Foreign Policy in Southern Africa: Causes of Changes in the Pattern of Cooperation-Conflict (1975-2010)

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Abstract
The International Studies have experimented, in post-Cold War, a general expansion, both in terms of approaches and geographical scope, in order to comprehend international phenomena in the South, including Africa. This study seeks to understand why there were changes in the Patterns of Cooperation-Conflict in Southern Africa in the period after 1989. This question underlies the necessity to comprehend what factors may explain regional systems' changes in the interaction level, more specifically on dynamics of cooperation and conflict. Therefore, the research broadly observes the changes in Southern Africa’s system in the last two centuries focusing on the great change in the Pattern of Cooperation-Conflict after 1989 (1975-2010). The central hypothesis is that the state-formation process and regional powers' foreign policies positions and impetus toward the region are centrally important factors which have directly affected the regional Pattern of Cooperation-Conflict. In broadly terms, one studies South Africa and Angola’s state-building process, elite formation and foreign policy project and impetus towards the region of, as part of a wider study project which also includes Mozambique, Zimbabwe and Namibia.

Keywords: Foreign policy; Southern Africa; Pattern of Cooperation-Conflict

Introduction

Brazil's approach towards Africa has become a priority in Brazilian foreign policy from the 2000s. Southern Africa is one of the sub-regions of greater relevance in this process as it gathers strategic partners of Brazil, such as South Africa, Angola, Mozambique and Namibia. Moreover, currently other emerging countries are increasingly accessing the region. Nevertheless, there is limited knowledge in Brazil and worldwide about how countries in the region relate to each other, how their process of decision making in foreign policy is characterized and which constraints, processes and actors define the foreign policies of the major players in the region. More than that what can explain the great changes in the level of regional cooperation and conflict in that last 40 years and why regional countries still lack deep regional integration. This paper, a partial development of the doctoral thesis of the same title (under construction), seeks to contribute to the overcoming this reality through a study that aims to analyze the international politics and state’s foreign policy in the region in the period between 1975 and 2010. The approach is based on the perspective of cooperation and conflict and on the assessment of systems factors that have conditioned these interactions.

The study seeks to understand why there were changes in the Patterns of Cooperation-Conflict in Southern Africa in the period after 1989. This question underlies the necessity to comprehend what factors may explain regional systems' changes in the interaction level, more specifically on dynamics of cooperation and conflict. Therefore, the research broadly observes the changes in Southern Africa’s system in the last two centuries focusing on the great change

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This working paper is divided into five sections. The first situates the proposed discussion within the stage of New Regionalism studies and Foreign Policy Analysis on Africa and Southern Africa. The second section introduces, based on Gilpin’s seminal work of 1981, a debate on how to analyse changes in regional systems in terms of levels of change and possible causal factors related to agency-structure debate. It analyses broad changes in Southern African system and raises some questions regarding possible causal factors related to state formation and foreign policy of regional powers, what is discussed in the subsequent sections. The third section introduces the discussion about state formation as regional building in Southern Africa in order to understand structural conditions that would later constrain independent states. The last two sections produces a tentative discussion on the relationship of the Patterns of Cooperation-Conflict in Southern Africa during 1975-88 and 1989-2010, and connects this discussion to regional powers’ (here limited to South Africa and Angola) state-building process, elite's preferences and foreign policy positions and impetus towards Southern African. This previous works concludes that to comprehend interaction change in peripheral regional systems one should not only observe the penetration character imposed by extra-regional powers or the predominant regional power’s policies alone. For this understanding, knowledge of the regional power’s state-building process, elite formation and foreign policy positions and impetus toward the region is needed in a relational conception.

New Regionalism and Foreign Policy: what to study in Southern Africa?

It is widely agreed that the International Studies have experimented, in the post-Cold War, a general expansion in the field of research, both in terms of approaches and geographical scope. In the first case, one can refer to the epistemological and theoretical renewed approaches which are involved in the third debate of International Relations Theory. In the second case, the deepening of the process of globalization and, later, the emergence of new regional and global powers expanded the general interest in the periphery of the world system, the so-called economic and political South. Subareas within the International Studies were no less affected by these developments. Two examples of them are the studies on New Regionalism (NR) and Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA).

The Expansion of New Regionalism and Foreign Policy Analysis to the South

The NR (here referred to the study of regions) saw an impressive development in terms of new approaches and concepts, as well as of a more democratic study of regions – with the incorporation of previously marginalized geographic areas and the intention to explain the particularities of their own regional systems.

In general terms, these different works opened the way for the assertion that regions are currently acquiring a growing value in international relations because of empirical and theoretical factors. In the first case (empirical) the argument is supported by the positions

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which highlight the relevance of geography and territoriality in what concerns to security issues, the volatility and ephemeral character of great powers’ strategic interests and the existence of a visible neo-regionalist trend in post-Cold War. In the second case, it is imperative to refer to fact that regional studies seek to give partial answers to the limits of parsimony, to the restrictions of the process of overlay, to the efforts of the Lakatosian progress of the area and to the perspectives of studies that relate the structure of the international system with the regional structures of power.

More than that, these studies allows us to observe differences between the old and new regionalism, both as an empirical phenomenon and a theoretical process (study of regions). In the first case, regions have become a main arena of international politics, what is observed by the increase of the twin processes of regionalization (movement of mutual approximation) and regionalism (political processes of regional cooperation). These processes are mainly related to the rise of a multipolar world (unbalanced) that is many ways unprecedented, because diffuse and regionally nucleated. Secondly, the theoretical advances of the new regionalism are mainly related to the possibilities of treating regions by the level of interaction of different types of actors and by its own terms. The former advance does not implies that states are less important, but that if we want to understand better regional dynamics we should not take them as given uniform actors. Moreover, territoriality is still a main element of regional systems and one cannot be discard it without incurring in many shortcomings.

The latter advance, the possibility of dealing with regions by its own terms, is connected to the idea of progress in International Relations Theory. Regions may be studied not just as a

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4 According to Buzan and Waever (2003), for non-global powers the main security threats are the geographically closest and related to the regional level. For the authors, as well as for Thompson (1973), Lemke (2002), Lake (1997a) and Lake and Morgan (1997b), "most threats travel more easily over short distances than over long ones" and "most states historically have been concerned primarily with the capabilities and intentions of their neighbours" (Buzan and Waever 2003, 4).

5 The penetration of great powers into other regions is limited by a cost-benefit logic which balances strategic interest with overstretching problems. In regions of relatively low strategic relevance, the room for regional powers is greater, as suggests Katzenstein (2000) for post-Cold War reality. However, these regions continue to be a potential target of global powers: as they can be of strategic interest to emergent powers, such as China, India and Brazil, and even because strategic interests of traditional global powers are more or less volatile and ephemeral. In the case of Africa for example, after the Cold War and the US failure in Somalia War, there was a strategic detachment of that traditional global power from Africa, what changed greatly since the War on Terror and the perception that the weakness some African states could propitiate a safe haven to terrorist groups.

6 According to some authors, the post-Cold War has been a period of uncertainty, where the superpower's inability to permanently affect all regions (overstretch) has opened room for regional dynamics and a neo-regionalist trend which has been seen with the emergence of many regional integration processes (Kelly 2007; Katzenstein 2000; 2005). There are, however, uncertainties about the future of the international system and even the possibility of the collapse of NR, with the emergence of a new superpower for example (Kelly 2007, 199).

7 The excessive parsimony of general theories about the international system generates insufficiency to explain the particular situations in some regions (i.e. regions where weak states predominate)(Kelly 2007, 201).

8 The global powers’ penetration in different regions is not a one way process. Local powers use global powers’ interests and patronage to pursue local policies and the global powers should be aware of this reality (i.e. Kissinger’s mistake in Angola) (Kelly 2007, 200; Visentini 2011). Therefore, “since regions matter more in the current era, the costs of underrating them could be even higher” (Buzan and Waever 2003, 41).

9 There is great knowledge value in expanding the scope of IR studies, even in the face of difficulties, costs and opposite expectations of the academic dominant community (escape the comfort zone). To create or enhance theories basing them on new empirical studies may be the first step in this task.

10 Regions’ specificities (polarity and polarization) seem to interfere in the capacity/power degree of the countries within them and these countries’ positions in face of other regional or global powers (international system).

11 In comparison to the concert of powers in the 19th century, today’s multipolar world is also unbalanced. However, in the earlier system great powers had little space in between then what made them export their confrontation and regions of influence to periphery. The bipolar world of Cold War also exported its real conflicts to periphery while balance of power in the centre and the distance between both poles avoided central warfare. In the contemporary system, however, global powers are geographically distant and the “free” space in periphery is less available for dispute (the exception is perhaps Africa). Then, regions that neighbour great powers have the potential to be part of the pole and less reachable to other great powers. This geospatial distribution of power may even increase the systemic stability since increases the cost of power projection in a central warfare.
part of the international system, but also as a system of its own. On the one hand, this allows us to analyse regions adopting the tools produced by the IR theory regarding International Politics and Foreign Policy. On the other hand, the same difficulties present in IR theory’s debate may be also imported by the regional studies such as the structure-agent debate and the difficulties to connect theories of International Politics and Foreign Policy. In any case, this reality may also highlight the role of regional studies to bring answers to the dilemmas of explaining the International System as a whole.

As far as the NR in the South is concerned, the scarcity of comprehensive analyses is partially compensated by the pioneering study of Hettne et al (2000) along with others. Peripheral countries generally perceive regionalism as a multilateralism factor (multilateralism possible), as an alternative to the challenges and risks of globalization (Mistry 1999, 117), and as a normative strategy towards overcoming developmental and security challenges as well as improving their position and bargain power in the international system (Hettne, Inotai, and Sunkel 2000, xxi–xxii). In short, NR encompasses the strategy of emerging powers to rise in a sustainable way, as the world is increasingly ‘multipolarized’ by regions.

Similarly, the FPA area has also experienced the emergence of a new generation, more aligned to a non-Western-centric intent that aims to study cases and themes without having pre-conceived patterns to follow. Another block that composes the theoretical pillar of this thesis is the literature on FPA and the particularities of Third World countries’ foreign policies, including Africa. In general aspect, first and second generations of FPA presented a lack of comprehensive analyses of foreign policy of countries in the South (Carlsnaes and Guzzini 2011; Hill 2003; Neack, Hey, and Haney 1995; Hudson 2007). As a natural result, the FPA of countries in the South is still predominantly based on pioneering approaches developed from two to three decades ago (Clapham 1985; Korany 1986a; Ayoob 1995). Nonetheless, recent exceptions are a hopeful sign that peripheral countries are important subjects for the understanding of foreign policy’s and international politics’ mechanisms, in a way vindicated by post-colonialist theories (Braveboy-Wagner 2003). This reality puts some question marks on Kenneth Waltz’s assumption that “[i]t would be … ridiculous to construct a theory of international politics based on Malaysia and Costa Rica” (Waltz 1979, 72).

In all this examples continuity may be seen in two aspects. First, the intent to connect different levels of analysis that may interfere in foreign policy making (Korany 1986b, 58–9; Neack 2008, 10–2; Hill 2003). Second, a fundamental preoccupation with the particularities of the process of state-building and nation-building in Third World, including State-society relations, as an explanatory element of foreign policy. One can refer to the contribution of Historical Sociology to this perception (Halliday 2005, 43). Authors like Christopher Clapham (1985) and Mohammed Ayoob (1995) address that, due to the particularities in the state-building process in Third World (such as recent process of state-building, delayed entry into the system of states, and particularities of the norms of international order when they entered), these states’ elites primarily seek to improve their chances of survival in the system (State and regime survival). Therefore, the behaviour of Third World states in the international system is largely determined by their sense of insecurity and vulnerability and powerlessness of their elites. Their main concern is to reduce these vulnerabilities. From this reality derives the commitment of these states to the postulates of the international system as sovereignty, non-intervention, self-help and codes of diplomacy. The greatest concern of the leaders of the Third World, almost an obsession, is the structure and security of states and government regimes (Ayoob 1995, 1–5).

New Regionalism and Foreign Policy Analysis in Africa

In the case of the African continent, both the NR and FPA subareas have seen a wide path for theoretical and empirical development. The study of regions in Africa is being widely assessed by analysts from both inside and outside the continent. Studies like the ones published by Grant and Söderbaum (2003) and Vale et al (2001) – as well as the studies of Odén (2000), Davies (2000), Abrahamsson (2000), Hentz (2005; 2009), Söderbaum (2004), Söderbaum and Taylor (2003) – try to adapt general theoretical constructions on NR to the African continent and lead the debate which is still incipient and has already been joined by me elsewhere (Castellano da Silva 2012).

In different ways these studies seek to address many challenges that are still present in assessing regionalism and regionalization in Africa. The dominant state-centric perception of the International Relations subject is unable to address the regionalism’s complexities in the continent. On the other hand, states should not be completely excluded from the analysis, as the continent is still much influenced by the structures of empirical and juridical statehood (Jackson and Rosberg 1982)\(^\text{13}\).

In the case of FPA, earlier studies based on Cold War assumptions (Thiam 1965; McGowan 1968; Aluko 1977; Mazrui 1977; Igham 1974; Saxena 1982; Gromyko 1983; Shaw and Aluko 1984; Ojo, Orwa, and Utete 1985) have been recently updated and expanded by new intents to integrate the FPA's main questions with regional issues related to the post-Cold War world (Chan 1990a; Chan 1994; Wright 1999; Akokpari 2001; Khadiagala and Lyons 2001; Adar and Ajulu 2002).

In terms of theoretical capacity to understand African foreign policy, one could divide the main works in three big ways of thinking Foreign Policy in Africa, a globalist, statist and regionalist perspective. The first one is a more common view. It highlights the factor of dependence, the peripheral aspect of countries’ participation in the international system (especially for economic and military asymmetries), which, together with internal challenges, constrains the actions of African countries since independence to the present day (Khadiagala and Lyons 2001; Khadiagala 2001, 131). Among the main constraints, one may cite: "shortage of skilled personal, limited resources to establish embassies or to gather information about external events" (Chazan et al. 1999, 363).

The second view questions the generalization of this first hypothesis and sustains the agency role of African countries and their space for action within the system, although submitted to constraints. One of the main approaches in this second perspective is the one which addresses the aspect of state survival; focusing on elements (more or less institutionalized, formal or informal) used by African countries to exercise agency in this asymmetric system. The discussion of the duality between juridical and empirical attributes of African sovereignty (Jackson and Rosberg 1982) is developed by Christopher Clapham (1996) to analyze the African foreign policies within an explanatory model of politics in the Third World (Clapham 1985). Clapham underscores how the elements of juridical statehood enable the agency of these countries (ensuring participation in the interstate system), despite its material and immaterial disabilities (low empirical statehood).

Clapham (1996) still seems to present an explanation that is more robust in terms of its sociological and political construction and is also more capable of generalization to other

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\(^{13}\) Jackson and Rosberg (1982) introduce the dialectics between juridical and empirical statehood for African countries. Juridical statehood indicates the juridical conditions of the sovereignty, such as territory, boundaries and international recognition of the state and its government. Empirical statehood refers to the effective accomplishment of the sovereignty, which includes governing, controlling, defending and protecting the state’s territory and its people. In this case it is evident the need of means/capacities to implement these tasks.
cases in the global South. In addition, Clapham (1985) introduces problems concerning the foreign policy of regional powers, in respect to its determinants and impacts in the region. However, this was one of the first attempts to develop an approach which seeks to address power asymmetry within the periphery in the FPA realm. Until today this area of research is hardly developed, a reality which this study attempts to contribute to overcome.

This leads us to the third approach on foreign policy in Africa. The regionalist perspective sustains that regarding inter-African relations, contrary to what is commonly conceived, African foreign relations do not differ much to those produced elsewhere (Chazan et al. 1999, 361). They are marked by tensions among governments, frictions across borders, alliances and counter-alliances. In other words, foreign policy in Africa is neither naturally given nor imposed from outside, it is the “expressions of the policy goals of the numerous state actors on the continent” (Chazan et al. 1999, 361). In what is related to space for action, African states have been well successful in placing its interests in foreign policy and executing it, though suffering with reactions from inside and outside the continent.

Moreover, the constraints of scarcity have generated a concentration of "diplomatic activity on continental affairs, contributing to the intensity of inter-African relations” (Chazan et al. 1999, 363). Therefore, it is important to notice that if one is interested in investigating the production of African countries’ foreign policies, the regional and continental environment are the ones which bare plentiful information.

In any case it is still little explained how the existence of more or less space of action in these intra-African relations (regionalist perspective) is related to the issue of state capacity (juridical and empirical statehood). For instance, how empirical capacity (state capacity) of regional powers can instigate regional level of conflict or cooperation, depending on foreign policy options, and even surpass the juridical statehood of weaker countries. On the other hand, what limits of action exist for regional powers, since smaller states can determine their interest in integrating coalition projects in order to protect its juridical statehood and their own projects for the region.14 In other words, there is an urgent need to integrate more lucidly the statist and regionalist approaches.

Moreover, few studies have produced (i) a more comparative and focused study on the role of state building and elite’s interests in producing foreign policy in Africa and (ii) an explanation of changes in regional systems in Africa, connecting it to the analysis on foreign policy of regional states and the role of regional powers (state capacity).

**Connecting New Regionalism and Foreign Policy Analysis in Southern Africa**

This study attempts to bridge the discussion on FPA of developing countries in general and African countries in particular with the problems of the NR in the South. More specifically it tries to integrate discussions on region politics and systemic changes and the production of foreign policy by main regional units.

Currently, different general analyses address regional power’s foreign policies to their regional environment. For instance, Destradi (2008) differs regional powers’ strategies in terms of the degree of cooperation and benevolence and formulate three types of strategy: empire, hegemony and leadership. Such strategies have the ability to influence in different ways the regional order and the institutional setting (Adler and Greve 2009) and should be

14 However, in this case, two trends appear to happen: (i) their lack of capacity cannot create much impact in the regional Pattern of Cooperation-Conflict, mostly determined by the regional powers; and (ii) the cooperation initiatives of weaker states seem to limit themselves to the extent that they do not outweigh the guarantees offered by juridical statehood.
evaluated according to the reaction of other actors in the region (regional powers or not) (Acharya 2007, 642). The approach of Solingen (1997; 1998) in addition to allowing the observation of the effects of external factors on domestic policies and structures, traces the relationship of these elements with the foreign policy and regional relations and structures. Moreover, Hentz (2005) and Solingen (1999) link domestic coalitions and their influence in patterns of regionalism.

However, few studies deal, in an explanatory way, with the relationship between state-building, State Capacity, foreign policy and regional structures and connect that to interactional character of various regional states (beyond the regional hegemon). Mohammed Ayoob (1999) is one of the few exceptions. The author produces an integrated approach which deals with relations among all these elements, sustaining that in order for a regional society [environment of regional cooperation,] to be established, regional states must perceive their concurrent state- and nation-building tasks as complementing each others’ efforts toward the same end and not as hostile ventures being undertaken at the expense of one another. This is probably the most difficult condition to satisfy because of the arbitrary manner in which the boundaries of post-colonial states have been drawn and the extreme nervousness with which state elites perceive state- and nation-building activities by others in their neighbourhood. (Ayoob 1999, 258)

This study seeks to bind both the discussions of regional systems, state making and foreign policy in a comparative way. The next section discusses how it expects to analyse Southern African regional system continuities and changes and its connection to foreign policy of regional powers.

**Continuities and Changes in Southern Africa: the evolution of regional politics**

Studies on regionalism in Africa in general and Southern Africa in particular have produced important descriptive analysis, focusing on the role of conflict and cooperation, regional institutions, security and development. However few analyses have produced systematic efforts connecting theories of international (and regional) politics and theories of foreign policy in order to explain regional dynamics. This study aims to contribute to fill this gap.

The first question related to regional studies is what to analyse. In fact, many elements could be integrated in a regional analysis. At least six could be identified from the literature of new regionalism and are centrally relevant to this work: regional dynamics (political, economic, securitarian, socio-identity), penetration of extra-regional powers/actors, State Capacity (polarity), polarization (setting alliances, institutions), foreign policy of the system’s members, and Pattern of Cooperation-Conflict. The latter refers to a *continuum* which indicates the predominance of a particular relationship of cooperation or conflict among actors in a specific period of time.

However, more than describing elements of regional analysis, it seems important to identify relations among them in a complex way. In other to produce this task, theory is the best suitable tool to shed light in a shadow path. In this aspect, treating the region as a system

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15 The concept of State Capacity refers to the state's power and the sustainability of this power (long term). It consists of a dual logic. Domestically, the concept of State Capacity not only provides a measure to the capabilities of the state, but its effective capacity to penetrate society and change the distribution of resources, activities and interpersonal connections (Tilly 2007, 16). Here it is important to consider the relative strength of the state in relation to the society and how sustainable the interaction of these two spheres is, in view of the processes of state-building (Tilly 1996). In the sphere of the international relations, State Capacity affects more specifically the ability that a country has to protect itself from the interference of the international system and, at the same time, shape the system according to its interests.
seems to be a fruitful effort. Robert Gilpin's work of 1981, *War and Change in World Politics*, is one of the main inspiring works that may help in this understanding. Besides being interest in aspects of political change (what is central to this work), Gilpin deals with systems in a relative flexible way, attempting to identify mechanisms of change in world politics. His analysis is adaptable to regional systems and assists in the effort to identify structural and aspects of agency of regional politics.

Gilpin (1981, 39–40) establishes three possibilities of relevant change in a system. The first and more fundamental is systems change, “a change in the nature of the actors or diverse entities that compose an international system”. The second is the systemic change, “a change in the form of control or governance of an international system”, that is, the distribution of power, the hierarchy of prestige and the set of rules that govern interstate interactions. The third type of change is the interaction change; a change in the form of regular interactions or processes among the entities in an ongoing international system”. Additionally, one might also mention change in the system's boundaries, which can be either related to a systems or interaction change.\(^{16}\)

Other relevant aspect present in Gilpin's analysis is the agency of system’s units. Robert Gilpin is interested in analysing how the behaviour of political actors, based on cost-benefit calculations, can produce changes in the international system and when those changes imply conflict and war. Despite being also concerned with systemic structural factors, such as the distribution of power and prestige and the aspects of military and technological, the author allows a great space for the study of agency power of units. For him, “international political change must focus on the international system and especially on the efforts of political actors to change the international system in order to advance their own interests” (Gilpin 1981, 10).

Hence, his interactional model sustains that “the relative stability of the system is, in fact, largely determined by its capacity to adjust to the demands of actors affected by changing political and environmental conditions” (Gilpin 1981, 13). More broadly,

> The explanation of international political change is in large measure a matter of accounting for shifts in the slopes and positions of the indifference curves of states and in the specific objectives of foreign policy. (Gilpin 1981, 23)

In this aspect, Gilpin seems to prefigure answers to later discussions in International Relations Theory about agency and structure. Currently, political realism seems to be watching important developments in this overdue discussion that has become increasingly relevant after Alexander Wendt seminal work (Wendt 1992). Still, the criticism provided by Buzan et al. (1993, 116–21) is rests alive, as Waltzian neorealism does not provide a wide and developed theory of the state. There is still need of a “much more fully systemic and multisectoral theory than that offered by Neorealism” (1993, 9), since “in confusing structure with system, Waltz has lost sight of the systemic interaction element that is essential to give the notion of system meaning” (1993, 39).

\(^{16}\) One can identify two types of boundary changes. One, of structural aspect, involves the expansion of a unit type to other regions in the logic of territorial expansion and modes of production. In regions (mainly the peripheral ones), this ends up involving changes in the nature of the units. The other type of boundaries shift is related to the change of interaction / dynamics between the units. This type of change is linked to the idea of regions of interaction and regional security complexes whose existence depend (result) from the more or less cooperative or conflictive interaction between units. In this case the definition involves a certain arbitrariness, since “what constitutes an international system (or subsystem) lies to some extent in the eye of the beholder” (Gilpin 1981, 38). The change depends on the characteristic of the new dynamics. Moreover, the consequence of this change in boundaries may result from changes in power capabilities and level of prestige of states (which may or may not result in systemic change), as “boundaries of the system are defined by the area over which great powers seek to exert control and influence” (Gilpin 1981, 38). Moreover, the inclusion of new units in the system may also imply a systemic change.
In order to operationalize the insights given by Gilpin (1981) and Buzan et al. (1992), two important roads of research have been produced. The first include theories of foreign policy which try to evaluate how systemic mechanisms affect countries' foreign policies in different ways through domestic process (elites' cohesion, internal vulnerability, personal perceptions, etc) (Schweller 2003; Rose 1998; Lobell, Ripsman, and Taliaferro 2009). However, difficulties are still present to theorize about the connection between the output (foreign policy) and international politics (Feng and Ruizhuang 2006, 122–3). The second road is forged by the possibilities that historical sociology brings to International Relations Theory as far as it can evaluate processes of state formation and changes and their connection to systems changes (Hobson 2003, 210–3).

Regional analysis brings at least one opportunity and one challenge to systems theory. First, due to the reduced character of the system, it allows a more viable study of the interaction between agency and structure and the integration of theories of international politics and theory of foreign policies. Second, it adds complexity to the analysis as the regional system is, by any means a part of a wider system and is constantly penetrated by external, state and non-state forces. This study tries to address these issues offering an introductory analysis of change in Southern African regional system.

**Greatest changes in Southern African system**

Partially adopting Gilpin's model, the illustration below synthesizes in broad terms the heuristic perception of changes in Southern African regional system during the last two hundred years. The systems change sphere was mainly based on the alternation from a system where different types of state competed to each other to one marked by the victory of a colonial model of state. More specifically, in Southern Africa one could observe a broad competition among colonial powers, pre-colonial/pre-modern states and territorial states established by the Afrikaner community which had a quasi-national character. In this regarding, two factors are relevant to mention. First, there was the victory of imperialists over local political units that were generally experiencing process of political revolutions and crises. Within the Nguni group of Southern Africa’s Bantu, this process has been identified as Mfecane (Ngcongco 2010; Mashingaidze 2010). The second was the victory of imperial power against the Afrikaner group involving intense warfare and new war techniques (Boahen 2010, 7–8). Moreover, the colonial type of state was itself very diverse. The autonomy and quasi-independence of Union of South Africa in 1910 gave this dominion wider means of state capacity to put into practice its regional project, what was neither possible in Portuguese colonies nor Rhodesia. After the 1960, there was an enormous inflection towards the establishment of fully independent national states, which is until today predominant in the region.

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17 For the most notorious reference on Africa’s colonial states, see Young (1994).
Concerning systemic change, it is important to mention that “there have been relatively few studies of earlier systems or non-Western systems by scholars in the field. Moreover, these studies have seldom addressed the problem of systemic change in a systematic, comparative, or theoretical vein” (Gilpin 1981, 43). In the case of Southern Africa this reality is also evident, since there is a notorious lack of studies addressing historically patterns of systemic characteristics, that is, the distribution of power among units. However, there would be little disagreement to the fact that South Africa has been a predominant regional power, at least since its internal process of industrialization and state-strengthening since 1920s. In terms of balance of power, based on material capacities, one could identify that a great gap between South Africa and the other regional countries would exist along the whole period.\(^{18}\) Indeed, no real threat to South Africa's hegemony, in a way that one state could substitute South Africa as the most powerful regional power, has been seen since the process of creating hegemony in the first half of the 20\(^{th}\) century.

However, at least two reservations should be added to this statement. First, since there is no consensus to what constitute indicators to state's material capacity, a more rigorous study should be processed to theoretically discuss and empirically identify longitudinal polarity in Southern Africa. Moreover, there is a vital need to integrate the immaterial aspects of power into the analysis, since they are one of the fundaments of any hegemony.\(^{19}\) By this criterion one could identify a crisis of prestige and credibility of South Africa in its own region at the time of independence of black majority states. This crisis is centrally connected to state-formation process, elite preferences and views towards the region. Then, even more than

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\(^{18}\) For a more detailed study, see Castellano da Silva (2012).

\(^{19}\) Based on Gramscian view of power, Robert Cox highlights that “to the extent that the consensual aspect of power is in the forefront, hegemony prevails. Coercion is always latent but is only applies in marginal, deviant cases. Hegemony is enough to ensure conformity of behaviour in most of the time” (Cox 1996, 127).
material capacity, immaterial factors are essentially relational. The second reservation relates to the current rise of Angola as a regional power in material terms. In general terms, Angola had experienced a high amount of military renovation, economy growth and state reform by the end of its civil war in 2002. As argued elsewhere, this situation confers on Angola a greater proximity to South Africa’s material capacities and a wider distance from other regional power aspirants in Southern Africa (Castellano da Silva 2012).

Regarding boundaries’ changes, they presented two types of modification. First, after a period of disconnection among different sub-regional links (the largest one being the social and economic links of Bantu linguistic branch communities); there was the expansion of colonial state throughout the region, creating a larger form of political and economic interaction. This boundaries’ change was related to the mentioned systems change that occurred in the same period. Other types of changes were verified by the interaction amongst states and political groups in the region after the establishment of state boundaries. One could at least verify a volatile interaction between the regional geographic centre and its periphery in the north. Expansion of the colonial project, British capital and South Africa’s foreign relations made possible the inclusion of Congolese southeast region of Katanga in Southern African dynamics. The independence struggle also connected Tanzania to the regional logic and strengthened the strong presence of Congo/Zaire in regional issues, mostly Angola’s civil war. During the 1980s, however, the relative settlement between Zaire and Angola and the focus of Tanzania on Uganda’s civil conflicts engendered a movement of contraction in the regional boundaries. Nevertheless, in the late 1990s, the renovation of SADC and the explosion of the Second Congo War and Great Lakes conflicts made possible a new huge movement of boundaries’ expansion, not just towards Tanzania and Congo themselves but also in direction to the Great Lakes region as a whole.

Finally, the interaction change in Southern Africa is the main concern of this study and the doctoral thesis upon which it relies. One could list various forms of analysing interaction and its consequences. This work is interested in identifying political, economic, securitarian and social dynamics within Southern African system and aspects of penetration of extra-regional countries, polarization, and the Patterns of Cooperation-Conflict. The latter is, however, an analytic element that allows the integration of the other factors in a wider and more oriented analysis using a criterion to identify changes. That said, one could observe three significant changes in Southern African system since 19th century. The first one was the modification from a system of high levels of conflict involving state formation towards one which set the pace to regional cooperation and formation. The second was the change from a cooperative environment to one marked by conflict and interstate, internal and proxy war, but with important initiatives of cooperation. The third was a movement from that conflictive pattern to an environment markedly cooperative that has seen the strengthening of regional institutions and connection in political, economic, security and social spheres – but with some focus of tensions that will be address later on this paper.

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20 It is important to refer that every observation regarding regional boundaries involves arbitrariness. Gilpin remembers that “what constitutes an international system (or subsystem) lies to some extent in the eye of the beholder” (Gilpin 1981, 39). For instance, besides addressing importance of state powers in creating systems, the author highlights the relevance of attitudinal criterion (actors perception), i.e. what countries and regions they consider in formulating foreign policy in terms of calculation seeking control and influence (Gilpin 1981, 39). However, a less arbitrary way seems to be on the analysis of real behaviour, the empirical reach of dynamics. In other words, it does not matter if a space is considered in the formulation of Foreign Policy of a country, if that country does not reach that space empirically in its foreign policy behaviour. If a real action is not produced then geographic space or unit is not included in the system. This statist view could be expanded towards a social view, including the dynamics and connections of social groups.
Possible explanations for change

More than describing changes and continuities, this study is interested in identifying, at least in introductory ways, the causes of changes in South Africa, mainly the transition occurred in 1989. In order to identify such explanatory factor it is important to bear in mind the discussion mentioned earlier about the power of agency given to units and domestic forces.

From the analysis of the last section, one could visualize a possible connection between the movements of systems change (changes in the nature of the units) and the changes in conflict and cooperation in the region and the connections between South Africa gradual loss of prestige and conflict formation in the region. However, these relations tell us little about mediation links between structure and agency. For instance, if transformation of regional units seems to be well related to regional interaction change in terms of cooperation and conflict, other factors may be essential to mediate the link between state formation and the regional pattern of cooperation-conflict. According to Gilpin’s and neoclassic realists’ thoughts, another important element is the domestic aspects of foreign policy produced by regional states (units), what is connected to the agency facet of regional politics. Then, systemic factors are important but war or cooperation only occur because of the agency power of state and the interactional factor of elites agreeing or disagreeing with each other’s policies.

Therefore two mechanisms seem central to the analysis of changes in the regional patterns of cooperation-conflict. First, the study role of foreign policies changes, as well as when changes happened and which actor (elites) produced change – focusing, thus, on actors that may influence more. To look for changes in foreign policy particularly involves studying relevant case of inflection and restructuring. According to Ali Dessouki,

Foreign policy restructuring entails a major alteration or breakup in the orientation of an actor in favor of establishing a new set of commitments and alliances. It is more than a change in tactics or instruments of policy implementation and goes beyond the routine fluctuations and oscillations of the foreign policy behaviour of developing countries. It involves a basic reconsideration of an actor’s perceptions of the global or regional system and of its role within that framework. Indicators of the restructuring of foreign policy orientation include patterns of diplomatic, commercial, military and cultural relations between the country and the outside world. (Dessouki 2008, 167)

The second mechanism is the study of the formation of foreign policies, factors that have influenced that change. In this respect, both domestic and external factors may interfere in foreign policy formation.

An appreciation that the structure of the international system is a significant determinant of the foreign policies of states does not require acceptance of the deterministic realist formula of the primacy of foreign policy or its identification of national interest solely with the pursuit of power. Nor must one accept a structural or systems-theory approach to international relations such as Waltz’s in order to agree that the distribution of power among the states in a system has a profound impact on state behavior. Both the structure of the international system and the domestic conditions of societies are primary determinants of foreign policy. (Gilpin 1981, 87)

Bearing that in mind, this study attempts to address main elements that can mediate foreign and domestic dynamics. One is a more historical (social, political and economic) process; the second is a more momentary process. The first one is the state formation, mainly because “whether or not a state will seek to change the international system depends ultimately on the nature of the state and the society it represents” (Gilpin 1981, 54). The second element, derived from the first, is the elite’s regional project and its perceived benefit
in perceiving it as a matter of costs and benefits in relation to the system. The definition of the benefits is a elitist process: "the benefits sought by a group and the price it is willing to pay depend ultimately on the perceived interests of the ruling elites and coalitions in a society" (Gilpin 1981, 51). These two elements feed each other, since determinant to the elite’s perception is the “historical experience of the society” (Gilpin 1981, 51). Decisions taken by state elites are themselves immerse on a complex historical, sociological process of state-building.

Therefore, in the regional system not only structural mechanisms and distribution of power produce consequences on international politics. Also options taken both by the regional powers and the ascendant powers (one could include as well all the other components of the system) will affect the level of conflict (war) and cooperation in the system. Moreover, it is the analysis of state-building process, elite formation and foreign policy making as an interactional one. One could say that the history of Southern Africa is the narrative of the role of the main regional power. However, the regional power does not act alone. African countries experience diplomatic challenges common to other countries of the globe. One cannot understand regional policy without understanding the interaction of other powers.

Figure 2 – Foreign Policy Interaction and Regional Conflict

**Figure 2 – Foreign Policy Interaction and Regional Conflict**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Impetus in promoting the project</th>
<th>Radical/Developmentalist</th>
<th>Liberal</th>
<th>Conservative</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Expansion</td>
<td>Zone of intense conflict</td>
<td></td>
<td>Zone of intense conflict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Isolation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**Elite’s Regional Project**

To sum up, this study intends to introduce a comparative analysis of state-building and foreign policy in order to understand regional patterns of cooperation and conflict in Southern Africa. It analyses foreign policy in two broad elements. First, influenced by Hentz (2005) and Ayoob’s (1999) assertions it analyses the elites project towards the region. In the Southern African case, three possible situations were identified, that relates to the countries position towards status quo: conservative, liberal and radical/developmentalist projects. Secondly, the study analyses the impetus of the implementation of that project, what connects to perceived benefits it could bring in relation to costs of its realization. Three types of impetus were stipulated: expansionist, neutral and isolationist. Different interactional
combinations of those different projects and impetus tend to instigate more or less regional conflict and cooperation. For instance figure 2 shows where the tendency to conflict is usually situated. It stands when different countries in the regional are situated, in a given moment, in opposed spectrum of expansionist types of foreign policy that seeks and acts either to change or preserve status quo.

The study of the state-building process in Southern Africa and the foreign policy process by foreign policy elites intend to give answers both to the mechanisms of systems change in the region and the agency aspect of foreign policy.

**State-building as region-building: how the state-building process in Southern Africa created the region**

As mentioned in the latter section, the process of region-building in Southern Africa is centrally related to the logic of state-building. Both the connection within the region and the struggle among different types of states are linked to logic which is central to the understanding of the regional distribution of power (formation of regional powers), the distribution of power inside the states (predominance of different elites, with different projects for the region), and the logic of cooperation and conflict.

Just like in Europe, Americas, and Asia, understanding the state-building process in Africa is central to the comprehension of its international politics and foreign policy formation. In any case, one could identify that Third World states’ particularities deviate these cases from the European trajectory, where "war made states and states made war" in a natural and interactional project of bargain between coercion and capital holders, and competition towards their competitors (Tilly 1985). Third World at many aspects differed from European way of making states in Europe, but the process largely meant the European way of exporting states. If Charles Tilly (1996) observed three types of trajectories that European states took to develop towards a tendency of capitalized coercion, in Third World, in general, and Africa, in particular, the usually result was a weak level of both coercion and capital, despite the fact that states were even weaker than social elites of caudillo type, although these ones even lacked capital capacities and were usually connected to the outside world in a enclave economy.

African states had three particular experiences that interfered in their processes of state-building (and, as a result, in State-society relations), elites’ formation and their options concerning foreign policies. The first relevant mechanism was the establishment of colonial states. This kind of imperial, semi-modern state competed in peacefully and violently against African pre-modern type of states. Its victory mostly in late 19th Century produced arbitrary political units, dependent economic formation and problems of legitimizing central authority, while reproducing traditional structures (Ayoob 1995, 34–36). At the same time this process and the recent independence of African national states relate to the difficulties related to timing, since they lack time and free hand to produce state building. Addressing this reality in Third World states, Ayoob sustain that

The inadequacy of the time element and the fact that several sequential phases involved in the state-making process have had to be collapsed or telescoped together into one mammoth state-building enterprise go a long way in explaining the security of the Third World state. (Ayoob 1995, 31)

The second experience was connected to the character of the regional and global interstate systems. The relative stability of the interstate system contributed significantly for this reality, which derived from the territorial inviolability and the rigidity of ineffective
boundaries. Since the colonial experience in the continent, a relatively stable environment was built through the empowerment of people from the coast (economic model focused on the external sector) and the establishment of rigid boundaries. This feature continued in the post-colonial period through the freezing of national boundaries and the banishment of wars of aggression by the international regimes of the United Nations (UN) and the Organization of African Unity (OAU) (Herbst 1989; 2000). As a result, the Letterbox politics became legitimized, as well as the existence of a juridical, rather than empirical, type of sovereignty. This sort of artificial sovereignty was depicted, in practice, when the political elites who just controlled the capital were in possession of the state sovereignty, although they usually did not control interior regions of the country (Jackson and Rosberg 1982; Clapham 1996). There was, therefore, the predominance of patrimonial policies in the central government and the existence of warlords and islands of coercion, rival to state power, in the hinterland. This resulted in the preponderance of internal threats to state security.

Finally, the relation between war and state-making was the third experience that contributed to difficulties in the process of state-making in Africa. Unlike in Western Europe, where the war encouraged the strengthening of the state and the optimization of the relationship between capital and coercion (Tilly 1996), in Africa the predominant type of war (determined by the system) and form of waging it (determined by agents and influenced by the system) led to the weakening of the state. The predominant type of war was one favoured by the porosity of the state borders and the little ability to control peripheral regions of the country by national governments. As a result, even in cases where interstate existed, war was expressed in the general form of intra-state or proxy war. That is, due to the particularities in the African process of state formation (weakness of state structures), domestic security threats were prevalent throughout the history of the region, including in the post-Cold War period.22

The way in which this kind of war was fought also greatly influenced the weak state of the continent. In general terms, the wars on the continent had the participation of extra-regional powers and multilateral institutions in the war effort as the main fighting forces. This reality has generated in practice disincentives for building autonomous national armies capable of the internal and external defence. The way of financing war also generated, unlike the European model, disincentives to strengthening of the state. Funding based on the extraction of natural resources and foreign loans brought little incentive for the creation of a system of taxation to compel the integration of the national state through the creation of a basic infrastructure that enables tax collection. The structure of economic enclaves remained predominant. In general logic, elites who got the victory in the war also contributed not to a trajectory of state-building, opting for political self-weakening of the state – based on patronage and warlordism. Finally, recent international pressure towards exclusively negotiated resolution of armed conflicts through power-sharing arrangements have contributed to the weakening of states in "post"-conflict situation, where armed groups are automatically included in the government administration and state. This encourages the reproduction of political warlordism (administration groups are virtually autonomous and defend particularistic interests) and the lack of national unity (command and control of the Armed Forces) – and establishes a system of rewards for political movements that decide to

21 Christopher Clapham (1996, 20) uses the term “letterbox sovereignty” to refer to a situation where whoever opens the letters at the presidential palace and receives invitation to represent the state at the United Nations and other international bodies is, in practice, the legal representative of the sovereignty.

22 The domestic level would therefore be prevalent in security dynamics, although no African civil conflict has been confined to a single territory. The main feature of this is the presence of internal actors rivals to the state, which usually claim strong relationships with post-traditional (ethnic ties - instrumented or not) structures, have the support of other African states (political base for proxy war), strategic control regions rich in natural resources and build partnerships with outside economic interests (public and private). Notwithstanding the existence of some degree of state rivalry, proxy war meant that African states were turned inward.
take up arms, which encourages their reproduction. If the overall trajectory of the construction of African states was marked by harmful character of the international system and the pernicious relationship between war and state-building, the countries that stand out on the continent in terms of capabilities appear to have been precisely those who have had different experiences from the standard path.

The creation of Southern Africa and the regional centrality of South Africa

The creation of Southern Africa is centrally connected to the occupation of the region by social groups and the struggle among different projects of collective organization. The most fundamental aspect is that none of these projects were destined to win. This reality is more or less connected to the environment of state-building process in early-modern Europe, despite the fact that one of the concurrent actors in the African case had already experienced the modern nation-state experience of effective political organization and the industrial revolution. Therefore, by the result of the interaction among the agents, the colonialist project betrayed itself as more capable and adapted to the struggle it helped to instigate. In relation to the native African project, capital, coercion and ideology made difference. Timing was also important, as the strongest African states were in a process of internal change and crises, what opened the way to the European colonialists. In relation to the white autonomous project, it was stronger in terms of capital and coercion capacity. However, the colonial state could not exterminate integrally both projects in order to maintain legitimacy of domination. The black African project was important to legitimize the colonialist state externally (in front of the social pressures for the native’s rights) and internally (in order to guarantee the use of black labour force). The use of local mediators and the discourse of native independent development suited the needs of the colonial powers and the limited tolerance of a racist society.

Moreover, the establishment of colonial rule in Southern Africa was marked by competition of three main different colonial projects and structures. The intensive character of South African formation and its connection with high capital and centralized political structure was an important element to the relative victory of its regional project.

The formation of South Africa implied a very particular trajectory from the African reality mentioned above and from Southern African competitors. It differentiated itself from the regular African narrative by two main elements. First, South Africa was created by the central logic of war. Although other regions in Southern Africa experienced war between colonial enterprise and traditional political units, nowhere else in the region war had such significance as it had in South Africa. This, partially due to the magnitude of the rival Zulu empire, but mostly because it was also waged between the colonialist and quasi-modern states of South African Republic and Orange Free State. This gave the new born Union of South Africa a strong formation of coercive and extractive capacities, as well as a more advanced battlefield experience. The second element was the expansive character of its elites. British colonialists realized that the best alternative to introduce their imperialist visions of a region connected from Cape to Cairo was to offer some concession to the well politically and socially organized Afrikaner elite. The alliance between British capital and Afrikaner political organization started from this time on. This relationship allowed the connection of between money and guns, capital and coercion that may sustain any systemic hegemony (Arrighi 1996, 38).

23 Besides Mfecane, one could also mention the international policies that banned the arms selling to local communities, such as the Sand River Convention (1852) and Brussels Conference (1890) (Chanaïwa 2010, 220).
The connection of Southern Africa started with the creation of an infrastructure of railways and roads centralized economically in the Rand and politically in South Africa. Moreover, South Africa’s position of regional nucleus had become increasingly important with the downturn of world economy between 1920s and the end of Second World War. In this period, South Africa government engaged in a project of import substitution and the establishment of state industrial monopolies that would increasingly protect White workers (Wallerstein and Vieira 1992, 7–8).

Thus when the post-1945 upturn in the world-economy occurred, South Africa was in a good position to try to create the “region” of southern Africa with itself as a now clearly semi-peripheral power, one that would dominate the region economically, and even politically and militarily. (Wallerstein and Vieira 1992, 9)

This incipient predominance of the Union of South Africa competed peacefully with two or three other regional nucleus that rivalled South Africa. However, the latter was more capable of connecting and creating a region of interaction. These other nucleus, mainly Portuguese colonies and Rhodesia, also did not produce significant impediment for the South African regional project. Even if there were different views for the region, scarce intentions of expanding and implementing this view were the predominant reality.

In a “tripartite alliance”, Portugal and Rhodesia had to be increasingly dependent on South African state economic and coercive capacity mainly to confront internal challenges related to decolonization process (Wallerstein and Vieira 1992, 11–13). This was combined with the rise of even more conservative forces in South Africa. The elites of the National Party, which broke the Anglo-Boer compromise, would try to protect industrialization under white control and “sought actively to project South Africa as a country with its own hinterland, the neighbouring states of southern Africa” (Wallerstein and Vieira 1992, 9). The white Afrikaner political elite used to socialize through the Afrikaner Broederbond a male Afrikaner Calvinist secret organization which had a large influence in South Africa’s social and political life and in the formation of the National Party (Chan 1990b, 10–3). One of its main leaders was D.F. Malan, Prime-Minister between 1948 and 1954, period that marked the rise of the official apartheid programme. This apparent state-strengthening project was nevertheless received with high social opposition, what in the middle run would be a force responsible to its own decadence.

Colonial states were more or less established by the use of force (coercion), capital and ideas. However, these structures were modified in the time of independence. The struggle between native and colonial elites was the base to the future result in post-colonial state structures. States like South Africa which was able to build strong capitalist elites with capacity to maintain power in the independence period could enjoy a more capable state to act internationally, however with some internal instability due to suppression of social groups. States that had no immediate substitute to colonial elites and were formed in a high opposition between colonial agents and internal groups, resulted in a flow of elites and capitals. The state as a result was constrained to act and revolutionary elites with affirmative/radical regional foreign policy were an emergent solution. On the other hand, both projects had to use the region (through the idea of existential threats) and external alliances to soften internal problems of legitimacy.
Explaining Cooperation and Conflict: State-building and Foreign Policy of regional players (1975-1988)

In the 1960s, the ‘winds of change’ in Southern Africa brought more than hopes of freedom. Two different logics related to formation of states in the region and aspects of international system brought the regional system under predominant relations of conflict. The first logic is related to the dissolution of the colonial states and with them the safeness of the South African and white rule project to order the region. Three movements mattered most. One, related to economic factors reflected the disruption of the commercial and business network that based the Southern African system centred on South Africa with the loss of the copper-belt with the independence of Congo, the failure of Katanga’s separatism and independence of Zambia. The second movement was mainly securitarian, with the establishment in Zambia and Tanzania of black majority regimes that were nationalists and supporters of national liberation of the rest of the region through national liberation movements. The armed struggle in Angola and Mozambique also brought about new intensity in the flux of arms and the perception of threat to white regimes. The third movement, of political character, is related to the latter aspect, since internal and external pressures for the independence of Namibia and against racist regimes of South Africa and Southern Rhodesia created a huge perception of threat in dominant white political elites.

The second logic that brought the region into the logic of conflict was the inflow of the Cold War dynamics. The Congo Crisis were the one element that linked the year of 1960 – the African year (symbol of political independence) – and 1975 – the independence of Portuguese colonies and the explosion of Cold War conflict in Africa. The Congo situation marked the start of Western preoccupation with the African continent and the emergence of radical movements supported by Soviet and Chinese arms and equipments and Cuban advisors. However, it was only after 1975 that the opposition between foreign policies of Nixon/Kissinger and Castro plus Brejnev brought to Africa, in general, and Southern Africa, in particular, the stage of a Hot Cold War.

The victory of the MPLA (Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola) in Angola and FRELIMO (Frente de Libertação de Moçambique) in Mozambique forged the increase of interstate rivalries in the region, manifested through proxy wars. The increase of tensions between 1975 and 1980 was marked by the support of insurgent movements by both conservative and radical regimes in the region. South Africa started its hostilities against the MPLA regime, which controlled Luanda in the 1975 struggle, by supporting operations of UNITA (União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola) and FLNA (Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola). The latter group was also supported by CIA, Zaire's Mobutu, and China. However, both groups were demobilized by MPLA with a high level of Cuban help. This support was a direct one, very different from the one given to Congolese rebels and other radical movements in Africa during the 1960s. In Mozambique, the conflict after independence was created by RENAMO, a puppet group forged by Ian Smith government against FRELIMO regime, which backed ZANU (Zimbabwe African National Union).

Within the dynamics of conflict, there was, however, an axis of cooperation. In security terms, Vorster's regime cooperated covertly with Ian Smith government in Rhodesia against Soviet backed ZAPU (Zimbabwe African People's Union) and China supported ZANU. This was compensated by the radical movement’s political connection and support through the
parties' ideologies and the historical leadership of Julius Nyerere and Kenneth Kaunda, with was gradually passed to José Eduardo dos Santos and Samora Machel – two of the main leaders of the Front Line States. In economy terms, South Africa proposed the idea of a Constellation of Southern African States (CONSAS) that would increase dependence on and centrality of its economy, which had historically created social connections of migrant workers, mainly Mozambicans, dependant on South African jobs, and trade and infrastructural dependence of neighbour states – mainly the Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland (BLS states). On the other hand, the developmentalist regimes were searching for a collective alternative that would result in the creation of the Southern African Development Coordination Council (SADCC) in 1 April 1980.

The defeat of the regime of Ian Smith in Southern Rhodesia, the strengthening of the Frontline States with the rise of Mugabe and the institutionalization of SADCC (higher polarization in the region), and the pressures on Jimmy Carter against apartheid are some of the facts that contributed to South Africa's increasing policy of destabilizing neighbours. There was between 1981 and 1988 an escalation of conflict in the region. The situation was represented with the advancement of the South African operations of military and economic destabilization, particularly in Mozambique and in Angola.

The conflictive axis was composed of security and economic elements. On the security side, South African direct and indirect (proxy) offensive was expanded in Angola, Mozambique, Zimbabwe and other countries that would supposedly give safe haven to ANC (African National Congress) and SWAPO (South West Africa People's Organization) movements. In response, neighbour countries would increase its support to anti-Apartheid movements, anti-Apartheid rhetoric and internal counter-insurgence operations. However, when outside support was scarce and economic alternatives reduced, few options were left but to cede to agreements with Apartheid regime. The economic element of the conflict axis created incentives for this position, since South Africa's economic diplomacy created costs to neighbours not inserted in the CONSAS project. It used transportation and communication dependence to inflict constrains on its rivals.

In the cooperative axis, the agreements signed with South Africa had a symbolic impact, since they usually meant subjugation to South African regional project and, on the other hand, rarely resulted in disengagement of South Africa’s direct or indirect incursions. Nkomati Accord signed in 1984 with Mozambican government was an example of that (as South African incursion continued) and the Lusaka Agreement with Angola resulted in no advance of cooperation, besides the beginning of US position as peace-broker and the popularization of the pro-Apartheid Chester Crocker's linkage solution. The cooperation among SADCC members was also limited due to differences among its members and vested interests of regional leaders. However, cooperation such as the Mozambican neighbours' assistance to FRELIMO operations against RENAMO (Resistência Nacional Moçambicana) and Angola's continued support to SWAPO and ANC (the latter also and mostly helped by Zambia), showed how conflict was an generator of cooperation. One of the main important was, however, extra-regional. The Cuban support of MPLA government was even expanded in the new drive of FAPLA against UNITA bases from 1986. With the also increased support of South African Defence Force (SADF) to UNITA units that implied a retreat of Angola and Cuban forces to Cuito Cuanavale, Castro threw its last card in the Angolan conflict, sending 15,000 plus troops and new equipments to the region. The most important battle in the region and the losses resultant to both sides resulted in a mutual disengagement and opened the way to an agreement. The Cold War distension also helped the negotiations, agreed by the Soviet Union (USSR) and the United States (US), the latter also an important mediator. Other important issue was the domestic context in South Africa, explained below. As the linkage
policy sustained the resolution of the conflict between South Africa and Angola involved the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola and the long waited independence and elections in Namibia. The climactic moment was the signing of the New York Accords with Angola and Cuba, on December 22, 1988.

If factors like polarization, changes in balance of power and penetration of extra-regional powers in the region were elements that contributed to the changes in the Pattern of Cooperation- Conflict in the region, all these factors had to be interfered, filtered and mediated by the foreign policy of countries in the region, mainly the one that were the central actors of the conflict.

State, Elites and Foreign Policy in South Africa (1975-1988)

If the perception of stability after Sharpeville uprising in 1960 was controlled by the regime, independence in the Portuguese colonies and the Soweto uprising were a central part of a new environment. The political elite's enemy of the apartheid was now stronger inside and outside. Inside, because the black freedom movement became stronger and less controllable. Outside, because the frontier of white rule were crumbling down, its main rivals were now states with continental and eastern support, and the international communities were less and less tolerant with the strong hand of white regime. The types of responses to this threatening environment were two: first, an economic solution to increase dependence and control in the region; second, a hard position against rival movements and regimes. Internally, the Apartheid regime sped up its policy of state building with high investments in defence, infrastructure and a new level of the import substitution programme, also in order to face international sanctions. These logics were connected to the infighting between political elites in foreign policy institutions. Dovish diplomats at the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) were mostly connected to Vorster's détente and the CONSAS idea, while conservative politician related to defence and military strata were represented by their leader's, P.W. Botha, idea of the necessity of a hard instance in the region. Points of consensus were: to gather neutral regimes to its side and to safeguard transition in Rhodesia. With the victory of Botha in the elections of 1978 the conservative project was to be sustained with expansionist intensity.

Domestic and external environments were determinant for this victory. The rise of domestic pressures of more radical scope after 1976 were received as a threat to be responded with force in order to demobilize the strength of ANC and to bring supporters to its side. Externally, the victory and relative stabilization of MPLA in Angola and FRELIMO in Mozambique with support of Cuba and Soviet Union, the creation of Front Line States scheme and the prospects of victory of radical movements in Zimbabwe, created a idea of a communist threat from outside and inside that justified the hard stance of the National Party. The Total National Strategy was a natural result. There was the advancement of the superpowers in the region and the consequent worsening of the civil wars (generated opportunities for South Africa to destabilize neighbours, as well as a heaven for the activities of SWAPO and ANC rebel groups), and the psychological effect in South Africa against the perceived penetration of communism in neighbouring territories and its own.

The loss of the moderate Muzorewa Bishop in Zimbabwe’s election and the entrance of the new borne country in the recently created SADCC (direct concurrent of CONSEAS) in 1980 were too much to support. A new era of Apartheid's offensive grew shortly. The offensive intended to impose a new version of the “war to end wars” and to guarantee a possible regional status quo. However, the defence of that policy involved hard instance operations against neighbours using covert operations, proxy war, direct engagement and economic sabotage.
Internally P.W. Botha regime played the card of co-opting Coloured and Indian segments in order to isolate the black opposition movement. The Constitutional reform of 1983 now banned only blacks the right to vote. However, the result was the opposite. The United Democratic Front (UDF) movement inflated opposition and created a mass movement that gather the moderate opposition that would condemn Umkhonto we Sizwe (ANC’s armed wing) operations and other armed actions.

Botha’s strategy turned out well towards more vulnerable and destabilized states. In Mozambique it obtained the Nkomati Accord, in Lesotho it could even suppress Leabua Jonathan government, in Zimbabwe it pressed the country to clean up ANC operations. However, the environment in Angola was more complex, since the country had a more radical instance and impetus toward national and regional liberation and strong outside support. The Lusaka Accord of 1994 did not create any real prospect of settlement and the proxy war continued until both sides were deeply weakened with the war efforts. In the South African case, the increasing domestic and international mobilization against Apartheid resulted in a crisis of the hard core wing of the National Party, what coincided with president’s health problems. The rise of De Klerk group consolidated the transition and restructuring in foreign policy’s elite composition and actions towards the region.

*State, Elites and Foreign Policy in Angola (1975-1988)*

Angola's foreign policy in post-independence was also deeply influenced by factors like state-formation and elites positioning. State-building stage was defined by political struggle, security fragility, economic crisis and social disruption. Political parties identified with different liberation movements were left in a power vacuum in 1975 by Portuguese colonialists and started a battle for the control of the capital Luanda. The prominence of the MPLA, supported by Cuban troops and Yugoslavian arms led the civil war to the country-side where opposite forces continued to receive support from their external backers. This reality created an internal social disruption that affected national legitimacy, since different groups (mainly MPLA and UNITA, after FNLA cracked down) were connected to a social basis and claimed different political legitimacy. UNITA, for example, was based on large support of the majority Ovimbundu population. To aggravate the situation, economic difficulties affected a country which saw the outflow of most of its bureaucracy and white economic elite.

The elite composition in politics in general and foreign policy in particular was closed linked to the state-building process. MPLA and state's President Agostinho Neto was constrained in his non-alignment profile by the party structure and hard line leaders, such as Lucio Lara, who supported a soviet-aligned foreign policy and a strong stance regarding regional issues. However, both for the president and party's hard line politicians, domestic stability and state/regime survival were strongly connected to regional politics. In this case, Neto's first intents to accommodate regional conflict with South Africa and Zaire were damaged both by neighbours' offensive stances and domestic pressures. Cold War scenario that exported central conflict to periphery also produced high level of instability in the region, as both regional rivals were supported by US. This reality was intensified with the ascension of José Eduardo dos Santos to the presidency (who had even less internal manoeuvre space) and the emergence of more conservative forces in South Africa and the US. Dos Santos experienced an internal and external siege and had to intensify his external alliances, increasing Cuban and Soviet support. This in the end would secure state integrity in the conflicts against South African and UNITA forces in the south region of Angola (Juba, Caluence and Cuito Cuanavale) in 1988. These operations and partial military victory, that involved also heavy costs to MPLA government, were a weight factor that assured South Africa's disengagement and both parties to negotiate a settlement, together with Cubans and
with support and mediation (formal and informal) of US and USSR. The American policy of linkage was implemented, what gave both sides an impression of victory. Therefore, from 1975 to 1989 one saw an inflection from a more non-aligned policy towards a hard line instance and then back to a more negotiating position. State-building, elite relations and external relations influenced this position. However, continuity and a pragmatic orientation was also present as, for example, relations with the US in economic terms was ever present, mostly in the oil sector, although official diplomatic relations were only established in 1993.

Explaining Cooperation and Conflict: State-building and Foreign Policy of regional players (1989-2010)

The period between 1989 and 1994 saw the process of transition and accommodation from a conflict to a cooperative regional system, with the accommodation of opposing forces in a depolarized environment. The process of political opening in South Africa created conditions to the reduction of the level of conflict, although some suspicion was still present until a democratic transition was consolidated in the country. The central logic of conflict transited to internal instabilities of the states. In Angola, Mozambique, and South Africa civil struggle and unrest were the main concern of the regimes.

Besides, the end of Cold War resulted in two main logics. The first was the political vacuum and the relative international freedom and abandonment of states to solve its internal issues, in spite of the penetration of non-governmental groups and international organizations concomitantly with the problematic situation of the states in the post-conflict period. The second logic was the new international agenda and the widening of the concept of security along with the decrease in importance of interstate conflict. On the one hand, increasing levels of cooperation could be expected from (i) the regional political party solidarity between ANC and the ancient historical allies; (ii) the infrastructural and commercial interdependence of the region, including the network of transport, energy and the centrality of South Africa in regional trade; and (iii) the social interdependence, given the demographic challenges. However, challenges such as (i) the regional trauma in relation to the historic South African political and economic role; (ii) the socio-economic and technological structural inequality; and (iii) the challenges of the economy and the post-Cold War political liberalization process would eventually halt higher levels of regional cooperation.

In the post-Apartheid period until 2002 a period of rebalancing forces was observed. South Africa was finally fully integrated into the regional system of cooperation, represented by the re-inauguration of SADC and the resultant depolarization. However, the full re-entry of South Africa and the growing disputes and inconsistencies involving the need for a South African diplomacy based on ethical principles and the need for the establishment of a regional leadership in crisis situations, produced constraints during the period. This process was aggravated by the later reintegration of the now DRC in Southern Africa regional dynamics, and with it the role logic of conflict from the Great Lakes region where interstate rivalries were still present (and manifested through proxy war) and the great powers dispute (now between the US and France) was plainly alive. The Second Congo War produced political conflicts between old rivals within SADC's Organ on Politics, Defence and Security (OPDS), since South Africa firstly opposed the intervention of Zimbabwe (whose president Mugabe presided the Organ), Angola and Namibia, and later on involved itself in its own intervention in Lesotho. On the other hand, SADC saw a high stage of institutionalization in the period and an increase in levels of economic and political cooperation. The rise of Thabo Mbeki to South Africa's presidency (bringing about a new African Agenda and commitments with DRC conflict) and the crisis of credibility and political decay of Mugabe regime contributed to reducing regional tensions.
The period after 2002 was marked by the rise of Angola and the South African leadership. Angola left its civil war with renewed state capacities and a large experience of dealing with regional security issues. On the other hand, the period saw an advancement of continental and global political ambitions on the part of South Africa, and regional engagement. The SADC institutions started a process of reform and new levels of cooperation in economic and security issues arose. However, some regional conflicts are still present. In the social field, the instability in the Great Lakes region and Zimbabwe create a flow of migrants to South Africa that is responded with high level of social Xenophobia and securitization towards increasing levels of criminality. In economic terms, the discussion of Economic Partnership Agreements (EPA) with the European Union (EU) and resentment with liberal and wealth concentrating programmes of SADC may weaken regional cooperation and development. It is not rare to observe complains in regional authorities and analysts regarding the perceived noxious role of South African business elite in the region. The emergence of a new external engagement in the region, with a renewed presence of the US, EU, China, Brazil and India is surely producing impacts in this reality. For example, levels of commerce and cooperation with outside powers surpass regional connections. Despite the enormous distinction between the Patterns of Cooperation-Conflict before and after 1989, these and other issues limit regional levels of cooperation towards a deeper regional integration. This situation may be linked to the foreign policy positioning of the main regional states in the period. Although regional projects have acquired strong proximity one may still find important incongruities.

State, Elites and Foreign Policy in South Africa (1989-2010)

Post-1989 South Africa's foreign policy was marked by the idea of transformation (Landsberg 2010). The guarantee of peaceful transition ensured by De Klerk government credited the country with gradual re-insertion in global diplomatic arenas. In the regional environment less confidence was present, since the white elite was still looking for political guarantees in the new democratic electoral system. Besides, domestic instability always haunted the viability of a democratic transition. The now lack of use of security forces in the infighting amongst black opposition movement betrayed the continuity of white elite's interests within the government. However, internal and regional pressures made it almost inevitable a transition that favoured majoritarian electoral system, what would eventually result in a black majority government.

The rise of Mandela also meant a lot to foreign policy. In global terms, Mandela had a dual instance of defending an ethical and human rights based position and an instance of generosity towards the supporters of ANC struggle. These two priorities were, however, not always easy to combine – what created some embarrassment. In regional terms, Mandela was prepared to use its image to exercise leadership in African issues. However, this position was also balanced by the always present and concurrent ideals of ethical and ideological policy. Internal issues also helped to complicate the equation. The new project of state-building was centred on an idea of congregation of different social groups in a promise of a new nation, a Rainbow Nation. The material side of state-building – which now was energized by a new flow of investments – was also implicated in this revolution in the legitimacy/identity pillar of the State-society relations. The institutions of foreign policy field were reformed and DFA was one of the main experiments of integration between ANC diplomats and old bureaucrats. During this transition, the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), which was more easily reformed, advanced most of regional policy. That could explain the trade focus of South Africa integration into SADC. The political participation, mostly its position within the ODPS was centred on Mandela's articulations. His positions in this organ revealed two main realities. First, Mandela had disgust to Mugabe's struggle to become the primus inter pares in
regional politics. Mandela's avoidance of intervention in DRC was, beyond the ethical element, based on this latent rivalry. Second, Mandela also had security concerns in the region and it would be inevitable to defend it and suppress the ethical criterion when the threat was too close to make a blind eye. Lesotho intervention made it much clearer.

Thabo Mbeki rise as ANC leader and national president produced another inflection in South Africa's diplomacy. His posture of a statesman and history as ANC's diplomat help to explain why the international politics was his natural environment, for good and evil. Firstly, his credibility as international thinker enabled him to envision and establish a South African Agenda for the continent, what resulted in a broad African Agenda. The African Union (AU) and The New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) resulted from the articulation of this vision with his counterparts in Nigeria (Obasanjo), Algeria (Boutlefika), Senegal (Wade) and Libya (Kaddafi). Mbeki's profile as a second generation leader in South Africa allowed him to combine intelligent critics against unequal global distribution of power (global apartheid), support increase in South-South relations and mechanisms (i.e. IBSA), and still maintain a strong North-South scheme, what gave him and his continental projects a lot of criticism (Habib 2009). In Southern Africa, the lack of credible competitors gave him free way to unblock settlement in DRC and Burundi and to become a regional peacekeeper. His ambitions produced animosities with Angola which did not want interference in its on conflict. However, his natural transit in international arena also produced distance from domestic problems that have to be urgently addressed. Internally, Mandela's Rainbow Nation project entered in stage of exhaustion, since the high level of legitimacy of ANC was being counterweighted by higher levels of inequality, economic crisis, lack of employment, and resultant criminality. Emergency measures had to be put into effect; however developmental projects did not produce the expected effects. The narrative of the end of Mbeki's government (deposed as party leadership) was paradoxical and completely opposite to his high credibility in international arena.

The rise of Kgalema Motlanthe and later Jacob Zuma was characterized by continuities and important ruptures (Landsberg 2012). Although maintaining the priority of the African Agenda and internal development, he showed infirm stance on important regional issues such as UN's Security Council mandate on Libya's intervention. However, after the shock therapy, he started a new phase of regional policies, defending a strong instance in regional conflicts (RCA and DRC) and in Zimbabwean crisis. There seems to be a growing realization that for the advance of regional leadership role of South Africa, the country would need to take ownership of costs of regional stability. However, foreign policy is firmly criticized of being a policy overly centred on the president and his advisor, such as Mrs. Lindiwe Zulu. The now-called Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO) and Department of Defence (DOD) would mainly inform foreign rather than formulating it, what seems to be the case in RCA and Gupta family's polemics. Moreover, in economic terms, regional presence of South Africa is still perceived as centred on private white capital and that it creates few opportunities for weaker neighbours. Some authors also highlight a still present fear of South Africa's regional domination that would be based on an always latent apartheid's trauma. It is paradoxical how the same reason that forced Mbeki out of power was not enough to destabilize ANC credibility along with the black electorate that gave a huge support to the party in recent 2014 national elections.

State, Elites and Foreign Policy in Angola (1989-2010)

In Angola, the resolution of regional conflict with the withdrawal of Cuban troops and independence of Namibia changed the problematic of the state mostly to internal conflict. However, internal conflict in Angola, that was left out of the New York Accords of 1988,
continued as Jonas Savimbi and Dos Santos had conflicts to agree in a mutual beneficial settlement. Moreover, UNITA continued to receive support from South Africa, Zaire and UA. Then, regional and international aspects of the conflict were still present. Only with transition in South Africa and Angola's intervention in the first Congo war in 1997 that a safer regional environment to MPLA could be ensured. At the same time Savimbi left out the only partial solid accord that was made in 1994 and restarted the war with a split UNITA. The resultant cut of support from US and a new state-building process marked the new era of government engagement towards civil war. A huge investment in material (military) capacities was combined with regional isolation after involvement in second Congo war to support Kabila's anti-UNITA regime and a new partnership with China – what guaranteed flow of cash to finance war efforts.

In the end of almost thirty years of internal and regional war, Angola was the main regional winner, as they most important rivals were defeated. However, if on the one hand winning the war did positioned Angola as a emergent regional power, on the other, Angola's institution are still archaic and the economy overly based on natural resources and ill-prepared for a knowledge based development. Moreover, Angola has become increasingly isolationist, because of its excessive focus on internal security. This concept stems from the historical experience with the civil war, when the greatest threat to the state was within its borders. In adopting the concept Angola seeks to prevent the formation of new forces claimants of power and rival to the state and to consolidate the process of state-building. However, the external result of this conceptual approach adoption is that Angola only interferes in the regional when security issues could disrupt its own internal security. Its participation in the wars in the DRC and Congo-Brazzaville and its alliance with Namibia to suppress the UNITA are indicators that seem to support this perception. Even more recently, the Angolan support to the training of security forces of the DRC seems to have to do with the fact that the security of the neighbouring country directly affects its national security. This is evident when one sees that Angola does not think twice about expelling Congolese citizens from the country.

The exception to this rule can be perceived also in the case of the DRC when, in 2006, Angola has again demonstrated that the government of dos Santos would assist Kabila in the case of an invasion by Rwanda, even where the threat of UNITA had been demobilized. However, even with attitudes based on concerns about national security, Angola ended up acting at times as an actor in stabilizing the region, seeking to block the war of aggression and assistance from central government against insurgent groups. Thus, history suggests that this model, even if focused on domestic concerns, can act as a stabilizing regional unintentionally. On the other hand, its focus on national security, sometimes translated into non-interventionism, can act as factor to block the development of more regular and incisive regional policies. The case of Côte d'Ivoire in 2011, when the objection to an AU intervention facilitated space for the French one, showed how this self-centred security perception may be harmful to avoid extra-regional interventions in the continent.

Concluding remarks

This working paper has analysed the explanatory factor that foreign policy of regional states has to systems’ interaction changes, what is connected to state-building processes and elite’s formation of regional powers. Previous conclusions indicate that regional powers foreign policy’s project and impetus toward the region may partially explain changes in and limits of the Pattern of Cooperation-Conflict. However, in this macro-perspective foreign policy should be analysed through the lenses of state-building and elite's formation. As figure 3 tries to synthesize in Southern Africa, between 1975 and 1988, the particularities of state formation
and elite preferences, both linked to domestic and international environments, produced very opposed regional foreign policies of South Africa and Angola. The first country pursued an intense expansionist regional project, while the latter put into practice an also expansionist but radical/developmentalist project that opposed status quo. Conflict was a natural consequence of the system. On the other hand, in the 1989-2010 period international and domestic changes entailed changes in state-building process and elite’s formation that created new foreign policies towards the region. Both South Africa directed themselves to a more liberal regional project and less expansionist. However, Angola's relative isolation in relation to regional issues and South Africa's lack of commitment to radical changes in regional distribution of wealth are factor that currently block the possibilities of deeper regional integration.

This situation brings us back to the capacity of regional powers to interfere in regional dynamics, in relational terms, and their responsibility with a more cooperative environment. While empirical statehood may affect most the Pattern of Cooperation-Conflict, the prospects of regional integration are always blocked in face of vested interests related to juridical statehood (which mostly refer to the principle of equality within the international system). For regional power's elites, juridical statehood does not need to be guaranteed as they are more interested in the inequality of capacities, which could also be a guarantee of profits with regional integration. On the other hand, smaller states' elites are interested in blocking regional integration projects that do not compensate the loss of the single bargain power they have in the international system, the juridical statehood. In the end, as the thesis suggests, the prospects of regional cooperation/integration depend on the regional power to accept a regional project which guarantees regional equality (overcome inequalities). This should not be seeing as a huge defeat by regional powers, since with the prospects of a multipolar world
centred on regions, their capacity to be a pole in the international system is directly related to the ability they will have to integrated their own region. This is even truer in the case of peripheral regions, where region integration is directly connected to the prospects of achieving social and economic development and security stability.

Nevertheless, these are partial observations. A more complete analysis should investigate deeper the processes of state-building, elite's formation and foreign policy making – as well as it would need to integrate other regional powers aspirants that were central in the dynamics of conflict and cooperation. These are the next task that will hereafter be addressed by this research.

References


