International Reputation and Smart Power: Brazil’ strategies lumping together reliability and power projection.

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Abstract

The focus of this article is the idea of a new form of international leadership and influence that can be analyzed by combining the conceptual prism of Smart Power and International Reputation. Anne Sartori, in her study about reputation based on honesty (as opposed in the reputation based on bluff), points out its relevance to diplomatic relations in spite of, including, the deterring of others actors. Thus, we recognize there is a close relationship between the principles of trust, commonly associated with cooperation, and deterrence principles, aimed at possible confrontation and robustness, notably of the military ways. Assuming the idea before advocated between the existence of varying degrees of cooperative reputation and leadership among state actors in the international arena, our objective is to study the Brazil international strategies for power projection through the composition of this reputational model with the sphere of the concept of Smart Power, thinking this how a new way to influence the international system in the globalization era. The Smart Power’s proposal is rethinking the way that the resources are used in the power relations between actors in the international arena, the focus is to highlight the absolute gains and cooperation processes, associated with a State honesty reputation with partners.

Keywords: Reputation, Smart Power, Foreign Policy, Brazil, Power.

1. Smart power: A new dynamic of power in international relations

A first important concept of to discuss when it study to foreign policy is the construction of state power, and how the projection of that power is an important tool to achieve an influence and relevance in the international space. Thus, power will be directly related to the concept of hegemony. According to

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political scientist Norberto Bobbio, the classical concept of hegemony can be understood as:

The hegemonic power it exerts on the other one not only military, but also often economic and cultural preeminence, inspiring them and conditioning them options, both (inspiring and conditioning) by virtue of its prestige as because of their high potential for intimidation and coercion (BOBBIO ET AL., 1998 p.579).

Complementing this concept, Bobbio will say that hegemony is not a rule, but an interstate’s influence that does not need a regulation for exists and it’s applied.

With the development of the relationship between Countries in the international context, the concept of hegemony will suffer changes, not at its core where the actor to exercise a power of leadership, but rather in the way as that leadership will be achieved and exercised. According Cravinho (2002, p.243), hegemony is the "set of pressures that define acceptable limits for autonomous decisions and produces therefore, repeated patterns of behavior in the international arena". The idea of the author is that hegemony is exercised not only in military and economic level, but also on a set of forces that are not measurable as the ideas, actions and experiences of the hegemonic actor, producing for them a leadership but without destabilizing international system. How Triepel argues (BOBBIO et al., 1998), is a species of particularly strong influence exercised without to use the arms and force, and therefore grounded in a certain degree of legitimacy.

These two ideas of hegemony can be related, respectively, with the two main classical theories of international relations, realism and liberalism. But the hegemony that imposes its will on other States, is not an example for an international insertion that this study aims to Brazil in the twenty-first century, on the contrary, the idea for Brazil is to perceive the construction of a new international dynamic that focuses in the cooptation of allies through multilateralism and in the projection of absolute gains\(^3\) for everyone. It is a

\(^3\) Is considered absolute gains equitable distribution of gains in the relationship between states, ie, the symmetry between the benefits generated by the cooperation. The relative gains would be the reverse,
hegemony based in multidimensional standards (GOODIN et al., 2005), in an attempt to influence the partners, without use of military force in the coercive way, but, taking into account economic factors and soft power that can be classified as projection of ideas and culture of a State.

Thus, the theoretical perspective of this article is not intended to present a proposal to change the status quo of the world order, which sees the world as anarchic, where the goal of the state is fighting for its survival, in others words, maintain its sovereign power and its territorial integrity, as advocated by realism (WALTZ, 1979). Contrary to this, the objective in this study is to debate another kind of international order that is based on cooperation and interdependence (PECEQUILO, 2004). A neo-institutionalist view that believes that rules, norms and institutions are the best means to ensure security and stability in the international system (KEOHANE; NYE JR, 1989).

In the towards of the construction of the international State´s power through cooperation and interdependence with other States in the international space, what is denominated smart power will emerge as an alternative that will merge two types of powers, the recognized as hard power with the soft power. These two powers will sustain the State power´s resources into three categories a) structural⁴, b) institutional and c) situational (Pecequilo, 2004). Together, these categories of power resource will form what we call smart power, as shown by the table below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Classification of State power´s resource</th>
<th>Hard Power</th>
<th>Soft Power</th>
<th>Smart Power</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Structural</td>
<td>X</td>
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<td>Institutional</td>
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<td>Situational</td>
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Source: AYRES PINTO, 2009

ie, disproportionality between these gains, and gain a state with more cooperation than the other, which would necessarily have to lose. The idea To learn more about this topic see chapter JM Grieco (1993) Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: a Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism, in the book of DA Baldwin (1993) Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate.

⁴ For a more detailed discussion on structural power see: Susan Strange (1998) States and Markets.
The term smart power was invented by American political scientist Suzanne Nossel, in 2004, in her article in the Foreign Affairs Magazine which aimed to rethink U.S. foreign policy after September 11. For Suzanne smart power is:

Smart power means knowing that the United States’s own hand is not always its best tool: U.S. interests are furthered by enlisting others on behalf of U.S. goals, through alliances, international institutions, careful diplomacy, and the power of ideals. (NOSSEL, 2004, p. 138).

In this article, we’re, together with the Nossel’s idea about smart power, to consider the smart power’s idea thinking by Joseph Nye Jr., in his book The Future of Power, which is the following: “The Smart Power is not simply" the soft power 2.0 ". Refers to the ability to combine Hard Power and Soft Power in effective strategies in various contexts."(NYE, 2011, p. 15).

The author complements the definition saying that:

A narrative for smart power in the twenty-first century, is not only about maximizing the power and maintenance of hegemony. It is mainly about finding ways to combine resources into a successful strategy in a new context of diffusion of power and "the rise of the other actors." (Idem, 2011, p. 208).

Thus, the smart power is understood as the integrality of power that covering the areas of economic and military State’s power, and will seek to develop other areas in order to complement the first two dimensions. The development of these areas should focus on five main points, in according to the report produced in 2007 by Nye and Armitage, they are: “a) alliances, partnerships and institutions; b) global development; c) public diplomacy; d) economic integration; e) Innovation and Technology” (ARMITAGE; NYE, 2007, p.5).
The Smart Power’s concern is to be an order with focuses in the positive sum game, as declared Morriß (2002, p.33): “Do not just think of getting power over others. We also need to think in terms of being able to achieve goals that involve power with others”.

The concept of cooperation that will be used in this study is the idea proposed by Keohane (1984) in his book After Hegemony. When the author has done an analysis of cooperation, harmony and discord him will say that cooperation is not always separated from the conflict, on the contrary, often the cooperation born from the conflict. The cooperation aims profound results, as to produce an interdependence between states, where the interest in resolving disagreements would be more by cooperation than by armed conflict, armed conflict be seen a much more costly process.

Thus, cooperation for Keohane is:

Cooperation occurs when actors adjust their behavior to the actual or anticipated preferences of others, through a process of policy coordination. To summarize more formally, intergovernmental cooperation takes place when the policies actually followed by one government are regarded by its partners as facilitating realization of their own objectives, as the result of a process of policy coordination.(KEOHANE, 1984, p.51-52)

In this perspective, this article in the next part will be deepening the study about the five main areas to be developed within the strategy for the construction of smart power, and in the sequence it’s try to demonstrate the concepts of reputation of the state, the conceptions of Brazilian foreign policy in the twenty-first century, and to analyze whether both are in line with the perspective of international influence based on the dynamics of smart power.

2. Areas to be developed to strengthen the State’s smart power

The five areas suggested to be developed are fully connected to an relationship more interdependent and cooperative with the States in the
international space, where they aimed not only their own benefits, but also focus in the development benefits that have a global reach, and provide gains to all actors in the international system, which can to be recognized as global public goods.

In a speech in March 2012 for the Royal College of Defense Studies in London, the Minister Gerald Howarth (International Security Strategy Minister) argued that in a world where the UK is only one of Powerful States, it’s must necessary to know how to use the foreign policy´s tools in an appropriate way in each circumstance. For this, signaled what he said through the metaphor of golf played: for each distance, each target, a different type of taco.

So, let’s look with more details the five areas of smart power and how their improvement can result in absolute gains in the international space.

2.1. **Alliances, Partnerships and Institutions**

This area is related not only as a way to interact in the international sphere, but how to build a new way to respond to global challenges and changes the *status quo* power in the international system. Alliances, partnerships and institutions are actions that seek to end the State´s isolation, and it is proposed to divide the bonuses and the onus for acting in the international space.

We can divide this area in three main points: a) to renew the State’s commitment with international institutions; b) to reinvigorate alliances with traditional States partners; c) to find unify the State's actions in relation with international law. (ARMITAGE; NYE, 2007.)

Regarding the commitment to international institutions is necessary to review the State’s compromise in to strengthen multilateral entities like UN, IMF, World Bank, ILO, WTO, in the way for these organisms been capable to understand the necessity of all its members, and bringing a collective benefit.

In alliances, can be think this reinvigoration from the prism of reproduction of bilateral or even multilateral agreements which are effective
means of cooperation and to brings benefits to all participants, and for other hand it is also a way to produce a global public good. It makes no sense for smart power, produce a gain from a particular group of states, if the consequence of that gain it is a prejudice at the global level.

Finally, when talking about the unify the State's actions in relation with international law, the focus is to the search to deepen for a collective global interest how can be protected by agreements where all States are present. In others words, the idea is not the State only to ratify the international agreement that will be beneficial or less costly for itself, but to open its range of interest by the international standard for the prism creating a network of effective protection in the International Area, which will continuous anarchic and with the State`s sovereignty but, will have in others hand, rules and limits of action clearer and more effective.

This is in agreement with the conclusions reached by Kydd (2005), despite his perspective on the States aggressors and States who seeking security (Security-Seekers). For him, it is considered a highly anarchic system, the trust does not exist until cooperation be experienced between peers, some memory is expressed by a contrasting system first molded trust. This does not impedes, however, that models of cooperative action are still spirals, so that, once engaged in security dilemmas generated by periods of uncertainty, the States undo or reduce its sphere cooperative. Commonly, this occurs for purposes of hegemonic states, endowed with low expression of confidence, generate instability in the system where even states with relative degree of trust between partners in the international system are required to leverage your system of weapon because the spiral effect that generates who those are aggressors.

Thus, cooperation can be considered an long-term expression, because is based on trust generated with a sequence of behaviors, as can be temporary if is interrupted by the growth of a factor of insecurity. Hence lies the importance of alliances and cooperation mechanisms more definitive, because they can be rendered more permanent and eventually hauls overlapped those raised by a segment of cooperation.
2.2. Global Development

This area is directly related to the State ability to acting in promotion of development (economic, political and social) of other states. For this, the internal development of the State who pretend to put into practice building strategies of smart power are essential. The example of internal development should be the focus in the international action.

In this sense, the global development aims not only the donation of funds from one State to other more needy, but the concern in the quality of this aid, and the real effectiveness that it will have to modify unfavorable situations. Another important point is that aid not be taken as only an official State contribution, but in fact the concern of creating a network of engagement around the purpose of promoting global development, for example: that institutions such as foundations, universities, corporations, religious organizations, NGOs, and others participate in the process of overseas development assistance.

However, promoting the global development also involves the sensitive issues and least practical from the standpoint of external action in the field. That means that promoting the global development involves issues such as forgiveness debt States, to release the fair trade among countries, the end of exploitation of cheap labor and etc.

As commented Nye Jr and Armitage (2007) the main point of promoting global development is to give needy States and their citizens the ability to achieve their aspirations without being deprived of basic needs such as health, food, education, fair wages, access to technology, among others.

2.3. Public Diplomacy

The public diplomacy is perhaps the most difficult area to define within the approach about strategy of smart power. Public diplomacy is much more than transparent performance of State’s diplomatic officers is nevertheless a dialogue of the State with the domestic and international public opinion.
The idea it is that public diplomacy is in everything what State and its society does and says, means as the country’s image is passed to others in a non-official way. Public diplomacy happens through networks of relationships created by non-governmental organizations and citizens who form society in such State, and how their interaction with other societies can mold their ways to self-recognize.

Here goes an important caveat, public diplomacy is not a mere propaganda that a State does about its actions, is an attitude focused on cognitive perception of individuals about the real attitudes of a State, and how importance they give to the culture, values and procedures practiced by that State.

For better elucidate this issue two good examples of public diplomacy are: a) the educational exchange between young people and b) the exemplary treatment given to immigrants in a country. The purpose of these examples is to demonstrate that kind of diplomacy includes an exchange of ideas, information passed between people through the education and culture because the increased range of new technologies, etc. Those relationships types approaches individuals, breaking taboos, stereotypes and create a trust, not only in others but also in their native culture and society. (ARMITAGE; NYE, 2007)

In the Brazilian case, it should be noted that the force of the bilateral agreements happens exactly in according to regional priorities and border (including Africa) for the purpose of training, for qualification, for fellowships and scientific research. Otherwise, the social issue or immigrant inclusion that has regulation in pre-Constitution laws of Brazil, appears to be an obstacle to the development of this aspect.

As said John Zogby cited by Armitage and Nye Jr (2007, p. 47): “public diplomacy ‘smart’ is one that shows respect to other States and a desire to understand the needs and relevant issues in this country.”

Thus, this area although complex is an important source of power, and can’t be neglected by government entities, we need public policies that
strengthen these actions and they start to have a significant weight in the foreign policy agendas of a country.

2.4. Economic Integration

This is the most sensitive area for the construction of smart power strategy, because it is directly linked to maintenance guidelines fiercest and prejudicial means of capitalist production and accumulation, which in turn throughout the nineteenth and twentieth century in international politics proved an effective way to submit all actors to the will of a hegemon State.

However, the reality of the late twentieth century and early twenty-first century brings for the international system an increased global economic integration. This doesn’t mean only greater economic integration areas (Mercosur, ASEAN, EU and NAFTA), but greater dependency among actors at global trade.

Although his has been criticized on the basis of his assessment of the European Union as a second superpower since the economic crisis that hit the European territory from 2011, Andrew Moravcsik points to the effect of integration on the international arrangement and the preponderance of actors, demonstrating that U.S. unipolarity is challenged by a complex overlapping relationship in which the profile of actors mechanisms which relate hierarchically in the international system is reduced, because are those mechanisms compounds for a measurable and unmeasurable factors.

In the liberal view, these varied social pressures are the most fundamental cause of foreign policy behavior. Zero-sum security rivalry, military force, and power balancing are not ubiquitous conditions. They are only a few among a number of possible circumstances—in fact, they are rather rare. Increasingly, international interactions are positive-sum, such that the rise of more than one country or region can be complementary (MORAVCSIK, 2010, p.93).

The main discussion about the efficiency of the European Union in terms of competitiveness on the international scene is done by disbelief in a
decentralized system with vigor in a power system consisting of highly centralized powers. Thus, it makes integrating something in contradiction with the preponderance, since the centrality and hegemony are not in question. Although the Lisbon Treaty seems to be the instrument of a higher level of institutional and representative deepening in European Union, in otherwise, isn’t characterized by an instrument of centralization and reductive for sphere of action for the States members of the European Union. With the economic crisis, the Euro became the qualifier of the difference between members and even more vulnerable by rising unemployment, debt and compensation costs for the capital.

This institutions crisis, which passes the European Union due to the loss of financial credibility in the region, is already known in Mercosur and has become a major target of criticism of Brazil’s foreign policy in recent years, whose widening of focus to others border of south America have neglected the institutions and agreements was already signed in Mercosur. Undoubtedly, this issue has great effect on the role of integration projects in projection states. In the both models that includes the integration as a process of enlargement of the borders of a state, as one that disintegrates its strategic objectives for the benefit of group goals are guided by a paradigm hegemony. Those models are in clear opposition to the view that realize that integration serves the factors necessarily are rooted in the reduction of risk through expanded partnerships. So, the question underscores a conclusion: the difference lies in the choice of an institutional link trampled into spheres of classic power and aimed at hegemony; and other mobilized for the creating alternatives to participation in the international competitive environment, despite the progressive gain relevance with cooperative basis, as in the case of Brazil.

In Moraviscky’s view (2010), the centralism that can be target of criticism is the main factor of force for that regime, more flexible than others to be guided when in crisis, to create alternatives, since in terms of what he called of "incomplete consensus" would have more ways to confront challenges relevant to the changing times.

Thus, economic integration can end up producing a scenario that, while it meets the business needs of a state, observe the totality of benefits that can be generated for the entire international community, and especially for the poorest
countries in the globe, the proposal is not a naive idea of believing that everyone should be equal within the international economic system, but rather is the perception that if there are no gains in favor of a positive-sum game, the own reputation and power f State leader can weaken. Considering the positive effects involved in the first process of integration, it’s possible to say that they are part of an unstoppable movement, not infrequently appointed as spillover effect. Not to be intentional, but especially the integration the creation of more cooperatives institutionalized spheres can reaches other individuals and communities that not only the first.

On the other hand, measures such as reducing or eliminating barriers to the products, especially the poorest countries, to reassess and to reduce the costs of workers affected by globalization, to strengthen equitable international financial and trade institutions are crucial steps to build a Stete power founded on absolute gains, as is trying to build the Brazil in the international organizations of the sector and in the WTO (which in 2013 had a Brazilian man elected for command the organization). The role of the regimes there’s lies: in restore the balance of one or the other (KRASNER, 1982; KEOHANE, 1986), or also, are these political arrangements that allow redistribution of the gains from cooperation by participants in a particular area of interest in a context of interdependence "(CARVALHO, 2005). Although relative gains may be target of alliances that are called by Snidal (1991, cited in KEOHANE, 1984) defensive cooperation or cooperative clursters, the main task of the organization is to reduce the incidence of relative gains because the bases of cooperation are centered on the balance and risk reduction. It is in this sense that intermediate theories, even institutionalists, gained focus on the possibility of not intend to deny the supremacy of states, however, driving increasingly cooperative ties due to an inevitable arrangement which apply unequal relations, but also interdependence.

A global trade policy seen as smart, depends on the design of an economy that is sufficiently flexible and competitive to distribute economic benefits for all, while minimizing human costs into the processes of globalization and economic displacement. (ARMITAGE; NYE, 2007)
It is important to realize in this area the difference between strategy of developed State and the developing State. Both are on opposite sides of the “fight” global economic and trade. However, both have to find a new way to enter into international trade in order to open markets that are sustainable, in both ways: economically and human. To keep old standards no longer will strengthen the strong economies, or improve the medium ones. The old standards only simply will increase the burden on developing countries and further limit your ability to grow and become somehow competitive.

2.5. **Technology and Innovation in energy production**

For understand this last area we have to think it in the reality of the world in the late twentieth and early twenty-first century, more precisely in the climate change and the need to seek alternative means of energy production. Thus, innovation and technology are closely linked to the way a state can build its international power through investments in its own autonomy. Sustainable and long-term energy matrices, which provide national and international development are part of it. In Brazil, the association of a wide variety of energy sources, the investment also amplified in recent years and the discovery of a fossil park fuel in the pre-salt layers are generate even more ambitions in this sector.

The project of State´s capable of supporting its development in the XXI century in these parameters are provided for Brazil in *Projeto 3 tempos*, the Secretariat of Strategic Affairs of the Presidency of Brazil, whereby Biodiversity, digital inclusion, poverty reduction, the Kyoto Protocol, innovation and education are provided as strategic planning. With this, Brazil has been preparing not only to protect its population from deep climate change, but also in to build a technology park able to put it in the differentiated position in the international system. However, this is not an isolated action of a State, and it is here that the power through strategies of smart power can be erected. Being able to promote a change in environmental policies and energy production can cause an empowerment of the State in the international system, which will cause for it an image for to be a reference to the other, thus creating a power of cooptation with absolute gains with partners, rather than coercion and maintenance of pollutants means and promoters of inequality between state actors.
According to Armitage and Nye (2007), states that want to have power to influence the international system in the twenty-first century need to be able, among other things: to establish a charter of principles to promote energy advance, the international security and sustainability, as also, to create and to participate in a free market for goods and products from clean energy matrices. In Brazil, the existence of the International Advisory from the own ministries ensures an important role in sectoral negotiations to Brazil. As a partner of the UNDP, FAP, UNESCO, for example, it is a responsibility of the Adviser's Ministry of Environment technical the technical guidance necessary to the Brazilian strategic positioning.

Again, this is another area where developed, developing and underdeveloped countries will be in a latent conflict. But to get power in the international system is only possible for those who have the ability to build consensus among all, who promote the equitable development while protecting the environment. However this idea is not only supported by the production of new energy matrices, but mainly by promoting economic development of all States, together with access to education and the possibility for all seek a clean way, in the ecological point of view, to insert yourself in the scenario of international trade.

3. Brazilian’s Foreign Policy Reputation

The reasons for a State cannot bluff in the international system, are more related to fear of loss reputation that betrayal can cause and, hence, the consequence of being considered an untrusted state, than their intentions and nature. Thus, the character of the negotiations among states, based on the conditions of bargaining presented by the actors involved it is necessary for the qualification of agents and a more stable system. But if the negotiation character can result in cooperative behavior that manifest a reliable reputation, every reputation is all temporary to Sartorian, in the long run, can be deconstructed. Therefore, how more recent is the confidence past of an actor, and more stable over time, tits get better your bargaining conditions in a given conflict of interest.
This argument may explain why the reputation of being focused on aggression, which Medeiros (2011) has called for Leadership, such as temporary or relative that one based on trust, which Medeiros (2011) called Cooperative. Sartori (2005) has very similar settings for behavior that eventually generates a more cooperative or more reputation based on leadership, but that does not seem to be synonymous. The author uses the terms challenger and defender to qualify the behavior, while Medeiros (2011) describes the results of each of these behaviors. For the case of Sartori, an actor who is considered defender may have varying degrees of reputation based on honesty and based on bluff (honesty x bluffing).

Sartori (2005) argues that much to effect aggressive behavior as to the effect of behavior conduct at self-defense, the ability to resolution conflict through non-violent ways of a particular actor, implied conditions in diplomatic negotiations even during a process of deterrence, is usually ignored but absolutely important. That's because the military element to effect the States’s behavior in the international system is highly impressive and at the same time, compensated by reliable system qualifier of its reputation.

Therefore, the military variant is an allocation that States potentially or temporarily perpetrators have, as well as defender States enjoy its cooperative reputation, based on its past of confidence and trading conditions. Anne Sartori (2005), the difference is that as the reputation of the defender, the aggressor will also be underpinned in its past, but with its military capabilities prized.
In the both cases, Sartori (2005) believes that the reputation is defined according to some understandable judgment that takes into account, beyond to military capabilities and degree of confidence, some variables of control: if the actors in contention have military parity, economic parity, if border states, if democracies. Finally, concludes based on empirical data statistically arranged that the theory is confirmed in States with a high degree of cooperative reputation (based on trust) have a large force factor in avoiding military conflict, demonstrating the high degree of containment, even that deterrence. This is to avoid conflict by violent means, and in this case, the trust ensures more stable and efficient means for promote the conflict settlement.

It is for this reason that the State capacity for negotiation, in others words, its diplomatic containment elements, can be more efficient than other variables and this is consistent with a deterrence won signed in relative military capabilities that can be associated with a honesty and trust model for the effect of competitive and conflictual relations between States in the international environment.

Moreover, the debate among scholars of international law points to one of its features: because also based on custom, the international law may eventually represent conclusions that came from unequal and unbalanced power relations (BEDERMAN, 2010). There is no doubt, therefore, that much of international law emerged from conflicts and demands arising from cases in which great powers were involved. How big funders of programs on international agencies that implement the arrangements within the United Nations, we must recognize that the role of their respective understandings about matters of various orders is diligent.

However, bilateral and multilateral negotiations are not only derived from the agencies, but the agenda of these talks, which to relate differently to trade relations, do not differ much from those of agencies, given that more and more often, multilateral actions bilateral trade and are accompanied by other types of foreign policy action as cultural, humanitarian, science and technology, education, infrastructure and logistics. This ultimately gives more guarantees, through ties of interdependence, those involved, so that the complexity of relations inhibits betrayal.
4. Finals Observations

In this context, its possible mention, even government Obama (2008-2016) in the United States, that to implement the "Function 150", has assured the foreign affairs budget a significant amount for agencies whose commitment goes beyond the traditional military, but are focused on the construction of infrastructure and services, capacity, training, education. In this environment, an great number of companies in a situation of recession could gain new impetus. The Function 150 budget for 2014 is already submitted and appears with the following opening paragraph:

My former colleague on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Vice President Joseph Biden, is fond of saying: "Don't tell me what you value - show me your budget, and I'll tell you what you value." Like all budgets, the one that follows is a reflection of priorities and hard choices in a difficult fiscal environment. Like all previous budgets for the Department of State and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), those priorities include proactive diplomacy, effective development, sustainable prosperity, the search for lasting peace, and principled American leadership in the world." (JOHN KERRY, Secretário de Estado)

Aspects such as leadership always appeared in U.S. strategy, as well as the assistance of state agencies such as USAID has been recognized since the Cold War. What is new is the budget, which enforces an aspect of public opinion rising linking the image that the United States has in the world with the progressive state of insecurity in which they live. In others words, the important elements of national security policy does not longer serve its warranty, which is extended to the extensive diplomatic work expressing the Smart Power which is part of the U.S. strategy, explicitly, since the report of Armitage & Nye - with the caption: for a Smarter, more secure America.

The concern with reputation and leadership to effect the representation of a State in the relation with the others is part of the United States’s strategy as well as Brazil. For mention the Hellinger’s text (2011), in his view, the Brazilian
model of diplomacy in South America has a reconfiguration of its strategic objectives, however, the participation of Chavez in public opinion positive way is much smaller than the Obama. Reside there an opportunity to challenge the American model of to exercise leadership and make diplomacy. Note, however, that the fact that there is greater investment in renewed strategies described as smart, does not exclude the conflict of policies that challenge the elect. This applies in to the case of the extension of U.S. diplomatic conflict with Iran and Korea, for example, whose bases are not guided in this renewal.

What remains of the U.S. proposal, it is in the words of Mariano and O’Brien (2009): “Favorable foster the attitude towards the U.S. goes everywhere the U.S. Army”. The conquest of the cooperative and trust reputation (reliability) is the goal of the United States, while in Brazil, it seems you have this reputation is established. Otherwise, the reputation for leadership in the Brazilian case, one that lives up to post a renewed prestige in the international environment, it’s ensures for Brazilian Smart Power another configuration.

For orientaion of President Dilma Rousseff, Brazil has reconfigured its operations in foreign policy. With the directive to take the opportunity that a scenario of economic scarcity presents today the major powers, the Presidency has met with the Ministries formally in the search for a common foreign policy and diversified action into various sectoral performances. If the prospect is to gain leadership in the international arena, the joint actions of the Ministries of Defence, the Ministries of Science and Technology, the Ministries of Strategic Affairs, the Ministries of Finance and Environment, expand the context of decentralization of Brazilian foreign policy, associating various cooperation programs to Brazilian strategy of doing itself more present, with an own model of Smart Power.

5. REFERENCES


