Regional Governance Complexes in Comparative Perspective

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Abstract

In Latin America the repercussions of the proliferation and overlapping of regional organizations are discussed widely. This article examines the opposing views on this process. Some authors postulate that an exhaustion of integration in Latin America will end up in segmented regionalism and hemispheric disintegration. Others endorse a variable geometry of integration that facilitates intraregional cooperation and minimizes the risk of veto players and zero-sum politics.

The article takes Latin America as a vantage point to analyse the topic of interacting and overlapping regional organizations from a more general perspective. It asks about the conditions under which the proliferation and overlapping of regional organizations might have positive or negative effects (on regional integration and cooperation). Additionally, it advocates broadening the analytical focus and replacing the analytical concepts of regional integration and cooperation with the analytical concept of regional governance. Regional governance more adequately captures and integrates different patterns of regional cooperation and different regional projects that result in overlapping regional organizations. Instead of looking at the proliferation of regional organizations from a perspective of fragmentation, this article contends that the focus should be redirected to analysing how different regional organizations interact. Regional interaction patterns can vary between synergistic, cooperative, conflictive, or segmented regional governance (complexes). In an initial application of this analytical scheme, the article summarizes the changing regional cooperation patterns in South America since 1990. In the conclusions it outlines some preliminary ideas for a future research agenda on regional governance (complexes).

Keywords

“La diversidad política, económica, geográfica, cultural y social de América Latina salta a la vista y, en consecuencia, no es materia de discusión; más aún, su variedad es, en muchos aspectos, un capital extraordinario. La región fue, es y será heterogénea, aunque probablemente menos que muchas otras áreas del mundo.” (Russell 2011: 129)

“La integración tan difícil, postergada, y a veces con más retórica que realidades, necesita trascender y articular visiones subregionales diferentes que necesariamente van a coexistir en un continente tan plural y diverso.” (Alvarez 2013)

“Es posible construir un todo integrado de partes distintas y desiguales. Hay espacio para proyectos subregionales que pueden ser ladrillos para la construcción de un proyecto mayor y más incluyente de integración latinoamericana.” (Munoz 2014)

1. Regions and the Proliferation of Regional Organizations

Regions and regionalism have become an important feature of world politics in a multipolar international system where the West is only one region of a “decentred globalism” constituted of several regional cores (or “regional worlds”; Acharya 2014) and where emerging powers seek to influence the norms of global governance (Buzan 2011; Fawcett 2013: 12). In this context, it is important to understand how regions are politically organized and governed.

While regions are porous social entities (Katzenstein 2005) open to external influence through processes of norm diffusion or through the foreign policies of great powers, local actors can use regional organizations to create rules with a view to protecting

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1 “The political, economic, geographic, cultural and social diversity of Latin America is evident, and consequently not contested; even more, the variety is in many aspects an extraordinary capital. The region was, is and will be heterogeneous, even though perhaps less than many other regions in the world” (translation D.N.).

2 “The very complicated, postponed and sometimes more rhetorical than real integration needs to transcend and articulate different subregional visions, which, as a matter of course, will coexist on a continent that is so pluralistic and diverse” (translation D.N.).

3 “It is possible to construct an entity made up of different and dissimilar parts. There is room for subregional projects that may become building blocks for the construction of a major and more inclusive project of Latin American integration” (translation D.N.).
their autonomy from dominance or abuse by more powerful actors (Acharya 2011). Regional organizations can make a region less porous to the international system by functioning as filters between the region and the international system (including global governance structures). The creation of regional organizations constitutes and consolidates a region inasmuch as these institutions give the region an identity (or “actorness”) as a social construct.

Regional organizations delimit the region as a subsystem within the international system and serve to structure the relations between states within the region. From this perspective, there are two functions of regional organizations. Regional organizations manage regional externalities (which could be related to trade, security or other topics) and/or articulate the common interests of the region to actors outside of it. The same institutions can be used as instruments of regional cooperation and as instruments of discrimination and exclusion vis-à-vis other states.

Most regions feature more than one regional organization. Often, these organizations are complementary and perform different functions. Some are suborganizations of other or broader regional organizations. However, regional organizations can also overlap (for Africa see De Lombaerde 2011: 37; Genna and De Lombaerde 2010: 591–592) with regard to mandate and membership (see Weiffen et al. 2013). The proliferation and overlapping of regional organizations is frequently described with and symbolized by the metaphor of a spaghetti bowl.

The topic of overlapping and competing regional organizations has still not been sufficiently analysed. What are the consequences for regional cooperation and integration? How can the evolving regional architecture of overlapping regional organizations be conceptualized? Using these general questions as a starting point, the article takes a closer look at the proliferation (and overlapping) of regional organizations in Latin America, something which different authors interpret from opposing perspectives.

2. The Proliferation of Regional Organizations in Latin America

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4 The discussion of “overlapping regions” (Genna and De Lombaerde 2010: 591–592) should be qualified based on an analysis of whether competing regional organizations really construct different regions.
Since the 1990s, regional and subregional organizations have proliferated in Latin America. While in 1990, for instance, there were only seven major multi-issue regional and subregional organizations in Latin America and the Caribbean; this number had increased to 13 in 2012 (Börzel 2013: 509; Goltermann et al 2012: 12–13). The newcomers are the Association of Caribbean States (1994), Mercosur (Mercado Común del Sur; 1991), ALBA-TCP (Alianza Bolivariana para los Pueblos de Nuestra América - Tratado de Comercio de los Pueblos; 2004), UNASUR (Unión de Naciones Suramericanas; 2008), CELAC (Comunidad de Estados Latinoamericanos y Caribeños; 2010) and the Pacific Alliance (PA; 2012). Other regional organizations such as the Andean Pact (now Andean Community (CAN)) and the Central American Common Market have changed their names and/or their objectives.

Although there is consensus that this proliferation (and overlapping) of regional and subregional organizations in Latin America in the last two decades has occurred – where “regional relations have turned into a complex, multi-layered arena, where social forces, regional powers and contending political projects compete” (Tussie 2009: 188) – there is less consensus about the consequences of this proliferation and the characterization of the current regional architecture.

Generally speaking, there are two approaches for analysing or describing the changing regional architecture in Latin America: The first approach is open ended and focuses on new and hybrid practices in a “period of transition” (Sanahuja 2010). From this perspective, it is still not clear how the regional architecture will evolve and what the emergence of a multifaceted pattern of overlapping regional organizations and projects will imply. The second approach is more critical. It emphasizes the risk of regional disintegration and questions whether regional integration has ever existed in Latin America. This article adds and endorses a third approach, which is taken and adapted from the European experience. This latter approach, which is new for Latin America, stresses the positive potential of a plurality of overlapping regional

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5 There are more regional organizations in Latin America and the western hemisphere. A study lists 31 still-active formal international governmental organizations. This study does not include ALBA, UNASUR, CELAC or the Pacific Alliance, but differentiates between inter-American, Latin American and subregional organizations (Jefferson 2007). Another study counts 25 (Scheman 2007) component institutions of the Inter-American System, differentiating between various areas: overarching cooperation, political cooperation, development, finance, regulatory and advisory cooperation, trade and economic integration.
organizations. It might also be seen as an extension or a specification of the first approach.

The first approach is best represented by Diana Tussie and Pia Riggirozzi. Tussie (2009: 185-186) stated that “the trend may be not towards amalgamation or a single converged regional bloc, but towards greater diversity of hybrids with mutually fuzzy boundaries, arranging component pieces in ever new combinations underpinned by increasingly intense regional relations.” Later, Riggirozzi and Tussie (2012b: 10) argued that “regional governance is currently the result of a mosaic where different regional policies, regional identities and regional forms of cooperation and competition are transforming the cartography itself.” Both authors stress the dynamic character of regionalism and the corresponding regional architecture in Latin America. As Riggirozzi (2012a; 2012b) remarks, older regional organizations and projects do not necessarily disappear. There is no process of substitution, but rather one that sees older and newer organizations overlap. Different regional organizations may compete and change over time with regard to their function and importance.

Contrary to Riggirozzi and Tussie’s (2012b) mostly positive view of current trends, Malamud and Gardini (2012) take a more critical view of the proliferation of regional organizations. They state that “the presence of segmented and overlapping regionalist projects is not a manifestation of successful integration but, on the contrary, signals the exhaustion of its potential” (Malamud and Gardini 2012: 117). In their opinion, the proliferation of regional organizations in Latin America will result in decentralized subregionalisms and hemispheric disintegration. Moreover, the multiple membership of states in different (sub)regional organizations will create friction between and within regional integration projects and will fuel divisions instead of unity in the region. A more recent analysis of the deceleration of South American regional integration criticizes “a logic of the lowest common denominators” (Comini and Frenkel 2014).

While Malamud and Gardini (2012) focus on the risks, the proliferation and overlapping of regional organizations might also have positive aspects. From a more general perspective based on European experiences, Hofmann and Mérand (2012) argue in favour of differentiated multilateral cooperation and “institutional elasticity”, which can foster peaceful and stable interstate relations within a region and minimize the risk of zero-sum politics. In their view, “outright bargaining failures become less
likely as member states have the flexibility to opt out of certain institutionalized policy domains or they can push for their preferred policy preferences in another institution.” Institutional elasticity reduces the possibility that regional integration will stagnate, because actors can switch between arenas and because there are more points from which new initiatives can be launched. The authors refer to a European-type “variable geometry”, where no state “feels forced to belong to the entire club, and hence is more willing to invest in the policy areas that are close to its interest” (Hofmann/Mérand 2012: 137).

This concept can also be applied to Latin America. Sanahuja (2010: 110) emphasizes the point that the constitutive treaty (Art. 13) of UNASUR explicitly opens up the possibility of a variable geometry–type architecture in South America. The new Chilean foreign minister, Heraldo Muñoz (2014), explicitly mentioned the concept “multispeed Europe” (“el concepto de la Unión Europea de las ‘velocidades diferenciadas’”) in one of his first public declarations. And Gardini (2013) describes the same phenomenon in South America as “modular regionalism”, where “states pick and choose membership of regional integration projects reflecting their national interests and foreign policy priorities in specific areas.”

Indeed, it would appear that likeminded Latin American states join each other to foster their common interests. Taking the issue of free trade and open markets as an example, it is possible to differentiate between the interests of the countries of the Pacific Alliance, the Mercosur members and the ALBA members. The countries that form these groupings have different average tariffs and different numbers of free trade agreement partners (see IADB 2012) and they represent different models of economic development and of regional integration (Quiliconi 2013). When we look at security, the regional cooperation patterns are different. While three Pacific Alliance countries (Chile, Colombia and Peru) are part of UNASUR and the South American Defense Council, Mexico is not. Instead, Mexico cooperates closely on security

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6Article 13 stipulates that “one or more Member States may submit to the consideration of the Council of Delegates a proposal for the adoption of policies, creation of common institutions, organizations and programmes to be adopted in an agreed manner, on the basis of flexible, gradual criteria of implementation in line with the objectives of UNASUR […]. Programmes, institutions and organisations in which Member States participate prior to the entry into force of this Treaty may be considered as UNASUR programmes, institutions or organisations […]. Any Member State may fully or partially exempt itself from implementing an approved policy, for a set time or indefinitely, without this preventing said State from subsequently incorporating the policy, either fully or partially.”
issues with the United States and the Central American countries, which have also created their own security cooperation forums, such as the Central American Regional Security Initiative. The cooperation within the different security-related organizations reflects divergent security threats and interests.

As the above examples demonstrate, there are diverging cooperation patterns (and regional organizations) in different issue areas. Hence, Latin America today is home to a broad spectrum of regional organizations that embrace different issue areas, reflect different types of integration and/or cooperation, and represent different political ideological projects. In this context, each Latin American country can choose the mix of regional organizations or cooperation structures that best fits its interests. Different patterns of cooperation in different issue areas can coexist without affecting each other; however, in some cases regional organizations may compete and overlap in the same issue area.

Because of the competition and overlapping of regional organizations, it makes no sense to look at regional organizations in isolation, “thus neglecting the specific properties of an institutional architecture (that is, how different regional organizations are assembled together) and the impact that these properties have on regional order” (Hofmann and Mérand 2012: 133-134). In the end, the whole architecture (that is, the combination and interaction of different regional organizations in Latin America) is more important than its parts (that is, individual regional organizations). Focusing on one isolated regional organization – for example, MERCOSUR – might lead to inaccurate conclusions about the state of regional integration. Therefore, it makes more sense to discuss the entire regional architecture rather than to investigate separate regional organizations. In this vein, Van Langenhove (2012: 26) persuasively argues in favour of widening the research agenda on regional integration with the objective of directing attention to the study of intraregional processes, because “unlike states regions and regional arrangements can overlap. This has consequences for regional integration as several of such processes may occur simultaneously in a given geographic area.”

But how should the analysis of the regional architecture and the processes of intraregional interaction between different organizations be conducted? Are there different patterns of interaction, and what are the factors that structure the regional architecture? Until now the discussion about the organizational configuration of a
region has been too focused on the contrast between regional integration and regional cooperation, and on different forms of regionalism. This article argues in favour of the concept of regional governance and then discriminates between different forms of regional governance.

3. **Regional Integration or Regional Governance?**

Regionalism is generally accepted as an overarching concept referring to, respectively, “the formation of interstate associations or groupings on the basis of regions; and in the doctrinal sense, the advocacy of such formations” (Nye 1968: vii), “the policies and practices of state-based permanent organizations with membership confined to a limited geographical area” (Fawcett 2013: 4), “the policy and project, whereby state and non-state actors cooperate and coordinate strategy within a particular region” (Söderbaum 2009), or “a state-led project to organize a region along particular political and economic lines” (Phillips/Prieto 2011: 117). Even though there is no substantial variation with regard to the basic meaning of the concept of regionalism, some definitions are technically more neutral, while others have a transformative or teleological component.

While there is a basic consensus on the concept of regionalism, there is much less consensus on how to conceptualize different forms of regionalism. Most authors will agree that regional integration is a narrower subcategory of regionalism that is principally based on the European post-World War II experience. Börzel (2013: 508) differentiates between regional cooperation and regional integration. She contends that regional integration “involves the setting up of supranational institutions to which political authority is delegated to make collective binding decision”, whereas regional cooperation refers to “the joint exercise of state-based political authority in intergovernmental institutions to solve collective action problems related to economic, political or security issues.”

Although Börzel (2013) argues strongly in favour of clearly differentiating between regional cooperation and regional integration, one might also conceptualize regional integration as a special type or subset – “not the most successful or even the most frequent” (Malamud 2013: 2) – of regional cooperation. Börzel (2013), however,
perceives regional (intergovernmental) integration and regional (supranational) cooperation as two opposite ends of a continuum of regionalism.

But regional integration can also be defined in a more encompassing and flexible way. Regional integration might be “used as synonymous for regionalism and/or regionalization” (De Lombaerde 2011: 38) or defined as “a historical process of increased levels of interaction between political units (subnational, national, or transnational), provided by actors sharing common ideas, setting objectives and defining methods to achieve them, and by doing so contributing to building a region” (Dabène 2009: 215). Van Langenhove (2012: 18/20) conceptualizes regional integration as “the formation of supranational spaces of cooperation between states.” Later he differentiates between three major types of actions that lead to regional integration: “removing economic obstacles towards integration; building adequate institutions or regulations that favour the delivery of regional public goods; and presenting the integrated region as a unit with some level of sovereignty.” This can lead to three different major varieties of regional integration: “a single market; a provider of services and policies; and an international actor with a certain degree of actorness in global affairs.” (Van Langenhove 2012: 21/28)

In contrast to economic liberalization and trade agendas, which have dominated the discussion about regional integration in the past (Falomir 2013: 98), some authors introduce the concept of “positive integration” as a new subcategory of regional integration based on political consensus building, the promotion of regional interdependencies, and an increase in cooperation on non-trade issues (for example, energy, infrastructure, finance and regional security) (Ayuso 2012; Sanahuja 2010; Sanahuja 2012a). The concept of positive integration is strongly related to the concept of “regionalism” (as used by some authors) and it is compatible with different regional projects covering different issue areas; it may also be employed in the analysis of overlapping regional organizations. Moreover, it is applicable to integration projects in different regions (for Africa see Draper 2012).

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7 “I will use ‘regionalism’ in this article to mean a set of policies by one or more states designed to promote the emergence of a cohesive regional unit, which dominates the pattern of relations between the states of that region and the rest of the world, and which forms the organizing basis for policy within the region across a range of issues.” (Hurrell 1992: 123)

8 With regard to the perspectives of regional economic integration in sub-Saharan Africa, Draper (2012: 79) mentions the pooling of capacities to provide regional public goods and construct network services (energy, finance, telecommunications, transport).
The examples discussed above demonstrate a certain disaffection with the narrow use of regional integration. But there are still good arguments to defend a clear-cut differentiation between regional integration and regional cooperation. One might accept the stringent definition of regional integration by Malamud and Schmitter (2011) and Börzel (2013) and the strict differentiation between regional cooperation and regional integration, because supranational institutions produce a transnational polity (Schmitter and Kim 2008) and transform the logics of politics in the corresponding regional space (in the direction of some form of multilevel governance). As a consequence of a narrow definition of regional integration, the analysis of regionalism outside of Europe would have to drop the concept of regional integration and instead work with the concept of regional cooperation.

However, while accepting regional (intergovernmental) integration and regional (supranational) cooperation as two opposite ends of a continuum of regionalism, one might ask whether too much emphasis is being placed on one end of the continuum (that is, regional integration) given that there is only one flawless example of this category: the EU. On the other hand, the terrain between these opposite ends remains largely unexplored. Moreover, it seems that the terrain between regional cooperation and regional integration is more populated than the regional integration corral. Besides, there remains the more fundamental question of whether the concepts of regional integration and regional cooperation can be used to cope with the topic of overlapping regional organizations.

Hence, one may also ask whether there is a need for different concepts to replace “regional integration” or “regional cooperation” in the comparative analysis of regionalism and to come to terms with the overlapping of regional organizations. Based on the previous arguments, such a concept should capture the formation of supranational spaces of cooperation, the actorness of a region in regard to actors outside of the region, the pooling of sovereignty without the necessity of building supranational institutions, the provision of regional public goods, and the existence of different regional organizations and competing regional projects.

What are the alternative concepts to regional integration and regional cooperation that can be used to chart the field of regionalism and to classify different forms of regional interaction? One option would be “regional architecture”, which is often used but seldom defined. More recently, regional architecture has been defined as “a
reasonably coherent network of regional organizations, institutions, bilateral and multilateral arrangements, dialogue forums and other relevant mechanisms that work collectively for regional prosperity, peace and stability” (Weixing Hu 2009: 14). One can also adapt the concept of “global governance architecture”, which has been defined as “the overarching system of public and private institutions that are valid or active in a given issue area of world politics” (Biermann et al 2009: 15), to the regional level. While the first definition makes no reference to rule setting and rule enforcing in a territorial (regional) space, the second definition describes “architecture” “as the meta-level of governance” and is focused on a particular issue area (Biermann et al 2009: 15f.). Regions are social and political constructs, and regional organizations perform regulatory functions within the corresponding region. Therefore, the regulations and political institutions that construct the territorial space of a region should be at the core of a concept that discriminates between different forms of regionalism.

This article argues that the concept of regional governance is the most adequate to capture the variations of regionalism and of regional projects. This idea is not new; “regional governance” (or, in reference to Latin America, “gobernanza regional”) is frequently used in textbooks, but it is often not clearly defined and conceptualized. How is regional governance best defined? Schimmelfennig (2006: 154) defines regional governance as a “regional space of political order and regulation” ("einen regionalen Raum politischer Ordnung und Steuerung"). Söderbaum (2004: 422) draws on Rosenau (1997) and defines regional governance “as spheres of authority at the regional level of human activity which amount to systems of rule – formal and informal, public or private – in which goals are pursued through the exercise of control.” Although Fawcett and Serrano (2005) do not provide a clear-cut definition, they appear to adhere to a dynamic concept of regional governance9 that refers to a process of setting rules and creating rules, which are enforced by institutions within a geographical space.10

9 “The real game of governance lies in defining the rules before playing them” (Serrano 2005: 19).
10 Adler and Greve (2009: 64–65) define governance as an “order-creating mechanism” and security governance “as a system of rule conceived by individual and corporate actors aiming at coordinating, managing and regulating their collective existence in response to threats to their physical and ontological security. […] Mechanisms of security governance are a more or less clearly delineated set of rules, norms, practices and institutions that coordinate security relations between actors in the international system.”
Riggiozzi (2012a) uses the concept of regional governance in the sense of models of governance that manifest a different logic of structuring a region with regard to the institutionalization of norms and practices in support of a regional community. Jayasuriya (2004: 21–22) also makes reference to “regional governance projects”. His encompassing definition fixes the following parameters. Regional governance projects should be composed of four core elements: (1) a stable set of international economic strategies, (2) a distinctive set of governance structures that enable regional economic governance, (3) a set of normative or ideational constructs that not only make possible a given set of regional governance structures but also make possible the very definition of the region, and (4) a convergence of domestic coalitions and political economy structures that facilitate the coherent construction of regional projects.

In another article, and without the strong economic component of the former definition, Jayasuriya (2009a: 321) defines regional governance more broadly as “the management of the conflicts created through growing interdependencies within a specific – albeit ideologically-constructed – geographical region through the creation of institutional forums, policy instruments and networks of private and public actors.” He further adds that “regional governance encompasses those institutions, instruments and mechanisms that allocate power, influence material stakes and shape the ideological representation of the region itself.”

To summarize these definitions, regional governance refers to international institutions/organizations and normative/ideational constructs as well as to the process that creates these institutions and norms. Regional governance is essentially, but not exclusively, based on intergovernmental regional organizations. It is not restricted to a single organization but refers to the set of relevant regional organizations and their interaction patterns.

11 In another article, Jayasuriya (2009b) focuses on new modes of regional governance (regulatory governance) based on region-wide regulatory frameworks that, as a new form of multilevel governance, transform the internal spatial architecture of the state.
12 Komori (2009), in his concept of a “multilayered” form of regional governance, also includes non-state actors, even though national governments remain the dominant actors.
13 This conceptualization of governance is congruent with Keohane and Nye’s (2000: 12) definition: “By governance, we mean the processes and institutions, both formal and informal, that guide and restrain the collective activities of a group.”
Furthermore, from the perspective of the duplicating and overlapping of regional organizations with regard to governance activities, it is perhaps more appropriate to speak of regional governance complexes. The article takes this concept from the literature of regime complexes, which “establish interinstitutional competition among functionally overlapping institutions as a systematic feature that influences the operations of their elemental institutions” (Gehring and Faude 2013: 120). While the literature about regime complexes starts from issue-specific regimes, the discussion about regional governance complexes starts from regional organizations that can have a mandate or competence in different policy areas. One may define regional governance (complexes) as the overall configuration of (intergovernmental) regional organizations that frame the regional discourse of the member states and generate the norms and rules for the region in different policy areas, thereby contributing to the solution of collective problems and to the realization of common benefits.

4. Regional Governance (Complexes)

The concept of regional governance (complexes) is broad and flexible enough that it can be used to confront the topics of multiplication and overlapping of organizations within a region and of variable interaction patterns between regional organizations. It does not rule out the existence of conflicts within a regional governance complex. So the article can thus reconsider the question of whether the proliferation and overlapping of regional organizations leads to conflict or segmentation (by creating independent subsystems or parallel systems of governance) within a regional governance complex or under which conditions a more cooperative pattern of regional governance prevails.

Subsequently, the article develops an analytical scheme and a taxonomy to differentiate between various types of regional governance (complexes). The analytical approach draws some of its orientation and concepts from the literature on regime complexes and institutional interplay (Alter and Meunier 2009; Gehring and Faude 2013), as well as from the more recent literature on the interaction of international organizations (Biermann 2008; Brosig 2010, 2011, 2014). While most of the literature on institutional interplay (within regions or between international organizations) has a positive bias because it looks for some kind of cooperation
pattern or division of labour and focuses on the relative autonomy of regimes and international organizations (with regard to the participating states), this article takes into account the interests of the states behind these institutions and possible conflicts of interest between different organizations and their member states.

Adler and Greve (2009: 73–75) attribute the “temporal/evolutionary overlap” of regional organizations (in their case, regional security organizations) primarily to history and the survival of institutions created in the past. However, there is also an alternative, or at least complementary, explanation. Regional organizations survive or are newly created because they serve the conflicting interests of different state actors (Hurrell 1998). The “‘balance of practice’ within regions may be as important as the balance of (material) power, or balance of interests” (Adler and Greve 2009: 82). From this perspective, regions, which are socially and politically constructed, are an area open to contestation (Riggirozzi and Tussie 2012b: 6). Alluding to Alexander Wendt’s famous title, Riggirozzi and Tussie (2012b: 3) write that “region is what actors make of it.” This article shares the view that one should take seriously the statements, declarations and proposals of actors involved in regional projects. Regional powers (see Nolte 2010; 2011) and their regional projects are important drivers behind the creation of new regional (intergovernmental) organizations, which can compete for members and mandates (with regard to UNASUR and the Organization of American States (OAS) see Nolte/Wehner 2013a).

Rising powers such as Brazil, China, India and South Africa do not promote an EU-type model of regional integration (Fawcett 2013). Against the will of these countries and without their participation, it will not be possible to create supranational institutions in the corresponding regions. However, as the experience of Asia demonstrates, minor powers can also initiate and create regional organizations as part of a strategy of hedging and binding major regional powers (Goh 2013; Acharya 2014).

The article parts from the assumption that regional integration processes are basically state driven – that is, that “the state continues to play the predominant role in most regional arrangements” (Fawcett 2004: 433) – especially in a context with weak supranational regional institutions, as is the case in most regions outside of Europe. So an analysis of regional governance has to take into account regional hierarchies with regard to status and power resources (major, minor, secondary
powers); the values and norms promoted by different state actors; these actors’ regional projects; and the relationship between both regional powers and minor powers and regional powers and the corresponding regional organizations (Nolte 2011), which may respond to strategies of dominance or hedging.

To obtain better insights into the tectonics of regional governance, it is important to understand the way regional organizations overlap and the possible consequences of these overlaps. There are two types of overlap: an overlap of mandates (or policy areas) and an overlap of members; taken together, these overlaps create a matrix of four different combinations (overlapping of mandate and members, overlapping of mandates only, overlapping of members only, no overlapping of members or mandates). Overlapping may result in both cooperation and conflict; the prevailing pattern has to be corroborated empirically. Even though the result is most probably influenced by other intervening variables, one may expect that certain interaction patterns (or outcomes) predominate.

Table 1: Regional Organizations’ Overlaps in Mandate and/or Members and the Resulting Interaction Patterns

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<tr>
<th>Overlap</th>
<th>Mandate – yes</th>
<th>Mandate – no</th>
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<td>Members – yes</td>
<td>cooperation +</td>
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<td>conflict +</td>
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<tr>
<td>Members – no</td>
<td>cooperation +</td>
<td>cooperation +</td>
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<td></td>
<td>conflict +</td>
<td>conflict -</td>
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expected outcome/interaction pattern: +(yes) / - (no)

When there is no overlap of mandate or members, there is a low risk of conflict. Some kind of cooperation arrangement might even exist. More probable is some form of segmentation between different regional organizations, which may result in the creation of a new (sub)regional governance complex. The overlapping of members but not of mandates facilitates cooperation and a division of labour between different organizations with regard to issue areas (for example, trade and security). While the overlapping of mandate without an overlap in membership might lead to competition for members, it might also result in segmentation if both (or more) organizations decide not to compete for members but instead to divide/create exclusive zones of influence (one can interpret this as a special form of cooperation). This constellation does not exclude member countries from both organizations from cooperating in other issue areas and/or organizations. The overlapping of membership and mandate between different organizations can lead either to cooperation or to conflict,
depending on other factors. A combination of cross-cutting membership and mandate differentiation through various organizations might be the key to a cooperative regional governance pattern. In Hirschman’s terms, in a cooperative regional governance complex the exit option in one issue area within multi-issue organizations (overlapping mandate) has to be combined with loyalty (and voice) in other issue areas (overlapping membership).

However, the overlapping of mandate and/or membership is not sufficient to explain the interaction patterns between international organizations in a regional governance complex. It is also necessary to take into account whether the overlap in mandates between different organizations refers to several issue areas or only to one issue area. Another element is the salience of the overlapping policy fields for the organizations involved. These issue areas might be core fields of competence or just peripheral for these organizations (Brosig 2010). The article agrees with Brosig (2010: 37) that “cooperation is most likely when institutions overlap outside their core fields of competence or if they at least overlap in a peripheral area in one organization and a core area in another”. In contrast, “competition between organizations is most likely if there is significant overlap in core competence fields or if one core area of one organization threatens to dominate a peripheral policy area of another organization”.

Moreover, regional organizations do not all have the same weight or importance for a regional governance complex. The element of centrality within a regional governance complex is of importance. It refers “to the power, influence, and prestige of an organization” (Biermann 2008: 170). From this perspective regional organizations are in a process of positioning themselves in relation to other organizations. Central regional organizations, such as UNASUR in the case of South America, are organizations which are highly valued and are integrated by most major players within a socially constructed region. Therefore, these are the pivotal organizations of a regional governance complex, because they overlap in membership with many other (minor) regional organizations and because they generally have a mandate in several important policy areas. These central organizations are usually multi-issue organizations. This quality is of special importance because it means these central bodies can build bridges between different regional organizations.

14 “A core field of competence can be defined as an area which an organization perceives to belong to its innate field of activity.” (Brosig 2010: 37)
Based on these conceptual building blocks, it is possible to differentiate between centrifugal and centripetal elements, between forces of integration and forces of disintegration, and between bridging and dividing factors in regional governance complexes. What are centrifugal forces? The creation of new regional organizations and the proliferation of organizations are centrifugal elements; they increase the risk of fragmentation and competition for members and mandates. Organizations with an overlapping of mandate but without overlapping membership (direct or indirect via associated membership) carry a higher risk of conflict. There is a higher risk of conflict when the members of different organizations adhere to different core values. Additionally, there is a higher risk of conflict when core states support different organizations. And there is higher risk of conflict when organizations overlap and compete in several issue areas.

And what are the bridging elements? Cross-cutting membership is a centripetal element. It might help to avoid open conflict between organizations because they share the same membership. In this way norms can be diffused from one organization to another and then emulated. The categories of associated member or observer status might be of importance in this regard, because non-members or organizations that are not full members are nevertheless linked to an organization and exposed to its norms. There is probably less conflict potential between organizations with different mandates. The chances for cooperation are higher in cases where a central organization that includes all (or nearly all) states (especially the major ones) in a region exists. Central organizations can help to build a bridge when different organizations are in conflict; they can mediate or constitute a forum of interaction for otherwise unconnected states/organizations.

To create a typology of regional governance complexes, this article adapts an interesting research approach developed for the analysis of global climate governance (Biermann et al. 2009). Given the fragmentation of global climate governance, the authors created an analytical scheme to capture the possible effects of fragmentation. They employed three criteria or analytical dimensions to differentiate between degrees of fragmentation, which can be adapted for the analysis of regional governance complexes: (1) institutional integration and the degree of overlap between decision-making systems (in our case regional organizations); (2) the existence and degree of norm conflicts (in our case between
regional organizations); and (3) the type of actor constellations, which in the case of regional governance complexes refers particularly to the interests and regional projects of national governments (especially of major regional powers). Just as Biermann et al. (2009) differentiate between three different kinds of fragmentation (synergistic, cooperative and conflictive), this article adapts the categories to differentiate between different patterns of interaction between regional organizations and state actors within a region in order to classify different types of regional governance (complexes) – synergistic, cooperative, conflictive, and segmented. The article adds the category “segmented” because there might be fragmentation without cooperation or there might be conflict that ultimately results in the creation of a new subregional governance complex.

### Table 2: Regional Governance (Complexes)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Synergistic</th>
<th>Cooperative</th>
<th>Conflicive</th>
<th>Segmented</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Institutional integration</strong></td>
<td>Central regional organization and other regional organizations are closely integrated.</td>
<td>Central regional organization and other regional organizations are loosely integrated.</td>
<td>Central regional organization(s) and other regional organizations are in part loosely integrated, in part in competition over members and mandates.</td>
<td>Different, largely unrelated regional organizations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Norm conflicts</strong></td>
<td>Core norms of regional organizations are integrated.</td>
<td>Core norms are not conflicting.</td>
<td>Core norms are in Conflict.</td>
<td>Core norms may or may not be in conflict.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Actor (state) constellation</strong></td>
<td>All relevant actors (governments) support the same organizations, including the central regional organization and the regional project related to this organization. Some minor actors might be outside of the central organization but cooperate closely with it.</td>
<td>Not all major actors support the same regional organizations, but they cooperate with and support the central regional organization and the regional project related to this organization.</td>
<td>Major actors support different regional organizations and promote different regional projects.</td>
<td>Major actors support different regional organizations and promote different regional projects.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Adapted from Biermann et al. (2009: 19) and further developed by the author.

A cooperative regional governance complex is defined as a regional governance structure that includes a central regional organization that is at least loosely connected with other regional organizations. The core norms supported by the central institution are not contested. Not all major actors support the same regional organizations, but they cooperate with and support the central regional organization and the regional project related to this organization. Thus overlapping membership (including associated members) – as an element of norm diffusion and consensus
building – is combined with a tendency to divide tasks between existing organizations. Cooperative regional governance is compatible with (or characterized by) a “variable geometry” and “institutional elasticity”.

Based on this approach, the EU represents synergetic regional governance, South America features cooperative regional governance (see below), Latin America also represents cooperative regional governance with a tendency to segmentation, and the western hemisphere constitutes a form of conflictive regional governance with elements of both cooperation and segmentation.

In the following section, the article applies the analytical framework in a cursory way to the South American regional governance complex that has emerged since 2000.

5. Regional Governance in South America from the 1990s to 2014

The whole period since 1990 has been characterized by a sequence of different regional cooperation projects in Latin America that have simultaneously represented divergent geo-economic and geopolitical interests. Historically there has always been an overlapping of intraregional cooperation (in Latin America) and inter-American or hemispheric cooperation, or, in other words, between subregionalism in Latin America and “macro-regionalism” (Hurrell 1992) in the western hemisphere. All regions and subregions – the Americas, Latin America and South America (but also Central America and the Caribbean) – have been represented by different, partially overlapping and competing regional organizations.

The proliferation of regional organizations in the Americas and Latin America in the 1990s and the first decade of this century was at the same time an element that structured and consolidated geographic (sub)regions, inasmuch as these organizations gave the geographic regions an identity (or “actorness”) as a social construct. Yet these organizations also fractured and segmented Latin America into subunits. When, for example, Mexico, the United States and Canada signed the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), Mexico became more dependent on the United States and more separated from the rest of Latin America, and especially South America, a process that Brazil capitalized on and pushed from 2000 on (Lima 2013).
NAFTA came into force in 1994 and consolidated North America as an economic region. At the same time, the US government promoted the idea of a Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) from Alaska to Tierra del Fuego, which was also the central topic of the first Summit of the Americas in Miami in 1994. Almost all the Latin American governments initially supported this idea. For a short time, the so-called Washington Consensus unified the region behind the same neoliberal economic model. During the same period, the OAS (created in 1948 and one of the oldest regional organizations in the world) was modernized, thereby giving more voice to Latin American governments and the active defence of democracy and human rights (Herz 2011; Weiffen 2012). As Canada had joined the organization in 1990, the OAS had actually been converted into an all-encompassing continental organization of the Americas. There was a basic consensus with regard to democratic values and economic liberalism between the United States and most of the Latin American countries.

Economic liberalization within the Washington Consensus facilitated economic cooperation and integration projects in Latin America, thus giving form to an open regionalism. In the 1990s the regional projects were primarily economic integration projects. The Mercosur, a joint Argentinean-Brazilian project, was created in 1991 with the objective of creating a common market including Uruguay and Paraguay. Chile soon became an associated member. Other regional organizations such as the Andean Pact changed their names and/or their economic objectives. In some cases the closer economic cooperation was helpful in resolving long-standing border problems, as in the case of Argentina and Chile, or it spilled over into security cooperation, as in the cases of Argentina and Brazil and Argentina and Chile. Mercosur and the Andean Community (Comunidad Andina, CAN) had similar mandates but did not compete for membership. In the 1990s there was no South American regional organization but rather a subregionally segmented economic territorial space.

However, there were also initial fissures in the Americas project due to growing resistance from Brazil and the Mercosur countries to an FTAA. Additionally, Brazil began to promote the idea of an exclusively South American Free Trade Area (SAFTA). So the push for hemispheric integration (FTAA) was combined with a

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15 The Andean Pact was renamed Andean Community (Comunidad Andina, CAN) in 1996; Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela were its member countries at the time.
tendency towards subregional segmentation through different projects related to free trade and the creation of a common market. But the dominant integration paradigm of the 1990s – “open regionalism” – did not preclude either subregional or hemispheric integration. On the contrary, both processes were viewed by academics and politicians as reinforcing each other. Mercosur, CAN and NAFTA were not seen as a contradiction to the Americas project but as building blocks for a future FTAA.

However, in the shadow of declining United States influence, Brazil was developing its own geopolitical project in South America and perceived the FTAA as a threat to its geostrategic interests. At the same time, Hugo Chavez (1999–2013) was using the oil income in Venezuela to create his own Latin American networks (ALBA, Petrocaribe, Petroamerica) and to build an alliance with Cuba. ALBA was conceived of as an alternative model to the FTAA, opposed to free trade and neoliberal policies. A small group made up of the leftist governments of Cuba, Bolivia, Ecuador and Nicaragua supported the initiative. As a result, the Americas idea embodied by the FTAA lost its appeal after the turn of the century. This is illustrated by the fate of the Summit of the Americas (Legler 2013), the turning point of which was marked by the 2005 Mar del Plata summit. In contrast to those of the previous three summits, the 2005 summit declaration made no reference to hemispheric integration. Moreover, the next two summits in Port of Spain (2009) and Cartagena (2012) concluded without the approval of a declaration, revealing a rift between the United States and many Latin American governments.

The subsiding influence of the United States within the OAS was best symbolized by the election in 2005 (and re-election in 2010) of the Chilean José Miguel Insulza as secretary general despite the opposition of the US government, which supported another candidate. Nevertheless, South American governments had begun to question the role of the OAS in their subregion. In the first decade of this century, a cooperative regional governance complex was in the making in South America.

While various subregional multilateral mechanisms have existed there for some time (and might be seen as the building blocks of a more comprehensive regional unit), South America as a region is a relatively new social construct. Its creation was strongly influenced by Brazilian foreign policy strategies intended to demarcate the country’s sphere of influence (Briceño-Ruiz 2010; Spektor 2010; Malamud 2012). It is part of Brazil’s “grand strategy” to use regional integration as the keystone of
“consensual hegemony” (Burges 2008; Brands 2010), with Brazil as the hub within a system of regional cooperation (Saraiva 2010).

Falomir (2013) proposes using the concept of “South American regionalism” to emphasize the construction of a new region which is mainly based on a political (in contrast to an economic) dimension of integration. In 2000, an initial summit of South American presidents was held in Brasilia. Four years later, during the third presidential summit in Cuzco, Peru, the South American Community of Nations was founded. In 2007, the organization was renamed the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR). One year later, on 23 May 2008, all 12 independent South American states – including Guyana and Suriname – signed UNASUR’s constitutive treaty, which has been ratified by the parliaments of all these member states.

With the creation of UNASUR in 2008 a common political platform was established that integrates all South American countries. UNASUR therefore complies with the criteria of a central organization. It is an organization that by means of its sectorial councils covers various issue areas. The system of sectorial councils is conducive to a “variable geometry” of integration and to cooperative regional governance. The councils do not interfere with the mandates of Mercosur and the Andean Community (CAN) and vice versa. In fact, one of UNASUR’s suborganizations, the South American Defense Council, is the only regional organization in South America with a clear mandate in its field (in Mercosur security is not a central topic). Furthermore, UNASUR has displaced the OAS with regard to mediation and conflict resolution in South America (Nolte and Wehner 2013b; Weiffen et al. 2013). While there is an overlap in membership and mandate between the OAS and UNASUR, this was partially overcome by the decision (and the subsequent actions) of the UNASUR countries to curtail the mandate of the OAS in South America. There is a tendency to separate the domains of UNASUR and OAS.

The core values represented by UNASUR are not contested in South America. These core values are sovereignty without supranational institutions, peaceful conflict resolution, and selective cooperation by the member countries in areas of common interest (without the obligation to participate in all areas).

In the economic domain, Mercosur and CAN mutually granted associated-member status to the members of the other organization: the Mercosur to Peru (2003),
Colombia (2004), Ecuador (2004) and Bolivia (1997); and the Andean Community (CAN) to the then-four Mercosur countries (as of 2005), after both organizations signed an economic complementarity agreement in 2004 (in 1998 they had signed a framework agreement to create an FTA). Chile was granted associated-member status within Mercosur in 1996 and within CAN in 2006. Consequently, the preamble of UNASUR’s constitutive treaty recognizes both organizations as well as the special status of Chile as building blocks for further economic integration.

However, CAN started to decay after Venezuela left the organization in 2006 in protest against Colombia’s and Peru’s signing of free trade agreements with the United States. At the same time there were plans to create a new organization, the Pacific Arc, which was promoted by then-president Alan Garcia (Briceño-Ruiz 2010a). Peru was in an isolated position after Venezuela left the CAN, and both Bolivia and Ecuador (two CAN members) were more inclined to participate in ALBA than in the former group. Besides, Peru’s economic efforts focused more on the Asia-Pacific region as a key market, an approach it shared in common with Chile, Colombia and Mexico, which would later become members of the Pacific Alliance. In fact, most Latin American countries on the Pacific coast share a similar, market-led economic orientation and prefer a model of bilateral FTAs between developed and developing countries (Quiliconi 2013). The rest of the South American countries adhere to the subregional blocks (such as Mercosur), which were created in the period of open regionalism but which took a political turn towards more state-oriented economic policy after 2000.

ALBA initially produced some tension in the South American regional governance complex. On the one hand, ALBA, like UNASUR, is a multi-issue organization; on other hand, it has members outside of South America such as Nicaragua, Cuba and some Caribbean countries – and in this way transcends the South American regional logic. However, as a political-ideological project, ALBA does not have the objective of including all South American countries. Additionally, the South American ALBA countries are members of UNASUR, CAN (Bolivia, Ecuador) and Mercosur (Venezuela). So they are linked to the central organization and other (minor) (sub)regional organizations and they do not question the existence and mandates of these organizations. The activities of ALBA are generally not in conflict with the activities (and mandates) of other South American organizations.
After 2010, UNASUR started a process of organizational consolidation and expansion with regard to the issue areas it covered. A secretary general was elected for the first time in 2010; and the number of UNASUR councils increased from nine to 12. In the Paraguayan crisis of 2012, when President Fernando Lugo was impeached and deposed, UNASUR and Mercosur acted jointly and suspended the new government of Paraguay until the next presidential election (Marsteintredet, Llanos and Nolte 2013). The OAS did not adopt this position.

UNASUR is the central regional organization in South America and is supported by all major actors (governments). When it comes to security-related topics, it has clearly won the competition against the OAS in South America. ALBA did not advance in South America after 2010, and with the death of Hugo Chávez in March 2013 the organization was debilitated.

In the field of economic integration or cooperation, the constellation is more complicated. There has been a shift of influence and importance between different organizations. When the Paraguayan government was suspended, Venezuela became formally integrated into the Mercosur (2012), and Bolivia later applied for full Mercosur membership. The Ecuadorian government has also declared its interest in starting negotiations regarding its admission to Mercosur. Thus, Mercosur will soon include six or seven of the 12 UNASUR countries. With the integration of Bolivia and possibly also Ecuador into the Mercosur, the Andean Community will be further debilitated and possibly enter into a process of dissolution.

However, there is another organization that might be seen as a competitor for Mercosur (but not for UNASUR). In April 2011, Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru formally agreed to launch the Pacific Alliance (PA) project. The constitutive treaty was signed one year later, on 6 June 2012, in Antofagasta, Chile. The key goal of this new regional group as outlined in its different declarations is to build a zone of deep integration in order to progress towards the free circulation of goods, services, capital and people. The PA was also created with the objective of becoming a platform for political coordination and projection to the rest of the world, especially towards the Asia-Pacific region (Nolte and Wehner 2013b).

The PA has revived the debate about the different types of regional cooperation and groupings that exist in Latin America since it has brought the open-regionalism model
back to the region. In fact, the four members of the PA are fully committed to the rules of the game of economic globalization. They also maintain FTAs with each other. The PA is an effort to harmonize and expand these existing FTAs, and to move towards a free trade area. New full memberships to the PA are only accepted under the condition that the candidates already have an FTA in place with each member of the group.

The PA is currently reaching out to Central America. Costa Rica entered into the process of becoming a full member in February 2014, and Panama is the next candidate for full membership. However, two Mercosur countries (Uruguay and Paraguay) have also successfully applied for observer status. This could be seen as representing an element of division within Mercosur or a bridging element between both organizations (Tvevad 2014: 25). From a geopolitical perspective the PA is strengthening the Pacific shift in South America and the economic links with Asia (Oyarzún and Rojas 2013: 25).

While there is an economic split in South America between free trade–oriented countries and more protectionist countries (Briceno-Ruiz 2014; Quiliconi 2013; Riggirozzi and Tussie 2012b), the risks to cooperative regional governance might be overstated. For example, the new Chilean government favours a process of convergence between the Pacific Alliance and Mercosur (Muñoz 2014). During their summit in June 2014, the presidents of the PA member countries also argued in favour of a rapprochement between both regional organizations. Moreover, both organizations do not really compete with regard to their mandates (though perhaps with regard to member countries). Mercosur’s declared objective is a common market; the Pacific Alliance is less ambitious and aims to create a free trade area. Furthermore, while Mercosur is integrating new members (such as Venezuela and perhaps Bolivia and Ecuador) it might also downgrade and modify its objectives. Its self-declared aims have become more political and less economic. At the same time, its advances in the creation of a common market have been quite modest (Malamud 2010; Malamud and Gardini 2012). Some member countries want a modification of the rules to permit bilateral free trade agreements with third countries, which would ultimately result in the perforation or even abolishment of Mercosur’s common

external tariff. In the end Mercosur might be transformed into a free trade area, and this would facilitate cooperation with the Pacific Alliance countries.

While the PA countries share economic interests that are not contingent upon the incumbent government, the same is not true when it comes to strategic political issues. Peru and Chile have pending disputes regarding maritime borders. Additionally, the member countries face different domestic security challenges (for example, armed conflict in Colombia and drug-related crimes in Mexico). Last but not least, these countries’ security agendas are determined by the (sub)regional context. Mexico, for instance, is closely linked to the United States, while the South American governments have created their own security architecture with UNASUR and the South American Defense Council at its core.

Thus, for the moment South America is characterized by a cooperative regional governance complex. The following table provides an overview of the different patterns of overlap between regional organizations in South America (including organizations with a broader geographical reach such as OAS, ALBA, PA and CELAC). There is no conflict constellation between regional organizations with an exclusively South American focus (UNASUR, CAN, Mercosur). Therefore, one may ask whether overlap really is a problem in South America.

In contrast, conflicts do exist between South American regional organizations and regional organizations with a broader geographical reach (UNASUR versus OAS; there is no conflict between UNASUR and CELAC, which coexist according to the principle of complementarity; Sanajuha 2014: 93) and in relation to Latin American regional organizations that have a more ideological orientation (ALBA). Therefore, conflicts are basically linked to the promotion of diverging regional projects and to the demarcation of regional domains (between UNASUR and OAS; OAS and CELAC). In some cases – marked by brackets () – this overlap has not resulted in any significant interaction between the organizations involved.
### Table 3: Overlapping of Regional Organizations in the South American Regional Governance Complex

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Overlap</th>
<th>Mandate – yes</th>
<th>Mandate – no</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Members – yes</strong></td>
<td><strong>Cooperation</strong></td>
<td><strong>Cooperation</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(CELAC-UNASUR)</td>
<td>UNASUR-CAN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>UNASUR-Mercosur(^{17})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(UNASUR-PA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(UNASUR-ALBA)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>OAS-Mercosur</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>OAS-CAN</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>(OAS-PA)</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(CELAC-Mercosur)</td>
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<tr>
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<td>(CELAC-PA)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>PA-CAN</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(ALBA-Mercosur)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(ALBA-CAN)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(ALBA-CELAC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Conflict</strong></td>
<td>UNASUR-OAS</td>
<td>Conflict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>OAS-CELAC</td>
<td>ALBA-OAS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Members – no</strong></td>
<td><strong>Cooperation</strong></td>
<td><strong>Cooperation</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CAN-Mercosur</td>
<td>PA-Mercosur</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Conflict</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>ALBA-PA</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 6. Conclusions and Future Research Perspectives

Latin America’s regional architecture reflects the region’s diversity with regard to economic interdependencies, economic development strategies, integration into the world economy and international value chains, security challenges and interests, and divergent regional projects. The South American trajectory illustrates that regional governance structures do not necessarily correspond to the European model. From this perspective, it is justifiable to speak of different “regional worlds” (Acharya 2014). Yet the South American experience also demonstrates that the proliferation of regional organizations does not necessarily lead to fragmentation and/or segmentation – as some critics argue – but may also result in cooperative regional

\(^{17}\) This classification refers to the general mandate of the organizations, but one might argue that there exists an overlapping of mandate with regard to specific policy areas between UNASUR and MERCOSUR (education, health) and between UNASUR and CAN (energy, infrastructure). I thank Stefano Palestini for pointing this out.
governance. So the proliferation and overlapping of regional organizations must not necessarily lead to problems. The South American experience might be seen as emblematic of “the capacity to continue a fructuous political dialogue in spite of divisions” (Dabène 2014: 92). And Heraldo Muñoz (2014) might be correct in stating that “it is possible to construct an entity made up of different and dissimilar parts. There is room for subregional projects that may become building blocks for the construction of a major and more inclusive project of Latin American integration” (translation D.N.).

The article shows that the concept of “regional governance” can give a new twist to the discussion about regional integration and cooperation within the framework of comparative regionalism. It also demonstrates that the focus on cooperation or conflict within a regional governance complex can be the basis for a taxonomy of different governance complexes (synergistic, cooperative, conflictive, segmented). However, there are still many open questions and interesting topics that could delineate a future research agenda on regional governance complexes.  

- The concept of regional governance should be further developed and take into account the literature on “multilevel governance” in Europe. While the concept of regional governance complexes expounded in this paper focuses on patterns of cooperation or conflict, it does not address the institutional structure of regional governance, which can be based on supranational institutions, intergovernmental agreements or regulatory networks. Moreover, the regional architecture might feature a “light” or a “deep/strong” institutional structure. The risks (or positive effects) of overlapping are perhaps closely linked to the institutional structure of regional governance. One might ask under what conditions the proliferation and overlapping of certain varieties of regional organizations may lead to an overstretching of the governance capabilities of the national governments within a

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18 Many of the ideas presented in this article with regard to a future research agenda have benefited from the discussion of different versions of this paper: at the ISA convention in Toronto (March 2014), at a workshop on “overlapping regionalism” at the Research College “The Transformative Power of Europe” of the Freie Universität Berlin in May 2014, and at a workshop of the EUI Global Governance Program in Florence in June 2014. I would like to thank the participants in these discussions for their contributions.
What are the repercussions of overlapping for the efficiency and efficacy of regional governance structures?

- While the paper delineates a taxonomy of overlaps, it does not confront the question of why regional organizations overlap. Here the literature on overlapping regimes and regime complexes, and also the literature on regional powers, might be of interest. This article touches briefly on the last aspect. The changing strategies of regional powers might be an important factor in explaining the overlapping of regional organizations. Regional powers can be motivated by the objective of strengthening regional cooperation between the states or by the objective of weakening the influence of specific regional organizations or states within a region. Additionally, a historical institutional approach with a focus on critical junctures and path dependency or a liberal approach looking for domestic drivers might be useful in explaining the overlapping of regional organizations.

- The influence of external actors on the overlapping of regional organizations is a topic not dealt with in the article. Are there external actors that promote a strategy of proliferation and/or overlapping? Some authors link the Pacific Alliance to a US strategy to foster its free trade agenda in Latin America (Nolte/Wehner 2013b).

- The South American experience suggests that overlapping might not constitute such a great problem but instead be a manageable affair. The overlapping of mandate per se is not problematic. It only becomes a problem when there is a clash between regional organizations over the delineation of shared areas of responsibility. Managing the interfaces of responsibilities between regional organizations seems to hold conflict potential. There might be conflicts over the delimitation of adjacent regions or conflicts between different regional layers, as in the case of the OAS and UNASUR. In consequence, there may be different kinds of overlapping (and related conflicts), which in turn respond to different logics:

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19 Between 2004 and 2012 there were four summits of the Americas, six Latin American summits, 29 South American summits, 9 summits of the Andean countries, 18 Caribbean summits, 52 Central American summits, 18 summits of the ALBA countries and eight Iberoamerican summits (in total 144 presidential summits in nine years). Moreover, in Latin America periodic ministerial meetings (or an equivalent political level) currently take place in 33 policy areas which are parallel (leading to a total of 126 ministerial meetings) and comprise eight (partially overlapping) regional organizations (Portales 2014: 52-56).

20 Palestini (2012) introduces the concept of “regimes of regional integration”.

overlapping within a region, overlapping between different regions and overlapping between different regional layers (region and subregion).

- The paper does not analyze the repercussions of the proliferation and overlapping of regional organizations for the participation of citizens and non-state actors (including NOGs) in regional governance. Does the proliferation of regional organizations create more opportunities for participation or does it exhaust the organizational and manpower capabilities of non-governmental organizations? How do non-governmental organizations react to overlapping?

- For the elaboration of a taxonomy of regional governance complexes, the article differentiates between two forms of interaction between regional organizations – conflict and cooperation. This might be too simplistic. On the one hand, it might be necessary to differentiate between degrees or levels of conflict/cooperation (high to low). On the other hand, there might also exist a form of non-interaction between regional organizations, or they might decide not to compete and to separate domains. The taxonomy of regional governance complexes differentiates between different analytical dimensions – institutional integration, norm conflicts, actor(state) constellation – but the article does not develop a full set of hypotheses about which motives lead to cooperation or conflict. As a next step, hypotheses should be formulated and tested. Moreover, more theoretical approaches (such as, for example, exchange theory; Brosig 2014) should be screened for whether they can be applied to explain cooperation (or non-cooperation) between regional organizations

- The article differentiates between the overlapping of members and the overlapping of mandates. The overlapping of members does not, at first glance, generate major conceptual problems. However, one may ask who the actors are in the case of overlapping members. Are these the individual member states of the regional organizations involved or are they the regional organizations themselves (institutional agency or “actorness” of regional organizations)? More challenging is the overlapping of mandates. When should one speak of a conflict? Is it sufficient that two organizations promote different regional projects (overlapping of agendas), or should there be a clash or dispute between these organizations (overlapping of policies)? How narrowly or broadly should one conceptualize the overlapping of mandates? Do Mercosur (common market) and
PA (FTA) have the same mandate, or do they only operate in the same policy area (trade)? What about shared responsibilities between regional organizations? While there may be no overlapping in the principal or general mandate of two regional organizations, they may overlap in specific policy areas. This is the case with UNASUR and MERCOSUR (education, health) and with UNASUR and CAN (energy, infrastructure), as the article has mentioned. It may thus be necessary to differentiate between different “subdimensions” of overlap (agendas, objectives, competencies, policy areas, etc.), or even to create an additive index of overlap (from high to low).21 This might also be necessary because the overlaps will vary for the different issue areas (for example, security or economic issues). The sectorial councils of UNASUR are an interesting case for comparing the consequences of overlaps between regional organizations in different policy areas (Palestini and Giovanni 2014).

To conclude, the topic of “overlapping regionalism” or overlapping regional organizations is still an evolving research area; it raises many questions that reflect real political challenges for regional governance in different world regions. Therefore, the conclusions of Carlos Portales (2014: 69) with regard to Latin America might be applied to other regions. He argues that in the short and medium term a plurality of regional and subregional organisms will coexist. The principal question is whether this coexistence will be based on agreements to establish areas of competency that are relatively complementary or whether there will be competition for predominance.22

21 I thank Stefano Palestini for this suggestion.

22 “A corto y mediano plazo la existencia de una pluralidad de organismos regionales y subregionales continuará. El dilema es si en esa coexistencia predominarán ciertos acuerdos para establecer ámbitos de competencia relativamente complementarios o si se dará una competencia más aguda por la preminencia de algunas.”
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