Multilateralism Matters (again):
Conflict Management through Intergovernmental Organizations

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Why are states less likely to solve their disputes through intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) rather than through other third party mediators? We address this question by considering two obvious yet surprisingly overlooked factors that define all such multilateral institutions: 1) their institutional character and 2) their multilateral character. Specifically, we argue all institutions, whether domestic or international, shape future expectations and, by doing so, both constrain and enhance the actions of states seeking conflict management. We also suggest that both the so-called “quantitative” multilateral character of IGOs and the “qualitative” one alter state preferences for their conflict management choices. Using the Issue Correlates of War (ICOW) data, we test hypotheses on third party and IGO involvement. We conclude that both multilateral and institutional characteristics of IGOs “matter” in conflict management choices.
In 1965, as fighting between India and Pakistan over Kashmir broke out yet again, the two sides turned down United Nations (UN) mediation but accepted the Soviet Union’s offer to help them find a peaceful solution to their dispute. In 1973, after Iraq invaded a Kuwaiti border station, Saudi Arabia’s mediation was preferred to the one of the Arab League or UN. Similarly, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia and Yugoslavia signed the 1995 Dayton agreements brokered by the United States after having refused UN and EU efforts for mediation. These cases are certainly not unique. Although the number of intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) and the number of tasks they have been entrusted with has grown considerably since the end of World War I, their role in solving interstate territorial disputes, one of the “traditional” and most important tasks for IGOs, does not appear to have advanced very much. Figure 1 shows that, indeed, when states have decided to resolve their territorial disputes peacefully through a third party, they have been much more likely to turn to other states rather than to IGOs. There are an average of 53 state-led management efforts each year, whereas IGO interventions occur every other year on average.

***INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE***

Work on conflict management outcomes also documents the discrepancy between IGO and state-led conflict management. We know states are far less likely to turn to IGOs to resolve their territorial disputes even though IGOs have been about as successful as states (in one third of cases) in reaching an agreement between the disputants. In other words, the avoidance of using IGOs in conflict management does not appear to be due to their ineffectiveness.

The relatively low IGO involvement holds across the varied types of peaceful methods:

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2 Zatulivete 2011.
4 Touval 1994.
5 See, e.g., Shanks et al. 1996.
6 Bercovitch and Schneider 2000.
good offices, conciliation, mediation, or arbitration. While adjudication is almost exclusively the domain of IGOs, these are the rarest types of peaceful settlements. Even in the case of the International Court of Justice (ICJ), the most active multilateral institution involved in adjudication of inter-state disputes, some have pointed out that since the end of the Cold War the proportion of cases that reach the ICJ has actually declined.\(^7\) The ICJ, like many other international institutions, has been underutilized in resolving international disputes.\(^8\)

This study seeks to explain the puzzling relative lack of involvement of IGOs in resolving international claims. It asks why states are less likely to solve their disputes through IGOs rather than through states or bilaterally. We begin from the observation that some states nevertheless turn to IGOs to resolve their disputes, while others do not. To explain the low rates of IGO conflict management, we seek to identify the factors that make IGOs less (or more) appealing as third party managers to some states than to others.

The following sections discuss the implications of treating IGOs involved in dispute resolution as multilateral institutions. We show that their 1) institutional, 2) quantitative multilateral and 3) qualitative multilateral characteristics each lead to three different hypotheses regarding states’ preferences for using IGOs as third parties in conflict management. We then proceed to test these hypotheses using cases for the period 1919 to 2001 drawn from the Issue Correlates of War (ICOW) data, which include all disputed territorial claims in the Americas and Western Europe. We control for other variables that have been shown in existing literature to affect states’ decisions to resolve their disputes through third parties. The concluding section offers a discussion of the findings and their implications.

**EXISTING LITERATURE**

\(^7\) For a list of factors that may skew the numbers of such cases see Posner 2004, 5.

\(^8\) See, e.g., Coplin and Rochester 1972.
The fact that we have only a partial understanding of IGO conflict resolution efforts is likely because the question straddles two very different bodies of international relations literature: that on IGOs and that on conflict resolution. The former has tended to revolve around general theoretical debates. On the one hand, Realists have argued that while international institutions may facilitate cooperation in economic, environmental or other non-security issues, in the security realm they hardly play any role. Neoliberal Institutionalism, on the other hand, disputed this claim showing why international institutions can also facilitate cooperation among states in the security realm. Yet, by remaining at a theoretical level, this literature focused, at best, only on a handful of empirical cases where IGOs mattered (or not) in resolving disputes among states. Surveys of such empirical case studies have concluded that, indeed, IGOs have difficulties in resolving territorial disputes, compared to their relative success in other issue-areas. The datasets allowing for more comprehensive tests of the use of IGOs in the security realm emerged starting the mid-2000s, when the theoretical debates had already moved beyond the Neorealist-Neoliberal Institutionalist dichotomy.

The second pertinent literature for this study, the one on conflict resolution, is based on comprehensive “large-N” studies. The empirical nature of this research appears to have led it to develop in isolation from the earlier theoretical debates on the role of IGOs. Therefore, this literature tends to treat IGOs as just another type of third party actor involved in conflict resolution, neglecting their very distinct multilateral and institutional characteristics and, implicitly, the different logics that accompany state decisions to seek such organizations for resolving their disputes rather than through bilateral channels or through state third-parties. The few conflict literature works dealing with IGOs have tended to emphasize the binding aspect of

9 See, e.g., Mearsheimer 1994, 26; Grieco 1988, 497.
10 See, e.g., Keohane, 1993; Keohane and Martin 1995, 46.
11 See, e.g., Duffield 2006.
IGO involvements and/or the impact they have on state compliance with agreements\textsuperscript{12} as unique characteristics distinguishing them from other third parties. Others, as mentioned, have emphasized solely the role of IGOs in adjudication, an important and visible yet rare type of dispute resolution. Yet this literature does not explain fully why states would choose IGOs (or not) as third party mediators in the first place or identify the unique characteristics of such organizations compared to other third parties.

Some scholars consider disputants’ choice of third party conflict management mechanisms. For example, Simmons examines arbitration and adjudication and shows that governments seeking the benefits of peaceful settlements may be constrained by domestic groups that oppose any form of compromise over a territorial issue. In such cases, governments may turn to a legally binding ruling to increase the costs of non-compliance with the decision.\textsuperscript{13} Yet, that study does not distinguish between binding rulings that are handed down through IGOs or through other types of third parties. Bercovitch and Schneider look at which actors receive mediation mandates, and find that perceived neutrality is much less important than status as a permanent member of the UN Security Council.\textsuperscript{14} While they offer evidence that states dominate international mediation and suggest that this trend is linked to credibility issues, their analysis only includes nation-state-led mediation. Ample literature examines the choice to involve a third party in efforts such as mediation\textsuperscript{15} and other types of conflict management\textsuperscript{16} without exploring the identity of the third party.

The literature examining IGO effectiveness as a conflict manager and IGOs in conflict

\textsuperscript{12} See, e.g., Simmons 2002; also McLaughlin Mitchell and Hensel 2007.
\textsuperscript{13} Simmons, op. cit.
\textsuperscript{14} Bercovitch and Sneider, op.cit
\textsuperscript{15} Greig 2005.
\textsuperscript{16} Author 2011.
prevention also offers partial answers to our puzzle. Boehmer, Gartzke and Nordstrom\textsuperscript{17} explain how states’ membership in certain types of IGOs (that have greater institutional structure, membership cohesion and a security mandate) leads to a reduced likelihood of militarized dispute. Mitchell and Hensel\textsuperscript{18} build on such arguments seeking to understand which types of IGOs can increase the chances of states reaching agreement between disputants and of then complying with settlement agreements both in an “active” way (becoming directly involved) and in a “passive way” (by increasing interaction opportunities among their members). They suggest that the ability of IGOs to collect independent information (thus reducing the amount of private information of the two sides and making agreement more likely\textsuperscript{19}) leads to greater success in reaching agreements between disputants. Like Simmons, they find that binding settlement techniques (that are more common in when IGOs rather than states are involved) lead to more effective conflict management. Hansen, Mitchell and Nemeth explain that certain types of organizations (the more “institutionalized” ones, those with more democratic members and with members with more homogeneous preferences) are more successful as conflict managers.\textsuperscript{20}

The present study complements the conflict management literature by shifting attention from the types of IGOs that make dispute resolution likely to the types of disputants that are more or less likely to turn to IGOs. By doing so, it identifies the characteristics of states that accept IGOs for resolving their disputes and offers important insights into the rarity of IGO conflict management efforts, regardless of the characteristics of specific IGOs.

More important, the study complements both the conflict management literature and the literature on IGOs by connecting the two. We respond to a long-standing (yet seldom answered)
call for work on multilateralism and its effects. In addition, we generate a series of hypotheses derived from theoretical considerations that build on arguments from the institutionalist literature and on the one discussing multilateralism. We then proceed to test these arguments using methods and datasets characteristic of the conflict management literature. The significance of this study therefore resides in the bringing together of these two important bodies of literature.

Our main argument is that states’ decisions to solve disputes through IGOs, often referred to as “multilateral institutions,” are affected by the institutional and multilateral character of such actors. As institutions, IGOs reduce flexibility and variability in behavior. Their rules and norms establish specific expectations for future actions. Moreover, as John Ruggie has pointed out in a study that inspired the title of the present paper, the institutionalism of IGOs is of a special type; it is a “multilateral institutionalism.” We further build on Ruggie’s arguments by distinguishing between two different types of multilateralism: quantitative and qualitative, emphasizing how each one further affects states calculations when deciding whether to resolve their disputes bilaterally or through third parties and, once they decide to turn to third parties, whether they choose states or IGOs to help them settle their disputes peacefully.

THEORY

Why do disputants often choose state conflict managers over IGOs? What explains disputant conflict manager preferences? To understand the puzzle of IGO conflict management, we explore two main characteristics of these actors: their institutional character and their multilateral character. These characteristics shape future expectations and alter disputant preferences, thereby impacting the conflict management decision process.

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21 Keohane 1990.
23 Ruggie 1993.
**IGOs as Institutions**

How does the *institutional* character of IGOs impact states’ decisions to seek peaceful settlement through such actors rather than through ad-hoc *non-institutional* channels? There are many differences among the various strands of the extensive literature on institutions. Virtually all perspectives agree that one of the main characteristics of institutions is that they create order and predictability.\(^{24}\)

The multiple explanations for how institutions shape actors’ preferences in order to give such predictability generally can be viewed as falling into one of two major approaches, dubbed by Hall and Taylor the “calculus approach” and the “cultural approach.”\(^{25}\) According to the calculus approach, institutions allow for a greater degree of certainty about actors’ behavior by providing information and mechanisms to enforce agreements. While agreements are more difficult to enforce in the international realm than in the domestic one, international institutions may nevertheless alter actors’ expectations about others’ potential actions by establishing rules based on principles of reciprocity that extend the “shadow of the future.”\(^{26}\)

The cultural approach emphasizes how institutions establish “symbols, scripts and routines” that alter actors’ preferences by giving specific meaning to potential actions.\(^{27}\) In the international relations literature, the Constructivist approach has embraced this type of cultural perspective, emphasizing how international institutions do not only limit states’ actions through their rules and norms (their “regulative effect”) but also offer possibilities of action by shaping common identities (their “constitutive effect”).\(^{28}\) The norms and identities shaped by interactions

\(^{24}\) March and Olsen 1998, 4

\(^{25}\) Hall and Taylor 1996.

\(^{26}\) Oye 1986, 12-18.

\(^{27}\) Hall and Taylor op. cit.

within IGOs also establish expectations that are more predictable. Together, the role of rules (especially in the calculus approach) and norms (especially in the cultural one) offer institutions the ability to generate greater predictability of actions.

One of the most common ways in which institutions make actors’ actions more predictable is through their “stickiness.” Specifically, once actors use an institution, it is more likely that they will return to that institution in the future. Even in the international realm, where the decision to join an international institution and remain part of it is not as easily enforced as in the domestic realm, scholars have noted a penchant for states to turn and return to international institutions to resolve their collective action problems. This characteristic of international institutions is explained, analogous to the case of domestic institutions, through various mechanisms such as embedded treaty commitments, intergovernmental routines, and internalized political processes.29 Indeed, in time, as national officials garner a better understanding of the way an IGO functions and how they can best use that organization to achieve goals, all things being equal, they become more inclined to act through that institution rather than through bilateral channels or through a new ad-hoc multilateral mechanism that they do not yet know well enough because they involve new rules and norms each time and therefore are more fluid and unpredictable. Such decisions may be “habit-driven.”30 Alternatively, they may be due to the constituencies that international institutions develop in national bureaucracies and among political groupings.31

For example, when states decide to resolve a dispute through an IGO, top decision-makers (in the foreign ministries as well as in other governmental bodies) hire or advance

31 Jervis et al.2002, 175.
individuals with expertise in the work, rules and norms of that organization. Even after the dispute is resolved, most such experts stay on in their newly acquired positions. For instance, when Romania decided to resolve its first ever ICJ case (involving a territorial dispute it had with Ukraine over the Snake Island, in the Black Sea), the Romanian Foreign Ministry put together a strong contingent of ICJ and UN experts. Virtually all such experts later stayed on in the Foreign Ministry even after the case ended. Moreover, the relative success of the case led the top experts to garner a great deal of prestige and to advance within the Foreign Ministry. The head of the Romanian team for the ICJ trial, Bogdan Aurescu, was nominated for the position of Foreign Minister (at age 36) and eventually was named Deputy-Foreign Minister just one year after the case concluded.\textsuperscript{32} One expects in such cases that countries that have garnered the necessary expertise for negotiating a dispute through IGOs will be more inclined to deal with other disputes through IGOs.

In addition to this argument based on “habit” and “domestic constituencies,” the literature has noted that continued participation in international institutions may also shape collective identities\textsuperscript{33} and make it more “appropriate” to act through such institutions. Indeed, a state may find it more difficult to reject a proposal for peaceful resolution through an IGO after it used that organization in the past (compared to the rejection of bilateral or ad-hoc multilateral resolution mechanism), as there is a certain degree of normative pressure attached to the potential use of IGO mechanisms.

In sum, what the above discussion suggests is that we do not expect states’ choices for seeking peaceful resolution through international institutions to follow the exact same logic of those through ad-hoc mechanisms. The stickiness of such institutions will establish a pressure for

\textsuperscript{32} Romania Libera 2009.
\textsuperscript{33} E.g., Checkel 2005; also Bearce and Bondanella 2007.
them to return to IGOs once they used such organizations in the past. Such stickiness is much stronger than the one associated with ad-hoc conflict management mechanisms.

This argument is similar to Wiegand and Powell’s that also emphasizes the relevance of past experiences with a certain type of forum for dispute resolution for the present choice of such forums.\textsuperscript{34} Yet, they argue that such choices will be contingent on the rate of success that the country has had with that specific type of dispute resolution mechanism. This strictly “cost-benefit” argument differs from ours as we suggest that habit, domestic constituencies and norms make states more likely to return to IGOs \textit{regardless} of whether they were successful or not in their past dispute settlements in those organizations. Specifically, we posit that:

\textit{H1: The more states have sought peaceful resolution through IGOs rather than through state-third party mechanisms in the past, the more likely they are to seek peaceful resolution through an IGO to resolve their present dispute (regardless of past success rate).}

\textbf{IGOs and “Quantitative” Multilateralism}

While the institutional character of IGOs may be important in shaping states’ decisions for conflict resolution mechanisms, we expect the multilateral character to be even more influential. The multilateral character of IGOs should be understood as distinct from its institutional one. In fact, as Ruggie points out, “multilateral” is an adjective that modifies the noun “institution.”\textsuperscript{35} A \textit{multilateral} institution is a specific type of institution in which there are “collectively sanctioned procedures for implementing the rules.”\textsuperscript{36} States have set up bilateral and not just multilateral institutions to negotiate their differences. For example, the United States and Canada have “institutionalized” their bilateral negotiations on multiple issues from the

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\bibitem{34} Wiegand and Powell 2011.
\bibitem{35} Ruggie, op. cit., 570
\bibitem{36} Ruggie, op. cit., 13
\end{thebibliography}
presence of U.S. ships in the Canadian-claimed waters of the Polar Sea Briggs\textsuperscript{37} to the Pacific Salmon Treaty for cooperation in conservation and harvest-sharing between the two countries.\textsuperscript{38} Even some of the most important issues of the Cold War, such as arms limitations between the United States and the U.S.S.R. (the SALT and START treaties), were negotiated in a bilateral institutionalized setting where the same norms and even rules were often maintained throughout the various phases of the negotiations.

Conversely, multilateral negotiations do not need to be institutionalized.\textsuperscript{39} In fact, this study attempts to explain why since 1945, there have been more than twice as many attempts to resolve territorial disputes between two states “multilaterally,” through ad-hoc arrangements where at least one state acted as a third-party in the negotiations, than through institutionalized forums such as IGOs. The term “multilateral” therefore needs to be treated separately from the one of “institution.” More importantly, the effects of multilateralism for states’ calculations when deciding on the best method for peaceful resolution need to be discerned from the aforementioned institutional effects.

The literature has distinguished between two different understandings of multilateralism: “quantitative” and “qualitative.”\textsuperscript{40} The quantitative understanding simply emphasizes the difference in the number of actors involved in multilateral negotiations. For example, Keohane used the term multilateralism based on this understanding. He defined multilateralism as coordination of national policies “in groups of three or more states” and considered the number of members in an IGO (specifically the open or restricted membership rules) as a reflection of the

\textsuperscript{37} Briggs 1990.
\textsuperscript{38} Buck 2008.
\textsuperscript{39} Keohane, 1990, op. cit.
\textsuperscript{40} Ruggie, op. cit.
multilateral character of that organization.\textsuperscript{41}

The qualitative understanding of multilateralism is more complex than the quantitative one. It emphasizes that the three or more parties to a process cooperate on the basis of generally agreed-upon principles. The principles do not only refer to the interactions at hand, but also apply to any potential (and often unknown) future interactions with any other state.\textsuperscript{42} This implies that qualitative multilateralism is institutional in nature. In fact, Ruggie defines it as “an institutional form which coordinates relations among three or more states on the basis of ‘generalized’ principles of conduct – that is, principles which specify appropriate conduct for a class of actions, without regard to the particularistic interests of the parties or the strategic exigencies that may exist in any specific occurrence.”\textsuperscript{43}

How do the two different types of “multilateralism” affect state calculations for resolving their territorial disputes? The first (more simple) quantitative interpretation of the term implies that in a multilateral setting at least one other actor besides the two disputants is present in the negotiations. We suggest that the main difference between simply having two parties negotiating among themselves and having three or more is an informational one. Indeed, one of the main reasons states may prefer bilateral negotiations to multilateral ones is because they want to maintain control over information as much as possible. States have traditionally preferred secrecy in such negotiations because they feared that by sharing private information to outsiders (be they domestic or international actors) they may have disadvantages in future interactions with others.\textsuperscript{44}

While the final agreement that is reached through any type of dispute resolution

\textsuperscript{41} Keohane, 1990, op.cit., 731 and 750
\textsuperscript{42} Ruggie, op.cit., 569-570
\textsuperscript{43} Ibid, p. 571
\textsuperscript{44} Fearon, op.cit.
mechanism is likely to be public, the *process* that led to it is not. State C, that has an ongoing territorial dispute with state A, will want to know how A reached an agreement with state B. What is A willing to accept? Did A “bluff” in its negotiations with B? Did B call its bluff? If so, how did A react? Who are the key domestic veto-holders in A’s decision-making process? Did A give any signs of external or internal “weakness” in such negotiations? When third parties (whether they are states or IGOs) are involved in the dispute resolution involving A and B, it is more likely that C will receive some answers to these questions as well as other pertinent information for its potential actions (peaceful or not) towards A than if the negotiations would have been bilateral and, implicitly, more closed. State A is therefore likely to avoid having third parties involved in its negotiations with B because it wants to keep state C from acquiring such sensitive information.45

The existence of states with multiple ongoing claims should not be viewed as a rare occurrence that need not be taken into account. In fact, most states that have an ongoing territorial dispute are simultaneously involved in other disputes with other states.46 The number of territorial disputes a country is involved in at a certain point in time is therefore an important characteristic of that state, one that affects its approach to peaceful resolution of any individual dispute.

Extending the above argument to its logical conclusions, we generate two hypotheses. First, we posit that this informational aspect of quantitative multilateralism is especially important for actors that have *multiple* ongoing disputes.47 Specifically, we argue that, the more disputes a state needs to consider simultaneously, the less likely it is to seek to resolve one specific claim through multilateral channels rather than bilaterally. They fear pertinent

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45 Authors, forthcoming
47 Crescenzi 2007; Walter 2003.
information leaks to other interested parties that jeopardize their other potential negotiations.

Second, we posit that, even when they decide to resolve their dispute through multilateral channels, the logic of quantitative multilateralism will lead states that have multiple ongoing disputes to avoid the “more multilateral” settings of IGOs, compared to those where only one or a handful of states act as third party mediators. That is because, as the number of outsiders who gain access to the two sides’ private information, the more likely it is that such information will reach those states that also have disputes with the two involved in the dispute at hand. This argument is in line with the literature that has long emphasized the role of IGOs as generators and providers of information through which they enhance cooperation by alleviating problems of cheating.  

These two arguments related to quantitative multilateralism lead to the following hypotheses:

\[ H_2: \text{The more disputes states are involved in, the less likely they are to resolve them through third parties rather than bilaterally.} \]

\[ H'_2: \text{The more disputes states are involved in, the less likely they are to resolve them through IGOs as third parties rather than through state third parties.} \]

Of course, in addition to the number of claims a state has, we need to also control for the relative salience of the territory that is being disputed. When deciding on a very salient dispute states may care less about the loss of control over information relevant to their less salient disputes and, therefore accept resolution in a multilateral setting. Conversely, in deciding how to resolve less salient ones they are more likely to think about the repercussions of the information that is offered through the present dispute settlement for other disputes.

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48 See, e.g., Keohane 1984; also Keohane 1989, 2.
49 Gent and Shannon 2011.
**IGOs and “Qualitative” Multilateralism**

The logic of the qualitative multilateral character of IGOs brings together both the logic of their institutional character (that forces states to think about the implications of their present decisions for the future) and the quantitative multilateral character (that forces them to think about the implications of their interactions with one state for interactions with other states). In other words, the more complex logic of qualitative multilateralism extends states’ ordinary calculations both across time and across space in a way that is not relevant in bilateral and/or in non-institutional settings.

Some of the literature on multilateralism, in fact, seems to imply, that qualitative multilateralism is the real (substantive) type of multilateralism, as opposed to the formal (quantitative) one. Ruggie explains that qualitative multilateralism entails 1) “indivisibility among the members of a collectivity” and 2) “expectations of diffuse reciprocity.” When a state accepts such qualitative reciprocity, it binds itself to future actions regardless of the state that such actions target. In other words, the rules and norms state A accepts for its negotiations with State B will be difficult to reject in potential future negotiations with State C. For this reason, we consider that the logic implied in this form of multilateralism is simultaneously one that makes states think about potential implications of such decisions across time and across interactions with other states.

Of course, the logic of qualitative multilateralism limits states’ future options even more than the one of institutionalism (that can be simply bilateral in nature). Yet states do accept the rules and norms that limit their future actions virtually every time they enter into a multilateral agreement and join an IGO. Nevertheless there are important differences between states that

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50 Diebold 1988, 1.
51 Ruggie, op.cit., 11.
accept the rules and norms of “diffuse reciprocity” inherent in qualitative multilateralism and the ones that do not accept them. We consider such differences to be essential in identifying which states are more likely to turn to IGOs to resolve their territorial disputes and which ones are less likely to do so.

But how can we assess which states are more likely to possess this “quality” of accepting the constraints that come with qualitative multilateralism? We suggest that a good surrogate measure of this quality is states’ acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice (ICJ). Indeed, states that recognize the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ undertake to appear before the Court if and when proceedings are instituted against them by any other state accepting compulsory jurisdiction. In other words, they give up ex-ante their ability to choose when to resolve their disputes through the ICJ and, more importantly, when not to.\textsuperscript{52} As a global institution it allows us to differentiate among all states in the system. Throughout the history of the ICJ (and of its predecessor the permanent Court of International Justice) somewhere between one third and half of all states have accepted such constraints while the others have not. The literature has offered multiple possible explanations for states’ decisions to accept the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ, such as their power, level of democracy and type of domestic judicial system.\textsuperscript{53} We do not seek here to understand the reasons why states differ in their acceptance of such important constraints. Rather, we consider the “dependent variable” of such studies, the acceptance of compulsory jurisdiction, as a very useful gauge of our explanatory variable reflecting the willingness of states to accept future constraints on their decisions to resolve their territorial disputes that come with any form of “qualitative multilateralism,” whether through the ICJ or through any other forum. It reflects a state’s

\textsuperscript{52} See International Court of Justice, at http://www.icj-cij.org/jurisdiction/?p1=5&p2=1&p3=3
\textsuperscript{53} McLaughlin Mitchell and Powell 2007.
willingness to accept the diffuse reciprocity principles characteristic of a multilateral institution and, implicitly, the likelihood that it will accept any IGO (not just the UN) as third party manager of their disputes. This argument leads to the following hypothesis:

\[ H_3: \text{States that accept the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ are more likely to seek IGOs rather than states as third party for resolving their territorial disputes than states that have not accepted the ICJ’s compulsory jurisdiction.} \]

***INSERT TABLE 1 HERE***

Table 1 sums up the previous discussion. It distinguishes between the various logics that are relevant in states’ calculations when deciding the type of dispute mechanism they want to use for resolving a territorial dispute. States may only consider the relevance of the institutional character of the mechanism or only the multilateral character. Alternatively they may consider both such characters simultaneously, when they embrace qualitative multilateralism. Simply put, the institutional character of the dispute resolution mechanism obligates them to consider how their present decisions impact future choices for resolving a dispute. The multilateral character obligates them to think how their actions with regard to one disputant impact their relations with others. The two characteristics extend states calculations in time and across space, respectively, from those that characterize bilateral ad-hoc dispute resolution mechanisms.

The table also includes the three main hypotheses deriving from the three logics (institutional, quantitative multilateral and qualitative multilateral) and shows that each of the three main hypotheses pertains to one combination of such logics. Of course, when states decide to negotiate their territorial disputes bilaterally (as they do in most cases), the upper left cell in the table indicates that they do not need to consider any of the three logics.

**EMPIRICAL TESTS AND RESULTS**
Data and Measures

Our analysis examines the decision to address a territorial claim by involving a third party or intergovernmental organization. We employ Hensel’s definition of a territorial claim as a dispute in which “official representatives of at least one state make explicit statements claiming sovereignty over a piece of territory that is claimed or administered by another state.”\(^5^4\) We analyze cases drawn from the Issue Correlates of War (ICOW) data, which include all disputed territorial claims in the Americas and Western Europe from 1816 to 2001.\(^5^5\) To identify claims, we employ the ICOW claim data, wherein a separate claim is coded for each distinct piece of territory, river, or maritime zone for each state.\(^5^6\) The temporal domain of our study is 1919-2001,\(^5^7\) and the unit of analysis is settlement attempt-dyadic claim-year. This captures annual information on each dyadic claim and attempts to settle each claim, thereby enabling the examination of settlement behavior over time. Because the factors that influence third party involvement may be correlated with the factors that predict whether a state or IGO is involved, we estimate a Heckman selection model. The model is clustered by the dyadic claim year, thereby accounting for the non-independence of events and avoiding problems of serial correlation.

Models

The present study asks when states are more likely to turn to IGOs to resolve their territorial disputes. In order to test the above hypotheses, we distinguish between two important decisions states make, represented in Figure 2. Once they decide that they do want to resolve the

\(^{5^4}\) Hensel 2001, 13.
\(^{5^5}\) Hensel et al. 2008.
\(^{5^6}\) Hensel, 2001, op. cit
\(^{5^7}\) We also tested our models in the post-WWII period only with similar results. A state’s decision to address a dispute peacefully is not a product of the temporal domain.
dispute peacefully, they first need to choose between bilateral or multilateral methods. The selection equation that refers to this decision takes into account the “quantitative multilateral” aspects of negotiations of H2.

***INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE***

Once states decide to turn to a third party to resolve their dispute they have a second decision (represented through part 2, the outcome equation), of whether to turn to a state or to an IGO. In this case, the institutional (H₁), “quantitative multilateral” (H’₂), and the “qualitative multilateral” (H₃) character of IGOs are all relevant for the decision.

**Outcome Variables**

We estimate two settlement methods as dependent variables:

*Third Party Involvement* is a dichotomous measure of the states’ decision to attempt settling the issue using a third party, as opposed to bilateral negotiations. A third party is involved in just over five percent of international claims.

*Intergovernmental Organization Involvement* is a dichotomous measure of two states’ decision to involve an intergovernmental organization in a peaceful settlement attempt. This accounts for almost twelve percent of the cases.

**Explanatory Variables**

We include the following explanatory variables in our models:

*Claims* is the summed total of the number of simultaneous other claims in which the disputants are involved, ranging from zero to twenty. This is used to test the role of quantitative multilateralism plays in disputant choices.

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58 Interestingly, the bilateral and third party efforts occur with similar frequencies, although bilateral efforts are occurring with a slightly higher frequency since 1970.
59 Hense et al. 2008 op.cit
60 Hensel, Mitchell, Sowers and Thyne op.cit
**IGO Ratio** is the ratio of the number of the disputants’ past claims that involved an intergovernmental organization to those that did not. It is intended to gauge a state’s proclivity to use IGOS for resolving its disputes and our argument about “institutional stickiness.”

**Accept Compulsory Jurisdiction** is coded one when both disputants accept compulsory jurisdiction at the time of the claim and zero otherwise. Twenty five percent of the cases include claimants that both accept compulsory jurisdiction.\(^6^1\) We employ this measure as a test of “qualitative multilateralism.”

**Control variables**

**Third Party History** is a count of the number of the disputants’ past claims that involved a third party to those that did not. It is intended to gauge a dyad’s management trajectory. Linkages among efforts within the same conflict are discussed in terms of experience and rapport,\(^6^2\) as well as having cumulative effects on disputant relation management history includes the disputants’ experiences in working with mediators and signals\(^6^3\) a disputant’s willingness to work with an outsider. Generally, scholars find the frequency of previous mediation efforts encourages future efforts, regardless of the success of those efforts.\(^6^4\)

**Joint Democracy** is a dummy variable capturing the similarity of claimants’ Polity IV democracy scores for the dyadic year.\(^6^5\) Dyads that both score 6 or higher on the Polity IV scale are coded 1; all others are coded 0. Others have shown democratic dyads are more likely to settle their conflicts peacefully.\(^6^6\)

**Capabilities** employs the Composite Index of National Capabilities (CINC) scores to assess the

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\(^6^1\) McLaughlin Mitchell and Powell 2011.
\(^6^3\) Regan and Stam. 2000.
\(^6^4\) Greig 2005.
\(^6^5\) Marshall and Jaggers 2004.
\(^6^6\) Dixon 1993.
claimants’ relative power.\textsuperscript{67} This measure is calculated by dividing the stronger state’s CINC score by the weaker state’s score. Existing findings show that disputants are more likely to employ peaceful resolutions in situations of power polarity due to uncertainty.\textsuperscript{68}

\textit{Alliance} is a dummy variable that accounts for the presence of a formal alliance between the claimants in a given year, measured according to the Alliance Applications and Provisions data.\textsuperscript{69} These data define alliances as formal agreements “among independent states to cooperate militarily in the face of potential or realized military conflict”.\textsuperscript{70} Alliances have been shown to indicate bilateral satisfaction with the status quo,\textsuperscript{71} reflect common interests,\textsuperscript{72} and signal beliefs about the likelihood and nature of future conflict.\textsuperscript{73}

\textit{Salience} is the ICOW salience index, which reports the highest salience for the dyadic claim.\textsuperscript{74} Existing literature argues states are less likely to solve salient claims peacefully because they want to maintain control over outcomes and are therefore more likely to deal with them using force.\textsuperscript{75}

The above variables are summarized in Table 2.

***INSERT TABLE 2 HERE***

\textbf{Results}

Table 3 presents the results from a Heckman probit model of third party and IGO

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\textsuperscript{67} Singer et al. 1972.
\textsuperscript{68} Reiter 2003.
\textsuperscript{69} Leeds et al. 2002..
\textsuperscript{70} Leeds 2005,4.
\textsuperscript{71} Lemke and Reed 1996.
\textsuperscript{72} Bueno de Mesquita 1981.
\textsuperscript{73} Morrow 1999.
\textsuperscript{74} Hensel et al. 2008.
involvements in territorial claims between 1919 and 2001. The first column presents the selection model, which is the presence of a third party conflict manager. The second model estimates the probability that an Intergovernmental Organization (rather than a state) is involved, after controlling for those factors that predict the involvement of a third party. The model shows that the presence of other claims has a significant negative effect on the choice to include a third party but a positive effect on the decision to involve an IGO in this process rather than a state. Disputants are significantly less likely to involve a third party with each additional claim, but once third party involvement is controlled for, claims significantly increase the likelihood of involving an intergovernmental organization. Substantively, a shift from the minimum (no other claims) to the maximum (20 other claims) value of other claims leads to a 21 percent decrease in the probability of third party involvement and a 16 percent increase in the probability of IGO involvement. It appears that quantitative multilateralism has a strong, negative effect on third party involvement and positive effect on IGO involvement. We explain below, that this may imply that, once states with many ongoing disputes have already given up their monopoly over information by accepting negotiations through a third party, they are more likely to try negotiating through IGOS as these give them a better chance of resolving multiple disputes.

As we expected, a history of working with intergovernmental organizations significantly increases their future use. The higher the ratio of previous international claims that involved IGOS, the more likely disputants are to involve an IGO again. States that have consistently turned to IGOS to resolve their territorial disputes are 35 percent more likely to involve an IGO that those that have never worked with an IGO. The likelihood that this result is from chance is very low, giving us confidence in our argument about the strong role institutional stickiness

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76 The results of robust logistics regression clustered by dyadic claim years can be found in the appendix, first modeling estimates the likelihood of third party involvement then modeling the likelihood of IGO involvement separately. Our theory and results suggest a selection model is appropriate.
plays in their use.

Our measure of the qualitative multilateral character of the dispute settlement method, the acceptance of compulsory jurisdiction, significantly increases the likelihood that an international organization is involved. When both states have accepted compulsory jurisdiction, the disputants are 21 percent more likely to involve an IGO than if only one or neither state has agreed to compulsory jurisdiction.

The control variables offer conflicting results in testing past findings. While a history of working with outside actors, salience, and capabilities increase the likelihood of third party involvement, democratic dyads and alliance ties do not have a statistically significant effect on third party involvement, and the coefficient is negative. Similarly, we find that capabilities and alliance ties both increase the likelihood of IGO involvement, but salience is not a significant predictor in the outcome equation. Perhaps most importantly, the results of these tests show that, even when controlling for factors that have been found to predict states’ choices for conflict resolution, the main independent variables are significant.\textsuperscript{77} In fact, our explanatory variables appear to take away some of the explanatory power of variables other scholars find to explain conflict management choices.

The significance of rho allows us to reject the null hypothesis that third party involvement and IGO involvement are the results of independent processes. Because international claims involve strategic interactions between the actors, selection models are useful. The negative rho coefficient tells us that the unobservable factors that increase third party involvement are negatively related to the unobservable factors that affect IGO involvement. Unobservable factors that affect third party and IGO involvement might include the disputants’

\textsuperscript{77} These results hold when running the models without controls as well (results available upon request).
commitment to conflict resolution and their concern over loss of face from being unable to resolve a conflict without assistance. While high commitment to resolution likely increases the use of bilateral negotiations (we know, for example, that mediators get the hard to resolve cases\textsuperscript{78}), it can decrease IGO use when a third party is involved. Similarly, reputation concerns (we know disputants prefer to resolve their own conflicts to avoid legitimizing the opposition\textsuperscript{79}) may dampen the inclusion of third parties, but they can increase IGO involvement when a third party is involved.

***INSERT TABLE 3 HERE***

Figure 3 depicts the predicted probability of third party and IGO involvement across levels of our main explanatory variables: claims, IGO ratio and accept compulsory jurisdiction. The first plot shows how the number of other ongoing disputant claims affects the probability a third party is involved. The probability of third party involvement decreases from 8 percent to 2 percent as the number of outside disputes rise to 20. The second, third, and fourth plots depict the probability of IGO involvement across claims, IGO ratio and accept compulsory jurisdiction. One first should note the differing ranges of the probability that an IGO is involved. The highest probability of IGO involvement occurs across levels of IGO ratio, which reaches a maximum of 1, while accept compulsory jurisdiction is maximized at .85 and claims at .775. The minimum probabilities are similar, ranging from .55 to .65. IGO involvement becomes increasingly likely as the number of other claims rises, the history of IGO involvement rises, and when the disputants accept compulsory jurisdiction. Overall, these graphs highlight the decreasing relationship between increased disputant claims and third party involvement, and the more

\textsuperscript{78} Gartner and Bercovitch 2006.
\textsuperscript{79} Melin and Svensson 2009.
dramatic, positive relationship between \textit{IGO ratio} and \textit{IGO involvement}, as well as accept \textit{compulsory jurisdiction} and \textit{IGO involvement} and \textit{claims} and \textit{IGO involvement}.

\section*{CONCLUSION}

What explains the puzzling absence of intergovernmental organizations in efforts to resolve international claims? We know this absence is not due to a lack of success.\textsuperscript{80} Our findings support three of our four arguments from Table 1, regarding the effects of the institutional and multilateral character of IGOs on state’s choices for dispute resolution. Indeed, the “stickiness” of IGOs makes states return to such organizations once they have had past experiences with them in third party dispute resolution, whether they were successful or not (H\textsubscript{1}). Also, states with many ongoing disputes avoid multilateral forums (H\textsubscript{2}). Lastly, the results support the hypothesis that states that avoid tying their hands through qualitative multilateralism are less likely to seek IGOs even for less constraining decisions (H\textsubscript{3}).

We also posited that the more disputes states have, the less likely they are to choose IGOs as third party mediators (H’\textsubscript{2}). Our results found support for the opposite relationship: once they have decided to turn to a third party for mediation, states appear to prefer IGOs rather than other states when they have many other ongoing disputes. This finding leads to an interesting (and plausible) conclusion, despite it running counter to our initial expectations. Indeed, one could interpret these results as indicating that once states have decided to include at least one outside actor in the negotiations (by selecting multilateral dispute resolution rather than bilateral), they do not feel that adding even more outsiders to the negotiations (and increasing the number of actors who have access to their private information) makes a difference. They have already given

\textsuperscript{80} Bercovitch and Sneider, op. cit
up their monopoly over that information. Instead, the positive sign of the coefficient for the number of claims suggests that, if states with many simultaneous ongoing disputes accept third party mediators, they are more likely to select IGOs than state third parties. This finding is also supported by the fact that the control variable for claim salience is significant in Model 1 but not in Model 2. This suggests that states with multiple disputes care about the salience of the claim they seek to resolve at first, when deciding on accepting a third party conflict manager. The positive sign of this variable in Model 1 indicates that will likely begin with the most important one (because they fear that by resolving a less important one the released information may jeopardize the more significant dispute later). Yet salience is no longer important when they have decided to share private information and are ready to deal with multiple disputes virtually simultaneously through IGOs.

There are several possible examples of states bearing such fairly unique characteristics: that have many ongoing disputes yet accept resolving their disputes quickly through multilateral forums. They could be ones that have just gained their statehood and have multiple territorial disputes that they may want to resolve as soon as possible. Also, these could be states where leaders have decided to resolve as many of their territorial disputes virtually simultaneously in order to focus on more important domestic or international issues.

Despite this finding and its interpretation, we should emphasize that our tests still show that there are very few states with many disputes that want to resolve them through IGOs. Overall, disputants are much less likely to accept IGOs rather than other states as third parte mediators. The positive effect of number of claims in Model 2 pales in comparison to the negative ones of the other independent variables. After all the number of states with many ongoing disputes that accept third party mediation is a small one, as reflected by the negative
relationship between this variable and the dependent one of the first model.

Overall, the institutional and qualitative multilateral characters of IGOs obligate states to consider all of their other disputes as well as the future implications of their present actions. These constraints discourage states from seeking IGOs to resolve their disputes. The fact that the few states that do turn to IGOs return to them implies that, in fact, the number of states seeking to resolve their dispute through IGOs is even smaller than Figure 1 (depicting the number of disputes rather than the number of individual states involved in such disputes) may suggest.

We need to be careful in teasing out any policy prescriptions from these findings. We are not prepared to join those who see states’ unwillingness to resolve their disputes through IGOs as an unfortunate outcome that needs to be resolved by making drastic changes to IGOs.\textsuperscript{81} We should consider the existence of multiple types of mechanisms (bilateral, through state third party or though IGOs) as a positive development allowing states to choose the best possible channel for resolving each one of their disputes. After all, as suggested, the success rate of state third party vs. IGO third party negotiation mechanisms is about the same.

By shifting focus in our analysis from the type of IGOs that are more conducive to conflict resolution to the types of states that are more likely to accept third party mediation and IGO mediation, we have contributed to identifying which disputes (among which types of states) should be resolved through a certain method. As long as we recognize that there is no “one size fits all” approach to conflict resolution, we may indeed be able to develop some more subtle policy recommendations.

Indeed, this study has found that while most states prefer to resolve their disputes bilaterally or through states third parties, there are certain states, with specific characteristics, 

\textsuperscript{81} See e.g., Touval 1994.
that prefer to work through IGOs. They are generally states that accept the ICJ’s compulsory jurisdiction, in other words (based on existing findings in the literature) they tend to be democratic with civil law judicial systems. In addition, states that have used IGOs in the past are more likely to return to them in the future. Lastly, states with many ongoing disputes will avoid third party mediation but, once they accept it, they will have a slight preference for IGOs. In such cases, states that are deciding on how to best resolve their disputes should indeed be encouraged to accept IGO mediation. Moreover, IGOs should be aware that states very often have other ongoing disputes on their mind and should take into account the possible implications of their negotiations for other such disputes. In fact, if it is indeed true that states that accept IGO mediation are interested in finding similar solutions to multiple disputes, IGO mediators may want to investigate potential linkages between existing claims.

Our finding that states avoid any type of third party mediation when they have multiple ongoing disputes implies that discretion in the negotiations is essential for such states. When states simply cannot resolve their disputes bilaterally, third party states need to assure such disputants that the information they reveal during the negotiations process is treated in strict confidentiality, making such negotiations as similar as possible to the bilateral ones. States that have developed a reputation for making sure that no leaks take place will be more likely to be chosen as third party mediators.

Lastly, we need to emphasize the importance of the strong correlation between the acceptance of compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ and the usage of IGOs as third party mediators. This finding does not lead, in our opinion, to a facile policy recommendation that more states should accept the ICJ’s jurisdiction. Rather, it implies that IGOs are best for resolving disputes between certain types of states and not others. They seem preferable for those states accepting
the principle of diffuse reciprocity. Diffuse reciprocity, in turn, is a product of the trust developed between states. The fact that states that have used IGOs in the past return to them regardless of outcomes implies that such trust and acceptance of diffuse reciprocity has staying power. This is extremely important in the context of the observation that states often have multiple ongoing disputes. It may suggest that once states resolve one dispute, they are more likely to resolve others. With each additional dispute resolved, whether it is a small or very important one, states build greater trust and are more likely to accept binding themselves to IGO rules and norms. This implies that states with multiple disputes should be encouraged to start somewhere. Resolving one dispute, even if a small one, may break the logjam of other existing intertwined disputes, simplify future negotiations, and broaden the potential mediation mechanism in other disputes, perhaps even including IGOs among such options.

References

82 See, e.g., Rathbun 2012.
83 Authors, forthcoming.


Jervis, Robert, Henry R. Nau, and Randall L. Schweller. 2002. “Correspondence:


Figure 1: The Puzzle of Infrequent IGO Management Efforts

The Frequency of Interventions by Third Party Actor since 1919

ICOW Data
Figure 2: State decisions in choosing type of dispute resolution

- States decide to peacefully resolve territorial dispute
  - States seek to resolve territorial dispute bilaterally
  - States seek to resolve territorial dispute using state third party
  - States seek to resolve territorial dispute using IGO third party

- States seek to resolve territorial dispute through third party
  - Part 1: Selection Equation
  - Part 2: Outcome Equation
Table 1: Relevant Logic for state choices of territorial dispute mechanism and hypotheses

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Logic</th>
<th>Multilateral character of dispute settlement method is not relevant</th>
<th>Multilateral character of dispute settlement method is relevant</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Institutional character of dispute settlement method is not relevant</td>
<td>States A and B only consider present implications for the dispute with each other</td>
<td>States A and B consider information they reveal now to other states when seeking peaceful resolution with each other</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>None</td>
<td>H$_2$: The more disputes states are involved in, the less likely they are to resolve them through third parties rather than bilaterally. H’$_2$: The more disputes states are involved in, the less likely they are to resolve them through IGOs as third parties.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutional character of dispute settlement method is relevant</td>
<td>States A and B consider future implications only for the dispute with each other</td>
<td>States A and B consider future implications for their disputes with all other rivals when seeking peaceful resolution with each other</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>H$_1$: The more states have sought peaceful resolution through IGOs rather than through state-third party mechanisms in the past, the more likely they are to seek peaceful resolution through an IGO to resolve their present dispute.</td>
<td>H$_3$: States that accept the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ are more likely to seek IGOs rather than states as third parties for resolving their territorial disputes than states that have not accepted the ICJ’s compulsory jurisdiction.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 2: Summary Statistics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Standard Deviation</th>
<th>Minimum</th>
<th>Maximum</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Outcome Variable</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third Party Involved (N=5,632)</td>
<td>.054</td>
<td>.225</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IGO Involved (N=319)</td>
<td>.313</td>
<td>.465</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Explanatory Variables</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutional “Stickiness”</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IGO Ratio</td>
<td>.674</td>
<td>1.617</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Quantitative Multilateralism”</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Claims</td>
<td>7.295</td>
<td>5.268</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Qualitative Multilateralism”</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accept Compulsory Jurisdiction</td>
<td>.008</td>
<td>.048</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Controls</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint Democracy</td>
<td>.012</td>
<td>.108</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third Party History</td>
<td>1.823</td>
<td>3.307</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salience</td>
<td>6.447</td>
<td>2.363</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>12</td>
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<tr>
<td>Capabilities</td>
<td>69.488</td>
<td>602.95</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>17691.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alliance</td>
<td>.569</td>
<td>.495</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note:* Statistics for outside involvement is based on 5951 dyadic-claim-years between 1919 and 2001, 319 included a third party manager, 100 of which included an IGO, and 5,632 of which ended without outside management.
Table 3: Heckman Probit Model of Third Party and IGO Involvement in dyadic claims, 1919-2001

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Selection: Third Party Involvement</th>
<th>Outcome: IGO Involvement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Institutional “Stickiness”</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>IGO Ratio</em></td>
<td>2.8809***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.0729)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>“Quantitative Multilateralism”</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Claims</em></td>
<td>-0.0370***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0094)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.0354*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0202)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>“Qualitative Multilateralism”</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Accept Compulsory Jurisdiction</em></td>
<td>0.9652***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.2345)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Controls</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Third Party History</em></td>
<td>0.0811***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0143)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Joint Democracy</em></td>
<td>-0.4454</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.3588)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Salience</em></td>
<td>0.0359*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0204)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.0073</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0411)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Capabilities</em></td>
<td>0.0001*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.0003**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Alliance</em></td>
<td>-0.0557</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0860)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.6684***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.1837)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Constant</em></td>
<td>-1.7922***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.1551)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-0.5025***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.5067)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N = 5778
N (uncensored) = 5462
N (censored) = 316
Rho = -0.5526** (0.1940)

Note: *p<.10, **p<.05, ***p<.01. Probit model with sample selection. Robust standard errors clustered on dyadic claim year in parentheses.
Figure 3: Plots of Predicted Probabilities by Claims, IGO Ratio, and Accept Compulsory Jurisdiction

- Probability of Third Party Involvement by Claims
- Probability of IGO Involvement by Claims
- Probability of IGO Involvement by IGO Ratio
- Probability of IGO Involvement by Acceptance of Compulsory Jurisdiction