CHINAFICATION OF THE GLOBAL SOUTH?

THE CASE OF SURINAME

working paper

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I. INTRODUCTION

From the 1990s the People's Republic of China (PRC) has by implementation of its foreign policy of Harmony and Peace in the Global South changed the geopolitical landscape. China’s unconditioned providing of donations, soft loans for infrastructural projects and investments as well as import of commodities led to a tremendous increase of trade with the Third World, which resulted globally in shifts of rank, status and political orientation of young nation states.

With China's Open Door and Go Global policies, the West and East became after the Cold War period (1) both relevant actors in the Third World. The West's linkages with its colonial past along with its decreased interest in developing countries after the collapse of the USSR in 1989, as well as the impact of the economic crisis of 2008 in the US are three crucial factors from which rising China has profited. The PRC's economic and political relationship with the Global South, notably the Caribbean and Latin America expanded and intensified. As expected China will be the major market for Latin American and Caribbean exports. (2) The pivotal question may be whether China can eventually become a referential framework in fields such as politics, morals and culture, previous domains of the West.

China does not openly promote its political system in the wider international society. For now its choice is not to challenge the US. The PRC's impact has been mainly economic. However, through strategic partnerships and cooperation treaties China influences (bilateral as well as multilateral) normative behavior in the Global South. (3) For example so called pariah countries, receiving aid and donations from China, can now take independent action, as in UN voting, and neglect western standards. In comparing China's rise with the US in the past, significant differences (4) can be identified. China has announced a peaceful rise. To realize this disputed goal the PRC strive for mobilization of the Global South to influence international politics in its favor.

Does the PRC has the potential to serve as political referential framework for young states in the Global South? Analyses of many studies in academia dealing with China and the Global South are dominantly based on political, military and economic criteria. Cultural, historical, sociological and psychological factors are not fully taken into consideration. (5) Regarding China's rise and position, the decisive question may become (a) does the Global South perceive China as a (regional) hegemon and (b) is its development model (a command-market economy) perceived as attractive?

The PRC's interaction with the Third World is facilitated by (1) its substantial financial support and (2) the pragmatic, non-ideological, nature of the relationship.

For China it is pivotal that it rises in a friendly, supportive and cooperative environment. Therefore the PRC will seek alliances, with countries in support of the One China policy, to secure loyalty and solidarity in the Global South on international political issues like acceptance of the new economic/political world order. China presents itself
as a Third World country and clearly takes in the Western Hemispheric Global South the position of primus inter pares (the first one under equals). Leadership of the Global South is decisive for legitimation globally of China's position as a (regional) hegemon. Bilateral and intergovernmental relations with regional organizations like the CARICOM, UNASUR and CELAC are instrumental for implementation of the PRC's foreign policy goals.\(^6\).

President Xi Jinping made the following statement during his visit of 6/5/2013 in Trinidad: "both China and Trinidad & Tobago belong to the developing world, we have similar views on international and regional issues and we hope to share views on the reform of the international system and climate change.". \(^7\) Geopolitical and security issues may become more relevant in this part of the Western Hemisphere if common Chinese and LAC objectives are non aligned with US' interests.

I.2. The nature of China's relationship with the Global South

The PRC's relationship with Third World countries, mostly in Africa, is often referred to as (neo)colonization. Despite a strong interest in commodities and natural resources, the objectives as well as nature of China's relationship with developing countries is significantly different compared with previous colonial powers. China's foreign policy has been characterized by non-interference in domestic affairs and request for alignment on issues of interest in international politics. Narratives that China's interest is still limited to trade and investment, are not correct. It should be confirmed, that from 1949 important shifts of foreign policy goals took place. China's soft power diplomacy, is an integral part of the PRC's foreign policy, that is, disseminating of its culture and adaptation of its behavior to improve its image, as suggested by Hu Jintao's supportive statement for soft power in 2007 \(^8\). It becomes evident that the PRC not any longer is uniquely oriented on extraction of natural resources. Its position to sit in "the back seat" according to David Shambaugh \(^9\), and distance itself from global conflicts and issues is changed: China makes itself ready for an active global leadership role that requires the Global South as strategic partners \(^10\) and promoters of its leadership worldwide.\(^11\) Xi Jinping's focus on domestic affairs goes together with implementation of foreign policy goals. Political and social stability in China and the Third World is crucial for the PRC's peaceful rise.

Thus, the PRC does not use its economic and political influence to control domestic affairs of countries in the Global South. Instead of domination, China uses its power to seek support and build alliances. It does not want to control the Global South. It seeks attractiveness by emphasizing "equality" and by using soft power. Because neo-colonization does not accurately characterize in my view China's relationship with the Third World countries, I introduce the term Chinafication.\(^12\)
Chinafication refers to this new trend of “China's role and relationship in the South”: a process of China's increasing influence in countries of the Global South whereby the PRC's prime goals are (1) external-political: support for its foreign policies and attractiveness of Chinese society and its people by implementation of public diplomacy and (2) domestic-economic: extraction of natural resources needed for increasing demand of growing middle classes (working definition). Features of chinafication are the South-South relationship and absence of a common-related colonial history as well as pragmatism (no export of ideology thus absence of a need for ideological support), unconditioned foreign aid, outward recognition of sovereignty of countries of the South on internal affairs and the quest for alignment with China in external affairs (13), while the nature of this super power’s relationship with countries of the South is characterized by donations and soft loans for cooperation projects as well as agreements resulting in guarantees of access to natural resources, powered by Chinese investments in large scale projects for exploiting these natural resources by Chinese companies with Chinese and/or local workers. China has broadened its cooperation: from predominantly economic to cultural, political, social and educational cooperation as well.

Thus: Neo-colonization by the West (mainly ex-colonial powers) occurred in the 20th century after colonization ended. Westernization -the adoption of western culture- started in the colonial period and continued after independence. At the end of the 20th century another interstate relationship, Chinafication, emerged. Westernization and Chinafication symbolizing the representation of competing West and East in the Global South. With the East is in the contemporary power setting realistically meant China. In the West the US dominates in most cases foreign policies and strategies on global issues of critical importance. It may be argued therefore that the term Americanization is more appropriate than westernization. In this globalized, plural, world both terms - Americanization and Chinafication- are relevant in the debate about competing political value systems in the Global South. (14)

In sum: following terms like Americanization I have introduced the term Chinafication which is to my opinion a more precise and accurate label for a phenomenon that is confused with (neo) colonization. From a historical perspective it can be argued that Chinese suzerainty during the tributary system has like (neo) colonization similarities with Chinafication. However relevant distinctions should be made. (15)

I.3 Chinese soft power and Chinafication: some observations

Soft power is a term coined by Joseph Nye in 1990. It implies the ability to get what a country wants through attraction rather than coercion or payments. (16). Soft power has been "adapted and adjusted" in China and became a focal point in the PRC's foreign policy. In literature it is referred to as Soft Power with Chinese Characteristics (ruan
**shili)** (17). **Ruan shili** emphasizes the influence of culture, independent and peaceful foreign policy, and politics (socialism with Chinese characteristics).

In the definition of Chinafication (see I.2) **attractiveness** is an essential attribute. There is a link (18) between soft power and Chinafication because the main objective of Chinese soft power is attractiveness which serves to receive international support and respect for its foreign policies and gets status and prestige as a world power.

Chinafication can be viewed as a process that progresses as China becomes more attractive for countries in the Global South. Chinafication exists all over the Global South in terms of China's impact. This can be illustrated with economic and statistical data. Influence of China on social, political and cultural values in the Global South's countries in transition, is part of chinafication as well. President Xi Jinping promoted the spreading of socialist core values (19) in his address to the Bureau of the Communist Party of China on New Years' Day this year.

In sum: to see whether Chinese soft power and Chinafication have an impact in the Global South, data about the attractiveness of the PRC and China's nationals in the Third World are needed. To start the following four criteria are selected but more should be added as the study progresses.

China is attractive when: (1) its culture, values etc. are admired. These are introduced through Confucius Institutes; (2) the Chinese model and economic performance is respected and is visible to government and civil society; (3) its people are liked. This mainly concerns Chinese overseas nationals (who left the PRC after 1978), in China referred to as *Xin Yimin*. (20); and (4) its foreign policy goals are compatible with those in countries of the Global South.

Successful soft power (21) goes hand in hand with successful Chinafication as will be illustrated in the Suriname case.

**II. SURINAME AND CHINA**

1. **Suriname after Independence: Decreased impact of The Netherlands and increase of the PRC's influence**

   The Suriname case deals with China's achieved position and Chinafication. Data (22) are collected about the nature of the relationship between both countries, the attractiveness of the Chinese model and political (non-economic) aspects of implementation of the PRC's foreign policy goals: (1) search for international solidarity; (2) development assistance (so called Economic and Technical Cooperation projects) and (3) commercial projects (extraction of natural resources).

   From empirical research (23) data are obtained about the response of civil society to the *Xin Yimin* (new Chinese migrants of the 1990s) and the behavior of Chinese enterprises. The impact on Chinese soft power is linked with inconsistencies in the PRC's foreign policies and discrepancies between the ruling elites and civil society.
concerning the attractiveness of China and the Chinese. Both are relevant to understand Chinafication in Suriname.

Suriname ended its semi-colonial status within the Kingdom of The Netherlands in 1975 and became independent. (24) Between 1975 and 2014 the country has experienced two leftist military coups of which the major one in 1980–1987 has deeply affected the foundation of the State. (25). From 1991 onwards, democracy was restored without interruption. However, waves of turbulence in politics continue. Tensions occur within The National Assembly (DNA) and in the wider society between opponents of governments either ruled by civilian politicians or governments ruled by military related politicians.

Since May 2010 the President, former coup leader, Desi Bouterse and his party (in coalition) are in power (19). Analyses of conflicts about the functioning of executive, legislative and judiciary bodies show that the political orientation between the ruling coalition and opposition parties are not compatible. (27) Political engineering (28) is directed to a transition stage characterized by a shift away from a dominant western system with referential frameworks in the domain of politics, culture and social values, to a similar system that emerged in the 1980’s under military regime with limitations on the power of the legislative and judiciary branches and structural changes in the executive branch.

The pivotal question in political circles is whether an alternative model can be implemented that guarantees civil and political as well as social and economic rights in multi-ethnic, multi-lingual, multi-religious Suriname. A Chinese model with Surinamese characteristics (electoralism) in Suriname?? Chinafication....

To identify shifts and links between political and economic aspects of changes since mid of the 1970’s, a distinction is made in three periods: A. 1976-1985; B. 1986-2000 and C. 2000-2014. The focus is on the position of the PRC from the establishment of diplomatic relations in 1976 until the present. (29) Since then, China’s position changed from more or less insignificant to the "most influential foreign country" in Suriname.


C. 2001-2014 The PRC replaces The Netherlands as the most influential foreign power. Cooperation Projects (30) and commercial projects.

Ad A. The first period from 1976 until 1985 is characterized by donations and a friendly relationship between the PRC and Suriname. China had in the first period, unlike the Netherlands until 1982, not a preponderant position. In Suriname this period is marked by Independence and a military regime from 1980 till 1987.

Between 1975 and 1981 Suriname established diplomatic relations mainly with democratic nations and the PRC. After 1981 diplomatic relations were extended with the
USSR, Libya, Cuba, Grenada, Iran, while the relation with The Netherlands turned sour and even hostile. Conflicts between the military and interest groups resulted in a massacre in December 1982. The Netherlands suspended development aid to Suriname. (31)

Ad B. 1986–2000. The gap in Dutch financial resources was filled by China. The PRC signed in 1986 and 1987 the first of many Agreements on Economic and Technical Cooperation as well as a Cultural Agreement in Beijing. (32) With the installation of the democratically elected government in 1988, relationships with other democratic governments were renewed or improved and special interest for cooperation with the PRC, India and Indonesia announced. Three Asian countries that count descendants among the Surinamese population.

From 1986 China became increasingly prominent: Suriname was in a desperate need for financial resources and received aid and soft loans for development projects (mainly infrastructure) while China implemented its One China Policy with success. Thus, China’s renewed interest in the Global South in the late 1980’s, coincides with Suriname’s search for a new partner since the Development Treaty with the Dutch was first suspended and thereafter ended.

During this second period a huge influx (33) of new Chinese entered Suriname legally as well as illegally. They were involved in projects mainly as labors or linked with entrepreneurial chain migration. It is unknown to what extend emigration from China to Suriname and the rest of the LAC is part of China’s foreign policy. In II.3 far reaching consequences of the huge influx of Xin Yimin for Suriname and Chinafication are discussed. (34)

Ad C. 2000–present. This period is characterized by investments and commercial (mainly forestry) projects, involvement in gold exploration as well as continuation of soft loans, donations, and influx (though reduced numbers compared with early 1990s) of Xin Yimin, Chinese migrants.

According to high officials, the relationship between China and Suriname is characterized by "mutual understanding, common foreign policy goals and non interference in domestic affairs". (35) Objectives such as democratization of international affairs and equality of nations, serve to accomplish solidarity on international platforms, like in the UN.

China thus became, like in other countries of the Global South, highly visible in Suriname. The country is within the Caribbean region attractive for its natural resources: especially timber and minerals. Commercial lumber projects came in focus as part of China’s worldwide search for access to raw materials/natural resources, which is related to increasing demands of the fast growing middle classes in China.

Two categories of agreements and treaties are signed between Suriname and the PRC: (1) the so called Economical & Technical Cooperation projects: gifts and soft loans for mainly infrastructural projects such as roads, low income housing, hospital and (2) commercial projects (mainly logging).

Before 1980 Multi–Annual Plans (Meerjarig Ontwikkelings Plan: MOP), composed since the 1960’s by the Planning Agency in Suriname, were approved by the Dutch parliament in the Netherlands and served as basic documents for priorities and
selection of development projects, financed out of the Dutch Development Aid fund. After suspension of the Dutch aid, China financed many of these projects. Consequently China has been perceived by part of the population as another dominant power replacing the former colonial power. From civil society this originally asymmetrical relation has been many times characterized as neo-colonization. (36)

Due to the PRC’s Open Door Policy—(i.e.: the internationalization of Chinese companies—twenty Chinese exporting enterprises were established in the country since 2000. Most are resource extraction projects (lumber) executed by Chinese companies and their preferably Chinese labor force. (37)

In sum: Suriname’s contemporary history shows that after Independence in 1975, the Dutch suspended development aid in 1982 due to a massacre under military regime. When Suriname got into serious financial problems, it went for aid from the PRC. China signed from 1986 onwards Economic and Technical Cooperation treaties with the country. Donations and soft loans became lifelines and contributed to the survival of the regime. China replaced the Dutch. It is evident that further intertwining of Suriname’s economy with the PRC will result, despite critiques, in predictable inseparable solidarity of Suriname with China’s international policies in the future. (38)

The next section deals with the interests and political orientation of today’s ruling elites.

II. 2. Relationship with China and Attractiveness of the PRC model: Socialism with Chinese Characteristics

Since diplomatic relations were establishment in 1976, democratic as well as military governments have had good relationships with China. Until recently ideology never has been an issue.

After the elections in 2010 the Surinamese President announced policy changes in Foreign Affairs. One of the most significant is the change in status and influence of the PRC. China's position is now preponderant. The PRC is recognized as "the most important country in Suriname's international relations". (39) Herewith it appears to be outpacing the influence of The Netherlands.

A Surinamese high official defines the relationship with the PRC as a South–South Development Partnership (40). According to him, the relationship is even a de facto strategic partnership because China’s and Suriname’s foreign policy goals are largely similar.

In replacing The Netherlands, China is considered by officials as well a donor country within the South–South scope. Equality characterizes the nature of the relationship. Quote: "The views of Suriname’s experts are decisive. This is in sharp contrast with
Suriname's subordinated position during negotiations for financial aid with the Dutch. (41) It is evident that China's behavior contributed to the attractiveness of the PRC. In policymaking as well as diplomatic circles the relationship with the PRC is characterized with the keywords recognition, equality, mutual political support, Third World solidarity. (42) The Chinese development model is seen as one of the core sources of the country's attractiveness. It is "argued that this model has already attracted followers in parts of Africa and Latin America, where left-leaning governments have explicitly sought economic development without far-reaching liberalization" (43).

The attractiveness of the Chinese model in Suriname is linked with political interests of the major party in the ruling coalition. (44). Relevant deliberations about the PRC model and its attractiveness for Suriname in policy circles are quoted: "decision making is more efficient with regard to implementation of objectives. If a substantial part of the population can rise out of poverty like in China it should be examined whether it is feasible. Question whether the ruling elite (NDP) will be able to implement the model. The previous ruling political elites (New FRONT) are western oriented and will take the opposite view in the National Assembly (DNA).

The ethnic composition of the population is seen as the most important handicap. A mind shift is a precondition. Venezuela, Cuba, Bolivia already choose for the model. De facto Brazil too, for diplomatic reasons not openly". (45)

Though China's foreign policy goals contributed substantially to its attractiveness in circles of the government and ruling political parties, Suriname does not comply fully with all its objectives. Four crucial objectives illustrate where Suriname agrees or disagrees.

- Non-interference in domestic affairs. This objective is enthusiastically underlined by the government. It is in contrast with foreign policies of the West: free from moral issues! For example, the crushing critiques in the West (US and EU) on the issue of the Amnesty Law which was passed in the Surinamese parliament (DNA) by majority rule in 2011.

- Mutual respect and recognition. This has been challenged when the PRC’s demand for support on its Human Rights position in Geneva was neglected by Suriname.

- Equality: In China's acceptance of prioritizing and selecting of development projects of the MOP by the Surinamese government, financed by the PRC, equality has been tested.

- Implementation of cultural and education projects like classes in Chinese culture in primary schools and a course "Mandarin for Surinamese officials/civil servants" in KNTS (Kong Ngie Tong Sang). (46). Both projects were announced this year by the Chinese ambassador, Yang Zi Gang 5/14/14.

The debate whether the Chinese model should be exported (47) and whether it is valid for Suriname is irrelevant under the present circumstances. The ruling elite uses the model for legitimizing a system it already carried out under military rule.
The Surinamese people have no vital interest in the model or the PRC. One exception is a negligibly small number of supporters of the China model, organized in the former CPS (Communist Party of Suriname. 1971–1983). (48) Shifts in the PRC from communism to socialism with Chinese characteristics have gone largely unnoticed in the wider society.

The first election held at the end of military rule in 1987, showed that the population rejected the model. The outcome of the next elections in 2015 will show whether shifts emerge.

China’s economic soft power – investment and soft loans and donation – have not prevented the emergence of a negative image of China and Chinese in civil society. Increased aggressiveness towards Chinese in shops, robberies and other criminal acts are more frequently reported in the mass media and contribute to stigmatization of local Chinese. In most cases though it concerns the new huge warehouses. China's interests should, however, not be confused: in contrast with colonial policies the PRC’s interest is not to control the population through alignments and assistance of the ruling elites. It even does not prefer to incorporate locals in their labor force.

In sum: The ruling political coalition/government holds in contrary to civil society/or the general population a positive attitude towards China and the chinese. A similar distinction occurs with regard to attractiveness of the PRC’s political system. The electorate will decide in 2015 whether the ruling elites will have the opportunity to reinstate in a "democratic setting" the political organization under military rule of the 1980’s.

While ruling elites are in favor of the Chinese model, the majority of the people are not interested in it. This is, as is shown in the next chapter, quite the opposite when focusing on the Xin Yimin. The negative impact of their behavior on Chinalification will be discussed there.

II.3 Chinese Soft Power: negative impact of the Xin Yimin

An important component of the PRC’s soft power is dissemination of its culture through movies, newspapers or CCTV, to establish a positive and attractive image among people in the Global South. However, in Suriname’s wider society public diplomacy does not have a profound impact. Compared with the popular Indian movies, in theaters as well as on TV, Chinese movies are rare. Chinadaily in English is not available and CCTV is not broadcasted in English (49). Cultural shows or exhibitions are limited to special occasions and a small, not very active circle of Friends of China exists in Paramaribo, the capital. Participation, however, of the embassy of the PRC in celebration of 150 years Chinese presence in Suriname in 2013 was absolutely spectacular and should
be marked as one of China’s successes in the country.
PRC diplomats in Suriname are, however, confronted in the mass media with sharp critiques from civil society about the behavior of New Chinese, and Chinese enterprises. Moreover, Chinese are frequently the victims of criminals. In June 2014 the embassy of the PRC requested in a letter to the government more security for its nationals. (50)

The perception of New Chinese. The association with Xin Yimin is largely negative in Suriname. Quote: "they are disrespectful, unreliable, corrupt, exploiting locals, their women are prostitutes, racist, take over the country, don’t try to integrate" (51). The behavior of the New Chinese negatively impacts the image of Chineseness including Surinamese with distant Chinese heritage. Demography plays a role: due to immigration between 1990 and 1992 the Chinese population in Suriname grew from less than 4% to more than 10%. (53) Apart from those who are linked to Chinese projects: workers, managers, technicians, there are others, independents, connected to entrepreneurial chain migration: merchants, retailers, traders, owners of enterprises; property owners of gold concessions. In Paramaribo as well as the rural areas the increase in permits (for exploiting warehouses, hardware stores, gas stations, street markets etc., as provided by the government or obtained by subletting with permit) is strongly condemned.

The huge influx and the clear visibility of New Chinese contributed to the label of China's "neo-colonization of Suriname"

Suriname and its people, however, are as well part of the problem because the chinese companies and Xin Yimin operate in a soft state. (54) Paul Tjon Sie Fat reported correctly in his empirical study that the "informal nature of social-economic life and lack of strong institutions means building extensive personal networks".....Indeed the Republic of Suriname belongs to the category of young states with a not fully processed colonial past and weak institutions, characterized by electoralism as well as patronage and corruption.

New Chinese as well as Chinese enterprises profit from the weakness of the soft State. Obstacles in the bureaucratic apparatus are "moved" and preferential treatments are "arranged" in the administration. Labor rights are not enforced on Chinese workers etc. Quote: " everything is feasible in Suriname. It just depends on how many zero's you want to put behind the 1". (in US $) (55)

In the DNA (National Assembly) sharp critiques are heard about the absence of a population policy and the problematic behavior of the new Chinese, accompanied by accusations about loss in jobs to Chinese workers since the PRC’s companies have a mainly Chinese labor force. This is facilitated and secured by a special China immigration policy allowing Chinese enterprises to work with their labor under some easy ignorable conditions and labor regulations.

China has changed its migration policies since 1978 (56). Chinese migrants are considered to stay connected with China and to foster bounds between China and previous generations of Chinese immigrants and their descendants in Suriname. Both categories are supposed to contribute from abroad to China’s development and wealth
from abroad. The Suriname State accepts the interpretation of Chineseness as long as Chinese presents themselves as loyal citizens (57). This PRC's objective however, can easily conflict with Suriname's policies of nation building and absorption of immigrants. Via its embassy China is connected with the activities of the state-owned companies and new Chinese. The embassy does not try to control Chinese of Suriname, rather they stimulates "by patriotic rhetoric recognition of the unity of the Chinese state. Similar to the rhetoric to mobilize loyalty to the PRC among ethnic Chinese in Suriname." (58)

Does the PRC implicitly implement a worldwide overseas population policy as part of the Go Global Strategy of 1999? It seems that with investments abroad, Chinese enterprises have made arrangements with governments to make use as much as possible of their own labor force. Critiques from abroad show, as in Suriname, that adjustment to the host country is problematic. Consequently behavior of the Xin Yimin is undercutting successful Chinafication.

III. Chinese Soft power and Chinafication in Suriname
1. Link between Chinese Soft Power and Chinafication

Attractiveness is an essential attribute in the definition of Chinafication. As already mentioned in I.3 there is a link (59) between soft power and Chinafication because the main objective of Chinese soft power is attractiveness which serves to receive international support and respect for its foreign policies and gains status and prestige as a world power. Gaps emerge though between the ruling elites and the population. The migration issue (see II.3) is the best example. Critiques by civil society on the behavior of the Xin Yipin and Chinese enterprises have a damaging effect on China's attractiveness among Surinamese: local workers in Chinese enterprises complains about denigrating attitude of instructors, labor conditions and low wages. Clients in Chinese warehouses complain about impolite, rough language and poor quality of Chinese products. An enormous discontent exists about construction of huge buildings of supermarkets, timber sales etc. in residential areas. It is evident that experiences reported are undermining the attractiveness of China and Chinafication. They even may become a destabilizing factor in Surinamese domestic politics. According to a high official of the Ministry of Labor and Housing:

"Only drastically reduction of immigration of Xin Yimin (60) and implementation of policies to guarantee the return of Chinese labor force after completion of projects can solve these problems".

The outcome of China's implemented foreign policy goals in Suriname show that the PRC's economic policies and migration policies are contradicting Chinafication effects. Economic policies (cooperation and commercial projects) contributed to Suriname's development and to China's attractiveness. while migration policies resulted in public
resentment and have the opposite effect. Nota bene civil society can express its unhappiness with China and the New Chinese in NGO's on international podiums.

Chinese soft power failed in Suriname in civil society because of communication and behavior of the Xin Yimin among the population. Chinafication progressed in policy and government circles and stagnated in the wider society.

The next paragraph illustrates the rapid Chinafication in government circles.

### III.2 From "Socialism with Chinese Characteristics" to "The Chinese Model with Surinamese Characteristics"

The Chinese model is according to 'Anver Versi and Richard Lapper (61) attractive in parts of the Global South and implemented in some countries in Africa and Latin America. These countries have though unlike the PRC no one party system. The so-called "left-leaning governments that sought economic development without far-reaching liberalization(62)" are countries of the Global South with formally a multi-party system. They are plural democracies more or less curtailed.

In the processes of changes in the PRC shifts and new features are identified. It is questionable whether President Xi Jinping's socialist core values fits in the Marxist-Leninist ideology with core values: common ownership of property and equality of people. In today's China free access to goods and services does not exist. The hukou system(63) and disputes after 1978, about inequality of social rights between migrant workers in cities and those who reside in their place of birth make a good example. To understand Socialism with Chinese Characteristics, it seems that pragmatism is the keyword leading to two main features of the model: (1) political decision making in the one party system and (2) a more or less state controlled market economy.

The Chinese model is attractive for the ruling political elite in Suriname because it can serve as a vehicle to control political, social and economic processes. In Suriname elections are perceived as a democratic right. Reality testing has been already in 1987 when the electorate's overwhelming choice was for the democratic parties. Cancellation or abolition of elections in Suriname is not feasible. This holds as well for the Chinese model with Surinamese characteristics. Therefore the most significant differences between the two models is Suriname's "multi-party" system and electoralism. Thus legitimating of the regime will be by 5 yearly elections. The outcome is decisive. The difference between this model and the authoritarian system under military rule in the 1980s is the "democratic setting": (a) the elections and (b) the (since 2010 curtailed) DNA (National Assembly) labeled by the president as a puppet theater (poppenkast). The Chinese model with Surinamese characteristics is quasi democratic with authoritarian features and a market economy.

Conflicting ideas, values etc. of democratic forces expressed in the 1980s are again relevant. Democratic standards contradict with authoritarian decision making in the office of the president e.g.: to deal with critical issues a new created body took over tasks of
members of cabinet. Consequently structural conflicts are inherent to the model in Suriname and consistent with experiences during the military regime of the 1980s.

**III.3 Chinflication: The Suriname case reviewed in a nutshell**

The PRC has profited from post-colonial domestic developments in Suriname. Most prominent the shift from democratic to military regime in the 1980s and suspension of Dutch development aid after serious violation of human rights (December, 1982). Declining influence of the Dutch facilitated Chinflication in Suriname. It accelerated China's indirect interference in the country's economy, and finally to the PRC's replacement of Holland and its preponderant position in the country's international relations.

A review of the PRC's foreign policies in Suriname show rapid Chinflication in the country. However, the process is characterized by discrepancies and inconsistencies. The most important discrepancies are identified:

1. The Chinese model. Attractiveness by the ruling power elites for socialism with Chinese characteristics (II.2), while oppositional political circles as well as civil society demands democratic standards and human rights in a multi party system.
2. Immigration policies. Critiques from civil society on the PRC and the ruling elites. Due to government's special regulations with Chinese enterprises for supply of Chinese workers and supply of permits to commercial chain migrants, unemployment increased and demographic "ethnic imbalances" emerged because the Chinese segment increased from 4 to more than 10% of the population in the early 1990s.

Comprehensive Chinese soft power policies are undercut by inconsistencies:

1. Behavior of Xin Yimin and anti-Xin Yimin behavior of Surinamese resulted in public resentment which had a negative effect on accomplishments of cooperation projects.
2. The previous and contemporary Chinese migration waves do not associate: A gap in values and behavior between the Surinamese of Chinese descendents and the Xin Yimin is significant. This disconnection of the old and new Chinese frustrates the PRC's objective of unifying all overseas Chinese in contributing to the development and wealth of China.
3. Disagreement on Human Rights issues (HR Geneva II.2) undercut the PRC's expectation of uninterrupted alignment and solidarity with China on international political issues.
4. Refusal of financing of an educational project (course mandarin) at the university of Suriname undercut policies of dissemination of Chinese cultural.

*Soft power* diplomacy with Chinese characteristics has *not always facilitated Chinflication in civil society. The government however endorsed and promotes the PRC's prime goals*: (1) extern-political (support and solidarity with China's international politics). *64* and (2) domestic-economic (extraction of natural resources for domestic consumption *65*). In politics as well as economics both countries profited from the relationship: Suriname's behavior in terms of support and solidarity with the PRC's
international politics and objectives, are consistent. The alignment of the country with China is illustrated by its voting record in the UN. The economic component: Cooperation projects (infrastructural) and commercial projects, is vital to the 'Suriname's development and economy and export to the PRC of lumber contributes to increasing domestic consumption: "mutual interest".

Chinafication for the ruling political elite is more than a lifeline. It considers the Chinese model as proof that with local adjustments an authoritarian system, similar to that implemented under military rule in the 1980s, can work well for Surinam. In seeking support for further implementation of its policies of restructuring the political (democratic) system, the government in Suriname has an invested interest in the PRC and its guarantee of policies of non-interference. The growing critiques from oppositional circles in parliament as well in the wider society about democracy undermining government policies may result first in comments and perhaps followed by sanctions of the West. China's non-interference policy will be perceived as real assistance to prevent destabilization in Suriname.\textsuperscript{(66)} If clustering of oppositional parties does not occur in 2015 after the elections, in a shift of power elites in Suriname, current domestic policies will continue and the Chinese model with Surinamese characteristics will have a better chance to be implemented. Irrespective of a shift of power elites the PRC is assured of pro-China policies and continuity of projects: China's popularity in all political parties in Suriname, is still based on Deng Xiaoping's motto about the color of the cat (it does not matter of the cat is black or white as long as it catches mice). Consequently all parties are assured of favors and contributions of the PRC.

In sum: In contrast with the left oriented anti-Dutch military regime of the 1980s, civil society despite declining Dutch influence in the 1980s, kept dominant western values. Regime shifts from political, democratic standards to authoritarian rule are in the 1987 elections rejected by civil society.
In adapting the Chinese model the ruling elites of the 1980's now in power, as in the 1980s, manifest the gap between civil society and governing elites. Public resentment about Chinese enterprises and the Xin Yimin's (New Chinese migrants) behavior as well as China's migration policies are three more factors contributing to sharp differences between the power elites and civil society with regard to attractiveness of China and the Chinese in Suriname.
Chinafication is manifest in Suriname. In announcing The United Business Fair, CEO Edward Lee said in a TV interview 7/2/2014 when questioned about China: "The takeover is a fact. We have to find ways to go around it". (67)

\textit{Chinafication in Suriname}......
Footnotes

1. Democratic values were challenged in the Western Hemispheric Global South (WHGS) by communist USSR and its proxy, Cuba, during the Cold War (1950–1990). The ideological competition between the West (US and West Europe) and the East (USSR) formally ended in the 1990s with the collapse of the USSR. Since then the PRC’s presence in the Third World is increasing.


3. In this paper no distinction is made between the Global South and Third World,; See in Strategic Partnership: a new form of association in International Relations? p.29. by Luis Blanco. 2011. “China does not promote its political system. Its impact started with economics [trade and investment] followed by strategical as well as comprehensive and cooperative partnership featuring equality, mutual benefit and common development”. See also : 4the China–CELAC Forum.


6. China has established with the CARICOM international relations. Recently, in 2013. Xi Jinping offered during his visit to Trinidad & Tobago to those member states not recognizing Taiwan (Belize, Haiti, St Vincent and the Grenadines, St Lucia and St Kitts and Nevis), 3 billion US dollars in concessional loans. Remarkable though the visit of Joe Biden, US Vice President some days prior to the visit of Xi Jinping, was reported in the Digital Guardian, June 5, 2013 "CARICOM must exploit US, China geopolitical rivalry" by Tony Fraser: The US Vice President, Joe Biden, essentially said by his presence, that the Caribbean continues to be the American backyard, even if at times others are allowed to pass through. On the other side with a fair amount of quiet aggression, the emerging power came from the Far East to assert that ".

7. More over President Xi Jinping made the point that “China always looks on its relationship with the Caribbean from a strategic perspective and we are committed to the building of a comprehensive and co-operative partnership.” Further, he pointedly sought to identify China as a developing country.

The China–Caribbean Economic and Trade Cooperation Forum PRC is another framework including Cuba as well. The latest meeting has been held in 2013 T&T.
The China–CELAC Forum provide according to Hong Lei (spokesman of China’s Foreign Ministry “an important platform for the growth of bilateral comprehensive and cooperative partnership featuring equality, mutual benefit and common development.”

Also see: China’s Push Into "America's Backyard" by Shannon Tiezzi 8 feb. 2014 in The Diplomat

The United States has been quite vocal about its "pivot to Asia," but as Washington seeks to further its influence in the Asia-Pacific, China has been quietly upping its own importance to Central and Latin America. Now China is making a push to further its engagement with countries in the Western Hemisphere, as evidenced by the announcement of a new dialogue mechanism. The Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC), which met in Cuba from January 28 to 29, adopted a statement announcing the establishment of a China–CELAC Forum.
The China–CELAC Forum, according to Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokesman Hong Lei, is designed to provide "an important platform for the growth of bilateral comprehensive and cooperative partnership featuring equality, mutual benefit and common development." Hong added that the establishment of this forum "fully speaks to the shared wish of Latin American and Caribbean states to enhance their overall cooperation with China.” The first meeting is expected to take place later in 2014.

8. From an analysis mentioned by Liu Haifang is learned that these policies started in the 1950s with cultural diplomacy that formed the basis for China’s general foreign policy. With China’s tremendous economic growth its global position changed as well as its ambitions in the past two decades. Soft power is an integral part of the PRC’s international politics. It is supposed to facilitate China’s acceptance as a peaceful rising global power.


10. China has in the Global South as well as in the West and Russia Strategic Partnerships. To implement policies for peaceful rise and harmony, it focuses on alliance. The past and recent presence and/or absence of the West in the Global South is not the issue. So, for full understanding of the effect of China’s presence, the significance of the colonial past or neo colonialism in the South are not ignored, but for the purpose of this paper marginalized. It is crucial however to accentuate that the decrease of the
West’s influence economically as well as politically in the Global South since the collapse of the USSR in 1991, correlates with an increasing impact of China in the South. In the case of Suriname this is very well illustrated


This author takes the view that colonization is *unchi*; Chinese. From Chinese history can be learned that China and tributary states had a vertical dependency relation of another nature. Neocolonialism" means "when a powerful country uses its economic and political influence to control another country." according to Longman Dictionary. See: Commentary: Win-win cooperation disproves accusation of "China's neocolonialism in Africa" Xinhua 5/5/2014.

13. Does. in this globalized world in which border states are not anymore defined by geographical location, China creates in the South a new kind of tributary states that are sovereign in internal affairs but in interstate affairs have to align with China?

14. Remarkable the PRC indicated that its leadership will, in contrast with the West, concentrate on moral codes, culture and politics instead of economics and military strength. Does this means a shift from hard power to soft power or a preference for soft power (Sun Tzu).

15. Defining Chinafication more precisely is needed. I have started with a working definition and describing the features. Work in progress. A theoretical framework is needed as well as more in depth analyses. Economics, education, cooperation, politics, diplomacy etc are areas of influence when applying labels as Americanization and Chinafication.


18. The inter-relationship between soft power and Chinafication is crucial. By operationalizing the concepts more insight can be obtained about a probable correlation between Chinese foreign policies/public diplomacy and Chinafication in the Global South. As such it is useful for evaluation of the PRC’s position in international politics.

19. Xinhuanet 1-1-2014. "Xi/China to promote cultural soft power". Question whether the China Dream is indeed about the core socialist values (common ownership of property and equality of people including free access to goods and services). In the PRC social-economic inequality, loss of social and economic rights and private ownership are in contradiction with the core socialist values. Or: Core socialist values with Chinese characteristics

20. Xin Yimin means new migrants. This term is used in the PRC. It is an international name used for migrants who left the PRC after 1978. In Suriname Xin Yipin is used in local chinese newspapers to refer to the so called 'new chinese'. See also p. 100. In: Chinese New Migrants in Suriname. Paul Tjon Sie Fat. 2009. Amsterdam. chapter 2: Chinese Immigration 1998-2004. page 97-104


22. Analyses in this section is based on publications, interviews as well as public statements by members of Council of Ministers, high ranked officials, and diplomats. Anonymity has been guaranteed to interviewees.


24. The Republic of Suriname is a representative democracy with a constitution and a 51- member unicameral National Assembly.

25. First major coup February 1980 lasted until December 1987, and second minor so called telephone coup December 1990 which lasted until may 1991.

27. Behavior and conceptions illustrate fundamental differences with regard to the political system e.g. structural changes by degradation of assignments of members of the council of ministers in the executive branch or in the legislative branch the unconstitutional adoption of the amnesty law.

28. By the president and his cabinet. This is the inner circle, a new decision making and policymaking body with far reaching tasks/competence, established by the president after elections of 2010.

29. In 1976 the embassy of China was opened in Paramaribo. In 1998 The embassy of Suriname was opened in Beijing.

30. Many times confused with so called development projects.


32. Noteworthy that in 1986 the military regime borrowed as well US $ 40 billion of Taiwan. This debt was neglected and after all the ROC took assets. See also Tjon Sie Kiet 2009, page 140.

33. See graph page 98 in Tjon Sie Kiet. Chinese New Migrants in Suriname (2009). The huge influx of new Chinese is discussed all over the Caribbean. It is unknown whether we are confronted with a population policy of the PRC or whether priority for its own cheap labor force and to prevent problems about working conditions with locals.

34. Less than 4% of the population in Suriname is registered (according to the census of 2011) as Chinese. However, Zijlman and Ensor (two dutch social scientists). See Tjon Sie Fat, P (2009) p.250, 2002 recorded 70.000 Chinese living in Suriname, which is 14% of the population of (2011 census) 492.000 (491.989) should be Chinese. Statistics show that between 1985 and 2008, 45.000 non-resident Chinese Nationals entered Suriname (via the airport). The highest influx is in 1990, 1991 and 1992 when 23000 Chinese entered Suriname legally. Furthermore Illegal entrance is reported via Guyana, crossing of the Corantine River (back track route). And, no data available about how many left! According to Tjon Sie Fat (2009) : "there is no way to accurately track the number of PRC citizens or ethnic Chinese entering and leaving the country. p.99.

35. Interview May 2014.

36. The label of neo-colonization for China in civil society can be explained in part by a confusion about China’s position with regard to financing of technical cooperation projects, the so called dutch development projects. Thus: the PRC is seen as replacing the dutch in continuing the "Santa Claus" role. The nature of the relationship between Suriname and the PRC is de facto significant different and it is not correct to confuse it with the post colonial Dutch–Suriname relationship.

37. According to China’s ambassador Yang Zizang there are 20 chinese enterprises in Suriname. The trading volume increased from US $35 million in 2003 to US $ 200 million in 2013. Suriname is the PRC’s biggest trade partner in the Caribbean. Source Starnieuws: Suriname gets new rating from chinese Dagong Global Credit Rating Co.7/5/2014. See Also: Suriname Imports, according to Investment Guide Suriname, 2013. Paramaribo, from the PRC are mainly household items, electronics, and machines. The trade balance is in the advantage of China. Suriname is planning to diversify its exports to China. Interview May 17,2014. In his speech 1/29/2014 China’s ambassador Zizang referred to Suriname’s export of lumber and fish, and indicated to expect an extension of agriculture, mining and electronic products.

38. In order to be secured from support, the government’s strategy is solid embedding in leftist oriented regional blocs.

39. interview with high official May 2014.

40. Ibid.

41. Ibid.

42. Ibid.


44. Interview February 2014

45. Ibid.

46. In Suriname no Confucius Institute has been founded so far. At the University of Suriname a course in Mandarin was held once only because of a lack of finance.

47. For pro and cons of export of the chines model as soft power in foreign policy, see: Zaoguang Yanghui vs Yousuo Zuowei. See: Soft Power with Chinese Characteristics. The Ongoing Debate. Bonnie S. Glaser and Melissa E.
In the 1970's three socialist (oriented) parties existed in Suriname. The KPS (Communist Party Suriname 1971–1983) participated twice in elections (1973 and 1977) under the name Democratic People's Front DVF. They were like the other two, a small party. Leftist surinamese students in the Netherlands (the 1960 and 70's) participated in the parties. The KPS was the first founded in Suriname. Members were local students and academics returned from Holland. In contrast with the other two leftist parties the KPS did not originated from a student movement in the Netherlands. Its members who studied in Holland were mainly students from Utrecht and Amsterdam. For Political Surinamese student movements in Holland in the 1960's, see Betty Sedoc-Dahlberg. Surinaamse studenten in Nederland, Amsterdam 1972.

The State TV channel (STVS) broadcasted CCTV for a short time in the early 2000s.

According to research (2009) of Paul Tjon Sie Fat the old Chinese contrast themselves with the new Chinese with regard to contamination, business and submission. See table 7, p.384

Chineseness generally used to refer to the condition of being ethnic chinese.//or: the meaning of being chinese. See: What''Chineseness'', whose Chineseness''?: A preliminary assessment of Sinicisation''in the discussion of culture and ethnicity in postcolonial Singapore. by Siao See Teng. in: Essex Graduate Journal of Sociology 2005. UK.

Less than 4% of the population in Suriname is registered (according to the census of 2011) as Chinese. However, Zijlman and Enser (two dutch social scientists). See Tjon Sie Fat, P (2009) p.250, 2002 recorded 70,000 chinese living in Suriname, which means 14% of the population (of 2011 census) 492,000 (491.989) should be chinese. Statistics show that between 1985 and 2006, 45,000 non-resident Chinese Nationals entered Suriname (via the airport). The highest influx is in 1990, 1991 and 1992 when 23000 chinese entered Suriname legally. Furthermore Illegal entrance is reported via Guyana, crossing of the Corantine River (back track route). And, no data available about how many left! According to Tjon Sie Fat (2009) : "there is no way to accurately track the number of PRC citizens or ethnic Chinese entering and leaving the country. p.99.


Interview February 2014 .

In China: Under the Qing dynasty emigration was seen as a serious, unforgivable crime. In 1866 arrangements were made for migration. See: Tjon Sie Fat, P. p 64 – 70.


The inter–relationship between soft power and chinafication is crucial. By operationalizing the concepts more insight can be obtained about a probable correlation between chinese foreign policies/public diplomacy and chinafication in the Global South. As such this term is useful for evaluation of the PRC’s position in international politics.

Further: It is unclear whether an emigration policy of the PRC is implemented. Given the tremendous importance economically as well as politically of China’s support to Suriname, the country will despite negative consequences continue policies of solidarity with the PRC. Because of mutual interest the PRC will despite the increasing aggressiveness to its nationals, not suspend donations and soft loans to carry out cooperation projects or withdraw from commercial extraction projects. Given the positive attitude of the government towards China, the PRC is assured of Suriname’s support for reaching its foreign policy goals.
Thus support of the Global South for the PRC’s rise to a world power. This second goal is of vital importance. China advocates a Peaceful rise and Harmony. According to the different schools of thought the pivotal question is whether China’s rise will be peaceful and conflicts can be prevented.

To fulfill demands of its increasing middle class. The tropical forest and minerals with lumber and more recently gold are interesting commodities for the PRC. Most prominent in the country is The Greenheart Group. This lumber enterprise has access to more than 400,000 ha of forest in Suriname.

It remains to be seen whether substantial support will be offered by leftist member states of regional organizations.

STVS (Suriname’s state television foundation) Interview with Edward Lee. CEO Magazine. 7/2/2014.