A critical appraisal of multidimensional peace missions’ mandates and activities

Abstract
Ever since their first formulation, UN peace missions have evolved from contained and specific mandates to broader and encompassing ones, implying a complex management of resources and goals as well as multi-level and interconnected responses, that imply the involvement of military and civilian actors, with differentiated but inter-related objectives and principles of action. This paper calls for a critical look at the inter-linkages implied in the ‘multi’ nature and scope in multidimensional peace missions, including how these have evolved in order to include humanitarian aspects. The challenges associated with this inclusion are discussed, with regards to coordination, rendering mandates operational and capacity building. Emphasis on local and communitarian aspects of interventions is given when analyzing how the broadness of mandates can address these challenges, adopting an integrated approach to conflict management and humanitarian action in order to respond to the complex violence settings where these missions take place.

Introduction
In a post-Cold War setting, the peace studies look at the international system must reflect the multi-dimensional character of peace and violence, as not self-excluding. It should also reflect the multi-level dynamics (individual, communitarian, societal and
international) where the continuum of peaces and violences takes place. The demands of a post-Westphalian order, in contrast to a still much state-centric international system, have an impact in this process where an evolving nature of violence and peace approaches is increasingly visible, and which has a fundamental influence in interventionist policies and practices.

The traditional ‘phasing’ of approaches to violence has given place to multi-level and inter-connected responses, that imply the involvement of military and civilian actors, with differentiated but inter-related objectives and principles of action. This paper adopts a critical approach to analyze the inter-linkages implied in the ‘multi’ nature and scope of the so-called multidimensional peace missions, including how these have evolved in order to include development and humanitarian aspects. The challenges associated with this inclusion are discussed, with regards to coordination and rendering mandates operational. For this effect, the paper discusses the securitization of (under)development and humanitarianism according to the Copenhagen School’s proposal. Emphasis on local and communitarian aspects of interventions is given when analyzing how the broadness of mandates can address these challenges, by adopting an integrated approach to conflict management, development and humanitarian action in order to respond to the complex violence settings where these missions take place.

**Peace studies research and interventionist action**

Peace studies have a distinctive nature in its research-action agenda, aiming at directly influencing policies and strategies. Also, peace studies research is by nature geared towards policy recommendations. This connection has not always been achieved, but in the 1990s it seemed that several concepts and concerns had seeped into the political sphere through official documents and actual intervention mandates, specifically concerning peace missions.
In the first decade of the twenty-first century, most peace researchers agree peace studies have to undergo a fundamental rethinking of its raison d’être (Pureza and Cravo, 2005). This concern comes from the realization of a too broad research agenda (Mason, 2002; Rogers and Ramsbotham, 1999), which came to include development (Duffield, 2001), security (Buzan et al., 1997), and feminist (Brock-Utne, 1985) studies. On the one hand, this broadening and interdisciplinary approach enriched peace studies, but, on the other hand, resulted in a dilution of focus. In addition, the distinctive characteristic peace studies had from their inception, a research-action oriented field, has lost momentum due to the incapacity to successfully translate into action the results of peace research.

Paul Lawler summarizes this discussion in three points that are also addressed in this paper: “the absence of a substantial theoretical or conceptual core, a tendency to deploy uncritically key terms (…), and an unclear standpoint with regard to direct violence” (Lawler, 2002: 9). This paper proposes the return and consolidation of the theoretical and conceptual peace studies core, by not only recovering the core value of peace, but also by framing the research and the action in cultures of peaces. Peace studies have “a substantial theoretical [and] conceptual core” (Lawler, 2002: 9), which is the value of peace. According to Galtung, values are an intrinsic part of the research this approach presents, with peace as its “core value” (1996: 13). This is essential not only for the kind of conclusions drawn, but also, and most importantly, for the action recommended. However, the broadening of the field has led to a dilution and segmentation of the concept. Peace is a complex concept and each attempt to better define it always finds criticism. Nevertheless, it is central for peace studies informing our vision regarding goals, instruments and policies.

Consequently, we understand peace as a holistic process that implies the existence of basic structural conditions. These include the absence of organized physical and psychological violence, the satisfaction of basic human needs, and at the institutional level, representative and proportional power-sharing structures and the promotion
and protection of human rights. To some extent this understanding of peace coincides with Galtung’s positive and negative peace approach (1969), though we assume these should not be, even if only methodologically, separated. The concept of peace itself, its holistic understanding, does not imply only one reading. This means that the different components of peace may combine in different intensities creating different peaces. This understanding should not however be defined as opposed to conflict, but in relation to violence.

We acknowledge that conflict exists in every society as well as peace and violence dynamics. However, this acknowledgement does not constitute an endorsement of the realist-hobbesian approach to conflict, in the sense that human nature is by definition violent. Or, for that matter, peaceful. In our understanding, conflicts cannot be resolved purely in the sense of being eliminated. Rather, what can be mitigated, and eventually eliminated, in society is violence. The usual dichotomy between peace and war/violence is, in our view, too simplistic and thus, in order to better understand the peaceful and violent dynamics of conflictual situations, it is better to adopt the concept of a continuum of peaces and violences, where violent options are chosen in different intensities, even in formal peace contexts. In addition, the concept of peace is embedded in a normative framework, where peace is the core value guiding theory and action. We act by peace and not only to mitigate or manage violence. This is particularly important when analyzing the role and influence of peace missions in violent and/or post-violent contexts, which will be analyzed in the following section.

**Conceptualizing peace missions**

The United Nations has early on assumed the need to intervene in violent conflict settings, initially resorting to the deployment of missions to maintain the peace. The United Nations Charter, however, does not foresee peace missions, although it contains elements and principles that reflect the spirit within which peacekeeping and peacebuilding are envisaged. So, the reasoning agreed to frame peacekeeping
missions was somewhat between Chapter VI (pacific resolution of disputes) and Chapter VII (peace enforcement measures when peace is threatened or violated or when there are acts of aggression). Some call it ‘Chapter VI ½’: soldiers are sent but with a restrictive mandate regarding the use of force. Most of the times, their mandates forbid the use of force except for self-defense. These first peacekeeping missions were in charge of observing the fulfillment of the conditions established in peace agreements, settlements, and cease-fires. Their main goal was to ensure physical violence was not perpetrated by any of the belligerent groups in the sense of Galtung’s (1969) negative peace, where direct violence is absent¹.

Three main issues result from these missions with these mandates, especially after the end of the Cold War. First, with the end of the Cold War, most of the wars of the 1990s differed from the traditional international wars. The most striking differences were the erosion of the state’s legitimate monopoly of the use of force; the fact that most of these ‘new wars’ were intrastate; the belligerent groups were often not in uniform or organized in an army-like fashion; violence was internationally (and illegally) financed and supported in a scale never registered before, having connections with arms, drugs and human trade networks; and a growing number of victims were civilians (Kaldor, 1999). Ken Booth further drew attention to the fact that it is not a matter of “either old or new [wars], but rather a complex recognition of both old and new” (2001: 165) [wars]. This new context made it harder for the missions to check and verify who was keeping or breaking the peace conditions agreed upon, since peacekeeping soldiers were trained to defend and fight against an identified opponent.

Second, although some kind of peace was agreed upon before the peacekeepers were deployed, a recurrent problem is that even in formal peace contexts violence might persist. The continuum of peaces and violences explains how in formal peace contexts

¹ According to Galtung (1969), direct violence includes physical and psychological violence exerted directly on someone.
one can still find war-like acts of aggression. These soldiers were not supposed to engage in fighting, unless fired upon and under very restrictive conditions. Consequently, acts of aggression perpetrated between the belligerent groups, or any other groups for that matter, did not qualify for the peacekeeping soldiers to intervene. The most they could do was to report that one or several groups were not keeping up to the peace agreement or cease-fire.

The disconnection between research and action was clear. The idea was to incorporate the need to install, restore and guarantee the peace. However, the instruments and personnel used did not embody this vision, since their training was directed at limiting/restraining violence. Furthermore, the conventional dichotomy of war/violence and peace subverted the mandates of these soldiers. For the sake of peace, they should not fight and, because of the violence still occurring, not qualified as war, they failed in fulfilling their mandates and protecting both the civilians and themselves. The underlying causes for the violence remained. Sometimes, it may fall short of civil war or armed conflict that developed before the peacekeeping mission arrived, but it just becomes socialized, not spoken of, more indiscernible. The violence becomes invisible for soldiers, since it transforms itself from a threat to the international peace into a matter of domestic/transnational criminality.

Third, traditional peace studies were portrayed as embracing the dominant paradigm, where Western development was the model to be adopted elsewhere if progress was to be achieved, “and doing little more than tweaking the power balance underlying the status quo” (Terriff et al., 1999: 71). Consequently, peace studies changed its focus from “the strategic relationship of the superpowers”, in the end still dealing essentially with direct violence, “towards the dynamics of the North-South
relationship”, enlarging the object of research to include global structural violence² (Terriff et al., 1999: 71).

Peace studies’ action proposal has followed the traditional conflict-oriented narrative: conflict prevention → conflict management → conflict resolution → post-conflict reconstruction. This narrative is, in our view, too narrow and misleading. First, conflicts, as explained above, cannot be prevented or resolved, but only managed. Second, what ‘conflict’ should mean explicitly in this narrative is ‘violence’. Violence can be prevented, managed, and resolved in the sense of being minimized or eventually eliminated whereas conflict is intrinsic to life in society. Thus, this narrative reflects the traditional assumption that conflict and violence are interchangeable concepts, which has resulted in a distortion of the premises underlying action. This narrative confines and directs strategies, instruments and actors to conflict. For peace studies, conflict is obviously the problem, but if the framework of action is bounded and rooted in conflict, the outcomes can hardly be framed outside a conflict-oriented narrative and address the real issue of violence.

Moreover, this conflict-oriented narrative follows a sequential approach to peace, where first violence is managed or eliminated and only then the structural conditions for peace are addressed as proclaimed by the United Nations’ peacebuilding model. This prevents the holistic framework for peace from being properly implemented. According to this narrative, when prevention fails and violence ensues, the primary concern is to contain or halt violence (‘conflict management’), usually through a cease fire or peace truce in order to create favorable conditions for the parties to negotiate a peace agreement (‘conflict resolution’). When minimum security conditions are met, efforts at ‘post-conflict reconstruction’ are initiated, involving reconstruction actors and dynamics, finally addressing the structural conditions for peace. This sequence

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² Structural violence is an indirect violence which is a result of “the social structure itself – between humans, between sets of humans (societies), between sets of societies (alliances, regions) in the world” (Galtung, 1996: 2).
does not fit a holistic concept of peace. Although we understand that certain minimum security conditions need to be met in order for more structural issues to be addressed, this sequential logic prevents the inherent connections between the different phases to be taken into due account. These interconnections are crucial to engage the different actors and link the different dynamics throughout the process, towards a durable and sustainable peace.

A good example of the peace studies research-action nature is the new terminology and dynamic approach reflected in An Agenda for Peace (1992), albeit with some adjustments.

**Figure 1: An Agenda for Peace**

preventive diplomacy → peacemaking → peacekeeping → peacebuilding

*Source:* Adapted from (UNSG, 1992).

The structure of *An Agenda for Peace* has not lost its linearity, maintaining a sequential perspective to intervention strategies. Nevertheless, the terminology reflects a peace approach, demarcating itself from the conflict-oriented narrative. Still, this demarcation is not enough to trigger a fundamental change in the nature of the associated interventions, which remain focused on violent conflicts. Moreover, the change in terminology was not followed by a change in the actors involved and instruments adopted. The UN, in face of these issues and of the fact that peace studies were broadening its meaning of peace to include social, economic and cultural conditions, realized the need to adjust its peace missions. And, for that purpose, new mission mandates were devised.
It was felt that there was a need to adapt the peacekeeping missions’ mandates to include more than observing and keeping the peace, namely, human security, confidence building, power sharing agreements, electoral support, rule of law strengthening, and social and economic development. These new missions went beyond the initial mandates and included besides soldiers and police, civilian personnel. Until then, structural peace was usually in the hands of development aid official agencies, both bi- and multilateral, and of non-governmental organizations. These would wait until it was safe to go in and then development would start, in the so-called ‘post-conflict reconstruction phase’. Incorporating these concerns into the peace missions’ mandates reflected an understanding that building the structural conditions for peace had to start much earlier than after the containment of violence.

In the framework of these multidimensional peace missions, the traditional distinction between humanitarian aid (short-term) and development/reconstruction aid (longer-term) – in which the first aims at saving lives and the second at preserving the living conditions of the populations – becomes blurred with peace missions increasingly starting to include both humanitarian and development goals and actors. Some of the tasks assigned to peace missions become no longer clearly distinct from humanitarian action, for example in contexts where they include ensuring the delivery of humanitarian relief supplies. As well, some mandates include long-term objectives geared towards reconstructions which usually falls within the scope of development aid projects.

This perspective reflected a significant change in the UN operational concept of peace: peace is more than the end of violence. The goal of these interventions became the creation of a ‘culture of peace’, through responding to immediate security and humanitarian needs as well as to the causes of violence. This is an

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3 "Culture of Peace is a set of values, attitudes, modes of behaviour and ways of life that reject violence and prevent [it] by tackling their root causes to solve problems through dialogue and negotiation among individuals, groups and nations.” (UNGA, 1998a, 1998b)
absolute innovative element. The peace missions become multidimensional, involving security, institutional, economic and psycho-social concerns. The security dimension follows the original peacekeeping mandates, guaranteeing peace through the absence of violence. The institutional one is related to the political regimes and systems, in order to frame the efforts developed, and to create a peaceful system to settle conflicts. This usually includes the judiciary, political parties, and multi-level governance. The economic dimension envisages the creation of a liberal market economy favorable to investment and focused on economic growth and development. Finally, all these efforts are insufficient unless the issue of social reconciliation is addressed, including all stakeholders (psycho-social dimension).

This enlargement, however, was followed by further stretching the peace studies’ object of analysis. Soon, each and every social problem seemed to be connected with dynamics of peace and violence and, therefore, should be analysed within peace studies (Tromp, 1981). As Håkan Wiberg put it, peace studies became a ‘black hole’ encompassing every social dynamics (2005: 25). Nevertheless, this broadening movement allowed for a better contextualization and definition of the concept of peace, analyzed at the individual, community, societal, regional and international levels, and finally consolidating a research approach that goes beyond the state-centric relationships of peace and violence.

**Security, development and humanitarianism**

The deployment and practice of multidimensional peace missions soon confirmed the concerns identified with such enlarged mandates, involving different objectives (military, humanitarian, and development short and long term objectives), diverse modes of operation, involving military and civilian personnel, each with a specific historical record of failures and successes. Tying together the concepts of security, development and humanitarianism, albeit making sense theoretically has become an operational hazard. But the problems are not merely operational; they are rooted in distinct conceptual frameworks of action with all that implies.
All three concepts – security, development and humanitarianism – are both broad and highly contested. Although they have evolved throughout time, different understandings still coexist today. Security may address only physical or territorial integrity, or include economic or environmental concerns. Development may mean just economic growth or be more encompassing to include social elements. Humanitarianism can be seen as a purely relief oriented activity or as having a more integrated and broader scope of action, aimed for example at reconstruction and development as proclaimed by the so-called ‘new humanitarianism’ of the 1990s. However, and despite the contestation and diversity of conceptual approaches, in the 1990s, all these concepts underwent structural changes. The alteration of paradigm with the end of the Cold War contributed with different intensities to these changes. It is important to highlight that these changes were already on the making and the paradigm shift allowed for a different visibility of these dynamics.

The changes the concept of security underwent implied an adjustment of security policies and instruments, since the scope of security threats widened requiring responses not necessarily with military means. From a concern with loss of sovereignty or territory, security threats came to include impacts of climate change or migrations, among others. Additionally, the object of security was also altered, adding to the state-level, a human and community focus as well as a transnational one. The state, although still central, shares with other actors the burden of promoting security, namely international organisations and private security companies. Again, this also contributed to the need for adjustments.

In this context, the concept of human security gained prominence, highlighting the individual as a central actor. “Human security was thus meant to change the referent object of security ‘from an exclusive stress on territorial security to a much greater stress on people’s security’” (UNDP, 1994: 24). The United Nations Development Programme (1994) vision of human security includes distinct dimensions: economic,
food, health, environmental, personal, community and political. Along the same lines, the Commission on Human Security also acknowledges that

Human security in its broadest sense embraces far more than the absence of violent conflict. It encompasses human rights, good governance, access to education and health care, and ensuring that each individual has opportunities and choices to fulfil his or her own potential. Freedom from want, freedom from fear and the freedom of the future generations to inherit a healthy natural environment – these are the interrelated building blocks of human, and therefore national security. (2003: 4)

Development as a concept also underwent a major shift in the 1990s, mainly as a result of the impact of development aid policies for almost half a century. From a narrow economic perspective, which equated development with national economic growth, the development agenda came to include economic policies rather than just aggregated indicators. Other concerns, however, soon emerged, adopting social and environmental concerns as development goals. As a result, the concept of development came to include a ‘human face’ and a concern with present and future generations (sustainability). As a means to consolidate these changes, the UNDP presented the concept of ‘human development’, as

a process of enlarging people’s choices. (…) [A]t all levels of development, the three essential ones are for people to lead a long and healthy life, to acquire knowledge and to have access to resources needed for a decent standard of living. If these essential choices are not available, many other opportunities remain inaccessible. (UNDP, 1990: 10)

Human sustainable development became the mainstream concept of development, which ten years later suffered not another adjustment but rather a specification of goals and targets with the United Nations Millennium Declaration (A/55/L.2) and the definition of the Millennium Development Goals (MDG). These specify eight objectives centred on the eradication of hunger and extreme poverty worldwide and include quantitative targets regarding education, health, sustainability and gender issues. Currently, development aid takes place within this framework of human sustainable development and the MDG.
It is fundamental not to confuse the concepts of human development and human security, although they are closely related. Human development constitutes a process of enlarging people’s choices, whereas “[h]uman security means that people can exercise these choices safely and freely and that they can be relatively confident that the opportunities they have today are not totally lost tomorrow” (UNDP, 1994: 23).

It follows that advancements and setbacks in one arena have direct implications in the other.

Failed or limited human development leads to a backlog of human deprivation poverty, hunger, disease or persisting disparities between ethnic communities or between regions. This backlog in access to power and economic opportunities can lead to violence. (UNDP, 1994: 23)

Similarly, humanitarianism also changed both in theory and in practice. With the classical humanitarianism based on the principles of humanity, impartiality, independence and neutrality being increasingly considered as palliative and dependency-inducing, a new approach was put forward giving humanitarianism a more integrated and longer-term set of principles of action and goals, namely development, conflict prevention, reconstruction and peace. There was also the development of a wide range of instruments and structures to put forward these significant operational changes, instead of focusing on short-term humanitarian assistance goals, such as providing relief, medical or food assistance (Armiño, 2002). This resulted in a merge of humanitarian and development objectives with humanitarian organizations progressively being called to perform development aid roles, significantly broadening their scope and depth of action.

**Securitising (under)development and humanitarian action**

The widening and deepening of the concept of security facilitated new theoretical arrangements to face these new challenges. The contribution of the Copenhagen School constitutes one of the proposals that helps explain conceptually and methodologically the process of widening of the security spectrum, namely with regard to development and humanitarianism. The Copenhagen School elaborates on
the concept of securitisation, arguing that security is “a self-referential practice, because it is in this practice that [an] issue becomes a security issue – not necessarily because a real existential threat exists but because the issue is presented as such a threat” (Buzan et al., 1997: 24). Underdevelopment as a cause of insecurity as well as situations requiring humanitarian action, perceived as threats, constitute the basis for the securitisation of development and humanitarianism, demanding exceptional measures to address this threat. Thus, substantiating the multidimensional mandates of peace missions. Securitisation occurs when an issue is taken out of the realm of ‘normal politics’ (Buzan et al., 1997: 24). ‘The exact definition and criteria of securitization are constituted by the intersubjective establishment of an existential threat with a saliency sufficient to have substantial political effects’ (Buzan et al., 1997: 25). This has become clear not only at the level of political discourse but also of implementation. Security actors, normally not engaged in development policies and humanitarian action, have gained a prominent role not only by carrying out, but also by defining the actual financing criteria and eligibility of, development policies and humanitarian activities. Also, the fact that aid workers and humanitarian personnel have seen their activities increasingly constrained by security considerations to the point of having to live inside ‘fortified aid compounds’ (Duffield, 2010: 71) further illustrates these dynamics.

In a process of securitisation there are the referent objects, those referred to by the securitisation actor as constituting a threat, and functional actors, those who influence decisions in the process, but who are not themselves securitisation actors. Humanitarian crisis and the lack of development constitute referent objects of securitisation. Aid donor governments, generally, are the securitising actors, identifying humanitarian crisis and the lack of development as security threats, visible in their discourses and official development assistance policies.

For instance, Gordon Brown, then the British Chancellor, stated that besides the ethical dimension for reducing poverty, one should consider that not doing so “leads
to civil wars, failed states and safe havens for terrorists” (Christian Aid, 2004: 2), clearly acknowledging that the lack of development constitutes a threat by leading to violence. In a post-2001 context, these causal relations speak directly to the terrorist threat and the means to respond to it, which continues to be a priority in the international agenda.

This move has been facilitated by so-called functional actors, including humanitarian organisations, private aid donors, and international organisations, such as the World Bank and the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development – Development Assistance Committee (OECD-DAC). For example, the United States Institute of Peace has been supporting peacebuilding projects, having defined as their priority country beneficiaries Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq and Pakistan, countries identified as breeding grounds for threats to international security. Activities include “promoting education and discussion about conflict resolution, rule of law and transitional justice” and “empowering marginalized groups, especially women, youth, Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), and persons with disabilities, to contribute positively to conflict management and peacebuilding processes”\(^4\). In the same line, the President of the World Bank, Robert B. Zoellick, stated when referring to the Bank’s strategy concerning ‘Fragile and Conflict-Affected Countries’ that “[o]nly by securing development can we put down roots deep enough to break the cycle of fragility and violence”\(^5\). The recent change of OECD-DAC’s criteria also sustains the same causal logic that the lack of development breeds insecurity.

In March 2005 the High-level Meeting of Ministers and Heads of Aid Agencies of the OECD’s Development Assistance Committees (DAC) decided to adapt the then applicable ODA criteria. Now, for example, the management of security expenditure through improved civilian oversight and democratic control of budgeting, management, accountability and auditing of security expenditure is eligible for ODA. (Klingebiel, 2006: 4)

The securitisation process implies for its empowerment the recognition of the authority of the securitising actor and the general understanding of the issue as a threat. This underlines the need for a convincing approach able to mobilise an audience (Buzan et al., 1997: 25). Concerning the securitisation of humanitarian crises and development, the audience includes aid recipient governments, Non-Governmental Organisations (NGO) and public opinion. As for the first, the majority of these governments do not have the power to define the North-South aid regime, having no credible alternative to this prevailing funding system. Consequently, these countries end up sanctioning the idea that humanitarian crises and/or the lack of development breeds violence, by allowing access to humanitarian actors and/or the implementation of development projects based on this assumption. The NGOs are the agents of implementation of these projects, once again, endorsing the underlying logic that links humanitarian crises and/or lack of development and violence. Finally, the fact that one of the current major concerns are threats to security, for example terrorism, means securitising actors can easily count with a captive audience when adopting exceptional measures in the name of security. Development and humanitarian action constitute areas where a securitising move of this nature has been sanctioned by the public in general. “Around two out of three Europeans cite self-interest motivations for giving aid (64%)”, namely terrorism (European Commission, 2009).

**Multidimensionality in peace missions**

During the 1990s, with the broadening and deepening of the concept of security, the UN sought to also broaden and deepen the mandates of its peace missions, to include, besides security, social, economic and psychological dimensions (multidimensionality). It was felt that there was a need to adapt peace missions’ mandates to include more than observing and keeping the peace, namely, human

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6 Despite the emergence of actors, such as Brazil or China, the South-South development aid dynamics still does not constitute an alternative to the North-South regime.
security, confidence building, power sharing agreements, electoral support, rule of law strengthening, and social and economic development (later acknowledged in the Brahimi Report, A/55/305-S/2008/809). The mandates, however, seem almost impossible to fulfil, since this multidimensionality became too broad (Freire and Lopes, 2009). For instance, the UN general policy on the inclusion of humanitarian tasks and goals in peace missions alerts to the fact that

Humanitarian assistance never occurs in a vacuum and is never simply a matter of delivery of food or medicine. The way in which assistance is designed and delivered, especially the selection of local partners and intermediaries, will almost invariably have important political consequences. It is critical to strategize, maximize the effectiveness of humanitarian assistance for beneficiaries and ensure that the UN humanitarian assistance complements the UN efforts to resolve conflicts. (UNDPKO, 2003: 159)

In this context and within this framework, humanitarian action starts playing an active role in the promotion of peace and security in complex violent contexts (Armiño, 2002; Duffield, 2001). Humanitarianism thus became an integral and fundamental part of the international interventionist peace agenda, in which the merging of humanitarian, development and security concerns, gave global liberal governance an expansive and inclusive political logic (Duffield, 2001; Roberts, 1996).

These changes also contributed to the emergence of some difficult operational dilemmas to the many actors involved in peace missions. In theory, the complementarities between military, civil and humanitarian activities is definitely recognised and enshrined in the peace mission’s mandates, but in practice the distinction between actors, goals and modus operandis is not as clear or easy to make. As Hulme and Edwards put it “from being outside of states looking in, NGOs are now inside looking out” (cited in Duffield, 2010: 59). In fact, emergency interventions that call for humanitarian action and development projects have always been significantly different from military interventions. And they still are in many aspects, in terms of objectives, time frames, ethical principles, planning and
management, work methods, and relations with other actors (Armiño, 2002; Armiño and Zirion, 2010; Duffield, 2001).

According to Weir, two tensions have emerged in the context of humanitarian action: the pragmatic need to collaborate and coordinate the disparate crisis response systems in such a way as to carve security and stability out of highly volatile and multidimensional conflicts; and the need to respect the essential distinction between the political dimensions of the peacekeeping response, and the necessary neutral and impartial position of humanitarian agencies. (Weir, 2006: 9)

Regarding development aid the tensions are similar: long-term development concerns are subsumed under short-term stability goals; and the political and social confidence-building necessary to embed sustainable development strategies collide with a traditional military approach. Although including a greater number of civilians and new dimensions, the command structures and most of the personnel of these missions are still military, trained for war.

The main consequences of these tensions is the creation of other insecurities, which constitutes the opposite end result of a process directed at promoting peace and security. Development efforts and humanitarian activities have suffered structural setbacks due to this interpretation of the nexus between security, development, and humanitarian crises, illustrated by the ‘fortified aid compounds’ and the fact that aid and humanitarian workers have increasingly become targets of violence (Duffield, 2010: 59). These setbacks are also illustrated by the growing negative perceptions and resentment among local populations due to the hostile context (fortified compounds, military equipment) within which development and humanitarian aid is being carried out.

In this context, Richmond argues that interventionism ends up providing externally imposed *peaces*, which distort the very basic assumptions that should constitute the concept of peace. He proposes instead “an emancipatory form of peace that reflects
the interests, identities, and needs of all actors, state and non-state, and aims at the creation of a discursive framework of mutual accommodation and social justice which recognizes difference. An everyday, post-Westphalian peace is its aim” (Richmond, 2008: 109). This should then pave the way for a better integration between the international and the local in a post-liberal model that should render interventionist policies a new dimension. “A deeper contextualization of peace may allow for a hybridized localized and internationalized praxes of peacebuilding to emerge that are more locally sustainable, resilient, and legitimate than what has been the result of the recently evolved liberal peacebuilding/statebuilding praxis” (Richmond, 2009: 572). This means multidimensional interventions need and should not be detached from their contexts, reflecting how the conceptualisation of peace, violence and the continua play in their intersections fostering positive intervention dynamics.

Conclusion
As explained above, peace studies research has seeped into the political discourse and instruments regarding peace missions. However, the results have not lived up to the expectations. On the one hand, the broadening of the peace studies’ agenda along with the disconnection between the operational results and the research proposals rendered the peace studies field fragile. On the other hand, these same dynamics have allowed for a legitimization of the operational instruments in a perverse manner. As analysed, the process of securitization of (under)development and humanitarian aid has led to distorted understandings about interventions in the promotion of peace and security. It allowed for a direct linkage between underdevelopment and humanitarian emergencies with violence, which is a fallacy, thus limiting the capacity of these interventions to effectively respond to the challenges as well as take advantage from windows of opportunity for building peace. The peace missions’ mandates and intervention strategies should therefore be adjusted to the different combinations of peaces and violences, and in this way reveal flexible enough to respond to complex violence scenarios.
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