Democracy, intervention and liberal strategy.

Abstract:
The article makes use of Michel Foucault's contributions and applies them to the study of international relations. This way, it asserts that through international relations history, there have been different modes of exercising power, accompanied by different modes of knowledge, which have had as condition of possibility and effect different modes of constitution of subjectivities. To this end, the article defines the present mode of exercising power as a global liberal government, in contrast to the mode of exercising power characteristic of the Westphalian system. This definition is constructed focusing in four dimensions: object, objective, mode of intervention and spatiality. The article arrives to a first conclusion which asserts that a series of liberal statements forming discourse has been established constituting new subjects and objects of power globally. Providing that mode of exercising power and mode of exercising war are considered as mutually constitutive, transformations in war are also defined through these four dimensions. The article argues that, combined, these four dimensions converge in the imposition of the democratic-liberal model. This way, the article reflects on liberal interventions, whose declared objective is the establishment of liberal democracy, not through moral categories, but as part of a greater technology of government.

Key words: global liberal government, interventionism, war liberal, liberal democracy
By Mariela Cuadro

Throughout the Cold War, we contained a global threat to market democracies; now we should seek to enlarge their reach ... First, we should strengthen the community of major market democracies - including our own - which constitutes the core from which enlargement is proceeding. Second, we should help foster and consolidate new democracies and market economies, where possible, especially in states of special significance and opportunity. Third, we must counter the aggression - and support the liberalization - of states hostile to democracy and markets. Fourth, we need to pursue our humanitarian agenda not only by providing aid, but also by working to help democracy and market economics take root in regions of greatest humanitarian concern.2

Anthony Lake, 1993

1. Intro
Modes of exercise of power were one of Michel Foucault´s main research subjects. The French philosopher did not conceive power as a substance that remains unchanged over time, but as a relationship that historically mutates. Hence, the question that guided him was not what is power, but how it is exercised (Foucault, 1988).

The exercise of power in Foucault appears to be linked to two other figures: the knowledge and the subject. According with Gilles Deleuze’s reading and in a few words, to be effected, the shapeless power requires a formed element: knowledge (Deleuze, 1988). Following Deleuze, knowledge is for Foucault an ensemble of the visible and the articulable. Under certain circumstances, the statements form discourse. Foucault’s conception of discourse is particular because he does not consider it as exempt of materiality. Thus, the French philosopher moves away from the materialism/idealism dispute and asserts that discourse is material because it generates material effects on "reality". This means that what it is said is as important or more important than what it is seen. That is why this article takes statements seriously, making a superficial reading of

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3 In this regard, Deleuze affirms: “The question of primacy is essential: the statement has primacy [over the visible]... But primacy has never meant reduction” (1988: 49).
them, that is, remaining at the level of the stated. Thus, the article dismisses interpretative readings which seek in the non-said of the text.

Through knowledge, power constitutes subjects. The condition and the effect of power exercise is the constitution of subjectivities. And just like there are different modes of subject (the sovereign power’s subject is not the same as the citizen, even if both are caught in a web of power), there are different modes of exercise of power. Some of which the researcher identifies are: sovereign power, disciplinary power, biopower, liberal power. Between them he establishes diverse and varied types of linkages. At times they are clearly distinct, at times, they overlap, at times, they appear linked forming others, and thus incorporated into a larger "technology."

The article assumes that in international relations there have also been various modes of exercising power, accompanied by a number of modes of knowing, and that required to be exercised, diverse modes of constitution of subjectivities. Thus, and very schematically, the mode of government guided by the reason of state and theorized by classical realism, in which state sovereignty appeared as a sacrosanct institution and whose subjects were instruments at the service of the survival of that State - Westphalian system – distinguishes itself from the current mode of government.

This last statement does not suppose the extinction of the previous mode and its full replacement by a new one. Far from that approach, the article agrees with Ann Laura Stoler who says that, instead of proposing the abandonment by Foucault of certain concepts, perspectives and methodologies, it is necessary to think that the author has a mechanism of work based on break up and recovery (Stoler, 1995). Thus, the current mode of governments to be named as liberal government (Dillon and Reid, 2001; Jabri, 2006; Odysseos, 2008; Petito, 2007), is no more than a set of observable trends that appear at times competing and at times acting in conjunction with elements of the reason of state or Westphalian system. Thus, while the sovereign power has not disappeared from international relations, its participation with respect to a liberal power that occupies more and more spaces has been reduced.

With the deployment of the Global War on Terror it has become clear that sovereignty is no longer a necessary concept and, on the contrary, that is has become a contingent one (Elden, 2009). However, the transformation of sovereignty is a phenomenon that has been unfolding before it and has continued since it. The dissolution of the state’s classical prerogatives, the growing importance of non-governmental organizations and other non-state actors, the increasingly strong presence of regional and international organizations, the expansion of financial deterritorialised capital, the
universalist claims etc., have preceded the Global War on Terror and have continued beyond it.

Since the end of the Cold War, there have been a series of transformations in the way of exercising power at the global level that have resulted in the emergence of a new world government rationality of liberal features. This does not mean that every state on the Earth has become liberal, but that liberal statements have formed discourse, constituting subjectivities. Indeed, it is not necessary that each state of the globe be actually liberal. It is just necessary that a hegemonic liberal discourse exists. In other words, for a liberal mode of government to exist, is enough that the most important international organizations seek to impose liberal standards; that regime changes which result in the imposition of liberal democracies, jeopardizing the principle of sovereignty, are executed; that interventions on behalf of populations or improvement of mankind are carried out; that the subject of Human Rights remains an individual subject; and that, despite some traces of protectionism appeared since the crisis in 2008 in the United States erupted, the free market remains considered by most of international relations actors as "a moral principle even before it became a pillar of the economy"\(^4\), a permanent, non-historical institution, and the regime of veridiction of state policies. As stated by Tim Dunne and Matt MacDonald, “‘the international’ is itself constituted by rules and institutions that have an affinity with liberalism without necessarily being dependent upon the preferences of liberal states. Once this has been admitted, we open up the possibility that the liberal world order could be held together by the actions of the non-liberal states” (Dunne and MacDonald, 2013: 5).

As exercise of power and exercise of war are mutually constitutive, the transformation of the former has showed up through the changes in the mode of exercise of violence, i.e. in the way of making war. Furthermore, wars are not presented as such anymore, the use of that signifier being avoided. In exchange, they appear as (humanitarian) interventions. Wars happen in non-liberal zones and aim to transform them. This latter is proved by the fact that all opened or covert interventions that have taken place in different countries of different continents since the intervention in the former Yugoslavia, have been made on behalf of liberal democracy, freedom of individuals and the protection of population and human rights.

Since the 2003 invasion of Iraq, the tendency to impose regime change in the intervened countries has been deepened, with its corollary being the imposition of liberal democratic model, which, besides periodic elections and the extension of certain civil liberties, supposes neoliberal economic reforms and the transformation of populations in a

set of atomized citizens. Among other things, the establishment of liberal regimes where these have not existed before requires free individuals capable of self-government. This new subjectivity must be built through the breakup of pre-existing social ties.

Changes in the mode of government at the global level can be conceived through various dimensions. With the intention of defending the existence of a particular form adopted by liberal interventions, the article defines some of those dimensions: object and objectives, mode of intervention and spatiality. The interventions can be military or civilian or have aspects of both. In all cases, the stated goal is the imposition of a "true" democracy (e.g. liberal or market democracy) to protect people from the excesses of "dictators" and "tyrants." Recent cases of Syria, Venezuela and Ukraine, and the former Iraq and Libya testify it.

The legitimacy that adopts the imposition of liberal democracy is sustained by a discourse that largely exceeds liberal powers and that is distributed through devices such as the concentrated media and internet, where specialized analysts also participate. In the specific context of International Relations, liberal democracy appears to be linked to two discursive elements of great weight: the Democratic Peace Thesis and the Responsibility to Protect.

The condition of possibility and the effect of the establishment of liberal democracy (corollary of the past interventions) lie in the constitution of subjects as individuals-citizens. In many cases, this means divesting them of their collective and communal identities. The fact that individuals are constituted as (self)governable supposes them to assume individual responsibility for their successes and failures, excluding the structural dimension from any analysis (Foucault, 2007).

2. Liberal power: the global liberal government.

Michel Foucault worked on the issue of liberalism in seminars as Society must be defended (1975-1976), Security, Territory, Population (1977-1978) and The Birth of Biopolitics (1978-1979), where he presented it as an exercise of power or technology of government. This way, Foucault argued that liberalism cannot be defined as an ideology. Instead, according to the author, it is a historically specific set of techniques aimed at the

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5 As Étienne Balibar argues, individualism is presented as the best mode of subjectivation: "This latent presence of the hierarchical issue (...) is today expressed especially in the prevalence of the individualistic model: implicitly superior cultures would be those that value and favor the 'individual' endeavour, the social and political individualism, in opposition to those that inhibit it" (Balibar, 2005: 43).
constitution of (self)governable subjects, the central feature of which is that it is a freedom consumer (Foucault, 2007). Indeed, it carries the mandate of achieving the smallest possible government, propped on the freedom of the subjects, constituted as individuals. Moreover, if it is a freedom consumer, it requires producing it. This way, freedom is not considered as a prefabricated zone needed to be respected. On the contrary, in order to produce it, action is necessary. This production has a cost whose calculation principle is security (for example, to secure the individual interest versus the collective interest, or, conversely, to secure the public interest against the individual). This way, Foucault affirms that the game between freedom and security is at the heart of liberalism as a technology of government (Foucault, 2007).

Foucault defines liberal power in contrast with sovereign power. He states that the object of the first is not the same that of the second. While the sovereign power’s object was the sovereign as such or the state (in the case of the reason of state⁶), the liberal government’s object is constituted by population and civil society. This does not mean that the state has died, but that its meaning has mutated. The state of reason of state, during which all of its forces pointed to its survival, is different from the state as understood at the present time, whose function is to improve the life of the population. The relationship between the population and the state has changed: If for the reason of state the first was an instrument aimed at the survival of the latter, for liberalism the latter (as a gubernamentalized state) is an instrument for improving the life of the first.

The claim that global civil society has become subject and object of government under the global liberal governmental regime may be endorsed through various documents and concepts of global incidence which appeared or gained prominence especially after the fall of the Berlin Wall. For example: governmental and non-governmental organizations dedicated to improve population’s life; the "human security" concept; the fact that principles of sovereign equality and non-intervention have lost relative importance and, instead, notions such as "responsibility to protect" have emerged; speeches about the end of war and the replacement of these by "humanitarian interventions", etc.. This was also evident in the modifications of the international organizations’ agenda, expressed, for instance, in the series of conferences organized by the United Nations that took place during the 1990s. Similarly, it is interesting to note the importance that acquired some agencies for the promotion of life, such as the United Nations Development Programme and the World Health Organization. In this regard, Ian Clark and Christian Reus-Smith sharply observe that the Security Council of the United Nations is experiencing a “mission

⁶ Foucault develops the concept of reason of state mainly in Security, Territory, Population. The concept appears again in Birth of Biopolitics.
creep’, in which special responsibilities are migrating from one domain to another: initially they were assigned to the Council in matters of international security, but latterly have been expanded to its safeguarding of human rights” (Clark and Reus-Smith, 2013: 39).

From this article’s perspective, the emergence of all these documents, concepts and institutions do not mean a linear and necessary progress of mankind, but is part of a new government technology exerted through a new subject and a new object of government: the global population.

Now, the global population does not only act as an object of government, but also as a subject of it. Liberal government is considered as a particular form of government that exercises its power not only on civil society, but also through it. This became evident in the context of recent interventions (especially in Libya and Syria). The populations on behalf of whom intervention took place have not appeared only as its object (object of protection, for example) but also as a subject of it, being presented as co-active. Furthermore, institutions exist which train them\(^7\). In this sense, it is intended that civil society actively participate in the promotion of liberal democracy. After the 2003 invasion of Iraq, it has been searched that interventions are accompanied by the express demand of the different oppositions (it was the case of Libya in 2011, it is the case of Syria and that of Ukraine).

If the object is transformed, so it is the objective. For the reason of state, it was the survival of the state as such. In this sense, it only cared about the lives of men, of their subjects, as long as they were considered as state forces. Therefore, every internal force worked to the conservative goal of the survival of the state in a world understood in terms of political and economic competition and zero-sum game. Regarding the liberal governmental rationality, its aim is not only to ensure the population survival, changing the state for the population, but to improve its life. Liberal rationality of government is not conservative, but multiplier, expansive.

This was evidenced in the last intervention in Libya. Although Security Council’s Resolution 1973 urged countries to intervene to protect people (conservative objective), countries which led the intervention (United States, France and Britain) unilaterally decided

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\(^7\)For example, with respect to the Middle East, in addition to the *United States Agency for International Development* (USAID), U.S. institutions that promote democracy through the funding of different sectors of civil society are: the *Middle East Partnership Initiative*, the *Bureau for Democracy, Human Rights and Labor*, the *National Endowment for Democracy*, the *Near East Regional Democracy Program*, the *Middle East Response Fund* and the *Office of the Special Coordinator for Middle East Transitions*. According to the *New York Times*, “as American officials and others look retrospectively the uprisings of the Arab Spring, they see that U.S. democracy construction campaigns play a bigger role in fomenting protests than previously known, with central leaders of movements having been trained by the Americans in campaign activities, organization through new media tools and monitoring elections.” Accessed April 2011 in [http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/15/world/15aidhtml?r=5&hp](http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/15/world/15aidhtml?r=5&hp)
that the only way to comply with the international body’s mandate was regime change and the subsequent establishment of a liberal democratic regime (expansive objective):

Our duty and our mandate under UN Security Council Resolution 1973 is to protect civilians, and we are doing that. It is not to remove Gaddafi by force. But it is impossible to imagine a future for Libya with Gaddafi in power (...). It is unthinkable that someone who has tried to massacre his own people can play a part in their future government (...). There is a pathway to peace that promises new hope for the people of Libya: a future without Gaddafi that preserves Libya’s integrity and sovereignty and restores her economy and the prosperity and security of her people (...). So long as Gaddafi is in power, Nato and its coalition partners must maintain their operations so that civilians remain protected and the pressure on the regime builds. Then a genuine transition from dictatorship to an inclusive constitutional process can really begin, led by a new generation of leaders. For that transition to succeed, Colonel Gaddafi must go, and go for good.\(^8\).

The possibility of the enlargement of objectives was given by the “Responsibility to protect” (from now on: R2P). R2P involves three responsibilities: 1) the responsibility to prevent, by attacking the causes of risks which affect populations; 2) the responsibility to react, by responding to the situations of concern with "appropriate measures, which may include coercive measures (...), and in extreme cases military intervention"\(^9\); 3) the responsibility to rebuild, acting on the causes that led to the population's vulnerability. In most cases, the "causes" appear related with the lack of liberal democracy. This latter point, combined with the Democratic Peace Thesis, opens up the possibility of the violent establishment of liberal democratic regimes. The R2P document was endorsed by the General Assembly of the United Nations in 2005.

With respect to the modes of intervention, due to the central importance of sovereignty, Westphalian system was based on the impossibility to intervene in other countries’ internal affairs. This principle was challenged by the Napoleonic Wars, aimed at exporting the French Revolution and whose response was the Congress of Vienna in 1815. The Congress of Vienna worked as a restorer of the European balance, reinstating the principle of sovereignty as the organizing axis of the "old continent". Foucault points out that, while the Westphalian system is supported on non-intervention among states, within each of these, a continuous intervention is produced, carried out by the police (Foucault, 2004). It is the age of discipline, which works through the imposition of rules to the subjects. This imposition is done "from the outside", this means that behaviors are imposed on subjects by a force strange (but not foreign) to them.

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\(^8\) Sarkozy, François ; Obama, Barack and Cameron, David (2011), ”Gaddafi must leave” (14/04/2011). (Online), accessed April 2011

\(^9\) INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON INTERVENTION AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY (2001), ”The Responsibility to Protect ”, Ottawa: International Development Center.
According to Foucault, liberal government is not exercised "from the outside", but it is a power that is exercised “from the inside”. Indeed, it is sustained on the "nature" of men, without seeking to impose behaviors on their lives, but guiding, regulating the existing ones. Under this logic, contrary to the police state, liberalism argues that the only way to promote wealth and development is through the liberation of market mechanisms, conceived as natural. This means the end of the intervention only in the market, emerging different spaces to govern (population and civil society). In a context in which the market has already been released from state intervention, neoliberalism emerges. Neoliberalism conceives the market as an artificial device and, therefore, suggests that constant intervention is necessary to introduce market mechanisms in all areas of society. It is an environmental intervention in the framework in which the life of the population develops. It establishes the rules of the game, so that at their interior issues develop naturally: "no economic intervention or the minimal economic intervention and the maximum juridical intervention" (Foucault, 2007: 199). Unlike liberalism, which presupposes freedom as a given and the withdrawal of the state as necessary, so it can be deployed, neoliberalism does not imply freedom as a nature, but intends to produce it.

In view of the homologation that liberal states postulates between their modes of production, government and social organization and freedom – as an ambiguous and undefined term-, it is possible to understand that the export of freedom involves the imposition of foreign models. In this sense, Tarik Barkawi and Mark Laffey claim that "inside and outside the core Western states, then, US post-World War II grand strategy can be understood in terms of the production of liberal spaces " (Barkawi and Laffey, 1999: 419). This way, liberalism is presented as an inclusive mode of government, whose intervention has as aim to incorporate illiberal countries and cultures to the liberal government. This is possible through institutional transformation. Regime change applied to different intervened countries supposes the establishment of liberal democracy (elections plus free market) with the goal of improving the lives of the people.

Moreover, these extrapolations of a particular regime of government are not restricted to the export of polls, political parties and ballots. Since the government relationship is a social one, it is the latter which must also be exported. This implies a transformation in the way in which subjects relate to themselves and to the others. If it is postulated that the government relationship can be simply exported to any country, no matter what its socio historical relations are, it is because it is assumed that subjects are naturally free, democratic and holders of (also conceived as natural) rights. This explains, in part, the failure of these experiments in Afghanistan, in Iraq and in Libya, to name just the most notable examples.
If this type of interventionism is possible, it is because world power configuration has gone through changes also in its spatial dimension. Despite not being immaculate -as Stephen Krasner has shown (Krasner, 2001)-, state sovereignty was the central institution of Westphalian system: it was the principle on which relations between the actors of world politics were based. Regarding the characteristics of political units, the central feature of the modern nation-state was the consolidation of a single authority in the territory governed. This involved two fundamental spatial demarcations: On the one hand, the separation between the public and the private, and, on the other hand, the separation between the internal and the external.

The central role played by the institution of sovereignty was sustained on the recognition of equality between states\(^{10}\), a feature Carl Schmitt (2006) regarded as fundamental to avoid wars of destruction, and John Gerard Ruggie (1993) called "mutual sovereignty". The Peace of Westphalia, which involved the recognition of states that were part of it, was based on the existence of a plurality of such entities. In terms of Schmitt, it was a "pluriverse" existing as such (Schmitt, 2006). This means that, while the balance of power was maintained, so that there was not a single state that could subsume the rest under his power, the Westphalian system was guaranteed. In this sense, it was immersed in a conservative rationality based on the recognition and maintenance of constituted (European) states. Regarding this latter point, Foucault affirms that "(t)he empire is dead" (Foucault, 2004: 252).

In this context, peace was fragile and precarious as the possibility of using the inter-sovereign war against political enemies (Schmitt, 1966) as a tool for preserving the balance of power existed. This means, on the one hand, that plurality was a condition for peace and, on the other hand, that the prospect of a "perpetual peace" was not part of the logic of reason of state.

Liberalism changes the spatial conception of reason of state. If this latter involved a "pluriverse" of self-interested states, committed to the maintenance of a balance of power within Europe, with the objective of surviving as such and based on a zero-sum game conception (the realist thesis), the new governmental discourse will postulate a non-zero-sum game. Liberalism assumes that development in a state is only possible through development of the others. Therefore, globalization of trade becomes necessary. From the liberal point of view, the latter is only possible if the market is allowed to develop naturally.

\(^{10}\) At first only European states enjoyed this benefit, while the rest of the world was considered as a liberated zone (see Schmitt, 2005). Besides, to affirm the formal mutual equality between European states regarding their sovereignty does not mean ruling out the existence of differences. What is sought is to highlight the plural character of Westphalian Europe, against the idea of universality which liberalism implies. Mutual sovereignty supposed impossibility to interfere in other (European) States’ domestic affairs.
The emergence of the new object of government at the global level, and of the individual as a subject of rights and, linked to this, the appearance in 1948 of which were defined as Human Rights, led gradually to a relative loss of importance of sovereignty as it was understood during the reason of state.

As discussed with the concept of "mutual sovereignty" and Schmitt's conception of *ius publicum Europaeum* (Schmitt, 2005), sovereignty supposed the formal equality of states. By contrast, the advent of liberalism worldwide establishes a hierarchy between them. Within it, liberal states, mostly geographically located in the West of the globe, mark the standard through which all other states are valued. Thus, sovereignty becomes contingent: the respect of illiberal states’ sovereignty depends on the will of the liberal ones. The emergence of various international institutions (UN conferences of the 90s of last century, the concept of Human Security, R2P, humanitarian interventions, etc.) facilitates the contingent nature of sovereignty through the weakening of the principle of sovereign equality and that of non-intervention. R2P is clear about that: among its basic principles, the document states that the primary responsibility of states is to protect its citizens. In this way it erodes the principle of sovereign equality, because it contends that when states cannot fulfill this function, or when its citizens are deliberately terrified, "the principle of non-intervention yields to the international responsibility to protect"\(^{11}\).

This should not allow the inference -as achieved by certain academics (e.g. Hardt and Negri, 2002)-, that the state has disappeared or has ceased to exist. According to Foucault, liberal governmental reason is traversed by the tension between sovereignty space and economic individuals (Foucault, 2007). Pressure exerted from the individual freedom pole taps continuously on the state’s rigid borders, to such an extent that another spatiality emerges, in which territorial integrity remains to be critical (the arguments around the issue of Crimea are there to prove it), but in which the content of that territory (state) tends to be homogenized according to universalized liberal norms. Thus, the paradox that underscores Stuart Elden (2009) can be understood: there is a willing to preserve the territorial integrity of intervened states, while, at the same time, sovereignty becomes contingent. With respect to that, the case of post-invasion Iraq is eloquent. Despite the wave of sectarian violence that erupted after the overthrow of Saddam Hussein, the Bush administration repeatedly refused to the division of the territory into three states (one Shiite, one Sunni and one Kurdish), as proposed by many analysts.

Therefore, in the passage of reason of state to liberal government the territorial issue remains important, but the institution of sovereignty changes its meaning. Already in

\(^{11}\) INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON INTERVENTION AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY (2001), "The Responsibility to Protect", Ottawa: International Development Center.
1950s, Schmitt’s attention had been drawn by such tension, which he has conceived under the form of the coexistence of a territorial logic, linked to the political state, and an expected global maritime logic, linked to a free market economy. According to the author, the Westphalian order, sustained on a territorial logic, was slowly eroded by a world economic current, of non-state character, that undermined it from all sides. The capitalist-liberal economy, sustained on a maritime logic, this is, of non-recognition of borders, did not only carry with it the overcoming of politico-state boundaries, but also the internal homogenization of states. The idea of a free world economy presupposed the states to adopt a minimum common denominator consisting "mostly in non statehood of property, trade and economy" (Schmitt, 2005).

Thus, while not finished, sovereignty suffers a transformation that does imply the end of the Westphalian type. In then Secretary-General of the United Nations, Kofi Annan, words:

State sovereignty, in its most basic sense, is being redefined—not least by the forces of globalisation and international co-operation. States are now widely understood to be instruments at the service of their peoples, and not vice versa. At the same time individual sovereignty—by which I mean the fundamental freedom of each individual, enshrined in the charter of the UN and subsequent international treaties—has been enhanced by a renewed and spreading consciousness of individual rights. When we read the charter today, we are more than ever conscious that its aim is to protect individual human beings, not to protect those who abuse them. ¹²

In this regard, the liberal conception of non-zero-sum game changes the conception of peace, but also of war. The idea of states’ mutual benefit through global trade makes possible the perpetual peace postulate and enables the prohibition of war. This conception of the state and the role of the individual and, through it of Humanity, in international relations is absolutely new. Indeed, international action on behalf of individuals and groups at risk has not been, in any case, something usual in recent centuries.


With the end of the Cold War came the inauguration of a new conception of war, one that sought to invoke humanity in its justifying discourses. The very construction of this form of war as “liberal” attaches to it a certain normative meaning; that war, when undertaken by particular states, is a progressive force globally. Intervention in distant lands would from henceforth be undertaken for the protection of other populations, those under threat from their own kinsmen and governments, requiring protection and rescue in the name of international responsibility and human rights. (Jabri, 2010: 94)

Some argue that this institutionalized, commercial, cooperative liberal order, characterized by a peaceful nature, prevailed during the decade of the 90s of the last century; then the Global War on Terror would have came to put an end to it (Ikenberry, 2011; Dunne and McDonald, 2013). So, the exercise of violence, the imperial feature of liberal order, is casted aside as if it was not part of it.

Opposite to these positions, this article argues that war and political order are strongly linked, as all political order is constituted by and is constitutive of a particular mode of warfare. That explains the transformations of the latter accompanying the changes in the global governmental rationality. For its part, these changes were and are possible due to the use of violence. What is termed as liberal wars, has, therefore, a fundamental constitutive aspect, not only instituting liberal governments in non-liberal zones, but also through their (equally important) discursive practices, which generate effects both on the targeted population’s subjectivity and on the spectator population.

Just as the liberal government regime was defined by its object, its objective, its mode of intervention and its spatiality, liberal wars are also determined by its object (the population’s life), its objective (to improve it), its mechanisms of intervention (environmental intervention) and its relationship to spatiality (effacement of borders).

Liberal wars expand liberalism in two ways: by establishing liberal governments (liberal democracy and open markets) where these did not exist (this was attempted in both Afghanistan and Iraq and Libya, and is what explains the support of the processes in Arab countries, known as the "Arab Spring"13); and by transforming subjectivities of those

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13 It is acknowledged that the same powers and international organizations that supported the democratizing struggles in places like Libya, Syria and Tunisia, did not supported those in other countries such as Bahrain and Yemen. It is not intended to rule out realistic and geopolitical analysis of international relations, nor is assumed that the establishment of liberal democracy in illiberal countries constitutes an act of charity or of international human progress. What it is argued is that the establishment of liberal democracy is proper of a particular mode of government, because it involves the transformation of subjectivities, the constitution of (self)governable individuals. In this regard, the Egyptian case is interesting. Liberal powers not only have not condemned the coup that took place in July 2013, but, for example, Britain is currently persecuting the activities of the Muslim
directly involved, but also of those who are its spectators. In this regard, it is worth to note that, the latest interventions worldwide involved not only the overthrow of the government, but also the reconfiguration of societies intervened under the liberal triad: individual identity (subjectification of subjects as individuals), liberal democracy and capitalist free market economy.

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In this sense, the article agrees with Julian Reid who claims that

It is insufficient when attempting to comprehend the nature of the relations between liberal regimes and war, to dismiss their commitments to the promotion of peace and the ideal of a common humanity simply as rhetorical devices for the disguise of ulterior, largely materially driven, strategic motivations14 (Reid, 2006: 5).

This is why discourse that frames wars is not merely rhetorical, ideological or superstructural. The epistemological conception of discourse assumed by this paper sustains that discourse is performative, that means that it is material and, therefore, has effects on "reality". Thereby, the explicit goal of establishing liberal democratic regimes in different parts of the world is not a mere rhetorical exercise that hides other (material) interests: it is constitutive of a liberal mode of government that works through the constitution of (self)governable individuals. Thus, the establishment of democracy is not conceived as a moral imperative, but as a technology of government.

In short, “(t)he discourses of war are perhaps as potent politically as war itself" (Jabri, 2010: 22). Indeed, discourse constitutes subjectivities and gives right to speak to some while excluding others. In this regard, deployment of global liberalism worldwide does not have to be read from the liberal progressive perspective, which reads in the end of the Cold War "the end point of mankind's ideological evolution and the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government" (Fukuyama, 1989: 6-7), urging to put an end to "ideological pretensions of representing different and higher forms of human society" (Fukuyama, 1989: 23). On the contrary, liberal deployment worldwide must be understood in its ability not only to present itself as the promoter of

Brotherhood in its territory. The arrival to power of the Muslim Brotherhood, an Islamic party, generated strong distrust among liberal powers from the beginning. Moreover, the Brotherhood refused to perform certain neoliberal reforms demanded by the International Monetary Fund in exchange for an indispensable loan (for example, reduction / elimination of subsidies in sensitive areas) and made certain reforms opposite to the idea of liberal democracy (for example, the sharia -Islamic law- occupied an important place in the 2012 Constitution). Based on the idea that the establishment of liberal democracy is part of a new strategy, the repeated statement of the President of the United States, Barack Obama, that "democracy is more than elections" (see USAToday of July 2, 2013:http://www.usatoday.com/story/theoval / 2013/07/02/obama-morsi-egypt-protests/2481861 /), can be understood in a new way.

14 Italics were added to highlight the materialist conception prevailing in the discipline of International Relations.
mankind’s welfare, but also in its ability to constitute the prevailing conceptions about what does welfare mean, and to constitute the interests and desires of men and women that populate the world. And war, as organized exercise of violence, also works by constituting this discourse and, therefore, constituting subjectivities.

Just as the object of the liberal government is no longer the state but the world population, liberal wars are also carried out on its behalf. The R2P document, to which the previous section has made reference, is precisely aimed at legalize the fact that humanity has become the object of war. The emergence of this formalizing document is the result of changes in the discursive practices regarding conflicts. The figure of R2P that has appeared repeatedly, before, during and after the 2011 intervention in Libya, is the result of looking for a "global consensus" on the "humanitarian intervention".

For its part, the objective of liberal wars is not limited to the survival of states or populations, but they aim to the improvement of populations´ life. The idea of enhancement is based on a hierarchy of values in which the discourse bearer’s way of life is presented as the better one.

In fact, the extended liberal discourse places liberal democracies in a privileged position to achieve the purpose of improving population´s life. First, because it assumes that that system of government does not violate the individuals´ human rights (understanding this one in a reductive way, as civil and political freedoms). Second, because it argues that democracies do not make war on each other and, therefore, protect their citizens from the suffering that it implies. This last reason is given by the Democratic Peace Thesis, "the closest to an empirical law in international relations" (Bishai and Behnke, 2007: 111).

The Democratic Peace Thesis is an updating, mediated by a particular interpretation, of Immanuel Kant´s Perpetual Peace (Kant, 1795). The German philosopher, considered as one of liberalism´s founding fathers and one of the Enlightenment´s references, reflected in his Treatise about an eternal peace between states. Imbued by the illustration discourse and its conception of history as an indefinite linear progress, Kant considered the possibility of relegating war to the past as a universal indicator of progress against reaction, of civilization against barbarism, of the civic order of the modern state against the chaos of the state of nature. To achieve this passage, Kant believed the action of men, the artificial, was necessary, because he considered war as being part of nature (Kant, 1795).

The first element considered crucial to achieving perpetual peace is the Republic, because, he argued, under this form the consent of citizens to wage war is required, and as the costs of such adventures falls on the citizens themselves, these are mostly unwilling to carry it out. The second necessary element is the creation of a League of Nations of
independent states, constituting collective security arrangements. The third and final element is the principle of universal hospitality that grants to all individuals the right to global citizenship. Finally, the author notes that perpetual peace’s guarantee is world trade that, unlike war, brings closer and puts together men. Liberal authors who emphasize free markets as a way of eliminating wars are based on this last point.

The updating of the perpetual peace theory under the form of the Democratic Peace Thesis that took place during the 70s of last century, in the context of neoliberal deployment, assembles democracy and free market, as was outlined by Kant. This assertion was based on the liberal theory of International Relations, which puts at the center of its reflections the domestic regimes nature and which gained strength again after the end of the Cold War. And it is sustained as well on the observation that liberal democratic states do not make war to each other: "It is a simple argument: the more you remove difference the more you will remove the sources of enmity " (Dillon and Reid, 2009: 48).

The referent of this update is Michael Doyle (1983a; 1983b; 1986) who picked up Kant’s theory in the context of a debate between liberals and realists. In contrast with the realist theory, the American author claims that internal regimes of states are important in determining its foreign policy, because states do not act in the same way if they are democratic or not, or if they are liberal or not (establishing an equivalence between liberalism and democracy). Doyle's thesis argues that liberal states act differently towards the same kind of states and towards those which are not so. He affirms that the basic tenet of international liberalism, the proposition that affirms that states have the right to be free from foreign intervention, only applies to liberal states since they are constituted based on its citizens’ consensus. By contrast, non-liberal states that do not find their basis on its citizen’s consensus are conceived as unjust states (Doyle, 1986). This last point gives place, on the one hand, to the concept of just and unjust wars, updated for the twentieth century by Michael Walzer (2006), and, on the other hand, also to the liberal states’ self-claimed right to wage war against the non-liberals ones. This way, a "zone of liberal peace" is established between liberal states. The basis to this latter is given by empirical arguments that place the American democracy model as the standard against which all other democracies are measured15. This zone of peace keeps liberal states separate from the Hobbesian state of war in which the rest of societies live. However, as stated, liberal states may wage war against the illiberal ones, wars that "are only fought in the name of liberal popular purposes" (Doyle, 1983a: 230; Doyle, 1986: 1160).

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15 With respect to the last assertion, see Russett, 1993 and Oren.
What is at stake in the Democratic Peace Thesis is the meaning of the signifier democracy, that theory proposing a single meaning notion. However, since it is a political concept par excellence, the term democracy is part of a struggle for it. And the one that is given from the exporting countries of it is that of liberal democracy: representative government plus free market. In the words of ex Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, in the context of the uprisings in Arab countries: "It is not only political reform that is important here, and I want to strongly emphasize this point, it is also the change and economic reform, and we are very, very focused on it. It is key to the success of these transitions to representative and responsive governments".

In this way, a new norm is imposed a priori, a new "standard of civilization" that creates new frontiers, not anymore through territorial lines but between liberalism and non-liberalism. Thus, it establishes a hierarchy among states according to their distances from that norm, opening up the possibility to the concept of discriminatory war, in terms of Schmitt. The democratizing interventions in the name of the defense of human rights, conceived as political freedoms, represent the establishment of a difference among countries: while liberal states’ sovereignty is respected and protected, that of non-liberal remains at the first’s discretion, leading to the concept of "contingent sovereignty" that has been worked in the previous section. Non-liberal states are a priori conceived as potentially dangerous to the "international community."

Therefore, the intervention through wars is also performed on the institutional framework in which life of population develops. This strategy becomes evident taking into account two particular characteristics of all of them: on the one hand, the transformation of illiberal regimes into liberal ones; on the other hand, the effort to regenerate the targeted state’s infrastructure. Indeed, compared to its destruction with the aim of weakening the state, as part of the Westphalian wars (it was the case of the 1990/1991 Gulf War), "(s)trategies for destroying illiberal regimes are now more likely to be based not so much on the violent destruction of their infrastructures as on their positive regeneration, with the view ultimately to reinserting them into the networks of exchange and flows which constitute the global liberal polity" (Dillon and Reid, 2009: 135). In this regard, a great example is provided by the last invasion of Iraq: the occupants were ordered to secure in

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16 WHITE HOUSE (2011), "Briefing by National Security Advisor Tom Donilon and Deputy National Security Advisor Ben Rhodes on Libya and the Middle East" (10/03/2011). (Online), available at www.whitehouse.gov, accessed May 2011. The support of the Obama administration to the deployment of global neoliberalism is also evident in his speech on Egypt after Hosni Mubarak: "Egypt's growth in the long term do not dependent on government employment but employment in the private sector. So the more foreign direct investment we can help to encourage and support, we believe it will be benefiting for the Egyptian people "(DEPARTMENT OF STATE UNITED STATES (2011)," Remarks with Egyptian Foreign Minister Nabil Al-Araby "(May 1 / 03/2011). (Online), accessed in April 2012 in www.state.gov).
the first place oil wells and pipelines that carry the country’s main product. Moreover, as seen in the R2P document’s brief review, this one is not restricted to react, but to prevent and rebuild. Both responsibilities require a transformation of the environment in which the life of the population develops. Intervention is environmental.

Thus, the spatiality of war also changes. Indeed, if the object is constituted by humanity, it is expected that boundaries become less relevant. The spatiality of war no longer supposes territorial boundaries between two political enemies (states), but it establishes distinctions between a liberal democratic space and another that is not. Democratic Peace Thesis puts war in this latter space. Non-liberal countries are then available to interventions by liberal ones. Thus, the reference to humanity generates a reconstitution of the international beyond the interstate system of sovereign states.

4. Conclusion

The article departed from an epistemological premise which traversed it and put aside the centennial conflict between materialism and idealism: it asserted that discourse is material, because it has the effect of constituting "reality". Thus, discourse appeared strongly linked to the exercise of power, because, it argued, is knowledge that, through the constitution of subjectivities, enables the updating of different modes of exercising power which vary historically.

Discourse was present both in the construction of the concept of global liberal government regime and that of liberal war. Both were linked, supposing them as mutually constitutive. In this regard, global liberal government regime and liberal war were defined by their object (world population), their objective (improving its life), their mode of intervention (environmental intervention) and their spatiality (effacement of borders). These four dimensions converged in the always present possibility of intervention that distinguishes the liberal rationality of government, and, through it, in the imposition of a particular configuration of social relations, the model of which is represented by the discourse’s bearer. In this regard, it was deduced that the objective of improving the population’s life (object) is fulfilled through the export of liberal institutions to non-liberal zones. Thus, a hierarchy among states is established, at the top of which are liberal powers.

Environmental interventionism also accounted for the transformations of spatiality both in the liberal government regime, as in its mode of warfare. Sovereignty is no longer the axis around which international politics revolves, instead, it becomes contingent. This means that, while liberal states retain their sovereignty immaculate, that of non-liberal states is available to the first. The result: the imposition of the liberal triad, with the consequent disruption of social ties that this latter assumes.
The imposition of liberal democracy is not usually object of analysis, but rather of evaluation, being used, for this purpose, moral categories. This reading is made both by its detractors, who assert that the democratizing policy is "hypocritical" because material interests are hidden behind it, as by its supporters, who consider that the establishment of liberal democratic regimes is a way to improve the lives of suffering populations. This article sought a reading detached from the purely moral one. Thus, through the establishment of a certain kind of linkage between liberal government and liberal war, it tried to show that imposition of liberal democracy can also be read as a strategy of global power, as part of a particular mode of exercising power: the liberal one.

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At first this benefit enjoyed only European states, while other parts of the world were as liberated land (see Schmitt, 2005). Affirm mutual formal European states regarding their sovereignty equality does not mean ruling out differences. What is sought is to highlight the character of the plurality of Westphalian Europe, against the idea of universality which is liberalism. Mutual sovereignty supposed inability to interfere in the domestic affairs of other States (European).


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