

RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT: THE CASE OF LIBYA AND SYRIA

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INTRODUCTION

The framework of Responsibility to Protect (RtoP) came to exist in 2001. It was triggered by the question of Kofi Annan in the context of responding to the humanitarian crisis that has been happening in which clearly become the threat to international peace and security.¹ The genocide which is one of the major crimes under international law happened in Rwanda seven years before this framework occurred. It was a devastating moment when the international community was just being the silent observer when they knew that civilian in Rwandan were dying day by day in that year. From this point, the question of when the international community should concretely respond and help the incapable state to protect their own people is appropriately placed by Kofi Annan.²

The next question that might occur is once we have RtoP in place, does it mean that the related actors can easily find the consensus in implementing it? The answer to this question at the moment is still no. There are many actors involved and there is a need to take a note that they have varied perspectives in understanding RtoP. Since it is not legally binding, there are no strict consequences when the authorized actor which in this case is the UN Security Council decided not to implement RtoP. However, another aspect that needs to take into consideration in understanding RtoP is that it just emerged and it does take the time to be fully accepted. Gareth Evans as one of the RtoP's advocates once stated that the new norm was practical 'almost choked at birth'³, it identifies the acceptance of RtoP's implementation needs further discussion and also awareness from related actors to contribute to its development.

¹ (SECRETARY-GENERAL PRESENTS HIS ANNUAL REPORT TO GENERAL ASSEMBLY, 1999): *"Nothing in the UN Charter precludes a recognition that there are rights beyond borders. What the Charter does say is that 'armed force shall not be used, save in the common interest'. But what is that common interest? Who shall define it? Who shall defend it? Under whose authority? And with what means of intervention?"*

² (Information, 2012)

³ (Arbour)

So the aim of this paper is to analyze the inconsistency of RtoP implementation in which will be the focus on the cases of Libya and Syria. These two cases have shown the characteristics of international conflict that need to be undertaken by RtoP framework. However, there is the disparity of its implementation in these two conflicts. This paper demonstrates that there is confidence factor to face the intervention consequences that influence the international community to decide to or not to create an intervention. The more confident the international community in facing the outcome of the intervention, it is more likely the decision makers to be faster in deciding the intervention. I also argue that the national interest of major power countries affects the decision to or not to intervene in Libya and Syria. The bigger benefits of the intervention towards the major countries, it is more likely the major power countries to be less hesitate to launch an intervention. These arguments are based on the perspective of neo-realism.

Primarily, the first part will explain the brief history and the intervention towards the Libyan and Syrian case. The second part will analyze these two cases through the factors of the confidence to intervene and the major power countries which are based on neo-realism perspective. The last part will summarize the whole discussion in this paper.

LIBYA AND INTERVENTION

None of the conflicts were started with violence at the first place. People in Libya took the streets in February with peace, echoing their Tunisian and Egyptian neighbors' demands for more representation and rights.⁴ For forty-two years, the Libyan government limited opportunities for social advancement to Qaddafi's family members and supporters or close associates; the undemocratic regime used repressive security services to maintain its power.⁵ Unfortunately, the Qaddafi's side responded not even a blink with the harmful and violence attack towards the protesters.

⁴(Renner and Afoaku 2014)

⁵Ibid.

The government already sensed something would erupt real soon on behalf of the people after seeing what happened in neighboring countries. Maintaining power was all that matter for Libyan government despite the welfare of its own people. They already put some efforts in responding to speculation that the protest would erupt by reducing food prices which they hoped would discourage people to oppose the government. As it was expected, the effort was failed since the people were aware enough that it was just a way to trick them.

February 15, 2011, was the date when the large protest began against Qaddafi's government in which accepted the quick response from them through violence attack. The government did even give the space for the people to be heard. Within two days, 20 people were killed due to the violence conducted by the security forces of Qaddafi. As public discontent escalated, Libyan authorities loyal to Qaddafi arrested hundreds of civilians, attacked protesters with all manner of weapons, including aircraft and killed hundreds.⁶ This autocratic government used extra-judicial killings, intimidation, and unrestrained violence in an attempt to maintain their authority.⁷

In responding to the conflict, the UN took several necessary actions which based on three steps of implementation on behalf of practicing the Responsibility to Protect concept. United Nations Security Council did not take that much time to finally decide to implement the RtoP framework in Libya. The starting step was giving sanctions towards members of the Qaddafi government and cessation of violence was demanded. Secondly, within the next three weeks after giving the sanctions, UNSC passed Resolution 1973, authorizing a no-fly zone to protect civilians and civilian protected areas. Lastly, in the next 48 hours, US and NATO planes were enforcing the no-fly zone and conducting airstrikes against Col. Muammar Qaddafi's forces.⁸ These three steps were fortunately led to the collapse of Qaddafi's regime and his death by October.⁹

⁶Ibid.

⁷Ibid.

⁸(Collins, Chivers and Roberts 2011)

⁹(Renner and Afoaku 2014)

SYRIA AND NONINTERVENTION

As it has been mentioned earlier, both of the conflicts were not originated from something violent. The civil war in Syria emerged due to the overreaction of the government towards an action performed by some teenagers that did not please the government especially the President Bashar al-Assad. What happened at that time was some teenagers painted revolutionary slogans on a school wall that led to the cruel response from the Bashar side towards them. These teenagers have been arrested and tortured. Knowing this painful fact, the pro-democracy protests erupted in March 2011 in the southern city of Deraa.¹⁰ They all wanted to have freedom and also to be heard by the president in which never happened. So, it led to the desire of the people to bring down his presidency. Again, the protest was peacefully performed but not until the armies on Assad's call fire upon the protesters. As early as April 2011, reports emerged of Syrian government forces conducting house-to-house sweeps, making mass arrests, sectioning off neighborhoods with barricades and checkpoints, and cutting electricity, water, and cell phone services.¹¹

The year of 2011 seems already passed way behind our current time and we might think that there are so many things have changed. But not in Syria where the conflict is still continuously emerging and even worsened. By June 2013, the UN said 90,000 people had been killed in the conflict. However, by August 2014 that figure had more than doubled to 191,000.¹² The number keeps increasing while the major powers in UNSC still are not sure on what needs to be done due to the favor disparity in between.

It is more than rigid proof of the state's failure in protecting its own citizens due to the fact that instead of protecting the people, the government side chose to sadistically oppose them. The Syrian government took all measures to maintain its power and position, continually claiming it was fighting "armed gangs and terrorists" and refusing to acknowledge the legitimacy of the opposition.¹³

Unfortunately, none of the significant interventions have been implemented in Syria up until now. The situation in Syria keeps getting worsened while the Security Council is still hesitating

¹⁰(Walker 2011)

¹¹(Renner and Afoaku 2014)

¹²(Rodgers, et al. 2014)

¹³(Renner and Afoaku 2014)

to make a decision in term of intervention. Instead of placing sanctions or military intervention there, UNSC brokered a deal to remove the government's chemical weapons.¹⁴ The Security Council has passed five resolutions related to Syrian conflict: three in 2012 to mandating a "failed UN observer mission to Syria," one in 2013 arranging (still ongoing) removal and destruction of Syria's chemical weapons, and one in February 2014 demanding an end to the violence, condemning human rights violations and attacks on civilians, and insisting on humanitarian access.¹⁵ The one that has been passed in February 2014, encourages all the parties to start to interpret the humanitarian value into action immediately as stated in the resolution as follow:

*Demands that all parties immediately put an end to all forms of violence, irrespective of where it comes from, cease and desist from all violations of international humanitarian law and violations and abuses of human rights, and reaffirm their obligations under international humanitarian law and international human rights law, and stresses that some of these violations may amount to war crimes and crimes against humanity.*¹⁶

Does the resolution solve the problem? Ideally, it is hoped to be the basis of change where formal expressions of the opinion or will of the United Nations organs are placed. Yet again for resolution, to make it into practice is not as easy as put it into words.

RtoP IN NEO-REALISM PERSPECTIVE

In neo-realism perspective, the international system is understood as anarchical which there is no central authority that can rule others.¹⁷ This interpretation that affects states behavior. They would tend to do the rational calculation of their own position in order to formulate their interests and also strategies. Moreover, political leaders would consider any incentives and respond to the incentives and limits that the system provides.¹⁸ In relation to RtoP, eventhough the decision makers are under the umbrella of the UN, there is still no central authority that can oblige states to implement or not to implement RtoP. The political leaders in the UN, from

¹⁴Ibid.

¹⁵Ibid.

¹⁶(Security Council Unanimously Adopts Resolution 2139 (2013) to Ease Aid Delivery to Syrians, Provide Relief from 'Chilling Darkness' 2014)

¹⁷ (Chatterjee, 1997)

¹⁸ (Realism-The Changing Global Order, n.d.)

this perspective, would consider consequences that might come if they do or do not intervene. If their rational way of thinking leads them to hesitation with the consequences that might occur when they do intervene, they would most likely be less confidence to intervene.

Stephen Krasner as neo-realist argued that the 'power maximizing states acting in international environment' remain the foundational element of international reality.¹⁹ This perspective relates to the explanation of why decision makers in the UN are willing and not willing to intervene. Need to keep in mind that, even though states agreed to cooperate but they are still individual states who have different calculation and strategies to maximize their power in order to fulfill their own interests. When it comes into practice, the R2P member states during the UN World Summit in 2005 agreed that only agreement of a majority of UNSC members, including the P-5, could result in collective action.²⁰ It means that there is the main door – the P-5 veto power – that needs to be passed in order to make the intervention happens. Depending on this fact, it can be seen that the major power countries play a significant role in deciding whether to or not to intervene. If they consider intervention would give bad consequences towards their interests, they would less likely to agree on implementing RtoP.

From this neo-realism perspective, it can be assumed that the possible key elements that affect decision makers to implement RtoP are: the confidence to intervene and the major power countries interests. The following part will explain the Libya and Syrian case with these two key elements.

THE CONFIDENCE TO INTERVENE

The confidence to intervene - In Libyan Case

The day when UNSC Resolution 1973 – in which authorizing "all necessary measures" to protect civilians in Libya from pro-Gaddafi – was passed, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon declared that "The Security Council today has taken a historic decision. Resolution 1973 confirms, clearly

¹⁹ (Chatterjee, 1997)

²⁰ Ibid.

and unequivocally, the international community's determination to fulfill its responsibility to protect civilians from violence perpetrated upon them by their government."²¹

Before the resolution 1973, there were several actions taken by UNSC in responding to what has been happening in Libya. Sanctions and resolution 1970 emerged initially but were ignored by Gaddafi's government in which led UN to launch resolution 1973 yet fortunately was categorized as a successful action to stop the conflict. The quick intervention authorized by UNSC reflected the idea that the international community was confidence enough to do something without significant hesitation. When turning our shoulders back to what was really happening in Libya, it was actually about the opponents who mostly represented people's voice were cruelly suppressed by the government troops. Adding to that, the loyal forces of Qaddafi's regimes were massacring protesters and Qaddafi was taking no steps to defuse the situation peacefully.²²

Unlike the Syrian case, Libyan civil war was not that complicated as Syrian in which did not produce any additional considerations for the decision makers to take quick actions towards it. Compared to what Syrian case has, in Libya the dynamic was not as complex as Syria. In Libya, there was no group religion disparity issue occurred and also other extremist rebel group such as Al-Qaeda in Syria that could discourage international community to do something for Libya. In contrast with Syrian case, one of the reasons why the UNSC seemed unhesitant to launch action was there was no thought of much worse consequences might occur if the conflict can be stopped. The expected outcome of the intervention was to protect Libyan civilians eventhough, in fact, it was slightly turned since no-fly zone and airstrikes conducted against Col. Moammar Qaddafi's forces led to the collapse of his regime and his death. When the regime was finally changed, the international community had no fear about another international security issue might occur afterward in contrast with what became the biggest fear of Syria in which what will happen if Assad's regime is actually over. The lesson learned might be coming from what the UNSC had done with Syria in order to response to Libyan civil

²¹(Secretary-General Says Security Council Action on Libya Affirms International Community's Determination to Protect Civilians from Own Government's Violence 2011)

²²(Renner and Afoaku 2014)

war. Due to the Libyan case came first, Russia and China used the idea of 'the negative lessons from Libya case' when refusing any possible intervention towards Syrian case.

The confidence to intervene - In Syrian Case

Recalling the underlying cause of the conflict which was the misbehavior of some teenagers towards the government somehow does not really represent how disaster the conflict has been going on up until now. The over-reaction of the government in responding those teenagers that actually caused the civil war. The situation in Syria is not getting even near to be called better when it is getting so much harder for the decision maker to understand the conflict in order to make the correct decision.

One of the undeniable facts of the Syrian conflict is the fight is not between the opponent and the government but it is much more than that. The Sunnites on the one hand, the Shia on the other hand, the Alawites; so the dimension is completely much more complex. The consequence is that Al-Qaeda is a player in the whole story or groups that are affiliated with Al-Qaeda or that defend similar kinds of positions as Al-Qaeda and that there is also a stronger risk of spreading of the crisis to neighboring countries.²³ By considering this fact, the major power countries such as the USA and also others started to question what will happen if the regime can be changed. Even though the common response will be "We want to get rid of Assad"²⁴ but this kind of emotional response only see from one side of the conflict which means that "what will happen next" is being ignored from their thought. But again, there is no one to be blamed for this especially for the people who have been experienced how the Assad's leadership throughout the years.

Looking through the components of the conflict dynamic, what comes to be their most fearful thing is in case it would be a regime that sympathizes with Al-Qaeda or in case the country becomes dominated by Al-Qaeda related groups, then it could become a serious security problem²⁵ for the decision makers who are mostly coming from the west. Glanville²⁶ argued when talking about the possibility of international community to intervene in Syrian case that

²³(Christiaens and Robijns 2013)

²⁴Ibid.

²⁵Ibid.

²⁶ Dr. Luke Glanville is a Research Fellow in the Department of International Relations at the Australian National University. He is the author of *Sovereignty and the Responsibility to Protect: A New History*

"the fluid and confused internal situation, question marks over the identity, intent, and methods of the rebels, the risk of atrocities against minority groups if the regime collapse; relations with Iran, China and Russia; and the deepening Sunni-Shia divide all around the Islamic; crescent in the middle east made it impossible to achieve the balance of consequences of outside intervention without confidence."²⁷

As it has been mentioned earlier that there are certain consequences of the intervention taken which unfortunately might discourage the decision makers to do so. The head of the CIA until 2009, General Michael Hayden once argued that there are three possible outcomes to the conflict: continuing fighting between ever more extreme rebel and pro-government sectarian factions, the disintegration of Syria as a state with flow-on destabilizing consequences for the whole region, or the survival of the Assad regime.²⁸ At this point, nothing can be certain and these type of well-said argument that actually discourage the world in deciding what to do with the Syrian conflict. The lack of readiness of UNSC was coming from the fears of uncertainties in the future that does not make they are even ready to face what will happen next.

THE MAJOR POWER COUNTRIES INTEREST

Major power countries interest in Libya

For western countries, the Libyan president was not someone they will be allied with. Some actions taken by Gaddafi before did not please the western especially the P3 countries – United States of America, United Kingdom, and France. In 1988, Muammar Gaddafi personally ordered the Lockerbie bombing that killed 270 people over the Scottish Lowlands town.²⁹ The activities of Gaddafi in Africa also annoyed the western countries. The African expert, Horace Campbell once argued that Gaddafi was not the unifier he claimed to be. He wrote that "Gaddafi is an obstacle to the unification of African people,". Other actions that make the western countries against this dictator leader were he used billions of petrodollars to support intervention in

²⁷(Takur 2013)

²⁸Ibid.

²⁹(Beaumont and Black 2011)

Chad, made a call for jihad in the Congo and armed rebel fighters in Mali.³⁰ Long way before the civil war in Libya emerged; western countries never placed Libya as their friend based on what its leader had done to other parts of the world.

For the United States, R2P has been part of its serious consideration and actively supporting its establishment as an international norm. It also can be seen through its effort in including R2P into US National security strategy.³¹ In the White House release of National Security Strategy on 28 May 2010, the intention of Obama administration to actively participate in responding to genocide and mass atrocity around the world with specific reference to the Responsibility to Protect³² was stated, as follows:

*(...) Prevent Genocide and Mass Atrocities: The United States and all member states of the U.N. have endorsed the concept of the “**Responsibility to Protect**.” In so doing, we have recognized that the primary responsibility for preventing genocide and mass atrocity rests with sovereign governments, but that this responsibility passes to the broader international community when sovereign governments themselves commit genocide or mass atrocities, or when they prove unable or unwilling to take necessary action to prevent or respond to such crimes inside their borders.*

Among those major power countries, France was actually the most eager country in responding the Libyan civil war. France even was the one who started the airstrikes in Libya.³³ Similar to the US, taking string action was in its national interest in terms of its security, economy, and prestige.³⁴ In France perspective, since France never did support the Qaddafi’s regime and have already begun taking steps against Qaddafi, it will be much better for France in term of economy and security if Libya formed a new government friendlier to France.³⁵ In addition to this, a New York Times editorial once argued that the reason behind France initiation to intervene Libya was due to Sarkozy’s view towards Libya as a chance to recoup French prestige in North Africa, a region France has long considered important to its economy and security.³⁶ By getting North Africa’s attention to what France has been doing towards Libya, it was hoped that it can help its economic and also support its security.

³⁰(Nuruzzaman 2014)

³¹Ibid.

³²(National endorsements of Responsibility to Protect: policy papers, strategy documents and focal points 2011)

³³(Renner and Afoaku 2014)

³⁴Ibid.

³⁵Ibid.

³⁶(Discord Among Allies 2011)

It cannot be denied that the natural resource – for Libya case is its oil – also played a significant role in the sphere of intervention. Libya is well-known as the 2% world's total oil³⁷ that attracted the major power countries to put hands on it. It is arguable that the powerful western countries agreed to intervene so that they could have more access afterward towards the oil source. The anti-Gaddafi NTC (National Transitional Council) and the P3 are reported to have concluded oil bargains that quickly prompted NATO's bombings on Gaddafi forces and military installations in March 2011.³⁸

Different story from the perspective of other major countries such as Russia and China who are also happened to be the P5 countries. Both of them did not have bad perceptions towards Gaddafi's regime. Both of them remained abstained upon the decision the Libyan intervention. Before the uprising started in Libya, Russia had developed friendly and yet growing ties with Gaddafi's regime in the sphere of economic and political interests. Like China, Russia did not support the idea to intervene Libya conflict militarily but more to allow the resolution to forward out of larger concerns for its relationship with Middle Eastern and African states. They still have their own interests towards Middle Eastern and also African states so when knowing AU and LAS were really into supporting the Libyan intervention, they chose to abstain. The perspective of AU and LAS states still is one of their considerations when making a decision. Some scholars also argued that China and Russia chose to abstain instead of opposing the intervention idea due to their unawareness of the consequences implementation would bring.³⁹

Major power countries interest in Syria

The responses from Russia and China towards Syrian civil war was in between opposing and supporting which yet caused no rigid action taken in responding to what has been going on in Syria. These two major countries repeatedly claimed that they were neither defending Assad nor condoning his actions.⁴⁰ China's UN ambassador Li Baodong said that Beijing opposed the idea of "interference in (Syria's) internal affairs. "He added that "sanction or threat of sanction does not help resolve the question of Syria" but "may further complicate the situation".⁴¹ The

³⁷(Macalister and Borger 2011)

³⁸(Nuruzzaman 2014)

³⁹(Renner and Afoaku 2014)

⁴⁰(Renner and Afoaku 2014)

⁴¹(Trevelyan 2011)

reluctant of China and Russia in allowing the resolution was based on their perception on the misuse of resolution 1973 by P3.

For Russia, Syria is one of the significant actors in term of its economic sphere. It has been major Russian ally in the Middle East, a buyer of military hardware and equipment.⁴² It means that if the Assad regime is thrown down from power, Russia will lose its important customer in which affect directly affect its economic stability. Having long been Syria's primary arms supplier, Russia had \$4 billion in future sales as of 2012 and Syria remains 'critical for some Russian companies' financial survival'.⁴³ Even though the situation in Syria keep getting far from better, in another side of the world, Russia keep sending Assad government with arms supplies. Beyond military sales, Russian companies have already invested some \$20 billion in Syria, including in oil and natural gas production and transportation.⁴⁴ It was imaginable enough that Russia has a big fear if Assad falls from its regime.

For China itself, the principle of non-interference is still placed on top of the non-intervention factors. China is never fond of the option of regime change mission in a legitimate country such as Libya or Syria. That is why China was really disappointed with the outcome of intervention taken by NATO in Libya whereas the regime changes and for China, it went too far beyond UNSC mandate.

Besides the principle side of China, there was domestic interest that affects its decision not allowing intervention towards Syria up until now. Similar to Russia, strong economic ties with Syria caused China firmly opposed the idea of intervention. China was Syria's third-largest importer in 2010, with their bilateral trade ties increasing 12 percent to almost \$2.5 billion.⁴⁵ China has been seeking a peaceful, political solution to the crisis since its beginning because does not want Assad regime fall from power. More than three times, Russia and China used their veto power to oppose the resolution draft of the Syrian conflict in which up until now caused no significant intervention occur in Syria.

⁴²(Nuruzzaman 2014)

⁴³(Renner and Afoaku 2014)

⁴⁴(Beinglass and Brode 2012)

⁴⁵(Renner and Afoaku 2014)

The hesitation is not only in Russia and China side but also on the P3 countries. Its intention to halt the tension in Syria was somehow defeated by the fear of a backlash against US interest or allies⁴⁶ that might occur afterward. The fall of President Assad will deal with the large blow to America's adversary Iran because Syria is Iran's oldest and most important ally in the Arab world. It also faces the risk that a post-Assad Syria could mirror a post Saddam-regime Iraq, wracked by instability and violence.⁴⁷ Some scholars once argued that U.S.' current policy undermines its credibility. The US claims to champion freedom and human rights. Its hands-off stance on Syria suggests that those principles only apply when they provide cover for the economic or other benefits.⁴⁸

For UK and France, the hesitation to intervene was also coming from the fear that it will not bring anything good towards their security interests. They keep arguing that the extremists could come or return to the UK with experience from the Syrian conflict.⁴⁹ When uncertainty and chaos are the only possible outcome – in western perspective – after the intervention, it affects UK response towards Syrian conflict that discourages it to be part of the resettlement program for more refugees. France tells the same gesture in responding the Syrian conflict. There were no specific benefits will come up from the intervention that might fulfil the P3 domestic interest. None of them had the initiative to launch intervention on its own but they content to follow US leadership in Syria, joined in imposing sanctions but will not act militarily on their own.⁵⁰

CONCLUSION

This paper has talked about the disparity of RtoP implementation in the case of Libya and Syria. The situation in Syria is much more complex if we compare with Libya in which affect the sense of confidence the decision makers to intervene. This lack of confidence to face the possible consequences after intervention caused them to be much slower in deciding the intervention. Even up until now, we have not seen any significant action that might help reduce the tensions in Syria. For Libya case, the decision makers were confident enough to launch intervention due

⁴⁶Ibid

⁴⁷Ibid

⁴⁸ (Pearlman 2014)

⁴⁹ (Renner and Afoaku 2014)

⁵⁰Ibid

to none worse consequences afterward had been thought beforehand. The intervention in Libya could be counted as an immediate and quick response. They did not take a long time to have second or third thought on what needed to be done if one resolution failed to be implemented.

It also cannot be denied that the role of powerful countries still plays an important role in deciding what so-called collective action in protecting the people in a state where the government is unable or unwilling to protect its own citizens. Intervention on the basis of R2P will thus be decided on a case-by-case basis, primarily determined by the collective judgment of the P-5 or convergence of their national interests.⁵¹ It can be seen from the case of Syria, one of the reasons of China and Russia hesitation to intervene Syria is because they have strong relations with Assad's regime in term of economy. It somehow relates to the early hypothesis in which the bigger benefits of the intervention towards the major countries, it is more likely the major power countries to be less hesitate to launch an intervention. So for China and Russia, they did not see any benefits that can support their interest from the intervention in which caused them to be more hesitate in favoring the intervention option. It has been more than three times these two countries that also happened to hold the veto power rejected the resolution drafts that have been proposed so far. Besides these two countries, the P3 also seems to hesitate to initiate any action without collective decision procedure due to the lack of confidence to face what the Syria might bring after the intervention.

Everyone has been blinded with fears in this case. In Syria, people are fearful and frighten to face how their life will be on the next day since it is more about how to stay away from being killed every single day. None of them are feeling secure. In the other hand, the international community also is fearful to do something due to uncertainties that might occur if they launch the intervention. There is no clear way in helping and actually implementing this new framework R2P. Once again, it is clearly stated that if one state is unable to protect its own people, it will fall to international community responsibility to protect the people. There is no hesitation word within it but still no significant action has been implemented. So, who is the international community anyway? Where are they now?

⁵¹Ibid

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