India as an Emerging Power

Strategic Challenges

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This paper will examine India’s central strategic problem, which is the challenge of devising ways of dealing on the one hand with countering China’s strategy of marginalising India through the development of strong ties with all of India’s neighbours, particularly Pakistan and on the other of cooperating with China and Russia in finding ways to adapt to a Western-dominated international system as well as strengthening cooperation with the United States and Japan.
India as an Emerging Power: Strategic Challenges

Introduction

The recently concluded electoral exercise (General Elections 2014) in India is a watershed event in the history of India and the world. The largest such democratic exercise held in human history, it showcased the entrenched strength of the democratic process in India. The elections, by itself, achieved many firsts. For the first time the middle class and the large segment of youth population (many of whom were first time voters) mobilised in a way never seen before. It was also the first time that one of the major parties (the BJP) announced its prime ministerial candidate well ahead which set the tone for its electoral campaign on issues of development and governance. The near flawless conduct of the elections is a signal demonstration of the power of democracy in India, and that is clearly the demonstration of the inherent strength of democracy in India, and that is clearly the demonstration of the inherent strength of democracy in India as an emerging power. The results were phenomenal – a single party majority after three decades – an outcome of the focus on important and pressing issues rather than the usual populism. This itself was a clear indication that the large young population will support the national leadership to take a proactive, firm and nationalist approach to governing India. Accordingly, one can expect a significant shift in India’s approach to international relations, in favour of unambiguously articulated national interests, over the coming years. The swearing in of the new government was used as the forum to send such appropriate signals to the rest of the world. Inviting the heads of state of the SAARC countries was a masterstroke of strategy.

India’s Strategic Legacy

For nearly fifty years since its independence in 1947 India’s national strategy and international relations were guided and driven by one person, Jawaharlal Nehru, India’s first Prime Minister. Clearly articulating the need for
India to follow an independent, and a narrow path of not joining any block, Nehru laid emphasis on the importance of following a path different from the conventional and accepted strategies of power politics.\(^1\) It was the beginning of what subsequently became the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). As a keen student of history, Nehru had implicit faith in the belief that India was destined to fulfil its role as a front-ranking power in the international system.\(^2\) The need to pursue an independent strategy and foreign policy emerged from this fundamental desire and envisaged role for India. While Nehru fully acknowledged that this would be possible only when the country was economically strong, the means to achieve that evolved differently. India's history and its strategic legacies had much to do with how Nehru evolved independent India’s national strategy in dealing with a world that was crafted and controlled entirely by the Western powers.

History is the product of two great forces, environment and personality; the course of action that the famous figures of history, be they individuals or states, can take, must of necessity take into account the environment in which they are placed. The product of its own historical experience and its general historical processes that were relevant, regionally and globally, shapes the strategic environment of the nation-state. In any attempt to analyse India's strategic imperatives, one must take into account the many varied factors that have had significant impact on the evolution of India's strategic thought and posture. The emergence of the modern Indian state is a singularly unique event in history because of many paradoxes that have supported as well as opposed this event. These factors that have influenced the evolution of India's strategic orientation need to be considered, along with current and emerging environment, to establish its strategic imperatives. To appreciate the evolution

\(^1\) Nehru explained the essence of India’s foreign policy for the first time in a speech in the Constituent Assembly (Legislative), New Delhi on December 4, 1947, in reply to Shri N.G.Ranga’s ‘cut’ motion for the reduction of the demand under the head ‘Ministry of External Affairs and Commonwealth Relations’.

\(^2\) India's manifest destiny as a Great Power, derived from its standing as a Great and Ancient Civilisation and a benevolent Power, is the core theme of Nehru’s book ‘Discovery of India’ written in the 1930s.
of India’s strategic orientation, the very ‘Concept of India’ needs to be understood well.

The Concept of India

The concept of India is unlike any other in human history. This national concept of India derives its permanence from many geographical, geopolitical and civilisational factors that are unique and uncommon with any other civilisation. Most countries can trace their conceptual roots to a single community, language, and territory. But almost all have their civilisational roots in a larger civilisation or were influenced by more than one civilisation. In the case of India, it has evolved as a single civilisational entity. The only other single civilisational entity that has survived and continues to flourish, much like India, is China. The entire subcontinent, by its very unique geographical nature, provided an ideal environment for this civilisation to develop rapidly and flourish. The concept of India applies to the entire subcontinent primarily due to its single geographical entity.3 In the north it was bound by the mighty Himalayas, in the north-west by the Hindukush mountains, in the north-east by the combination of Himalayas, and Arakan ranges with its dense tropical forests, in the west by the Great Thar Desert and further down the long coast-line washed by the Arabian Sea, in the east by Bay of Bengal, and in the south by the vast Indian Ocean. This natural geographical boundary gave India, what is known as its ‘splendid isolation’, which aided the development of its civilisation. As A. L. Basham observes as he starts his excellent book of Ancient Indian History – “the ancient civilisation of India grew up in a sharply demarcated sub-continent bounded on the north by the world’s largest mountain range-the chain of the

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3 The sub-continent of India stretches from the Himalayas to the sea. It is known as Bharatvarsha, or the land of Bharat. He was a king famous in the Puranic traditions. Bharatvarsha was said to form a part of a larger unit called Jambudvipa that was considered to be the innermost of the seven concentric island-continents into which the earth, as conceived by the Hindus, was supposed to have been divided. But early Buddhist evidence points out that Jambu-dvipa was a territorial name actually in use from the third century B.C. It was applied to that part of Asia, outside China, throughout which the powers of the great imperial family of the Mauryas made itself felt. See B. N. Luniya, Evolution of Indian Culture (Agra: Lakshmi Narain Agarwal Educational Publishers, 1951, Fifth Edition, 1970), p. 1. See also An Advanced History of India by Majumdar, Roy Choudhary and Datta, p. 3.
Himalayas, which with its extension to east and west, divides India from the rest of Asia and the world” – it could not have been more apt.⁴

This ‘splendid isolation’ produced, in alliance with few other factors, certain distinct characteristics in the Indian civilisation. It enabled her to develop peculiarities and special characteristics, which constitute the differentiating marks of a distinct type of civilisation. Her civilisation is distinct in important respect from other civilisations of the world. To a very large extent the habits, the dress, the religion, the laws and the learning of the Indians have been what they have themselves evolved and found to be suitable for themselves. There are traces of foreign influence, but they are comparatively small when considered along with the vast panorama of India’s historical development and her civilisation. On the other hand most foreign cultural aspects were totally absorbed and assimilated within the Indian culture so much so that almost all foreign invaders ended up becoming thoroughly Indianised over a period of time. The British were the only exception.

Though India was isolated largely, yet her vast dimensions, variety of peoples, wide differences of climate, great diversities of soil and different physical characteristics not only prevented her from being a stagnant pool but also gave it a continental character. It enabled her to generate the forces of action and reaction, which lead to the development of her civilisation. India is a vast sub-continent in Asia, and the continental character of India is an essential factor in her history.⁵

The geography of India aided the development of her unique civilisation and culture in many ways. Firstly, the Indian subcontinent was endowed with perennial rivers, two of the most distinguished river systems in the world; the Indus and the Ganges, a very fertile land mass, excellent weather, in times when technology did not master it, that aided all human activities, and a vast wealth of forests and wild life. Secondly, all ancient civilisations originated in river basins, where water and lands were aplenty. Of all the locations of ancient civilisations India was easily the best and richest. As a result the growth of civilisation was

⁵ K. M. Panikkar, A Survey of Indian History, p. 1.
exceptional and soon the subcontinent was easily the wealthiest land, peopled by an industrious lot who were culturally and economically very advanced. As anywhere else competition for wealth and resources was part and parcel of society. Many competitive kingdoms inhabited India, each trying to increase its wealth and territory at the cost of the other. This development was natural in a continent, much like the European continent. The competitive nature within subcontinent was obvious, because of the richness of the subcontinent, as beyond the subcontinent's borders there was little that was attractive in terms of wealth or territory. History proves this point, as India became the target of many invaders primarily for its wealth.⁶

A conducive geographical environment, both in terms of terms of climate and vast territory, enabled the development of civilisation and culture that was rich not only materially, but more in terms of intellectual growth, literature, languages, religious enquiry and an exceptionally high level of enquiry into logic and philosophy. Such cultural vibrancy translated into vibrant economic activity, resulting in the development of a vast and sophisticated manufacturing industry, a complex and advanced economic system centred on the self-sufficient village model, and very active international trade in spices, textiles and sophisticated manufactured goods that was heavily in India’s favour. The combination of trade and cultural interaction of intellectuals enabled India to influence far-away lands in the whole of Asia and Indian Ocean region. Greater India, in terms of cultural influence, can be seen scattered all over the world. Alexandria was a port frequented by ancient India’s trading community. Southern India had a vibrant trade in spices and textiles with Rome, so much so that Pliny lamented that Rome’s treasury was being emptied due to trade imbalance with South India. In

⁶ In the run up to the independence, Indian leaders tended to favour the name "Bharat" as against "India" for the new republic. This was because in their opinion "India" evoked a meaning of an acquisition rather than a territory. Though 'India' was conceptually concrete, it was somewhere to be coveted - as an intellectual curiosity, a military pushover and an economic bonanza. To Alexander the Great as to Mahmud of Gazni, to Timur the Lame as to his Moghul descendants, and to Nadir Shah of Persia as to Robert Clive of Plassey, 'India' was a place worth the taking. John Keay, A History of India (London: Harper Collins Publishers, 2001), p. 57.
all, geography, weather, rich resources and a vibrant and intellectually stimulated culture signified the 'Concept of India.'

While the unifying thread of civilisation characterises the 'concept of India', its continental dimension has created diversities that are unique to India. The vastness of the country, the extreme diversity of peoples and the magnitude of its population, professing numerous creeds, speaking a variety of languages and dialects - all these have made difficult to establish an all-India empire. The result was the emergence of an enormous number of smaller kingdoms and principalities that characterised the anarchic systems of states in the sub-continent. However, in spite of the bewildering diversity in the geographical features, the people, religion and language, there is a deep underlying fundamental unity. This is well described by Sir Herbert Risley: "Beneath the manifold diversity of physical and social type, language, custom and religion which strikes the observer in India there can still be discerned a certain underlying uniformity of life from the Himalayas to Cape Comorin."7

Jawaharlal Nehru, in his eloquent 'Discovery of India', asserts that no other country except China can trace back its language and literature, its religious beliefs and rites, its dramatic and social customs through an uninterrupted development of more than 3,000 years. Culturally and economically India was not isolated, as throughout this long period of history she had continuous and living contacts with Persians and Greeks, Chinese and Central Asians and others.8

**Strategic Orientation**

Ancient India was a microcosm of the present day anarchic international system. The vast diversities of India created many political units, each vying for dominance over the rest. At the same time the cultural homogeneity created a strategic perception wherein the sub-continent was the larger world for each of the smaller political units. As a result conflict, competition, and struggle for dominance were all enacted within the continental confines of the sub-continent.

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7 Sir Herbert Risley, *People of India*, p. 299.
This was one of the major factors that limited the strategic orientation of India to the sub-continent. Does that mean India lacked a larger strategic perspective? May be. Although India did have extensive contacts with rest of the world, a power-centred approach to dominate areas outside the Sub-Continent was rare.

Historically the insufficiency of larger strategic perspective was caused primarily by material or economic factors. Until the arrival of the Europeans in large scale, which transformed Indian economy for worse, India was one of the important poles of the distributed world economic system. In effect, India was a world economic power until the 16th - 17th centuries. This is well borne out by many economic statistics (See Tables 1, 2 and 3).

Table 1: Relative Shares of World Manufacturing Output (%)  
1750-1900

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>1750</th>
<th>1800</th>
<th>1830</th>
<th>1860</th>
<th>1880</th>
<th>1900</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Europe as a whole</td>
<td>23.2</td>
<td>28.1</td>
<td>34.2</td>
<td>53.2</td>
<td>61.3</td>
<td>62.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Third World</td>
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<td>67.7</td>
<td>60.5</td>
<td>36.6</td>
<td>20.9</td>
<td>11.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>32.8</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>29.8</td>
<td>19.7</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>6.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>24.5</td>
<td>19.7</td>
<td>17.6</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>19.9</td>
<td>22.9</td>
<td>18.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Habsburg Empire</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>4.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>6.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>German States/Germany</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>13.2</td>
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<td>2.5</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>14.7</td>
<td>23.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
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<td>3.5</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>2.4</td>
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</table>
Table 2: Per capita Levels of Industrialisation – 1750-1900
(Reference to UK in 1900=100)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>1750</th>
<th>1800</th>
<th>1830</th>
<th>1850</th>
<th>1880</th>
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<td>24</td>
<td>35</td>
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<td>16</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>14</td>
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<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
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<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 3: Distribution of World Income 1700-1995 (%)

<table>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>23.1</td>
<td>32.4</td>
<td>13.2</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>10.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>22.6</td>
<td>15.7</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>4.6</td>
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<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>8.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>23.3</td>
<td>26.6</td>
<td>40.3</td>
<td>29.7</td>
<td>27.9</td>
<td>23.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>13.8</td>
<td>21.8</td>
<td>21.8</td>
<td>20.9</td>
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<td>Russia</td>
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<td>4.8</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Right up to the eighteenth century Indian methods of production and of industrial and commercial organisation could stand comparison with those in vogue in any other part of the world. India was a highly developed manufacturing country exporting her manufactured products to Europe and other countries. India had an advanced banking system that was efficient and
well organised throughout the country. Indian merchants and trading system were efficient and well respected the world over. Trade dominated maritime activity, and in the first millennium after Christ many Indian settlements came up in South East Asia and Indian Ocean region. They went on to establish some of the most powerful and long lasting empires in those lands. Contrary to popular perception, India had an advanced ship building industry in earlier times. The ship building industry was flourishing and an Indian firm in India had built one of the flagships of an English admiral during the Napoleonic wars. India was, in fact, as advanced industrially, commercially, and financially as any country prior to the industrial revolution.

Because of a very stable economic management and highly prosperous trade activity, India’s enormous wealth attracted adventurers, nomads and invaders over the centuries. The mountain passes in the northwest became the gateway of entry for these invaders. Considerable number of invasions were arrested or thrown back. Those that came in were mostly assimilated by the Indian culture. The combination of continental size, vast population, a thriving economic system, and political fragmentation was mainly responsible for the evolution of a defensive strategic orientation in India. A sense of security that stemmed from the geography of the sub-continent was also partly responsible for this defensive strategic orientation.

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9 George K. Tanham’s analysis that India’s naval traditions were severely limited is open to debate. It is partly true with respect to the period under the British dominance. British policies throttled and killed the Indian traditional industrial strengths. As Wallerstein’s world economy model shows, the British deliberately marginalised Indian economy to serve as a resource base and fuel for Britain’s Industrial revolution. In this light, a detailed analysis of Indian historical sources will contest the claim that Indians lacked a sense of maritime strategy. The contention of Tanham, based on Thapar and K. M. Panicker, that Indians seldom sailed the ships is questionable. See George K. Tanham, Indian Strategic Thought: An Interpretive Essay (Santa Monica: RAND Publications, 1993), p. 15.


11 Tanham observes: “Indians have long regarded the mountains and seas as protective barriers against outside interference and invasion.” History, however, proves it otherwise. In Tanham’s opinion this dichotomy - the simultaneous sense of security based on geography has failed to keep India secure - is partially offset by India’s ability to accommodate in various ways to the invaders, thus creating and strengthening an evolving culture that plays a crucial role in
Political fragmentation has largely influenced the evolution of Indian military culture and strategic thought. The anarchic system of states in the sub-continent encouraged competition and conflict. There was always a struggle for dominance by one power or the other. Kautilya's strategy, based on his 'mandala' system, governed the relations between states. Such a concept naturally encouraged the existence of many states, some of them very powerful to overwhelm others in a particular region. As a result pre-modern India possessed many states, and unlike China, India was rarely under single unitary governance.

However, there were many empires that held sway over significant areas of the sub-continent. For example, the Mauryas and the Moghuls administered nearly three-fourths of the sub-continent at the peak of their power. The Guptas ruled almost the entire north India for nearly three centuries. In the seventh century A.D. India was ruled by three powerful empires: Harshavardhana held sway for more than forty years in the whole of north India; the powerful Chalukyas ruled the Deccan; and the Pallava empire covered the peninsula and had significant maritime forces. Seventh century India typifies the power struggle amongst various states in the sub-continent. It also indicates the primary reason for India's strategic isolation from the rest of the world.

The political fragmentation that characterised India throughout its history resulted in another major drawback with regard to India's external modern India's identity. A defensive attitude to strategy results from a complex set of factors, of which geography has a significant influence. Tanham, Indian Strategic Thought, pp. 2 - 7.

12 In Kautilya's 'mandala' concept, a state's contiguous neighbours are always seen as enemies and their outer neighbours as friends, etc., in a series of circles. See Kautilya's Arthashastra, translated by Dr. Shamsastry (Mysore: Mysore printing and Publishing House, 1967), pp. 22-24.

13 The seventh century was a period of intense strategic and military activity in the sub-continent. Harsha's rule extended over most of north India. His forces stabilised the northern borders against the Hun invaders. Harsha's expansion to south was halted at the Narmada, where the Chalukyan emperor Pulekesin II defeated him. A mutual understanding established a stable border at the Narmada. The powerful Pallavas southwards halted the Chalukyan drive. The Pallava king Narasimhavarman I defeated Pulekesin II. The Pallava Empire extended into parts of Sri Lanka. The Pallavas possessed significant naval capability. The three empires were home to many visitors, pilgrims and historians, from China and Central Asia.
security. Rarely were the invaders fought by any combined might of the Indian sub-continent. Almost on all occasions smaller kingdoms fought the invaders. A strategy for the defence of the sub-continent did not exist primarily because no unitary power held sway over the entire sub-continent. When major powers held sway over north India, the defence was well organised, and strategies were governed by Chanakyan principles. This was evident in the Mauryan Empire that extended well into present day Iran. So was the case during the Hun invasions. These were successfully tackled when the Gupta Empire was strong. When the empire fragmented the invaders succeeded. This pattern is seen increasingly in the second millennium with the Muslim invaders. While many smaller kingdoms defeated many, these turned out to be insufficient to hold out against repeated invasions.

In the south larger empires such as the Cholas and Vijaynagar held sway for longer time. The Cholas mounted maritime expeditions against South East Asian empires. As Tanham says - "Indians did most of the fighting inside India, only rarely undertaking military ventures outside the sub-continent. The Cholas were the exception, but their adventures occurred nearly 1000 years ago." Ancient India's maritime traditions were significant because they indicated the only area where India did display an outward orientation in its strategy. The Chola expeditions marked the pinnacle of this tradition, which subsequently declined, until the British put paid to any semblance of India's maritime capability, so much so that after independence Panikar said with respect to Indian navy - "a new tradition had to be created." Contrast this with analysis of ancient Indian maritime traditions. Most of the powerful empires of Malay archipelago and Indonesia were established by people of Indian origin. It is obvious, from analysis of cultural, archaeological and architectural influences,

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14 Tanham, Indian Strategic Thought, p. 13. The Chola king Rajendra I's expeditions to Southeast Asia were "unique in the annals of India," according to A. L. Basham, The Wonder That was India (London: Sidgwick & Jackson, 1967), p. 75. Kar states that Rajendra's "naval expeditions form a glorious chapter of our own maritime history. No Indian monarch before and after him even attained such conspicuous success in this field." Lt Col H. C. Kar, Military History of India (Calcutta: Firma KLB Private Ltd., 1980), p. 110.

that Indians sailed extensively on commercial and military expeditions to the east and were responsible for settlements that came up there. As Nehru observes: "From the first century of the Christian era onwards wave after wave of Indian colonists spread east and south-east reaching Ceylon, Burma, Malaya, Java, Sumatra, Borneo, Siam, Cambodia, and Indo-China. There appear to have been four principal waves of colonisation from the first century A. D. to about 900 A. D., and in between there must have been a stream of people going eastwards. But the most remarkable feature of these ventures was that they were evidently organised by the state."\(^{16}\)

The large number of states within the anarchic sub-continent forced states to adopt strategies that were focused on ensuring their survival within the sub-continent, conquest of other states in the area, and ultimately establish hegemony within the sub-continent. This was largely responsible for the inward looking strategic orientation of Indian states. The evolution of India's strategic orientation has been shaped by many complex factors. What stands out clearly is the fact that India could have played a much larger strategic role in the past, but was hampered primarily by political fragmentation, which itself was caused by many complex factors. L. P. Singh's observation serves to highlight this fact. He says: "It is a significant fact of history that India, or the Indian people as a whole, have never fought an invader. It was always a part of India, or a caste or a community within the part involved that fought."\(^{17}\)

India's strategic orientation and security perspective, until the advent of the British, could be summarised as follows:

- A defensive and land centred security perspective, largely conditioned by invasions from the north. As a result majority of Indians strategic perception

\(^{16}\) Nehru, *The Discovery of India*, p. 202. The huge states and empires that developed from the original Indian settlements were essentially naval powers interested in trade and, therefore, in the control of the sea-routes. They came into conflict with each other on the seas. The greatest of these states was the Sailendra Empire, Sri Vijaya, which became the dominant power both on land and on sea in the whole of Malasia by the eighth century. It came into conflict with Chola interests in the tenth century, and invited the wrath of Rajendra Chola. See Nehru, pp. 203 -206.

is strongly oriented towards land security from the north, and lack a larger perception of the country's geo-strategic dimension in the Indian Ocean area.

- After the Cholas, India generally ignored the importance of maritime strategy. By the 16th century Indian maritime capability had declined drastically.
- Inward strategic orientation had led to stagnation of India's military culture and technology. Later stages of Moghul Empire was characterised by drastic decline of military capability. The advent of the Europeans accelerated this process. ¹⁸

**Modern India's Strategic Environment and Orientation**

Modern India, in terms of an integrated nation-state, centralised rule and the spread of nationalism owes this reality to the British rule. Much as India suffered economically, technologically, and socially under the British rule, the one major gain that resulted from the British rule was the integration of India. The British needed to enforce their rule centrally so as to effectively control and exploit their Indian empire. The value of Indian empire in economic terms for England was phenomenal. For a small minority of Indians British rule gave them the opportunity of acquiring western education, understand western concepts of nationalism, freedom, liberty and equality. As this awareness spread it enabled many to re-discover their own history, largely interpreted by westerners. All this gave the much-needed impetus for a rapid growth of nationalism and integration. The most important result of the British period in India was the disappearance of political fragmentation and the emergence of a political fact called India.

**Strategy Under the British**

By creating infrastructure for unified administration of India, the British unconsciously sowed the seeds of a modern nation-state. In other words the

¹⁸ As opposed to the decline of Indian military culture and technology in the second millennium, ancient India was famous for her weapons of war. Alexander fought some of the toughest battles of his life in India, and almost lost his life on couple of occasions. India was famous, especially for the quality of her steel, her swords and daggers. In the fifth century B. C. a large body of Indian troops, cavalry and infantry, accompanied the Persian army to Greece. For more on this see Nehru, The Discovery of India, pp. 114-115.
British imparted to India - 'A defined territory; a national armed forces; uniform philosophy of jurisprudence, a common civil service, a judiciary.' They created a vast number of institutions and organisations that go to make up the basics of a modern nation-state. For example, they conducted extensive and perhaps the first detailed surveys of India. They conducted censuses and published highly informative gazetteers of the districts that they administered. They introduced railways and telegraphs that were instrumental in integrating this vast continental land. All these measures helped develop, for the first time, a larger, outward looking strategic orientation amongst the educated population of India.

As the British consolidated their Indian possessions, the sub-continent became the centrepiece of their strategy. They recognised that for the defence of India, strategically, adjacent lands were vital. Thus, preventing ingress into India became a strategic objective. Hence their strategies were designed to meet this objective. This explained their focus on Tibet, the Great game, Afghanistan, Burma, the Indian ocean, Russia and China. Thus the British formed a strategy of creating buffer zones around India to keep other major powers, Russia and China in particular, away. The security of the Indian possession was thought to be dependent on a sphere of influence up to and around the natural barriers of the Hindukush and the Himalayas. To give effect to such a policy the British created a system of buffer states in Persia, Afghanistan, Nepal, Tibet, Sikkim, Bhutan and Burma. Fundamentally this was no different from the strategy followed by the Chinese emperors. The middle kingdom concept revolved around the security provided by the creation of buffer states. The buffer state concept evolved in the Asian cultural context as opposed to the European, Westphalian territorial concept. Much later, in the 20th century, the Westphalian territorial concept has created boundaries inherent with conflict rather than peace.

Britain, a great sea power by now, realised the importance of maritime security for India. They evolved a maritime strategy for the defence of India, but excluded any Indian participation in this strategy. As Tanham observes: "they evolved an Indian maritime strategy subsumed under a British Global strategy to gain and maintain supremacy of all the oceans and to control the world's major...

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19 Jaswant Singh, Defending India (Bangalore: Macmillan India Ltd., 1999), p. 18.
choke points, especially those leading to the Indian Ocean. British domination of the high seas turned the Indian Ocean into a British lake.”

By the end of the nineteenth century Britain was the foremost global power. As a status-quo power its strategies were now designed to protect its territories and dominion. Its strategy for the defence of India was linked to its global strategy. This strategy was entirely done at London. Thus, for the entire period of British rule, policy about the defence of India and its external relations had been the preserve, total and exclusive, of the British alone, and that too from Whitehall. No Indian was involved in conceptualising foreign and defence policies; or even in subsequent strategic planning. Therefore, at the time of independence India’s appreciation of its strategic environment and role was not fully developed. Its leaders did not have the background experience of meeting strategic challenges. In the absence of such experience, they resorted to theoretical, moralistic, and idealistic visualisation of international relations.

**Independent India and Geo-strategic Realities**

In the 90 years since the British Crown took control of the Indian empire from the erstwhile East India Company in 1857, Indian strategic thought had crystallised and gravitated considerably towards viewing India as a unified sub-continental nation-state. Although the country’s infrastructure, industrial capability, literacy level of the people and the state of its agriculture were at its lowest level ever in its 3500 years of history, its potential as a great state of the world was visualised by visionaries like Gandhi, Vivekananda, Nehru and Subhas Chandra Bose. Nehru was clear in his mind that India, with its vast resources and

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20 The British gained control of the Suez Canal and established a base at Aden, which together gave them control of the most direct route from Europe, the most likely source of naval threat to India. In addition, by establishing suzerainty over Malaya, and establishing Singapore, they gained control of the vital Strait of Malacca, the most important passage into the Indian Ocean from the Far East. Their control over Cape of Good Hope in South Africa completed their dominant maritime strategy in the Indian ocean, See Tanham, *Indian Strategic Thought*, p. 20.
population, 'will always make a difference in the world...Fate', he said, 'has marked us for bigger things.'

The British withdrawal from India was not, as is often asserted, an act of high statesmanship. At the end of the Second World War a near bankrupt Britain could not have held on to India without outside help. Under the new spirit of freedom, encouraged by the US and in need of American investment to re-start its war-ravaged economy, Britain now found India too hot to handle. 'It was no longer in a position to hold India in bondage; its intelligence network in India had in any case been warning of great disorder and public upheaval to follow if India did not gain independence.' Much against their wishes, the British were forced by geo-strategic realities to withdraw from India, the 'Jewel in their Crown.'

The collapse of the British Empire and the rise of the Bi-polar international system were the most significant geo-strategic developments at the end of the Second World War. It is to the credit of the British that they transformed the collapse of their empire into a sophisticated transformation of the international geo-strategic landscape. Accepting the reality that loss of the Indian empire would take the most important economic resource that sustained their empire, the British refashioned their grand strategy to accept the reality of the new super powers and bandwagon with the United States. In this they managed to retain the trappings of a global power well into the twentieth century, although this is now diminishing at a rapid rate.

The result of all these events was the British foresight in visualising the potential of a vast Indian sub-continent as a single nation-state. Along with China this surely would transform into a global power, given its economic and human resources and potential. The outcome was the creation of a situation that called for partition of the sub-continent, very much in line with the strategy of 'divide

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22 Jaswant Singh, Defending India, p. 21.
and rule’ that the British practised successfully to rule India for nearly two centuries.

The partition of India created an artificial divide of a homogeneous civilisation and culture. Power struggle was the root cause of partition. The British exploited this underlying reason, and used all instruments including narrow communalism and religion to accelerate this artificial divide.\textsuperscript{23} The partition of India and the dawn of the Cold War coincided in time. The Cold War politics helped accentuate this artificial divide, and thus change security environment of the sub-continent forever. As Aung San, the President of Burma, now Myanmar, was to remark on 4 June 1947, the day after Mountbatten announced the partition plan: ‘A divided India augurs ill not only for the Indian people but for all Asia and the whole world.’\textsuperscript{24}

Many Indian strategists and leaders saw through that the partition was intended to marginalise the Sub-continent and embroil them in local strategic issues. Nehru thought partition would not survive very long, and that subsequent integration was inevitability.\textsuperscript{25} He was wrong for he did not visualise the impact of the world’s strategic environment and the Cold War. As a result, free India’s strategic perceptions, in the initial years after independence, were not entirely realistic.

\textbf{Strategic Orientation in the Decade after Independence}

India as an independent nation-state is only 67 years old. This is a very small time frame in the evolution of a nation-state from coming into existence to its emergence as a significant power. That India has managed to establish the essentials of great power in a short time validates the essential argument that India’s civilisational and cultural depth, along with its geopolitical size, is a major

\textsuperscript{23} This Western strategy has been a familiar instrument throughout the twentieth century. Religion was the most important tool that was exploited by the west in their strategy to defeat former Soviet Union in Afghanistan. Much to their dismay, the monster that they nourished has turned on them as seen in the events that have unfolded in Iraq, Afghanistan and West Asia.

\textsuperscript{24} Jaswant Singh, \textit{Defending India}, p. 24.

\textsuperscript{25} For Nehru, the idea of Pakistan was a “fantasy,” and “the loss of certain parts of India a temporary phenomenon which would soon right itself.” See Stephen P. Cohen, \textit{India: Emerging Power} (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2001), p. 19. See also Jaswant Singh, \textit{Defending India}, pp. 28-33.
contributing factor to its great power status. All that required to translate India into a vibrant nation-state was education, awareness and the spread of nationalism.

The concept of Indian nationalism started a little over hundred years earlier, and the Indian nationalists worked hard to create the concept of a modern Indian nation-state. The consolidation of this concept has been an ever-continuing challenge to Indian leadership since independence. A very large level of illiteracy, poverty and regional divisions under the surface of nationalism at independence, contributed to the problems. The first few decades of independent India, therefore, has been characterised by the continuing efforts to consolidate the concept of the Indian nation-state in its citizens. That this has succeeded largely is evident in the unity displayed by the country in its four wars. Rapid economic growth in the nineties, increasing literacy levels, and a growing strategic elite have all contributed to greater understanding of India’s geo-strategic importance within the country.

The security strategies, however, are yet to break out of the box India had put itself into in the early years. An aversion to the use of force, in the early years was largely responsible for a defensive security orientation. Absence of any military experience amongst the top leaders contributed significantly to a mindset that harped on non-violence and idealism in international relations, and ignored the reality of power politics for survival and growth. India’s freedom struggle contributed in no small measure to this mindset. India, under the leadership of Mahatma Gandhi, chose the strategy of non-violence to achieve her freedom from the yoke of British rule. The evolution of this doctrine by the Mahatma and the reasons for its eventual development and success are unique and significant when compared to other independence struggles in history. However noble this doctrine was, it had its negative impact on the strategic culture of this nation after independence. All the leaders thrown up by the non-violent revolution, Gandhi and Nehru included, had a thorough grasp of world history, which unambiguously demonstrated the relationship between policy and power. Yet this knowledge was discarded in favour of a doctrine evolved as a result of a few decades of personal experience, which had achieved a notable, but as a basis for future action an unproven success. A study of the realities and the
machinations of international power politics and more especially the employment of power in the furtherance of policy were incompatible with the doctrine of truth and non-violence. Thus India’s greatest strength at the time of the country's independence became its greatest weakness since the time of independence.

Added to this weakness was the lack of India’s integration into the global economy. While Nehru’s emphasis on the need for rapid industrialisation was right, his fascination with socialism was largely responsible for the uncontrolled expansion of Public Sector Units in every segment of economic activity. By the 1960s it insulated the Indian economy from the competitive benefits of market economy and the world economy. As a result India was deprived of the benefits of FDI and inflow of technology. It also resulted in widespread corruption in state controlled institutions and the prevalence of the infamous licence quota raj. Lack of economic power was the biggest weakness of India right up to the early 1990s. As the late K Subrahmanyanam observes “The licence permit quota raj, which got entrenched after Nehru, was partly the result of the then prevailing international strategic environment and partly the beginning of organised corruption in our electoral politics and top down control of our political parties”.26

The above reasons were largely responsible for the evolution of a defensive strategic outlook, which was not in conformity with the country’s power and potential. Historical evolution, as seen earlier, was not a small contribution to this mindset. This had a grave result: that of neglecting the development of military power commensurate with its size, threat perceptions and potential. Nehru’s cousin and ambassador, B. K. Nehru observes: "It was in fact one of the greatest mistakes of those involved in our foreign policy, including the whole lot of our foreign service officers, that they thought that the respect in which they were held abroad was because they were Indians. This was not true at all; the realists of the world respected (and respect) only power and India had none.”27 Stephen Cohen describes the strategic culture at the time of

27 B. K. Nehru’s correspondence with Jaswant Singh, Defending India, p. 25.
independence. He observes, as many others have done, that 'Indian strategic tradition emphasised defence, rather than imperial expansion.'\textsuperscript{28} As a result Indian leadership did not favour use of force across India's borders. This attitude showed up in the ineffective performance in international relations. One agrees with Cohen when he says that few Indian leaders could match the British in their experience with the application of force and its relationship to statecraft and diplomacy. The non-violent freedom movement had its after effects in post-independent India. "The real Indian experts on defence and military matters were politically marginalised after independence or went to Pakistan."\textsuperscript{29} The net result was a complete neglect of development of the instruments of power; military and military technology. On the other hand the major powers focused on the development of the military-industrial complex as an essential factor of national power.

**Effect of Regional and International Factors on Strategic Orientation**

There emerged in 1947 a number of newly independent nations on the natural frontiers of the sub-continent.\textsuperscript{30} The major upheaval was the partition of the sub-continent into India and Pakistan. This post-colonial settlement was not only to engender a highly problematic physical security environment, but also a series of ethnic and religious anomalies that trouble the security of the sub-continent to this day. The partition, through which Pakistan was created on the basis of Islamic identity, disrupted many of the economic, social and political ties which had until that point been vital features of the political geography of the sub-continent. Even Nepal and Sri Lanka, which had distinct political identities, were linked to the rest of the sub-continent by common peoples, religion, culture and economic ties.

Cultural homogeneity, however, did not prevent the age-old problem of fragmentation, accentuated by partition, to raise its ugly head soon after Independence. Unlike the smaller neighbours, India was faced with the major

\textsuperscript{29} Ibid., p. 19.
\textsuperscript{30} Between 1946-48 India, Pakistan, Burma and Ceylon (SriLanka) became independent. In addition Nepal, Tibet, Bhutan and Sikkim became free of obligations as British protectorates.
task of integrating many of the fractured principalities into the union. The major examples were Hyderabad, Junagadh and Kashmir. In the immediate aftermath of independence Indian security planners had to consider not only external threats, but also had to tackle the onerous task of national integration. In 1947 cultural and regional identities were often far stronger than the sense of Indian national identity, and welding together of the diverse regions of India into one political unit for the first time in its history was bound to be profoundly complex and needed a clear display of internal power on the part of the new nation. With great foresight and strategic brilliance, using coercion as well as force, India's home minister, Sardar Vallabhai Patel, successfully integrated all the princely states into the Union.

But the creation of Pakistan on the basis of its Islamic faith raised in sharp relief the question of the political status of India’s many different religious communities. Secularism, enshrined in India's constitution, and the guaranteeing of rights to all religious communities to practice their beliefs and social customs, were an essential precondition of their acceptance of a unitary state. Pakistan's creation was in contrast to the fundamental basis of Indian society over thousands of years, which is tolerance to all religions of the world. So right from independence India was weighed down with a sub-continental focus of a security problem as a result of the partition. However, viewed from a strategic and long-term perspective, secularism is a strategic imperative, as it provides fundamental strength to this otherwise complex nation-state.

Creation of Pakistan adversely impacted on India's strategic prospects in many ways. Firstly, it created a state whose foundation was laid on the basis of insecurity against India. This implies that Pakistan, as long as it exists, will always consider India as its most serious threat to its survival, and this aspect, in turn, has created a perennial threat to India's interests. Secondly and more importantly, 'it upset the natural geographical unity of the sub-continent by creating a new military threat, now arising from within, in addition to those dangers traditionally seen as emerging from without.' 31 Thirdly, it complicated India's integration efforts by encouraging minorities and separatist groups to

resort to insurgency and terrorism. Lastly, Pakistan has continued to challenge the natural hegemony of India in the sub-continent, and as a result India's resources were locked up in efforts for achieving hegemony in the sub-continent, rather than using those resources to pursue Asian and global role.³²

On the international system the emergence of the bipolar system and the Cold War created enormous pressure on the new nation. Nehru's non-aligned strategy during the Cold War period was a strategic masterstroke. It signalled certain fundamental strategic imperatives: a strong will to retain sufficient strategic space and freedom; a desire to focus on immediate priorities of development rather than get involved in ideological battles; provide a leadership to those countries with similar problems of development; achieve significant international voice in spite of the lack of economic or military power; and finally, the fierce desire for strategic freedom was indicative of the long term goal of achieving great power status. Thus at the very start India had decided that it would prefer to retain its strategic freedom even at the cost of significant aid through alliance with a major power. Its policies on technological development, particularly in the nuclear and space fields, is clearly indicative of this strategy, which has paid rich dividends.

In 1949 China became a communist republic. In 1950 China occupied Tibet, thus taking away a major buffer state that had existed between the two countries. This was to have major strategic significance on India's security and strategic environment thereafter. Nehru compounded the issue when he announced India’s recognition of Chinese suzerainty over Tibet. This was a major blunder that has adversely affected India's interests ever since. The Chinese did not show any such supportive consideration for India. On the other hand within the same decade they began serious incursions into Indian Territory. Nehru’s

³² Rafiq Zakaria points out that partition occurred due to narrow interests of the political leadership in the subcontinent, which was exploited by the British to create a permanent India-Pakistan conflict. He observes: “The land, which had been one unit for more than a thousand years with the two communities living and working together and contributing richly to its composite culture, was divided; it was the most tragic blow, struck at its very heart. It happened because, as Dr. Ramohan Ruia, pointed out, a tired, and an ageing leadership, hungry for power, surrendered to the subtle intrigues of Mountbatten.” Rafiq Zakaria, “The Price of Partition,” Indian Express, Pune, 14 August 1997.
China policy turned out to be a major disaster that finally led to the humiliating military reverse against the Chinese in 1962. Within the next decade China linked its Xinjiang province to Tibet by roads through occupied Aksai Chin in Ladakh, thus precipitating an intractable border problem between India and China.

As if to prove the doomsday prophets, Pakistan attacked Kashmir within few months of independence. The Pakistani army assisted the tribal irregulars of NWFP to invade the state of Jammu and Kashmir, and overran nearly half the state. Although India's contraction was slow to start, primarily due to delay in formal accession of the state to the Indian Union, the Indian armed forces were well on their way to recovering the lost areas completely. Inexplicably, Nehru decided at this stage to refer the dispute to the United Nations. Nehru's handling of the Kashmir dispute showed naivety and the lack of understanding of the ruthless nature of the international system. Britain played no small role in precipitating and complicating the Kashmir issue. All this was done entirely to serve Britain's interests. The Kashmir issue is unresolved since then.33

**India's Geo-strategic Relevance and Challenges**

If India's progress was plagued by economic, technological, political, social, and security problems in the early years she has certainly overcome some of her problems today in the second decade of the 21st century. Today India can be seen more likely to achieve its long expected potential for wielding power in economic, military, technological and political terms. The 2014 general elections

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33 In an excellent study C Dasgupta brings out the naivety of India and Pakistan in handling the Kashmir issue. Britain's dubious role is well exposed in this study. Dasgupta brings out how Britain manoeuvred with Pakistan to lead Nehru to wrong decisions. The study reveals that Nehru is hardly to be blamed. What is worse is the fact that at the time of independence both countries allowed their main national instrument of power, their armed forces, to be controlled by British Officers, whose loyalties were to Britain. India went one step further by asking Lord Mountbatten to function as the Governor General, who also headed the all important defence committee. Mountbatten's role in the Kashmir issue has grievously harmed India's national interests. Thus, India's decision to retain British leaders, including the Governor General, to run the affairs of independent India was a case of serious strategic incompetence. See C. Dasgupta, *War and Diplomacy in Kashmir: 1947 - 48* (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 2002), pp. 200-210.
clearly demonstrated that India is the largest and the most vibrant democracy in the world. Her rapid population growth is now well under control, and the rate of growth has reduced significantly. Some of the southern states of India are on the verge of achieving stable, replacement levels of population growth in the near future. With rapidly growing educational facilities, and a vast media that has penetrated every rural corner of India, awareness among people is growing rapidly. Modern technologies are enabling rapid rise in education levels. The large Indian population, with its demographic dividend of the youth bulge, could become a massive human resource asset with efficient and farsighted governance. India’s rise as a major power and its geo-strategic relevance should be seen along with the challenges it faces for its growth in economic, military and technological capability.

**Economic and Technological Power**

Economic strength and control or mastery over core technologies are critical requirements of a major power. Nehru, well aware of history and international relations, was acutely conscious of India’s need to catch up on the missed industrial revolution so as to not only improve the well being of the people, but to translate India into a world power, industrially and technologically. With great foresight he established, what he called the temples of modern India, heavy industries in all core sectors. The initial state controlled activities in core sectors, including defence manufactures, were designed to create the industrial and technological capabilities required to sustain both defence and development goals with minimum external assistance. Particular attention was paid to high technology, atomic energy and space sectors, which were 'salient for the purposes of power politics.'

34 Although state enterprises bridled with corruption and poor efficiency, they were necessary in the initial stages, primarily from the point of view of establishing core competencies. The advantages of this strategy was seen in 1997, when India was unaffected by the economic meltdown that ravaged Southeast Asia. Economic liberalisation, set in

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motion since 1991, has brought about significant growth in Indian economy.\(^{35}\) Nehru's policy of establishing institutions of higher learning such as the Indian institutes of Technology have become world class centres that have turned out professionals sought all over the world. These and many other similar institutions have pioneered the growth of technological expertise in the country.

One of the fundamental requirements for any state is to achieve self-sufficiency in food production. India, whose agriculture had fallen to the depths of low productivity and lack of technology, had grown spectacularly, through green revolution, in the 1970s and 80s. Since then India has been able to achieve self-sufficiency in food production. From a country that imported food to tide over drought situation in the 60s, India today has buffer stock of more than 35 million tonnes. Subsequent drought years in the 80s or 90s did not attract any attention because no food was imported. The 1990s have seen the diversification of agriculture into export orientation and food processing industries. Today India has the potential to dominate the world food-processing market.

Indian technological growth has been impressive in the last decade and a half. India's strength in software has not only allowed it to dominate world market, but has given it the opportunity to leapfrog certain intermediate stages to achieve rapid progress. For example computerisation is already accelerating education. India has set up significant capabilities in strategic areas such as avionics, communications, satellites etc. The infrastructure is being revamped to world-class systems. Given the country's size this would need enormous investment in capital and time. Indian stock market is one of the biggest in the world, in terms of number of registered companies. India's GDP has grown on an average at 5-6% a year over the two decades. In PPP terms Indian economy became the third largest in 2013. India's economy size, as of 2013, is $4.8 trillions. In dollar terms the Indian economy was $1.8 trillion strong. A large and a fast growing economy, vast pool of technical manpower and a huge middle

\(^{35}\) Gurcharan Das analyses - "although the reforms after 1991 have been slow, hesitant, and incomplete, they have set in motion a process of profound change in the Indian society. It is as important a turning point as Deng's revolution in China in December 1978. See Gurcharan Das, *India Unbound* (New Delhi: Penguin Books, 2000), Introduction, p. xi.
class signifying a vast market makes India a major economic and technological power in the making.

There is a large room for improvement as India's per capita income is low, and its human index performance is low. But these would take time primarily due to large populations. At the national level, however, Indian economy is huge. Although India did not achieve those astounding rates of growth like China’s, nevertheless her GDP has been increasing steadily and the growth is more even as compared to China. In the longer term India’s steady growth of 6-7% would make enormous difference. Having liberalised her economy after four decades of being a command economy, India now has the advantage of both. Her economy has built-in resilience, which makes it fairly insular from large adverse changes in the world economy, while her liberalisation now allows the strength to function effectively in the global economy. Her economic parameters, in terms of GDP growth pattern, increasing exports, growing consumption, rising reserves of foreign exchange, indicate a very healthy and steady development pattern (Table 4 and 5). While Per Capita income will rise only in a gradual manner, the overall strength of the economy is high enough to compete with other major powers. The implication of all this is that by 2025 the size of the Indian economy will impact on the international system and on power politics in a major way.

Table 4: India's GDP Growth and Macro Economic Trends

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>-0.9</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>-2.4</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>0.7</td>
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<td>Industry</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>11.6</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>6.4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Services</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>9.6</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total GDP</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>6.6</td>
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Table 5: External Economic Indicators

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Export Growth (%)</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>11.6</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>2015</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>--------------------------------</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Economic Growth</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>India’s GNP</td>
<td>$1.2 trillion</td>
<td>$3.7 trillion</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of Japan’s GNP</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>82%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of China’s GNP</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Military Capital Stock</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>India’s Total</td>
<td>$79 billion</td>
<td>$333 billion</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of Japan’s Stock</td>
<td>79%</td>
<td>204%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of China’s Stock</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>79%</td>
<td></td>
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Military Power

India’s armed forces are the fourth largest in the world. India has been spending less than 2 to 2.4% of its GDP on defence, one of the lowest in Asia. Considering India’s economic capability this figure could easily be increased to 3 to 4%.
Table 7: India's Defence Spending

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Current Rs (Crores)</th>
<th>Constant 1980-81 Rs (Crores)</th>
<th>% age of GDP</th>
<th>% age of Total Govt Exp (TGE)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1987-88</td>
<td>11,967.49</td>
<td>6881.31</td>
<td>3.59</td>
<td>10.67</td>
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<tr>
<td>1988-89</td>
<td>13,341.02</td>
<td>7097.42</td>
<td>3.37</td>
<td>10.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989-90</td>
<td>14,416.00</td>
<td>7092.76</td>
<td>3.17</td>
<td>11.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990-91</td>
<td>15,426.48</td>
<td>6833.93</td>
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<td>1991-92</td>
<td>16,347.04</td>
<td>6309.96</td>
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<td>1992-93</td>
<td>17,581.79</td>
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<td>2.49</td>
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<tr>
<td>1993-94</td>
<td>21,844.73</td>
<td>7099.54</td>
<td>2.49</td>
<td>8.45</td>
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<tr>
<td>1994-95</td>
<td>23,245.23</td>
<td>6857.34</td>
<td>2.24</td>
<td>7.73</td>
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<tr>
<td>1995-96</td>
<td>26,856.29</td>
<td>7331.77</td>
<td>2.21</td>
<td>7.89</td>
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<tr>
<td>1996-97</td>
<td>29,505.08</td>
<td>7582.81</td>
<td>2.09</td>
<td>7.68</td>
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<td>1997-98</td>
<td>35,277.99</td>
<td>8572.55</td>
<td>2.26</td>
<td>7.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998-99</td>
<td>41,200.00</td>
<td>9599.60</td>
<td>2.33</td>
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<tr>
<td>1999-2000</td>
<td>45,694.00</td>
<td>10,372.54</td>
<td>2.31</td>
<td>N/A</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Source: Jasjit Singh, “India’s Defence Spending,” IDSA, p. 94.

In the last decade and a half the defence expenditure as a percentage of GDP has come down from 2.31% in 2000 to 1.79% in 2013. India’s defence spending is relatively low at $34 billion in 2013. In comparison China spent $122 billion, Japan $51 billion, Russia $68 billion and the USA $600 billion. Pakistan spent 6.5% of its GDP on defence as compared to India's 1.79%. In Stephen P. Cohen’s analysis India’s low spending is offset by certain advantages. "The low wages and generally high quality of Indian armed forces magnify the effect of India’s mere $14 billion (1998) in defence spending. Indian armed forces are large, and if one were to add the considerably large Para-military forces, it would put the total at nearly two million, just behind China. Indian air power is significant, and the fourth largest in the world. Indian Air Force is qualitatively far ahead of the numerically larger Chinese air force. The Indian navy, although smaller as compared to China, is the most effective naval force in the Indian Ocean region. Indian ships range throughout the Indian Ocean, paying regular calls on ports in East Africa and Southeast Asia."
The importance of mastering strategic technologies has not been lost on the Indian leadership. India’s scientist President Dr. A. P. J. Abdul Kalam has emphatically argued India’s need to establish firm control over certain core technologies, so as to ensure India’s security and strategic flexibility. India has already built and is continuing significant R & D capabilities in core areas such as electronics, space, nuclear science, and the material sciences. As Stephen Cohen observes: "though India may be the weakest of the great states (for now) and still unable to do some great things, it is capable of some surprises. India will have one foot in the 'developing' world and one in the world of advanced economic and military powers for the indefinite future."37

**Nuclear Capability**

Since the end of the Second World War it has become axiomatic that great powers will necessarily have to be nuclear weapon states. India declared itself a nuclear weapon state after its series of 1998 Pokhran tests. The Indian governments announcement of 4th January 2003, which officially brings into existence India’s new Strategic Forces Command is a signal to the rest of the world that India’s nuclear weapon status is an irreversible fact. Nehru was a realist as far as the issue of developing India’s strategic capabilities. With significant foresight Nehru laid the foundations for India to acquire its own nuclear and space capabilities. K Subrahmanyam explains the logic of India’s overt transition into nuclear weapon status: "The Indian security experience over the last five decades, including the ultimatum from China, and the entry of the American nuclear-powered carrier into the Bay of Bengal during the Indo-Pakistani War of 1971, makes the exercise of the nuclear weapons option imperative."

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38 Karnd brings out the realism behind Nehru’s critical strategic decisions with respect to nuclear technology in his voluminous study. See Bharat Karnad, Nuclear Weapons and Indian Security: The Realist Foundations of Strategy (Delhi: Macmillan India Limited, 2002), pp. 163-280.
Space and Missile Capability

The most important instruments of great power status in the 21st century are already identified as space and missile capability. India's space capability has matured significantly. Its capability to launch Geo-stationary satellites heralds the achievement of a major capability. India today has entered the exclusive club of countries that market space launch capabilities commercially. Strategically this capability provides a country the ability to exploit space for military purposes as well. Thus India now possesses the capability to design, develop and deploy missiles of all sizes and capabilities. With Agni series of missiles already well underway, India today has the ability to field IRBMs up to 3000 km ranges. This means India's ballistic missile capability to cover most of Asia and the Indian Ocean region is already well established. Coupled with its significant surveillance and communications satellites, Indian space and missile power has the ability to impact on Asia, in particular, and the world in general. When this is viewed with its nuclear capability India can be seen as a significant space and nuclear power.

But the impact of space and nuclear capability for national power is even greater. Indian space programme has the potential to increase its economic relevance manifold, and allow India to leapfrog many stages of development. Nuclear power is an important requirement for India's rapidly growing energy sector.

India's Strategic Effectiveness – Pre 1991

India's non-alignment strategy, Nehruvian socialism, Command economy model, and an inward looking foreign policy – all combined to make India's role quite ineffective in the international arena. While the NAM started well for India in the 1950s, the movement started to lose its clout following a series of events; the chief among them was India's humiliating military reverse in the hands of China in 1962. As one of the analysts put it, Nehru's foreign policy based “on global influence without military power” was shattered and India's influence
among the new non-aligned nations were also affected. In the aftermath of the war, India abandoned its cherished non-alignment policy, cast off the Menon defence strategy, which had left the Indian Army helpless before the Chinese invasion; and set out a comprehensive program of military modernisation with the help of the U.S and the Soviet Union. While attempting to retain its strategic freedom during the Cold War, India’s real practice focused on serving its national interests. The result was the strong Indo-Soviet military and strategic partnership that developed in the 60s and 70s. Its highpoint was the Indo-Soviet friendship treaty signed in August 1971 as a prelude to the Indo-Pak War of Dec 1971 to liberate Bangladesh.

When Moscow occupied Afghanistan in 1980, contrary to its expectations India’s support was not forthcoming. While not supporting the U.S. led activities in Afghanistan, India’s decisions were driven solely by its national interest. This was amply demonstrated in its actions in Maldives and Sri Lanka in the 1980s. The Cold War’s bipolar stability provided a reasonable level of success and reliability of India’s national strategy. While the official Indian establishment believed that India managed the Cold War bipolarity very well, many post-Cold War analysts are fairly critical – “Thus while it lasted the Cold War had provided an ideally stable environment; it allowed India to play an exaggerated role on the international stage for many years, where it could moralise about the inequalities of bipolarity and the “Cold War mentality” while still benefiting materially and politically from its ties to both the Soviet Union and the USA.

**Geo-strategic and Geo-political Importance**

During the Cold War, the bipolar division of the world had marginalized the importance of India and the Indian Ocean. End of the Cold War has brought about many significant changes. A combination of events; collapse of the bipolar system, rise of free market economies, globalisation, and aerospace revolution

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encompassing revolutions in computers, communications and media; has resulted in enormous growth rates of Asian economies. After almost 300 years the Asian continent is now well poised to overtake rest of the world in terms of economic and military power. As Paul Dibb observes, by 2010 the world power balance, in terms of economic and military power will certainly shift to Asia, as the Great powers of the 21st century would be China, Japan, India, Russia (all Asian powers), besides the USA and the European Union.

Table 8: Shifting economic power in Asia, Europe and North America

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Asia</th>
<th>Europe</th>
<th>North America</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GNP</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>1,871</td>
<td>3,591</td>
<td>3,350</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>4,511</td>
<td>5,583</td>
<td>5,323</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Change</td>
<td>141</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Per Capita GNP</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>922</td>
<td>8,674</td>
<td>11,627</td>
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<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>1,539</td>
<td>12,140</td>
<td>14,481</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Change</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Note: By 2010, Asia’s share of world output is predicted to be more than 70% of North America’s and Europe’s output combined. Estimates derived from the work by the Australia-Japan Research Centre at the Australian National University.

China, India, Japan, ASEAN countries and East Asian countries are economies that are becoming very large and will have significant impact on the world economy. By 2015 China is likely to be the largest economy in Asia, well ahead of Japan.42 Similarly Indian economy would have developed considerably to become a major economy in the world. In the Indian Ocean region and ASEAN

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42 Hamish MacRae observes: “It is difficult to see any set of circumstances where-measured in a sensible way-China will not be well on its way to becoming the world’s largest economy by 2020.” See his The World in 2020 (London: Harper Collins, 1994), pp. 253-255. Francis Pike makes a similar assessment to say that China’s economy will overtake that of the USA in the year 2023. “Mandate from Heaven: China will wear the Crown,” Asian Age, Bombay, 22 July 1997. By arrangement with Spectator.
region, India would be the largest economy. The importance of developing extensive economic linkages in this region cannot be lost on either side. Just as it is important for India to establish extensive trade with nations of this region, it is equally critical and very beneficial for them to access the Indian market.

In addition, India’s Geo-strategic location in the Indian Ocean would be of great significance in the 21st century world where Asian balance of power would be of critical relevance. India sits astride some of the most crucial sea-lanes of the world. Indian Ocean is home to nearly 70% of the maritime traffic of the world. India’s own maritime interests are enormous. Historically, India did not lie in the middle of the trade routes involving China and the West, or China and the East, or Europe and West Asia, Japan and Asia. But India itself was the source of extensive economic resources and trade in the past. India’s maritime trade with China, West Asia, Africa, Europe and Southeast Asia was extensive. Because India itself was the centre of most trade activity in the past, India’s geo-strategic importance, both for Indian Ocean Region and Asia as a whole was significant. The British understood this and evolved their strategies with Continental India’s defence as the centrepiece of their strategy. That relevance has only increased in the 21st century, with increased strategic relevance of the Gulf and Southeast Asia.

The overbearing projection of the Indian peninsula into the Indian Ocean, and its strategically located offshore island chains provide natural geographical advantage and strategic prominence. India’s Lakshadweep islands in the Arabian Sea dominate the 9°-Channel through which an enormous value of cargo ships transit daily. Similarly the Andaman-Nicobar islands are strategically situated to dominate the vital Malacca Straits. Every day about 300 ships traverse the Indian Ocean. On an average, 40 super tankers pass through the nine-degree channel daily. Annually about $300 billion worth of oil pass through the Straits of Malacca. Japan has the most vital stake and its estimated trade

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43 Pike’s analysis of India’s growth is interesting – “By 2051 India’s aggregate GDP will also have exceeded that of the United States. Of course, if one assumes a rapprochement with its erstwhile inhabitants in Pakistan and rapidly developing Bangladesh (now about 135 million people each), then the economic power of the Indian sub continental block will over haul the United States much sooner.” Ibid.
flowing through this region is worth about $260 billion, which includes 80% of its oil imports from the Gulf. The value of Chinese trade passing through the Malacca Straits is of the order of US $100 billion, and her trade and oil demands are growing at the rate of approximately 10% per annum.

With a very long coastline and large chains of island territories, India has an extensive area of EEZ (2.01 million Sq. Km). Indian Ocean is almost entirely warm water ocean, and this makes it a vitally important area of enormous resources for economic exploitation. In the 21st century this could become an area of serious competition and conflict. The domination of the Indian Ocean through economic co-operation and military power projection is an important strategic imperative for India in the 21st century.

India’s geo-strategic relevance assumes great importance when various parameters of its national power are considered. India is already the third largest economy in the world44, a major consumer of energy, one of the fastest and largest growing market, a major manufacturing and trading nation and a major military power. All this makes India’s strategic frontiers extend well beyond its geographical frontiers. India’s strategic frontiers, therefore, extend from the Gulf to the Malacca straits, covering the entire Indian Ocean, and extending north, well into East and Central Asia.

**India’s Strategic Challenges: Environment, Threats and Opportunities**

An analysis of India’s strategic environment and threats must begin with its immediate environment. Too often scholars tend to restrict India’s environment to the subcontinent. Terming it as South Asia. Nothing could be more wrong.

**South Asia - A Misnomer**

The term South Asia is of recent origin. It denotes the Indian subcontinent, which has India as its massive centre and all other six countries

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44 World Bank report released in March 2014 has stated that India has overtaken Japan to become the third largest economy in the world on PPP terms. Its GDP, calculated by the PPP method, is $4.8 trillion. The largest is USA at $15.3 trillion, while China at second is $12.3 trillion. The IMF report released at the same time has pegged India’s GDP in dollar terms at $1.8 trillion, in 12th place.
(Pakistan, Nepal, Bhutan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Maldives) scattered around it. Historically, culturally and geographically South Asia is more of a single unit. The term South Asia is a clever ploy designed by major powers to effectively restrict India to this zone. India is a major Asian power. It is a continental size power with a huge population and economy. To restrict it and club it with states that are barely one-tenth to one-eighth its size, in terms of economy and population, does not make any strategic sense. South Asia can at best be seen as an idea that promotes economic and cultural integration. It does not make any strategic significance. On the contrary, to say that India is the dominant regional power in South Asia tantamount to marginalising India’s strategic significance. The term South Asia is essentially a Cold War concept where the Super powers tended to divide the world, Asia in particular into sub-regions for their convenience.

Stephen Cohen observes the inappropriateness of the term South Asia and the damage it has caused to India - "India’s strategic marginality was reinforced by the widespread view of Asia as a series of subregions, some more important than others. Seen merely as state in South Asia”. Cohen says- "India jostled for attention in the foreign ministries of the world with other Cold War battlegrounds such as Southeast and East Asia and the Middle East. These constructed subregions displaced the older, expanded notion of Asia.”45 Throughout the Cold War period the Western powers, the USA in particular, followed a deliberate strategy of equating India and Pakistan in their strategic calculus. Pakistan being a frontline state of the US block, this was what it desired. For China, it suited its strategy of containing India in an endless struggle with Pakistan. End of the Cold War, coupled with significant upturn in Indian economy, has changed the equations once again. India today is seen more as an Asian power, although China still follows a strategy to scuttle this development.

India’s strategic environment effectively can be seen in terms of immediate, Asian, and global regions. The evaluation of the threats should also be seen in this framework. The immediate region or circle consists of India and all its neighbours: Pakistan, China, Nepal, Bhutan, Bangladesh, Burma, Sri Lanka, Maldives and Afghanistan, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, Cambodia, Laos,

Vietnam, Indonesia and Philippines. The second region or the larger circle will be the Indian Ocean region that has 48 countries. The third is the Asian region and fourth is the global or the international system.

India as an emerging major power has important strategic interests at the global level, but its primary interests are concentrated in Asia and the Indian Ocean region. However, India can become effective at the Asian and global level only when it handles its immediate region successfully.

**China**

Since the last 50 years China has played its strategic game in a very deliberate and calculated manner. China’s actions, policies, and its large presence in the world as a major military and economic power cast a significant shadow on the sub-continent, and on India in particular. Right since the beginning of the post Second World War period, Chinese leaders have viewed India as a rival that should be contained early. Their strategies were focused on this objective. Although Nehru was, as Karnad calls him, 'that rare world leader whose understanding of history and of historical trends was astonishing' he, unfortunately, failed to see through the ruthless strategy of the Chinese.46 The Chinese began by swallowing up Tibet and thus, for the first time in their history the two nations became contiguous neighbours. In a rare demonstration of strategic blunder by any major power, India in 1954, surrendered all of its inherited rights in that country in exchange for nothing more than China’s subscribing to homilies and platitudes which comprise the five principles of ‘Panchsheel.’47

The 1962 conflict worsened India-China relations to an all time low. China is still in possession of considerable portions of Indian Territory. Although significant steps have been taken to reduce tension along the borders, China has not, up to now, compromised on its claims on the disputed territory. China poses a major security threat to India and this situation has worsened particularly after

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47 Ibid., p. 36.
the Pokhran II nuclear tests by India.\textsuperscript{48} China sees India as a challenger and competitor to its influence in areas such as Southeast Asia. India on the other hand, cannot permit China to weaken its position or power in South Asia and Indian Ocean region. China has been following a policy of encirclement and containment with respect to India by increasing its influence in countries adjacent to India. Its long standing relationship with Pakistan in the west and an increasingly close relationship with Myanmar in the East could be seen as a strategic flanking of India.

The Chinese being the true disciples of a master strategist like Sun Tzu generally follow a long term game plan entrenched in realpolitik.\textsuperscript{49} Ever since Deng Xiao Ping redefined China’s grand strategy in 1978, China has pursued the development of ‘comprehensive national power.’ Modernisation of its military is an important element of this objective. “Attainment and maintenance of geopolitical influence as a major power” has always been China’s primary objective.\textsuperscript{50} This aspiration has been a central factor throughout China’s history. To achieve its objectives of power and hegemony, China has believed implicitly in the use of force directly or intensive application of coercive force and wide range of diplomatic stratagems of balance and manoeuvre, a strategy of ‘indirect approach.’ Swaine and Tellis say that currently China follows a “calculative” security strategy.\textsuperscript{51} That is it has focused on its internal economic growth and stability, maintain peace on its borders through a strategy of subdued and amicable relations, focus on modernisation of the military, and achieve asymmetric gains internationally. This is clearly evident in its strategy against India. While it advocates peace and tranquillity on the borders with focus on enhanced trade relations, it has quietly followed a strategy of encirclement of India through military and economic cooperation with Pakistan, Myanmar,

\textsuperscript{48} In an interview India's Defence Minister George Fernandes declared China as the "potential threat no. 1." See “George in the China Shop,” in \textit{India Today}, 18 May 1998.

\textsuperscript{49} M. V. Rappai, "India - China Relations and the Nuclear Realpolitik" in \textit{Strategic Analysis}, April 1999, p. 16.


\textsuperscript{51} Ibid., p. 98.
Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Maldives. In short while in the near term the focus is on friendly relations involving economic cooperation, its long-term strategy is to constrain and marginalize India’s influence not only in Southern Asia but in the Indian Ocean Region as well. As its economic and military power increases China will exhibit increasingly assertive behaviour overtime. This has become evident in 2013 where it has made many intrusions into Indian territory, made provocative remarks/actions on Arunachal Pradesh and Kashmir, and made much bigger provocative actions in the South China sea.

China is continuing to modernise its forces and has considerable aerospace power that poses significant threat to India. The Chinese threat to India has three components:

- A direct Challenge along the 4000 km India-China border.
- An indirect threat from Beijing’s support to India’s other neighbours, especially Pakistan.
- A potential Challenge to India’s pre-eminence in the Indian Ocean region.

China would not only remain the principal strategic challenge (in political-diplomatic, techno-economic, and ultimately in military terms), but it would be in a position to cause serious damage to India’s vital interests. China’s southward drive, especially into Myanmar, has long-term implications for India. The terrain and altitude implications that China faces on the Sino-Indian border may not be applicable to Chinese military posture in the Indo-Myanmar sector, especially as China continues to develop the strategic infrastructure in Myanmar. Access to porting facilities for the Chinese Navy by that time could dramatically alter the maritime power balance in the northern Indian Ocean. Fructification of the

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53 China has become the largest donor of economic and military assistance to Myanmar, amounting to $2.5 billion since 1998. The ‘Military Junta’ that rules Myanmar owes its survival almost entirely to China, as rest of the world has virtually ostracised it. In return Myanmar has provided immense access to its territory and ports to China. The Chinese have leased out the naval facilities at Sittwe, established SIGINT/ELINT facilities on the Hianggyi island at the mouth of the Bassein river, and are modernising existing facilities at Akyab and Mergui. China has established SIGINT facilities at the Great Coco islands, just 18 nautical miles from the Indian Andaman islands. This location allows the Chinese to monitor all signal and electronic traffic of Indian Navy’s Eastern Naval Command,
HWCT (Highway Waterway Combined Transport) project would link China’s Yunan province to Yangon port and thus provides China with direct access to the Bay of Bengal. Similarly, China is assisting in the development of major Pakistani naval bases at Gwader and Ormara, which would provide docking and berthing facilities for the PLA navy.\textsuperscript{54} China has also encouraged Bangladesh to interact and collaborate with Pakistan navy.\textsuperscript{55}

China’s long-term objective is to establish a significant presence in the Indian Ocean region in view of its growing dependence on the SLOCs of this area for its trade and commerce. In addition China looks at this region from the point of view of a large market for its products. In view of these economic considerations, China would like to limit India’s influence as much as possible. To achieve this China will have to ensure its freedom for access to Straits Malacca and the Gulf. A dominant presence in the Indian Ocean will enable it to achieve its aim for which it needs sufficient port facilities in Bay of Bengal and the Arabian Sea. Hence, its active collaboration with Myanmar, Sri Lanka, Pakistan and Bangladesh.\textsuperscript{56}

China maintains considerable strategic nuclear forces. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) possesses the world’s third-largest nuclear weapons arsenal, including more than 80 Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles (IRBM) and more than 20 Inter Continental Ballistic Missiles (ICBM).\textsuperscript{57} The airforce has

\textsuperscript{54} Pakistan’s Gwader Naval base as an independent naval station with its deep-water profile has been abundantly funded and constructed with Chinese expertise. In return the PLA Navy would be enjoying full access to dock, service and perhaps even station its future flotilla in this base. Pakistan is developing its second naval base Ormara in the Baluchistan province known as Jinnah naval base. The Jinnah naval base is being constructed at a cost of $ 850 millions with berthing facilities for eight large warships and four submarine piers.

\textsuperscript{55} For the first time since 1971, Pakistani warships sailed into Bay of Bengal for a joint naval exercise with the Bangladesh Navy. Officially denied by Bangladesh, it was facilitated quietly by China.

\textsuperscript{56} Beijing’s determination to challenge India’s significant presence in the Indian Ocean is reflected in the words of Zhao Nanqi, director of the General Staff Logistics Department of the PLA Navy: “We can no longer accept the Indian Ocean as only a ocean to the Indians.”

\textsuperscript{57} A 2002 CIA report predicts that ‘the overall size of Chinese strategic ballistic missile forces’ over the next 15 years will increase to 75-100 warheads, deployed
180 nuclear capable bombers, and the Navy deploys two to four nuclear submarines, each armed with 12 ballistic missiles. China has already converted to accurate, mobile, solid-fuel ICBMs. Beijing is also expected to field ICBMs with multiple independently targeted warheads by 2010. China has deployed a variety of nuclear weapons including tactical nuclear weapons in Tibet. China has already fielded an ABM system using the Russian S-300 ABM. As Raja Menon observes: “The acquisition of an ABM is essentially a destabilising action and its thoughtless purchase by China is indicative of its disregard for its neighbours who already felt threatened by its ballistic missile capability.”

China has gone in for extensive modernisation of its air forces and space capabilities. Its air force is being modernised at a fast pace. China has fielded more than 400 nuclear capable, long-range Su-27 ac and the more advanced Su-30 MKK aircraft. It operates significant number of force multipliers such as AWACS and aerial refuellers. Its national defence university has done considerable analysis of recent wars and has identified Information dominance as the most critical requirement in future wars. Its emphasis on RMA and aerospace technologies has increased considerably. It has put into operation significant reorganisation of its forces to achieve higher levels of combat readiness and greater force projection. Its modernisation of its forces is focused on mechanism, rapid action forces, and acquisition of modern weapons. The aim is to improve its capabilities in penetration, survivability, accuracy and mobility. To that extent China has concentrated on improving its strategic forces and its aerospace power capabilities. However, this has serious threat implications for India. A galloping Chinese technology in nuclear-tipped ballistic

primarily against the United States. In addition, it would field about 24 shorter-range DF-31 and DF-4 (CSS-3) missiles that could reach parts of the USA. Shorter-range missiles are also deployed in Tibet. The new Project 094 SSBN submarine is expected to carry 16 three-stage Julang II SLBMs with a range of up to 8000 km. Following allegations of Chinese theft of US nuclear warhead designs, the Cox Report of 1999 concluded that China, with ‘aggressive development of a MIRV system’, could deploy ‘upwards of 1000 thermonuclear warheads on ICBMs by 2015.’ See SIPRI Yearbook 2002: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security, Appendix 10 A.


missiles with MIRV, advanced nuclear powered and SLBM armed submarines, a robust and modern command and control system, increasing number of satellites that provide extensive targeting data on India, and deployment of the aircraft carrier; all together indicate that China already poses a considerably enhanced aerospace threat to India.

China's war fighting strategies are changing from traditional attrition models to modern manoeuvre oriented model based on “Limited War” concept and an Offensive-Defensive doctrine. Its thrust is now on fighting short, swift modern wars under information conditions. It's long term objective is to close the technological gap with the USA. As a result it is now shifting from "continental" strategy to "Ocean" strategy, focused on anti access and area denial. This has grave security imp

In a significant change China has now emphasised its nuclear deterrence strategy to be built around a strong second-strike capability. It has also revised its "no-first use" policy in keeping with the policies of the USA and Russia, where both have adopted first use policies. In 1995 China amended its "no-first use" pledge to make it applicable only to member-states of the NPT and nuclear weapon free zones.

The threats to India that emanate from china's security strategy can be summarised as below. China aims at "achievement of military and economic security by limiting that of its potential rivals." This is indicated by many of China's actions since 1962, which suggest an anti-India bias.

- China has kept the vexed border problem with India unresolved. Its strategy is to keep this option available to activate hostilities at a time and point of its choosing. On the other hand China has compromised considerably to settle its border disputes amicably with smaller states. The objective is to strengthen strategic relationships with them by showing a benevolent face. For example, it has reached amicable border settlements with Pakistan and Myanmar. Most border problems with many other countries have been settled. But with India it remains frozen.
• China has established close strategic relationship with Pakistan. It has been instrumental in providing nuclear and missile assistance.  

• China has gone out of its way to woo countries on India's periphery. It is now heavily involved in Sri Lanka, Myanmar, Bangladesh, Maldives and Nepal with military and economic assistance.

• China has followed a strategy of encirclement/containment of India. For this it has developed close military and naval co-operation with Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Myanmar.

• Strategic cooperation between China and Myanmar carries major security ramifications for India. India's relations with Myanmar and Bangladesh are on the upswing. This must be utilised to limit China's involvement in these countries.

• POK has become the key to China's links to the Arabian Sea through the Karakorum highway and Gwadar port, and to China's investment plans in Afghanistan. Its increased stakes in POK, including project implementation there, contrary to the argument it uses against funding of projects in "disputed" territories by international institutions, mean that it is positioning itself as a third party in the India-Pakistan conflict over Kashmir.

• China's military modernisation and its close assistance to Pakistan and other countries have resulted in the introduction of advanced aerospace capabilities in the region.

• It has neutralized India strategically by arming Pakistan with nuclear and missile technologies. Its strategic commitment to Pakistan is unique, in that it continues to boost Pakistan's nuclear capability with its latest announcement to construct a 1000mw nuclear reactor there contrary to its international obligations. It seeks by this to balance the India-US nuclear deal with a parallel deal of its own with Pakistan without NSG approval.

• In Sri Lanka, China is looking for key port facilities for the movement of its sea-borne trade, to be followed no doubt by naval berthing facilities when China's international clout increases further and the capacity of India to resist diminishes.

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60 John Woosey, former director of the CIA, stated in a testimony to US Senate Governmental Committee - "Beijing has consistently regarded a nuclear armed Pakistan as a crucial regional ally and as a vital counter weight to India's growing military capabilities."
Pakistan will continue to pose a significant threat to India in the 21st century. Political, strategic and economic factors profoundly influence the nature of India-Pakistan relations. Pakistan's use of religion as the key instrument of policy is a major security threat to India, and a strategic threat to the rest of the world. Pakistan has, through its madrasa culture, become the hotbed of international terrorism. ISI is autonomous and no government has been able to exercise any control over it. The development of Al-Qaeda and numerous other terrorist outfits has been Pakistan's major contribution to international terrorism. The following strategic issues impact severely on India:

- Pakistan's geographical location at the entrance to the Gulf and at the doorstep of Central Asia made it attractive to the USA and other Western Powers during the Cold War. In the present climate of Islamic fundamentalism, Gulf oil, and Pakistan's leverage with Islamic countries of the Arab world, the US and its allies continue to see Pakistan as a valuable ally. This is one of the primary reasons for the US turning a blind eye on Pakistan's terrorist links. The West feels Pakistan can be brought around gently through concessions.

- Pakistan continues its obsession with Kashmir. As a result it continues to encourage fundamentalist forces that pose grave threat to India's security.

- Pakistan itself is divided between moderate and fundamentalist forces. Years of colluding with fundamentalists have resulted in deep entrenchment of fundamentalist clergy, who view India as the main enemy. Islamisation of its armed forces has complicated the issue even further. Pakistan, therefore, continues to back fundamentalist forces.

- The use of 'terrorism' as an instrument of policy forms an essential part of Pakistan's strategic doctrine, laying the basis for its threats to unleash nuclear weapons against a numerically stronger enemy.

- It is a mistake to write off Pakistan as a failed state. Reality is that Pakistan is a nuclear weapon state. It still wields considerable influence in Afghanistan and West Asia. It has built up impressive second-strike capabilities.
• The memories of 1971 defeat continue to fester and the desire for revenge is acute. The Kargil misadventure of 1999 should be seen in this light. As a dissatisfied state Pakistan will continue to resort to asymmetric strategies such as LIC against India.
• Pakistan's concept of "offensive defence" is tailored against India. Islamisation of its armed forces is a major threat.
• Pakistan has vested interests in sustaining tensions with India, particularly in the context of conflict over Kashmir.
• It will continue to keep LOC tense.
• Pakistan is not reconciled to the natural imbalance of power in favour of India. In this it has played into the hands of China, whose strategy is to use Pakistan to keep India contained. Sino-Pak collusion is a serious strategic threat not only to India but Asia as well.

The China-Pakistan collusion is a serious threat to not only India but to the world in general. Apart from nuclear assistance China supplies nearly 80% of Pakistan’s defence requirement. It has also helped establish a considerable amount of aerospace infrastructure in Pakistan. China has helped establish aircraft overhaul factories, set up joint venture in fighter aircraft and aero engine production, and also in space technologies. China’s support for Pakistan has enabled that country to play a role in South, Southwest and West Asia, larger than its population; economy or domestic technological capacity would have allowed it to play.

Its nuclear capability is rising with active assistance of China and North Korea. Pakistan is thought to have produced enough fissile material for 100 nuclear weapons. It has moved in the direction of second-generation nuclear weapons and is pursuing advanced designs and refinements. The 40-50 Megawatt (MWth) Khushab reactor has the capability to produce weapon-grade plutonium.

With the establishment of its nuclear command structure (Army Strategic Forces Command), it has put in place its operational nuclear units. Five missile groups have been raised. With the development of the Ghauri II (Hatf-6), which has a range of 2000 km, Pakistan will be able to target most cities of India. The two-stage Shaheen II, first shown on Pakistan Day parade on 23 March 2000, is
solid fuelled and is estimated to have a range of 2500 km and a 1000 kg payload.\(^{61}\)

Ever since Pakistan gained confidence of its nuclear capability (between 1987 and 1989) it has become more assured of its survivability and ability to prosecute a low intensity conflict strategy against India. It has continued this strategy since 1989. Confident that India would be unable to decide on any effective response it has become emboldened to take more aggressive measures as well as resort to nuclear sabre rattling. This was seen in 1990. After the 1998 nuclear tests, it felt it could prosecute a bolder plan under the nuclear shadow and Kargil 1999 happened. This was followed by the military stand-off for nearly a year in 2002. In all these instances Pakistan never failed to resort to nuclear sabre-rattling. All this indicates a clear strategy of using the nuclear to achieve its objectives. As Ashley Tellis and et all observe – Pakistan has adopted a strategy of using its evolving nuclear capabilities as effective strategic cover for an active Kashmir policy that sanctions episodic limited aims operations.\(^{62}\)

\(^{61}\) Pakistan’s missile threat to India is far more serious than is generally perceived. While Chinese assistance with 24 M-11 and 80 M-9 missiles in the early nineties was known, Indian strategists generally tended to downplay Pakistani threat. Ghauri I missile test in April 1998 changed all that. Indian security establishment was shocked into disbelief, and when details of the extensive missile and nuclear collaboration between Pakistan, China and North Korea came to light, India’s vulnerability to nuclear blackmail became significantly obvious. Technologically, Pakistan seems to have established far more operational capability than India. Its M-9 and M-11 missiles were solid fuelled as against India’s liquid-fuelled Prithvi, and its Ghauri-Shaheen systems could be located in depth and still target most of India’s cities. Pakistan had perfected it warhead designs with active Chinese assistance by 1996. It seemed to have established a more operational command and control system well ahead of India. Operationally Pakistan’s nuclear threat is significantly more potent than is perceived. For detailed analysis see Ashley J. Tellis, *India’s Emerging Nuclear Posture*, pp. 39-79. For details of Pakistan-China-North Korea collusion see “Centre for non-proliferation Studies, Monterey, CA,” available at [http://cns.milis.edu/research/india/china/npakpos.htm](http://cns.milis.edu/research/india/china/npakpos.htm) and also *Peace Initiatives*, vol. V Nos. III-VI, May-December 1999. For a comment on comparative status of the nuclear capabilities of India and Pakistan reported by “Janes Intelligence Review” see “Janes Report Wakes up NDA Government” *Kashmir Sentinel*, April-May 2001, at [http://www.panunkashmir.org/KashmirSentinel/April2001/9.html](http://www.panunkashmir.org/KashmirSentinel/April2001/9.html).

\(^{62}\) Ashley J. Tellis, C. Christine Fair, and Jamison Jo Medby, *Limited Conflict Under the Nuclear Umbrella: Indian and Pakistani Lessons from the Kargil*
believes that its nuclear capability has made it conducive to the initiation of bold operations.\textsuperscript{63} Events that have followed since 1998 prove this point.

Current events in Pakistan, a virtual civil war, and the situation in Afghanistan are pointers to serious instability in the region. Pakistan has a fixed view on Afghanistan with regard to its notion of strategic depth. Once the American forces and the ISAF leave Afghanistan, trouble will erupt. India must have a reliable strategy to tackle the situation in coordination with USA, Russia, China and Central Asian republics.

Two major problems that will be created by Pakistan are linked to Islamisation, and Terrorism. India will have deal with both firmly and with clear strategy.

**Afghanistan**

The fall of Taliban regime and the installation of moderate Karzai in Afghanistan have given India the opportunity to seize the initiative. A moderate Afghanistan is imperative not only for India's security but for Central Asia as well. The turn of events has certainly added to India’s strategic strength in the near term. In this scenario Russia and China are similarly disposed, and this adds to India's favourable strategic situation. The presence of American forces is favourable in the short term. A favourable Afghanistan provides the contact door for India to reach out to countries in its neighbourhood. This however is not going to be easy as Pakistan and China would spare no efforts to establish their influence at the cost of India. The impending withdrawal of American and nato forces has cast a huge shadow. Given its past track record, and its established strategy of creating strategic depth for itself, Pakistan would, in the long-term,

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\textsuperscript{63} Ashley Tellis and et all note that Kargil crisis highlighted the ‘critical importance of nuclear weapons to the success of Pakistan’s grand strategy. Its nuclear weapons functioned as the critical permissive condition that made contemplating Kargil possible. All this became possible when it demonstrated its nuclear capability to the world, particularly to India that Pakistan possesses capabilities previously only suspected (and in India often denigrated).’ This, in its opinion, provided it with windows of opportunity and more robust forms of immunity.’ For more detailed assessment see Ibid., pp. 48-49.
aim to establish a client state in Afghanistan. This is a potential danger for not only India but rest of the civilised world as well.

Central Asia

Central Asia is an integral part of India’s northern neighbourhood. It has gained immense geo-strategic relevance since the collapse of the USSR. Its significance increases on account of its massive energy and mineral resources. Central Asia has already become the scene for 21st century Great Game involving USA, Russia, China, Iran, and Turkey. India cannot be a bystander, particularly in view of its projection as the fourth largest energy consumer by 2025.

Central Asia has become an area of intense strategic struggle, particularly after the Afghan War of 2001-02 and the recent Iraq War. China is emerging as a major player. It has attempted to revive the “Silk Road” and has worked out programmes for intense economic and technological co-operation. Without overtly alienating Russia and the USA, China has made an offer of extensive assistance to develop the immense sources of energy in the region. Its “Shanghai Five” (comprising Russia, China, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan) is a strategic approach to establish a strong presence in Central Asia.64 India must

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64 The ‘Shanghai Five’ was a smart move by China to establish bilateral relations with individual Central Asian countries so as to achieve strategic and economic strength to its flanks. It was able to orchestrate this organisation by taking advantage of Russia’s declining influence in the region and raising common concerns about Islamic fundamentalism. While playing on the region’s security concerns as the reason for the need of this organisation, China’s ulterior motive is to establish long-term linkages for access and exploitation of the region’s enormous energy resources. Russia’s economic problems, its problems with Islamic fundamentalists in Chechnya, and its focus on the threat of NATO’s expansion forced it to join hands with China on this issue. Declining Indo-Russian economic interaction during this period was also a factor that relegated India to the sidelines. The Group formed in 1996 with the objective addressing issues such as disarmament and reduction of forces on the borders, non-interference, respecting of national sovereignty and territorial integrity, and fight against separatists and religious extremists. The sixth summit in 2002 admitted Uzbekistan as a full member and discussed membership to Pakistan. On Russia’s and CAS’s insistence, it was renamed as the ‘Shanghai Co-operation Organisation’ (SCO), a unique cocktail with each member pursuing different aims with the only convergence being “Containment of Islamic Fundamentalism.” It reflected duplicity on the part of China that while fighting terrorism at home it valued its relationship with Pakistan and Taliban, the main promoters of Islamic
make efforts to counter any attempt that would marginalise its role in this area. In this she must work closely with the region as well as Russia and USA.

**Iran and the Gulf**

This region has immense strategic significance for India. The entire Gulf, from Oman to Iran, is critical for India's strategic trade, economic and energy needs. India needs good relations with these countries, as they are particularly influential in the OIC. Iran shares its borders with Pakistan, Afghanistan and Turkmenistan, and its relations with them have significant importance for India. India's economic interaction with this region is considerable. As of 2012 India's trade with this region was nearly $20 billions annually. This when combined with the remittances of Indians working here ($4.2 billions) makes this region strategically very important.

**Indian Ocean Region**

The Indian Ocean region is a natural strategic area of great importance to India. India interacts with 48 Indian Ocean littoral states that extend from the east coast of Africa to the Straits of Malacca. Some of these regions are highly developed, while some are developing countries. India, as the largest economic and military power can become a source of immense economic and technological interaction with these countries. Aerospace power can contribute immensely to this development. India also happens to be the only space power amongst these countries and its considerable strength in Information technology can allow it to leverage these strengths in its favour.

India's strategic location gives it enormous advantage in the maritime sphere - both as a sea power and as a participant in the Europe-Pacific regional trade. India's EEZ covers nearly 2.01 million square km. 95% of its trade is conducted by sea. India has considerable cultural and trade links with all parts of the Indian Ocean region. Unfortunately its obsession with northern land borders has so far neglected this aspect. End of Cold war has provided India with an opportunity to establish its rightful influence and place in the Indian Ocean

fundamentalism and terrorism. After 9/11 the SCO lost much of its relevance due to the American led War on Terrorism as the members shifted their allegiance to the USA and offered bases and other facilities. This could be a setback to China's strategy in the long run.
region. China has already shifted its strategic orientation to establish itself in the Indian Ocean region. This poses a significant strategic threat to India.

Western Naval presence is significant in the Indian Ocean region. India's engagement with the USA (Navy to Navy) is significant. This should be enhanced to involve the air forces as well and the south east Asian countries as well. The USA has reactivated its permanent fleet HQ in the Gulf. The US, Australia, New Zealand and ASEAN countries cooperate on surveillance, military exercises and intelligence exchange.

**ASEAN, and Japan**

ASEAN countries, Korea and Japan have represented the most advanced economies of Asia. With increasing economic power these countries are now developing significant military power as well. Japan has the most technologically advanced aerospace and naval capabilities in Asia. Philippines and Indonesia are developing considerable naval and aerospace capabilities. These countries are heavily dependent on the security of their SLOCs for their national security and economic well being. Japan's lifeline depends on its SLOCs. It has defined its national security strategy as dependent on its ability to defend its SLOCs up to 1000 nm. South Korea is also becoming increasingly dependent on its SLOCs. The straits of Malacca and the Indian Ocean have critical bearing on the economies of ASEAN countries.

All these countries have a common approach to security and share India's concerns about China’s rising power. These countries have realised the value of India's rising economic and military power and, as a result, have focused on evolving fruitful partnership with India to enhance the region's security. The China factor was an important element in India being made a full dialogue partner of the ASEAN and a member of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) – despite non-ASEAN ARF states’ objections. This is indicative of the seriousness with which India is regarded within South East Asia and India has the potential to offset China’s growing military power.

Countries such as Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam share common perceptions on security and economic development with India. Some of these countries face insurgency and terrorist problems that
have the potential of spilling over to India. India can help these countries to tackle these problems by expanding its security and economic relationships with them. Almost all these countries, particularly Singapore, Cambodia, Vietnam and Thailand are favourably inclined towards India on this issue. India’s advantages in space and missile technologies can be used to enhance co-operation with these countries. India must offset their inherent apprehension about China and Japan, through its co-operative engagement.

United States and other Great Powers

The USA is today the world’s lone super power that wields enormous economic, technological and military power. End of the Cold War led analysts to hope and predict that the world would be heading towards a multi-polar system. But various events that followed; the collapse of communism, globalisation, and the many conflicts such as the Gulf War 1991, Bosnia and Kosovo conflicts, Afghan War and the current Iraq conflict; have all only established the increasing preponderance of US power. As India’s security analysis indicates, “the pre-eminence of the USA in political, economic, military and technological fields is more in evidence today than ever before. Its capabilities to forge alliances and coalitions are unmatched. US pre-eminence in the global strategic architecture is unlikely to diminish in the foreseeable future.”

Although the world is functioning in a limited multi-polar pattern the overwhelming power of the USA is evident in almost all aspects of international relations. Much has changed in the last decade, and the USA has now realised that it can’t go it alone. India has a strategic partnership with USA. This has somehow gone into a stagnant mode in the last five years. This needs to be revived and a healthy cooperative relationship needs to be developed. This is in the interest of all, particularly in the context of the rise of China.

65 The Andaman and Nicobar islands, far removed from the Indian mainland, are increasingly vulnerable particularly in the context of Islamic separatist movement in Aceh. Organisations like Al Qaida and Pakistan’s ISI have already established links and penetrated some of these countries like Indonesia and Malaysia. This has caused the India to be seriously concerned about its national security. See Government of India’s Group of Minister’s Report on National Security management, Report of The Group of Ministers on National Security, http://mod.nic.in, Online, Internet, 2002.
With its vast global role the US will need partners and allies to share its global commitments in ensuring a stable international environment. While Europe has more or less stabilised in the last 50 years, it is Asia that is going to dominate the international landscape due to its dynamic growth profile in terms of economic and military power. The US strategy is to prevent any power from dominating Asia unilaterally, particularly China. This would suit the requirements of many countries like Japan, India, Australia and the ASEAN countries. Therefore, a constructive and broad-based relationship with the USA spanning political, economic, and technological interests and commonalties will benefit India’s security concerns in a positive manner. On the other hand, as the GoM report points out, an adversarial relationship can have significant negative impact on India’s security.

A careful analysis of USA’s strategy will indicate that it poses both as a beneficial ally as well as a threat to India’s interests. The US has imperatives aimed at retaining its global pre-eminence in the political, economic and military spheres. A change in its broad-based military strategy was first articulated in 1997 bottoms-up review. The outline given by the former US Defence Secretary William Cohen is indicative of its strategy in the 21st century.67 The strategy proposes that the US develop the capability in its armed forces to do three things: respond to crises worldwide, shape the strategic environment in ways favourable to US interests, and prepare now for possible future threats. It emphasises the gravity of existing threats and more on future hypothetical ones, warns of unnamed future “peer” competitors and the proliferation of new weapons and diffusion of military technology.

What is particularly significant is its focus on the new strategy of ‘environment shaping’, which means more active peacetime use of military power to influence the course of strategic affairs. It encompasses not only traditional deterrence, but also the goals of discouraging other nations from even trying to compete militarily with the US of “preventing the emergence of a hostile regional coalition or hegemon.” The national strategy prescribes the need for the

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ability to fight and win two major wars at once in the 21\textsuperscript{st} century. While the 1997 report mentions potential areas of conflict as Persian Gulf and North East Asia, the 1998 document avoids mention of any specific region but emphasises that a generalised two-war capability is “the sine qua non of a superpower.” This, however, has changed significantly in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of 9/11. The two-war capability has been modified to create a force projection capability that can intervene rapidly anywhere in the world. This would largely based on the expeditionary airforces concept. This makes sense, as the occurrence of two major wars would be very remote, as well as the feasibility of maintaining forward presence in worldwide bases is now irrelevant in the post Cold War scenario. Accordingly the new security strategy, announced by President Bush in 2002, focuses on maintaining an ability to deploy forces rapidly in the world.

As evident from the strategic policy the US would make all attempts to ensure that no challenge emerges to its military, technological and economic supremacy in the 21\textsuperscript{st} century. According to many scholars there is an essential flaw in the US strategy as it views the global stability purely from its own national interests. This, they contend, is a fundamental anomaly and, in a unipolar world, translates into unilateralist and hegemonic aspirations, which poses significant threat to the national interests of others.\textsuperscript{68} However, it views the possibility of the emergence of ‘peer competitors’ on the basis of technological and economic growth profiles. China, European Union, Russia and Japan are already major powers. In the Indian Ocean region India’s role will only increase in the 21\textsuperscript{st} century. As India’s technological and economic power increases it would join the ranks of the other powers. Diffusion of technology would enable all these powers to leapfrog over many stages and narrow the technological lead that the US enjoys currently. More importantly their economic

\textsuperscript{68} As Carlo Bellinzona observes-“American policy-makers often think of the world as unipolar. But in this way they are isolating themselves. The number of governments that consider their interests as exactly coinciding with the American ones is decreasing. In the new international situation, the US can be defined as the most powerful national actor of the system, but as such, it is likely to support a foreign policy that promotes only its particular interest.” See Carlo Bellinzona, “Great Power Relations” in \textit{Asia’s New Dawn: The Challenges to Peace and Security}, ed., Jasjit Singh (New Delhi: Knowledge World, 2000), p. 38.
power would continue to increase substantially. Since all these powers are space powers, the possibility that the current superpower status of the US being challenged by the middle of the 21st century is high. The US strategy, therefore, would be to delay this process as much as possible through technology denial regimes. Therein lies the main threat to India’s growth and security.

**Technology Control Regimes**

Technology control regimes pose a significant denial strategy that affects India’s progress and security. The USA uses technology and arms control regimes to delay and retard India’s technological progress. The MTCR was used to disrupt GLAVCOSMOS’s transfer of cryogenic technology to India. This effectively retarded India’s GSLV programme by 20 years but could not stop it from achieving this capability indigenously. Similarly nuclear technology, in terms of safety and power production, is denied. While the Indo-US nuclear deal of 2007 is a major achievement, it has not progressed further. This needs to be pursued vigorously, as it is in India’s interest. India, as a major power, must now be considered as part of the agreements and not as a victim. The strategy to resolve this is in India’s hands.

**Russia**

With Russia the challenge for India is to nurture a relationship that has served India’s political, economic and security interests exceptionally well over decades but has lost its relative importance with the transformation of international relations after the end of the Cold War and the demise of the Soviet Union, the phenomenon of globalisation, the vast improvement of India-US ties, and, in general, new opportunities that have arisen for India to build productive relationships with diverse countries. Defence supplies is at the core of India’s relationship with Russia; economic exchanges remain modest; Russia is not in a position to meet India’s needs for modernization of its industry, provide the technical inputs required or mobilize funds for developing its infrastructure.

The energy relationship with Russia, despite its vast resources in this sector has not broken new ground. Nuclear cooperation has stalled because of
India's nuclear liability act and public agitation against the Kudankulam project following the Fukushima disaster. Space cooperation has not got galvanized. India and Russia have similar views on several core principles that should guide the conduct of international relations, on a better redistribution of power in global institutions, and on building a multi-polar world in general. Even as India is developing closer strategic partnership with the US, she needs a strategic relationship with Russia too for a better balance in her external relations and for preserving India's strategic autonomy.

Europe
In any discussion on India's strategic challenges, Europe has a tendency to get excluded, although two European countries are permanent members of the UN Security Council and Germany, France and the UK are the fourth, fifth and sixth largest economies in the world. India has strategic partnerships with France, Germany and the UK. The European Union is its largest trading partner. It has long-standing defence partnerships with major European countries. Europe also offers advanced industrial technologies. It has valuable nuclear and space cooperation with France.

The tendency to downplay the strategic importance of Europe would be a mistake. Europe has interests in India independent of the US and, indeed, in several key areas- defence supplies and nuclear, for instance- there is severe competition between the two in India. In the multi-polar world in the making, India must work strategically with Europe, bilaterally and multilaterally.

Conclusion

India is clearly an emerging power not only in Asia, but will be important in its global role. As rises to take up its role and responsibilities, the challenges it faces are enormous. As the only democracy and a secular nation in its immediate neighbourhood, India faces its acute challenges in managing its neighbours.
India's requirements of addressing its developments are equally daunting. Given the past experiences, the best way to deal with its challenges is to follow a firm path with clearly articulated policies and its national interests. In effect, India must not shy away from articulating its national interests unambiguously and evolve her appropriate strategies.