Peacebuilding and development aid: friends or foes?
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Abstract
Ever since the United Nations (UN) peacekeeping missions became multidimensional and started including peacebuilding objectives, the relation between these missions and development aid has grown tense and often confusing. Basically, one finds two positions regarding this relation: the phase-approach – development aid comes after peacebuilding; and an integrated approach – peacebuilding and development aid are complementary. Still, both approaches disregard the actual relation between the international systems put in place to govern development aid and peacebuilding. This paper provides a critical analysis of these dynamics departing from the conceptual evolution to the existing institutional architecture. The analysis will be illustrated by the Timor-Leste case.
Introduction

Development aid and peacebuilding are not easily defined concepts and analysing the conceptual and operational relations between them is not an easy task. Since World War II, interventionism regarding peace and development have been addressed in an autonomous way, with distinct actors, policies and strategies. Development aid politics has a long history of institutions, such as the World Bank Group, the UN Development Programme and national development aid agencies, which have developed policies, instruments and strategies to better assist third countries, i.e. less developed countries, in promoting their national development (Kharas 2007; Forster and Stokke 2013). Peace interventions for the longest time meant peacekeeping missions, having evolved in the 1990s into multidimensional missions and more recently including peacebuilding mandates (Bellamy, Williams and Griffin 2004; Fortna and Howard 2008; Freire and Lopes 2009). Still, currently, there has been a growing recognition that there is a link between these two areas of intervention (Galtung 1996; Barnett 2008). There is no development without peace, and peace needs development to be sustainable (Eliasson 2011). Despite the general recognition of this intrinsic relation, rendering this connection operational has been a constant challenge.

A cross-cutting major problem with external interventions resides in the way they are implemented. Thus, some argue peace and development interventions should be sequential. Whereas others argue peace and development should be addressed at the same time, albeit adjusting for different specificities in each case. Smoljan (2003) identifies two approaches associated with the implementation of these interventions: the exclusive and the inclusive. The exclusive approach, adopted, for instance, by Khüne at the Berlin Institute for International Affairs (1996), argues that peacebuilding and development are two distinct phases of a process adopted separately and under different circumstances (Smoljan 2003). Peacebuilding is a political effort developed in a limited period of time in response to security problems; whereas development consists in a long-term strategy usually implemented in peaceful conditions (Smoljan 2003: 234). On the other hand, the inclusive approach states that peacebuilding and development reinforce each other mutually and is promoted, for instance, by Boutros-Ghali, who argues for an ‘international consensus on the crucial importance of economic and social development as the most secure basis for lasting peace’ (A/50/60-S/1995/1: §3).

This article argues that UN (United Nations) peace missions, although conceptually adopting an inclusive narrative, follow an exclusive approach when it comes to implementation. The
Timorese case illustrates well this disconnection between an inclusive approach, in theory, and an exclusive one, in operational terms. After five UN missions, from 1999 to 2012,¹ including a Transitory Administration and an Integrated Mission, the traditional security indicators in Timor-Leste reveal a rather stable situation, with the organized means of violence being under state monopoly and judicial scrutiny based on the rule of law and a democratic and human rights approach; whereas development indicators in Timor-Leste still reveal a fragile situation. The fact is that the UN peace missions responsible for building the peace in Timor-Leste did not have a specific mandate for creating development.

The argument discussed in this article states that although the UN have adopted an inclusive understanding of peacebuilding with An Agenda for Peace (A/47/277 1992), on the field, in Timor-Leste, UN peace missions did not have development objectives explicitly included in their mandates. The wider argument in the article contends that it does not make sense to analyse peacebuilding, with specific mandates and concrete activities, if there is no articulation with development programmes. Similarly, it does not make sense to implement development programmes, policies, strategies or projects, especially in post-violent conflict contexts, without adopting a peacebuilding structural and transversal approach. Investing in the implementation of one of the concepts without including the other undermines directly the sustainability of the results that might be achieved in terms of both peace and development.

The article starts by analysing the term ‘peacebuilding’, focusing on the concept of ‘peace’, and the evolution of UN peace missions, while also introducing a brief historical account of the concept and practice of development aid. It then presents an analysis of UN peace missions’ mandates in Timor-Leste in order to identify their relations with the development process. The following section discusses the development indicators in Timor-Leste, identifying the undermining dynamics regarding peacebuilding efforts. The article concludes with some considerations regarding the necessity for these issue areas to be addressed in an articulated manner not only theoretically but also in practice, otherwise running the risk of not being possible to guarantee the sustainability of either process. Peacebuilding and development processes are mutually dependent and cannot survive without one another. The analytical part of the article is based on a review of the existing literature on the topic as well as on information

collected in Timor-Leste through semi-structured qualitative interviews and direct observation in June–July 2012 and July 2013.

**UN peacebuilding and development: A brief account**

The concept of peacebuilding has been adopted by the UN since 1992 with *An Agenda for Peace* (A/47/277), where it is defined as an ‘action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict’ (§21) and which aims at ‘the construction of a new environment […] of sustained, cooperative work to deal with underlying economic, social, cultural and humanitarian problems [which] can place an achieved peace on a durable foundation’, preventing in this way a relapse into violence (§57). This understanding of peacebuilding goes beyond the more traditional peacekeeping mandates which were more focused on peace as the absence of violence.

The UN Charter does not foresee peace missions, although it contains elements and principles that reflect the spirit within which peacekeeping and peacebuilding are envisaged. So, the reasoning agreed to frame the initial peacekeeping missions was somewhat between Chapter VI (peaceful resolution of disputes) and Chapter VII (peace enforcement measures when peace is threatened or violated or when there are acts of aggression). Some call it ‘Chapter VI½’: soldiers are sent with a restrictive mandate regarding the use of force, hosting countries give permission to the intervention and peacekeeping forces should remain neutral regarding the belligerent actors (‘holy trinity’). This first type of peace mission is in charge of observing the fulfilment of the conditions established in peace agreements, settlements and ceasefires. Their main goal is to ensure physical violence is not perpetrated by any of the belligerent groups (Galtung’s negative peace).

With the conceptual changes security carried out in the 1990s, with a wider and deeper meaning and with the various critiques to the limitations of these peacekeeping mandates, the UN realized the need to adjust peacekeeping mandates. And, for that purpose, in the 1980s and 1990s, a second type of peacekeeping took shape, where mandates included more than observing and keeping the peace, namely, human security, confidence building, power sharing agreements, electoral support, rule of law strengthening and social and economic development. These new missions went beyond the initial mandates and included, besides soldiers and police, civilian personnel. Until then, the more institutional, economic and social aspects of building peace were usually in the hands of development aid official agencies, both bi- and multi-lateral, and of non-
governmental organizations (NGOs). These would wait until it was safe to go in and then peacebuilding would start, in the so-called ‘post-conflict reconstruction phase’. Incorporating these concerns into peace missions’ mandates reflects an understanding that peacebuilding has to start much earlier than after the suspension of violence.

As a result, peacekeeping became multidimensional, involving security, institutional, economic and psycho-social dimensions. The security perspective follows the original peacekeeping mandates, guaranteeing peace through the absence of violence. The institutional dimension is related to the political regimes and systems, in order to frame the efforts developed, and to create a peaceful system to settle conflicts. This usually includes the judiciary, political parties and multi-level governance. The economic dimension envisages the creation of a liberal market economy favourable to investment and focused on economic growth and development. And finally, all these efforts are insufficient unless the issue of social reconciliation is addressed, including all stakeholders. This constitutes the psycho-social dimension.

From these multidimensional peacekeeping missions, in the 1990s, the UN started discussing peacebuilding mandates, where the concept is understood as ‘a self-sustaining structure in itself’ (Cavalcante 2010: 6). The activities include ‘demilitarization, the control of small arms, institutional reform, improved police and judicial systems, the monitoring of human rights, electoral reform and social and economic development’ (A/50/60-S/1995/1: §47). Peacebuilding is considered ‘a complex and long-term process of creating the necessary conditions for sustainable peace’ (UN 2008: 18). As a result, some UN peace missions are characterized by mandates that explicitly mention ‘peacebuilding’, others have mandates which include activities that can be identified as elements of an overall effort to build peace as defined in the UN official documents. The salience of trying to render peacebuilding operational with beneficial outcomes, led to the creation, in 2006, of the UN Peacebuilding Architecture. The Peacebuilding Commission, the Peacebuilding Fund and the Peacebuilding Support Office were created to better support UN peacebuilding efforts in post-violent conflict countries.

The UN identifies as the most frequent peacebuilding needs: ‘safety and security, including rule of law; support to political processes and reconciliation; basic services, such as water, health and primary education; institution building and public administration; and economic revitalization, including jobs and livelihoods’ (UN 2010). Although the concept adopted by the UN recognizes the complex and long-term nature associated with peacebuilding, its implementation has been
characterized by an essentially technical approach based on the assumption that ‘the principal “problem” with conflict-prone and post-conflict states is the absence of “effective” state institutions’ (Newman 2011: 1742). As a result, the ‘construction of state institutions’ is understood as the ‘main pillar’ of the current UN peacebuilding model (Blanco 2009: 2). In fact, UN Secretary-General, Ban Ki-moon confirms this idea by stating that building peace ‘is about putting in place the institutions and trust that will carry people forward into a peaceful future’ (UN 2010). As Newman states, the UN peace missions depart from a limited perspective on rendering peacebuilding operational, where the objectives regarding human well-being, human development, social justice and inclusive democracy are secondary and should be promoted by the national authorities in the long-run (Newman 2011: 1737). Consequently, when deployed, peace interventions tend to focus first on guaranteeing physical security and then, already under the aegis of peacebuilding, creating the institutional framework, i.e. governmental institutions, legal and judicial apparatus, security institutions, qualified human resources, for peace to become sustainable, providing a conducive environment for development to thrive.

It should be noted, however, that the inclusive approach is used in the institution’s discourse. For instance, Cheng-Hopkins, Assistant Secretary-General for Peacebuilding Support argues:

Building lasting peace after conflict is at the heart of the UN’s mission and purpose. From peacekeepers to civil servants, from lawyers to police, from humanitarian staff to development experts, all parts of the UN family are engaged in peacebuilding. (UN 2010)

Consequently, the link between peacebuilding and development aid is both institutionally and conceptually recognized. Still, development, unlike peacebuilding, has a long history and has been associated with development aid policies for more than half of a century. Until the 1990s, development was equated almost exclusively with economic growth. In the last decade of the twentieth century, development started to include social and environmental elements, besides the initial economic ones. Thus, the concept of development acquired a ‘human face’ and a concern not only with the current population, but also with the future generations (sustainability). The concept of human development was introduced in the first Human Development Report issued by the UN Development Programme in 1990, and is defined as ‘a process of enlarging people’s choices’, focused namely in guaranteeing a long and healthy life, providing access to education and creating the conditions for the enjoyment of a decent standard of living (UNDP 1990: 10). The 1990s also saw issues such as good governance and institution-, capacity- and state-building
gain prominence when defining development aid conditionality. It was only in 2000, with the Millennium Declaration adopted by the UN General Assembly (A/55/L.2 2000), that eight specific development goals were defined. The Millennium Development Goals (MDG) focus on the eradication of hunger and extreme poverty and include quantitative targets to be achieved by 2015 regarding education, health, sustainability and gender issues. No reference to peace dynamics or institutions is included in the MDG. Still, the 1990 human development definition remains the overall referential concept used for development.

In 1997 the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development’s Development Assistance Committee (OECD DAC) defined that the role of development aid in complex emergency situations should ‘strive for an environment of “structural stability” as a basis for sustainable development’ (OECD 2001: 80). For the OECD DAC, structural stability consists of an environment that ‘embraces the mutually reinforcing objectives of social peace, respect for human rights, accountable military forces and broadly-shared social and economic development; supported by dynamic and representative political structures capable of managing change and resolving disputes through peaceful means’ (OECD 2001: 80).

Thus, one can identify that the current major link between peacebuilding and development aid concepts seems to rest in the creation of institutions, accountable, democratic, human rights-based institutions to provide a conducive environment to sustainable human development.

**Peace Missions in Timor-Leste: Goals and development links**

Lothe and Peake identify two phases regarding the UN presence in Timor-Leste. From 1999 to 2006, the UN missions focused essentially in building the state (state-building); and post-2006, the UN basically gained the opportunity to redo what they had done before, during the first phase (Lothe and Peake 2010: S427). The UN had a three-fold role: as peacemakers, facilitating a peace agreement; as peacekeepers, monitoring the cantonment and demobilization of the former Timorese freedom fighters, the resettlement of refugees and internal displaced people; and as peace builders, monitoring and organizing the implementation of a new political, public and economic infrastructure, with particular attention to human rights and national democratic elections (Croissant 2006). This brief account suggests the adoption of the exclusive approach by the UN peace missions in Timor-Leste, within which peacebuilding is essentially understood as state-building.
The five UN peace missions were in Timor-Leste from 1999 to 2012. They had different mandates, including peace enforcement, peacekeeping and peacebuilding. As discussed in the conceptual section, peacebuilding has been implemented by the UN with a focus, sometimes exclusively, in the creation of institutional structures able to respond to different challenges that arise in a post-violent conflict situation, namely in the areas of security and governance. The creation of these structures has been accompanied by a structural investment in capacity building to create the necessary conditions for the local human resources to be able to assume the destiny of their own country with the indispensable institutions and skills for that effect.

Consequently, analysing only the mandates of the different UN missions that were in Timor-Leste, one can quickly understand that the UN approach followed that exact model of peacebuilding. The first mission, UNAMET (United Nations Mission in East Timor) (S/RES/1246 1999), had as its central mandate the organization of the popular referendum that allowed the Timorese people to choose between autonomy within Indonesia or independence. The choice for independence obtained 78.5 per cent of the votes, with 98 per cent of participation from registered voters. As a result, several violent confrontations erupted throughout the territory determining a reinforcement of UNAMET’s mandate, namely with military and civilian police components (S/RES/1262 1999). UNAMET ended up being supported by a peace enforcement mission, INTERFET – International Force for East Timor, with a mandate to restore peace and security and provide humanitarian assistance (S/RES/1264 1999).

The Transitional Administration (UNTAET – United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor) – 1999–2002 – included a range of activities that can be identified as peacebuilding, although its mandate did not refer the term: provision of security and maintaining public order; establishment of an effective administration; support in the development of civil and social services; coordination and distribution of humanitarian and rehabilitation assistance as well as development aid; support the development of self-governing capacities; and support the creation of conditions for a sustainable development (S/RES/1272 1999 and subsequent extensions). To this effect the work of UNTAET centred around three components: governance and public administration, humanitarian assistance and emergency rehabilitation, and military forces. According to Richmond and Franks, UNTAET was poorly equipped to build peace because it was structured as a peacekeeping mission (Richmond and Franks 2008: 190).
The two subsequent missions – UNMISET (United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor) and UNOTIL (United Nations Office in Timor-Leste) – were very different in their nature, but were, at the same time, very similar regarding the fact that none of their mandates included a reference to peacebuilding as an objective. UNMISET was a mission with some weight concerning the support of the Timorese state with the restoration of its independence on May 2002. Its mandate addressed concerns resulting from the work initiated previously by UNTAET: stability, democracy and justice; public security and rule of law; and external security and border control (S/RES/1410 2002). UNOTIL was a political mission, the activities of which were limited to supporting the Timorese government regarding essentially the development of state institutions, police establishment and the training of ten human rights officials (S/RES/1599 2005). In the UN Secretary-General Report to the Security Council addressing the 2006 crisis in Timor-Leste (S/2006/628), the main causes of the crisis are identified as being political and institutional, although it is also mentioned that ‘poverty and its associated deprivations, including high urban unemployment and the absence of any prospect of meaningful involvement and employment opportunities in the foreseeable future, especially for young people, have also contributed to the crisis’ (§34). According to Lothe and Peake, the 2006 crisis ‘had set the development clock back for Timor-Leste’ (2010: S434).

The UN Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT) was the only one that included an explicit reference to peacebuilding in its mandate. After the 2006 violent conflicts and political instability, the Timorese government asked the UN for ‘the establishment of a new integrated UN peacekeeping mission’ (S/2006/620: 2). The Timorese governing structures believed that ‘a robust police, military and civilian element [was] indispensable to [their] hard-won peace and freedom’ (S/2006/620: 2). This new mission would contribute towards the consolidation of the institutional development initiated with UNTAET and continued, in a certain way, with UNMISET. Consequently, UNMIT’s mandate included supporting the Timorese government in consolidating stability and a democratic culture; supporting the 2007 elections; guaranteeing public order; assisting in border patrols; supporting the consolidation of the justice sector; supporting the monitoring, promotion and protection of human rights; facilitating the provision of humanitarian assistance; and cooperating and coordinating international efforts regarding peacebuilding and capacity building as well as helping the government in defining a poverty reduction strategy and promoting economic growth (S/RES/1704 2006).
Consequently, in global terms, it is possible to argue that UNTAET and UNMIT mandates included peacebuilding activities, although only UNMIT’s mandate explicitly refers to the term. Still, the joint analysis of the mandates of the various missions reveals the emphasis given to the security sector and institutional creation (legal, executive, judicial, public administration) by the UN missions. Even in the UNMIT mandate, the reference to peacebuilding is associated with cooperating and coordinating international efforts and supporting the government in defining strategies. A direct involvement in poverty reduction activities and/or in economic growth initiatives and/or in financing or implementing public services, such as health or education, is not envisaged in UNMIT’s mandate. Still, the UN Peacebuilding Architecture identifies, for instance, ‘basic services, such as water’ and ‘economic revitalization, including jobs and livelihoods’ as peacebuilding’s most frequent needs (UN 2010), needs that were (and are) present in Timor-Leste.

One can argue, in global terms, that all of the missions aimed at reducing the economic, social and political vulnerabilities in Timor-Leste. However, the actual activities developed under the aegis of the UN peace missions in Timor-Leste focused particularly on creating a stable and accountable security sector and an institutional framework, namely executive, legislative and judicial. And, from this point of view, one can conclude that there was a direct and structural focus on the reduction of political vulnerabilities, leaving economic and social vulnerabilities for other actors and another moment. This reflects the exclusive approach of UN peace missions. After UNMIT’s exit in December 2012, Timor-Leste is characterized by a stable security sector, with operational military and police forces. The most concerning violent indicators are due to domestic violence cases (UNDP 2013a). The governance structure is in place and working, with political parties, governmental institutions, parliament and the judicial system, all working under the democratic human rights-based constitution. Rule of law is established. This is not to say that the work on these dimensions is done, it is a constant process of improvement, consolidation and embedding. However, Timor-Leste can be currently described as a stable, functioning democratic country.

The recurring problem with this type of approach is that political vulnerabilities are interlinked to economic and social ones, and to not address this interconnection from the very beginning requires a very fast and well-targeted strategy in the post-UNMIT phase to correct the discrepancies created among these three dimensions. The reduction of political vulnerabilities will only be sustainable if, in the short- to medium-term, economic and social vulnerabilities are
also reduced and the range of opportunities in these dimensions reaches a significant part of the population. Otherwise, economic and social pressures can rapidly derail the progresses obtained in the political and security areas.

Development in Timor-Leste: Dynamics and links with peace

After fourteen years of peace missions in Timor-Leste and eleven years since the restoration of its independence, one of the aspects that still characterizes the country in a visible way is the lack of basic infrastructures: drinking water, sanitation, electricity, roads, health and education, among others. Additionally, the rate of unemployment, particularly among the young population, should also be taken into account. This is not a straightforward analysis, since there is a lack of credible and comparable information to allow for a systematic and grounded examination of the development reality in the country. It has not been possible to obtain information for the last decade from the same source or using the same calculation criteria. Nevertheless, the lack of basic infrastructures is visible to the naked eye and it constitutes a critical aspect for a better understanding of the development situation in Timor-Leste, in order to better assess the sustainability of peace efforts. As for the rate of unemployment, for instance, for the year 2010, one can find figures as low as 3.6 per cent (DNE-SEFOPE 2010) and as high as 50 per cent (cited in Freedom House 2011). However, the idea that the Timorese unemployment rate is high and that the rate of youth unemployment constitutes a source of concern is recurrently identified as a major Timorese challenge (ADB 2012), also by the Timorese authorities (MED 2012). Consequently, this section is based on the analysis of data provided by the UN Development Programme, data accepted by the Timorese government and facts identified through direct observation.

Despite the limitations of an analysis based on the Human Development Index (HDI), it should be noted that it constitutes the index reference for assessing development worldwide. And, in relation to Timor-Leste, in one decade (2000–10), the country registered a significant improvement, with an increase of its HDI of almost 35 per cent, from 0.418 to 0.565 (see Table 1). It should be noted that during the first half of the decade (2000–05), the HDI increase was due almost exclusively to the increase in Timorese average life expectancy, from 56.2 years to 59.6 years. The dynamics of the second half of the decade was very different. The HDI increase was due to a significant rise in the number of years Timorese people spend in school (from 2.8 to 4.4 years, a 57 per cent increase) and, in a crucial way, due to an increase of the Gross National Income (GNI) per capita of around 156.5 per cent, from US$1,830 to US$4,694 per
capita (2005 prices). The HDI figures for the last two years, 2011 and 2012, reflect a low increase, 0.571 and 0.576, respectively, due essentially to the GNI per capita growth, which remained around 7.5 per cent and 8 per cent. All the remaining components stagnated.

Table 1 Evolution of the Human Development Index and its components in Timor-Leste

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<tr>
<td>HDI</td>
<td>0.418</td>
<td>0.461</td>
<td>0.565</td>
<td>0.571</td>
<td>0.576</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average life expectancy</td>
<td>56.2</td>
<td>59.6</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>62.5</td>
<td>62.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average years schooling</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>4.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expected years schooling</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>11.7</td>
<td>11.7</td>
<td>11.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GNI per capita (2005 US$)</td>
<td>1195</td>
<td>1830</td>
<td>4694</td>
<td>5069</td>
<td>5446</td>
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From this brief analysis, two aspects are worth highlighting: the average life expectancy, since the restoration of independence (2002) has not undergone any significant changes; and there are countries with a lower GNI per capita and with a much higher life expectancy, such as Vietnam with an average life expectancy of 75.4 years and US$2,970 per capita (UNDP 2013b: 146). The initial increase of the average life expectancy right after the 1999 referendum is explained to a great extent by the immediate decrease in the number of young people killed due to the end of the armed resistance to Indonesian occupation. The non-increase of this indicator, on the other hand, suggests the improvements regarding life quality and the access to health services as well as a healthy and nutritious diet still constitute a problem in Timorese people’s daily lives.

Including in the analysis the data regarding the Millennium Development Goal 1 – to halve the proportion of people living in extreme poverty and suffering from hunger until 2015 – for Timor-Leste (see Table 2), this very gradual increase of the Timorese life expectancy is better contextualized.

Table 2 MDG 1 Evolution: Extreme poverty and nutrition in Timor-Leste

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MDG 1</th>
<th>2001</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2015</th>
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<tr>
<td>People living in extreme poverty (%)</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>49.9</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Children under five with malnutrition</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>48.6</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In the first half of the last decade, the number of people living in extreme poverty in Timor-Leste seems to have increased. It should be noted, however, that the 2001 figure was calculated based on a minimum threshold of US$0.51 per day, whereas the 2007 figure was calculated with a US$0.88 threshold, which can explain the increase identified. Still, from 2007 to 2009 the calculation criteria were the same, and although there is an overall decrease of the number of people living in extreme poverty, the fact that 41 per cent of the population is identified as living in extreme poverty is extremely concerning. If one adds to this analysis the evolution regarding nutrition in children under 5 years old, again, the data suggest an increase of the number with malnutrition problems in the first half of the last decade (2001–06). Once more, this figure fell in 2009, but it is still at a very high level, with 44.7 per cent of Timorese children under 5 years old presenting malnutrition symptoms in 2010, and 38.1 per cent in 2013 (MH 2013). These dynamics contextualize the fact that the average Timorese life expectancy at birth has not presented highly positive results in the last five years.

Another indispensable indicator to include in this analysis in order to better understand the meaning of these figures is the Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI), which analyses the population deprivation in terms of education, health and the standard of living. The MPI is included in the Human Development Reports from the UN Development Programme since 2010. In the case of Timor-Leste, although some information still suffers from problems of calculation and lack of credible data collection, the MPI presents a value of 0.360 for the period 2009–10, with around 68.1 per cent of the population living in a multidimensional poverty situation (UNDP 2013b: 160). When disaggregating this indicator and analysing the elements that contribute to the MPI, one obtains a more comprehensive picture of Timorese daily-life struggles. In Timor-Leste, education contributes with around 21.3 per cent to the MPI value, health with around 31 per cent and the standard of living with around 47.7 per cent (UNDP 2013b: 160). Standard of living includes access to electricity, drinking water, sanitation, the type of floor in the household (earth, sand or other), the type of fuel used to cook (wood, charcoal or compost) and the equipment the household has (bicycles, motorcycles, televisions or radios) (Alkire and Santos 2010: xx). Consequently, this index identifies that the living conditions contribute with almost 50 per cent to the extreme poverty of Timorese people, and that these
conditions, added to the health situation measured by infant mortality and the number of people with nutrition problems, are responsible for almost 80 per cent of the poverty causes in Timor-Leste. Independently of the accuracy of this data, these figures present a draft scenario with the most pressing dimensions at the level of poverty in the country.

And, as a result, these indicators question the process of enlarging opportunities to the Timorese population and contribute directly to a low impact in the reduction of the Timorese economic, social and political vulnerabilities. Consequently, a population that does not expect to live a long and healthy life, nor a life with significant levels of education, has structural difficulties in acquiring the necessary skills to contribute positively to sustainable peacebuilding efforts. Having their basic daily security guaranteed (by the government or external entities), their priorities become unequivocally others. A peacebuilding process without, or with very shallow foundations, will not resist swift changes or social, economic and/or political convulsions. For instance, several people interviewed at the level of the government, identified youth unemployment as a ‘ticking-bomb’ when asked about the current challenges facing Timor-Leste. Some added that the increase of economic and social inequalities between the capital, Dili, and the rest of the country, between the working poor and the new rich (without any apparent source of income), between an educated elite with well-paid jobs and access to a standard of living similar to any developed country, and a population that subsists without access to health, education, drinking water, basic sanitation services or to a well-balanced diet, constitute a growing ‘silent bomb’.

Conclusion
The analysis of the relationship between peacebuilding and development aid in this article shows how both concepts are intrinsically intertwined. The case of Timor-Leste illustrates how this link is still not rendered operational in a sustainable manner. There are efforts, but the results are extremely questionable. A country considered ‘physically’ safe, but where drinking water and sanitation are practically non-existent, structurally undermines the success achieved in terms of internal security. It is obviously important for the population to feel safe to develop their daily activities and make their choices, but if the ability to choose is not there because there are no available basic services, if the possibility to evolve professionally and personally is not there because there is no infrastructure for that effect, then ‘internal security’ can easily and rapidly be undermined.
It is impossible to dissociate human development from peacebuilding and, consequently, to define precise and concrete sequences and phases of development and peacebuilding. But the inclusive approach often leaves the actors without knowing how to act and what to prioritize. The brief analysis presented here suggests peacebuilding should not be a mandate, a phase or any type of mission, but rather the framework for all and every external action in another country, be it during a violent conflict or in a situation of a so-called post-violent conflict. This framework of peacebuilding allows for all actions – missions, interventions, projects, models, programmes, assistance – to be framed and adjusted in order to contribute to peacebuilding, following the terms defined by the UN: to create the necessary conditions to a sustainable peace. Peace understood as more than the absence of physical violence and, thus, including the overall dynamics of human development promotion, support and improvement.

First, the focus on institutional building, although necessary, may prove unsustainable if these institutions do not have roots in local society dynamics. Second, institutions are only the organizational structure, but without human development, this institutional structure may not have anyone to function for or anywhere from which to gain support. And third, peacebuilding is a daily activity; it is something that requires infrastructure, and is rendered operational in the daily lives of each and every person in their social, political, economic, religious, personal and professional interactions, whether individually or as a community. Peace missions and development aid strategies need to have the same overall aim of promoting and consolidating peace and, for that effect, their interventions need to work in tandem with security concerns and human development needs, including local expectations, perspectives and understandings. Until these aspects are internalized in peace missions and in development aid strategies, the sustainability of these efforts will always remain provisional.

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