Contesting practices: The EU in the UNSC Open Debates on Women, Peace and Security

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Paper presented to FLACSO-ISA Joint International Conference (Buenos Aires, July 23rd-25th 2014)

The emergence of the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) raises questions about the role of the Greater West (Hurrell, 2006) as shaper of the international order (Cox, 2012). Assuming that the rising rest is a challenge for the West (Laïdi, 2011), how does the EU react vis-à-vis this power shift from classical powers to emerging ones? This paper aims to address how the EU is reacting, as an international actor, vis-à-vis this change perceived as adverse for the EU, as it weakens both its relative position and that of its close allies in the multilateral system. Recent literature (Gamble, 2013; Smith, 2013; Santander, 2014) assesses the decreasing influence of the EU in the international system in general and in international institutions in particular. This paper does not intend to assess the degree of influence of the EU in international institutions but to understand how the fact that the EU is on the wrong end of the power shift changes, or not, its policy regarding multilateralism. Just before the end of his mandate, Javier Solana warned Europeans and Americans that “we can no longer run the world as we used to” and that the risk exists of a word of multi-polarity without multilateralism (Solana, 2009). Does it mean that we must expect changes regarding EU policies in the multilateral institutions in order to accommodate the emerging challengers? More to the point, this paper poses itself a set of related questions: how is the international structural change shaping the attitude of the EU regarding multilateral institutions? Is any adjustment taking place, and in what terms? How does the EU act, under unpropitious international contexts, concerning multilateral institutions and global governance mechanisms?

In order to approach those questions this paper is structured as follows. The first section deals with the analytical framework to cope with structural change in the

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1This paper falls within the EU-IANUS (The EU in an unsettled international system: crisis, polarity and multilateralism) research project funded by the National R+D Plan of the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness (CSO2012-33361).
international system. Since this paper falls within a large project (EU-IANUS) the paper builds on EU-IANUS’s analytical framework. The project seeks to conceptualize the structural changes. By drawing on a definition of international structure that includes power, institutions and ideas, EU-IANUS explores the consequences of different patterns of alignment among these three factors. The second and third sections of the paper are devoted to the analysis of a case: UNSC Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security (WPS). Section 2 tests EU-IANUS’s analytical framework in the case of Resolution 1325. Together with a series of other cases of EU policies in international institutions, based on different patterns of structural change, the work may result into general conclusions of the project. Section 3 incorporates a new bias to the analysis of how the power shift takes place in international organizations by focusing on practices through the case of Resolution 1325. Section 4 deals with the reaction of the EU vis-à-vis the contestation of practices taking place in the UNSC everyday performance in regard with Resolution 1325. Following EU-IANUS analytical framework this paper depicts how the EU reacts in front of adverse changes in the realm of practices through two ideal type strategies (accommodation and entrenchment). This Section will deal with EU’s entrenchment strategy in the case of Resolution 1325. The paper finishes with some final remarks.

1. Analytical framework and conceptualization

This paper defines international structure as the configuration of three interdependent forces, namely power, institutions and ideas. These forces have the capacity to shape the behavior of states, but we should not see them as determining it: they influence decision-making by imposing pressures and constraints that actors have to reckon with, which they can do in different ways.

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2 This section is based on Barbé et al. (2014).

3 The conceptualization of international structure that we use in this paper comes close to that of historical structure used by Robert W. Cox. More to the point, we take from it the idea of a tripartite structure (power, institutions and ideas) and a particular approach to hegemony (see below in the text). Nevertheless, we depart from Cox in a number of important key ways. First, our structures have shorter horizons, both time- and issue-wise. Second, we define some of the key concepts (particularly power and institutions) in a more conventional manner. And more importantly, we do not seek to explore the possibilities that each type of structure offer for change in the international order (i.e. we do not conform to the normative approach we normally identify with critical theory).
Following Barnett and Duvall (2005) this paper understands power as well as an interaction as a constitution. According to this differentiation, the concept of power has two dimensions: firstly, power works through the interactions between actors in a direct (compulsory) or diffuse (institutional) way and, secondly, power precedes the actors’ position and constitute them through social relations in a direct (structural) or diffuse (productive) way. Power can be concentrated in one actor or effective coalition of actors (both state and non-state ones); or it can be widely distributed so that neither a single actor nor a coalition has the capacity to effectively govern international institutions (because of the existence of a blocking minority, typically).

Robert W. Cox identified two different kinds of ideas. On one hand there are intersubjective meanings, which are normally shared by different actors, on the other rivaling collective images on the international order (Sinclair, 1996: 11). The former include rather durable notions, for instance that ųstates relate to one another through diplomatic agents (Cox, 1996: 98). Concerning collective images, they have to do with ųthe nature and the legitimacy of prevailing power relations, the meanings of justice and public good, and so forth (Cox, 1996: 99). A particular international structure can thus contain conflicting collective images.

Finally, this paper understands institutions as ųpersistent sets of rules (formal and informal) that prescribe behavioral roles, constrain activity, and shape expectations (Keohane, 1988: 383). Institutions have an important role, when it comes to the articulation of the components of a given international structure, as they represent ųfrozen configurations of privilege and bias (Barnett and Duvall, 2005: 52). In other words, they can reflect, stabilize and perpetuate a given distribution of power and/or a given distribution of legitimacy for actors and ideas. Alternatively, institutions can become a battlefield both in terms of power and ideas. Therefore, and given that institutions ųend themselves both to the representations of diverse interests and to the universalization of policy (Cox, 1996: 99), they allow dominant agents to ųsoften their social domination [É ] through a process of consensus building (Sinclair, 1996: 11).

The alignment (or lack thereof) between power, institutions and ideas yields five different international structures: three possible combinations of resonance between two of the three corners of the triangle, congruence between all of them and its opposite.
Change happens when one of those structures evolves towards a new type. Each of these five structures has its own differentiated features and offers different options and challenges to the international actors.

**Hegemonic structure.** In hegemonic structures, power, institutions and ideas are mutually aligned with each other. The way EU-IANUS uses hegemony is not in the way in which this term is used in the theory of hegemonic stability, where the existence of a hegemon allows for the provision of a public good, but the way in which neogramscians use it (Gill, 1993). A structure is hegemonic if there is a coherent fit between the three corners of the triangle. Under these conditions, “the power basis of the structure tends to recede into the background of consciousness,” becoming less conspicuous but at the same time more effective (Cox, 1996: 99). Apart from hegemony we can find four other structures.

**Normative congruence.** The first possibility consists in the alignment between ideas and institutions, both misaligned with the distribution of power. Ideas and institutions (namely, the normative component of the structure) are not sustained by any coalition strong enough to allow for their reproduction in the long term.

**Material congruence.** This situation takes place when power and institutions resonate with each other but not with prevalent ideas in the international society. Under such circumstances, institutions represent the preferences of relevant actors, either because they embody norms that match their preferences or because of how influence is organized within them. Contrarily, there is no fit between institutions and ideas.

**Institutional lag.** Thirdly, the international institution can be shaped by the inability of institutions to correspond both to prevalent ideas and to the coalition of actors that sustain them. We call this situation *institutional lag* because we expect it to be caused by the potentially slower pace in institutional change, as compared to change in the distribution of power and in legitimacy patterns for ideas.

**Dysfunctional structure.** Finally, there are occasions in which none of the components of the structure is in sync with any other, to no relevant degree. We deem this type of structure dysfunctional, as neither power, nor ideas, nor institutions are backed by any other factor. Powerful actors can only exercise their power in a coercive manner; ideas are not sustained by any actor or coalition of actors with the capacity to bring them into force, nor are they able to rationalize existing power relationships; and institutions are unable to function properly and not perceived as legitimate.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Structure</th>
<th>Structure (graphic representation)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Normative congruence</td>
<td><img src="image1.png" alt="Diagram" /></td>
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<tr>
<td>Material congruence</td>
<td><img src="image2.png" alt="Diagram" /></td>
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<td>Institutional lag</td>
<td><img src="image3.png" alt="Diagram" /></td>
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<tr>
<td>Hegemonic structure</td>
<td><img src="image4.png" alt="Diagram" /></td>
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<tr>
<td>Dysfunctional structure</td>
<td><img src="image5.png" alt="Diagram" /></td>
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*Source: Barbé et al. (2014)*

*Note: The upper corner of the triangle represents power, the left one represents institutions and the corner at the right stands for ideas.*

Change is associated, as already stated, to the emergence of a new structure. Thus, each of the above structures can turn into another one because of challenges in
terms of power, ideas or institutions. A few examples can illustrate those challenges. In regard with power we can mention the case of development since the emergence of private funding (private actors) challenges the traditional Official Development Assistance (OECD / DAC). Regarding ideas, we have the example of antipersonnel mines that after being approached as a matter of disarmament entered the humanitarian agenda, inducing a paradigm shift that affected the negotiations about their abolishment. Finally, in the case of financial institutions, we have the example of G20 as a challenge to the Bretton Woods system.

2. Resolution 1325: From hegemony to normative congruence

The adoption by the UNSC of Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security (WPS) in November 2000 took place under the conditions of a hegemonic structure. Institutions were aligned with ideas (the reframing of traditional norms on Humanitarian and Human Rights) and power (since Resolution 1325 was the result of the combined efforts of a powerful coalition of actors). More specifically, this coalition consisted of like-minded countries (Canada, United Kingdom, Netherlands), countries affected by gender-based-violence during conflicts (basically African states), and a global constituency of non-state actors (the Working Group on Women, Peace and Security that led the process and drafted the Resolution based on the 1995 Beijing Platform, 1995).

The adoption of the Resolution was the culminating point of a process initiated a year before with resolutions on Children and Armed Conflict (1261) and the Protection of Civilians (1265). This process aimed at reframing traditional norms pertaining to International Humanitarian Law, Human Rights and refugee law in order to make them fit with a new ideational approach to sovereignty (sovereignty as responsibility). Until that moment, the UNSC had dealt with the humanitarian dimension of violent conflicts in an ad hoc, country-by-country manner (Somalia, Cambodia, Bosnia, Haiti, and Rwanda) through peace-keeping mandates that strove to create secure environments for humanitarian assistance. Resolution 1325 affirms that Security Council missions take into account gender considerations and the rights of women as a cross-cutting concern.
So, the UNSC endorsed (and legitimated), by unanimity, a set of ideas that had emerged during the previous years as a result of the mass atrocities occurred during the 1990s conflicts.

The Resolution provides a political and legal framework for regional organizations, national governments and nongovernmental agencies to take into account and involve women and girls in peace and security measures. In other words, the UNSC refers both to the role of women as victims of armed conflicts and as peacemakers. The text contains three sets of norms, also called the three Ps: protection of women, prevention of conflict and participation of women. To be sure, the alignment of the UNSC with this set of ideas that ‘genders and humanizes’ the UNSC agenda took place at the expense of trimming the Beijing platform. For instance, the Resolution does not incorporate any mention to ‘gender equality’, sexual violence as a crime or the reduction of military expenditure. Even so, Resolution 1325 was still welcomed by normative entrepreneurs (like-minded and affected countries, civil society) because it embodied the legitimation by the UNSC of a double framework of needs and rights of women in conflict and post-conflict situations (see box 1).

**Box 1. Needs and Rights in Resolution 1325**

Needs: Security concerns
- Framework: Protection (of civilians)
- Normative background: International Humanitarian Law
- Prescription: Taking action against sexual violence in conflict

Rights: Empowerment concerns
- Framework: Gender Equality
- Normative background: Human Rights
- Prescription: Participation (engendering peace and security)
Since the adoption of Resolution 1325 the UNSC has, as a result of its Open Debates, established a broad set of norms on WPS. Another six Resolutions, adopted between 2008 and 2013 (see box 2) have provided guidance on WPS to member states (launching of National Plans) and UN organs (Secretary General and UNSC). They have also triggered the creation of new posts (Special Representative on Sexual Violence in Conflict, gender advisors) and the adoption of new instruments (indicators).

### Box 2. Resolutions on WPS (presidency of the UNSC upon adoption)

Resolution 1325 (October 2000) Namibia
Resolution 1820 (June 2008) USA
Resolution 1888 (September 2009) USA
Resolution 1889 (October 2009) Vietnam
Resolution 1960 (December 2010) USA
Resolution 2106 (April 2013) Rwanda
Resolution 2122 (October 2013) Azerbaijan

All of these resolutions on WPS have been adopted by unanimity. Nevertheless, their adoption has proved harder than that of Resolution 1325. A new constellation of powers ("emergent sovereigntist") not aligned with the solidarist ideas that underpin Resolution 1325 has provoked a significant pushback. According to Security Council analysts, "this push back has largely played itself out in difficult and protracted negotiations at the thematic level but has not negatively impacted the integrity of the Council's women, peace and security normative framework (Security Council Report, 2013: 2) that is regularly enforced by the UNSC either on peace-keeping mandates or decisions on sanctions.

In general terms, there is an alignment between ideas and institutions, even if the UNSC has been more active on the humanitarian dimension (protection) than on the Human Rights one (participation). This is partly due to the leadership role played by the United States, which had until now disregarded the double approach (protection and
participation) championed by civil society organizations. The US played a key role in the passage of three WPS resolutions (1820, 1188 and 1960) that focused on gender-based violence. Due to American determination, Resolution 1820 is a normative step forward with regard to justice, recognizing that sexual violence can constitute a war crime, crime against humanity or a constitutive act of genocide. It is also a step forward in terms of the commitment of the UNSC with WPS, as it clearly links sexual violence and the maintenance of international peace and security. Nevertheless, China and Russia opposed part of the proposed text (Barnes, 2011: 28) amid a harsh debate which will only intensify in the next years. As a result, Resolution 1325 is not supported by a sufficiently strong coalition of actors anymore.

The hegemonic structure that favored the adoption of Resolution 1325 in 2000 has given way to a normative congruence structure due to the fact that the dominant coalition of power is being challenged in the domain of practices. This paper situates the focus on practice, or how things are done in the UNSC in regard with Resolution 1325, to explain how the normative component of the structure is not sustained anymore by a coalition strong enough to allow for the reproduction of the normative component of WPS resolutions in the long term. This approach permits to grasp the challenges in power terms since the focus on practice resitutes the approach to power in International Relations, demonstrating that, in practice, power also emerges locally from social contexts (Adler-Nissen and Pouliot, 2014: 1). In our case, we will look thus on the context of the UNSC Open Debates on WPS.

3. Exercising power through practices. Contesting Resolution 1325

Resolution 1325 embodied an ideational turn, assuming that protection of women is a security problem that has to be dealt with by the UNSC and also that security goes beyond protection, incorporating prevention of conflict and participation of women in peace making and peace building. Since 2000, the UNSC has been exercising the regular powers of an international organization such as fixing of meanings and diffusion of norms (Barnett and Finnemore, 2006: 183).

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4 Practices are socially meaningful patterns of action, which, in being performed more or less competently, simultaneously, embody, act out, and possibly reify background knowledge and discourse in and out on the material world (Adler and Pouliot, 2011:4).
Regarding the fixing of meanings, the UNSC has been involved through the adoption of Resolution 1325 in a productive power exercise following Barnett’s and Duvall’s conceptualization: "Being able to invest situations with a particular meaning constitutes an important source of power" (Barnett and Finnemore 2006: 184). Through the adoption and evolution of Resolution 1325 the UNSC has legitimized the ideational turn favored by liberal solidarists (western states and social movements) in the late 1990s, which affected cornerstones of the international system, such as sovereignty and security. Solidarist ideas underpin Resolution 1325: sovereignty as responsibility\(^5\), human security\(^6\) and, as a result of the previous ideas, a broad conception of UNSC commitments tying protection of civilians (women) to the maintenance of peace and security. Some voices called this last process a humanization of the UNSC.

Finally, in regard with diffusion of norms by the international organizations, Barnett and Finnemore (2006: 185) recall the "desire (of international organizations) to shape state practices by establishing, articulating, and transmitting norms that define what constitutes acceptable and state legitimate behavior. In the case of Resolution 1325, the UNSC is a norm shaper (six resolutions between 2000 and 2013 that incorporate the 3 P’s: Protection, Prevention and Participation) while expands the operational dimension through peace missions and sanctions. Furthermore, the UNSC boosts the member states and the regional organizations to adopt National (or Regional) Plans to implement the normative framework of Resolution 1325.

As we saw above the normative dimension of Resolution 1325 is not supported anymore by a strong coalition of actors. How do the emerging dynamics of power work in this case? On one side, there is a normative development since the UNSC adopts new resolutions (Resolution 1820 stands out) and incorporates the normative content of Resolution 1325 in peace missions’ resolutions and sanctions committees. On the other side, everyday performance of practices in the UNSC, discussed in Open Debates, points out a contestation of practices by the emergent sovereigntists.

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\(^5\) The concept of "sovereignty as responsibility" formulated to help internally displaced persons, by Cohen and Deng (1998) underlies in the thematic Resolutions adopted in 1999 and 2000 as a response to the massive atrocities that happened during the 1990s conflicts.

\(^6\) The concept of "human security" draws attention to the individual as referent of the security. In the mid-1990s Mahbub Ul Haq (1995) incorporates in the Human Development Report the human security concept that come to define security as freedom from fear and freedom from want, linking security, development and Human Rights.
China, Russia and other states do not share the practices inspired by the solidarist ideas underscored by the launching of the WPS process. On the contrary, they, together with other countries active in the regular Open Debates on WPS such as India or Pakistan, have shown a clear desire to gain the control of the WPS patterns of action. More particularly, they have been reluctant to the comprehensive approach to the WPS issue pushed by solidarist, an approach that includes conflict prevention, human rights and development. Even as Russia and China voted in 2000 to adopt Resolution 1325 they felt that the resolution went beyond the Council’s institutional capacity and duplicated the General Assembly mandate (True Frost, 2007: 122).

Therefore, the emergent sovereigntist coalition aims at recuperating the control in hierarchical (oligarchy in the UNSC) and sovereignty terms. This has been specially so since the intervention in Libya in 2011, which shed the shadow of suspicion upon any reference to the protection of civilians. As a result, China and Russia have put forward strong reservations regarding any practice that could commit the UNSC to a broader agenda, such as the preventive approach underpinning the mandate of the Special Representative on Sexual Violence in Conflict. This has been an ongoing dynamic for several years in the Council with China, Pakistan and Russia consistently arguing for a more narrow interpretation of [...] WPS as it applies to the Council’s own work.

Regarding sovereignty, this new coalition is showing its willingness to prevent the practices framed under the ideational framework that defines sovereignty as responsibility, such as a strong role of civil society in the norm making process, or evolving practices like monitoring of national action plans, referral to the International Criminal Court or control of troop-contributing countries aimed at excluding perpetrators of past human rights violations. The Open Debate previous to the adoption of Resolution 2106 (2013) illustrates the incongruence between the ideational content underlining the WPS process and the expectations of the emerging sovereigntist coalition (see boxes 3 and 4). It is symbolic that for the first time a resolution on WPS

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reaffirms its respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of all States.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Box. 3 Contesting practices related with ideas on security</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>UNSC scope:</strong> Calls for a narrower focus of the Secretary-General's reporting on WPS and only include countries that are on the UNSC agenda (situations of concern of the UNSC agenda).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>UNSC scope:</strong> Scope of the reporting on WPS of the Special Representative on Sexual Violence on Conflict (Resolution 1888) narrowly focused and not including situations that do not constitute threats to international peace and security (UNSC identification).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>UNSC scope:</strong> Language in WPS should refer to &quot;armed conflict and post-conflict situations&quot; rather than the more general &quot;conflict.&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>UNSC purview:</strong> Despite the universal applicability of the WPS agenda, calls for language to ensure (Resolution 2122) that situations that do not constitute threats to international peace and security are outside the purview of the UNSC.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Protection approach:</strong> Council focus is less sharp when it comes to the women's participation aspect of the agenda.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>WPS agenda:</strong> Arguing for a more narrow interpretation of WPS agenda as it applies to the Council's work.</td>
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## Box 4. Contesting practices related with ideas on sovereignty

- **Accountability**: Section on accountability was dropped in the Secretary-General 2014 sexual violence report along with its accountability-specific recommendation to the Council, including ICC referrals.

- **Collection of information**: While Council calls for the deployment of women protection adviser increase, calls for the implementation of monitoring, analysis and reporting arrangement for tracking sexual violence does not, hampering early warning of conflict.

- **Zero tolerance policy**: Inconsistencies of the Council in including a reference to the UN's zero tolerance policy (Resolution 1820) when establishing or renewing mandates.

- **Non state actors**: Elaboration a set of indicators for use at the global level to track implementation of Resolution 1325 (Resolution 1889) criticized for the participation of NGOs.

- **Non state actors**: Contention during negotiation of Resolution 2106 was language related to the mandate of the Special Representative to interact with non state actors. Same situation (Syrian case), will of restricting contacts of the Special Representative with non-state parties in the conflict.

- **ICC**: Objections to references to the ICC. 2014 Secretary-General report removed recommendation of ICC referrals.

- **Zero tolerance-monitoring**: During negotiations of Resolution 2122 references to the need of (gender and women protection) advisers to monitor human rights abuses in UN missions omitted.

- **Zero-tolerance**: Omitting references to vetting armed forces of troop contributing countries to exclude perpetrators of past human rights violations.

- **Monitoring analysis**: Establishment of monitoring analysis and reporting arrangements (MARA) on conflict related sexual violence (Resolution 1960) providing information to the Special representative. Reluctance to formulate a mechanism for systematic use.

Approaching the contest of power in international organizations as a contestation of practices builds on the notion of institutional power (Barnett and Duvall, 2005), since this kind of power relates to an actor’s capacity to shape institutions which may affect other actors. Thus, debates in the Commission of Human Rights in the 1980s turned to be a division between those that wanted to empower the Commission with a monitoring machine and those that did not want. Pace (2006: 214) shows, for instance, how the evolution of conventional procedures in the Commission was an exercise of productive and institutional power since this evolution led to a focus on the right to development and the role of the United Nations system in supporting governments to create conditions that would enable them, to fulfil their international legal obligations. In other words, practices may fix meanings and orient normative developments. Practices adopted in the Council’s work to deal with WPS resolutions, such as the participation of the civil society in the shaping of UNSC resolutions, incorporate a liberal way of doing things.

By framing issues in certain ways or through initiative taking, players strive to establish their ways of doing things as a competent practice (Adler-Nissen and Pouliot, 2014: 7). Currently the recognition of competence in the case of Resolution 1325 is going through a process of contestation as we saw before with a group of emerging sovereigntists that contest ongoing practices in the UNSC work and want their competence to reframe them recognized. Following Adler-Nissen and Pouliot we can distinguish two kinds of contestation: thin and thick contestation. A thin form of contestation may affect the relative positions of actors since the new actors accept the competence of the established ones but contest the way in which they or others are categorized in order to climb positions in a particular setting (2014: 7). The newcomers want to hold a prominent seat on the table and have a say. Limiting the mandate of the Special Representative on Sexual Violence in Conflict has for example been such an issue in the last years. The thick form of contestation questions not only the relative position between the agents in a particular practice, but the very game itself (2004: 7). Reorientation towards territorial sovereignty claims may move in that direction.
4. Entrenchment: the EU in the UNSC Open Debates on WPS

According to EU-IANUS analytical framework, changes in the international system are explained by changes in the structure. Building on this notion of change this paper enters a second stage that aims to answer two questions: first, when does the challenge suffered by the existing structure (always thinking in specific issues and not in global terms) becomes adverse for the EU and, second, how the EU reacts in multilateral institutions that govern the issue area.

The EU suffers an adverse change (the conditions are worse for the EU to establish or implement the standards in a particular area) when challenges affect its dominant position, either in terms of power, ideas or institutions. So, we try to identify developments that are adverse within the wide range of possibilities offered by the combination of structures. For example, any development that involves moving from a structure of hegemony (in which the EU is part of the ruling coalition that has achieved to establish their ideas as legitimate and institutionalized) to any other, by way of challenging material power, ideas or institutions (normative congruence, material congruence, institutional lag) or all at once (dysfunctional) generates, by definition, conditions more adverse for the EU policies.

How will the EU react to these changes taking into account that is in the vertex being disadvantaged? In other words, how does the EU react to the current changes that weaken its position in multilateral institutions and global governance regimes. The EU-IANUS project provides two reaction strategies as ideal types - accommodation and entrenchment- that can result in different objectives.

The accommodation strategy consists in adjusting the behavior of the EU (objectives, instruments, norms) to the new context, reaching agreements with actors or accepting rising ideas. Depending on the challenge, the strategy will result into different intentions. Thus, if the challenge comes from the side of power, the EU will tend to yield "power positions" facing the demands of the new players (for instance, the extension of voting for the emerging powers in financial institutions). If the challenge is ideational, meaning that other ideas than the European ones are perceived as legitimate, the EU will seek commitments in the normative dimension (for example, the EU
campaign for the abolition of the death penalty in the United Nations turned into a campaign for a moratorium). Finally, if the structure is modified by an institutional challenge, the EU will accept the reform of the institution or even its replacement by another (for instance, the area of global warming is a good example due to the difficulties of the Kyoto Protocol). Contrarily to accommodation, an entrenchment strategy is the tendency to maintain or further strengthen the position held by the EU (ideas, institutions) in order to resist adverse changes.

In the case of UNSC Open Debates on WPS, the EU follows a strategy of entrenchment. It is probably useful to start with a few words on UNSC Open Debates on WPS. Resolution 1325 states that the UNSC has to remain actively seized of the matter of WPS. Since the adoption of Resolution 1325 the UNSC has met on WPS annually. The format of these meetings has been annual Open Debates discussing the progress made in the implementation of the Resolution. Since the adoption of Resolution 1820, in 2008, the UNSC also organizes Open Debates on Sexual Violence in Conflict (SVIC) in order to discuss findings of the Special Representative on Sexual Violence and recommendations outlined in the SG's report. At the Open Debates, all fifteen Member States of the UNSC and many other non-Member States participate. Furthermore, by invitation of the President of the UNSC, representatives of UN agencies, regional organizations and organizations of the civil society participate in the Debates. Those Debates can be considered the first step for the adoption of new UNSC Resolutions on WPS ((1820, 1888, 1889, 1960, 2106, 2122) and several Presidential Statements. For each Resolution and Presidential Statement, negotiations are conducted by the fifteen members of the UNSC. Language is agreed upon and adopted as the official text. Arria Formula meetings may also be held (usually before the annual Open Debate) in which civil society organizations and other actors can informally brief the UNSC. The role of the civil society in the case of Resolution 1325 is particularly

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8 The "Arria-formula meetings" are a relatively recent practice of the members of the UNSC. They are very informal, confidential gatherings which enable UNSC members to have a frank and private exchange of views, within a flexible procedural framework, with persons whom the inviting member or members of the Council (who also act as the facilitators or convenors) believe it would be beneficial to hear and/or to whom they may wish to convey a message. They provide interested Council members an opportunity to engage in a direct dialogue with high representatives of Governments and international organizations often at the latter’s request as well as non-State parties, on matters with which they are concerned and which fall within the purview of responsibility of the UNSC. The process is named after Ambassador Diego Arria of Venezuela, who, as the representative of Venezuela on the Council initiated the practice in 1992. See [http://www.un.org/en/sc/about/methods/bgarriaformula.shtml](http://www.un.org/en/sc/about/methods/bgarriaformula.shtml)
important since UNSCR 1325 is one of the few Security Council Resolutions that has a
global constituency of civil society organisations behind it (Barnes, 2011: 27).

Since the first Open Debate on WPS in 2000 the EU has been present in the
meetings. A European state as rotatory presidency was speaking on behalf of the EU
between 2000 and 2002. In 2003 the EU as such began to address the participants in the
debate represented by the rotatory presidency. Since 2010 the EU is represented in the
debates by the Delegation of the EU at the UN. Albeit the EU has been present since the
beginnings of these debates, it did not play an important role in promoting the emergence of this norm.

The EU was already aligned with solidarist ideas and institutional setting before
the change from hegemony to normative congruence, but it was thus not part of the
norm making process. The role of the EU was initially very limited and it only unfolded
with the development of its own internal policies. Until the mid-2000s, the EU framed
the issue of gender and conflict within the broader context of development and
humanitarian policies, instead of that of security and conflict problems. The
mainstreaming of the gender-related commitments embodied in the Resolution 1325
was significantly enhanced in 2008 when the EU adopted the Comprehensive Approach
to the EU implementation of Resolutions 1325 and 1820 on Women, Peace and
Security.

The change from hegemony to normative congruence coincides in time with the
gendering of European security policies both at the national level (National Action
Plans) and the European one (European Security and Defence Policy). These
developments turned the Europeans into the most vocal supporters of Resolution 1325
at the UNSC Open Debates. The United Kingdom and France (since 2008), both
permanent members of the UNSC, have traditionally been among the proponents of the
normative development of the WPS agenda.

The Open Debates -in which the EU participates as an invitee of the UNSC
presidency- show how the EU reacts in rhetorical terms to the adverse normative
evolution in the past years. The European permanent members of the UNSC have not
accepted compromises on this issue (all resolutions have to be adopted by unanimity)
and the EU reacted thus to the structural change by entrenchment. On the other hand, it must be highlighted that the EU does not participate in the actual decision making process. Therefore, the EU is free to perform as a principled actor, supporting the WPS agenda both in terms of its ideational dimension (the 3 Ps) and its institutional one, stressing and enhancing the role of what Jolly, Emmerij and Weiss have called the second and the third UN (in our case, the Special Representative and the women’s and human rights organizations respectively).9

From 2008 the EU has performed at the Open Debates as the quintessential normative power ("promoting women’s rights is at the core of the European Union human rights policy"10), which leads to a straightforward prescriptive orientation: the European Union supports the idea that the Security Council should vigorously pursue a strategy to ensure an increase in women’s participation in all peace processes [...] encouraging all member states to adopt accountability instruments including National Action Plans11. However, since the EU delegation in the UN took on the representation in the Open Debates in 2010 and the debates have become harsher regarding practices in the UNSC, the EU has hardened its position. Namely, it has produced a more articulated discourse based on EU values (gender equality and humanitarian protection) and has reacted to the sensitive issues discussed by the emerging coalition12. Therefore, the EU has entrenched itself in the support for the human security conception that underpins Resolution 1325, vis-à-vis the opposite move by sovereigntist countries and it has done so by supporting a culture of prevention that links security, human rights and rule of law instead of the current culture of reaction. In this sense, the EU is rather vocal in defending against its critics the expanded agenda of the Special Representative (dealing with topics that are not on the UNSC agenda). Furthermore, the discourse of the EU constructs the role of civil society (women’s organizations) as key to the legitimacy of

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9 The third UN which includes not only NGOs, but also external experts, scholars, consultants, independent commissions, and other individuals who regularly engage with the UN adds a further dimension to Inis Claude’s distinction in his 1956 classic textbook, Swords Into Plowshares, between the first UN and the second UN. Claude distinguished the dual roles of the world organization as an intergovernmental arena and a professional secretariat. See Jolly et al. (2009).


the WPS efforts, which is at odds with the positions defended by the emerging coalition. Finally here, the EU has also defended the need to ratify the Rome Statute and the referral of cases of gender-based violence to the International Criminal Court.

To sum up, since the pushback in the UNSC by an emerging, sovereigntist coalition, the position of the EU in the UNSC Open Debates has been one of rhetorical resistance. It has supported the ideas underpinning Resolution 1325, which have a constitutive value for the European foreign policy (women’s and human rights, participation of civil society, culture of prevention, international justice) and constitute a paradigm for EU policies (comprehensive approach, accountability, monitoring).

5. Final remarks

Following Jolly’s (2009) characterization of the UN triad, we can see that the normative set built around Resolution 1325 is relevant in the first UN (states), the second UN (UN machinery) and the third UN (civil society). A recent example of the salience of this issue is the Global Summit to End Sexual Violence in Conflict, organized in London (10-13 June 2014) and led by William Hague, British Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Angelina Jolie, Special Envoy of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees. The Summit pointed out the ongoing relevance of the topic and underscored the solidarist ideas which underpinned the process and were also supported by the organizers (UK government and civil society organizations). The Declaration of Commitment of the Summit, focused on shattering the culture of impunity and providing effective justice for crimes of sexual violence in conflict. These messages come back to one of the ideas that were at the roots of Resolution 1325: sovereignty as responsibility.

This paper makes the distinction between ideas as intersubjective meanings, which are rather durable notions, and ideas as rivaling collective images (Sinclair, 1996: 11). We have pointed out that Resolution 1325’s normative set emerged in a hegemonic structure, but is now being challenged in the UNSC daily performance. Institutions can become a battlefield both in terms of power and ideas (Cox, 1996: 99) and this paper focuses on revealing how “practices as power” work in the WPS issue. No one rejects
the objective of shattering the culture of impunity itself, but the matter how to implement the corresponding mechanisms has become especially in the last three years a contested issue (in particular since the intervention in Libya). To give an example, accountability and monitoring have come to the center as contested practices. Recent reports indicate that “the past three years have been a time of particular divisions in the Council, with significant push-back by several permanent and elected members on key thematic-issues including on women, peace and security” (Security Council Report, 2014: 2).

To sum up, the ideas underpinning Resolution 1325 are not challenged by themselves. We cannot say that ideas such as human security, sovereignty as responsibility or the protection of civilians are not treated anymore as a threat to peace and security and do not shape UN resolutions now. The problem is not the ingredients (ideas) but the recipe, how we cook with them (practices). The result is an often divided UNSC when debates come to issues such as the role of civil society organizations, monitoring, UNSC involvement, etc. The choice of the EU to entrench itself with respect to these challenges to the solidarist ideas on which the Resolution 1325 was built, is a result of its normative identity. This identity, which calls for the defense of European norms and policies, clashes however with the EU’s role as a promoter of multilateralism.

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