of a norm as a standard of appropriate behavior for actors with a given identity (...)” (p. 891). The authors put a categorization of different kinds of norms: “Scholars across disciplines have recognized different types or categories of norms. The most
common distinctions is between regulative norms, which order and constrain behavior, and constitutive norms, which create new actors, interests, or categories of action” (1998, p. 891).

The definitions of Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) serve as a basis for analysis with respect to their questions about the normative dynamics in international politics, and thus bring the concept of "life cycle" of norms. The life cycle of norms refers to the process by which ideas become standards. Within this process of "life" of the norms, there is a sequence of steps that generate the norms. The authors state that there are three stages in the life cycle of the rules, following:

- Emergency rule: In this first stage, which deals with the emergence of the norm, the authors emphasize the importance of persuasion exercised by norm entrepreneurs. These entrepreneurs actors need to persuade a significant number of actors. The norm entrepreneurs do not create new standards of a vacuum, the authors stress that, despite the great importance of these actors, there is also the need that there is a normative challenge of space so that these actors can propose something (p. 896-897 ). In addition, the authors stress the need for these actors promoters of new standards are anchored in international organizations (p. 900). This point will be challenged further. In the first stage, the authors state that after a significant number (Finnemore and Sikkink make it clear that there is not much clarity regarding what would be a "significant number of States") states be persuaded to join a new standard, it achieves what both call "tipping point". In addition to the importance of entrepreneurs actors standards, another very important factor for the emergence of a new rule is the existence of an organizational platform (organizational plataforms, p, 899). For Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) there is a great importance for the emergence of new standards the existence of an organizational platform, which in some cases is created with the purpose of promoting certain standard. The entrepreneurs of new standards can work through non-governmental organizations already existing, or organizations like the World Bank or the United Nations, since such organizations already have expertise in their respective areas and thus efficient mechanisms to leverage new standards and so have a greater chance of promoting behavioral changes of the actors. In the words of Finnemore and Sikkink (1998):

"All norm promoters at the international level need some kind of organization platform from and through which they promote their norms. Sometimes these platforms are constructed specifically for the purpose of promoting the norm, as are many nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) (such as Greenpeace, the Red Cross, and Transafrica) and the largest transnational advocacy networks of which these NGOs become a part (such as those promoting human rights, environmental norms, and a ban on land mines or
those that opposed apartheid in South Africa). Often, however, entrepreneurs work from standing international organizations that have purposes and agendas other than simply promoting one specific norm. Those other agendas may shape the content of norms promoted by the organization significantly. The structure of the World Bank has been amply documented to affect the kinds of development norms promulgated from that institution; its organizational structure, the professions from which it recruits, and its relationship with member states and private finance all filter the kinds of norms emerging from it. The UN, similarly, has distinctive structural features that influence the kinds of norms it promulgates about such matters as decolonization, sovereignty and humanitarian relief. The tripartite structure of the International Labor Organization, which includes labor and business as well as states, strongly influences the kinds of norms it promotes and the ways it promotes them” (p. 899).

- Norm cascades: in this second stage in the process of the norms lifecycle. For Finnemore and Sikkink (1998), after the point of inflection occurs, the trend is that more states will be persuaded to join the emerging norm. In this second stage, the main mechanism for other actors to join the emerging standard is the socialization that takes place largely through the identity of the actors as actors of the international system is a way in which there is an indirect pressure.
- Internalization: This is the final process of "life cycle" proposed by Finnemore and Sikkink authors (1998). For internalization stage the authors is the end of the process "norm cascades" when a particular norm is in such a way imbricated in the political process that is not even discussed, it is given as something absolutely natural. The authors pose as an example of internalized norms in the West sovereignty, market standards and individualism (p. 904). The other extreme of this are the rules that end up not being internalized, are not controversial, but not in the middle of any discussion, because they are ignored.

One of the very important issues to be addressed by this research, after such exposure about the rules of its operation, the emergency to the internalization of the same, is the motivation for carrying out an analysis based on the prevailing literature on norms. Why norms matter? All norms matter? Which norms matter? To this end, the work Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) continues to be important for analysis in this research because it performs not only the scrutiny of what are the norms, which is very important, the process of "life cycle "the norms, that is, the authors bring very carefully the definitions and empirical examples to support their explanations. In addition, the work Finnemore and Sikkink, to bring the "life cycle" of the norms, which is not an easy task, can clearly expose the stages of the legislative cycle, dividing it into three phases: 1) emergence of norms; 2) regulatory cascade and 3) internalization of norms, where once again, the authors manage to perform a work that demonstrates the clarity of his ideas and examples that Finnemore and Sikkink are used to empirically illustrate his arguments are interesting to
explain changes, not only to stay. And yet, the authors argue that not all norms will be of great importance, for example, in international politics, as there conditions so that certain norms are more important than others. This argument is quite clear, especially from examples throughout the work in question, the authors are used as for a norm to emerge and be internalized there is a need of a social context and plausible policy for a norm to emerge and be internalized by the actors.

3) Russian Federation approach to humanitarian interventions

So far, the research conducted had as its main claim to bring some empirical aspects that motivate the search in case the Russian intervention in Ukraine without details. Is at a second stage carry out a survey of some authors dealing with "norms", again in general. In the third section, intended to make the manipulation of the concepts brought about earlier norms, in general, for the empirical case.

I) Humanitarian interventions applied: According to the definition of humanitarian intervention brought earlier in this research by Adelman (1992); humanitarian intervention should be multilateral, but not only in quantitative terms but qualitative. This means that according to this author, the intervention must have the broad institutional support, and not only carried out by a group of states. In legal terms, a humanitarian intervention must be sanctioned by the United Nations, or in the case of intervention carried out by the Russian government in the Crimea and was made unilaterally, should then be considered illegal. However, there is still debate about the legality and legitimacy, as was the case of the intervention in Iraq and Kosovo (averre et al, 2015). In the case of Crimea, after a series of violent events, protests, and non-popular, ie that counted on the participation of the then government opponents president Yanukovych, there was an attempt to opposition and situation to reach an agreement, what actually occurred. The then Ukrainian president agreed to accommodate the opposition's political demands, but still, it was deposed and fled to Russia. According to President Vladimir Putin (2014 b), Yanukovych took a hit, and since then the popular protests have exacerbated endangering especially the Russian population in the Crimean peninsula. Also according to Vladimir Putin (2014 b) intervention in the Crimea was carried out with the sole purpose of protecting the population at risk of life:
“We hoped that Russian citizens and Russian speakers in Ukraine, especially its southeast and Crimea, would live in a friendly, democratic and civilized state that would protect their rights in line with the norms of international law. However, this is not how the situation developed. Time and time again attempts were made to deprive Russians of their historical memory, even of their language and to subject them to forced assimilation. [...] Those who stood behind the latest events in Ukraine had a different agenda: they were preparing yet another government takeover; they wanted to seize power and would stop short of nothing. They resorted to terror, murder and riots. Nationalists, neo-Nazis, Russophobes and anti-Semites executed this coup. They continue to set the tone in Ukraine to this day.... We can all clearly see the intentions of these ideological heirs of Bandera, Hitler’s accomplice during World War II.”

According to the excerpt from one of the speeches of Vladimir Putin, it underlines the need for something have been done to protect the Ukrainian population of the possibility of violence against this population. Putin (2014 c), the intervention was legitimate, and fully justified, in his words:

“When we see this we understand what worries the citizens of Ukraine, both Russian and Ukrainian, and the Russian-speaking population in the eastern and southern regions of Ukraine. It is this uncontrolled crime that worries them. Therefore, if we see such uncontrolled crime spreading to the eastern regions of the country, and if the people ask us for help, while we already have the official request from the legitimate President, we retain the to use all available means to protect those people. We believe this would be absolutely legitimate. This is our last resort. Moreover, here is what I would like to say: we have always considered Ukraine not only a neighbour, but also a brotherly neighbouring republic, and will continue to do so. Our Armed Forces are comrades in arms, friends, many of whom know each other personally. I am certain, and I stress, I am certain that the Ukrainian military and the Russian military will not be facing each other, they will be on the same side in a fight.”

After brought the concept of humanitarian intervention coupled with the empirical study of Russian intervention in Ukraine, it is known that the Russian government action of illegality may be present in the same way that the legitimacy of their actions. This process exemplifies the moral cost of positivation the norm. The Government of Putin defends the norm internationally through speeches, but acts to violate it. The authors analyzed here do not seem to give due attention to this space generated by the concept of standards, their optimal settings that there are two or three ways to behave opposite the norm tends to not calculate the space created between the positivated settings. This "empty" space just taking shape in moral hazard exists dichotomous actors in relation to normative concepts. The next step of the analysis is to analyze the empirical fact to the dynamic norms.

II) Dynamics of norms applied: as explained earlier in this research is of great importance for understanding the dynamics of the norms in the international arena to bring the concepts of norms entrepreneurs and anti-preneurs actors. According to Bloomfield (2014) as well as can be
seen in the work Finnemore and Sikkink (1998), broadly, the norm entrepreneurs, are the actors who provided norms are entrepreneurs, and who seek to change something in the scene normative, while the anti-preneurs norm are the actors who somehow are against regulatory changes. But here arises that these two concepts are not mutually exclusive for the analysis because the two labels are in ideal positions, or the actors are against a particular standard or favor and seek to undertake it.

But what we try to demonstrate here from these two concepts is the analytical gap that the authors that these concepts arise. It is questionable, especially as positivate so categorically that one necessarily anti-preneurs norms, to oppose a rule cannot be creating a new standard, and thereby stimulating the creation of a new standard. Bringing these concepts to the empirical research arises that Russia, to undertake a humanitarian intervention unilaterally Ukraine, qualifies as a State which is opposed to the current rules of humanitarian interventions. However, the Russian government defends itself by arguing that it acted legitimately and makes emphasize its respect for international law and emphasize the importance of multilateralism, as can be noted in the official document of the Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation 2013 mentioned above. Moreover, taking into account the still present gaps regarding the concept / rule of Responsibility to Protect, which has as one of the pillars of humanitarian intervention and the responsibility to prevent, in the case of the population at risk in Ukraine, although there is no legality for the actions of Russia, might be considered that the actions of the Russian government can be found in a meander between being norms entrepreneurs and / or anti-preneurs norms, when considering that Russia was establishing a new standard of normative behavior. As stated by Bloomfield (2014), not necessarily anti-preneurs norms are opposed to a standard without a justification. That is, their opposition can be constructive, enterprising. Although paradoxical (averre et al, 2015).

III) Localization and applied subsidiarity: the work of Amitav Acharya is a way to analyze the process of norms diffusion, the author brings two important contributions to this field of study, localization and subsidiarity. The localization is a mechanism by which domestic actors reconstruct external ideas, that is, he values the norms entrepreneurs (ACHARYA, 2004, p. 248). Meanwhile, subsidiarity actors have more resistance to norms by a perceived threat. Subsidiarity affects the small and weak actors (anti-preneurs norms?) (ACHARYA, 2011). How to put
Kenkel and Rosa (2015), there are some differences between subsidiarity and localization, and one of those is that the actors engaged in subsidiarity reject the norm, while the actors engaged in localizing embrace the norm. However, by bringing subsidiarity and localization for the empirical study, again arises a gap because the Russian government, rejecting the norms of humanitarian intervention, legally speaking, not part of the analysis of Acharya (2004) that subsidiarity serves only to analyze cases of small and weak actors who perceive the rules as a threat. Just as at other times, as in the government's official rhetoric, the discourse is to uphold such standards as may be noted, for example, Lavrov (1999) condemning the use of force by NATO in Kosovo in 1999 and emphasizes the importance of the UN in cases of humanitarian intervention, genocide, among other crimes (p. 422).

IV) Norms Life Cycle applied: as exposed from the work Finnemore and Sikkink (1998), so that ideas become norms, there are three stages: 1) the emergency regulations, which largely depends on the norms entrepreneurs; 2) the rules waterfall and 3) the internalization of norms. The reading is done here working Finnemore and Sikkink (1998), is that despite the authors emphasized the importance of the actors who contest apparently the "life cycle" both propose is closely linked to the norms entrepreneurs, after all the focus of the authors is to analyze the emergence of new norms, but do not give much attention to the fact that norms are challenged. Another problem is considered in the work of these authors is the fact not question the possibility of a rule be appealed after internalization. It is known that the rules of humanitarian interventions do not have long, however, appear to have been internalized, at least for most actors in the international arena, however, even after the internalization process it appears that the rules can be challenged. The actions of the Russian government to intervene unilaterally in Ukraine, but still justifying his action by international law, and still acting at odds regarding the same, can demonstrate a significant gap in the norms cycle of life.

Faced with highlighted gaps in the literature on norms used in this research, we note that there is a significant conceptual gap, when the concepts are applied to the case of the Russian intervention in Ukraine for humanitarian purposes. In a way, the normative concepts in general, apply to ideal cases, and most often do not address situations that may not be at either extreme positivized.
4) Final considerations

To date, the research has led to certain directions. After exposure of certain concepts inside of the literature that deals with norms, the next step was to try to apply them to the case of humanitarian intervention of the Russian Federation in Ukraine. From this movement, the guidelines arrived at, although limited in the literature, were that there are gaps to deal with certain sensitivities, and perhaps gaps to be filled. Such conceptual spaces put highlighted the possible need to expand the discipline of locus scope to cover other areas that may not be included in this field of study. Therefore, the research so far points to the emergence of some questions as: how is it possible to understand not engagement or Russian engagement in the dissemination of international norms? The Russian Federation can be understood as a norm entrepreneurs, an anti-preneurs, both, or there is a need to explore a different type of engagement? The empty space created by positivation ideas ways of behaving before a norm can create opportunities for an incongruous behavior theorized? Perhaps the case of the Russian intervention is not between the ideal types presented in this research, and therefore there is a need to explore other possibilities. Verduyn (2015) manages to present a valid proposal that the author calls "creative resistors", which would be a position between the norms entrepreneurs and anti-preneurs norms. Just as it is worth considering that the possibility of anomalous behavior as moral hazard created by the assertiveness of ideal behavior can be an important aspect although perhaps lacks further clarification. Despite incipient such assertions are not definitive because such questions and answers possibilities will be examined in greater depth in a future thesis.
5) Referências


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