

# Bandwagoning for Prestige: Denmark, Norway and the War on Terror

Peter Viggo Jakobsen, Royal Danish Defence College, Denmark  
[Ifs-12@fak.dk](mailto:Ifs-12@fak.dk)

Jens Ringsmose, University of Southern Denmark, Denmark  
[Jri@sam.sdu.dk](mailto:Jri@sam.sdu.dk)

Håkon Lunde Saxi, Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies, Norway  
[Haakon.saxi@ifs.mil.no](mailto:Haakon.saxi@ifs.mil.no)

By Peter Viggo Jakobsen, Jens Ringsmose & Håkon Lunde Saxi<sup>1</sup>

Words: 9,954

### **Abstract**

Realist scholars are divided when it comes to assessing the reasons that states opt for bandwagoning strategies. Defensive realists, like Kenneth Waltz, argue that states choose to bandwagon for security reasons; offensive realists, like Randall Schweller, argue that states are more often ‘robbers than cops’ and that they are more likely to bandwagon for profit. This paper argues that states habitually choose to bandwagon for a third major reason: a desire for prestige and reputation. While prestige in international politics is sometimes sought as an end in itself, more often states invest to attain prestige in order to gain something else. Prestige, status and reputation are perceived as means that can occasionally be employed to influence other actors on the international scene. We illustrate this argument with two exemplifying case studies: Denmark’s and Norway’s contributions to the American-led wars in Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya.

---

<sup>1</sup> We are grateful to all those who have offered their valuable insights and advice in writing this chapter. Any mistakes or omissions are entirely our own.

[Prestige] is, however, far from being a mere bobble of vanity; for the nation that possess great prestige is thereby enabled to have its way, and to bring things to pass which it could never hope to achieve by its own forces. Prestige draws material benefits mysteriously in its train. Political wisdom will never despise it (Olivier 1931: 123-4 quoted in Wight 1979: 97).

## **Introduction**

The American-led campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan following the attacks on 9/11 were not only tremendously costly to the United States, but also to the many (mostly) European troop-contributing countries. In terms of blood and treasure, the nations that signed up for the Multi-National Force – Iraq (MNF-I) and the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan paid a remarkably high price for being part of the US-led coalitions (Icasualties 2016). Moreover, few – if any – European governments earned much domestic applause for their willingness to come to the aid of their great American ally. In the vast majority of the European troop-contributing nations, governments faced strong public opposition to being part of what was generally perceived to be unsuccessful military endeavours, and in at least one instance – the Netherlands – the decision to contribute led directly to a change in government (Kreps 2010; Graaf & Dimitriu 2015; Graaf, Dimitriu & Ringsmose (eds.) 2015). At the same time, it was less than crystal clear that the Europeans had national interests in stabilizing Iraq and Afghanistan strong enough to justify the high economic, military, and political costs involved. In fact, to many members of the coalitions, it would arguably make little difference security-wise if the missions were successful or not. Neither the Iraqi nor the Taliban regime posed a direct threat to the majority of the countries engaged in the coalitions.

This begs the question of why so many European nations decided to take part in the American ‘War on Terror’. On the surface of things, the out-of-area operations in Iraq and Afghanistan posed very strong incentives *not* to participate. So what convinced governments all over Europe to deploy a substantive number of forces to the Middle East and Central Asia? Why did so many European decision-makers accept the human, economic, and political costs associated with being a member of the US-led coalitions? Or put in the jargon of IR-theory: Why did nations so willingly bandwagon with the United States?

The answer to this question is critical to our understanding of the fundamental dynamics of coalition formation and alliances engaging in out-of-area operations. If multiple states become part of coalitions for reasons *not* associated with the perceived need to balance a direct threat to their security (which was clearly the case in Iraq and Afghanistan), other compelling forces than those leading to classical balancing behaviour must be at play. To fathom the inner workings of coalitions and coalition formation, we must thus identify the multiple causes driving states to sign up in the first place. Certainly, understanding the deep-rooted dynamics of coalition formation is also important for policy-makers and practitioners. Whether planning to contribute to or setting up a coalition, governments are well advised to fully comprehend the motives of their potential brothers-in-arms. Misreading other nations' reasons for providing political and military support is likely to lead to poor coalition management and policy failure.

In this article, we argue that states sometimes decide to contribute to coalitions or alliances engaged in out-of-area operations because they seek to advance the prestige and reputation granted them by other states. Most of the time, they do so not because they perceive of prestige as an end in itself, but rather because they consider prestige, status and a good reputation as means to an end. Increasing prestige is understood to serve the national interest. This instrumental or, indeed, opportunistic view of bandwagoning implies that states are sometimes willing to invest in prestige at a relatively high cost, because they put an even higher premium on the influence and benefits believed to be flowing from high esteem and goodwill obtained with all or a few coalition partners. According to this interpretation, prestige is a category of social capital. Once obtained, a reputation for being a staunch ally or 'an alliance heavy-lifter' can be converted into influence, agenda-setting power, access, or even material benefits. Not unlike a bank account, states can take actions that will increase their 'prestige capital', and they can sometimes make a 'withdrawal' capitalizing on their international standing.

Even so, we fully recognize that states become coalition contributors for multiple reasons – and that their reasons might oscillate over time. To name but some of the motives that presumably influenced national policy-makers when deciding to contribute to operations in Iraq and Afghanistan: the threat of international terrorism, a desire to keep the transatlantic bonds and NATO strong, human rights and nation building, bilateral American security pledges, 'democracy export', becoming a member of NATO, the fear of being marginalized and chastened as a free-

rider, and aspirations to uphold a liberal international order. The purpose of this article is not to weigh the relative importance of these motivations against the proposed prestige-seeking drive. More modest, the aim of the article is to investigate whether the ‘bandwagoning for prestige-argument’ can supplement other explanations for the Europeans’ somewhat surprising willingness to contribute forces to the American ‘War on Terror’. We conclude that in both Denmark and Norway, prestige-seeking was an important explanatory factor driving the decisions to contribute to Iraq, Afghanistan and Libya; one that policy-makers and scholars should not ignore in the future.

The article has three main parts. It begins by briefly outlining the different theoretical explanations for states becoming contributors to coalitions and alliances engaged in out-of-area operations. In the next part, we offer an alternative realist explanation for states becoming coalition members. We take our clue from Classical Realism and build on Randall Schweller’s seminal argument that states ‘bandwagon for profits’ (1994). We twist Schweller’s main assertion slightly and propose a ‘bandwagoning for prestige-hypothesis’. While we subscribe to the idea that states are likely to jump the bandwagon for profit, we contend that profit in the 21<sup>st</sup> century is thought to come in the shape of prestige and goodwill rather than territory and other more traditional spoils of victory. In the third and final section, we probe this hypothesis by examining the Danish and Norwegian contributions to the wars in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya.

### **Explaining military contributions to Iraq and Afghanistan**

During the last decade, scholars have provided a variety of explanations for the making of broad American-led coalitions in Iraq and Afghanistan. None, however, has put the desire for prestige as a means to obtain other benefits centre stage. While ‘the good reputation-motive’ has been put to a use as a minor component in a distinct neoclassical realist explanation (Davidson 2011), no scholarly work has of yet portrayed the desire for esteem and prestige as a critical reason for going to war with the United States.

Realist scholars have generally focused on three motives for deploying with Uncle Sam to Iraq and Afghanistan: A desire for credible security guarantees, keeping the Americans engaged in Europe, and the fear of international terrorism. Several scholars has thus pointed to the fact that most of the European allies closest to Russia chose to side with the U.S. in Iraq and Afghanistan because they sought more credible security guarantees from Washington (see for instance Walt 2005; Hansen

2001; Auerswald & Saideman 2014: 16-19; Graaf, Dimitriu & Ringsmose (eds.) 2015). According to this logic, bandwagoning with the U.S. in the War on Terror was perceived to be a means for a stronger alliance with the U.S. aimed at balancing Russia (Schuster & Maier 2006).<sup>2</sup> Other realists have emphasised a strong (and broader) European interest in keeping the United States engaged in Europe (Wood 2003; Porter 2010). Following this line of reasoning, it is in the interest of both the EU and individual European nations to avoid the ‘US going it alone’ and America acting unilaterally; hence many European allies opted to bandwagon with Washington. Moreover, strong transatlantic ties are perceived to be an “insurance policy against any future ‘renationalization’ of foreign policy” in Europe (Walt 2005: 188) and the safest way to ensure some kind of influence on American policies (Davidson 2011: 15f). Finally, realists have argued that European fear of international terrorism and the spread of weapons of mass destruction stemming from Iraq and Afghanistan have provided incentives to join the United States in the War on Terror (Walt 2005: 190; Davidson 2011: 16f).

As opposed to realist scholars, liberals have tended to focus on the importance of institutions and a desire to uphold and export values in order to support a generally liberal world order. For instance, Sarah Kreps argues that participating “under the banner of NATO is as close to an ideal type iterated game as there is in security cooperation” (2010: 192). Following Robert Keohane (1984), she suggests that actors that do not contribute will be precluded from enjoying the fruits of future cooperation. In other words, in Afghanistan it was NATO – the institution – that provided the incentives for NATO-Europe to contribute forces to an unpopular war. Other liberals have argued that European nations went to war in Iraq mainly because they sought to promote international law and human rights (see for instance Cushman (ed.) 2005). According to this perspective, policy-makers in Western capitals were primarily motivated by a desire to expand the sphere of liberal values, underpin the credibility of the UN, and facilitate the spread of democracy (Dunne 2009).

In line with their preferred focus on ideas and identities, social constructivists have given emphasis to securitization processes and strategic culture when illuminating and explaining contributions to the American-led operations in Afghanistan and Iraq (see for instance Auerswald & Saideman 2011: 22; Donnelly 2013; Flockhart 2016). Observed through the ‘securitization theory lens,

---

<sup>2</sup> Stephen Walt has a somewhat narrower definition of what is bandwagoning behaviour than us and, thus, he labels the behaviour “regional balancing” (Walt 2005: 187f). Birthe Hansen has made the argument that deploying with unipol to obtain more credible security guarantees is best understood as “flocking behaviour” (2011: 31ff).

governments and key decision-makers in the troop-contributing nations successfully transformed Iraq and Afghanistan into ‘security matters’ legitimizing the use of armed force (Hayes 2016; Schlag 2016). Via the use of speech acts, political actors and experts thus constructed terrorists and insurgents in Afghanistan as well as Saddam Hussein’s presumed weapons of mass destruction as threats to national security, and accordingly rationalized the use of extraordinary measures. Studies of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan anchored in the concept of ‘strategic culture’ have mainly focused on *how* the war was fought, while the decision to deploy in the first place has been less scrutinized from this perspective (see for instance Farrell 2010; Angstrom & Honig 2012).

While all these theoretical approaches add bits and pieces to our understanding of why the U.S. succeeded in setting up broad coalitions in both Iraq and Afghanistan, we argue that something important is missing: several states’ attempts to bandwagon for prestige, esteem, and standing. Although some of the involved actors might have craved for prestige as an end in-and-of-itself (Lebow 2008 & 2010), we argue that more often the prestige and status believed to be flowing from bandwagoning with United States is seen as a means for other ends. We elaborate on this in the following section.

### **Bandwagoning for Prestige**

Since the end of the Cold War, realists have debated amongst themselves whether the EU and the Europeans would attempt to balance America or rather bandwagon with the world’s remaining superpower (see for instance Brooks & Wohlforth 2008; Cladi & Locatelli 2012; Hyde-Price 2006; Posen 2006). The dominating ‘balancing camp’ has argued that in an essentially unstable unipolar world, the Europeans will eventually seek to balance the unchecked power of the United States (as will other potential poles) since ‘international politics abhors unbalanced power’ just as ‘nature abhors a vacuum’ (Waltz 2000: 28; see also Layne 1993; Waltz 1993; Walt 2005). To this group of scholars, a bandwagoning course is inherently dangerous, as it is rather narrowly understood as a strategy of giving in and accepting an alliance with the main source of power and/or danger in the pursuit of security (Walt 1987: 17).

As opposed to the balancing-hypothesis, other realists have forcefully argued that we should expect to see European states engage in bandwagoning behaviour vis-à-vis the United States (Cladi & Locatelli 2012; Hansen 2011). European contributions to the US-led coalitions in Iraq and

Afghanistan are, in fact, not anomalies but the logical response to systemic level challenges and opportunities. According to this line of reasoning, scholars following in the footsteps of Kenneth Waltz and Stephen Walt have adopted a definition of what is bandwagoning that is much too narrow, as it limits the motive for bandwagoning to security seeking. Rather than considering bandwagoning an alliance or coalition strategy to be pursued when faced with grave danger or preponderant power, this group of scholars – subscribing to the views of Randall Schweller (1994) – believes that bandwagoning is basically about siding with the stronger, and not only with the aim of being secure but more often in order to obtain some coveted value (Schweller 1994: 74). In this interpretation, ‘balancing is done for security’, while ‘bandwagoning is commonly done in the expectations for making gain’ (Schweller 1994: 106).

This article feeds on Schweller’s broader definition of bandwagoning. But while we concur with Schweller that bandwagoning is most accurately understood as entering into coalitions or alliances with the stronger side, we believe that his understanding of profit is too narrow, as he tends to equate profit with ‘territorial gains’. Surely, history offers an abundance of examples of states aligning with stronger powers for irredentist reasons, but second or third-tiers allies may also have other ‘profit motives’ for opportunistic alliance choices than territorial gain. We propose that such an ‘other profit motive’ is prestige, standing, status or reputation. As Schweller does not explicitly exclude that profit can come in the shape of other values than additional territory, our ‘bandwagoning for prestige-hypothesis’ is not as much at odds with the ‘bandwagoning for profit-hypothesis’ as an operationalization or specification of the latter. In other words, we identify prestige as a distinct subcategory of profit.

How, then, should we understand prestige? And what are the intellectual roots of our ‘balancing for prestige-argument’? Like Steve Wood, we consider prestige to be a concept belonging to a larger ‘conceptual family that includes honour, status, reputation, respect, glory, credibility, pride and legitimacy’ (2013: 388).<sup>3</sup> These terms do not hold the exact same meaning – although some scholars employ some of the terms interchangeable (see for instance Etzioni 1962; Barnhart 2013) – but they ‘have abundant intergenerational connections’ (Wood 2013: 388). Wylie makes a distinction between reputation and prestige as the former ‘can be both positive or negative, whereas prestige always grow out of a positive reputation’ (2009). We agree with this distinction, which

---

<sup>3</sup> For an etymological survey of the term “prestige”, see Kim (2004). For a useful analysis of different aspects of ‘prestige’, see Mercer (forthcoming).



implies that a good reputation is very similar to prestige. Also, we agree with Jonathan Mercer that prestige is a relational concept, as prestige and a good reputation in international politics depend on what others think of the state (Mercer forthcoming).

In essence, the possible influence flowing from a good reputation and prestige is based on social recognition and intersubjective appraisals bestowed on an individual, institution or state by a group of other actors. Prestige and status in international politics is thus gained when states receive respect, admiration or esteem from the peoples or representatives (policy-makers, diplomats, high-standing officers, etc.) of other states or institutions in the system. As noted by Hans J. Morgenthau:

Actually, the policy of prestige, however exaggerated and absurd it uses may have been at times, is as intrinsic an element of the relations between nations as the desire for prestige is of the relations between individuals ... In both spheres, the desire for social recognition is a potent dynamic force determining social relations and creating social institutions ... Thus, in the struggle for existence and power ... what other thinks about us is as important as what we actually are. The image in the mirror of our fellows' minds (that is, our prestige), rather than the original, of which the image in the mirror may be but the distorted reflection, determines what we are as member of society (1993: 84-85).

As the international system consists of multiple actors (and since a state's international standing and prestige is inherently dependent on other international actors' beliefs), states will sometimes pursue policies that will grant them much esteem and prestige in some quarters while not being noticed – or perhaps even giving rise to a bad reputation – amongst other actors. Particular policies and efforts will, in other words, frequently divide the rather sizeable international audience (Davidson 2011: 18). When, for instance, Canada pushed hard for the establishment of the International Criminal Court (ICC) during the 1990s, Ottawa received much praise from some states, while being scorned by, *inter alia*, the United States (Wylie 2013). Similarly, while Sweden's support for Nelson Mandela and the African National Congress (ANC) during the 1960's and 1970's increased Sweden's prestige in some parts of the world, Stockholm's policies earned few kudos in other quarters (Sundelius (ed.) 1989).

The scholarly literature on prestige, status and reputation in international affairs is divided into two different schools of thought split in their views on states' motives for seeking prestige. One school of thought maintains that states desire prestige for its own sake – i.e. prestige for the sake of identity or as an end in itself; the other school of thought holds that states first and foremost acquire prestige as a means to an end (Barnhart 2013; Kim 2004; Markey 1999; Wohlforth 2009; Wood 2013; Wylie 2009). The first general perspective on prestige has deep roots in the study of international politics. Already Thucydides claimed that 'honour' was one of three crucial motives driving and providing dynamic to the Peloponnesian War (the other two being *security* and *self-interest*). Several later realists, e.g. Machiavelli, Hobbes, Rousseau, and Aron subscribed – with minor semantic variations – to the same three-pronged understanding of what fuels the behaviour of states. To all of them, the lust for *glory*, *pride*, *reputation*, *status*, and *prestige*, was a fundamental driver of international relations (Aron 1967: chapter 3; Markey 1999).

Later on, social constructivists and scholars working from within the field of international sociology picked up on early realist thinking and the idea that states seek prestige as an end itself (see for instance Kim 2004; Lebow 2008 & 2010; Luard, 1976; Wood 2013; Wylie 2009). Like Thucydides, Machiavelli, Hobbes, Rousseau, and Aron these scholars perceive of prestige not as an instrument of power or a means to make other political entities voluntarily defer to the state's wishes or suggestions. Rather, prestige is seen as a 'final goal' sought simply because states (and statesmen) prefer to have international status and standing – i.e. states seek the intersubjective and social recognition inherent in prestige for its own sake. According to this non-instrumental – or intrinsic – perspective, states might even engage in 'financially costly or otherwise potentially risky international behaviour' to obtain a good reputation and prestige (Wylie 2009: 114). Seeking to build a distinct identity and driven by a 'logic of appropriateness', states thus pursue policies to be seen as a prestigious actor doing the right thing. Underlining the intellectual links between early realist thinkers and social constructivists and their shared understanding of, *inter alia*, prestige, Lebow has even argued that Thucydides was 'a founding father of constructivism' (Lebow 2011: 547).

In this article, we subscribe to the second school of thought. We acknowledge that states sometimes seek prestige and glory as a final goal, but – in the words of Hans Morgenthau – we maintain that prestige is an 'indispensable element of a rational foreign policy' (1993: 93; see also Herz 1951: 4-

5; Oliver 1931; Wight 1978: 95-99). Often, states adopt certain ‘prestige-augmenting policies’, because they believe that a good standing or reputation will increase their potential influence and access with those nations that bestow social recognition upon them (Davidson 2011: 17f). Sometimes, the policies undertaken to build up a good reputation might be entirely unrelated to the policy-areas where the state wishes to capitalize on the enhanced prestige. In this perspective, prestige is a means to a higher end. Driven by a ‘logic of consequentiality’, statesmen and diplomats engage in prestige seeking for strategic reasons. Again we subscribe to the analysis of Hans Morgenthau: “The prestige of a nation is very much like the credit of a bank. A bank with large, proven resources and a record of successes can afford what a small and frequently unsuccessful competitor cannot...” (1993: 95).

According to this line of reasoning, state behaviour initiated with the aim of gaining prestige (in order to gain influence, access or some tangible benefits elsewhere) is akin to, what we label, ‘strategic symbolic policies’.<sup>4</sup> The main aim of such policies is often not the publicly stated policy ambitions, but rather the expected by-products in the shape of reputation, goodwill and prestige (the by-products are, in fact, the main objectives of ‘strategic symbolic policies’). As such, ‘strategic symbolic policies’ serve to evoke a distinct response (social recognition and goodwill) from specific international actors in order to gain something else. Whether the state succeeds in fulfilling the publicly stated objectives (e.g. winning the war or stabilizing Helmand) is of only secondary concern. What matters to the state pursuing ‘strategic symbolic policies’, is the by-product and not the ‘material’ impact.

Obviously, small or third-tier states are often more tempted by the expected outcome of ‘strategic symbolic policies’ than their larger neighbours. Frequently, small states will thus tailor their policies not as a means to a solution but as a measure to create goodwill or standing. Given the small states’ limited resources, their contributions to international coalitions or institutions are hardly ever decisive in determining the success or failure of a given policy. Witness the interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan. Whether the small state allocates x, y, or z resources to the common endeavour, it is unlikely to have a real or material impact on the chances of success. For the small, this is both a blessing and a curse. On the one hand, the small state can almost never be blamed for unsuccessful policies, as it is difficult to reproach those without the resources to make a

---

<sup>4</sup> We, of course, realize that national prestige can also – and often does – flow from policies initiated for other reasons than prestige.

real difference. Small states thus carry less of a responsibility than their larger allies and partners, and they are also freer to focus on the symbolic value of their contribution. On the other hand, small states have to follow the larger states. Their preferences must be adjusted to those with the resources to make a tangible difference.

If this overall ‘bandwagoning for prestige-argument’ is to be plausible, we should expect our case studies to be characterized by statements made by policy-makers and senior officials indicating that Danish and Norwegian contributions to the American-led interventions was at least partly motivated by a desire to gain prestige and a good reputation. Indeed, we should expect to find a significant concern with how being part of a given military mission will influence the standing of the nation. Likewise, a widespread use of analogies indicating that ‘strategic symbolic policies’ (rather than an aspiration to achieve ‘material’ impact) were behind the decision to contribute, will substantiate the ‘bandwagoning-for-prestige-argument’. Finally, the key hypothesis of this paper will be corroborated if we find that the military contributions themselves were tailored more with a view to be visible and eye catching than the need for making the coalition or alliance more effective.

### **Denmark: fighting for prestige and influence**

During the Cold War Denmark was a major contributor to UN peacekeeping operations but its armed forces were not allowed to participate in operations using force beyond self-defence. Denmark thus turned down an American request for combat troops during the Korean War; instead the United States received a hospital ship. This restriction was removed in the 1990s as the UN operation in Bosnia demonstrated a need for greater force protection and combat capacity. This induced Denmark as the first nation ever to deploy main battle tanks to a UN mission, and they proved highly successful with respect to defeating and deterring Serb harassment. One skirmish, known as *Operation Hooligan Buster*, made international headlines. On 29 April 1993 the Danish tanks fired their 105 mm canons 72 times against attacking Serb forces, blowing up an ammunition depot and killing an estimated 150 Serb soldiers. This skirmish became a watershed in Danish foreign and security policy because it earned Danish policy makers prestige abroad and pride at home. Pictures of the Danish tanks were put up in the Pentagon and the robust Danish approach to peace operations influenced NATO and UN doctrines and gave Denmark the prestige required to

establish a multinational rapid reaction brigade earmarked for UN operations (SHIRBRIG) (Jakobsen 2009, 2).<sup>5</sup>

Danish decision makers drew the lesson that combat capable contributions provided an effective way of earning prestige in the United States and NATO. Establishing a reputation in the US as a staunch and loyal ally has been an important policy driver shared by all Danish governments since then. While a reputation as a loyal US ally has been regarded as a value in its own right, it has also been regarded as an important means to an end. In the 1990s the Danish Ministers of Defence Hans Hækkerup (1993-2000) and Foreign Affairs Niels Helveg Petersen (1993-2000) both regarded a close relationship to the United States as critical to obtain US support for the successful Danish campaign to secure the Baltic states early entry into NATO (Hækkerup 2002, 54; author interview with Niels Helveg Petersen March 2016).<sup>6</sup> It is clear from Hækkerup's memoirs how he constantly throughout his ministerial career sought to position Denmark as closely to the United States as possible by making military contributions available to US-led operations whenever they were requested. This included controversial ones, such as *Operation Desert Fox* (Iraq) in 1998 and *Operation Allied Force* (Kosovo) the following year, which were conducted without UN mandates (Hækkerup 2002, 30, 40, 41).<sup>7</sup>

This 'troops-for-influence policy' was continued after 9/11 and the US launch on the war on terror. Since 9/11 Denmark has made high profile combat contributions to Afghanistan 2001-2013, Iraq 2003-2007, Libya 2011, Iraq 2014-15, and Iraq/Syria 2016-. They were all designed so as to maximize the Danish visibility and standing in Washington, London and, after 2011, in Paris. Denmark was thus one of only five allies contributing to the US attack on Iraq in 2003, one of only six NATO members deploying combat troops to Southern Afghanistan in 2006; one of only eight NATO members dropping bombs over Libya in 2011, in September 2013 it was the only nation together with France supporting the US threat of air strikes to punish the Syrian regime for its use of chemical weapons, it was one of only six NATO members dropping bombs over Iraq in 2014-15 and over Iraq/Syria in 2016-17.<sup>8</sup> During the Libya War four Danish F-16s dropped 11 per cent (821 bombs) of the NATO bomb total during *Operation Unified Protector*, and they were second only to

---

<sup>5</sup> Peter Viggo Jakobsen, *Nordic Approaches to Peace Operations: A New Model in the Making?*, London and New York: Routledge (2009).

<sup>6</sup> Hækkerup, Hans (2002) *På skansen* (Lindhardt & Ringhof),

<sup>7</sup> The United States did not make use of the Danish contribution during Operation Desert Fox.

<sup>8</sup> Peter Viggo Jakobsen, Derfor skal Danmark fortsat gå i kamp, *Ræson* 24, 04/15 (December 2015), 27.

the United States dropping 102 bombs in the initial US-led *Operation Odyssey Dawn*. In 2014-15 four Danish F-16s dropped more bombs (503) than the British and French planes operating over Iraq (Jakobsen 2016b).<sup>9</sup>

Several statements from key decision makers indicate that these combat contributions were made in order to enhance Denmark's standing and prestige in Washington and NATO in the hope that this could be exploited to enhance Danish influence on issues of strategic importance. It is also clear that Danish decision makers and diplomats believe that this policy has paid off. Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen (2001-2009) believes that Denmark's positive standing in Washington 'strengthened Denmark's voice on the international scene' (quoted in Kastrup 2008).<sup>10</sup> He also believed that Denmark's many military contributions to NATO operations had earned it a reputation as an 'elite ally' in the alliance in spite of the fact that Denmark spent considerably far less on defence than the 2 per cent of GDP demanded by NATO (Ritzau 2014).<sup>11</sup>

This view was shared by Foreign Minister Per Stig Møller (2001-2010). He argued in 2008 that support for the United States enhanced Denmark's international influence on issues of strategic importance, because its reputation as a close ally made it easier to obtain US support for Danish initiatives on the international scene. He backed his argument by listing a number successful Danish foreign policy initiatives that in his view would have failed without US support.<sup>12</sup>

The rationale was the same when the government headed by Prime Minister Lars Løkke Rasmussen (2009-2011) went to war in Libya in 2011. It was a priority for Løkke Rasmussen to be 'out in front' with 'the right states' [i.e. France, the United Kingdom and the United States], as he put it (quoted in Jakobsen 2016, 199),<sup>13</sup><sup>14</sup> and the factor mattered again when a new Løkke Rasmussen government (2016-) decided to send F-16s and special forces to Iraq/Syria in 2016 as part of the US-led campaign against ISIL. This contribution was deliberately designed to put Denmark 'out in

---

<sup>9</sup> Peter Viggo Jakobsen, The Danish Libya Campaign: Out in Front in Pursuit of Pride, Praise, and Position, in Dag Henriksen and Ann Karin Larssen (eds.) *Political Rationale and International Consequences of the War in Libya* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 201, 207.

<sup>10</sup> Mads Kastrup, Verden ifølge Anders Fogh, *Århus Stiftstidende*, 22 juni 2008.

<sup>11</sup> Ritzau, Anders Fogh før Nato-topmøde: Danmark er eliteallieret, *Information*, 3 September 2014.

<sup>12</sup> Per Stig Møller, Dansk udenrigspolitik mellem EU og USA, *Berlingske Tidende*, 14 august 2007.

<sup>13</sup> Peter Viggo Jakobsen, Danmark går ikke i krig mod ISIL for at vinde, men for at være med, *Ræson* 26 (02/2016): 60-67.

<sup>14</sup> Peter Viggo Jakobsen, The Danish Libya Campaign: Out in Front in Pursuit of Pride, Praise, and Position, in Dag Henriksen and Ann Karin Larssen (eds.) *Political Rationale and International Consequences of the War in Libya* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 199.

front' in the fight against ISIL and Denmark 'one of the largest force contributors pro capita' and 'out in front' in the fight against ISIL as an Ministry of Defence factsheet put it, and the government also made clear that this relatively large contribution was made in direct response to requests from the United States and France. The government was also quick to point out that the United States had praised Denmark for its contribution (Jakobsen 2016b: 64).

Danish diplomats and military officers share the government view that Denmark's military contributions have increased the international respect for the Danish armed forces and made them a more attractive partner. According to the Danish Defence Command the United States and the United Kingdom treat Denmark as a privileged partner that is granted easier access to high-level decision makers, intelligence, courses, staff positions and equipment than most other nations.<sup>15</sup> Since Libya the UK has initiated bilateral Air Staff meetings with Denmark, and France has also approached the RDAF in order to establish closer bilateral cooperation. Minister of Defence Nick Hækkerup (2011-13) also found that Denmark carried greater weight in NATO debates because the other members knew that the Danish view was respected in Washington.<sup>16</sup>

Interviews and correspondence with senior officials from the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs suggest that although prestige-seeking was far from the only motive for deploying with Uncle Sam during the period considered here, it was indeed a driver for contributing significantly in the War on Terror. As pointed to by an experienced Danish diplomat: 'Moreover, I believe that (from a cynical perspective) it is entirely OK and a commonplace interest-based policy for a small country to also consider... where and how our most important ally wants our support and assistance. I believe that practically all nations consider when and how much credit it will create in Washington'.<sup>17</sup> By the same token, another senior official emphasised that a good standing is an important vehicle for security, access and influence. 'Although a desire for prestige and standing was not in itself the motive for participating in Iraq and Afghanistan, it played a role. Other nations listen to the allies that deliver – to the allies with standing. Those allies are in another category. And remember: standing and reputation provides you with access. And for a small state access is the key to information and influence'.<sup>18</sup>

---

<sup>15</sup> Forsvarskommandoen, *Årsrapport 2011*, 67.

<sup>16</sup> Knudsen and Marker, Ministeriet for krig, 78.

<sup>17</sup> Correspondence with senior official, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, May 2016.

<sup>18</sup> Interview with senior official, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, May, 2016.

The evidence in short is clear. Danish politicians and diplomats have cultivated a close relationship with the United States since the end for the Cold War because they believe that prestige in Washington can be translated into greater influence on the international scene. Most ministers regard this policy as successful, a view that is generally shared by Danish diplomats and military officers. They believe that the close relationship to Washington has enhanced Denmark's standing in NATO and its international influence more generally. The extent to which this is the case, is a topic of heated debate in Denmark as influence is notoriously difficult to measure (on this debate see Jakobsen and Ringsmose 2015).<sup>19</sup> But few would dispute the conclusion that Denmark has used its military contributions instrumentally to enhance its standing in Washington and NATO in the hope of increasing its international influence

### **Norway: building prestige and a 'reservoir of goodwill'**

Like Denmark, Norway was an important contributor to UN peacekeeping operations during the Cold War, but mostly shied away from operation going beyond 'traditional' peacekeeping. During much of the Cold War, Norway was also a country of great strategic importance. It made up the northern flank of NATO's key Central Front region, and it was geographically proximate to the Soviet Union's vital Kola Peninsula. The Kola region was home to the Soviet Northern Fleet, containing most of the Soviet Union's strategic nuclear submarines (SSBNs). In US maritime and nuclear strategy, as well as for intelligence gathering, this made Norway into an important Ally.<sup>20</sup> For Norway, American interests and involvement in Norway's defence was considered vital. Only by seeking support in the West, mainly from the US, could the country hope to create some semblance of balance vis-à-vis its Soviet superpower neighbour in the East.

The end of the Cold War, and the dissolution of both the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union, also represented the end of Norway's high importance in US and NATO strategy. The Scandinavian Peninsula and the Arctic now seemed a calm and pacific part of the world. The result was a profound lack of interest in Washington D.C. and Brussels for Norway. Norwegian prime ministers who sought appointments in the White House were now politely informed that 'the problem with

---

<sup>19</sup> Peter Viggo Jakobsen and Jens Ringsmose, 'Size and reputation – why the USA has valued its "special relationships" with Denmark and the UK differently since 9/11', *Journal of Transatlantic Studies*, 13:2 (2015), 135-153.

<sup>20</sup> Rolf Tamnes, *The United States and the Cold War in the High North* (Oslo: Ad Notam, 1991), see especially the chapter 'Into the 1980s'.



Norway is that there is no problem with Norway'.<sup>21</sup> Norwegian officials in the 1990s came to experience an unsettling lack of interest for Norwegian concerns. As one Norwegian NATO ambassador (1992–98) put it, when he briefed the North Atlantic Council on the strategic challenges in the Norwegian 'High North':

My ambassador colleagues' eyes began to wander around in the council chamber, or that they began looking absentmindedly through their papers ... [they] were in short, not exceedingly keen to hear about Norway's strategic situation; the Cold War was the over! Now there were other areas and issues that were in focus: the Balkan, the Mediterranean region, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.<sup>22</sup>

One way to compensate for Norway's loss of strategic importance was to make sure that the country had high standing in key allied capitals. In short, prestige would be a way of avoiding marginalisation and purchasing access, influence and attention. Making visible and relevant military contributions to US- and NATO-led military operations would be one way of ensuring Norway's reputation as a state that more-than-fulfilled its alliance obligations. In the last instance, the prestige garnished was also to serve as a 'reservoir of goodwill', increasing the likelihood that Norway's allies would provide support in case of a conflict with Norway's unpredictable great power neighbour: the Russian Federation.

In the 1990s, Norway had been slower than Denmark to embrace 'robust' peacekeeping in the Balkans, and the Norwegian Armed Forces remained more focused on territorial defence at home than its Danish counterpart.<sup>23</sup> In 1999 the Norwegian Government introduced a plan to significantly adapt the armed forces, strengthening their ability to contribute to international military operations abroad.<sup>24</sup> The initiative was driven by senior officials in the MoD who had long worried that Norway's lacking ability to contribute to US- and NATO-led military operations was worsening its marginalisation.<sup>25</sup> The initiative was given extra impetus from the 1999 Kosovo War. The Norwegian Government had wanted to make a 'significant and visible' contribution to the NATO

---

<sup>21</sup> Minister of Foreign Affairs (2005–12) Jonas Gahr Støre, *Å gjøre en forskjell: Refleksjoner fra en norsk utenriksminister* (Oslo: Cappelen Damm, 2008), 141.

<sup>22</sup> Leif Mevik, *Det nye NATO: en personlig beretning* (Bergen: Eide forlag, 1999), 98–99.

<sup>23</sup> Håkon Lunde Saxi, *Norwegian and Danish defence policy: A comparative study of the post-Cold War era*, Defence and Security Studies no. 1 (Oslo: Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies, 2010), 29–45.

<sup>24</sup> Norwegian Ministry of Defence, *Tilpasning av Forsvaret til deltagelse i internasjonale operasjoner*, Report to the Storting, no. 38 (1998–99).

<sup>25</sup> Olav Bogen and Magnus Håkenstad, *Balansegang: Forsvarets omstilling etter den kalde krigen* (Oslo: Dreyers forlag, 2015), 95–100.

operation, but the armed forces were slow to respond and lacked relevant capabilities.<sup>26</sup> In 2001 a more comprehensive reform bill was introduced, abandoning the present invasion defence posture in favour of a smaller and more flexible defence.<sup>27</sup> Norwegian concerns about standing in key allied capital were to drive its involvement in three subsequent wars: Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya.

The post-2001 War in Afghanistan provided both a challenge and an opportunity to raise Norway's standing in the alliance. The Norwegian Special Forces unit (about 80–100 operators) which deployed to Afghanistan in January 2002, as part of the US-led Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), managed to generate considerable goodwill in Washington D.C. American officers reportedly 'particularly praised the capabilities of the Norwegian special forces, for example, because their extensive mountain training proved useful in Afghanistan's rocky terrain'.<sup>28</sup> The Government now briefly spoke of a niche capability strategy. As the minister of defence put it, the idea was to 'identify what you are good at, and concentrate on it. That way you can play with the big boys even if you are small'. By nurturing some small-but-excellent capabilities, Norway could gain positive attention from its larger allies. The minister declared: 'We want to be relevant'.<sup>29</sup>

In August 2003, NATO assumed command of the ISAF. This led Norway to rebalance its efforts from OEF to ISAF. Norway deployed infantry companies, Special Forces, F-16 combat aircraft for close air support, and, from 2005, assumed lead-nation responsibility a Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in northern Afghanistan (Meymaneh). Overall troop numbers in the north had grown to about 500 soldiers by 2007.<sup>30</sup> Norway remained lead-nation in the PRT until 2012. A key reason for the incremental scaling-up of Norway's engagement in ISAF was to demonstrate NATO's continued relevance, especially to the US. In addition, it was considered vital to provide 'visible contributions' to demonstrate Norway's commitment to the alliance. For example, Norwegian manoeuvre companies on two occasions took on the role of quick reaction force (QRF) in Kabul (2003) and Northern Afghanistan (2006–08) since this was viewed as a 'high-profile mission that

---

<sup>26</sup> Jacob Børresen, Gullow Gjeseth, and Rolf Tamnes, *Allianseforsvar i endring 1970–2000*, vol. 5, Norsk Forsvarshistorie (Bergen: Eide Forlag, 2004), 226–227.

<sup>27</sup> Norwegian Ministry of Defence, *Omleggingen av Forsvaret i perioden 2002–2005*, Proposition to the Storting, no. 45 (2000–2001).

<sup>28</sup> Nora Bensahel, *The Counterterror Coalitions: Cooperation with Europe, NATO, and the European Union* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2003), 11.

<sup>29</sup> Minister of Defence (2001–05) Kristin Krohn Devold, quoted in Matthew Brzezinski, 'Who's Afraid of Norway?', *The New York Times*, 24 August 2003.

<sup>30</sup> Ida Maria Oma, 'Small states and burden-sharing in allied operations abroad: The case of Norway in ISAF'. PhD Thesis (University of Oslo, November 2014), Chapters 4, 5 and 6.

will demonstrate NATO's flexibility and Norway's ability and willingness to support the efforts of the alliance in Afghanistan'.<sup>31</sup>

For the most part, Norway's efforts succeeded. As the government appointed Afghanistan-commission concluded in June 2016, Norway's main objective in Afghanistan 2001–14 had been to visibility support the US and ensure NATO's continued relevance. This objective had been largely achieved – Norway had been 'A good ally'.<sup>32</sup> However, domestic Norwegian politics at times made it difficult to build a reputation for reliability by military means. In October 2005 a new Centre-Left 'Red-Green' coalition government had won political power in Norway. It was dominated by the Atlanticist and pro-NATO Labour Party (AP), but also included the traditional anti-NATO and very US-critical Socialist Left Party (SV). SV's leader, who was also the minister of finance in the new government, 'understood that it was important for the prime minister, foreign minister and minister of defence how Norway's contribution's to missions abroad were perceived in NATO'. However, she nevertheless 'just could not understand why Norway should be there for NATO and the US no matter what they asked of us'.<sup>33</sup> Following a compromise in the new Government, Norwegian regular and Special Forces were to be geographically limited to Kabul and northern Afghanistan.<sup>34</sup> This gave Norway less credit in the alliance than would otherwise have been the case.

The 2003 Iraq War proved a similar balancing act between, on the one hand, demonstrating alliance loyalty and gaining standing abroad, and, on the other hand, keeping coalition governments in Oslo together. Norwegian public opinion was deeply critical of the war, and the Centre-Right coalition government was split on the issue. The ministers of foreign affairs and defence, who came from the traditionally Atlanticist and pro-NATO Conservative Party, wanted to stand visibly with Norway's traditional allies: the US and UK. The Prime Minister, who came from the 'peace-oriented' Christian-Democratic Party, was completely against any involvement in the war.<sup>35</sup> The Prime

---

<sup>31</sup> Devold, quoted in *ibid.*, 63.

<sup>32</sup> Norwegian Afghanistan Commission, *NOU 2016:8 En god alliert – Norge i Afghanistan 2001–2014* (Oslo: Departementenes sikkerhets- og serviceorganisasjon, Informasjonsforvaltning, 2016).

<sup>33</sup> Minister of Finance (2005–09) Kristin Halvorsen, quoted in Lilla Sølhusvik, *Kristin Halvorsen: Gjennomslag* (Oslo: Cappelen Damm, 2012), 154.

<sup>34</sup> Norwegian Afghanistan Commission, *NOU 2016:8 En god alliert – Norge i Afghanistan 2001–2014*, 31–34; following US requests, Norwegian Special Forces squadrons had previously deployed to southern Afghanistan for several months in 2002, 2003 and 2005 as part of OEF. Tor Jørgen Melien, *Våre hemmelige soldater. Norske spesialstyrker 1940–2012* (Oslo: Spartacus, 2012), 327–334.

<sup>35</sup> Prime Minister (2001–05) Kjell Magne Bondevik, *Et liv i spenning* (Oslo: Aschehoug, 2006), 567–569; Ole Berthelsen, *En frelser, en prest og en satan: USA, Norge og Irak-krigen* (Oslo: Gyldendal Akademisk, 2005), 88–103.

Minister's view prevailed. In March 2003 Norway made no direct contribution to the US-invasion of Iraq. However, as soon as the UN Security Council in May passed a resolution calling for UN member states to stabilise Iraq, Norway was quick to send a military contribution. In June 2003 a Norwegian engineering company – about 125 troops – arrived. They were to serve as part of the British-led multinational division in southern Iraq. This immediately raised Norway's status in Washington D.C. In his January 2004 State of the Union address, President George W. Bush now mention Norway as one of America's 34 'partners' who had 'committed troops to Iraq'.<sup>36</sup>

But, again for domestic political reasons, this limited success proved short-lived. After only a year, the engineers were withdrawn from their controversial mission. Then, when the new Red-Green government came into office, it withdrew Norway's last staff-officers. The Norwegian flag was removed from the US-led 'Coalition of the Willing' in Iraq. American dissatisfaction with the withdrawal from Iraq was coupled with disappointment over Norway's simultaneous refusal to deploy forces to the hazardous southern Afghanistan. Both stood in startling contrast to Denmark's willingness.<sup>37</sup> Norwegian prestige in Washington D.C. and London was damaged. One symptom of this was reduced access to senior US decision makers. A meeting in March 2003, immediately before the Iraq War, was to be the last bilateral meeting between a Norwegian Prime Minister and a US President for more than eight years. By contrast, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, the Danish Prime Minister, had annual bilateral meetings with the US President.<sup>38</sup>

The potential benefits of providing relevant and visible forces to raise Norway's prestige with its US and European allies were to be epitomized by Norway's participation in the 2011 Libyan War. This time the Red-Green government, with the support of the opposition Conservative Party, quickly chose to make a significant contribution.<sup>39</sup> In March 2011 Norway was among the first allies to lend military support to the (initially) American, British, and French air campaign against Libya. Between March and July 2011 six Norwegian F-16 combat aircraft dropped 586 precision-guided bombs as part of the campaign. This represented about 8 per cent of the total ordinance dropped by NATO, who assumed command of the operation in late March. The importance of the

---

<sup>36</sup> CNN. 'Transcript of State of the Union'. CNN international.com, 21 January 2004.

<sup>37</sup> Saxi, *Norwegian and Danish defence policy: A comparative study of the post-Cold War era*, 47–51.

<sup>38</sup> Anders Henriksen and Jens Ringsmose, 'What did Denmark Gain? Iraq, Afghanistan and the Relationship with Washington', in *Danish Foreign Policy Yearbook 2012*, ed. Nanna Hvidt and Hans Mouritzen (Copenhagen: Danish Institute for International Studies, 2012), 163–164.

<sup>39</sup> Per Anders Johansen, 'Tok beslutningen om kampfly på telefon', *Aftenposten*, 19 April 2011.

Norwegian contribution was amplified by the fact that only 11 of NATO's 28 member states contributed combat aircraft to the campaign, and only eight agreed to attack ground targets.<sup>40</sup>

The participation was immediately successful in raising Norway's profile and prestige with the US. After having previously made four unsuccessful attempts, the Norwegian Prime Minister, Jens Stoltenberg, now managed to secure an invitation to meet with President Barack Obama in the White House.<sup>41</sup> The White House released a 'Fact Sheet' on US-Norwegian relations before the meeting, in October 2011, in which it was stressed at the very top that Norway had been 'one of the first allies to step up and deploy fighter aircraft' in the Libyan War, and that the Norwegian aircraft had 'contributed substantially to [the missions] ultimate success'.<sup>42</sup> At their common press conferences after the meeting, the US president heaped praise on 'the capacity of Norwegian pilots' and characterised Norway as a country which 'punches about its weight' in the NATO alliance.<sup>43</sup> A visible military contribution to a high-profile mission had reaped political dividends for Norway. The resulting 'reservoir of goodwill' most likely also played at least a part when, in 2013, Germany and the US agreed to put Stoltenberg's name forwards as their candidate to replace Anders Fogh Rasmussen as NATO's next secretary general. He began his tenure in October 2014.<sup>44</sup>

## Conclusion

Contributions by smaller third-tier allies, such as Denmark and Norway, will rarely make any decisive difference in determining the ultimate material success or failure of US-led military campaigns. Such contributions can however make a substantive difference in terms of building up the prestige, standing, status and reputation of the smaller states vis-à-vis its larger ally. Having such prestige and high standing is desirable primarily because it in turn can be utilized instrumentally to influence the larger ally or obtain other benefits. When viewed as such, the pursuit of prestige, even at the expense of considerable blood and treasure, seems a natural part of a rational foreign policy. States, and particularly smaller members of alliances, will therefore be tempted to 'bandwagon for prestige'.

---

<sup>40</sup> Håkon Lunde Saxi, 'So Similar, Yet so Different: Explaining Divergence in Nordic Defence Policies', in *Common or Divided Security? German and Norwegian Perspectives on Euro-Atlantic Security*, ed. Robin Allers, Carlo Masala, and Rolf Tamnes (Bern: Peter Lang, 2014), 257–258.

<sup>41</sup> Alf Ole Ask, 'Stoltenberg skal møte Obama i Det hvite hus', *Aftenposten*, 1 October 2011.

<sup>42</sup> The White House, *Fact Sheet: The United States and Norway - NATO Allies and Global Partners* (Washington, D.C.: The White House, 20 October 2011).

<sup>43</sup> *Remarks by President Obama and Prime Minister Stoltenberg After Bilateral Meeting* (Washington, D.C.: The White House, 20 October 2011).

<sup>44</sup> Tore Gjerstad and Kristian Skard, 'Stoltenbergalliansen', *DN Magasinet*, 14 June 2014.

In this article, we have argued that prestige-seeking has been at least one motive why Denmark and Norway have repeatedly chosen to make considerable – for their size – military contributions to US-led military operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, and elsewhere. While there were plenty of other motives as well, prestige-seeking provides a necessary but not sufficient explanation for Copenhagen's and Oslo's willingness to take great risks and endure significant material costs in these wars.

While they can rarely spell it out publically, policymakers often grasp instinctively the important role which prestige plays in coalition warfare. Its role is however arguably less appreciated by scholars. By introducing the concept of 'bandwagoning for prestige', drawing on Randall Schweller's work, we hope to rectify this. Smaller allies seek to use their – necessarily limited – military contributions to coalition wars as 'strategic symbolic policies' to build up their prestige in larger allied capitals. Sometimes, a high-visibility contribution, which generates more awareness and goodwill with the larger ally, will be seen as more desirable than a contribution that could have a greater material impact on the conflict. Under such circumstances, it would seem appropriate to talk about states 'bandwagoning for prestige'.

## References

- Angstrom, Jan & Jan Willem Honig (2012), "Regaining Strategy: Small Powers, Strategic Culture, and Escalation in Afghanistan", *Journal of Strategic Studies*, vol. 35 (5), 663-687.
- Ask, Alf Ole. 'Stoltenberg skal møte Obama i Det hvite hus'. *Aftenposten*, 1 October 2011. <http://www.aftenposten.no/nyheter/uriks/Stoltenberg-skal-mote-Obama-i-Det-hvite-hus-6632847.html> [15 May 2016].
- Auerswald, David P. & Stephen M. Saideman (2014), *NATO in Afghanistan: Fighting Together; Fighting Alone*, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Barnhart, Joslyn (2013), *Prestige, Humiliation and International Politics*, PhD Dissertation in Political Science, University of California.
- Bensahel, Nora. *The Counterterror Coalitions: Cooperation with Europe, NATO, and the European Union*. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2003.
- Berthelsen, Ole. *En frelser, en prest og en satan: USA, Norge og Irak-krigen*. Oslo: Gyldendal Akademisk, 2005.
- Bogen, Olav, and Magnus Håkenstad. *Balansegang: Forsvarets omstilling etter den kalde krigen*. Oslo: Dreyers forlag, 2015.
- Bondevik, Kjell Magne. *Et liv i spenning*. Oslo: Aschehoug, 2006.
- Brzezinski, Matthew. 'Who's Afraid of Norway?' *The New York Times*, 24 August 2003.
- Brooks, Stephen G. & William Wohlforth (2008), *World Out of Balance: International Relations and the Challenge of American Primacy*, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Børresen, Jacob, Gullow Gjeseth, and Rolf Tamnes. *Allianseforsvar i endring 1970–2000*. Norsk Forsvarshistorie. Vol. 5, Bergen: Eide Forlag, 2004.
- Cladi, Lorenzo & Andrea Locatelli (2012), "Bandwagoning, Not Balancing: Why Europe Confounds Realism", *Contemporary Security Policy*, 33(2), 264-88.
- CNN. 'Transcript of State of the Union'. CNN international.com, 21 January 2004. <http://edition.cnn.com/2004/ALLPOLITICS/01/20/sotu.transcript.3/index.html> [2 September 2010].
- Cushman, Thomas (ed.) (2005), *A Matter of Principle: Humanitarian Arguments for War in Iraq*, Berkeley: University of California.
- Davidson, Jason W (2011), *America's Allies and War: Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Donnelly, Faye (2013), *Securitization and the Iraq War: The Rules of Engagement in World Politics*, Milton Park: Routledge.

Dunne, Tim (2009), "Liberalism, Terrorism, and Democratic Wars", *International Relations*, vol. 23, issue 1: 107-114.

Etzioni, Amitai (1963), "International Prestige, Competition and Peaceful Coexistence", *European Journal of Sociology*, 3(1): 21-41.

Farrell, Theo (2010), "Improving in War: Military Adaptation and the British in Helmand Province, Afghanistan 2006-2009", *Journal of Strategic Studies* 33(4): 567-94.

Flockhart, Trine (2016), "Understanding NATO through constructivist theorising", in Mark Webber & Adrian Hyde-Price (eds.), *Theorising NATO: New perspectives on the Atlantic Alliance*, Milton Park: Routledge.

Gjerstad, Tore, and Kristian Skard. 'Stoltenbergalliansen'. *DN Magasinet*, 14 June 2014.

Graaf, Beatrice de, George Dimitriu & Jens Ringsmose (eds.) (2015), *Strategic Narratives, Public Opinion and War: Winning Support for Foreign Military Missions*, London: Routledge.

Graaf, Beatrice de & George Dimitriu, "'Fighting' versus 'reconstructing': framing the Dutch mission in Afghanistan", (2015), In Beatrice de Graaf, George Dimitriu & Jens Ringsmose (eds.), *Strategic Narratives, Public Opinion and War: Winning Support for Foreign Military Missions*, London: Routledge.

Hansen, Birthe (2011), *Unipolarity and World Politics: A Theory and its Implications*, London: Routledge.

Hayes, Jarrod (2016), "Identity, Authority, and the British War in Iraq", *Foreign Policy Analysis*, vol. 0:1-20.

Henriksen, Anders, and Jens Ringsmose. 'What did Denmark Gain? Iraq, Afghanistan and the Relationship with Washington'. In *Danish Foreign Policy Yearbook 2012*, edited by Nanna Hvidt and Hans Mouritzen. Copenhagen: Danish Institute for International Studies, 2012.

Herz, John (1951), *Political Realism and Political Idealism*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Hyde-Price, Adrian (2006), "'Normative power Europe': a realist critique", *Journal of European Public Policy*, 13:2, 217-34.

ICasualties (2016) Coalitions death by nationality. Available at: <http://icasualties.org/OEF/Nationality.aspx> (accessed 15 May 2016).

Johansen, Per Anders. 'Tok beslutningen om kampfly på telefon'. *Aftenposten*, 19 April 2011.

Kim, Youngho (2004), "Does Prestige Matter in International Politics", *Journal of International and Areas Studies*, 11(1): 39-55.



Keohane, Robert. (1984) *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Kreps S (2010) Elite consensus as a determinant of alliance cohesion: why public opinion hardly matters for NATO-led operations in Afghanistan. *Foreign Policy Analysis* 6: 191–215.

Layne, Christopher (1993), “The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Power Will Rise”, *International Security*, vol. 17, no. 4: 5-51.

Lebow, R. (2001), “Thucydides the constructivist”. *American Political Science Review* 95(3): 547–560.

Lebow, R. (2008), *A Cultural Theory of International Politics*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Lebow, Richard Ned (2010), *Why Nations Fight: The Past and Future of War*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Luard, Evan (1976), *Types of International Society*, London: The Free Press.

Mercer, Jonathan (forthcoming), “The Paradox of International Prestige”, *International Organization*, Vol. Xx, No. Zz, pp.

Melien, Tor Jørgen. *Våre hemmelige soldater. Norske spesialstyrker 1940–2012*. Oslo: Spartacus, 2012.

Mevik, Leif. *Det nye NATO: en personlig beretning*. Bergen: Eide forlag, 1999.

Morgenthau, Hans J. (1993), *Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace* [Brief edition], Boston: McGraw-Hill.

Norwegian Afghanistan Commission, *NOU 2016:8 En god alliert – Norge i Afghanistan 2001–2014* (Oslo: Departementenes sikkerhets- og serviceorganisasjon, Informasjonsforvaltning, 2016).

Norwegian Ministry of Defence. *Omleggingen av Forsvaret i perioden 2002–2005*. Proposition to the Storting, no. 45 (2000–2001).

Norwegian Ministry of Defence. *Tilpasning av Forsvaret til deltagelse i internasjonale operasjoner*. Report to the Storting, no. 38 (1998–99).

Oliver, F.S. (1931), *The Endless Adventure*, Vol. II, London: Macmillan.

Oma, Ida Maria. ‘Small states and burden-sharing in allied operations abroad: The case of Norway in ISAF’. PhD Thesis. University of Oslo, November 2014.

Pedersen, Rasmus Brun (2012), “Danish foreign policy activism: Differences in kind or degree?”, *Cooperation and Conflict*, vol. 47 (3): 331-349.

Porter, Patrick (2010), “Last Charge of the Knights? Iraq, Afghanistan and the Special

Relationship”, *International Affairs*, Vol. 86, Issue 2, 355-375.

Posen, Barry (2006), “European Union Security and Defense Policy: Response to Unipolarity?”, *Security Studies*, 15:2, 149-86.

Saxi, Håkon Lunde. *Norwegian and Danish defence policy: A comparative study of the post-Cold War era*. Defence and Security Studies no. 1. Oslo: Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies, 2010.

Saxi, Håkon Lunde. ‘So Similar, Yet so Different: Explaining Divergence in Nordic Defence Policies’. In *Common or Divided Security? German and Norwegian Perspectives on Euro-Atlantic Security*, edited by Robin Allers, Carlo Masala and Rolf Tamnes. Bern: Peter Lang, 2014.

Schlag, Gabi (2016), “Securitisation theory and the evolution of NATO”, in Mark Webber & Adrian Hyde-Price (eds.), *Theorising NATO: New perspectives on the Atlantic Alliance*, Milton Park: Routledge.

Schuster, Jürgen & Herbert Maier (2006), “The Rift: Explaining Europe’s Divergent Iraq Policies in the Run-Up of American-led War on Iraq”, *Foreign Policy Analysis*, Vol. 2, issue 3: 223-244.

Schweller, Randall (1994), ”Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In”, *International Security*, vol. 19, no. 1: 72-107.

Støre, Jonas Gahr. *Å gjøre en forskjell: Refleksjoner fra en norsk utenriksminister*. Oslo: Cappelen Damm, 2008.

Sundelius, Bengt (ed.), *Committed Neutral: Sweden’s Foreign Policy*, Boulder: Westview Special Studies in International Relations.

Sølhusvik, Lilla. *Kristin Halvorsen: Gjennomslag*. Oslo: Cappelen Damm, 2012.

Tamnes, Rolf. *The United States and the Cold War in the High North*. Oslo: Ad Notam, 1991.

Walt, Stephen M. (1987), *The Origins of Alliances*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Walt, Stephen M. (2005), *Taming American Power: The Global Response to U.S. Primacy*, New York: W.W. Norton & Company.

Waltz, Kenneth, ‘Structural Realism after the Cold War’, *International Security*, Vol. 25, No. 1 (Summer 2000), p. 28.

Waltz, Kenneth, ‘The Emerging Structure of International Politics’, *International Security*, 18(2): 44-79.

The White House. *Fact Sheet: The United States and Norway - NATO Allies and Global Partners*. Washington, D.C.: The White House, 20 October 2011. <https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/10/20/fact-sheet-united-states-and-norway-nato-allies-and-global-partners> [15 May 2016].

The White House. *Remarks by President Obama and Prime Minister Stoltenberg After Bilateral Meeting*. Washington, D.C.: The White House, 20 October 2011. <https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/10/20/remarks-president-obama-and-prime-minister-stoltenberg-after-bilateral-m> [15 May 2016].

Wight, Martin (1998), *Power Politics*, Leicester: Leicester University Press.

Wohlforth, William C. (2009), “Unipolarity, Status, Competition, and Great Power War”, *World Politics*, 61, no 1, 28-57.

Wood, Stephen (2003), “The Iraq War: Five European Roles” *National Europe Centre Paper no. 112*, Canberra: National Europe Centre

Wood, Steve (2013), “Prestige in World Politics: History, theory, expression”, *International Politics*, 50(3): 387-411.

Wylie, Lana (2009), “Valuing Reputation and Prestige: Canadian Foreign Policy and the International Criminal Court”, *American Review of Canadian Studies*, 39(2): 112-130.