Human In/Security in Okinawa: Under the Development Promotion Regime

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"I shall feel secure when I know that I can walk the streets at night without being raped." (UNDP 1994: 23)

This is a voice of a fourth-grade schoolgirl in Ghana, a quote from Human Development Report (HDR) 1994. Her voice reminded me a year 1995, when three U.S. servicemen brutally gang-raped a twelve-year-old schoolgirl in Okinawa, and another case of rape of young schoolgirl in Okinawa happened in February 2008. Andrew Linklater wrote one of three respects in which states are a source of insecurity as follows. "First, they are a source of insecurity where migrants, gypsies, minority nations, and indigenous peoples, among others, do not enjoy the protection of the rule of the law or are barred from enjoying the political and other rights that full members of the community already enjoy" (Linklater 2005: 116).

This paper tries to describe human insecurity in Okinawa, and to investigate issues in applying the concept of human security to the periphery of a developed country. After reviewing a brief history of Okinawa in Section 1 and some conceptual frameworks of human security in Section 2, Section 3 describes situations in Okinawa with respect to personal security and economic security. Violent crimes, accidents and noise levels are examined with respect to the U.S. military presence, while unemployment rates, average income, and revenue dependence are referred as economic aspects of human security. Section 4 and 5 deal with the Regime for Promotion and Development of Okinawa, its outcomes and its functions. Section 6 describes implications for human security discourse as concluding remarks.

1. Okinawa: a Brief History

Okinawa is a southwestern prefecture in Japan, that consists of about 160 islands. About 1.4 million people live on 50 of these islands. Okinawa covers 2300 square kilometers, while the Okinawa Island is the largest island covering 1200 square kilometer. Its subtropical climate makes Okinawa the popular resort destination. In the Battle of Okinawa in 1945, not only American and Japanese soldiers but also many local civilians lost their lives. More than 230 thousand people died, and almost a quarter of the population of Okinawa were lost. Okinawa was an expendable in the war, for buying time and protecting the national polity under the emperor. It was “nothing to do with protecting Okinawa, and everything to do with slowing down the U.S. advance against the main Japanese islands” (Angst 2003: 142).

After it had landed in Okinawa, the U.S. military began to converted Japanese military bases into their own’s and construct new ones. Even after Japan’s surrender, they kept building new bases while they confiscated land by the edge of the sword. As a result, Okinawa began to function as the "Keystone of the Pacific Ocean" for the U.S. military forces.

Rape cases by GI was reported as 278 cases (1945-51), while this could still be an underestimate. A former Okinawa councilwoman Takazato Suzuyo said the cases of abuses committed by the U.S. troops during this period were never solved and those who committed them were never punished. The documented cases included incidents such as women being gang raped in front of their husbands and fathers (Okinawan Women Act Against Military Violence 2005).

San Francisco Peace Treaty of 1951 put Okinawa under the control of U.S. administration. While Japan enjoyed the peace constitution with the article 9, Okinawan people could not enjoy the same security level as other Japanese enjoyed. Even after reversion of Okinawa in 1972, the excessive concentration of military bases on the islands was not improved (Figure 1). This bilateral alliance, being intended to enhance Japan's national security, has caused various problems due to the concentration of U.S. bases in Okinawa, which are accepted as a "security cost" (Minamiyama 1999: 16). The continuing U.S. military presence gives a constant reminder of the traumatic episode in the battle of Okinawa.

2 This section is mainly based on descriptions in Okinawa Prefectural Government (2004).
Figure 1: U.S. Military Bases in Okinawa

Base Concentration

Although more than 60 years have passed since the end of World War II, Okinawa still functions as the "Keystone of the Pacific Ocean" for the U.S. military forces. U.S. bases in Okinawa account for about 75% of all facilities exclusively used by the U.S. Armed Forces in Japan, while Okinawa accounts for only 0.6% of Japanese total land area. U.S. military bases occupied 18.8% of the main island of Okinawa Jima, where population and industry are concentrated. Approximately 60% of U.S. military personnel in Japan are stationed in Okinawa, and about 60% of them belong to the Marine Corps. Concentration of U.S. forces in Okinawa affects a variety of serious concerns and the local people's lives: accidents, incidents and crimes caused by U.S. soldiers; everyday noise caused by military aircraft; forest fires by live-fire exercises; water pollution from oil leakage; and so on. Okinawa Prefectural Government insists that a decrease in the number of U.S. forces in Okinawa would reduce the number of incidents and accidents related to the U.S. servicemen and lead to lighten an excessive load to Okinawan people. Faced with a series of criminal cases committed by military personnel, Okinawan Prefectural Assembly and municipal assemblies have passed resolutions requesting a reduction in the number of U.S. armed forces. They are expressions of the general consensus of Okinawan people (Okinawa Prefectural Government 2004).

2. Concept of Human Security

"The concept of security is therefore a battleground in and of itself... Who would want to keep the concept narrow and why? ... Who might want to keep some issues off the security agenda and why?" (Smith 2005: 57-58)

Human security represents an effort to re-conceptualize security in fundamental ways. It is an analytical tool which focuses primarily on security for individuals, not states. Thus, exploring options that are aimed to mitigate the threat to personal security becomes a primary goal of policy recommendations and policy behaviors. As the

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3 This section is largely based on descriptions in Jolly and Ray (2006).
definition of security extended from military security to human security, the causes of insecurity are also expanded from military threats by antagonistic nations to threats to socio-economic and political conditions, food, health, and environment, community and personal safety. So the policy initiatives that applies the idea of human security have incorporated these considerations into its policy making, and have reduced the emphasis on military forces in its policy behavior. Therefore, human security has following characteristics: people-centered, multi-dimensional, interconnected and universal (Jolly and Ray 2006).

**Human Development Report 1994**

As Jolly and Ray (2006: 4) pointed out, “The concept of human security emerged as part of the holistic paradigm of human development cultivated at UNDP by former Pakistani Finance Minister Mahbub ul Haq, with strong support from economist Amartya Sen.” Human Development Report 1994 was “the first major international document to articulate human security in conceptual terms with proposals for policy and action.”

The 1994 report argued that the concept of security has “for too long been interpreted narrowly: as security of territory from external aggression, or as protection of national interests in foreign policy, or as global security from a nuclear holocaust. It has been related more to nation states than to people” (UNDP 1994: 22). The concept of human security tries to expand this narrow interpretation to include the safety of individuals and groups of people from various threats such as poverty, hunger, disease, disaster, violence and political instability; and protection from “sudden and hurtful disruptions in patterns of daily life” (UNDP 1994: 23). The 1994 report identifies seven core elements that reflect the basic needs of human security: economic security, food security, health security, environmental security, personal security, community security and political security (Jolly and Ray 2006).

**Commission on Human Security Report 2003**

In 2001, the Commission on Human Security (CHS), chaired by Amartya Sen and Sadako Ogata, was established to explore the concept of human security and to make recommendations for policy. According to the CHS report (2003), human security is "to protect the vital core of all human lives in ways that enhance human freedoms and human fulfillment."

Highlights from the CHS report are as follows:

- The international community urgently needs a new paradigm of security. The state often fails to fulfill its security obligations, and at times has even become a source of threats to its own people. Attention must now shift from the security of the state to the security of the people, to human security.
- The report is a response to the threats of development reversed, to the threats of violence inflicted. That response cannot be effective if it comes fragmented, from those dealing with rights, those with security, those with humanitarian concerns and those with development.
- Human security complements state security, enhances human rights and strengthens human development.
- Human security complements "state security" in four respects:
  - Its concern is individual and community rather than the state
  - Menaces include more than threats to state security
  - The range of actors is expanded beyond the state alone
  - Achieving human security includes empowering people

Jolly and Ray (2006: 4) stressed, “The report noted that human security complemented state security because its concern was focussed on the individual and the community, whose agency and well-being represented an integral part of state security. Achieving human security therefore included not only protecting people but empowering people to fend for themselves.”

The linkage between security and development is explicit in the UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan’s report of 2005, *In Larger Freedom*. He insisted that “all people have the right to security and to development” (Annan 2005: 5). We could describe
the linkage as two contrasting views of the state: “One ‘leg’ of human security is in the human-rights tradition that sees the state as the problem and the source of threats to individual security. The other is in the development agenda that sees the state as the necessary agent for promoting human security. Both are reflected in these UN policy documents” (Thakur 2005).

Human Security in Japanese Foreign Policy

After 1994, some governments showed interests in the concept of human security and adopted it to a central theme of their foreign and defense policies. The Canadian, Japanese and Norwegian governments, in particular, were top runners in incorporating human security concerns into their respective foreign policies (Jolly and Ray 2006).

According to MOFA, “Human Security is a perspective to strengthen efforts to cope with threats to human lives, livelihoods, and dignity. The most important element of Human Security is to enhance the freedom of individual human beings and their abundant potential to live creative and valuable lives” (MOFA 2001).

Prime Minister Obuchi delivered his speech, “Toward the Creation of A Bright Future for Asia,” at Hanoi in 1998, when Japanese government clearly located “Human Security” in its foreign policy. In other occasion, Prime Minister Mori expressed that Japan sees human security as one of the main pillars of its diplomacy at the UN Millennium Summit in 2000. He also stated that Japanese government intends to establish an international committee for human security (MOFA 2001).

In 1999, Japanese government materialized the Obuchi's commitment in his Hanoi Speech by establishing the "UN Trust Fund for Human Security" at the UN Secretariat with the initial contribution of $4.6 million. In the following years, Japan announced its intention to make further contributions to this fund. The Japan’s total contributions has amounted up to $297 million (1999-2006). Thus, Japanese government is serious about promoting human security in terms of “freedom from want” in international contexts.

3. Describing Human Insecurity in Okinawa

While Japan’s total contribution to the UN Trust Fund is almost $300 million, the government seems to be indifferent with human insecurity in Okinawa. In the following section, I would like to examine some of the major impacts of Japanese government choices in its national security policy on human insecurity in Okinawa, by applying the concept of human security to the periphery of a country in the global north. Here we focus on personal and economic insecurity within Okinawan context.

Personal Insecurity: In 1995, three U.S. servicemen of the Marine Corps abducted and gang-raped the thirteen year-old schoolgirl, and the news prompted immediate powerful Okinawan responses. "These included the demand by women's groups in Okinawa to publicize the crime and increase protection for women, ... renewed protests by landowners forced for decades to lease lands to the U.S. military, and strengthened" (Angst 2003: 137).

The governor Ota called for reduction of U.S. bases in Okinawa and rejected to sign over to extend land lease agreement on some of U.S. communication facilities. A debate over the nature and role of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty was sparked. Especially, the provisions of the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) regarding the treatment of U.S. military personnel accused of crimes were major concerns among others (Angst 2003).

"Media coverage shifted from the rape to 'larger' political issues of land lease, base returns, and troop reduction, pointing out the long-standing victimization of Okinawans" (Angst 2003: 138). September 1996, the first prefectural referendum was held in Okinawa. Asking review and rewriting of SOFA and reduction of U.S. bases. About 482 thousand voters (89%) answered “Yes”, that accounts 53% of all eligible voters. Only 46 thousand voters said “No”.

Responded to these developments, the governments of U.S. and Japan established the Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) as “a consultative committee to reduce the excessive burden of the U.S. military bases in Okinawa” (Okinawa Prefectural Government 2004: 12). In the 1996 SACO final report, eleven facilities, including Futenma Air Station for the Marine Corps, were said to be returned. If all of
five thousand hectares of land were returned, it would exceed the total land area returned since reversion in 1972 (Okinawa Prefectural Government 2004).

But, the return was conditional: there should be the substitute facilities offered somewhere in Japan. The new site chosen for the substitute of Futenma Air Station was Henoko, on the northeast coast of the Okinawa main island. The plan calls for Japan to build a new Marine Corps air-sea base for American use.

**Personal Insecurity as Security Cost**

In February 2008, there was another case of the rape of a fourteen-year-old schoolgirl in Okinawa. Okinawa Women Act Against Military Violence, an Okinawan feminist NGO, immediately published a statement and called public attention (OWAAMV 2008).

... We have been imposed the burden of hosting U.S. military and bases. For long 62 years, the lives of women and children in Okinawa have been made insecure by the presence of the U.S. military and bases. ...

We call for withdrawal of the U.S. military in order to abolish such violence. We argue that the military is a violence-intrinsic institution. And true security cannot be realized by the military in our community nor between nations. ...

All the municipal assemblies have passed resolutions to protest, and another Prefectural People's Rally was held in March, while the plaint was withdrawn, so that no judicial procedures for the perpetrator. He did not sit in judgement on case.

In the Okinawa Prefectural Assembly, Governor Nakaima answered on the case, saying that he could not choose between security of the Asian-Pacific region and protecting the girl’s safety. "The Okinawa problem" has always been treated as a dependent variable of the U.S.-Japan alliance under the Cold War structure. This bilateral alliance, being intended to enhance Japan's national security, has caused various problems due to the concentration of U.S. bases in Okinawa, which are accepted as a "security cost" by mainland Japanese (Minamiyama 1999: 16). Now the Okinawan governor included the personal insecurity of Okinawans as such a security cost.

**Impacts of U.S. Military Presence**

Crimes, Accidents, and Living Conditions: Serious impact of the U.S. military facilities on the Okinawan people's lives lies in crimes. Between the reversion of Okinawa to Japan in 1972 and the end of December 2003, more than five thousand criminal cases, committed by military personnel and military-related people, were recorded, that includes 540 serious crimes and 977 assault cases (Okinawa Prefectural Government 2004).

Figure 2 shows the number of crime cases by U.S. soldiers in Okinawa since 1972. Serious cases include murders, rapes and so on. It is notable that the number of crime cases were more than 200 a year for the first 12 years after reversion, and that were less than 100 a year for the latest 12 years but once. Though the number of crime cases clearly decreased recently, it also should be noted that the occurrence are still more than 50 a year for last 10 years, and there are serious crimes like murders and rapes every year.

Figure 2: Crime Cases by U.S. Soldiers in Okinawa, 1972-2009 (case)
A local newspaper (Ryukyu Shimpo, October 22, 2008) reported that US-Japanese governments agreed in 1953 that Japan would give up jurisdiction on US soldiers’ crimes in Japan except serious cases. In next five years till 1958, Japan did not take 97% of crimes to the court. Dale Sonenberg, international law division of US forces in Japan, mentioned this issue in his 2001 article on SOFA in Japan, saying that the agreement was unofficial and Japan has been following this agreement till today. Thus, the number of cases decreased in recent years, there still is serious negligence of domestic insecurity.

Furthermore, an Prefectural Government booklet describes other impacts of heavy U.S. presence on the lives of Okinawan people as follows. “Specifically, daily air craft noise, military aircraft crashes (fighters, helicopters, etc.), oil and fat spills, red soil runoff, mountain forest fires caused by live-firing exercises and other incidents and accidents stemming from U.S. base activities result in health-related problems among residents living in the vicinity of bases and other negative impacts on Okinawan people and the environment” (Okinawan Prefectural Government 2004: 8).

Figure 3 shows the number of U.S. maneuvers-related accidents in Okinawa between 2001 and 2009. They are, from bottom to top, a large number of aircraft-related accidents, a small number of stray bullets, water pollutions, wilderness fire and others. As the Prefectural Government booklet argues, “With only a minor miscalculation, aircraft accidents have the potential to be tragic, possibly resulting in the deaths of local residents. These accidents therefore cause a great deal of anxiety not only among residents living in the vicinity of the bases, but also among all Okinawan citizens” (Okinawan Prefectural Government 2004: 8).

Figure 3: U.S. Maneuvers-related Accidents in Okinawa, 2001-2009 (case)
On August 13, 2004, a heavy assault transport helicopter, a CH-53D, crashed into the Okinawa International University Administration Building, whose campus is next to the Futenma Air Station. Fortunately, no one was killed. After the crash, U.S. Marines from the base invaded and occupied a large section of the University campus for their investigation. The investigation into the cause of this accident by Japanese has not been completed, but the U.S. Marines have already resumed flights of all aircraft, including the CH-53Ds.

Other serious impact of the U.S. military presence on the Okinawan people's lives is noise pollution. Prefectural Government established several measuring stations near Kadena Air Base and Futenma Air Station to record noise levels. Figure 4 shows that, at almost all measuring stations, noise levels measured are exceeding the WECPNL level of 70, the standard set by the Ministry of the Environment. The Prefectural Government booklet expressed great concerns that “such noise pollution will affect the daily lives and health of local residents, as well as education by interrupting classes at schools adjacent to the bases” (Okinawan Prefectural Government 2004: 8).

Figure 4: Noise Levels of Kadena and Futenma, 1995–2006 (WECPNL)
What to Do With U.S. Military Bases in Okinawa?

According to the Okinawa opinion poll in 2007 by Okinawa Times (800 voters Random Digit Dialing), answers to the question "What to do with U.S. military bases in Okinawa?" were: status quo 13%, gradual closure or reduction 70%, and complete closure right away 15%.

Some may say that, to the proportion of impacts described above, too many Okinawans say "No" to the U.S. bases. But, I believe there are at least three good reasons for that. First, freedom from fear. In order to feel "secure", you have to be liberated from not only physical threats but also mental ones such as past trauma, fear to be beaten, or concerns over your own future. The mental side of security constitutes the core of human security.

Second, protection of human dignity. Okinawa was an expendable in the battle of Okinawa, in San Francisco Treaty, and in today’s formation of Japan-US alliance. "[T]here is growing recognition worldwide that the protection of human security, including human rights and human dignity, must be one of the fundamental objectives of modern international institutions" (ICISS Report on R2P, 2001). In Okinawa, human dignity is felt violated.

Third, memories of the battle of Okinawa. The Japanese troops were stationed in Okinawa to protect the territory and not the people. The Japanese soldiers killed some Okinawa people that they were suspected to be spies, because they spoke local language that soldiers could not understand. Some were expelled from caves where they were hiding; there were food dispossession; and some were forced to commit group suicide or family suicide. For Okinawans, the lesson of the war is: the military does not protect people.

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4 People were told, “When being captured, men will be killed and women will be raped. So, if there were no way out, you should kamikaze-attack them or commit suicide.” See Sekai (2008) Vol. 774, Special Issue on Okinawa.
4. Regime for Promotion and Development of Okinawa

In terms of economic insecurity, Human Development Report (HDR) 1994 mentions income insecurity and job insecurity in industrial countries. "Income insecurity has hit industrial countries as well. ... Minority ethnic groups are usually among the hardest hit ... With incomes low and insecure, many people have to look for more support from their governments. But they often look in vain" (UNDP 1994: 26). "Many people in the rich nations today feel insecure because jobs are increasingly difficult to find and keep. ... Young people are more likely to be unemployed ... Even those with jobs may feel insecure if the work is only temporary" (UNDP 1994: 25).

Addition to personal insecurity, and instead of economic inequality, let’s take a look at Okinawan perception of inequality by the Okinawa opinion poll in 2007 by Okinawa Times. Answers to the question "Any Inequalities between Okinawa and the mainland?" were: Yes 87%, No 11%, and DK 2%. Asking "What kind of inequalities?" to people answered "Yes," their responses were: income 48%, base problem 24%, job 17%, and education 5%.

In fact, average income of Okinawa is the lowest among 47 prefectures in Japan, while the prefecture's unemployment rate is the highest in Japan. Financial independence is also very low: Okinawa is among bottom five (Figure 5). When we calculate the Human Development Index (HDI) values, one of selected indicators of human security, Okinawa is the second to the lowest among 47 prefectures (Umemura 2003).

**Figure 5: Economic Inequality, Okinawa vs National Average (index, national average = 100)**


**Economic Inequality as a Tool to Control**

Central government utilizes these economic inequalities as the instrument to control the Okinawa Prefectural Government and to force it to accept the U.S.-Japanese plan.
to build a new base in Henoko. "Local authorities in Okinawa were at first extremely negative, but after heavy pressure, in 1998 both the prefetural Governor and the Nago City mayor accepted the principle of base construction and in 1999 the Okinawa Prefectural Assembly endorsed it after a bitter and prolonged 18-hour debate" (McCormack and Matsumoto 2008).

Gustavo Esteva (1992) said the notion of underdeveloped was born on January 20th, 1949, in Harry S. Truman's Inaugural Address. Truman changed the meaning of development, and since then it always imply “escape from a humiliating situation called underdevelopment.” In order to escape from a humiliating situation, people pursue development, welcome foreign aid and FDI as additional capital for development, and mimic the political, economic and societal institutions and way of thinking that are common to developed societies.

In 1972, Okinawan people was ready to pursue development in Truman’s sense. In reversion movement before 1972, Okinawan people demanded Kaku-nuki Hondo-nami 核抜き本土並み (No nukes and achieving main land average). Hondo-nami in politics, economy, and social life. Kakusa Zesei 格差は正 (Catching-up to the main land) was the other big word at that time. Even thirty some years after the reversion, an editorial of a local news paper describes Hondo-nami and Kakusa Zesei were not materialized. Though economic growth did occurred, either catching-up or achieving main land average did not.

When people believe in development in Truman’s sense, development is the inevitable process for every society. If you apply the right policy, welcoming foreign capital and mimicking developed societies, people in the south, or the periphery, would eventually get wealthy and become a society of high living standard like the country in the north, or the main land (de Rivero 2001). When foreign capital flew in, exploited nature and destroyed traditional culture, you might call it development. It sounds like an escape from a humiliating situation and also an emancipation of what you already have in your culture and society. It is natural and effective for the central government to utilize economic inequalities as a tool to control Okinawan people.

Regime for Promotion and Development: A basic policy of Japan and United States were making Okinawa dependent on two governments. In Okinawa today, economy is dependent on central government policy, public finance is dependent on transfer from central government, and people seemingly lost the independence in their way of thinking. These could be direct results of the regime for promotion and development of Okinawa since 1972.

Before the reversion of 1972, Okinawa changed from agricultural prefecture to a prefecture of service industries. Population in agriculture was nearly 80% before the WW2, and became around 20% during U.S. occupation, losing huge flat land for base construction. The secondary industries grew to 20%, mainly in construction industries as base construction progressed. Workers in the tertiary industries were less than 40% around 1955, and grew to 60% in 1972 (Tominaga 2003). Japan’s high rate of economic growth in the 1960s did not come to Okinawa. Exchange rate of Okinawa’s yen, called B yen, was 120 yen to one dollar, while that of Mainland yen was 360 yen to one dollar. Because of this policy decision, manufacturing industries, especially export industries, were eradicated and did not grow in Okinawa.

In 1972, in order for Okinawa people to welcome the reversion, the program for promotion and development was introduced in Okinawa. Special Treatment Acts says the central government is responsible of catching up to the main land in infrastructures such as roads, ports, air port, schools, and agriculture, and in level of income, so that Okinawa people could have hopes for future development. In order to protect and foster business, tax rates of custom, alcoholic drink, and gasoline were set lower. Okinawa Development Agency and Okinawa Development Finance Corporation were established (Miyata 2008).

Policy rationale of central government to do the promotion and development of Okinawa is that (1) it experienced the battle of Okinawa, (2) it was under US occupation for 27 years, (3) it hosts vast military bases (Miyata 2008).

After three 10 year plan, the new Okinawa Promotion and Development Act took in place, and another 10 year plan started. This time, the word “development” was dropped, though. Since 1972, about 8.5 Trillion Yen were used for the program. About 7.9 Trillion Yen were the public investment (Figure 6).
The central government reviewed the 30 years of the program, and concluded that it didn’t work. Economy is stagnant, public finance dependence grew, per capita income is the lowest among prefectures, unemployment rate is high, a little too much tertiary industries, manufacturing industries are very weak, and financial independence is hard to be achieved (Miyata 2008).

Public investment did not have much of spin-off effect on production and employment, so that no catching up in terms of average income realized. Figure 7 shows average income per capita for Japan (国) and Okinawa (沖縄), and a ratio of Okinawan’s to Japan’s (所得格差). Okinawan income per capita increased from less than 500 thousand yen in 1972 to around 2,000 thousand yen in 1992. Ratio of Okinawan per-capita income, however, has been around 70% of national average for more than 30 years.

Outcome of Promotion and Development Regime

Figure 7: Prefectural Per-Capita Income, 1972-2007 (% ten thousand yen)
No catching up in terms of employment happened. Figure 8 shows unemployment rates of Okinawan (沖縄県) and Japanese (全国), and the numbers of unemployment in Okinawa (失業者数). As seen in Figure 8, unemployment rates of last 10 years are worse than before. It was 3% in 1972, and now it is about 8%, because manufacturing industries did not grow out of public investment. Forty-one percent of working population do not have stable regular jobs, 89% of whom are working poor with less than 2 million yen of annual income. Inequality within Okinawa is growing.

Figure 8: Unemployment Rate, 1972-2009 (% thousand person)

Independent revenue sources of Okinawa is the lowest or within bottom 5 among 47 prefectures (Okinawa Prefectural Government 2007). In other words, Okinawa is heavily dependent on money from central government. The regime of promotion and development offers high rate subsidy for prefecture cities, towns and villages. Given the incentives, municipalities tend to do a lot of public works, and to have
indisciplined public finance and dependent mind set on subsidy. According to a questionnaire survey to municipalities in 2002, top request for the New Program for Promotion of Okinawa was maintaining of high rate subsidy mechanism.

5. Dependence through Regime for Promotion and Development

Functions of Promotion and Development Regime
With 3.8 Trillion Yen and 36 years, why the Program of Promotion and Development could not bring economic independence to Okinawa? Maedomari (2009) summarizes an answer by Oshiro Tsuneo, former professor of University of the Ryukyus: Because the Promotion and Development Regime is not aimed at economic independence of Okinawa. The program was intended to be an anchor for U.S.-Japan Alliance. Once Okinawa attained economic independence, need for land for further economic development would raise, which means more voices for base removal and U.S.-Japan security treaty in danger.

In other words, from the national security view point, it is extremely important to keep Okinawa dependent on central government, to keep regional economy dependent on the presence of US military bases. Practicing influence through subsidy and public finance from the central government is called politics of influence peddling. Other prefectures have this mechanisms established for a long time, while Okinawa didn’t have one for 27 years. So, the Regime of Promotion and Development became the substitute for it just after the reversion.

Another role of the regime, according to Shimabukuro (2009), is keep the base issue away from municipalities’ requests on promotion and development and public works. Okinawa Development Agency did not work for projects based on base reduction plan. After the rape of schoolgirl In 1995, the governor Ota challenged the regime, but he failed to be reelected. He was criticized that he was responsible of recession: the government stopped the flow of public finance because Ota challenged the central government, the critics said.

Because the government could not start construction of new base in Henoko nearly 10 years, a new subsidy on Realignment of the U.S. Forces was introduced in 2007. If municipalities were cooperative to the realignment, then the Defense Minister would OK for the subsidy. If not, no subsidies. Typical carrot and stick.

“Compensation Politics” (Calder 2007) is a policy of distributing benefits to whom accept the government’s requests. Network of beneficials, called subsidy circle, includes construction companies, labor union on base, electric company, and land owners. Given the financial difficulties of central government, and given the introduction of new subsidy on Realignment of the U.S. Forces aka political conditionality, Compensation Politics may not be functioning any longer.

Base Related Revenue Dependency
Base related revenue increased over thirty some years since 1972, while its proportion to gross prefectural income decreased during the same period. U.S. forces related revenue was 78 billion yen in 1972, and it increased to more than 200 billion yen in 2007. Prefectural government admits that it is still a large source of revenue, and an important factor for prefecture’s economic activities (Okinawa Prefectural Government 2004). It should be noted clearly, however, that base related revenue dependency is in decrease. When we examine a ratio of U.S. forces related revenue, it was 15% of gross prefectural income in 1972 and it decreased to around 5% in 2007.

During the same period, tourism revenue increased from 6% to 11%.

Figure 9: Ratio of Base Related Revenue to Gross Prefectural Income, 1972-2007 (%)
Picture is different when we look at municipalities, instead of prefecture as a whole. Dependency of some municipalities on base related revenue (% in their total revenues) are growing lately. Especially, that is clear among these municipalities in the middle and the north of Okinawa. Surprisingly, many of these municipalities are suffered with high unemployment rate than average Okinawan municipalities (11.9% in 2005). In other words, base related revenue dependency does hurt local economy, instead of promising economic development.

Figure 10: Base Related Revenue Dependency (%, billion yen)
Some even argue that reduction of bases is in fact leads to economic development. Here are two examples: one is economic success with base removal, the other is economic downturn with base dependency (Maedomari 2009).

Town of Chatan had 66 hectare of base removal in 1981. It took 20 years, but now have more tax revenue, more economic spin-off, and more employment.

City of Nago decided to accept building the new marine base in Henoko in 1997. Its base related revenue was 2 billion yen in 1995, while it increased to 9 billion yen in 2001. Rate of base related revenue in the city budget was 6% in 1997, and it increased to 29% in 2001. But, unemployment rate worsened from 8.7% in 1995 to 12.5% in 2005. Revenue from corporate tax did not change much. City’s debt increased from 17 billion yen to 24 billion yen in 2004.

The promotion and development regime and Compensation Politics have been working as the mechanism for keeping U.S. bases in Okinawa. Okinawan people have been trapped in this mechanism, because development as ideology is hard to get free from.

But it is not for sure if Compensation Politics will keep functioning for ever. One of the signs is the election of Nago city assembly members in September 2010. Sixteen out of twenty-seven seats were occupied by ones who agree with the mayor, who repeatedly says “No new base in Henoko.” It sounds like they are saying, “No Compensation Politics working in Nago anymore.”

**Conclusion: Implications for Human Security Discourse**

This paper describes human insecurity in Okinawa. The security of most Okinawans is threatened more by the government imposing a burden of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty on them than by threats of armed attack by other countries. For Japan and Japanese, the world may be becoming more peaceful through such policy choice, but it is no consolation to people suffering human insecurity in Okinawa.
Reframing security in human terms will have profound consequences for how we see the world and how we make choices in public and foreign policy. Applying the concept of human security to the periphery of a developed country, this paper draws following implications for human security discourse.

1. State as a source of insecurity: Barry Buzan said, "Individuals can be threatened by their own state in a variety of ways, and they can also be threatened through their state as a result of its interactions with other states in the international system" (Buzan 1983: 364). In this paper, we saw a typical case in Okinawan context.

2. Human insecurity as a cost for national security: Kozue Akibayashi said, "We were made to believe that we have to have a military base in order to be secure." But the resulting effect is contrary to the intention of the military presence. "The military actually creates a situation that gives us insecurity, especially in areas where a foreign military is stationed for a long time," Akibayashi said (Marianas Variety (Guam), January 29, 2008). Governor Nakaima's answer in the Prefectural Assembly reminds us human insecurity in Okinawa as a cost for national security of Japan.

3. Economic inequality as an instrument to control local government: Cooley and Marten (2006) argue that "the Japanese government's unique system of 'burden payments' provides incentives to Okinawans both to highlight the negative effects of the U.S. presence and to support the continuation of the bases for economic reasons." While policy of carrot and stick is not a new thing, economic insecurity in Okinawa is utilized as an instrument to control the local government through Compensation Politics and subsidy for promoting the Roadmap for Realignmment.

4. Agencies for human security: Their anti-base movement in Henoko and other part of Okinawa, with global linkage of civil societies, could function as agencies for human security in Okinawa. "Shifting the focus of security away from preoccupations of military might, ... allows civil society to become an integral part of the system of human protection, not simply the state" (Blaney and Pasha 1993).
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