Foreign Policy, Social policies, and the Emerging Power Status: the Brazilian Case
(2003 – 2013)

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The study will present an aspect of the Brazilian foreign policy in the last ten years (2003 – 2013): the intersection between the government’s social agenda and the country’s foreign activity. The work’s goal is to contribute to a larger comprehension of Brazilian foreign projection during the period, from the starting point that the study of International Relations necessarily goes through foreign policy, but it doesn’t limit itself to it, and must include other themes to provide an accurate, even though more complex, image of its object.

Firstly, we’ll make a brief debate, on an introductory basis, about the concepts of state policy and government policies, in order to shed a light over the following subjects. Secondly, we’ll describe the social policies adopted during the studied tenure and their impact over national economic and social structure. Next, we’ll exhibit the main lines of Brazilian foreign policy during those years, towards introducing the subject of social policies on foreign policy, with special attention to the Brazilian measures on the international cooperation sector and the initiatives aiming hunger and poverty fighting in an international scope. In the end, we’ll highlight the permeability among social policies and foreign policy during the period and the effects of it over the Brazilian insertion as an emerging power.

STATE POLICY AND GOVERNMENT POLICIES

According to Pierre Bourdieu (1998), the modern State was formed as a result of a process of institutionalization of the symbolic proprieties that belonged to the royal crown as a metaphor and as the king’s personal property. The image of the sovereign and suzerain, while concentrating the symbolic domination capital, was subjected to constant attacks from its relatives – possible inheritors of that capital – and liable of weakening as a consequence of the long chains of feudal command. As a way to overcome those two obstacles, there’s been a process of division of the domination work, in which specialized agents, without family ties with the royal family, started to manage governmental subjects. This body of employees is relatively autonomous from the pressures of economic and politic sectors and takes care of the public interest, defined in general terms as the maintenance of the State’s own organization (Bourdieu, 1998). This group is the foundational matrix of the contemporary State bureaucracies, responsible for the difference among the State, i.e., the administration structures of the public affairs, and the governments, groups that that transitorily have the power and that
are responsible for the management and decision-making at the head of the public affairs.

The bureaucracies didn’t remain isolated from the political changes that took place since their appearance, in the end of Middle Ages, from nowadays. When they were formed, the goal of the bureaucracies was exactly to separate the State from the government, to isolate the temporally continuous entity from the contingencies of the governments in constant changing – at first, due to the death or senility of the royal families members. Since then, there’s been the process of creation of a liberal body of ideas and, consequently, the democratization of the political relations started by the European revolutions of the XVIII century, which resonates in the most diverse places (Hobsbawm, 2010; idem, 1995). The spreading of democracy brought along the expectation of regular changes in the governmental staff, as well as the opening of the inner works of public administration to popular scrutiny and, mainly, the ideal that the elected representatives should implement the policies and programs that were deemed better by the popular choice. The effectiveness of the government, in a democratic system, depends fundamentally on its proximity with the State structure, precisely the one whose creation was motivated by the need to interpose to the changes in the power command. Political moderation, that supposedly protects the State from the possible excess of a ruler, exists nowadays through the system of checks and balances among powers and by the expectation that the sovereign expression of popular will is capable of containing abuses.

The contemporary model, at first sight, blurs the distinctions between the two concepts that are so dear to International Relations: State policies and government policies. The State policy would consist in a policy advocated by the bureaucracy enthusiasts as a support to the political power, insulated from the political variations that compose public interest. This interest would encompass a wide range of interests, superior to the sum of the parts that compose society or the totality of individuals of a State (Bobbio, 1987). The defense of that interest would originate a logic baptized as Raison d’état: the conception that public power is the first among powers, and that its maintenance could justify the usage of a judgment different from moral judgment. Furthermore, “Underlying the Raison d’état (...) is the idea that each State has an ‘intelligence’ for his own, according to which the ruler will base his strategic actions in the international plan.” (Lopes, 2012, p. 186). Contrarily to the Raison d’état, the government policies would mean the implementation of the interests of a group or
faction, with capacity to segregate the political unity. In other words, if it’s believed that power is constituted on a univocal form, the taking of the power by a group means necessarily the denial of power benefits to other groups.

Modernity, specially the modern democratic thought, unifies the two logics: parties, understood as the gathering of individuals around a common understanding of general interests, are not seen as factious groups that seek to become legitimate actors in search for the control of the State (Bobbio, 1987). The government and the state become, in the end, the same thing, especially when we consider that the rulers, who are party members, start to direct the permanent bureaucracies, taking the decisions whose implementation is up to the permanent bodies of State employees. This logic is valid to all areas of political action, from the administration of municipal affairs to foreign policy. “From the juridical point of view, international relations are founded upon the identification between the States and their governments. In behalf of this principle, all the acts issued by the rulers are imputed to the State and the rulers and the sole qualified to act under the name of the State and to engage it before other States.” (Merle, 1981, p 223).

However, there isn’t a consensus on the complete disappearance of the distinction between State policy and government policies, even after the rooting of the democratic practice in the contemporary political *modus operandi*, especially with respect to the foreign policy. Lopes (2012), in his analysis of the possibilities of construction of democratic foreign policies nowadays, presents the noticeable permanence of *Raison d’état* references among the formulators and practitioners of the area. Rodrigues (1966), studying the Brazilian foreign behavior through time, observed the phenomena of diplomacy’s partisan neutrality, meaning that the concerning bureaucracy should obey to the national interests, “the sum of current permanent aspirations that are created and develop themselves in the historical process and depend on the characteristics of the people and the phases of economic development.” (Rodrigues, 1996, p.76). Lima (2000) lists alleged reasons to the impermeability of foreign policy to the pressures of democratic activity: the specificity of foreign policy, once it deals not with individuals subjects to sovereignty, but with unities gifted with a large capacity of action in an anarchic system; and the institutional handicaps of democracy, whose logic of power spreading between many instances could be harmful to the maintenance of deals acquired in international scale.
How to understand, under the circumstances of unification of State and government promoted by the age of democratic politics, the permanence of elements that distinguish State policy and government policies regarding the external plan? A possible interpretative key of such a difference could be the temporal character that differs the two policies. “We have to admit that, if the State remains, the governments pass and…change, be it after a coup d’État or a revolution, be it, on a simpler way, in consequence of an electoral consultation or the rupture of the balance on the parliamentary majority.” (Merle, 1981, p 223). The permanent character of the States, in contraposition to the constant changing nature of the internal politics of partisan bias, would make the State policies, in the foreign policy field, long range actions, that would take in consideration the stable nature of the other actors with which it relates. Governmental policies would act inside the limits imposed by the considerations of permanence of the State policy, i.e., the groups that alternate themselves in power could implement new agendas since they fit inside the options presented by a previously configured structure. The contemporary Raison d’état wouldn’t suppose a complete autonomy of the foreign policy regarding the State’s inner structures and dynamics, as point Bobbio, Matteucci and Pasquino (1998), but the recognition that its logic is processed in a more perennial and insulated way form the diverse interests of the internal groups, since, for the international realm, the State presents itself as a single and constant unity. As it is fundamental understand for this work, the changing from governmental policies to State policy is, in that sense, qualitative: an action starts to be recognized as State policy when it is executed on a regular basis, apparently isolated from interferences caused by the changes of the groups that occupy the power. Furthermore, there is no formal guarantee that a change implies the discontinuity of that policy. This qualitative change occurs more often in foreign policy due to the characteristics of the area previously mentioned, as the sensible difference when dealing with other autonomous unities that could put at risk the existence of a State incapable of maintaining a coherent international actuation.

TWO ASPECTS OF CONTEMPORARY DIPLOMACY: LEGITIMACY AND SOFT POWER

In contemporary International Relations, there are frequent allegations that there’s been a substantial change in the dynamics of the interaction between States, a
movement that would point to a progressive obsolescence of the military means to the resolution of transnational squabbles. The consolidation of international organizations as the stances in charge of the decisions in many themes of the global agenda throughout the XX\textsuperscript{th} century and the subsequent importance gain of the items unrelated to security were processes that fostered the good receptivity to strategies of international projection that are dissociated from military questions (Keohane, 1984; Yilmaz, 2008)

Those changes aggregated value to the international actions turned to the economic coordination and to the protection of human rights, and brought attention to subjects as the intangible power of the States and the divergences between the feasible actions and the legitimate actions in the international sphere. We’ll approach those two topics aiming to elucidate concepts that will return at the end of the work.

The absence of an entity whose powers surpass those of the States in the international system places a constant question over the actions performed in that realm: what is the legitimacy of the acts of the States? According to Fonseca Jr. (1998), the creation of legitimacy in the international sphere is a relational process that cannot be inferred abstractly from a value, but it’s based on the convergence or distance of the States of the norms and practices created and imposed by them. Legitimacy would depend on concrete actions and, therefore, is close to politics and power in the international plan, many times mirroring a direct interest of a power. At the same time, that proximity doesn’t harm the basis of an actuation legitimated in ethical terms, once, as points Brown (2001), there is no precise division between the behavior completely oriented by interests and the ethical behavior. The context of anarchy and dispersed power allows for each State to be a potential source of legitimate propositions and actions, that will be expressed through a consensus – that is, an intersubjective element – and this consensus will add value the set of norms that underlies those actions and propositions (Fonseca Jr, 1998). The legitimacy on international action is enhanced, because, in a context of multilateral action or search for the establishment of consensus in bilateral relations, there is the accommodation of the differences: the unities treat themselves as equals. “If equality means diplomatic reciprocity, the acceptance of difference, as an element of negotiation, will mean non-reciprocity: the one who has less will gain more” (Fonseca Jr., 1998, p 212). Legitimacy becomes, in a context of relations among unequal States and agendas with many items, a kind of quality stamp of the adopted policies and positions.
Contemporary International Relations are also marked by the diffusion of polarities, taken into account the decline of the militarist logic of the Cold War period (Haass, 2008). The disintegration of power in many poles (economic, military, technologic, cultural, etc) complexifies international actuation. “The agenda of world politics has become like a three-dimensional chess game in which one can win only by playing vertically as well as horizontally. On the top board of classic interstate military issues (...) it makes sense to speak in traditional terms of unipolarity or hegemony. However, on the middle board of interstate economic issues, the distribution of power is multipolar. (...) And on the bottom board of transnational issues like terrorism, international crime, climate change, and the spread of infectious diseases, power is widely distributed and chaotically organized (...)” (Nye Jr., 2004, p 4)

In this context, it’s reasonable that States search for support and acquiescence from the others by the mean of attraction strategies that take into account national characteristics. This strategy, albeit not generating immediate or easily identifiable results, has the potential of building cooperation ties, a valuable arrange in a time when, due to the multiplicity of themes, there is more potential to disagreements at the international level (HAASS, 2008). Soft power, a term coined by Nye Jr. (2004), is the State ability to make the others follow him by his example and, potentially, cooperate with him. It’s about the capacity of molding others’ preferences without using physical or economic coercion to do so. In the governmental realm, soft power can be generated by political values developed in a State by specific policies, included in foreign action. The costs of soft power, when compared with the costs of military action, are low, what makes this kind of actuation particularly attractive to emerging countries, who wish to enlarge their global projection, but are limited by the lack of resources in the domestic arena.

Soft power and legitimacy creation are close concepts, capable of explaining some behaviors in the foreign realm. In a time when there is, in certain limits, the prevalence of a global ethos that values ideals of peaceful acquaintanceship, both concepts are useful to understand foreign policies as a whole, with emphasis in developing countries, given the absence of resources of those when compared to the less scarce means that developed countries have to conduct their foreign policy.

1 National characteristics understood as a wide range of aspects, like foreign policy, public policies, governmental structure, civil society actions and culture.
THE SOCIAL POLICIES OF THE PARTIDO DOS TRABALHADORES

The analysis of social policies in contemporary Brazil necessarily goes through the description of some events and historical processes. The end of the 1970 decade witnessed a global crisis of the Keynesian model of development and, consequently, the start of the expansion of the neoliberal ideology and actions throughout the planet. This process, characterized by the retreat of the State action in a series of economic areas, had its apex during the governments of Ronald Reagan in the United States and of Margaret Thatcher in the United Kingdom, and caused effects in countries as different as Chile and Mozambique (Harvey, 2005).

Brazil entered later in the neoliberal expansion dynamic. The dismantling of the authoritarian civilian-military regime and the simultaneous reconstruction of the democratic rule-of-law State allowed the action of many social movements until then repressed. Their actuation in defense of their claims forbade the immediate opening of the country to the neoliberal agenda. The result of this process is registered in the Federal Constitution of 1988 that, besides rebuilding democracy, consecrated many social rights principles, approximating itself of the model of Welfare State (Fagnani, 2011). One of the examples of the constitutional consecrating of the social protection corollary is the prevision of the benefits of continued installments (in Portuguese, benefício de prestação continuada, BPC), that guarantee a minimum earning to the elderly and to the disabled, to be funded by the social security organs.

The advance towards the building of a Welfare State was interrupted after the election of Fernando Collor to the presidency in 1989, a fact that marks the establishment of a neoliberal political agenda in the country. “Comparing the Brazilian experience with other Latin American countries, or even with some Asian experiences, the pace and the extension of the reforms that took place in the Collor/Itamar tenure can be seen as mild (...)” (Castro, 2005, p. 148). The neoliberal experience was still at the beginning; however, it was enough to stop the construction of the Brazilian Welfare State for more than a decade. The Fernando Henrique Cardoso government (1995 – 2002) brought new measures and implemented policies of wealth redistribution, as the

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2 Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT) is the Brazilian Labour Party, to which Lula da Silva and Rousseff are members.

3 President Collor was impeached in 1992, and substituted by the vice-president Itamar Franco.
Bolsa-Escola and the Auxílio-Gás, however, these movements cannot be seen as a restart of the construction of the Brazilian Welfare State for two reasons. First, because “[…] the social policy was not conceived and presented [… ] as substitutive or even capable of providing all the social needs, dramatically augmented by the growth of poverty, by unemployment and by the income reduction.” (Draibe, 2003, p. 89). Second, because there was a deadlock between the universalization and the focalization, what undermined the efficiency of the programs and contributed even more to reduce their impact to the generation of social well-being in the period.

In the Lula da Silva government there is a substantial change in the management of social policies by the federal administration. According to Fagnani (2011), there’s been an initial time of shock between two perspectives inside the government: one defending the continuity of austere economic policies and, consequently, the maintenance of a reduced welfare governmental apparatus; another defending the expansion of the State action aiming economic growth and the guaranteeing of welfare, even though relaxing some guidelines of macroeconomic affairs. From 2005 on, with the prevailing of the second group, there is the consolidation of the social programs of the Lula da Silva government, represented essentially by the Programa Bolsa Família (PBF) as an umbrella, a structure that gathers a series of minor programs, defined by their focalized character. The PBF coordination is held by the Ministério do Desenvolvimento Social e Combate à Fome (MDS), founded in 2004 with the objective of concentrating national policies of social development and food security. “Generally, the program […] sets five main goals: (1) promotion of access to basic public services, specially health, education and social assistance; (2) fight against hunger aiming the promotion of food and nutritional security; (3), stimuli to sustained emancipation of the families that live in poverty or extreme poverty; (4) fight against poverty; and, finally, (5) promotion of the interaction between sectors, complementarity and synergy of social actions of public power.” (Oliveira, 2009, p 7).

To reach those goals, the PBF makes wealth distribution through monetary transferences to families classified as in a situation of poverty or extreme poverty with the occurrence of children, teenagers and/or pregnant, selected in a double process of

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4 Payments to families under a minimum level of income that kept their children going to school and subsidies to the purchase of cooking gas, respectively.

5 Ministry of social development and fight against hunger
registration in the Cadastro Único do Governo Federal\(^6\) and technical evaluation by the body of workers of the program (Oliveira, 2009). As a counterpart to the receiving of the benefit, the family members in school age must present a minimum level of presence in class and the family members must receive medical attention and take part in the actions of nutritional checking made by the federal government. In global terms, the PBF can be seen as a policy of subsidizing the demand for internal production goods and a stimulus to human development whose aim is to break the cycle of poverty intergenerational reproduction \(\text{idem, ibidem}\).

The results of the social policies of the Lula da Silva government are expressive\(^7\). According to Fagnani (2011), millions of people weren’t any more classified as under the lines of poverty or extreme poverty thanks to the redistributive actions. Some possible critics to the model, in the sense that the changes didn’t depend of social policies and were caused by currency valorization and by the growth of Gross Domestic Product, must be seen carefully, once “(…) Nowadays, the dynamic of national economy is associated to the behavior of the social spending, because it responds to the strengthening of the private sector in the production of goods and services suited to the growing demand that stems from the process of inclusion of enormous segments traditionally excluded” (Pochmann, 2011, p 18).

PBF, whose covering was expanded four times between 2003 and 2010, comprehending 12.8 million families, became an example of focalized social policy whose effects were multiplied beyond the initial goals. The Northeast economy, area that concentrates the majority of the families covered by the PBF, grew in superior rates comparatively to the national average in the Lula da Silva government\(^8\) (IBGE, 2010). The institutional design of the program, that preferentially selects mothers to give the benefit, allowed the raise in participation of women in local society, and there’s been a noticeable change in the levels of schooling and school frequency of the benefited children (Medeiros \textit{et al}, 2007).

The following quotation is appropriate to close the segment on social policies initiated in the Lula da Silva government and present already an element that will return in the end of this study: “With the inflexion occurred from 2006 on, there was a

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\(^6\) Federal cadaster  
\(^7\) This work won’t present deep statistical analysis on the effects of social policies of the period, but will present the conclusions of works that present those data.  
\(^8\) The investment in the productive structure of the region also were significant during that time, however, there are evidences of the importance of the wealth transfer by itself to northeastern economic growth, as presents Singer (2012)
movement towards the construction of a new strategy of social protection based on economic development with stability, income distribution and convergence between the universal and the focalized actions. However, the consolidation of this effort requires still a long walk.” (Fagnani, 2011, p. 76)

**TEN YEARS OF FOREIGN POLICY**

In his inaugural speech, president Lula da Silva stated that “Our foreign policy will reflect also the call for changes expressed in the streets. In my government, Brazilian diplomatic action will be oriented by a humanist perspective and it will be, above all, a tool for national development.” (Brasil, 2007, p. 17). If the idea of using foreign policy as a device to help national development isn’t new among presidents and other actors of Brazilian foreign policy, it’s possible to state that, after ten years, the Lula da Silva/Rousseff tenure had brought a series of new contributions to Brazilian diplomatic behavior, although there may be evidences of the exhaustion of the model.

In the political realm, Brazil has acted in a context seen as “favorable to the consolidation of a new polycentrism” (Ricupero, 2010, p. 38), in which the country sought to reinforce its ties with the so-called global south countries, a group with no formal definition, but composed essentially by developing countries, previously defined as the second and third world. “Itamaraty has chosen to concentrate itself on unoccupied spaces. By coming closer together with its South-American neighbors – particularly Andean ones -, Southern Africa, Arab countries, and giants as India, China and Russia, Brazilian diplomacy was able to advance considerably and immediately (…)” (Visentini; Silva, 2010, p 68). That approximation happened in bilateral terms, with the increasing of the exchange of visits of high-authorities, and also in multilateral terms, with the creation of institutions and the search for the coordination of policies in forum like World Trade Organization (WTO). The creation of IBSA, a forum that aims to promote the coordination and the cooperation among Brazil, India and South Africa, is a paramount example of Brazilian’s foreign policy political orientation of the period. Besides economic reasons, that will be presented ahead, IBSA served as a sustaining platform to goals as the Brazilian quest for a permanent seat in the United Nations
Security Council and the projection as a regional leadership in South America (Taylor, 2009).

The approach of unoccupied spaces, relatively to the immediate neighborhood and spaces as Sub-Saharan Africa and Arab countries had as main pillar the use of the asymmetries between Brazil and other countries, a factor until then underused in Brazilian foreign policy. If the differences between Brazil and more developed countries had been used before, during the Lula da Silva government there was, as never before, the projection of national capabilities over less developed countries (Spektor, 2011). In South America, integration with smaller neighbors became a priority, entangling not only political themes, but also questions of technical and financial exchange, and it was maintained even when there weren’t perspectives of immediate return of the dispensed efforts (Malamud, 2011; Saraiva, 2010b). In Africa, Brazil opted for a strategy of transferring social technologies of low cost to his partners and to approach those countries, which avoided the critiques usually addressed to developed countries (Saraiva, 2010). As points Malamud (2011), the Brazilian change of posture may have generated a mismatching between the country’s global projection, majorly favorable, and its regional projection, once Brazilian action finds resistances in his surroundings and wasn’t until now able to consolidate itself as a unquestioned regional leadership. Official speech, however, shows that Brazilian good will towards unfavorable policies is deliberated, once the guideline of Brazilian foreign policy in that subject is to use national resources to build a stronger region, and this will provide future dividends (Amorim, 2011).

The economic aspects of foreign policy also obeyed to the logic of approximation to underdeveloped countries. Far from adopting a belligerent economic foreign policy – the country maintained and advanced in its deals with external creditors – Brazil sought to change the pattern of its insertion, working for the reform of the international financial system and looking for exchange terms more favorable to developing countries. “The G-20 of the WTO – a group of emerging countries (Brazil, India, Argentina, South Africa and others), which came to include China and at least one LDC, Tanzania – was formed with a view to ensure that the Doha Development Agenda (DDA) would not be another unfulfilled promise and would effectively bring the development dimension into trade negotiations” (Amorim, 2010, p. 218). An

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9 It’s important to point the Brazilian plight for a permanent seat at the Council isn’t new, but came back as a priority during the recent years. For more on the subject, see Vargas (2011).
unavoidable fact to the analysis of international economy of the period is the economic crisis started in 2008. The growth stagnation and the many samples of frailty of the public and private financial systems of the developed countries made the Brazilian government initiate a series of demands on the necessity of reforming the international economic system. Without proposing structural changes, Brazil started to ask for a more consistent participation of the developing countries in world economic governance. This movement had as consequence the strengthening of the financial G-20\textsuperscript{10}, who obscured the G-8, and the augmentation of the Brazilian participation quotas at the International Monetary Fund (Galvão, 2012; IMF, 2012) – obviously, the will and deeds of Brazil weren’t the sole responsible for those changes; it’s impossible, however, evaluate what could be the facts if Brazil had not taken the initiative to support the reforms.

The 2008 crisis underlined another economic aspect of Brazilian foreign policy of the period. The strategy of diversification of partnerships in the commercial realm, which sought to elevate the number of countries to whom Brazil exports its production, altered the foreign commerce pattern of the country. In 2003, 24,8% of Brazilian exports went to the European Union, 23,1% to the United States, 17,7% to Latin America and 16% to Asia (MDIC, 2012). In 2010, the pattern was 37,9% of the exports to Asia, 23,8% to Latin America, 21,4% to the European Union and 9,6% to the United States (MDIC, 2012b). The change was important to assure the dynamism of the national foreign commerce at the moment of the international economic crisis after 2008, once it redistributed the quantum of Brazilian exports and raised the importance of regions that were less affected by the depression. During the Rousseff tenure, the distribution became more even, probably as a result of the relative recovery of the United States: Asia, 31,7%; European Union, 20,2%; North America 15,7 % and Latin America, 19,5% (Comércio…,2013).

The foreign policy of the period brought also a conceptual innovation, the principle of non-indifference, which can be associated to humanist principles and to foreign policy as a development instrument, both evoked by the previously quoted speech by president Lula da Silva (2007). Developed by the African Union as a response to the massacres that took place in Ruanda during the nineties, the principle of non-indifference consists in the consideration that it’s necessary to act against human

\textsuperscript{10} We call “Financial G-20” the annual meetings of finance ministers and central bank presidents of the G-20, in contraposition to the G-20 created to act inside the World Trade Organization, the “Commercial G-20”
suffering wherever it may be, action that can involve even the momentary overcoming of considerations of sovereignty and the non-intervention principle (Seitenfuss et alii, 2007). Used in a flexible manner by the Brazilian government during the Lula da Silva government, the non-indifference was used to justify Brazilian participation in places and acts that, at first sight, didn’t need Brazilian contribution and, according to the critics, would be maleficent to the country. The Brazilian command of the peacekeeping mission of the United Nations in Haiti (Minustah), the nuclear agreement with Turkey and Iran and the talks on human rights with the former, the opening of diplomatic missions in small countries of Africa, Asia and the Caribbean, the entangling in the presidential crisis of Honduras\textsuperscript{11}, the spending of resources in cooperation with less developed countries: all of those attitudes were defended by the principle of non-indifference (Amorim, 2010, idem, 2010b). This principle, therefore, served the cornerstone of Brazilian diplomacy between 2003 and 2010, and should be considered as the ideological support of many acts, including the ones of insertion of social policies in the country’s international agenda.

Rousseff’s foreign policy is still in progress, but some major trends can be apprehended by the analysis of the three initial years of government. The main one is the slower pace of diplomatic activity, seen by some commentators as a strategic retreat after years of frantic action, and by others as the normalization of the Brazilian insertion after the Lula da Silva supposedly abnormal years (Stuenkel, 2014; Lopes, 2014). The lack of a defining concept to the foreign policy underlies this debate, and justifies the reactive stance took by Brazil between 2010 and 2013 – cases as the American electronic surveillance brought to surface by Edward Snowden, institutional crises in Paraguay and Venezuela and the currency war were dealt with, at most, moderate answers from Brazilian agents. Furthermore, political and bureaucratic problems caused the substitution of Antonio Patriota as minister and led to cuts in the budget of the MRE, what curbed even more its capacity of action (Desgastado…,2013; Orçamento…, 2013)

\textbf{FOREIGN POLICY AND SOCIAL POLICIES: INTERSECTIONS}

\textsuperscript{11} Even though the case had an accidental beginning, with the asking for asylum made by the deposed president Manuel Zelaya to the Brazilian embassy in Tegucigalpa, the continuity of the Brazilian participation in the case was justified under the non-indifference concept.
The intersections between Brazilian foreign policy and social policies happen essentially in two fields: the political acts, bilateral or multilateral, and the technical cooperation acts. The boundaries between them are hazy, as political acts serve as a support to cooperation agreements and, by the same path, cooperation serves to the construction of new political arrangements. The fields will be presented as different areas in order to simplify the text, even though, as shown above, they’re fully interconnected.

In the political realm, the fight against hunger and poverty was presented since the beginning as one of the international aims of the Lula da Silva government – minister Amorim declared that the effort to eradicate both “(…) is the only war we’re engaged” (Amorim, 2011b, p 71), evoking the possibility of a complete effort in that struggle, as it happens with war efforts. In 2004, in one of the firsts acts of greater visibility on the subject, Brazil convoked a global meeting about the subject, which took place at the same time of the United Nations General Assembly, and produced the New York Declaration on action against hunger and poverty (2004), together with Chile, Spain and France. The document lists the actions against hunger and poverty in course, suggests new mechanisms towards development and urges other States to engage themselves in that sense. At that same year, Brazil adhered to the Voluntary guidelines to support the progressive realization of the right to adequate food in the context of national food security, a document made by the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) which aims to consolidate the right to alimentation as a complimentary right to the whole specter of civil, economic and social rights. Still in 2004, Brazil, together with India and South Africa, founded the Ibsa Fund, whose aim is to fight poverty through South-South cooperation projects, in line with the Lula da Silva government aim to give emphasis on the relations with other developing countries. Since then, the fund has already financed projects in Guinea-Bissau, Haiti and Cape Verde, and helps the implementation of others in Cambodia, Burundi and Palestine (IBSA, 2013).

The political initiatives have become sparse through the years, giving place to cooperation initiatives that will be presented further; however, they didn’t disappeared from the speeches of president Lula da Silva or chancellor Amorim. A medium term consequence of the political initiatives, both internal and foreign, was the election of the Brazilian agronomist José Graziano da Silva, coordinator of the Fome Zero program, to
the presidency of the FAO, a global range organization, responsible to approach themes related to the farming and production of food (Brasileiro…, 2011).

Brazil, during the Lula da Silva tenure, expanded the number and the intensity of the technical cooperation actions, especially the ones related to social policies and towards the struggle against hunger and poverty. The Agência Brasileira de Cooperação (ABC), the Ministry of Foreign Relations agency responsible for the coordination of international cooperation programs, had its budget tripled between 2006 and 2010, from R$ 15.6 million to R$ 52.5 million (A política…, 2011). There’s been a budgetary roll back during the Rousseff presidency, in tandem with the slower pace of the foreign policy as a whole: the ABC budget for 2012 was around R$ 36 million, with possibility of reduction in 2013 (Governo…, 2013; ABREU, 2013). The cooperation projects are destined to developing countries, in order to promote social development through the providing of expertise generated in Brazil: in 2008, the country executed cooperation projects in 58 countries and in 2011 estimations held that the number had risen to 65 – all of them use, in a way or another, a social program that was created and put in practice in Brazil (ABC, 2013; Governo…, 2011). Embrapa and Fiocruz offices were opened in Central American and African countries, using Brazilian resources, to help in the development of technologies that use Brazilian knowledge on the particularities of tropical climate. The MDS is now implementing technical cooperation programs of income redistribution in Bolivia, Guatemala, Ecuador, Haiti and Peru, besides having other agreements with Angola, Argentina, Chile, Cuba, Egypt, El Salvador, Lebanon, Nicaragua, Panama, Pakistan, Senegal, Venezuela and Vietnam (MDS, 2013).

Other social programs of the Brazilian government, as the Minha casa, minha vida and the Segundo Tempo are a source of inspiration to other countries. “‘Brazil is now seen as a social policies laboratory by the countries that come to ask for cooperation as by the developed countries, that ask us for more projects’, justifies ambassador Marcos Farani, president of the Agência Brasileira de Cooperação.” (Governo…, 2011, translated)

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12 Embrapa is the Brazilian state-held company of agricultural research, Fiocruz is a foundation dedicated to medical research supported by the Ministry of Health
13 Designed to provide credit for residential purchasing to low-income families
14 Designed to democratize the sports practice.
15 From the original “‘O Brasil é visto hoje como um laboratório de políticas sociais, tanto pelos países que vêm pedir cooperação como pelos desenvolvidos, que nos pedem para fazer mais projetos’, justifica o presidente da Agência Brasileira de Cooperação (ABC), embaixador Marcos Farani.’”
THE DOUBLE EFFECT OF CONVERGENCE

The presentation above is the support to this final segment, which aims to answer two questions: what were the consequences of inserting social policies in foreign policy to the former? What were the consequences of inserting social policies in foreign policy to the latter? Those answers – including, possibly, no consequences at all – are relevant in the contemporary international context, in which globalization blurs the boundaries between those two policies and in which Brazil is a rising actor.

Let us face the effects of that interpenetration over social policies. The reinvigorating of public investment on social programs is one of the most relevant characteristic of the Lula da Silva/Rousseff government, seen by many as one of the factors responsible for the high approval rates of that administration and of fundamental importance to the victory of Dilma Rousseff, albeit the inner functioning of Brazilian politics hasn’t witnessed the sustaining of the approval from 2013 on. There is, therefore, a political association between the Lula da Silva government, the Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT) and the growth of social spending, specially the one linked to the PBF. In one hand, the association between the programs and the party seems beneficial from the electoral standpoint, as it may be inferred by the popular choice of the continuity of the PT government. In the other hand, the same association may cause harm to the continuation of social policies: the election of an oppositional party can provoke the discontinuity of the programs, if the party realizes the electoral potential of such decision – what may not be the case now, but can happen – or, otherwise, chooses to do a substantially different government. As points Medeiros et alii (2011), the PBF sustention is fundamentally political, once its legal basis is a provisory measure converted in a law. There is no judicial access assurance to the benefits provided by the PBF because, without the insertion of the program in the federal constitution, it doesn’t count as an assured right. In comparison with the BPC, the PBF is unstable because it’s exposed to administrative variation, contrarily to the former, protected by constitutional consecration.

16 The term “globalization” is always complex, given the many observations: it isn’t a new phenomenon; its effects are different when considering political and economic spheres, among others. It’s undeniable, however, that contemporary International Relations are marked by a high degree of linkage between its agents, what is enough to define globalization in the terms proposed by this work.

17 Brazilian Labour Party
Let us now return to an idea presented in the debate on the difference between State policy and government policies. The concept of State policy resists because a perception of two differences remain: temporal and directional. State policy is made to persist indefinitely, in opposition to the governmental policy that exists while a given group remains in power. State policy is, most of the time, oriented to the foreign realm, to an environment in which the State presents itself as a unity (and is stronger because it’s a unity), meanwhile governmental policies are oriented towards the inner public and makes explicit the divisions between groups. Turning policies into State policy is to assure their permanence in time against the changes of the groups that occupy power.

Inserting the new approach to the social policies in foreign policy is, from the perspective of the consequences of such movement to social policies, to make them potentially State policy. This is to realign their viewpoint, once they cease to be an initiative made by PT to Brazil and become a Brazilian regular policy implemented by PT. The reversal seems merely rhetorical, but it implies practical consequences if considered the proximity between international and national themes. As points Oliveira (2009), the reversion of a policy that holds a high approval degree by the international actors may harm the State’s prestige and reliability, putting at risk its actuation in international forums. The ‘statization’ of Brazilian social policies through their insertion in foreign policy is a deliberate process made to assure that they will be regarded by other countries and will count as a Brazilian quality that cannot be interrupted. An example of such reasoning is the article signed by president Rousseff, published by the occasion of the tenth anniversary of the PT presidency, that articulates in its beginning the fight against social inequalities and the international perspective on Brazil, postulating that the country has earned respect in the international sphere by avoiding economic crisis by many measures, the struggle against poverty being the most important (Dez…, 2012).

When regarding the consequences of the insertion of social policies to foreign policy to the latter, the main effect is the aggregation of soft power and legitimacy to Brazilian performance in the international realm, important elements if the premises of complex interdependence and shared international values are accepted. In the international relations defined as the tridimensional chess by Nye Jr. (2004), economic success is a pursued objective and, as it must be underlined, not mutually exclusionary between States. After the economic crisis of 2008 and the subsequent loss of credibility of the unregulated market as a stable instrument of wealth generation, inclusive
economic growth with the due public authority intervention started to be seen as a valid and desirable model. The Brazilian model of macroeconomic stability combined with poverty reduction measures and incentives to internal consumption became an example to be followed by other countries, especially the ones that had problems with neoliberal policies in fashion during previous decades.

In the terms posed by Nye Jr. (2004), social inclusion may be considered as a national characteristic in its wide sense, this is, valued by civilian society and encouraged by governmental agents, internally and externally. As the creator of the concept of soft power alerts, measuring the attraction generated by aspects as national characteristics is hard; however, there are evidences that may serve as a proxy to the argument. The statement made by the head of the ABC, which sustains that dozens of countries contact Brazil and search, through cooperation, to implement social policies that emulate the PBF, points clearly the attractiveness of contemporary Brazilian foreign policy, what may generate benefits, as support to Brazilian plights in multilateral institutions and political coordination in many themes. Another example is the election of José Graziano to the FAO presidency that can be read in two ways: it can be an international seal of approval to Brazilian policies against hunger and, simultaneously, the spending of political capital earned through soft power.

Delving into the unfolding of such a movement of generating a Brazilian model that projects itself abroad, and considering the observations made by Haass (2008) on the absence of a well-defined power pole in contemporary international relations, it’s possible to think about Brazilian social policies as generators of legitimacy in the global scenery. If there isn’t a definite pole, there is an augmentation of the possibilities described by Fonseca Jr. (1998) that any State may become an emissary of acts accepted by the others and that may establish an intersubjectively shared consensus. This is remarkably close to the strategies identified with emerging powers: to influence the international system in order to get better results, but to do so from within, through reforms and through the establishment of rules and institutions that favor their aims (Flemes, 2007; Hurrell, 2010). Therefore, the emphasis in measures related to food security and fight against hunger reinforces the Brazilian classification as an emerging power – it’s no coincidence that some of them are conducted under the Ibsa initiative -, and the solid adhesion to this strategy by countries of lesser development points towards the viability of such way as main course of action. The export of Brazilian public policies may signalize the generation of a global agreement on the perspective that it’s
ethical for governments to act against poverty – a change that by no means is irrelevant, and if not revolutionary, is certainly ones that defies many of the current presuppositions of the international system driven by the developed countries -, and that the means to do it may come from international mechanisms. In this case, Brazil would dawn as a State that defends an ethically conduct towards the others, a support that serves as an international attraction factor maybe even more relevant that soft power as originally defined.

FINAL CONSIDERATIONS

This work showed some aspects of contemporary Brazilian foreign policy and social policies, as well as some concepts and theoretical notions from International Relations aiming to find the consequences of the recent movement of fusion between the two fields of national politics, and their connection with Brazilian emerging power status. There are evidences that the two areas were affected: social policies, by being projected abroad, gained stability because they were apart from the policies associated to a government and approximated to what is conventionally called State policy, that is, a policy independent from the group that controls momentarily the governmental bureaucracy. Foreign policy, by its turn, was boosted by the inclusion of social policies in its agenda, once there is a demand by the other States for a model of policies against poverty similar to the Brazilian ones. The limitations shown during the Rousseff tenure are related to focal points unrelated to the social programs, thus, they don’t affect, until now, the projection based on the south-south relations.

There is still the need to verify the resistance of such conclusions after the passing of time, to check if there will be the permanence of social programs implemented by the Lula da Silva if the PT leaves government. There is also the need to analyze if, in medium and long term, Brazil will present a bigger resourcefulness in the international realm thanks to the prestige acquired by its public policies. The continuity of the Brazilian insertion as described in this work, however, will stress the country’s adherence to a characteristic emerging power behavior. Its quest for legitimacy and change inside the international system, adopting a posture of using social policies to achieve niche leadership among less developed countries, indicates an international insertion that must be comprehended in a more profound way, with the help of further studies that frame the phenomena in comparative ways.
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