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Title: Revisiting Turkey and the BRICS in the UN: A Comparative Analysis of Their Material Power Contribution

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ABSTRACT

This paper aims to locate Turkey as a non-BRICS rising power and to compare Turkey's financial and human power contributions to the UN with BRICS countries. In doing so, it will first examine Turkey's and the BRICS countries' positioning in the changing international international order. Thereafter, it will proceed to a qualitative and quantitative comparison of Turkey and the BRICS' financial and human power contributions to UN. This paper argues that Turkey's relatively low material capacity in terms of GDP compared to that of other rising middle powers in the BRICS group (except South Africa), its strong perception about its possible constructive role and rising power actorness, and its long membership in the UN and other UN Special agencies, all serve to make Turkey potentially a more active player in global governance.

Introduction

The taken-for-granted divide between the global "rich" North and global "poor" South as well as the unchallengeable US hegemony in the post-cold war era are put into trial in the last decades with the emergence of new powers, mostly coming from the south, which are threatening the current international order. These new emerging powers are characterized by an expanding economic size with huge human resources and seem to have succeeded to translate these material capabilities into political power. Indeed, these rising powers are increasingly exerting diplomatic influence in international institutions through the key positions they hold in the most powerful international organizations such as the UNSC (United Nations Security Council) and WTO (World Trade Organization). The term "Rising Powers" designates a category that includes the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South

Africa) as well as other key countries such as Mexico, Turkey and Indonesia.[1] In the particular case of BRICS countries, the acronym is used to define those original "emerging powers", including Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa. The existing literature on emerging powers has mostly based their analytical framework on the traditional BRICS countries and their positioning vis-à-vis the West, neglecting other emerging powers standing outside this grouping or in other terms, the non-BRICS ones, which are laying in-between the North and the South, especially like Turkey.

In response, this paper aims to address this lacuna in the literature with regards to the "non-BRICS emerging powers" from a policy-based analysis perspective by putting a special emphasis on Turkey as a "non-BRICS emerging power" through a comparison with BRICS countries. Considering Turkey's strong historical and current ties with the West, there have been some doubts about the potential of Turkey to act like other "formalised" rising powers, -especially acting under the categories like BRICS or IBSA-, able to influence the current shape of world politics. However, Turkey has proved its ability in the recent years through the adoption of a pro-active global governance policy, to a certain extent that is increasingly qualified as an "accommodating" rising power.

This paper aims to locate Turkey as a non-BRICS rising power and to compare its financial and human power contribution to UN with the BRICS countries by asking the following question: How contributive are Turkey's human and financial resources to the UN compared to those of the BRICS? Here our main objectives are to first assess how Turkey and BRICS project their human and financial power capabilities to the UN and to scrutinize the interests and objectives of the BRICS and Turkey to commit their material and financial power to the UN, as well as the diverging and converging strategies both Turkey and the BRICS use to influence the UN in terms of human and financial power. In order to assess the material power contribution of Turkey and the BRICS to global governance, this paper decided to use the United Nations as the center of analysis because the UN is undoubtedly the center of global governance and multilateralism *par excellence*, whereby rising powers like the BRICS and Turkey could effectively become more centrally involved in the global politics. The UN appears as the most important institution where they could

[1] Musab Younis et al, Rising Powers in International Development: An Annotated Bibliography, *Institute of Development Studies*, March 2013, p.6.

easily convert their material power capabilities into a political power and actively contribute to the shaping and improvement of the current international political and economic order.

In the rising power literature, Turkey has rarely been analyzed as a rising power together with the other rising powers. Despite the recent increase in the number of scholarly work evaluating the nature and strategies of Turkey's rise, as well as its global governance policies, this field of study still remains understudied. Most of the existing studies are rather policy and discourse-oriented rather than empirical and evidence-based. This study aims to fill this lacunae by drawing a comparative and comprehensive picture of Turkey and the BRICS, the most representative rising powers group in global governance with a special focus on their material contribution to the major global governance institution, the UN. Another novelty of the paper is to present the continuities and changes in these countries' trends of contribution to the UN since the 2000s.

To meet the above-mentioned goals, the methodology used is both qualitative and quantitative: qualitatively, this paper makes use of primary sources and official documents, such as the BRICS' summit declaration, the documents issued by the Turkish official institutions, as well as secondary sources like relevant articles and media and internet sources; quantitatively, the paper uses official data as primary sources from the UN, WTO, UNHCR.

The paper is divided in three sections: the first part examines Turkey's and BRICS countries' positioning in the global order; the second part critically examines the motivations of the BRICS and Turkey, as well as their instruments and strategies employed while materially contributing to the UN; and the last part quantitatively compares Turkey and the BRICS' financial and human power contribution to the UN and makes a critical assessment of the comparison.

1. Positioning Turkey and BRICS Countries in the Global Order

1.1. Turkey in the Global Order

In the first half of the 2000s, Turkey's rapid economic boom as well as the coming to power of the neo-conservative party, the Justice and Development Party (AKP) has significantly changed the foreign policy landscape of Turkey. Especially, the 9/11 event and USA's declining power, Afghanistan and Iraq Wars, Mortgage

Crisis in 2008, Arab Spring led to show Turkey and some developing states as an emerging rising power. Indeed, Turkey has become more assertive and pro-active in international politics and has shifted its foreign policy from a western-oriented and passive perspective to an eastern and pro-active one. In this context, Turkey is gradually building its own image as a regional power in the Middle East and in Africa. In doing so, Turkey has gradually improved its relations with its neighborhood in the Middle East, Caucasus and in South-East Europe through the zero-problem policy. In Africa, Turkey has started to re-engage with the African continent, which had in the past historical ties with the Ottoman Empire. Turkey's efforts to build its "rising power" status are no longer debatable. Turkey's UNSC (United Nations Security Council) non-permanent membership in 2009-2010, its host of the fourth conference of the LDCs (Least Developed Countries) under the auspices of the UN in 2010, its application for the UNSC's non-permanent membership fort the period 2015-2016, as well as its current presidency to the G20 since December 2014, clearly illustrate the increasing willingness on the side of Ankara to have an active role in international politics[2]. Likewise, Turkey's mediation role respectively between Syria and Israel and Israel and Hamas; in its high-level diplomatic efforts at the initial stages of the 2003 Iraqi intervention, in its engagement with Brazil in the Iranian nuclear affair (through the signature of a Turkey - Brazil - Iran nuclear fuel swap agreement), in 2010 and in Syrian crisis triggered circa 2011 show how Turkey engaged in solving regional crises together with the other regional actors and organizations[3]. During the first two years after the Arab Spring (of late 2010 to 2012) positive perceptions about Turkey's potential leadership role, coming from both inside and outside the region, led to the emergence of the concept of the "Turkish model"[4]. This model served to foster Turkey's regional image and regional power.

In addition, since 2002, Turkey's foreign policy has reflected a more "value-oriented" outlook towards order, both in discourse and practice.[5] Turkey self-conceived itself as the voice of the voiceless fellow Muslim countries in Africa and in

[2] Emel Parlar Dal and Gonca Oğuz Gök, "Locating Turkey as a 'Rising Power' in the Changing International Order: An Introduction", *Perceptions*, Winter 2014, Vol: 19, No: 4, 2014, p.8.
[3] Parlar Dal, Emel . "A Normative IR theory Approach to Contemporary Turkish Foreign Policy through the Cosmopolitanism-Communitarianism Divide", *International Journal*, Vol:70, No:3, 2015.
[4] Emel Parlar Dal, and Erşen, Emre . 'Reassessing Turkish Model in the Post-Cold War Era: A Role Theory Perspective', *Turkish Studies*, Vol: 15, No: 2, June 2014, p.258-282.
[5] Ziya Öniş and Mustafa Kutlay, "Rising Powers in a Changing Global Order: The Political Economy of Turkey in the Age of BRICS", *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 34, No. 8, 2013, p.1411.

the Middle East, in international institutions. In other words, Turkey is willing to use its relative material and political power capabilities to influence the course of events in international order in favor of the low-income countries, preferably the Muslim countries. In favor of his visit to Cameroon in March 2010, former President Abdullah Gül declared that the world has moral and political responsibility to African nations, and Turkey will be the voice of Africa in international institutions.[6] Conscious of its considerable assets and ability to use these assets to affect international politics, Turkish current Prime Minister introduced a new foreign policy discourse called, humanitarian diplomacy. [7] Humanitarian diplomacy, from the understanding of Turkish foreign policy makers, encompasses three dimensions, mainly – citizens of Turkey, policies toward crisis zones and global world order.[8] The country's most remarkable humanitarian feat has been its humanitarian engagement in Somalia ''in August 2011, where at the height of the most recent hunger crisis in the Horn of Africa, then Prime Minister, current President of the Republic of Turkey Erdoğan was the first non-African Head of State to visit Somalia in nearly 20 years''.[9] Turkey has then increasingly enacted a civilizational anti-hegemonic discourse, which "come to function as oppositional, as a search for anti-hegemony, and as a center of an increasingly pluralist world order perspective vis-a-vis the existing world order as its dominance"[10]. The statement made by President Erdoğan at the UN General Assembly in 2014 that "the World is bigger than five" and that "the West is no longer the only center of the world"[11] corroborates this point.

Beside Turkey's humanitarian diplomacy especially towards Africa, aid policies have also crucial role to show Turkey's rising power status in world politics. Turkish International Cooperation and Development Agency (TIKA) is the principal institution for managing aid in developing countries. Moreover, Yunus Emre Institute is another body for promoting Turkish cultural heritage, Turkish language to improve

[6] "New Vision, 'Turkey-Africa: Solidarity and Partnership'", Nov 13, 2014, <http://www.newvision.co.ug/news/661775-turkey-africa-solidarity-and- partnership.html>
[7] Samiratou Dipama, Ferrit Belder, Emel Parlar Dal - International Relations and Dialogue of Cultures No 3 (2014)
[8] Ahmet Davutoğlu, "Turkey's Humanitarian Diplomacy: Objectives, Challenges and Prospects", Nationalities Papers: *The Journal of Nationalism and Ethnicity*, Vol: 41, No: 6, 2013, pp.865-870.
[9] Samiratou Dipama, Ferrit Belder, Emel Parlar Dal - International Relations and Dialogue of Cultures No 3 (2014)
[10] Murat Yeşiltaş, "Turkey's Quest for a "New International Order": The Discourse of Civilization and the Politics of Restoration", *Perceptions*, Winter 2014, Vol: 19, No: 4, p.43.
[11] Al Jazeera Türkçe, "Erdoğan: Dünya Beşten Büyüktür", 24 September 2014. http://www.aljazeera.com.tr/haber/erdogan-dunya-5ten-buyuktur

the friendship between Turkey and developing countries to increase the cultural exchange. In 2013, "Turkey provided US$1.6 billion for humanitarian emergencies which was making it the third largest government donor of official humanitarian assistance".[12]

Furthermore, in recent years Turkey shares a common ideational ground with the BRICS countries in regards to the reform of the global political and financial institutions, particularly the UN and IMF (International Monetary Fund). Like the BRICS countries, Turkey seeks a reform of the IMF quota regime. Related to this ambition, President Erdoğan once stressed that "developing states should be given more roles within the IMF, and their administrative representation should be enhanced"[13]. And he called for a new currency quota system within the IMF. [14] President Erdoğan also proposed an alternative "Turkish Lira zone" in response to the economic crisis in the Euro-zone countries[15]. He also criticized the IMF's USD-based usage and called for IMF acceptance of the gold-based regime as an alternative. [16] Another sign of Turkey's rise globally and institutionally can also be seen in its rhetorical involvement in the four MIST countries (namely, Mexico, Indonesia, South Korea and Turkey), a new acronym recently coined, which refers to the four emerging economies in the next tier of large emerging economies.[17] All these developments in favor of the development of Turkey's institutionalism clearly prove how Turkey has increasingly become engaged in "effective multilateralism", aiming to diversify its institutional links at both global and regional levels.

Another significant point to show the Turkey's rising power position both regional and global space is the Turkey's geopolitical importance, especially in the sense of energy roads. Turkey is the key country for geopolitical and strategic plans to transfer the Asian and Middle Eastern countries' oil and natural gas resources to European states. However, as the Prime minister Ahmet Davutoğlu argues, Turkey is

[12] "Global Humanitarian Assistance: Turkey" http://www.globalhumanitarianassistance.org/countryprofile/turkey
[13] Gökhan Bacik, "Can Turkey join the BRICS?", *Turkish Studies*, Vol: 14, No: 4, 2013, p.767.
[14] CNN Turk, May 7, 2013.
[15] Dünya, February 11, 2013
[16] Dünya (Turkish journal 'World'), February 11, 2013; Dünya Ekonomi (Turkish journal 'World Economy'), November 10, 2012.
[17] "After BRIC comes MIST, the acronym Turkey would certainly welcome", *The Guardian*, 1 February 2011, http://www.theguardian.com/global-development/poverty-matters/2011/feb/01/emerging-economies-turkey-jim-oneill; Zachary Fillingham. "Turkey in the MIST", *Geopoliticalmonitor.com*, 9 May 2012, http://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/turkey-in-the-mist-4675/.

interested in more than to be an energy corridor. Turkey tried to establish reconciliation of interests and balancing the states, within the scope of seeking stability and order around the Middle East, Caucasus, Balkans and the Russian Federation. With the constructivist foreign policy tendency and growing Turkey's regional power, it can be interpreted, as Turkey wants to go forward to become a global power.[18] In the same stance, during and after the Arab Spring, active Middle Eastern policy movement in Turkish Foreign Policy was seen as a shift of axis in Turkish Foreign Policy. During this period, Turkey began to seen as a model for Arab countries, especially because of the Turkey's soft power, economic growth, promotion of democracy and rule of law over the region countries.[19] Starting from this period, Turkey has become the soft power in the region. The friendship, cultural ties and also diplomatic links with the Middle Eastern countries bring them together with Turkey. With this rhythmic diplomacy, Turkey has become more and more influential and visible in regional organizations such as Islamic Cooperation Organization.[20] According to a Pew survey in July 2012, the then Prime Minister, Erdoğan is seen as the most popular leader in the Muslim world. Moreover, Muslim World believes that Turkey is a democracy promoter state in the Middle East and North African countries.[21] In this period, Turkey was promoted itself as the center of mediation actor in the Middle East.

However, Turkey as a rising power does not intend to take a systematic anti-western position or third wordlist ideology, "but clearly fall into the framework of a within system challenge"[22]. Turkey's strong ties with the Western World since the early years of the Ottoman Empire constraint it to be an accommodating rising power, which means that it "prefers cooperation as a response to regional and transnational threats"[23]. As a member of NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization), OECD (Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development) and a potential

[18] Ahmet Davutoğlu, "Türkiye Merkez Ülke Olmalı", Radikal, (2004) http://www.radikal.com.tr/haber.php?haberno=107581 .
[19] Emel Parlar Dal and Emre Erşen. "Reassessing the 'Turkish Model' in the Post-Cold War Era: A Role Theory Perspective" *Turkish Studies*, Vol: 15, No: 2, June 2014, p.258-282.
[20] Aaron Stein, "Turkey's New Foreign Policy: Davutoglu, the AKP and the Pursuit of Regional Order", *Whitehall Paper*, 2014, pp. 11-87.
[21] "Most Muslims Want Democracy, Personal Freedoms, and Islam in Political Life", http://www.pewglobal.org/2012/07/10/most-muslims-want-democracy-personal-freedoms-and-islam-in-political-life/
[22] Emel Parlar Dal and Gonca Oğuz Gök, "Locating Turkey as a 'Rising Power' in the Changing International Order: An Introduction", *Perceptions*, Winter 2014, Vol: 19, No: 4, 2014, p.2.
[23] Emel Parlar Dal and Gonca Oğuz Gök, "Locating Turkey as a 'Rising Power' in the Changing International Order: An Introduction", *Perceptions*, Winter 2014, Vol: 19, No: 4, 2014, p.7.

candidate to the EU (European Union), Turkey has most often sought a more-balanced position in foreign policy. This argument has been proven right during the early years of the Arab Spring where Turkey sided with the West camp to support popular revolutions in Tunisia, Algeria, Egypt and Libya.

1.2. BRICS Countries in the global order

The BRIC acronym, which includes Brazil, Russia, India and China, firstly appeared in a research paper called ''Building Better Global Economic BRICs'' and written by Goldman Sachs paper, which aimed to make prevision about global economic trends over the next half-century. The findings show that ''the BRIC countries collectively would play an increasingly important role in the global economy''[24]. The BRICS group, originally called BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India, and China) started as an informal ad-hoc group in 2006 when foreign ministers of Brazil, Russia and India began conducting political dialogue. The formalization of the grouping came on June 16, 2009, with the first summit. South Africa was shortly granted an invitation to join the meeting to be held in Brasilia on December 23, 2010 by the then minister of foreign affairs of the People's Republic of China, Yang Jiechi. The BRIC group was renamed BRICS after the official presence of South African president Jacob Zuma, during the third BRIC summit held in China[25]. The admission of South Africa to the BRIC group is a way to shop that this group is expanding and open to new members with different cultures. The BRICS countries are part of the so-called "rising" or "emerging powers". One of the most commonalities of the rising powers is that they "have mostly moved from low- to middle-income status with the adoption of innovative economic and social policies", and "have acted as role models to low-income states"[26]. Another feature commonly shared by rising powers is their growing economic and political weight in World politics, to an extent that they have the potential to reshape the world economy and to reshape the global political

[24] Suresh P. Singh and Memory Dube, "BRICS and the World Order: A Beginner's Guide", http//www.nkibrics.ru/system/brics/docs/data/54c7/a153/6272/6937/f91a/0000/original/BRICS_and_the_World_Order A_Beginners_Guide.pdf?1422369107

[25] Hany Besada, "South Africa in the BRICS Opportunities, Challenges and Prospects", *Africa Insight,* Vol: 42, No:4, March 2013, p.1.

[26] Musab Younis et al, Rising Powers in İnternational Development : An Annotated Bibliography, *Institute of Development Studies*, March 2013, p.7.

landscape of the 21st century.[27] Moreover, and according to Hurrell, emerging powers have put great emphasis on normative issues like "justice" and "fairness"[28] and they are "expected to challenge the established institutions or at least attempt to revise the dominant norms of the system in order to reflect their own interests and values"[29].

The BRICS could play an important role in the world both in political and economic terms if they can stand by one voice in international institutions. Under these conditions, they would be able to counteract the western powers' hegemonic ambitions and allow a greater representation of the interests of the global south in international institutions. All BRICS countries called for "comprehensive reform of the UN, including its Security Council". China said it would endorse the aspirations of India, Brazil and South Africa for permanent membership of the UNSC.[30]

Coincidentally, the five countries are all now members of the Security Council, China and Russia as permanent members and the other three non-permanent members[31]. BRICS members consider the UN as the most legitimate institutions to adopt collective actions for keeping and restoring peace, such as preventive deployments and post-conflict peace-building .Given that the UN is an important plateform through which international security issues can be effectively handled, BRICS countries try to play a greater role in the framework of UN either through contributing more available resources or by promoting the reform of UN Security Council.[32]

In this stance, the Iran's nuclear issue has heralded the likelihood for the BRICS countries to be united as a bloc to defend a common position. For instance, in its joint statement on Iran, the BRICS countries states "we recognize Iran's right to peaceful use of nuclear energy consistent with its international obligations and support resolution of the issues involved by political and diplomatic means and dialogue between the parties concerned, including between the IAEA and Iran, in

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[27] Andrew F. Hart and Bruce D. Jones , "How Do Rising Powers Rise?", *Survival: Global Politics and Strategy*, Vol: 52, No:6, 2010, p.65

[28] Andrew Hurrell and Sengupta, "Emerging Powers, North-South Relations and Global Climate Politics", *International Affairs*, Vol: 88, No:3, May 2012, p. 464.

[29] Gonca Oğuz Gök, "Tracing the shift in Turkey's normative approach towards the international order through debates in the UN", *Perceptions*, Winter 2014, Vol:19, No: 4, 2014, p.78.

[30] Pranab Dhal Samanta, "BRICS calls for UNSC Reforms", *Indian Express*, 15 Apr 2011.

[31] Sarwar Kashani, "BRICS Seeks Revamp in Global Monetary System", IANS via twocircles.net, 14 April 2011.

[32] Haibin Niu, "BRICS in Global Governance A Progressive Force?", *Perspective/Fes New York* , April 2012, p.2. http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/iez/global/09048.pdf.

accordance with the provisions of the relevant UN Security Council Resolutions".[33] Yet, it is sometimes difficult for the BRICS countries to agree on a common position regarding international issues because of the divergence and soften incompatible interests. For instance, Russia and China vetoed the UNSC resolution on Syria, while India voted in favor it. Three of the BRICS countries, Russia, India and China, possess nuclear power.

In economic terms, BRICS countries are leading the growth of the world economy for over ten years and the IMF projected that from 2013 to 2017 it will maintain its growth at least 26% above world growth GDP.[34] There are also some Emerging Multilateral Companies (EMNCs), which work with natural resources and also with new brands, such as Lenovo, Natura, Mahindra and Mahinda.[35] In addition to economic asset, the BRICS enjoy huge human resources since half of the world population lives in these countries. Most of the population is young contrasting with the ageing population of the west. All the BRICS are now members of major international and multilateral institutions, such as WTO, the UN, G-20 and the UN Framework convention on climate change[36]. As Cornelissen and al argued, economic transformation after the global financial downturn indicates tectonic shifts away from the G-7 countries and toward the BRICS countries and other countries of global south[37]. In this context, the proposed BRICS Development Bank is meant to promote joint investment initiatives and conduct transactions in local currencies of the BRICS nations, shifting power away from the west[38].

In terms of development assistance, if the traditional western powers have long had an exclusive sphere of influence in Africa in terms of development, they now have to share this power with new emerging powers that are actively involved in the continent, politically, economically and culturally. These new entrants have growing economic power, and in some cases also significant political influence. They insist on the fact that their development cooperation is distinct in principle and

[33] http://www.cfr.org/brazil/brics-summit-delhi-declaration/p27805
[34] Adriana Chirinos, "BRICS Strategies 3.0", *International Journal of BRIC Business Research (IJBBR),* Vol:2, No: 2, November 2013, p.1.
[35] Adriana Chirinos, "BRICS Strategies 3.0", *International Journal of BRIC Business Research (IJBBR),* Vol: 2, No: 2, November 2013, p.1.
[36] Suresh P. Singh and Memory Dube, "BRICS and the World Order: A Beginner's Guide", p.3
[37] Scarlett Cornelissen, Fantu Cheru and Timothy M. Shaw, Africa and International Relations in the 21st Century. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012.
[38] Bracht, Caroline, "Will the Brics Bank deliver a more just World order?", The Guardian, 08 May, 2013.

practice from more traditional development cooperation. Thus, "rather than be subjected to norms that they perceive as being 'handed down' by traditional donors and international organizations dominated by industrialized economies, the emerging powers seek to actively participate in and even transform the global norms-setting process in the development cooperation arena".[39]

Individually, BRICS countries are prominent regional players in their respective regions. Russia has initiated the Eurasia Economic Union to shape and maintain its position as a regional power in Eurasia and to counteract EU and US foreign policies in this part of Europe. South Africa is an active founding member of the SADC in the southern part of Africa and holds a leading position in the African Union. Similarly, China and Brazil are trying to get more leading roles in some regional organizations such as the ASEAN Plus Three in South-East Asia and the MERCOSUR in Latin America.

2. Material Power of Turkey and BRICS at the UN: From Strategy to Practice

Motivations &Strategies

This part of the article focuses on a critical analysis of the objectives and strategies used by the BRICS and Turkey to commit their material powers to the UN. To begin with the BRICS, one of the most important goal for the BRICS countries is to contribute actively to the reform of the UN, one of the most important center for multilateral diplomacy, in a more democratic and equal way. Indeed, BRICS are conscious that the dynamics of the current international order require the use of multilateral institutions to handle effectively global problems such as transnational terrorism, climate change.[40] BRICS see the UN as the center of global governance and multilateralism, and it enjoys universal membership.[41] The 2012 New Delhi declaration underlined that the BRICS governments "recall our close coordination in the Security Council, during the year 2011, and underscore our commitment to work together in the UN… in the years to come"[42]. Yet, since the UN is considered by the

[39] Thomas Weiss and Adriana Abdenur, Emerging Powers and the UN: What kind of development partnership?, *Special Issue of the* Third World Quarterly, Vol: 35, No: 10, 2014, p.1751.

[40] Joint Statement by 1st Summit, June 16, 2009 Yekaterinburg, Russia; 2nd Summit, April 16, 2010 Brasilia, 5th Summit, 27 March 2013, Durban, South Africa.

[41] Joint Statement by 5th Summit, 27 March 2013, Durban, South Africa.

[42] Joint Statement by 4th Summit, 29 March 2012, New Delhi, India.

BRICS as one of the creation of the west in the post-World war II to serve its interests, BRICS's countries are advocating for a comprehensive reform of the UN with a view to make "it more effective, efficient and representative so that it can deal with today's global challenges more successfully"[43]. According to BRICS, developing countries overwhelm the UNGA and the logic would be that they get greater representation in the decision-making institutions of the UN, namely the UNSC. Thus, they claim for a greater representation of the developing and least developing countries in the UN, and China and Russia have been particularly advocate to the inclusion of India and Brazil into the UNSC permanent membership[44] . For instance for South Africa a reason to be in BRICS is to profile itself as a campaigner for the reform of the multilateral international institutions[45]. From a Russian perspective there is no real alternative for the UN but UN reform is needed in order "it could gradually adapt itself to changing global political and economic realities"[46].

Since BRICS are aware of the importance of the UN and the need to reform it, BRICS countries are increasing their material power commitments to the UN in order to increase their power influence over that institution and to represent more effectively the interests of the developing world in the UN. In other terms, BRICS are concerned about the poorest countries and they present themselves as a voice of all emerging nations[47]. What they claim is the reform of various international institutions for providing a rightful place and voice for emerging nations in defining the norms and rules of the international games. In illustration, China, India and Brazil agreed to major increases in their UN payments as part of the new agreement for the revised UN budget for 2012-2013 and in 2011[48], all five BRICS managed to sit on the UNSC and four (minus Brazil) remained in 2012.

Another objective of the BRICS' material contribution to the UN is to promote the use and respect of their core principles and values in the UN, namely the principle of national sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-intervention in the domestic politics of developing countries. According to BRICS members every country has the

[43] Joint Statement by 4th Summit, 29 March 2012, New Delhi, India.
[44] The 2011 BRICS' Leader Summit.
[45] South Africa in BRICS (2013): BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa). Pretoria, p.2.
[46] Russian FP 2008, 5
[47] Joint Statement by 1st Summit, June 16, 2009 Yekaterinburg, Russia and 3rd Summit, 14 April 2011, Sanya, China.
[48] Leslie Elliot Armijo and Cynthia Roberts, "The Emerging Powers and Global Governance: why the BRICS matter?", 2014, p.12.

right to choose its own path of social, economic and political development [49].BRICS's sensitive understanding of national sovereignty could be partly explained by the fact that most of them (except Brazil and Russia) have been victims of "colonial humiliation" during decennies and therefore they consider any intervention in the domestic politics of any country as an attempt to jeopardize the country's sovereignty and as a new form of "colonialism". In illustration, China and Russia have at several times vetoed UNSC's resolutions on military intervention in Libya and Syria. The strategies used by the BRICS have gradually shifted from unilateral commitment to the UN to the gradual coordination of policies among them through the formal launch of the BRICS in 2009.BRICS countries have recourse to informal grouping such as G20 to increase their influence in the UN.

As regards Turkey, its increasing assertiveness in the UN in terms of material power contribution has particularly been evident since the coming to power of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) in 2002. Since that period, Turkey's foreign policy has shifted from a neutral, passive and western-oriented stand to a pro-active and pre-emptive peace diplomacy. It is worth mentioning that this increasing presence of Turkey in international order has coincided with the country's economic boom, which has made it capable of using these material assets to influence the current international order.

Staring with the objectives of Turkey's material contribution to the UN, one of the most important points is Turkey's willingness to use the UN framework to pursue its normative foreign policies. Indeed, Turkey has always portrayed itself as a contributor to world peace. Kemal Ataturk's foreign policy of "peace at home, peace abroad" defined the new Turkish republic as a "modern state, which aims to coexist peacefully with international society of states"[50]. However, while the pursuit of this policy was rather passive and western-oriented (EU and NATO) during the republican early days, Turkey's foreign policy has become much more pro-active and has been marked by a gradual shift away from the west to become more globalized, in the 2000s, especially under AKP's rules. Indeed, the disillusion of Turkish policy makers about their probable membership to the EU in the recent years have resulted in a reorientation of Turkey's foreign policy towards the Middle East, Central and eastern

[49] A Shared Vision (2008) for the 21st Century of the People's Republic of China and the Republic of India, and Russian FP 2008, 6.
[50] Oral Sander, *Türkiye'nin Dış Politikası***,** İstanbul, İmge, 1998, p. 141.

Europe and Africa. This policy reorientation reflects a new definition of Turkey's identity based on civilizational discourses, which defined the new Turkish identity as the interplay between culture, geography, religion and history. Through its zero problems with neighborhood policy, Turkey has normalized its relations with its neighbors in the Middle East and with Russia, although the done has relatively changed with the Arab spring where Turkey's foreign policy stances in Syria and Egypt have been highly criticized in the late 2011. In the same vein, Turkey has reconnected its ties with the African continent, more assertively with the muslin African countries with past ottoman ties, where the use of humanitarian diplomacy has been more assertive, especially in countries like Somalia and Sudan.

Besides, increasing civilizational discourses are also intimately linked with the increasing normative stance of the country's foreign policy because Turkish leaders, under the current AKP rule, are advocating for a more "humanitarian" world and "equal world". As a result of this foreign policy shift, Turkey has in the last decade centered the pursuit of its foreign policy on the UN, as the most effective multilateral institution that would ease the pursuit of their normative goals. According to Turkish leaders, "*Strengthening multilateralism and the central role of the United Nations in the international system is a fundamental aspect of our foreign policy. It is the strongest hope and guarantee for a safer and better world"*[51]. In the words of Abdullah Gül, the former President of Turkey: "*The United Nations provides a political and moral compass for our endeavors towards a just international order- a better order that will prevent new conflicts, ensure that human rights are upheld and lead to more equitable and sustainable distribution of prosperity"*[52].

Acknowledging the center role played by the UN in global governance, Turkish leaders frequently criticize the failure of the UN to increase its global representativeness, especially in the developing world. In this regards, Turkish leaders have remarkably made the point in the following statement: "*You have the UN Security Council still reflecting the post-second World War geopolitical balances…We think that in the UN there should be a much more 'participatory' political order, much more 'justice oriented' economic order and a much more*

[51] Statement by President Abdullah Gul at UN General Assembly, http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N05/516/22/PDF/N0551622.pdf?OpenElement

[52] Statement by President Abdullah Gul at UN General Assembly, http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N08/515/70/PDF/N0851570.pdf?OpenElement

*'inclusive cultural orde*r'".[53] In the context of the Syrian civil war, the then Prime Minister Erdogan remarks in 2012 that "*The United Nations is facing a serious test. That test is about whether or not the Organization can represent the good conscience of the international community and act in accordance with it. In other words, it is about whether it can translate humanity into practice or not. So far, the track record has not been promising"*[54].

In their criticism towards the UN system, Turkish leaders attribute to their country "a new role" aiming to *"ring a higher moral standard to global governance and politics and achieve a harmony of realpolitik and norms-based foreign policy."*[55] Thus, Turkey is willing to play a crucial role in the building of the new world order: "*...At the global level, we will aspire to build in a participatory manner a new international order that is inclusive of the international community at large…*"[56].

Beside the normative motivations, Turkish leaders also consider increasing material commitments to the UN as a strong signal of their "rising power" status. Indeed, increasing material contribution signify that Turkey has been able to convert its material assets into a political tool to influence current issues in the international system. From this perspective, Turkey's UNSC (United Nations Security Council) non-permanent membership in 2009-2010, its host of the fourth conference of the LDCs under the auspices of the UN in 2010, its application for the UNSC's non-permanent membership for the period 2015-2016, clearly illustrate the increasing willingness on the side of Ankara to have an active role in international politics[57]. In illustration, Turkey's decision to send troops to Lebanon/UNIFILII, after heated national debates and protests "was a victory for (then) Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, who called Turkey's participation a moral duty that would contribute to regional stability and raise Turkey's profile on the international stage"[58]. In the same

[53] Statement by President Abdullah Gul at UN General Assembly, http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N05/516/22/PDF/N0551622.pdf?OpenElement

[54] Statement by Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu at UN Security Council on 30 August 2012, http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/PRO/N12/475/08/PDF/N1247508. pdf?OpenElement

[55] Emel Parlar Dal, "Assessing Turkey's 'Normative' Power", *Turkish Studies,* Vol: 14, No: 4, 2013, p. 716. http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/14683849.2013.861113

[56] Ahmet Davutoğlu, "Principles of Turkish Foreign Policy and Regional Political Structuring", *Horizons,* No.1 (Autumn 2014), p. 100.

[57] Emel Parlar Dal and Gonca Oğuz Gök, "Locating Turkey as a 'Rising Power' in the Changing International Order: An Introduction", Perceptions, Winter 2014, Vol: 19, No: 4, 2014, p.8.

[58]George E. Gruen. "Turkey's role in Peacekeeping Missions", *American Foreign Policy Interests*, Vol:28, No:6, 2006, p.435.

vein, the election of Turkey as a non-permanent UNSC Member States on 1 January 2009 for the next two years was viewed by the then Prime minister (PM) Recep Tayyip Erdogan as a strong signal of Turkey's 'increasing weight in international politics'[59]. The then President of Republics Abdullah Gul argued in the same way that the support for Turkey was 'a reflection of the confidence and friendship of international community' and emphasized Turkey's efforts to 'mobilize all abilities of Turkish diplomacy for the security, tranquility and welfare of the nations of the world'[60].

In practice, Turkey has openly defended the causes of the Palestinians and has never missed the occasion to criticize the UN mishandling of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Turkey has also taken the lead in addressing the underdevelopment and humanitarian plight in Africa, especially during the recent Somali hunger crisis by pointing out to the lack of interests and willingness of western powers to address these humanitarian issues. Given these contexts, Turkey has increased its voluntary contribution to the UN in order to contribute actively to the tackling of humanitarian crises worldwide. In illustration, "Turkey's voluntary contributions to the United Nations amounted to almost US$ 12 million in 2005 and 2006, including a donation worth US$ 600.000 to the newly founded "Central Emergency Response Fund"[61].

Finally, some security rationales are behind Turkey's increasing material contribution to the UN. Considering Turkey's proximity to the Middle Eastern countries mainly characterized by political instability and conflicts, Turkey fears the spillover effects of the conflict in its neighborhood. From this perspective, the need to ensure the security of Turkish territory was the driving force behind Turkey's extensive contribution to UNIFIL II in Lebanon since 2006. Yet, these arguments should be relativized because NATO is still considered as the better framework to ensure efficiently Turkey's security concerns.

[59] "Turkish officials hail Turkey's United Nations Security Council seat", Hurriyet Daily News, Available at http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/english/world/10150122.asp
[60] "Turkish officials hail Turkey's United Nations Security Council seat", Hurriyet Daily News, Available at http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/english/world/10150122.asp
[61] http://www.mfa.gov.tr/humanitarian-assistance-by-turkey.en.mfa.

3.Turkey's and BRICS' Financial and Personnel Contribution to the UN: A Comparative Account

3.1.Financial and Human Power Contribution: Statistics

Table 1: Material Power (in terms of Population, GDP (Billion USD), Military Expenditure, CINC, and Growth Competitive Index)

Country	Population*	GDP (Billion USD)**	GDP per capita (thousand USD)**	Military expenditure*** (Million USD)	CINC****	Growth Competitive Index
Turkey	**79,414,269**	**798,429**	**10,515**	**22,617**	**0,014317**	**4.45**
Brazil	204,259,812	2,346,076	11,384	31,743	0,0245967	4.33
Russia	142,423,773	1,860,597	12,735	84,461	0,0392739	4.25
India	1,251,695,584	2,048,517	1,581	50,029	0,0734437	4.28
China	1,367,485,388	10,354,831	7,590	216,371	0,198578	4.84
South Africa	53,675,563	350,085	6,482	3,894	0,0063162	4.37

Source:
*Total population, 2015, CIA Worldfactbook (https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/tu.html)

**GDP at market prices and GDP per capita according to 2014 current prices. Source:
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD/countries
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD/countries

***Military expenditure by country, 2014 current figures. Source: SIPRI Military Expenditure Database.
Source: http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/milex/milex_database

**** Composite Index of National Capacity (CINC), as of 2007. Source: National Material Capabilities, Correlates of War Dataset, v3.02, See also: http://www.nationalpower.info/cinc/
The Composite Index of National Capability (CINC) is a statistical measure of national power created by J. David Singer for the Correlates of War project in 1963. It uses an average of percentages of world totals in six different components. The components represent demographic, economic, and military strength. More recent studies tend to use the (CINC) score, which focuses on measures that are more salient to the perception of true state power beyond GDP.

***** Growth Competitiveness Index: World Economic Forum (2013), http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_GlobalCompetitivenessReport_2013-14.pdf The Global Competitiveness Index (GCI) attempts to quantify the impact of a number of key factors which contribute to create the conditions for competitiveness, with particular focus on the macroeconomic environment, the quality of the country's institutions, and the state of the country's technology and supporting infrastructure. The data used to measure GCI are administrative data (publicly available data), such as enrollment rates, government debt, budget deficit, and life expectancy, which are obtained from internationally recognized agencies, notably the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural

Organization (UNESCO), the IMF, and the World Health Organization (WHO). Furthermore, it uses data from the World Economic Forum's annual Executive Opinion Survey (Survey). Its producers are World Economic Forum with Columbia University.

Table 2: Turkey and BRICS Countries' Scale of Assessments[62] to United Nations Regularly Budget According to Gross National Income (percent) (2000-2015)

	Turkey	Brazil	Russia	India	China	South Africa
2004 - 2006	**0.372**	1.523	1.100	0.421	2.053	0.292
2007 - 2009	**0.381**	0.876	1.200	0.450	2.667	0.290
2010 - 2012	**0.617**	1.611	1.602	0.534	3.189	0.385
2013 - 2015	**1.328**	2.934	2.438	0.666	5.148	0.372
2016	**1.018**	3.823	3.088	0.737	7.921	0.364

Source: http://www.un.org/en/ga/contributions/budget.shtml

Table 3: Turkey and BRICS Countries Average Contributions to United Nations Regularly Budget (Million USD)

	Turkey	Brazil	Russia	India	China	South Africa
2004 - 2006	**6.139.020**	24.988.064	18.047.847	6.907.403	33.683.844	4.790.883
2007 - 2009	**7.976.887**	18.296.977	25.064.349	9.399.131	55.705.517	6.057.218
2010 - 2012	**14.039.745**	36.658.070	36.453.276	11.988.973	72.565.230	8.760.619
2013 - 2015	**34.589.121**	76.419.036	63.500.208	17.346.652	134.084.935	9.689.121
2016	**24.922.159**	94.913.044	75.598.847	18.042.859	193.917.898	8.911.262

Source: https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL30605.pdf
http://www.un.org/en/ga/contributions/budget.shtml

Table 4: Turkey and BRICS Countries Voluntary Contributions to United Nations (USD)

	Turkey	Brazil	Russia	India	China	South Africa
2010	**4.250.865**	9.597.524	7.143.170	21.523.473	3.698.167	347.809
2011	**6.795.329**	1.630.162	8.628.014	7.579.494	3.399.064	443.705
2012	**877.760**	2.371.100	11.288.130	6.072.019	4.555.945	336.594
2013	**6.825.707**	1.804.244	5.410.000	4.420.068	3.965.762	328.732

[62] The scale of assessments reflects a country's capacity to pay (measured by factors such as a country's national income and size of population) (for further details please visit https://www.globalpolicy.org/un-finance/tables-and-charts-on-un-finance/member-states-assessed-share-of-the-un-budget.html).[62]

Source: https://www.unsceb.org/content/FS-D00-01

Table 5: Turkey and BRICS Contribution to UN Peacekeeping Operations: According to Years (Averages of each year)

	Turkey	Brazil	Russia	India	China	South Africa
2000	**150**	95	248	3636	67	1
2001	**180**	96	329	2423	112	74
2002	**185**	102	362	2929	129	142
2003	**186**	80	328	2827	261	893
2004	**265**	842	340	3075	824	2009
2005	**267**	1287	296	6309	1011	2213
2006	**362**	1260	265	9033	1462	1970
2007	**978**	1280	295	9401	1825	1211
2008	**737**	1292	287	8922	2061	1901
2009	**619**	1344	341	8691	2150	2059
2010	**582**	2118	354	8805	2054	2119
2011	**495**	2298	237	8399	1997	2129
2012	**557**	2277	112	8036	1908	2114
2013	**477**	1843	102	7848	1846	2056
2014	**221**	1713	98	8042	2186	2207
2015	**160**	1396	76	7962	2862	2155

Source: Troop and police contributors archive (1990 - 2014)**:**
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/resources/statistics/contributors_archive.shtml

Current troop and police contributors:
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/resources/statistics/contributors.shtml

Table 6: Turkey and BRICS Membership Duration in UN and UN's Special Agencies

	Turkey	Brazil	Russia	India	China	South Africa
UN (United Nations)	**70**	70	70	70	70/44*	70
WTO (World Trade Organization)	**20**	20	3	20	14	20
GATT (The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade)	**64**	67	3	67	14	67
WHO (World Health Organization)	**67**	67	67	67	69/43**	68
IMF (International Monetary Fund)	**68**	69	23	70	70/35***	70
WB (World Bank)	**68**	69	23	70	70	70
UNHCR (Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees)	**53**	55	22	20	33	19
FAO (Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations)	**67**	70	9	70	70	22
UNESCO (United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization)	**69**	69	61	69	69	21
ILO (International Labour Organisation)	**83**	96	61	96	96	21
Average	**62,9**	65,2	34,2	61,9	57,5/48,8	44,8

Source:
United Nations, Member States of the United Nations, http://www.un.org/en/members/
World Trade Organization, Members and Observers, http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm
World Health Organization, http://apps.who.int/gb/bd/PDF/bd47/EN/members-en.pdf
IMF Fund, List of Members, https://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/memdir/memdate.htm

World Bank, Member Countries, http://www.worldbank.org/en/about/leadership/members

UNHCR, http://www.unhcr.org/3b73b0d63.html

FAO, http://www.fao.org/legal/home/fao-members/en/

UNESCO, http://en.unesco.org/countries

ILO, http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:11003:0::NO:::

* China gained its seat in the UN in 1971.
** China gained its seat in the WHO in 1972.
*** Taiwan was expelled from the IMF when China was admitted in 1980.

Table 7: Turkey and BRICS Personnel (Staff) Contribution in UN and UN's Special Agencies (2013)

	Turkey	Brazil	Russia	India	China	South Africa
UN (United Nations)	**56**	142	461	549	406	129
UNDP (United Nations Development Programme)	**28**	61	29	161	42	47
UNFPA (United Nations Population Fund)	**16**	9	4	45	17	26
UNOPS (United Nations Office for Project Services)	**1**	3	2	24	3	21
UNHCR (Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees)	**99**	10	37	58	17	30
UNICEF (United Nations Children's Fund)	**33**	57	15	275	53	42
UN Women (United Nations Entity for Gender Equality & the Empowerment of Women)	**2**	11	1	23	4	5
UNRWA (United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East)	**-**	-	1	5	-	1
UNITAR (United Nations Institute for Training and Research)	**-**	1	-	1	-	-
ITC (International Trade Centre (UNCTAD/WTO))	**1**	4	2	8	2	1
ICSC (International Civil Service Commission)	**-**	1	2	3	1	-
ICJ (International Court of Justice)	**-**	2	2	1	1	-
UNU (United Nations University)	**-**	1	-	3	3	-
UNJSPF (United Nations Joint Staff Pension Fund)	**-**	-	3	9	2	-
ILO (International Labour Organisation)	**7**	29	24	43	25	21
ICTILO (International Training Centre of the ILO)	**-**	1	1	1	2	-
FAO (Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations)	**18**	33	16	45	40	10
WFP (World Food Programme)	**2**	7	7	59	15	35
UNESCO (United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization)	**5**	27	26	29	32	10
WHO (World Health Organization)	**15**	24	38	329	58	27
PAHO (Pan American Health Organization)	**-**	59	-	-	-	-
UNAIDS (Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS)	**1**	9	8	20	6	15
ICAO (International Civil Aviation Organization)	**1**	8	13	4	18	3
UPU (Universal Postal Union)	**-**	5	2	2	3	1
ITU (International Telecommunication Union)	**4**	13	25	14	23	2
WMO (World Meteorological Organization)	**1**	1	10	4	8	2
IMO (International Maritime Organization)	**2**	5	7	4	7	3
WIPO (World Intellectual Property Organization)	**2**	9	11	10	21	3
IFAD (International Fund for Agricultural Development)	**-**	3	-	7	5	3
UNIDO (United Nations Industrial Development Organization)	**6**	2	12	25	16	5
IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency)	**15**	15	83	89	34	22
UNWTO (World Tourism Organization)	**1**	1	2	1	2	-
UNFCCC (United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change)	**-**	6	7	21	17	9
UNICC (United Nations International Computing Centre)	**2**	1	-	11	2	-
UNSSC (United Nations System Staff College)	**-**	1	-	-	-	-
TOTAL	**318**	561	851	1883	885	473

Source: http://www.unsceb.org/content/stats-hr
http://www.unsceb.org/CEBPublicFiles/CEB_2014_HLCM_HR_21.pdf

Table 8: Turkey and BRICS Total Personnel (Staff) Contribution in UN and UN's Special Agencies According to Years (2000-2013)

	Turkey	Brazil	Russia	India	China	South Africa
2000	**140**	406	796	1318	457	130
2001	**146**	466	824	1349	487	170
2002	**204**	538	843	1417	532	186
2003	**205**	483	827	1414	552	227
2004	**209**	503	856	1467	579	249
2005	**215**	566	876	1480	604	278
2006	**209**	556	969	1442	645	302
2007	**208**	565	1001	1518	666	363
2008	**217**	558	890	1625	737	355
2009	**232**	596	918	1782	794	439
2010	**243**	575	912	1875	844	466
2011	**273**	595	896	1897	886	481
2012	**270**	587	862	1890	888	474
2013	**318**	561	851	1883	885	473

Source: http://www.unsceb.org/content/hr-statistics-reports

Table 9: Ranks of Turkey and BRICS Participations to UN Regularly Budget, Voluntary Contributions to UN, Personnel (Staff) in UN and UN's Special Agencies and UN Peacekeeping Operations

	Turkey	Brazil	Russia	India	China	South Africa
Financial Contributions	**2,5**	3,5	2	4	5	4
Staff Contributions	**3**	4	2	5	6	1
PKO Contributions	**4,5**	2,5	3,5	2,5	5,5	2,5
Averages	**3,3**	**3,3**	**2,5**	**3,8**	**5,5**	**2,5**

Source:

Analyses based on : Hongying Wang & Erik French (2013) Middle Range Powers in Global Governance, Third World Quarterly, Vol.34, No.6, pp. 985-999 DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2013.802509

Financial Contributions : https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL30605.pdf
http://www.un.org/en/ga/contributions/budget.shtml
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.ATLS.CD/countries?page=3

Staff Contributions : http://www.unsceb.org/content/hr-statistics-reports

PKO Contributions : http://www.providingforpeacekeeping.org/contributions/
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/resources/statistics/contributors_archive.shtml
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/fatalities/documents/stats_2.pdf

Population : http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL

2.1.Findings and Critical Assessment

Regarding the material power contribution (Table 1), as Table 1 shows, in terms of size of economy, China, Brazil, Russia and India, among the BRICS countries, rank respectively higher than Turkey. As seen clearly in the table 1 China, Russia, India and Brazil occupy respectively the high end in terms of military spending, while Turkey and South Africa are respectively at the low end. In terms of Composite Index of National Capacity (CINC), which measures state power beyond GDP, Turkey, among these six countries, is ranked 5th. On the other hand, GDP per capita shows that Turkey is ranked 3rd among the six countries. While China, India, Russia and Brazil occupy the high end, Turkey and South Africa are respectively at the low end. Regarding their Growth Competitiveness Index (GCI), Turkey has a higher GCI score than that of the BRICS (except China) and this shows that, despite its low GDP (compared to the other five countries, except South Africa), it is economically competitive in terms of growth. Taking a neorealist perspective according to which a state's participation in global governance should be conditioned by its relative material power (defined in terms of economic, military power and of population), it can be argued that Turkey's relative low material power, defined in terms of economic output (GDP), growth competitive index (GCI), Composite Index of National Capacity (CINC), military output (military expenditure), and demography (population) compared to the five BRICS countries (except South Africa) has a positive impact on its participation in global governance.

UN financial system is basically financed with the assessed and voluntary contributions from the member states. The UN Regular Budget and Peacekeeping Operations' Budget are funded through assessments. On the other hand, the UN Programs and Funds are supported by voluntary contributions from members. The UN Specialized Agencies are funded both with assessed and voluntary contributions.[63] Besides that, the United Nations is also funded through voluntary contributions from the member states. In terms of calculating the Regular Budget, there are some influential factors such as countries' Gross National Income (GNI), population, national debt etc. Therefore, with the calculation of these factors for each member county, "the scale of assessments" constituted what reflects a country's

[63] "UN System Budget" https://www.globalpolicy.org/un-finance/tables-and-charts-on-un-finance/un-system-budget.html

capacity to contribute UN Regular Budget. The scale of assessments percentage is determined every three years sets maximum (22%) and minimum (.001%) rates for all nations based on their capacity to pay.[64]

In terms of financial contribution to the UN regularly budget, the tables 2 and 3 show the increasing trend of Turkey's financial contribution especially after 2010. Although the period 2010-2013 witnessed a smooth increase in Turkey's financial contribution, in 2013 the amount of this contribution doubled. This high increase in Turkey's financial contribution in 2010 can be explained by both Turkey's increasing capacity to pay measured by factors like GNI and the size of population and its rising activism in the UN through its non-permanent membership to the UNSC during 2009-2010 together with Brazil. Focusing more specifically on the GNI factor, table 2 shows that an increase in Turkey's GNI in 2010 and in 2013 has resulted in an increase of its scale of assessment and consequently to the rise of Turkey's financial contribution to the UN during those specific periods. Here it must also be reminded that Brazil's financial contribution to the UN doubled in the same year. With regards the second wave of increase in Turkey's financial contribution in 2013, it can be argued that in 2013 Turkish leaders increased the ton of their UN and international order criticism within the aggravation of the Syrian tragedy especially after the Ghouta chemical attack in summer 2013. On the other hand, as the current year's statistics shows, except China, other five countries have some decreasing trends in GNI, scale of assessments or contribution to UN Regular Budget. In terms of GNI, when Brazil, Russia and South Africa have decreasing amounts, India and China's GNIs increased; however Turkey's GNI stays nearly in the same amount. In regard to the scale of assessments, while Turkey and South Africa's rates are decreasing, Brazil, Russia, India and China increase their rates. Lastly, related with the contribution to UN's Regular Budget, whereas Turkey, South Africa and India's amounts are decreasing, Brazil, Russia and China increase their amounts to contribution.

Another important point to underline in the sense of financial contribution is the member countries' voluntary contribution (Table 4) to the UN. UN published only

[64] "Assessments of Member States' Contribution to the UN Regular Budget" https://www.globalpolicy.org/un-finance/tables-and-charts-on-un-finance/member-states-assessed-share-of-the-un-budget.html

four years' voluntary contributions up until now.[65] As mentioned above, the UN Programs and Funds and the UN Specialized Agencies are financed by voluntary contributions from member countries. There are two kinds of voluntary contributions, namely specified and non-specified. Yet, table 4 shows only the specified voluntary contributions because the UN has not yet published non-specified voluntary contributions. Table 4 shows that Turkey's voluntary contribution to the UN is bigger than China's (except in 2012) and South Africa's. Moreover, in some years Turkey's voluntary contribution also outweighed the contribution of Brazil, Russia and India. On the other hand, Turkey's financial contribution to UN doubled especially in last three years, with the increase of Gross National Income (GNI) and scale of assessment. From this point of view, as an interpretation of table 4, Turkey's voluntary contribution to UN would accordingly increase after 2013.

In terms of contribution to UN Peacekeeping Operations (Table 5), Turkey's contribution has slightly increased during the period 2000-2007 and outweighed the contributions of Brazil, China and South Africa during the period 2000-2002. In 2007, Turkey's contributions to UN Peacekeeping Operations sharply rose from 362 in 2006 to 978 in 2007, which amounted to nearly triple the contributions made in 2006. This sharp increase in 2007 might be explained by Turkey's active participation in several UN Peacekeeping Operations during that year. For instance, under the framework of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), an operation established by UN mandate in 2001, which has come under NATO's leadership since 2003, Turkey assumed the leadership of Kabul sector command between April 2007-December 2007 and contributed 1845 personnel to the Kabul regional command in addition to the Wardak Provincial Reconstruction Tea during his mandate[66]. During the same year, Turkey also assumed the leadership of the Multinational Task Force-South (MNTF-S) in KFOR(Kosovo) on 29 May 2007 for one year. During its leadership, its commitment to MNTF-S was 723 personnel[67].

Regarding Turkey and BRICS membership duration in the UN and UN's Special Agencies, among the five countries, Turkey has a relatively long membership in UN and UN's Special Agencies. Generally speaking, Turkey ranks as the 2nd

[65] Agency Revenue By Government Donor (Assessed And Voluntary Contributions) https://www.unsceb.org/content/FS-D00-01

[66] For further details, please visit, http://www.geneva-academy.ch/RULAC/peace_operations.php?id_state=226

[67] http://www.geneva-academy.ch/RULAC/peace_operations.php?id_state=226

country having the longest membership to the UN and its special agencies, after Brazil and this is also consistent with its active participation in global governance (see Table 6). Memberships by Russia and China to these organizations are shorter than other countries in the cluster.

With regard to Turkey and BRICS human power contribution to UN and UN's Special Agencies (see Tables 7 and 8), Turkey overall appears at the low end among the six countries. However, Turkey's contribution to the UNHCR (Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees) is the highest one among the six and this might be explained by Turkey's increasing humanitarian diplomacy towards Africa and the Middle East. In the Middle Eastern case, Turkey's human power contribution seems to have focused mostly to the Syrian refugee crisis. On the other hand, as table 8 shows that Turkey, China and South Africa have the highest rates among the six countries which have doubled their human power contributions in UN and UN's Special Agencies since 2000.

Table 9 shows the ranking of Turkey and BRICS participations to UN Regularly Budget, voluntary contributions to UN, Personnel (Staff) in UN and UN's Special Agencies and UN Peacekeeping Operations. Basically, on one hand Staff and PKO contributions are evaluated relative to population size, and on the other hand, financial contributions are evaluated relative to Gross National Income (GNI) and then ranked accordingly from 1 to 6, with 1 being the largest contributor relative to population or GNI and 6 being the smallest contributor. Therefore, averages of the rankings produce the overall contributions. As table 9 shows South Africa and Russia are the largest contributors while China is the smallest contributor among the six countries. Turkey and Brazil rank equally as the third contributors to the UN system after South Africa, Russia.

The general evaluation of Turkey's participation in the UN and its agencies in terms of human power and financial contribution illustrates that Turkey's relatively low material power compared to that of the BRICS countries (except South Africa), gives it an advantage in interfering more actively in global issues through multilateral cooperation. Similarly, in 2015 Turkey ranked as the fourth financial contributor to the UN regularly budget respectively after China (1st), Brazil (2nd) and Russia (3rd ranking). In the same stance, Turkey's relative long membership in international organizations correlates with its strong identification with the problems of global governance and its increasing degree of socialization in the cultures and values of the

major international organizations also make it both a legitimizer and a reform-seeker country. Lastly, Turkey's relative high human contribution to the UNHCR is intimately connected with the performance of its humanitarian actorness role in Africa and the Middle East.

Conclusion

This paper has compared Turkey as a rising power with BRICS countries in terms of financial and human power contribution to the United Nations. In doing so, it has first examined Turkey's and BRICS countries' positioning in the global order, their objectives for and strategies of contributing to the UN and it has critically compared the qualitative and quantitative material contribution of Turkey and the BRICS to UN. Generally, the emerging powers such as Turkey and BRICS countries are characterized by their expanding economic and human resource capacity, as well as their increasing aspiration to become a regional power. Regarding their objectives and strategies to committing their material power to the UN, both Turkey and the BRICS countries seem to have a strong willingness to make use the UN channels in order to pioneer or influence the undertakings of great reforms that will contribute to increase the global representativeness of the UN. Contributing to the UN is also seen on both sides as a strong signal of their rising power status because of their growing influence on the international political, economic and social areas in a stance similar to that the traditional great powers like the USA. In addition, although normative factors are behind both BRICS and Turkey's material power commitment to the UN, religious considerations play a central role in explaining Turkey's increasing material contribution to the UN. In fact, Turkey has constantly used its relative weight position in the UN to advocate for the causes of the Muslim countries that experience war and humanitarian disaster such as Palestine, Syria, and Somalia.

Coming to the qualitative and quantitative comparison of Turkey's and the BRICS' material power contribution to the UN, it can be deducted from our findings that although Turkey has a relatively low material capacity in terms of GDP, financial and human contributions, compared to that of the BRICS, Turkey is assertively confident in its possible constructive role and middle power actorness, as proved by its long membership and the increase of its scale of assessment resulting from a parallel rise of its GNI. In the same stance, despite its lower participation in UN

Peacekeeping Operations and UN's special agencies compared to those of the BRICS countries, in recent years Turkish leaders and society have increasingly become more sensitive and inclined to global governance problems, especially in regards to humanitarian crises, as showed by during the recent Syrian crisis. This development could also strengthen Turkey's hand in multilateralism and global governance in the upcoming years and lead to raising its voice in calls for the reform of global governance institutions. As Turkey's decision makers always address in their speeches, Turkey's contribution to international organizations in every sense, notably to UN will increase, therefore, Turkey's rising power will be more visible in global governance in the near future.

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