The EU Contribution to the Multilateral Response in Tackling the Crime-Terror Nexus

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The publication of the first article on crime-terror, in 1999, was the starting point of a long, controversial and intense debate - among academics, practitioners and policy-makers - which complemented the parallel debates about the changes occurring in wars, insurgency, military interventions.

The ability of criminal and terrorists to progressively increase their performance at the global level, to establish their headquarters inside failed and weak States, and to interact with other groups that violently oppose the state, namely insurgents and paramilitaries, deserves to be evaluated within a comprehensive theoretical framework.

Undoubtedly, empirical analysis is complicated by the sensitiveness of the topic and the difficulty in using reliable data. Nevertheless, the use of terror tactics by criminals for securing the environments in which they act and the exploitation of illicit markets by terrorist for funding are largely becoming visible manifestations, as well as the interactions with insurgents. Thus, the phenomenon needs to be reconceptualised in order to include flexible and changing features and to understand the reason why it requires collective rather than individual response by the states.

Multilateralism is the more appropriate framework to understand the set of responses at the international level. It is defined here as a sophisticated form of interaction among states, and international and regional organisations, founded on universal principles, equal participation of states in collective mechanisms, and no discrimination in putting principles into action (Attinà, 2013). Cooperation started with the attempt of Western powers to export and impose their domestic definitions, expressed in political, economic and moral terms to the rest of the world. This officially happened through the production of formal definitions, norms and documents. At the same time, this procedure is based on the governments’ understanding of the threats, initially as separate ones towards crime and towards terrorism.

The more substantial aspect of the US contribution to multilateral cooperation in this field is the shifting process from an almost exclusive law enforcement approach to organised crime and terrorism to a more comprehensive strategy, essentially founded on the blurring boundary between internal and external security.

This is the trend towards which multilateral cooperation is presently moving, led by the US but with the increasing and evolutionary contribution of the EU security model.

This chapter aims at replying to the following research questions:

- does the crime-terror nexus represent a threat to the current global security agenda and which one?
- does the presence of insurgent groups represent a third ‘component’ in exacerbating the nexus and, if so, which is its impact?
- which features are currently shaping the state of response on a global level? Which actors are more relevant in shaping cooperation? What is the role of the EU?

The chapter is divided into three parts. First, the crime-terror nexus is reconceptualised in order to understand the level of implications it poses both to the regional and global level. Then, it is analysed against additional threats, represented by insurgency, armed conflicts and weak and failed States. The investigation is based and sustained on some empirical data (provided by UNODC, UCDP/PRI and the Global Terrorism Database). Second, the current set of strategies and approaches are explored through the lenses of the multilateralism theories. The analysis focuses here on the roles played by the US and European States. In the last part, the security strategy developed by the European Union is stressed. Some conclusions on the nexus perception within the
political agendas at the global level – as well as future perspectives – are exposed at the end.

1. Organised crime, terrorism and armed conflicts: a re-conceptualisation of the threat

The scientific debate about the concept of crime-terror nexus has started only recently and has produced some interesting results. It refers to the connection between two different actors, provided with distinct identities, aims and methods but willing to go beyond them, in order to reach practical purposes. According to the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organised Crime – which represents, so far, the only universal legal tool - an organised crime group usually (a) consist of a collaboration of at least three people (b) that are gathered for a prolonged or indefinite period of time; (c) they are suspected or convicted of committing serious criminal offences; and, (d) have as their objective the pursuit of profit and/or power.

The notion of terrorist group is more controversial and deals with the identity of the actor (governmental/non-governmental) as well as with the nature of the act of violence. According to the EU, it is a structured group of more than two persons, established over a period of time and acting in concert to commit terrorist offences (EU Council, 2002). This kind of violence differs from other forms of political violence, namely, from “paramilitary” which includes both those groups that maintain some forms of violent capacity and yet are not in any way part of the State as well as private enterprises employed by states for providing assorted services (Tupman, 2009). Additionally, it is also different from the notion of ‘insurgency’ which refers to the organized use of subversion and violence to seize, nullify, or challenge political control of a region (US State Dept, 2009).

Scholars have analysed the ways through which the different nature (entrepreneurial for criminals, political for terrorists) of the two actors may converge and produce various forms of connection. Thus, the first debates focus on the nature of the phenomenon.

Tamara Makarenko was the first one to describe the environment in which such threat emerged and started to use the definition of nexus (Makarenko, 2000). She sustained that the immediate post-Cold War environment provided both actors with more access to technological advancements and to financial and global market structures. Despite the very explicit differences, the intensification of the transnational dimension of organised crime activities in the 1990s, and the changing nature of terrorism, have contributed to blur the distinction between the two and to renew the existing operational and organisational similarities (Makarenko, 2004; 2009; Wang, 2010). She has depicted the process through distinct phases which can be put along a continuum. Starting with the adoption of tactics of the other for achieving a practical mutual benefit, it can proceed with the appropriation of methods or tactics from the other; the merging of a criminal and terror group, producing a functional alliance; finally an evolutionary phase marked by the transformation of the tactics and motivations of one entity into another. The continuum includes all potential steps and a wide variety of case studies, which depend on different conditions and causes (Makarenko, 2004). The alliances among criminals and terrorists have also received some critics. Williams, for instance, argued that they were based on

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opportunistic reasons rather than on a real change in attitudes and nature. He stressed the fact that terrorist groups were able to use illicit activities for funding while criminals are ready to provide illicit goods and services to any buyer regardless of their motivation (Williams, 2002). Thus, later analysis concentrates on the contexts in which such alliances may proliferate more easily. Shelley (2005) investigated those features which facilitate interconnections and sustained that a state of chaos and on-going conflicts as well as regions with the largest shadow economies have provided a safe haven to them. According to some scholars, the nexus needs to live within unstable countries for proliferating, while to others, political and economic instability are not a structural cause but only an exacerbating condition (Pettinger 2001). The impact of criminal activities and the intersection of both groups are less risky in regions affected by economic transition or failing states (Ridlay, 2005).

These dimensions are defined as conditions of non-governability and conduciveness to terrorist or insurgent presence, that is to say, conditions in which the presence of criminal networks opens the possibility of strategic alliances through which terrorists or insurgents and criminal groups can share logistical corridors, safe havens, and access to sources of funding (Rabasa et al., 2007). Cases like Afghanistan or Sierra Leone constitute the most visible examples used by scholars and policy-makers to describe - and to some extent, to measure - the phenomenon. Therefore, the scientific debate on the nexus was enriched with investigations on the linkages between the nexus and institutional failure or instability and, increasingly, to wars and civil conflicts. Some analysis aimed, in fact, at investigating the extent to which the nexus may have an impact on the escalation and/or duration of conflicts, or, alternatively, the existence of an armed conflict may facilitate it more easily (Cornell 2005).

At the end of the Cold War, the growth in number of intra-state conflicts produced a large discussion on security threats. The debate on the difference between ‘old wars’ and ‘new wars’ sustained that the shift from interstate to intrastate war dimension implies that effects of conflict are not contained within state borders and that they spread from a country to neighbouring countries and region (Holsti, 1999; Kaldor, 1999). In the wake of state collapse, war becomes primarily a competition among various non-state actors over the use of scarce resources, including the residues of the state, the assets of the population and available inflows of materials, food and money (Kaldor, 1999: 90). This explains the rise of ungoverned conditions in which criminals and terrorist may flourish. Even though the sensitiveness of the phenomenon may affect the availability of empirical data, the literature has offered a wide range of case studies. The present analysis is intended to the in-depth analysis of the connections between the nexus and armed conflicts, in order to assess its global impact on security management.

1.1 An empirical overview

Data used in this chapter are provided by three different sources. The Global Terrorism Database (GTD), managed by the University of Maryland, includes information on terrorist events around the world from 1970 through 2012. The Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) offers a number of datasets on armed conflicts, organised violence and peacemaking. Data on criminal activities are provided by the UN Office on Drug and Crime Prevention.

All figures present data that refers to the period between the end of the Cold War and 2012 and are divided by region. The main aim is to understand whether the interconnection is strong and consolidated in the most troubled areas of the global system.
Fig. 1 describes the number of terrorist attacks (regardless of the weapons and perpetrators) during the abovementioned period.

![Fig. 1 - No. of terrorist attacks by region (1989-2011)](image)

Source: GTD, 2012

The graph includes both active and inactive groups, that is to say even remnants, disbanded or formally decommissioned ones (which are particularly relevant at the end of the Cold War). Attacks are globally widespread but some regions are extraordinarily more affected by terrorism than others. Southeast and Southern Asia, Middle East, Northern Africa are regions in which the presence of non-democratic regimes, unstable institutions and failed and weak states is considerably high and this makes them a privileged place for subversive groups.

However, the most stable and secure areas are not free from attacks. Groups, either external or internal ones increasingly distress Western Europe, for example. The incidence of attacks in the African continent is lower, if compared to other regions, but still escalating.

Data are now compared to the presence of conflicts. The analysis is based on the notion of armed conflict, which can be measured in a quite affordable way and is here defined as “a contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths” (Gleditsch et al, 2002).

Thus, conflicts presented in Fig. 2 have all features described by the scholarship on old and new wars, that is to say, the use of violence by non-state entities, the eventual presence of insurgent groups and mass of refugees.

![Fig. 2 – Terrorist attacks and armed conflicts by region (1989-2012)](image)
Given this definition of armed conflict, it is clear that regions characterised by political stability and democratic regimes, like Northern America, Australia and Western Europe present very low percentages of convergence of actors. It is likewise evident that other regions, like MENA, Southeast and Southern Asia, and Africa have a strong presence of them. Both the conflict and, more importantly, the post-conflict transitional period are marked by lack of rule of law, inefficient law enforcement structures, permeable borders and profitable criminal opportunities (Oehme, 2008). These conditions are evidently most favourable to terrorist groups to flourish and plan their activities, rather then established democracies (even though they still represent a main target). Data on prosecution of persons reveal that all regions are hugely affected (Fig. 3).

Data are provided by the United Nations Office on Drug and Crime prevention and are focused on the cases of people who have been actually prosecuted for any kind of crime. The definition of persons prosecuted refers to alleged offenders prosecuted by means of an official charge, initiated by the public prosecutor or the law enforcement agency responsible for prosecution (UNODC, 2012).

Clearly, the number of suspected, who are arrested and prosecuted largely depend on the local law enforcement agents’ ability and efficiency, the level of corruption and, generally speaking, the capacity of state institutions to defend their own stability. These
factors may explain the low numbers in South-Eastern Asia.

At the same time, the transnational dimension of illegal activities, the cross-border character of their implications and the increasing flows of people movements have contributed to the porosity of borders. On the contrary, these factors explain the huge numbers of prosecutions in Europe (mainly Northern Europe) and North America.

Focusing on the specific transnational dimension of the phenomenon (which is at the core of the UNODC analysis) and on the definition given by the UN Palermo Convention, it is possible to add further features. As stressed by scholars, terrorist groups need also to identify affordable sources of funding. According to major agencies’ reports, the exploitation of illegal activities by terrorists, as well as the occasional or more solid use of terrorist tactics by criminals is increasing. They may vary, according to the local context, but usually deal with the use of violence for destabilising law enforcement control, or political power. Table 1 provides an assessment of transnational organised crime threats, evaluating its impact on a regional basis.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Major Type of threats</th>
<th>Criminal group involved</th>
<th>Other actor involved</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>South America</td>
<td>Cocaine trafficking, corruption, violence</td>
<td>South Americans</td>
<td>FARC, AUC, ELN, Shining Path</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Africa</td>
<td>Illegal exploitation of mineral, gold, diamonds, weapons; armed conflicts</td>
<td>Groups based in Congo, Burundi, Rwanda, Uganda, Tanzania</td>
<td>Use of illegal trafficking as a source of insurgency funding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Africa</td>
<td>Cocaine trafficking, armed violence, corruption</td>
<td>South Americans, Locals</td>
<td>Rival military, non-military factions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central America</td>
<td>Cocaine trafficking, corruption, instability</td>
<td>Colombian and Mexican cartels, central American affiliates</td>
<td>Armed local groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Horn of Africa</td>
<td>Piracy for ransom</td>
<td>Groups based in Somalia</td>
<td>Local insurgents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Asia</td>
<td>Heroin trafficking, insurgency, terrorism</td>
<td>Local groups and criminals</td>
<td>Al-Qaida, Afghan Talibans, Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, groups based in Pakistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southeast Europe</td>
<td>Heroin trafficking, political fragmentation, ethnic rivalries</td>
<td>Groups based in the Balkans and Turkey; mafia groups based in Italy</td>
<td>PKK, former militants can be mobilized</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southeast Asia</td>
<td>Opium trafficking, insurgency</td>
<td>Local ethnic groups</td>
<td>Use of opium trafficking as a source of insurgency funding</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: UNODC, 2010
Even tough it is possible to investigate on estimated data only, the picture provided by UNODC is quite clear. Somali pirates, Mexican and Colombian cartels, Italian mafia, PKK and Al-Qaida have very different purposes and aims, but their ability to establish functional interactions is increasing and professionalising. Additionally, the interactions they have with other political or economic actors – either ethnic factions or local insurgents - may hugely vary, as well as the impact the nexus can have on the region in terms of stability and level of violence. This does not mean that these activities are constrained only to troubled contexts or that established democracies cannot offer those conditions which are essential to them to flourish. This preliminary empirical analysis has raised essentially three main points: firstly, it is true that armed conflicts and insurgency may contribute to exacerbate the nexus and they can be a relevant component of it, but they do not represent the only possible conditions. On the contrary, this phenomenon affects all regions, with a significant impact on European countries, either as traditional basis of criminals and as a larger transit area. Secondly, the evaluation of such factors introduces some innovations in the re-conceptualisation of the nexus, in terms of how alliances may be conceived and how they work. Thirdly, the challenges posed by the nexus to states are marked by the global and regional widespread and can be placed on a double level. It constitutes a threat to the state capacity to provide security to its citizens and to the regional and international institutions ability to manage cross-border flows.

1.2. The need for reconceptualisation

Data show that intersections between terrorism and organised crime have been changing over the years. The scientific debate has produced many explicative efforts and the continuum remains useful for understanding the escalating relationship between the two actors. In a more sophisticated investigation, Makarenko has discussed the concept of regional variations of the crime-terror nexus, stating that the nexus is determined by the level of stability within the geographic region in which it operates (Makarenko, 2007). This means that a troubled context, a transitional state or a democratic regime can have an impact on the nexus, its main features, its performances and actions.

Thus, the phenomenon needs to be reconceptualised in order to include more flexible and changing features and to understand the reason why it requires a collective response. The present analysis will focus on three larger categories (cooperation, coexistence, convergence) which better describes such flexibility, in embracing various gradations of activity.

The notion of cooperation refers to the most envisaged case, that is to say, the established alliances between terrorist and criminal groups. Short-term, occasional or ad hoc relations may be frequent and outweigh the risks which are mechanically associated to this set of relationships, especially if focused upon specific operational requirements. The alliances between FARC and cartels in Colombia is a case in point. In some cases, as Hansen points out, customer-service provider relationships have developed, as both criminals and terrorist groups often require similar expertise, support structures and services – including fake passports, IT and communications equipment (Hansen, 2012).

Coexistence may be located into an intermediate position, producing a condition, in which criminals and terrorist groups operate in the same business but explicitly prefer to remain separate entities, unless it is rationally required. It can happen during a conflict or in a non-democratic political regime (Nigeria, Sudan, Malaysia), but not necessarily. Some of the features that build a situation conducive to organized crime also make it attractive to terrorist groups. The lack of border control and law enforcement and the eventual
presence of certain types of infrastructure and services for operations may be found in democratic states as well (Italy, Greece). The combined presence can amplify the threat to state structures – both weak or democratic states - even if they do not explicitly act together and they may produce cross-border effects.

Convergence is apparently the most difficult case to explain and refers to a very frequent condition, in which the two actors make use of their respective techniques for practical purposes. Organized criminal networks have long used terror tactics to safeguard business interests and protect their working environments, but even the use of criminal expertise by terrorist groups in order to meet operational requirements is increasing. There are several examples of the first ones (bombing campaigns by Cosa Nostra in the 1990s) as well as the second (PKK in Turkey, INLA in Northern Ireland).

It is clear that the crime-terror nexus represents a tangible threat albeit still difficult to measures, especially in its main components. Additionally, it has evolved into something more complex which, as already seen through the three categories, may affect stable and unstable regions and may involve or skip the insurgent part (Irrera, 2013).

This makes the implications they can produce on a regional and global level extremely multi-layered. They urge to be analysed in the long-term period and in a broader perspective, involving those states which are most manifestly affected, as well as those ones which can suffer indirect unfavourable effects.

2. The development of a global response

The long and gradual process which has produced a set of policies and measures in tackling organised crime, terrorism and conflicts is paradigmatic of the relationships among leading states at the end of the Cold War. Largely initiated and shaped by the US, such cooperation involved at first most relevant and experienced European states and secondly the EU, together with additional regional organisations. The internationalization of policing primarily reflects ambitious efforts by generations of western powers to export their own definitions of crime and terror, not just for political and economic gain but also in the attempt to export their own morals to other parts of the world (Andreas and Nadelman, 2006). According to these scholars, any internationalization process of crime and terror definition and their subsequent control is the outcome of the export of domestic perceptions and definitions, which reflected the relations among political powers. Thus, it was based on the attempts of Western powers to export and impose their domestic definitions, expressed in political, economic and moral terms to the rest of the world. In the aftermath of the Cold War, this process occurred according to the same rules which dominated the relations among political powers. This officially happened through the production of formal definitions, norms and documents. At the same time, this procedure is based on the governments’ understanding of both threats, initially as two separate ones (Irrera, 2011).

The different policies, produced by the US and the European states reflected their dissimilar perceptions of organized crime and terror, as well as dissimilar approaches to security. However, the shifting perceptions of the security environment, together with the parallel transformation of the global system, pushed these prominent States to change their attitudes and to strengthen multilateral cooperation for developing adequate responses to new threats. Even before September 11, the transatlantic law enforcement infrastructure was actively working, through several joint initiatives against money laundering and cybercrime. The terroristic attacks contributed to change the characteristics of those initiatives, because it modified the perception of the threat itself.
Attempts to facilitate greater cooperation in crime control and counterterrorism on an international level started to be strengthened for promoting more communication, establishing guidelines and best practices, and, ultimately for regularizing cooperation (Hignett, 2008).

Multilateralism framework, especially through its more recent developments, can constitute the framework within which the cooperation in this field can be better analysed. Multilateralism has become, since its first development within the United Nations system, the set of practices and principles, upon which cooperation among states has tried to manage collective problem (Keohane, 1990; Ruggie, 1993). Scholars have extensively debated about the ways multilateralism has evolved, entangled more actors and diversified its outcomes.

Multilateralism is firstly a mode of action, a sophisticated form of cooperation which, over the decades, required specific qualities of international actors. The multilayered dimension of security and the flexible nature of current global problems have imposed to States and international organizations to develop and expand their capacity to contribute, by following the rules of the game and fulfilling the fluctuating requested criteria (Wouters et al. 2008; Telò, 2012). Also, the need to use more expertise and resources have pushed additional actors, like regional organisations, to assume more responsibility in managing global issues (Attinà, 2011).

Secondly, the increasing set of incentives explains the normative potential of multilateralism, in the sense of the conviction about how international cooperation should function to increase multilateral security (Caporaso, 1992).

Therefore, multilateralism is different from any form of international cooperation resulting from negotiation and bargaining about national interests and can be perceived as a set of ‘international practices that are founded on principles of conduct widely shared by states, the equal participation of states in the rules and mechanisms of the principles of implementation, and the non-discriminating application of the principles, rules and mechanisms’ (Attinà, 2013).

Common rules and norms are generally created for solving problems and they facilitate coordination, instead of rivalry or juxtaposition (Keohane, 1990; Caporaso, 1993; Ruggie, 1993; Lake, 2006). These considerations bring some important political implications. The responses and the new partnerships created for replying to global threats and emergencies should be addressed, first of all, to solve a specific problem, and, at the same time, can serve as a catalyst for changing the existing political conditions to tackle other problems, for establishing new rules of conducts, and, in the long period, for enforcing the rules themselves.

The more substantial aspect of the US contribution to multilateral cooperation in this field is the shifting process from an almost exclusive law enforcement approach to organised crime and terrorism to a more comprehensive strategy.

Since the first articulated analysis, made by the Kefauver Committee in 1951, the American perception of organized crime as a domestic issue has significantly changed. The alien conspiracy has turned into a larger involvement in illegal migration and border control issues, especially in the relationship with Mexico and other Central American countries (Bynum, 1987; Finckenauer, 2005). Drug trafficking and money laundering were considered as the most important targets as part of the ‘narcoterrorism’ phenomenon, which has dominated the last decades of the Cold War and which was essentially applied to the most important US spheres of influence, that is Central and Southern America. The strategy was based on the protection of American interest, the strengthening of law enforcement and information system. In the aftermath of September 11, the US
contribution to the multilateral cooperation increased, since officials started to include counternarcotics in a broader security strategy, focused on lawless zones (Irrera, 2011).

Documents issued after the terrorist attacks to the Twin Towers marked the formalization of this change, stressed the need to tackle the root causes of the threats and contributed to link new global challenges, including organized crime activities and terrorism to fertile grounds which can be easily found in weak or failed States (NSS, 2002; 2006).

The official launch of the War on Terror was characterised by a very imposing and militarised language. The list of key security issues consists of terrorist threats, WMD and state failure as key dangers. The NSS affirms that “the United States must start from the core beliefs and look outward for possibilities to expand liberty” (NSS, 2002: 3) and that there are many enemies, especially among rogue states, which remains a political category usually associated to terrorism sponsorship and now to other security threats, including organized crime. In the aftermath of the military intervention into Afghanistan and the successive invasion of Iraq, the US took the lead but also reminded to the allies the need to take their own responsibilities. National security is still the main concern but it is no more defined in traditional terms, and associated to globalization of threats and to greater cooperation. No direct reference to the nexus (as a unique phenomenon) can be found, but the perception of its single components is paradigmatic of the distance which separated the US from other political actors, in the security strategy formulation.

The National Security Strategy, issued by President Obama in 2010, marked an evident shift in the language and established new patterns of cooperation. Even though the challenges posed by terrorism is a priority, the use of criminal activities for funding is stressed as well and, more importantly, they are associated to other security threats whose boundaries cannot easily be traced. The document re-launches the need of reinvigorating old alliances and to build new ones. The role of multilateral institutions and practices is essential.

The analysis of the process of US propensity to multilateralism in tackling the crime-terror nexus should be combined with the evaluation of the Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime, released in July 2011 by the US National Security Staff. Here, organised crime is defined in a very traditional way (as previously seen through the Palermo Convention) and in terms of threat to national security of US citizens, but, at the same time, it is presented as Transnational Organized Crime, stressing the fact that the cross-border dimension of alliances and activities is the first feature, in terms of policy (SCTOC, 2011).

In other words, hegemony and multilateralism can coexist in security policies but the hegemonic state tends to use its influence to shape the procedure through which intervention is decided (Attinà, 2013). More importantly, the success of such strategy is also dependent on the abilities and resources the actors are investing.

In this sense, the EU have offered, until now, a wide expertise in the field, based on single Member states experiences, in the framework of the Justice and Home Affairs structures.

3. The impact of the nexus on the EU security agenda

The impact the nexus is producing on the EU agenda is to analyse by taking into account the two dimensions of internal and external security, which has produced, so far, a set of different policies and actors. The internationalization of EC/EU crime control started at the beginning of the Cold War, through the development of cross-border
policing institutions, and the extension of its own practices to the neighbours. The deepening and widening of the European integration contributed to the increasing of this process.

It needs to be analysed in combination with the tradition of close cooperation with underdeveloped countries, in the field of aid and relief. This last one offered the already exploited platform and expertise for improving cooperation with third countries and international organizations in the field of drugs through closer coordination of policies within the EU.

In the document *A Secure Europe in a Better World*, issued by the European Council in December 2003, the EU High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy, Javier Solana, pointed out the main elements which are required to build a strong and solid *European Security Strategy* (ESS). The abovementioned set of principles is used also for enlarging EU capabilities and contribution to global security. The ESS stresses European responsibility for global security, the need of effective multilateralism and the extension of the international rule of law, considering that: “the post Cold War environment is one of increasingly open borders in which the internal and external aspects of security are indissolubly linked” (ESS, 2003). The ESS lists five key threats to Europe: terrorism, the proliferation of WMD, regional conflicts, failed/failing states, and organized crime. The last one, in particular, is strictly linked to the conditions that cause conflict, fear and hatred, a criminalized economy that profits from violent methods of controlling assets, weak illegitimate states, the existence of warlords and paramilitary groups.

Even in the case of the EU, the main character of its contribution is the shifting process from a Home and Justice Affairs approach to a more comprehensive plan, essentially founded on the blurring boundary between internal and external security. The common objective, which is the protection of citizens and States from risks, explains why the threat of terrorism and organised crime was identified in the ESS which had an explicit external perspective and then appears in the set of documents which constitutes what is commonly described as the Internal Security Strategy (ISS) of the Union ². The ISS addresses a wide list of security challenges the European countries face in their domestic borders, including terrorism, organised and cross-border crime, cyber-crime, violence in all its forms, accidents (transport, industrial, etc.) and natural and man-made disasters and implicitly suggests a larger reflection on the *European Security Model*, consisting of common tools and a commitment to: a mutually reinforced relationship between security, freedom and privacy; cooperation and solidarity between Member States; involvement of all the EU’s institutions; addressing the causes of insecurity, not just the effects; enhancing prevention and anticipation; involvement, as far as they are concerned, of all sectors which have a role to play in protection – political, economic and social; and a greater interdependence between internal and external security. (EU Council, 2010, p. 5). Special attention will have to be paid to "weak and failed States" so that they do not become hubs of organised crime or terrorism. In this context, the Internal Security Strategy serves as an indispensable complement to the EU Security Strategy, developed in 2003 under the EU’s Security and Defence Policy to address global risks and threats and to make a commitment to the social, political and economic development of global society as the most effective way of achieving effective and long-lasting security (EU Council, 2010, p. 17).

² *Towards a European Security Model*, prepared by the Council and approved at the European Council in 2010 (doc. 7120/10); *The EU Internal Security Strategy in Action: Five steps towards a more secure Europe*, of 22 November 2010 (see Attinà, 2013).
According to the document, the EU aims at coping with these phenomena and developing adequate responses, through a coordination of existing agencies (Europol, Eurojust, Frontex, Community Civil Protection Mechanism, the Counter-Terrorism Coordinator) which will be strengthened.

Therefore, the need to integrate all the existing European strategies relevant to internal security, to strengthen coherence and consistency and to promote truly effective policies is urgently underlined (Attinà, 2013). The necessity to tackle challenges which go beyond the EU states’ national, bilateral or regional capability and which strongly require multilateral efforts have therefore produced two main outcomes.

On one hand, the EU is improving its institutional capacities and actions in a wider framework of international cooperation for preserving its own citizens and its neighbourhood, from increasing domestic political violence by local organized groups. On the other, as made clear in the ESS, the rationale on which the fight against crime and terror is based is part of a broader security culture the European countries founded in the early 1990s and deals with the contribution the EU is able to provide for preserving global society.

The constant use of the common actions, in the last decades, has contributed to the rising of a specific international image of EU as a civilian power. The will to build long-term stabilisation, to act through multilateralism, and to be inspired by norms and ideas are the main elements of the global actorness EU has developed in the field of promotion of democracy and security (Duchene, 1972). The more complex set of competences the Treaty of Lisbon has contributed to link this policy to the common security and defence policy and to the civilian and military assets in support of peace-keeping missions, conflict prevention and international security outside the Union (TEU art. 42).

The number of military and civilian missions the EU has deployed outside Europe has increased and developed over the years. Even though they are envisaged as the last resort, civilian missions have been extensively used for tackling non-traditional threats, including crime and terrorist issue. There is, thus, a general absence of explicit mention to the fight against terrorism among the objectives of the Union’ s missions despite the fact that all of them were carried out after 11 September 2001 and despite their respective implementation have originated occasional demands. This tendency has not changed as the list of missions expanded (Oliveira Martins and Ferreira-Pereira, 2012).

Fig. 4 – EU civilian and military missions (as of February 2014)
Fig. 4 includes all missions deployed by the EU, both civilians and military, either already ended and still active. The EU is obviously more active outside Europe, using its crisis management abilities in countries affected by insurgency and instability. Thus, civilian missions are entrusted with a number of executive tasks, that is to say Security Sector Reform, Rule of Law, Border Control which are inevitably dealing organised crime, terrorism and insurgency. The use of civilian missions constitutes a unique feature of the EU contribution to the multilateral cooperation. Surely, it gaps a real comprehensive strategy which coordinate all agencies and policies and there is no clear reference to the nexus in the missions mandate. Nevertheless, it is expected that the number of mission – and missions provided with executive tasks – will increase.

Conclusions

The main aim of this chapter is to understand whether the nexus between terrorism and organised crime may represent a renovated kind of security threat and to measure the impact of the insurgency component. The basic definition, provided by the literature, refers to the strategic alliance between two non-state actors, both able to exploit illegal markets and to influence policy-making on a global level. Such effects may be deteriorated in troubled contexts, affected by war and insurgency, which can constitute safe heaven because ungoverned entities. Nevertheless, failed and weak state do not attract criminals and terrorist per se and they can be considered as an additional features, not a constitutive one.

The empirical analysis aimed at understanding firstly the kind of threat the nexus represents to the current global security agenda and, secondly, since challenges are posed to both states and international system, producing important implications for policy at national and international level, there is a need to understand how multilateral is the current state of response. Although they still remain two separate phenomena, the changing nature of global security and the increasing effects of globalisation have contributed to blur the distinction between political and criminal motivated violence and to reveal operational and organisational similarities. While the presence of armed conflicts and the insurgents activities may considerably exacerbate the nexus, they do not represent the only condition. On the contrary, it is sustained that different contexts – stable or unstable - have a direct effect on the nexus performance. This does not mean that the crime-terror-insurgency threat is disappearing or decreasing, rather the fact that the evanescence of traditional boundaries is currently marking the new manifestations of the nexus and imposing to scholars and policy-makers a reconceptualization of the whole phenomenon, which include on one hand the flexible set of interactions between separate entities and, on the other, the multi-layered implications they can produce at the regional and global level.

In particular, it has been here analysed through three large categories (coexistence, cooperation, convergence) which describe various gradations of intersections between the two actors. While cooperation expresses the traditional way to conceive the nexus, in terms of alliances, co-existence and convergence better represent the more practical use of terrorist techniques by criminals or the illicit activities by terrorist for funding in an occasional and functional perspective.

Empirical data demonstrate that all categories may be found in both ungoverned or democratic states and can occur in a very fluid way. The challenges the nexus poses to
states are definitely marked by the global and regional widespread and can be placed on a double level. It constitutes a threat to the state capacity to provide security to its citizens and to the regional and international institutions ability to manage cross-border flows. This is the reason why it is listed among those issues of global concern that require a collective response.

As for global responses, multilateralism can constitute the framework within which they can be understood. Multilateral cooperation is here considered as a sophisticated form of interaction among states, international and regional organisation, founded on universal principles, equal participation of states in collective mechanisms, and no discrimination in putting principles into action.

In this specific field, the internationalisation of crime and terror control was essentially the export of law enforcement rules – namely the domestic definition of security and of organised crime – from the Western powers to the rest of the system. Even though they tried to collaborate on various initiatives, since the Cold War, US and EU offered somewhat contrasting views of the threat and of the way they should be tackled.

Both US and EU contributed to shape the international set of definition and rules in the field of organized crime and terror, by using their different but leading roles. The globalization process, the rising of non-State actors and the consequent development of the human aspects of security, as well as the events of September 11 pushed the main international political actors to change this composite structure of relations.

The potential EU has developed and, in particular, its complex strategy based on an integrated strategy may be a promising step for advancing multilateral cooperation.

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