Dynamics of Extractivist Resistance: Linking Latin America and Northern British Columbia, Canada

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1.0 Introduction
The global commodities boom of the first decade of the twenty-first century has revived extractivism as a development path and resistance to it. While this revival has specific local characteristics—for example, ‘re-primarization’ in parts of Latin America, ‘land grabbing’ in parts of Africa and elsewhere, and a quest for ‘energy superpower’ status in Canada—they can all be seen as part of a wider concern over, and resistance to, the global dynamics of extractivist capitalism.

This paper has two purposes. The first is to provide a theoretical framework in which extractivism can be understood globally and within which specific country and regional debates can be situated. Debates over the political and economic costs and benefits of extractivism are not new and we survey these before analysing the specifics of the contemporary post-2000 commodities boom. The theoretical analysis of extractivism has also focussed on ways to understand the resistance to it, its sociological basis. Our framework addresses this and draws on the Latin American experience to ground the analysis.

The second purpose is to analyse resistance to a specific form of extractivism, that of oil pipelines, in Northern British Columbia intended to transport bitumen from Alberta’s tar sands to Asian markets. We illustrate how it can be understood within the context of the turn of many countries towards natural resource extraction as a model of national development. While resistance to extractivism has been the subject of much analysis in the Latin American context less is available on resistance in the global north (in fact, the global south in the
northern hemisphere) and less still on a comparative analysis. This paper seeks to
fill this void and, in doing so, demonstrates the similarities in extractivist
resistance in both north and south.

Canada, we argue, provides a good case study for exploring such similarities as it
engages in ‘extractivist imperialism’ abroad at the same time as the natural
resource development on the unceded territory of indigenous groups in Canada
represents a form of neocolonialism.

The paper is structured as follows. In the next section we provide a framework
for analyzing debates over extactivism drawing on the controversies which have
plagued the strategy over many decades before moving to analysis of the
contemporary period. The empirical base on which the framework is derived is
provided by developments in Latin America. We then move to an analysis of
Canada. After providing an overview of Canadian extractive imperialism we
then turn our attention to domestic policy and analyse resistance to the proposed
Enbridge Northern Gateway pipeline. In so doing, we reveal the similarities
between extractivist resistance in both north and south.

2.0 Framing the debate: theoretical approaches to extractivism
The economics and politics of natural resource extraction / development can be
understood with reference to and in terms of two debates. These debates concern,
firstly, the extent to which extractivism can be seen as a viable development
strategy and, secondly, how best to conceptualize resistance to it. These debates
have drawn on Latin American experience and have been particularly active
there. The debates also have long historical roots and we provide a brief
overview of them here.

2.1 The economics and politics of natural resource extraction
The literature on the economic and politics of natural resource extraction in the
current context of globalizing capitalism takes three distinct approaches towards
natural resource development. The first has to do with an argument advanced inter alia by economists at the World Bank, who have presented the demand for raw materials and primary commodities—minerals and metals, sources of energy and agro-food products—as an unparalleled ‘economic opportunity’ of which resource-rich countries should avail themselves (World Bank, 2005, 2011). From this perspective, the resource-rich countries of Latin America and Africa should take advantage of the large-scale movements of ‘resource-seeking’ investors seeking to maximise the return on their capital in the context of large-scale acquisition of land for the purpose of energy and food security. In the literature on these issues the agency and motor of natural resource development is the private sector in the form of transnational capitalist enterprises, the transnational corporations that have the requisite capital and the technology to exploit and develop the natural resources of these countries.¹

Another approach is to take a society’s wealth of natural resources not as a blessing or an economic opportunity but as a ‘curse’, with reference here to the finding that, on average, developing countries highly endowed with natural resources were growing less rapidly than those that were less endowed, or that so many resource-rich countries failed to develop at all while many resource-poor countries are among the most advanced developed countries in the world today (Auty, 2001). Explanations of this resource curse (Acosta, 2009; Auty, 1993; Haber & Menaldo, 2012; Sachs, J. & Warner 2001) have made reference to or specified at least eight factors, any one of which sufficient to bring on this supposed curse, but in combination a recipe for underdevelopment rather than development.

One factor relates to the exploitation of labor—the ‘unlimited supplies of surplus labor’ generated by the capitalist development process. According to a line of development thought that prevailed from the 1950s to the 1970s the exploitation of labor and human resource development have much broader multiplier effects
and far greater linkages into other economic and social sectors than an extractivist approach towards development.

Other factors include the Dutch disease, with reference to the negative exchange rate effect of primary commodity exports on other production sectors; the notion that what goes up (prices of primary commodities) must and often does come down, resulting in a boom-bust cycle if not a trend towards deteriorating terms of terms of trade for primary commodities; the use of foreign direct investment (FDI) as a mechanism for the extraction and transfer of surplus value; and the propensity of extractivism and natural resource development towards economic concentration, the use of relatively little labor relative to technology and capital, and excessive inequalities in the distribution of the social product and the benefits of economic growth—the ‘inequality predicament’ as conceived by the economists associated with UNDESA (2005); and, the incentive and means for political elites to form a (typically comprador) rent seeking coalition which is more interested in personal accumulation than national development.

A third approach has focused on the primary commodities boom in Latin America in the context of the turn of many governments in the region towards a post-Washington consensus regarding the need to bring the state back into the development process—to bring about a more inclusive form of development (Infante & Sunkel, 2009). In this context, government after government in the region turned towards extractivism—a strategic reliance on foreign direct investment in the exploration for, and the extraction of, minerals, fossil and bio-fuels, and agro-food products in high demand—and the exportation of these products, or ‘reprimarization’ as it is referred to in this context (Cypher, 2010).

The intention has been to pursue a post-neoliberal strategy of combining an extractivist development strategy with a new social policy of poverty reduction designed for a more inclusive form of development than had been the norm for the previous two decades. From this post-neoliberal perspective, a strategy of
natural resource extraction was viewed as a means of bringing about a process of inclusive development—using resource rents and taxes on corporate profits as a means of reducing poverty and securing a more equitable distribution of the social product—‘progressive extractivism’, in the conception of Eduardo Gudynas (2010, 2011), a senior researcher at the Uruguay-based Latin American Centre of Social Ecology (CLAES).

Another variation of this political ecological approach is much less sanguine about the prospects of successful natural resource development. Reflecting a deep concern about the environmental and social costs of extractivism, the issue from this perspective is that the social and environmental costs of extractive operations, many of them externalised and unaccounted for, far exceed the benefits of economic growth; moreover the benefits are highly concentrated, appropriated by very few (with even the government taking but a marginal share of the proceeds), while the costs are disproportionately borne by the poor and the most vulnerable segments of society that received few or none of the benefits (Veltmeyer, 2013). Proponents of this approach often shift the focus from the system dynamics of extractive capitalism towards the complex and multiple social responses of the communities affected by the operations of extractive capital (Bebbington & Bury, 2013).

2.2 The resistance to extractive capitalism
The literature on the resistance to extractivism can be placed into three main categories. The first relates to what we might term the political economy of the resistance, an approach based on a class analysis of the objective and subjective conditions of the capitalist development process. From this perspective, the process and project of capitalist development generates both forces of change and forces of resistance to this change, forces that are rooted in the class structure of society and that take the form of a social movement in opposition to the economic model used by the state to make policy as well as the operating system (capitalism).
In Latin America these class-based social movements have assumed different forms. From the 1950s to the 1970s they took the predominant form of a labor movement in the resistance of workers to the exploitation of their labor and their struggle for higher wages and improved working conditions. In the countryside the class struggle took form as a land struggle based on the resistance of direct producers against forces that threatened to separate them from the land and to dispossess them from their means of production. In the 1990s, in the vortex of a second cycle and generation of neoliberal policies, the resistance was directed against the economic model used by the governments of the day to make policy. With the destruction of major forces of production in both agriculture and industry, and thus the decimation of the labor movement and its forces of resistance, the popular movement engaged in the resistance to the forces of capitalist development and neoliberal globalization found its social base in the indigenous communities and peasant organizations most directly affected by the incursions and operations of capital and the policies designed to facilitate these operations (Petras & Veltmeyer, 2001, 2005, 2009, 2011).

From this class analysis perspective, sustainable resource development—which presupposes a regulatory regime that allows for corporate social and environmental responsibility, and for the mitigation of any negative impacts or environmental damage caused by the operations of extractive capital—is not at issue. Nor are the politics of identity at issue. At issue, rather, are the dynamics of capitalist development of the forces of production and the corresponding relations of production, as well as the forces of resistance that ensue from these relations. Capitalist development is predicated on separating the direct producers from the land and their means of production—‘accumulation by dispossession’ Harvey (2003) has it. Under conditions generated by the forces of capitalist development the direct producers on the land—peasant farmers in the Latin American context, indigenous communities in the Canadian context—are denied access to their share of the global commons (land, water, sub-soil resources and
the forest) and subjected to a process of social and productive transformation, converting them into a proletariat, dispossessed from any means of social production except for their capacity to labor, that many are compelled to exchange for a living wage or a job at any cost.

Another approach to understanding the dynamics of resistance is grounded not in the political economy of capitalist development but rather a historical analysis of the impact of imperialism and colonialism on the social structure of indigenous nations and aboriginal societies, and the symbiotic relationship of these societies to the land and more broadly to mother earth or nature. An example of this approach is found in a number of studies made into the impact of the European (Spanish) ‘conquest’ and subsequent colonial rule on the societies constructed by the indigenous nations that inhabited the highlands and lowland of the Andes in South America, and also in the forces of resistance generated in the process—500 years of anti-colonial anti-imperialist struggle (Tellez, 1993).

There is a fundamental continuity between the studies of the resistance movement formed in the context of the conquest and colonial rule and a number of more recent studies into the social movements and the resistance to the forces of capitalist development associated with the neoliberal state—forces that eventually (December 2005) allowed Bolivia’s indigenous movement to eventually capture state power (Webber, 2010, 2011). The common feature of these studies (see, for example, Farah and Vasapollo, 2011) is an emphasis on the absolutely central role of the idea of a society existing in a relation of harmony with the land and mother earth and social solidarity as a belief system and an ideology serving to mobilize the forces of resistance. Evidently (see our discussion below) a similar cosmovision and associated system of beliefs now serves to mobilize the resistance of an alliance of indigenous communities in Northern British Columbia to the transportation of Alberta tarsands oil across their territory and in particular the Northern Gateway pipeline.
A third approach towards in an analysis of the social movement dynamics of resistance emerged in the 1980s in the context of a critique of forms of structuralism, including Marxist class analysis. The focus of this post-modernist approach was on the formation of what appeared to the theorists of this approach as ‘new social movements’ (NSMs) that were forming and taking shape in Latin America’s urban centres (Veltmeyer, 1997). Unlike the class-based labor movement and the rural land struggle, these movements did not turn against the economic model used by governments to make policy or target the underlying system. Rather, they were issue-oriented advocacy groups that protested a broad range of single issues from violence against women and the lack of democracy to environmental degradation (Assies et al. 1991; Borón, 1993; Escobar & Alvarez; Hunter, 1989; Melucci, 1992; Veltmeyer, 1997). In the 1990s these ‘new social movements’ were reconceptualised as expressions of an emerging ‘civil society’, associations of individuals or citizens that shared a concern and mobilized action around a particular social issue (Veltmeyer, 2007).

In the 1990s these nongovernmental organisations (NGOs) were enlisted by the World Bank and other Overseas Development Associations as a strategic partner in the project of international cooperation in the development process—to mediate between the donors (aid-giving international organizations and governments) and the communities of the rural poor. In the broader context in the global north this ‘global civil society’ (Albrow et al., 2008) constituted the social base of both a global environmental movement and what took form as the ‘anti-globalization movement’, which was directed against the ideology of neoliberal globalization and associated economic and political practice. And they also formed the basis of a global scattering and movement of international nongovernmental organizations and advocacy groups in support of those communities negatively impacted by the operations of extractive capital in the south.
A characteristic and defining feature of the resistance politics of these civil society organizations is a concern for fairness, equity (equal opportunity) and social justice in the distribution of the social product and public goods, as well as the authentic identity of subaltern groups and peoples that are excluded from the system operative in contemporary mainstream society.

Typically, in any resistance to an extractivist project, labor, indigenous groups and environmental organizations have formed some kind of alliance in support of common goals (although not without its tensions) and all three conceptualizations of resistance find analytical purchase. However, unlike sporadic acts of collective protest that can be triggered and fuelled by any number of issues this resistance movement, as with any organized sociopolitical movement, needs to be analysed in terms of its social base, its organization and leadership, and an ideology that serves to mobilize collective action towards a desired goal, as well as the strategy and tactics of collective action. We take a few tentative steps in the direction of such an analysis towards the end of this paper.

These debates over the possibilities for development following a extractivist path and over our understanding of the nature of the resistance to it have, as noted, been evident over many decades. They have most recently resurfaced in the context of the post-2000 global commodities boom that has put extractivism back in the spotlight. We now turn our attention to this contemporary example of an enduring issue.

3.0 Application to the “new” extractivism

The new millennium opened with a boom—a primary commodities boom stimulated by changes in the global economy, specifically the ascent of China as an economic power and the associated demand by industry and the growing middle class for raw materials—industrial minerals and precious metals, energy (bio- and fossil fuels), and agrofood products. The demand for these
commodities, stimulated by security needs of some governments related to energy and food, as well as the ‘economic opportunities’ for multinational corporations in the extractive sector, led to the growth of large-scale foreign investment in the acquisition of land (FAO, 2011; World Bank, 2011).

The volume of the capital so deployed and the profits made is staggering. Higginbottom (2013: 193) estimates that from 1997 to 2010 US- and EU-based multinationals extracted a total of US$477.6 billion in direct investment income out of Latin America, most of it derived from the primary commodity exports. As for profitable returns to other investors, the Financial Times in an article published on April 18, 2013 documented the fact that traders in commodities have accumulated large reserves of capital and huge fortunes in the context of the primary commodities boom. As the author of the article observed: “The world’s top commodities traders have pocketed nearly $250bn over the last decade, making the individuals and families that control the largely privately-owned sector big beneficiaries of the rise of China and other emerging countries”—and, we might add, beneficiaries of the turn or return towards extractivism and export primarization.

The wave of resource-seeking foreign direct investment was a major feature of the political economy of global capitalist development at the turn into and the first decade of the new millennium. Another was the demise—at least in parts of Latin America—of neoliberalism as an economic doctrine and model. Over the past decade (since 2002 to be precise) a number of governments in Latin America in riding a wave of anti-neoliberal sentiment generated by powerful social movement with their social base in indigenous communities and peasant organisations, underwent a process of regime change (Petras & Veltmeyer, 2009).vi

The political victories of these anti-neoliberal movements and post-neoliberal regimes have opened a new chapter in Latin American history. Yet the embrace
by these left-leaning regimes of resource-seeking foreign direct investment, or extractive capital, has generated deep paradoxes for those progressive regimes in the region committed to addressing the inequality predicament and the crisis of nature. Some leaders and social movements in this context speak of revolution—Venezuela’s ‘Bolivarian’ revolution, Bolivia’s ‘democratic and cultural revolution’, and Ecuador’s ‘citizens’ revolution’—and, together with several governments that have embraced the new developmentalism (the search for a more inclusive form of development), these regimes have indeed taken steps in the direction of equality and poverty reduction, using the additional fiscal revenues derived from resource rents to this purpose. Yet, like their more conservative neighbours—regimes such as Mexico’s and Colombia’s committed to both neoliberalism and an alliance with ‘imperialism’—the left-leaning progressive regimes in the region find themselves entangled in a maze of renewed dependence on natural resource extraction (the ‘new extractivism’) and primary commodity exports (‘reprimarization’). Further, as argued by Gudynas (2010), this new ‘progressive’ extractivism is much like the old ‘classical’ extractivism in its destruction of both the environment and livelihoods, and its erosion of the territorial rights and sovereignty of indigenous communities most directly affected by the operations of extractive capital, which continues to generate relations of intense social conflict.

Despite the use by progressive governments of resource rents for certain redistributive policies it is not at all clear whether they are able or disposed to pursue revolutionary measures in their efforts to bring about a more inclusive and sustainable form of development, or a deepening of political and economic democratization, allowing the people to ‘live well’ (vivir bien), while at the same time continuing to hoe the line of extractive capital and its global assault on nature and livelihoods.

The advance of extractive capital throughout Latin America and the Caribbean, promoted by governments that despite all its evident contradictions and pitfalls,
continue to view natural resource development as a pathway towards both economic and social development, have stirred up a flurry of protest actions—and forces of resistance against both the destructive operations of extractive capital and government policies that disregard indigenous territorial rights, advancing instead the rights of private property vis-à-vis the concessions given to foreign investors in the extractive industry to explore for and exploit for profit.

In the Latin American context of the ‘new extractivism’ these forces of change and those of the resistance are very much in evidence, reflected as they clearly are in the formation of a powerful socioenvironmental resistance movement and the growing number—and increasing virulence—of the conflict and resource wars that have surrounded and continue to surround this movement (Bannon & Collier, 2003).

Unlike sporadic acts of collective protest that can be triggered and fuelled by any number of issues this resistance movement, as with any organized sociopolitical movement, needs to be analysed in terms of its social base, its organization and leadership, its relation to the state and the other forces of resistance, and an ideology that serves to mobilize collective action towards a desired goal, as well as the strategy and tactics of collective action. We take a few tentative steps in the direction of such an analysis towards the end of this paper.

The evident albeit surprising tendency of even the most ‘progressive’ extractivist regimes to side with capital (foreign investors) against the local communities in their relation of conflict with the mining companies in their extractive operations can be explained as a coincidence of economic interest—extraordinary profits for the companies, additional fiscal revenues for the governments. However, this coincidence of economic interest is hidden rather than manifest by the government’s extractivist discourse, which highlights the potential and anticipated contribution of natural resource development to the country’s future. Here the extractivist discourse of Rafael Correa, President of a country
(Ecuador), which, like Bolivia, has committed itself to an indigenous development path of ‘living well’ as well as a ‘citizens’ revolution’, is particularly revealing. Opponents of mining and the government’s extractivist strategy and associated policies, which include the most powerful indigenous movement in the country (CONAIE), are branded by Correa as ‘childish’ and ‘environmental extremists’—in effect, as in the case of Andrew Frank, Senior Officer of ForestEthics in his relation to the Canadian government, as ‘enemies of the state’.

In his support of the mining and oil companies with which he has negotiated a deal conducive to economic development and inclusive growth Correa has gone as far as to elicit the support of his neoliberal neighbours in combatting environmental extremism. In this stance, i.e. in viewing and presenting extractivism as a tool for advancing the revolution, Correa is aligned with Bolivia, another post-neoliberal ‘revolutionary’ regime seeking to reconcile the contradictory and conflicting demands of extractive capital and the communities most directly affected by the operations of this capital.

Notwithstanding the revolutionary pretensions of Correa and Morales, and their shared ideological commitment to a policy of inclusive development (poverty reduction) and ‘living well’, both regimes have been branded by opponents in the popular movement against extractivism as ‘the most anti-indigenous government in recent years’—a servant of global capitalism rather than a custodian of mother earth. In effect, extractivism in this context has been rebranded as progressive, allowing the regime in the process to undermine the opposition, criminalize protest and buy off leaders and divide the social movement.

While these dynamics have unfolded in Latin America, Canada too has also become caught up in the global commodities boom both in other countries and domestically and provides us with the opportunity for comparative analysis.
4.0 The Canadian case

4.1 Mining capital and extractivist imperialism

In recent years significant mining activity has moved from the developed to the developing world, with the latter’s share of global trade in minerals and metals rising from less than a third to over one half. A landmark 2012 publication by the International Council on Mining and Metals points towards a huge wave of investments in recent years in Africa, parts of Asia and in Latin America (Interpress Service, June 23, 2013). One of the largest players in this process has been and remains Canada, itself heavily dependent on mineral exports but now home to close to 60 per cent of the capital invested worldwide in the mining of precious metals and industrial minerals (Keenan, 2010). ECLAC and UNCTAD data show that the biggest recipients of this mining capital are found in the booming economies of Latin America, with the overall effect of consolidating the extractivist orientation of these economies, increasing the weight of primary commodities (minerals and metals, fossil and bio-fuels, and agro-food products) in exports and dramatically increasing the weight of the Canadian state in its interventions on behalf of Canadian mining companies in their deal-making with local governments and in their conflicts with the communities most directly and negatively impacted by the extractivist operations of Canadian mining companies. viii

These operations have proven to be damaging to the health of people living in communities adjacent to the extraction sites and destructive of both the environment and livelihoods, ix providing the latest twist in a century-long process of capitalist development, a process in which the direct producers are separated from the land and their means of production, in this case because of the damage done to the ecosystem and the forces of privatization and commodification. This process of accumulation by dispossession has also proven to be highly controversial and conflictual, bringing Canadian mining companies into conflict with the communities most directly affected by the destructive operations of extractive capital and on the firing line of the mounting resistance.
It is here where the intervention of the Canadian state on behalf and in support of Canadian extractive capital has been most useful and consequential.

The Canadian government from the beginning was fully supportive of, indeed an active participant in, setting up the rules of the new world order that paved the way for the current wave of large-scale ‘resource seeking’ foreign direct investment into Latin America and the developing countries. However, the recent surge of anti-neoliberal sentiment in Latin America and the process of regime change in the direction of inclusive development forced the government to take a more active role in representing the interests of Canadian mining companies abroad and big oil at home, thereby linking, conceptually and sometimes in practice, the economic development strategies and resistance movements pursued in the south and domestically.

The key strategy of the Canadian government’s approach to advancing the operations of extractive capital and promoting an extractivist approach towards economic development has been to promote a regime of Corporate Social Responsibility’ (CSR) to counter the pronounced tilt of the post-neoliberal progressive extractivist regimes in South America towards ‘resource nationalism’—to nationalize ownership of their society’s wealth of natural resources and the economic enterprises used to exploit and develop these resources. The government has advanced its CSR agenda in regard to the Latin American operations of Canadian mining companies—as a means of ensuring mining concessions and a license to operate with minimal regulatory intervention of the state—as well as its operations within Canada. However, the CSR strategy by no means limits the extent of the Canadian state’s intervention in the field of natural resource development—what, in terms of the power relation involved (the projection of state power in support of capital and the subordination of the Latin American state and the local forces of resistance to this power) we very well might term ‘extractivist imperialism’ (Veltmeyer & Petras, 2014).
Other imperialist interventions of the Canadian government\textsuperscript{xi} include active participation in the ideological struggle to subordinate the developing country state to a global strategy of sustainable resource development—to opt in its economic development strategy for its model of private sector led ‘inclusive growth’ rather than the alternative model of ‘inclusive development predicated on inclusionary state activism’ (Arbix & Scott, 2010). Beyond this global strategy the Canadian government has experimented with and implemented a variety of policies and institutional mechanisms designed to impose its will against resistance—to paraphrase the sociologist Max Weber in his conception of power. They include the writing the environmental legislation for some governments, diplomatic pressure on these and other governments, and various forms of financial support provided to Canadian mining companies both directly and indirectly via CIDA (and now External Affairs and Trade), converting Canada’s program of international cooperation for development, and its foreign aid program, into a mechanism of promoting the ‘private sector’ (i.e. Canadian-based multinational corporations) as an ‘engine of inclusive growth’ (House of Commons, 2012).

The Canadian government’s actions and policies regarding these and other such mechanisms of extractivist imperialism have been well documented in regards to Latin America, leading to an on-going albeit fruitless academic and political debate. However, these imperialist actions and policies are by no means restricted to Latin America and developing countries where Canada (Canadian capital, that is) has a vested interest in the global process of natural resource extraction under way. The government’s imperialist designs are equally evident in its relations and dealings with the First Nations and the way that it has proceeded to implement its national development plan and lay the groundwork for a green light to Enbridge’s Northern Gateway pipeline project. As we discuss below these relations, and the federal government’s policy of internal colonialism (assuming the right of decision-making, reserving certain delimited areas for aboriginal communities and extending the authority of the Canadian
state over indigenous peoples) have been conducted not on the basis of a relation of equality between sovereign nations, but as an imperial state and colonial power.

4.2 Canada’s domestic shift to extractivism and the Enbridge pipeline
For decades after the signing of the automobile pact between the US and Canada the engine of economic growth was automobile manufacturing in the country’s industrial heartland. But in a context of an economic downturn and a declining manufacturing sector Canada has turned back towards what has always been a major force of production in the country: the extractivist industry and manufacturing related to natural resource and staples production. With a growing demand in the world economy for fossil fuels and industrial minerals, as well as agro-food products, the current government has staked Canada’s future on natural resource development, including the production for the exportation of Alberta tarsands oil. The tarsands have been at the centre of debate since the 1980s but it was not until the price of oil rose during the mid-2000s that it became economic to extract oil from the tarsands. Over the past decade, the extraction of oil from the tarsands has been ramped up, resulting in a number of megaprojects to build pipelines to take the tarsands oil to market—to the refineries of the Gulf Coast of the US via the Keystone pipeline the expansion of which is currently the focus of intense debate in the US and to markets in Asia via the proposed Enbridge pipeline from the tarsands in Northern Alberta to the port terminal of Kitimat in Northern British Columbia (NBC), another major pipeline that has also generated political opposition and resistance.

Of course there is nothing new about extractivism in the Canadian context. Canada has always relied on the extraction of natural resources, and for a number of provinces—currently Alberta, British Colombia, Saskatchewan and Newfoundland—the pathway towards economic growth, employment and income generation, as well as fiscal revenues, has been natural resource extraction. For example, Alberta’s take from the production of oil and gas in
2013, although down almost 40 per cent from two years earlier, will still be $7 billion, while Saskatchewan and Newfoundland will each take in about $2 billion, enough to lower the average tax rate. As for British Colombia the government currently in power is staking the province’s economic development and pursuit of ‘debt-free’ status on natural gas—transporting provincial supplies to the emerging markets of Asia.

As for the federal government its stated commitment to natural resource extraction as a pathway towards sustainable development makes increased exports of oil to Asian markets a ‘strategic imperative’ (*The Prince George Citizen*, June 20, 2013). At issue in the construction of the pipeline and the permit to transport and export Albertan tarsands oil, is the government’s goal of ‘diversifying export markets to create jobs and economic growth for Canadians’, as well as its strategy of sustainable and socially responsible resource development (ibid).

So as to understand and appreciate the significance of the resistance to extractive capitalism and the opposition to Enbridge’s Northern Gateway pipeline project consider the following facts provided by Council of Canadians, a citizen’s advocacy organization with chapters across the country. First, the tarsands in Northern Alberta covers an area larger than Scotland, resulting in the province having the highest per capita carbon footprint of anywhere in the world. The production of toxic, tarsands bitumen is currently two million barrels per day, but fossil fuel producers want to boost that four or five times. The toxic ponds of wastewater from tarsands production currently cover 170 square kilometers, and eleven million liters leak from them every day. Over 14,000 kilometers of new tarsands pipelines are planned. And in Alberta alone, there have been 1,500 pipeline spills over the last 20 years.

Notwithstanding the well-documented facts regarding the negative impacts and heavy environmental and social costs of Canadian mining and the extractive
industry, and the potential negative impact of continuing to develop the tarsands, not a single one of Canada’s political parties have taken a clear stand against or phasing out tarsands operations, not even the Green Party (Fidler, 2012). It is no surprise, therefore, to find proposals such as the Enbridge Northern Gateway pipeline on the table.

The proposed 1,177 kilometre pipeline from the tarsands to the BC coast is intended to carry 525,000 barrels of bitumen per day where it would be loaded onto 225 supertankers per year to transport the product to Asia and the U.S. A reverse pipeline would carry the condensate needed to think the bitumen for pipeline movement. The approval process has involved the National Energy Board (NEB) setting up a Joint Review Panel (JRP) to assess the proposal under the terms of the National Energy Board Act and the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act. The JRP held public hearings over the course of a year and a half starting in January 2012 and, despite the fact the overwhelming majority of presentations which it heard were opposed to the project, the NEB nevertheless released its report in December 2013 arguing that the project was in the best interests of Canadians notwithstanding the 209 conditions that it imposed on the project. The final decision was taken by the federal cabinet in June 2014 which approved the project subject to the same conditions.

However, rather than being the end of the debate this is only likely to be another beginning in the face of widespread and sustained opposition to the pipeline to which we now turn.

4.3 Dynamics of the pipeline resistance

Apart from the unparalleled opportunities for Enbridge and other capitalist enterprises in the oil and gas sector to take advantage of arbitrage opportunities to make superprofits by bringing tarsands oil and natural gas to new markets in Asia, at issue in the Enbridge project is the federal government’s strategy and plans for the country’s economic development. As for Alberta, the provincial
government naturally enough sees the Enbridge project as an opportunity for additional fiscal revenues and to solve its budgetary deficit situation. And British Columbia? It is not likely to make much from the pipeline, not even in terms of short-term construction jobs, and it would have to assume responsibility and account to British Columbians for the enormous risk and potential threat posed by the Enbridge project to the environment and the sustainability of key provincial industries such as the salmon fishery, as well as important watersheds and waterways and large tracts of land inhabited by First Nations groups and indigenous communities with territorial rights, if not sovereignty, over much of this land and these waterways.

In this controversial and conflictual situation the current BC provincial Liberal government has rejected the Enbridge proposal ‘as it stands’ but has left the door open for further negotiations, presumably including a greater share of the oil rent. In any case, the provincial government is staking the economic development of the province on another network of pipelines designed to transport liquefied natural gas to Asian markets, a project that is anticipated to have much greater economic spinoffs without near the same level of risk and the negative socioenvironmental impacts associated with the transportation of oil, and thus without the same level of unified resistance – at least not to date - of the First Nations communities and of environmentalists across the country as well in British Columbia.

A popular movement against tarsands oil production and pipeline as well as tanker transportation of oil is on the rise and gathering steam in Canada. As documented by Annis (2012), one of the biggest expressions of this movement to date was in Victoria, BC, on October 22, 2012, when 4,000 to 5,000 people rallied in front of the British Columbia Legislature to send a forceful message to the tarsands industry and its political representatives. ‘No tarsands pipelines across BC! No oil tankers in coastal waters!’ read the lead banners. Two days later, thousands of activists staged rallies at the offices across the province of
more than 60 elected members of the Legislature. Both actions were organized by the recently formed Defend Our Coast coalition and the Council of Canadians, a broad coalition of nongovernmental organizations concerned with issues of social justice and the environment. Some eight months on (June 17 2013), after the last public JRP hearing another rally was held—this time in Terrace, a town on the proposed pipeline route. The rally might not have been as large, but representation from both First Nations groups and the environmental movement groups that organized the rally was extraordinarily inclusive in terms of both First Nations communities and organizations in the environmental movement. As in the case of the earlier rally in Vancouver the rally was overwhelmingly indigenous in appearance, but there was no question about the broader social base of support, which not only brought together virtually all indigenous communities and First Nations organizations on the proposed pipeline route, but the organizing coalition for the rally evidently crossed the well-established social divide between indigenous and non-indigenous communities, as well as the divisions among environmental organizations, indigenous groups and labor.

The depth and breadth of support among diverse communities, both indigenous and non-indigenous—and the unity in the struggle and opposition to Enbridge in particular was evident to the authors in their trek across the proposed pipeline trail in Northern British Columbia. The aim of this trek was to gather voices of protest and resistance to the pipeline and to gauge the strength of this resistance—to determine whether it had the makings of a broader social movement that could possibly scuttle the plans made by industry and the government. Although not conclusive, the diverse voices of resistance to the Enbridge pipeline project, coming from and representing all sectors of protestors and the resistance movement, were so united on the fundamental issues as to allow us nevertheless to formulate a number of theses regarding the resistance to extractive capitalism in Canada.
The protest actions taken in BC over the past year against various projects to build a pipeline to transport tarsands oil to a port terminal on the coast, and related proposals to transship oil and liquefied gas from port terminals in BC to Asian markets via mega-tankers, are part of a growing global socioenvironmental resistance movement against the destructive operations of extractive capitalism in conditions of the 21st century. This resistance brings together environmentalists and activists from across the country concerned with the negative impacts of these operations on the global environment and the ecology of local communities; citizens groups concerned with issues of social justice, sustainable development and democracy regarding public policy, environmental degradation and community development; elements of the labor movement concerned with issues of class exploitation and capitalist development; and, above all, diverse First Nations groups and indigenous communities concerned with the protection of their culture and the livelihoods and welfare of community members, their territorial rights and ways of living that are predicated on a relation of harmony with nature (mother earth) in all of its diverse forms, and their very existence as a people. At issue in this resistance are not only the destructive operations of extractive capitalism on both nature and society, but the dynamics of an economic system that places profits before people and the private interests over the public interest.

Thus, the resistance to the transportation of tarsands oil engages diverse groups, grassroots organisations and communities as well as a broad coalition of citizens that has joined a civil society movement concerned for the implications of the tarsands for the environment and global climate change. As measures of the resistance, it boasts the support of 160 First Nations (out of 198 in BC), 31 municipal governments, two regional districts, the Union of BC Municipalities and six unions. A broad range of groups have been brought together in this process and new alliances formed. For example, the Yinka Dene Alliance, itself an alliance of six First Nations on the pipeline route, has signed a Solidarity Accord with leading unions, such as Unifor and the BC Teachers’ Federation, as
well as organizations such as the BC Wilderness Tourism Association, the Canadian Association of Physicians for the Environment and the David Suzuki Foundation.

But while the base of the resistance movement is broad it draws its power from the mobilizing capacity of the indigenous communities in the direct path of the pipeline project. In part, this is strategic in that First Nations have legal tools at their disposal which other parts of the resistance do not; land claims have not been settled in BC in the vast majority of cases which provides First Nations with the ability to legally challenge the government in cases where they do not consider that appropriate consultation has taken place. This is certainly the case with the JPR hearings in which First Nations were treated as equivalent ‘stakeholders’ to individuals. But their leadership of the resistance goes beyond this strategic advantage. From the perspective of the First Nations, which includes both the tribal reserves (bands) under the ultimate authority of the Department of Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development Canada and communities that can claim and have retained territorial rights as sovereign nations, the Enbridge project is a matter of life and death, raising questions about their very existence as a people and their territorial rights as sovereign nations.

In terms of the debate over the conceptualization of resistance movements discussed above, the resistance in Northern BC supports interpretations which point to indigenous views on the need for harmony with Mother Earth. As Hereditary Chief Na’mox of the Wetsu’wt’en explained to us, his starting point for opposition to pipelines is the elders’ “great saying, ‘if we don’t speak for the animals, the fish and the birds, who will?’” Simply, very simply, very to the point and how could we give up something that our great great grandchildren will ask one us day ‘why don’t we have this anymore? Why didn’t you stop this then?’ We don’t have a right to let that happen.” From this indigenist perspective the stakes could not be higher. As Jasmine Thomas, an Aboriginal leader explained, her resistance was based on “our role as stewards of the water, doing what we
can to make sure that the veins, you know, of our Mother Earth are healthy, so that we can continue to be healthy and we can continue to live how we have always lived.”

In support of this worldview, First Nations leaders invoke indigenous law as a basis for their opposition to the pipeline and other extractivist projects. Indigenous law is based not only on rights but also responsibilities, of which responsibility to the earth is a major one and one which frequently runs up against capitalism’s treatment of nature as a resource to be commodified and translated into financial wealth. Hence the leading role of the First Nations and their communities as a protagonist in the struggle and growing resistance against not just against the Enbridge project and the neoliberal policies of the federal government but of the operative capitalist system, which not only threatens their way of life and traditional culture but challenges their very right to exist as a modern society and sovereign nation with territorial rights.

The existence of the First Nations as a people and a culture is predicated on a symbiotic relationship of harmony with ‘mother earth’ and unrestricted access to the global commons of land, water and society’s natural resources as illustrated in the quotation above. Given the fundamental impulse of capitalism to enclose the commons, privatise and commodify the social forces of economic production, and separate the direct producers on the land from their means of social production, capitalism stands in a relation of fundamental contradiction to the ability of First Nations communities to protect their traditional and modern culture, determine their own future, and to exist as a people and as a society.

Thus the resistance of the First Nations to Enbridge’s Northern Gateway project reaches well beyond the limits of the global environmental movement (to protect the environment and the eco-system via a regime of sustainable resource development and management).

But this in itself is not enough to explain the breadth and depth of First Nations resistance to the pipeline. First Nations, often many of the same ones engaged in this resistance, have also supported some extractivist projects—from forestry to
mining—in their territories, have signed Impact Benefit Agreements to allow this happen, and formed their own corporations to actively participate in the process leading to assimilation with, or at least articulation with, dominant capitalist practices. Not all extractivist capitalism, it would seem poses the same threat to Mother Earth. What else needs to be added to the analysis to explain the strength of the opposition to the pipeline?

Here, we argue that a second strand of the conceptualization debate needs to be added, namely, the dynamics of capitalist development itself and particularly in its as regards to what Marx described in one context as “primitive accumulation” and David Harvey in another as “accumulation by dispossession”. First Nations communities have thus far resisted the complete commodification of nature and processes of proletarianization. Access to land and the ability to hunt and fish enable individuals and communities to support their material needs outside of the dominant capitalist market system. Cultural practices, such as the potlatch, enable the redistribution of the surplus within the community outside of market allocative mechanisms and beyond the dictates of government welfare systems; indeed, it was precisely because of the decommodification of labor that it permitted that the potlatch was made illegal for many years by the colonializing Canadian state.

The pipeline, by requiring “corridors” which divide traditional hunting and fishing territories and threaten wildlife movement and migration as well as the damage that would be wreaked by any large spill on land or sea, therefore pose a threat to indigenous cultures – ways of interacting and meeting material needs – which go far beyond the threat posed by some more geographically circumscribed extractivist projects which do not threaten to impact traditional cultural practices to the same extent. Although, this may be not always be expressed in these terms, this is a fundamentally an anti-capitalist struggle, which distinguishes the indigenous movement, rooted in the community-based organizations of First Nations society and culture, from the class-based labor
movement and the civil society-based environmental movement, both of which take capitalism as a given, seeking only to regulate it in the public interest (through, for example, inclusive and sustainable development). For some groups, the anti-capitalist nature of their position is clear. For example, the Uni’stot’en have set up a camp on the proposed oil pipeline route (also to shared with a proposed natural gas pipeline). The camp leaders have declared that “there is a huge groundswell of public opinion against BC’s carbon corridor, the Unis’tot’en are mounting a determined resistance against incursions onto their territory, and a space is being carved out where we can change the course of BC’s energy future. We know that dismantling the fossil fuel empire is a colossal task, but every action we take takes its toll.” The pipelines of northern BC have become new fault lines in the resistance to global extractivist capitalism.

5.0 Conclusion

Extractive capitalism as a strategy of economic development is fraught with contradictions, more of a curse than a blessing or economic opportunity. Its politics brings new alliances of state and capital. In Latin America this has often taken the form of governments, even those left leaning governments advocating policies associated with ‘progressive extractivism’, of siding with the interests of foreign capital over the interests of the local population. In Canada it has taken the form of extractivism imperialism in which state structures are used to support the interests of mining companies abroad. Domestically it has led to internal colonialism as the rights of First Nations have been overlooked in pursuit of the “national interest” of diversifying export markets for tarsands oil.

In this context, the resistance to the Enbridge pipeline has a double significance. First, it cuts across and can be used to build a bridge over various social divides—between the indigenous and non-indigenous communities across the country, between the environmental movement based on an emerging global civil society and an indigenous movement formed in the protracted struggle to preserve nature and society from the depredations of class exploitation and
colonial rule. Second, it is at the extractivist frontier of a system that is not only putting at jeopardy the livelihoods of billions and the welfare of humankind but that threatens life both as given to us and as constructed over the centuries in diverse cultural and historical contexts. At issue on this frontier is a complex set of interactions between diverse systems, such as those that determine the carrying capacity of the earth’s ecosystem or global climate patterns, in which a precarious balance can be disrupted by human activities that are driven by a mindless process of extended capital accumulation in the quest for private profit. One such issue is global climate change induced by the emission of carbon into the atmosphere, carbon released in the capitalist development of fossil fuels used to drive modern industry and the capitalist system. In this context, the Northern Gateway pipeline has been likened to the bloodline of the Alberta tarsands, and, as activists have argued, the first step to eventually closing down the tarsands—in the interest of preserving nature and society from the destructive dynamics of extractive capitalism—is to stop the pipeline. Hence the importance of the pipeline resistance led, not just as it happens but out of necessity, by Canada’s First Nations. It is too early to tell how the fight against the pipeline will end and where the forces of resistance can take us. But there is hope in the position taken by the indigenous and other communities against Enbridge: ‘The Answer is Still No!’

Perhaps ironically, it is the means of transporting of resources, rather than their direct extraction itself, which has mobilized a widespread opposition. But the reason for this is that the geographical area encompassed by the pipeline and associated tanker traffic pose threats to the livelihoods of many communities in the event of any spill. This is felt particularly keenly by First Nations communities whose ways of life – their ability to resist the further assault on the cultures and last remaining abilities to preserve non-capitalist material relations as well as worldviews which stress the importance of responsibilities towards nature – are threatened and have placed themselves at the forefront of the resistance. In this way, the resistance to extractivism has strong parallels in
northern British Columbia and Latin America where the indigenous movement has also been leading the wider resistance movement.
References


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Lievesley, Geraldine and Steve Ludlam, eds. (2009). Reclaiming Latin America:
UNEP (2010). Study of the possible effects on human health and the environment in Latin America and the Caribbean of the trade of products containing cadmium, lead and mercury. UNEP.
i In this tradition the risks and pitfalls of natural resource development are recognized but it is believed, or argued, that any negative impacts can be mitigated if not avoided and that problems can be managed via a technological fix, prudent resource management and if necessary, an appropriate form of governance and regulatory regime. An example of this approach is a study by Collier and Venables (2011) who recognise at the outset that ‘often plunder, rather than prosperity, has become the norm in the industry’ but that this as well as other problems (environmental degradation, for example) can be eluded or managed by following certain “improv[ing] the management of natural resources in developing countries’ and following certain ‘key principles ... to avoid distortion and dependence”.

ii The slowdown of the commodity supercycle in the same year (Konold, 2013) suggests that extractive capitalism has not yet outgrown this propensity. Global commodity prices dropped by 6% in 2012, a marked change from the dizzying growth during the ‘commodities supercycle’ of 2002–12, when prices surged an average of 9.5% a year, or 150% over the 10-year period (Konold, 2013). On the other hand, while prices declined overall in 2012, some commodity categories—energy, food, and precious metals—continued their decade-long trend of price increases.
This is argued with substantive evidence in case studies presented in Veltmeyer & Petras (2014). See, for example, the studies in this book by Giarracca & Teubal on Argentina, Veltmeyer on Bolivia, Dávalos & Albuja on Ecuador, Lust on Peru and by Sankey on Colombia.

Another representative of this approach is García Linera, currently the Vice-President of Bolivia and the chief ideologue of the development path staked out in the direction of ‘living well’ by the current regime, but also a respected intellectual described by Brazilian political scientist Emir Sader (in *Upside Down World*, January 8, 2014) as “the most important intellectual living today in Latin America”. In a 2013 study on *Geopolitics of the Amazon* he resolves the apparent contradiction between the Vivir Bien (Living Well) model based on an indigenous cosmovision and the economic growth dynamics of capitalism by arguing that there is nothing intrinsically problematic about extractivism; just as with the market or an industrial policy it is a question of harnessing it to a progressive strategy and embedding it in an alternative system to capitalism.

At the same time other NGOs were enlisted or even created to the purpose of assisting mining companies in their relation of conflict with the local communities negatively impacted by their operations. In this regard Eddy Gómez Abreu, President of the Parlamento Amazónico Internacional, declared that they had ‘incontrovertible evidence of these transnationals and foundations, under the cover of supposed ecological, religious or humanitarian concerns, collaborated in the effort to extract diamonds, strategic minerals and genetic as well as espionage and illegal medical experiments on the indigenous population (*Sena-Fobomade, 2005*). In effect, he alleged that the mining companies regularly used private Foundations and other NGOs as one of their tactics to secure the consent of the local population to their projects and operations, and to manipulate them.

This process of regime change has resulted in the formation of what some scholars see as the beginnings of a post-neoliberal state (Barrett, Chavez & Rodriguez, 2008; Grugel & Riggirozzi, 2009; Levitsky, S. & Roberts, 2011; Lievesley & Ludlam, 2009; Petras & Veltmeyer, 2009; Silva, 2009).

On January 5, 2012 Andrew Frank, and other Vancouver-based staff of ForestEthics were called into an office of Tides, an environmental NGO funded by the Canadian government and sub-contracted ForestEthics, to be informed that the Canadian government considered ForestEthics to be an ‘enemy of the state (interview, June 8, 2013).

The Observatory of Latin American Mining Conflicts (OCMAL) has registered 155 major socio-environmental conflicts in Latin America’s mining sector recent years, most of them in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru. See the Observatory’s website [www.olca.cl/ocmal] for details about these conflicts.

From the perspective of the inhabitants of these local communities what is at issue in the operations of extractive capital is not only the health of their members and their territorial rights and sovereign control over their national territory, but the environment on which their livelihoods and way of life, and life itself, depend. To cite just one example, researcher Mayoral (2011) reported that over a million people in the
Amazonian basin now suffer from diseases derived from open-pit mining and exposure to and ingestion of toxic and carcinogenic substances such as mercury. Similarly, Alarcon (2011) documented scientific evidence that the Peruvian city of Oroya is one of the ten most contaminated cities in the world, with high levels of lead and sulphur in the air and high levels of mining-based and related carcinogens such as cadmium, arsenic and antimony in the soil, agriculture-based food products and the water supply – toxins that were also detected in other towns and surrounding communities (UNEP, 2010). Documentation of these and many other such socioenvironmental impacts of extractive capitalism abound (but see UNEP, 2010), leading in Latin America to a regionwide coalition of social organizations concerned about these negative impacts as well as a network of some 160 social movements united in the search for a systemic alternative to both neoliberalism and capitalism (Abya Yala, 2009).

\(^x\) On the role of the Canadian government in promoting CSR as a strategy of corporate self-regulation, and as such as an alternative to the model of state regulation presented by the post-neoliberal regimes in South America in their ‘progressive extractivism’, see Kuyek (2007) and Canada (2009). With the government’s CSR strategy Canadian mining companies receive direct financial support for their operations abroad from Export Development Canada (EDC) in the form of insurance and loans. For example, in 2008 EDC facilitated Canadian extractive activities in Latin America to the tune of four billion dollars (Kuyek, 2007: 208). By means of CIDA, the government’s agency for ‘international cooperation’ for development the government in 2011 implemented a policy of co-financing of corporate-social-responsibility (CSR) programs in the vicinity of Canadian mining operations in developing countries. Thus, Canada committed 6.7 million dollars to pilot CSR projects in Burkina Faso, Ghana and Peru, essentially to compensate local inhabitants for the environmental destruction and social upheaval caused by the highly profitable mining activities of IAMGold, Rio Tinto Alcan and Barrick Gold, respectively. In addition, CIDA committed 20 million dollars for a CSR initiative in the Andean region (Bolivia, Colombia and Peru, to be specific) with the aim to ‘strengthen the capacity of local governments and communities to implement sustainable development projects” and to “improve dialogue between communities and the private sector”.

\(^xi\) In this context the Minister for international cooperation in his address to the Economic Club of Canada on Nov 23, 2012, outlined his vision for the agency’s future in terms of the government’s view of the ‘private sector as the most driver of long-term economic growth’, preparing developing countries for foreign investment, and the intention to pursue partnerships with Canadian companies, helping them build market opportunities and to dissuade governments from nationalizing extractive industries (www.theglobeandmail.com).

\(^xii\) For a fuller discussion of the ‘mechanisms of Canadian imperialism’ in Latin America’s mining sector see Tetreault (2014).
It is estimated that there would be 3000 direct construction jobs over a three year period and around 100 permanent jobs once completed. Indirect employment estimates vary and are subject to dispute. See Lee (2012).


Personal interview, June 10, 2013.

Personal interview, June 8, 2013.

In the words of Roy Henry Vickers, a leading Aboriginal artist and public figure, “Our ancestors are the land. So, when we allow some corporation to run a pipeline through this country because of the promise of money, what we are doing is endangering what was given to us, and we do not have the right.” Personal interview, June 11, 2013.

Many proponents of a Political Economy approach to what Marxists have defined as the ‘agrarian question’ in the current context of neoliberal globalization, or the ‘new world order’, have picked up on and made use of David Harvey’s notion of “accumulation by dispossession”. Here (see, for example, Kinuthia, 2013) “accumulation by dispossession” refers to the persistence of practices that Marx had regarded as “primitive” (original) vis-à-vis the birth of capitalism and the ensuing process of capitalist development. These practices include “the commodification and privatization of land and the forceful eviction of peasant populations; conversion of customary forms of property rights into exclusive private property rights; suppression of territorial rights of access to the commons...colonial, neocolonial and imperial processes of appropriation of assets (including natural resources)” (Harvey, 2006: 43).

As an example of the anti-capitalist nature of indigenous resistance, consider the following critique of modern society offered by Vickers: “When money becomes your addiction, that’s all you think of. The only thing that you think is going to make you better is to get more money. Well that’s the way people are thinking. What they don’t understand is when you get old like me, you can’t buy back your youth. There’s no fountain of youth. When you lose a loved one, all the money, all the millions that you have cannot change that. You know? When we lose that river, all the trillions cannot bring it back. Cannot fix it. And so, there are things that if we think with a mind that is chained, thinking there is some other way to be better and money is at the root of it all, that will lead us to destruction because money can’t. It’s just a fallacy. It rises and falls with the whim of whoever is buying stocks and it’s BS. What’s real is the seasons and how much rain falls and how is the soil and are you looking after it properly or are you
killing the soil because you are not taking care of it the way you should. Those are the real things.” Personal interview June 11, 2013.