Towards Consensus after Bandung:

Global Public Goods and Mitigating Uneven Development

Decades after the 1955 Bandung Conference divisions between peoples, nations and regions are more pronounced with uneven development in the postcolonial experience of states and markets. The (re)emergence of non-state actors, particularly transnational firms, has initiated and sustained moves away from liberalism, and the uneven impact of global capitalism has of necessity shaped increasingly authoritarian institutions of state power whether most viscerally in China and Russia, and emerging markets elsewhere, or with more cultural ideological nous within the G7 nations that includes the US. In this context of shrinking space for citizens everywhere, it becomes important to seek common ground to enhance the ecology of poverty and the poverty of ecology. This paper makes the case for an invigorated role for the discussion of public goods at the global level, to not only pay our respects to Bandung, but to also seek to operationalize the vision of those leaders via a new language that is more technical in addressing the problems of the last 50 years, but in a manner that includes those losing out in so-called rich countries too. When coalitions extend beyond South-South, to also be North-South, changes that can re-embed societal preferences might just be possible.

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Introduction

More than half a century after the 1955 Bandung Conference, divisions between peoples, nations, and regions are more pronounced than ever, with uneven development in the postcolonial experience of states and markets. The (re)emergence of non-state actors, particularly transnational firms, has initiated and sustained moves away from liberalism, with the uneven impact of global capitalism shaping increasingly authoritarian institutions of state power used in the service of markets dominated by the interests of large transnational corporations rather than those of citizens. With deep economic and social divisions within as well as between countries increasingly blurring traditional boundaries between the global ‘North’ and ‘South’ all reinforced by ecological crisis, it is now crucial to seek out common ground to address global social and economic inequalities to improve the lot of the marginalized around the world.

Concerned with problem-solving in our times, this paper proposes that the cooperative spirit of Bandung can be furthered through use of the language of global public goods to address pressing problems that stretch beyond jurisdicational boundaries. In taking up this task, it critically considers the uneven capitalist development that formed the historical context for the Bandung Conference, with its tenets largely ignored with the imposition of neoliberalism by Western powers and the worsening of uneven development. The paper attempts to further the cooperative spirit of Bandung in our times to advance circumstances for common wellbeing proposing a foundation for the development of a critical language of global public goods as a basis for South-South as well as North-South cooperation. Insights from Habermas as deployed to conceptualize a critical approach to global public goods that allows space for debate between participants with varying levels of power and resources.

In proposing a critical approach to global public goods as a foundation for South-South and North-South cooperation, this paper intervenes in an effort to add to the debate about the usefulness of the concept of public goods in a dogmatic neoliberal era in which such goods are in very short supply. On the whole, with problem solving theory not emphasized in the social sciences, this debate has been understudied with little attention to developing an emancipatory approach to understanding these goods or emphasis on how to create a basis for inclusive deliberation about their nature and provision. Pieterse (2013: 171), for instance, recognizes “a shortfall of global public goods”, but does little to suggest a way forward beyond noting that a “east-south turn” may shift “the center of gravity of the public goods that are provided”, while overlooking the problem of hegemony and power. This paper seeks to move beyond the limits of this prognosis in the interest of furthering “problem solving theory” (Brown 2013a, 2013b) in IR/IPE, suggesting how critical use of the language of global public goods, understood metaphorically, is desperately needed and thus an appropriate focus for a reinvigorated vision of global action in the context of present and historical uneven development and deepening inequalities under capitalism. To this end, the first section of the paper addresses uneven capitalist development leading to the 1955 Bandung Conference. The second section considers capitalism, regionalism, and blurring boundaries between the ‘South’ and ‘North’ since the Bandung Conference. The third section focuses on global public goods, drawing on insights from Habermas to propose a critical approach to
theorizing these goods in ways that can support global dialogue and cooperation in determining their content and furthering their provision.

Understanding the Context: Uneven Capitalist Development Leading to Bandung

Eurocentrism provides a linear understanding of modernization, with capitalism and democracy presented as central tenets that the rest of the ‘backward’ world must aspire to emulate (Amin, 1989/2010). This perspective is blind to the tremendous unevenness of capitalist development historically as well as in the present. From its very beginnings, however, capitalism has had a messy trajectory through time and space with varied consequences around the globe. Neither China, nor Islamic nor Catholic trading worlds fell prey the allures of this economic system initially, with state power and religious ethics blocking primitive accumulation. With such accumulation requiring a relatively anarchic setting free of state power and weakly tied to religious ethics, it was the Hanseatic trading cities of Northern Europe that provided fertile ground for the creation of new institutions by early capitalists. The emerging English state went further with protectionist trading at the periphery of the Hansa (List 1841/1928) accessing Northern European markets by supplying goods from enclosed land with the natural safety of an island allowing capitalist accumulation. Thus capitalism subsequently took firm root in the British state, where private interests were able to not only benefit from land enclosures, but once capitalists emerged to dominate Parliament and deploy a navy, they were able to go overseas in the wake of Spanish, Portuguese, Dutch and French traders, all of whom were themselves interested in circumventing Arab and Venetian traders.

The future of capitalism, with Western European states at its center, was more or less guaranteed at the Congress of Vienna that ensured relative peace, even if the seeds of major future war were sown with the emergence of self-regulating markets along with states (Polanyi 1944/2001). With the peace of the Congress, large firms—East India-style monopolies that extracted wealth from colonies by any means necessary, including the use of colonial military and naval power—emerged in the continent via extensions of exclusive trade routes to colonies. In order to maintain the peace among the dominant powers, the British in particular maintained balances of power to thwart the dominance of any one nation. The strategic enabling of Germany at the Congress of Vienna supported by Britain not only thwarted French ambition east of the Rhine, but also led to Poland’s dismemberment, and with it capitalism’s uneven spread to the east of Europe itself—a harbinger of things to come.

In many ways the brutality visited on Poland as a result of balance of power politics in Europe foreshadowed what was to come for Africa, Asia and Latin America in the 19th and 20th centuries, which informed Bandung. The rapid spread of capitalism—via newly created state institutions that enhanced modern imperialism (Hobson 1902/1938)—meant the creation of a distinct colonial, industrial ‘North’ and a mirror of colonized, non-industrial ‘South’. Uneven development provided the context of developed vs. developing nations, the discursive accompaniments of which were civilization types, with the colonized being cast as uncivilized. Interestingly, resistance against Western imperialism came from Japan, no doubt surprising those committed to Eurocentric
discourses. Japan itself had escaped colonization by first putting to the sword proselytizing Portuguese in the 17th century and then excluding the West, except the Dutch, for the better part of the 18th and 19th centuries. After being forced open by US warships in 1854, the Japanese had to take to capitalism, industrialization and imperialism via Meiji era reforms that allowed for the development and colonization of resource rich Korea with the creation of Japanese firms aided by the military. Russian defeat at the hands of the Japanese during this time was to inspire early postcolonial movements in India and elsewhere, but not before the self-regulating market had created imbalances of power in Europe leading to atrocities of WW I.

The end of WW I saw the tenuous reestablishment of a weakened Poland with the emergence of US power in Europe. In contrast to the British role of balancing power in Europe, a global balance of power system emerged with a slowly engaging US state that had colonized western America and established dominance over Latin America to the exclusion of Europe under the Monroe Doctrine. Capitalism underpinned the establishment of the US state from coast to coast, with growth that was highly uneven between industrial and non-industrial regions. This was to allow for the emergence of cutthroat US firms under ‘robber barons’ that were continental in orientation and already among the largest in the world, and early signal of corporate capitalism with minimal rules. The emergence of the US on the global stage led to the creation of formal rules of the game with the Paris Peace Conference of 1919 leading to the League of Nations, even though the US itself stayed out of it. The US was to thwart Japanese power in the pacific and European power in the Atlantic in an attempt to maintain the status quo. WW II, fought between major powers of the world, was to include other countries as well, in particular those that were colonized on the side of their colonial power, but predicated on promises of independence and equality on the world stage. The decolonization that began soon after WW II was thus a process that began nearly a hundred years before. However, uneven capitalist development ensured that over time the different regions that emerged from formal colonial control would grow in different ways, at different times, and at different rates, with some nations subsequently emerging as new powers while other slid back into neo-colonial control, with many experiencing conditions somewhere in between.

Understood within the broad sweep of history of the modern period, the Bandung Conference was truly a meeting of the world’s periphery that has since been described as “a central moment of the period of decolonization” (Lee, 2009:82). The conference was convened by the leaders of India, Egypt, Ceylon and Indonesia and Yugoslavia1 and attended by Afghanistan, Cambodia, People’s Republic of China, Egypt, Ethiopia, Gold Coast, Iran, Iraq, Japan, Jordan, Laos, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Nepal, Philippines,

1 Peripheral Yugoslavia is an especially interesting reminder of the deep history of uneven capitalist development and the early problems and contradictions that appeared in Europe’s immediate periphery. This is also important to address when considering the role of partitioned and colonized Poland that inspired works after Marx from Luxemburg to Lenin and Trotsky, all too often overlooked in mainstream international relations. Recent work by those such as Justin Rosenberg (1994) and others has helped to address this.
Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria, Thailand, Turkey, Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam, State of Viet-Nam and Yemen. This was a gathering of great intellectuals and leaders who had managed to rid themselves of colonial overlords, but who were struggling to advance the economic interests of their nations amid the balance of power politics of the Cold War era. Leaders from newly independent African and Asian countries sought to launch cooperation between developing countries “on the basis of mutual interest and respect for national sovereignty” thus establishing a new independent identity opposed to ‘neo-colonialism’ from imperial centers whether from Western Europe, the US, the USSR, the or any other imperialistic nations of the world (Asian-African Conference, 1955:2/7).

At Bandung in 1955, emphasis was placed on restoring historical economic and cultural ties undermined by colonialism that forced each colony to revolve around distant centers of power economically. As Prashad (2007:45-46) observes, “the Bandung Spirit was a refusal of both economic subordination and cultural suppression—two of the major policies of imperialism”. To enhance independent development of the South, the Final Communiqué of the Asian-African Conference (Asian-African Conference, 1955) emphasized cooperation within the new Global South members. This was to occur through provision of “technical assistance to one another, to the maximum extent practicable, in the form of: experts, trainees, pilot projects and equipment for demonstration purposes; exchange of know-how and establishment of national, and where possible, regional training and research institutes for imparting technical knowledge and skills in co-operation with the existing international agencies” (Asian-African Conference, 1955: 2/7). The significance of the legacy of this conference has been assessed in a variety of ways (see, for instance, Tan & Acharya (eds.) 2008; Lee (ed.), 2010). Subsequently, the realities of Pax Americana and Pax Sovietica meant involvement in the Cold War, even if postcolonial leaders sought cooperation with the Western Alliance led by the US and the Eastern bloc led by the USSR. While they sought to move away from ideological conflict, they also needed the technical capabilities of both superpowers to advance postcolonial economic development.

The Bandung Conference was a difficult achievement given the complex and heterogeneous histories of the peoples represented, which made movements towards unity challenging even in the face of common colonial and Cold War challenges. Moreover, the dominant ideas of development in the times were shaped by a classical Eurocentric (racist) narrative that understood poorer countries as part of a Cartesian continuum of development, with Europe cast as the ultimate example of civilization. The oft-cited Liberal economic historian Rostow’s (1960/1991) *The Stages of Economic Growth*, for instance, provided a sweep of modern history, in which he maintained “It is possible to identify all societies, in their economic dimensions, as lying within one of five categories: the traditional society, the pre-conditions for take-off into self-sustaining growth, the take-off, the drive to maturity, and the age of high mass consumption.” This vision was underpinned by a rationalizing a-historical and Eurocentric form of economic history that subsequently came to provide the basis for Western—and especially US policy—towards postcolonial states via the Brettonwoods system. In this general context, it is not surprising that the concerns of the Bandung conference had limits, with a focus on economic matters within the existing system at the expense of broader social concerns.
Beyond Bandung: Capitalism, Regionalism, and Uneven Development Blurring Boundaries Between ‘South’ and ‘North’?

The historic proposals of the 1955 Bandung Conference led to the emergence of the Group of 77 developing countries within the UN, organized to take up key ideas further, as in the 1974 Declaration for the Establishment of a New International Economic Order. Substantial cooperation sought at Bandung emerged in the form of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), founded in 1961. The NAM held its first conference in Belgrade, led by Josip Broz Tito of Yugoslavia, Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt, Jawaharlal Nehru of India, Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, and Sukarno of Indonesia, beginning a series of conferences with heads of state meeting every three years or so (see Chart 1).

These meetings provided a forum for leaders to discuss issues of mutual concern. Portrayed in some circles as ‘talking shop’ (see, for instance, The Economist, 2011), Western powers resented the NAM collective while members of the Eastern Bloc sought to exploit it to their advantage. The NAM, in the spirit and essence of its founding, can be considered useful in that it has provided, on an ongoing basis, a common platform for representatives from the South to air grievances about the global political and economic system run by Northern powers. Although the Cold War forced Pakistan, Turkey and the Philippines into the Western camp, along with Cuba to the Soviet side, the Bandung Conference had laid early foundations of non-alignment and consideration of social and economic development of postcolonial peoples. With issues such as ending Apartheid and tenuous commitments to cooperation despite vast differences among participants and the divisions of the international system in the Cold War period.
and achieving the independence of Namibia, decolonization and economic inequity continuing to dominate, the NAM provided—and continues to provide—an outlet for many postcolonial countries, with the 2015 meeting scheduled to take place in Caracas.

Along with NAM, the UN came to be an important form in which to pursue interests of postcolonial states. In the 1960s, developing states used the General Assembly as a venue in which to express problems with the international political and economic situation that were impacting their peoples. As reprinted in Ahmia (ed.) (2012), the 1963 ‘The Joint Declaration’ of the 75 Developing Countries (Group of 75) at the 18th Session of the United Nations General Assembly echoed the Bandung agenda in important respects, declaring the General Assembly should adopt concrete measures to reach basic agreement on a new international trade and development policy. Topics addressed in ‘The Joint Declaration’ included:

1. creation of conditions for expanding trade between countries;
2. progressive reduction and early elimination of barriers and restrictions impeding exports of the developing countries;
3. increase in the volume of exports of developing countries in primary products to industrialized countries;
4. expansion of markets for exports of manufactured and semi-manufactured goods from the developing countries;
5. provision of more adequate financial resources at favorable terms so as to allow developing countries to increase imports of capital goods and industrial raw materials;
6. improvement of invisible trade of the developing countries;
7. improvement of institutional arrangements, including, if necessary, the establishment of new machinery and methods for implementing the decisions of the Bandung Conference (Ahmia (2012: 7).

Overall, the 1963 ‘Joint Declaration’ aimed to bring more “stable and healthy international economic relations in which they can increasingly find from their own resources the means required for self-sustaining growth” (Ahmia (ed.), 2012: 7).

Developing countries sought to push the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) to enable the acceleration of economic development, seeing this an important “instrument for promoting stability and security in the world.” (Ahmia (ed.), 2012: 7). Yet it is crucial to recognize that the areas under consideration were still narrowly addressed economic outcomes that still focused on aggregate numbers within a largely a market system that was embedded in the liberal order created by the Brettonwoods institutions. This meant ignoring the crucial role of firms that were becoming increasingly powerful in the 20th century as in the 19th century at the height of imperialism, despite early warnings of “sovereignty at bay” (Vernon, 1971).

Despite intentions expressed at Bandung in 1955 and later in the 1963 ‘Joint Declaration’ and after, uneven development went on to become more pronounced with the rise of neoliberalism as a political economic project shaping policy orientations the world over after the Cold War especially. With neoliberal emphasis on markets as self-correcting,
transnational firms increasingly came to dominate and states to support rather than limit this process (Strange, 1996). In this context, firms from the North and South have both entrenched and created uneven development and political mal-development around the world. Rates of growth of different regions in the global economy have varied even more, with some locales and regions in the South experiencing faster growth that ‘catch-up’ development allows for those with lower GDP per capita, while other locales and regions have been mired in slow growth and stagnation. Within the South, regions have grown at different rates at different times:

(A) Latin America
Facing a long struggle with European imperialism to gain independence relatively early in the 19th century, Latin America nevertheless emerged in the 20th century with a result of uneven development. With its bourgeoisie divided between national aspirations and serving the interests of the metropole, the region also faced US imperial interference and dominance as US firms pushed for overthrows of elected governments, such as in Guatemala. This region’s development has been unsteady at best, with political development within countries of the region hampered by military coups. There were spurts of growth in the 1960s with ISI and then again the in the 1990s with open economies, but domination by Western capital has largely continued under new regimes of free trade.

(B) Eastern Asia (Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, ASEAN and China)
The Cold War saw Eastern Asia with favorable structural possibilities that somewhat matched the Marshall Plan and access to US markets. Not surprisingly, in this context countries in the region experienced impressive growth rates, with Japan’s ‘miracle’ and the ‘flying geese’ that saw South Korea and Taiwan followed by Southeast Asia. Japan was the first to join the OECD nations, with South Korea, Taiwan and Hong Kong also benefiting economically as frontline states in the Cold War. Southeast Asia was trailing, but rapidly emerged with economies benefiting from developmentalist policies created by Japan and access to Western markets, all disciplined by strong states. Much of this promising Cold War system was, however, to unravel with its end, as the introduction of China into this regional market led to problems. Eastern Asia faced problems of absorbing China into the market system dominated by the US and Japan, and the diversion of corporate attention to China was to lead to the Asian Financial Crisis of the 1997. With that crisis halted by US action when South Korea showed signs of stress, it was by virtue of particularly Japanese leadership in providing regional public goods that South Eastern Asia reemerged rapidly, to contribute to a region that has led global economic growth by some distance.

(C) Middle East
After WW II, the Middle East continued to be a hotbed of imperial intrigue mixed with the Isreal-Palestine question. The Cold War ensured political instability, with efforts to breakup Arab unity as different regimes had different interests. While Bandung allowed some room to maneuver, it was not enough to save the life of Nasser himself. Over the 1970s and 1980s, the Cold War contributed heavily to destabilizing the region, exacerbating the uneven capitalist growth. The end of the Cold War was to further unleash US imperial interests led by its natural resource firms, particularly in the area of
oil. In more recent times the US and European powers have been joined by China in competition for control of resources in the region, with firms from all of these power centers participating vigorously, whether in Sudan or Libya. This trend is arguably not going to change anytime soon, with the British establishing a new base in Bahrain in 2014. The Chinese navy has ambitions in the region as well, and US is more entrenched with bases now within Saudi Arabia. Ongoing conflicts in countries in the region can be seen in part as a result of peoples’ dissatisfaction with the outward orientation of the region, which generally comes at their expense.

(D) Sub-Saharan Africa
Long under the control of European powers, Sub-Saharan was important in the Cold War. Gaining independence from Europe was delayed as European powers were reluctant to leave, as was the case in Algeria and Kenya, but also in other parts of the region as well. Bundung served as a starting point to politically organize African leaders against continuing colonization, and in these leaders were able to oppose Europe successfully. Yet independence in Sub-Saharan Africa did not mean great strides, as institutions left behind by colonial powers were mostly those of coercion. With the debt crisis affecting Africa as a whole, leading to the force abortment of African socialism, growth meant uneven development. Long a space suffering brutalities of imperialism, now resources, labour and markets in this region have come to be of increasing interest to rising Asian powers India and China.

(E) The North
In addition to addressing continuing uneven development in the ‘South’ with the rise of neoliberalism and expanding power of transnational firms, it is important to consider uneven development in the ‘North’. Countries of the North have come to have Gini coefficients that are historically high, signifying a failing middle class. In the US, for instance, round after round of productivity gains have led to the destruction of the middle class, with the Gini coefficient reaching the 50 level after being in the progressive 30s in the 1960s.

Thus, what the “North” and “South” have increasingly come to share through the process of neoliberal globalization is deep inequality. Overall, inequality has continued to increase around the world, as conveyed by the rising Gini coefficient shown in the chart below:
By the year 2001, the income distribution was a champagne glass shaped, the richest 20% of the world controlled 80% of its wealth, while the poorest 20% had only 1.4%.

The existence of stark inequalities within as well as between countries in both the South and North challenges traditional North-South dichotomies, creating a far more complicated picture of privilege and disadvantage around the world. While this picture features fresh divisions, as between ‘haves’ and ‘have nots’ within the South itself, it also suggests potential grounds for global collaboration to address the shortcomings of neoliberal globalization with the rise of transnational corporations and the far-reaching inequalities this has entrenched and created around the world. All this is complicated by the destruction of the ecosystem.
Global Public Goods: A Common Language to Address Global Inequalities?

The global market system of the 21st century makes cooperation difficult. The most problematic challenge has arguably been the increasing importance of non-state actors, particularly transnational firms. The ability of large firms to change the international system from one in which states could—and often did—govern the market to one in which states support the market has been at the root of this round of globalization and its rapid spread of uneven development. States beholden to the power of capital have become increasingly unaccountable to citizens: democratic nations have become less so, while authoritarian ones have become more so. Private goods, rather than public goods, are the dominant focus and privatization the order of the day. The shrinking space for citizens in this not so new world order demands new ways of thinking about solutions. Now more than ever, there is a pressing need for IR/IPE theorizing to address ongoing poverty in both the Global South and the Global North. In this context, global public goods can offer a common language to address global inequalities that can provide a focus for South-South and North-South cooperation in our time.

Public goods are not a new idea (see, for instance Samuelson, 1954). By definition, pure public goods are non-excludable and non-rivalrous. These goods—identified as essential for a stable world capitalist system with provision by a leading power—were famously addressed by political economist Kindleberger (1986), who was concerned with US provision of such goods to stabilize the liberal international system of his day. Understood metaphorically, this category of good can be approached as one from which most can benefit—in contrast to a more pure reading that insists on non-excludability and absence of rivalrous consumption.

In the 1990s, following the many development crises of the 1980s, the UNDP-sponsored work of Kaul, Grunberg and Stern (1999) advocated for global public goods. For these authors,

Global public goods must meet two criteria. The first is that their benefits have strong qualities of publicness—that is, they are marked by nonrivalry in consumption and nonexcludability. These features place them in the general category of public goods. The second criterion is that their benefits are quasi universal in terms of countries (covering more than one group of countries), people (accruing to several, preferably all, population groups), and generations (extending to both current and future generations, or at least meeting the needs of current generations without foreclosing development options for future generations) (Kaul, Grunberg & Stern, 1999: 2-3).
This work on global public goods occurred in the heyday of the Washington Consensus—and on the heels of the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis, as it became increasingly clear that firms intent on profit making did not—and would not—provide crucial categories of public goods vital for postcolonial peoples in particular. Unfortunately, contributors to this UNDP-sponsored volume, such as Martin (1999), promote a liberal vision of global public goods—one that had already failed in due to unwillingness to address inequalities in power and resources between states within the global system as shaping capabilities and provision of global public goods in practice.

The shortcomings of liberal approaches to global public goods are apparent when considering both measures discussed in the 1963 ‘Joint Declaration’ (as reprinted in Ahmia (ed.), 2012: 7) and goods addressed several decades later by Kaul, Grunberg and Stern (1999), outlined in Chart 2.

**Chart 2: Recommended 1963 General Assembly Measures as GPGs**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1963 Joint Declaration Recommended Measures</th>
<th>Liberal Global Public Goods Expression</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Creation of conditions for the expansion of trade between countries at a similar level of development, at different stages of development or having different systems of social and economic organization;</td>
<td>Market efficiency as GPG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Progressive reduction and early elimination of all barriers and restrictions impeding the exports of the developing countries, without reciprocal concessions on their part;</td>
<td>Market of last resort as GPG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Increase in the volume of exports of the developing countries in primary products, both raw and processed, to the industrialized countries, and stabilization of prices at fair and remunerative levels;</td>
<td>Market efficiency as GPG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Expansion of the markets for exports of manufactured and semi-manufactured goods from the developing countries;</td>
<td>Market efficiency as GPG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Provision of more adequate financial resources at favorable terms so as to enable developing countries to increase imports of capital goods and industrial raw materials essential for their economic development, and better co-ordination of trade and aid policies;</td>
<td>Finance and Credit as GPG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Improvement of the invisible trade of the developing countries, particularly by reducing their payments for freight and insurance and the burden of their debt charges;</td>
<td>Anti-protectionism as a GPG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Improvement of institutional arrangements, including, if necessary, the establishment of new machinery and methods for implementing the decisions of the Bandung Conference.</td>
<td>Communication as GPG</td>
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Blind to matters of power, the liberal approach to global public goods is fundamentally about continuing the status quo. Following Bandung, the trajectory of ‘The Joint Declaration’ of 1963 was to continue with the liberal world rules with no safeguards.

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2 This crisis went on to impact other regions, until it finally arrived in the Metropole itself in 2008.
against the key unit responsible for uneven development: the transnational corporation. This continues in Kaul, Grunberg and Stern (1999), with inadequate safeguards vis-à-vis corporations that had even by this time more powerful than many postcolonial states. In this context, those such as Moore (2004) reject the concept of global public goods. Yet the concept of global public goods cannot be abandoned with the very existence of the planet under threat, as exemplified when considering ecological issues.

With a more critical sociological turn in IR, IPE and GPE scholarship, there is now potential to move beyond limited liberal approaches to consider global public goods from a critical perspective. This task, long over due, is vital to address longstanding needs of the marginalized in the Global South and the Global North in the context of centuries of uneven development under capitalism. In developing a critical approach to global public goods in the context of the great disparities in power and resources within the contemporary global system, insights from philosopher Jürgen Habermas offer a useful starting point. Habermas’s scholarship is particularly helpful in understanding the value-laden nature of knowledge itself, considering key components of a revitalized public sphere, keeping the fundamental goal of human emancipation in view, and reflecting on communicative action for a globally inclusive debate about global public goods. His work arguably offers important building blocks for an inclusive approach to deliberation about global public goods in the global system, one that can allow for the challenging work of building a basis for global cooperation in a context rife with inequality.

To begin with, Habermas (1971) has underlined that there is no such thing as disinterested or interest-free or 'value-free' knowledge. This is to say, all knowledge is fundamentally shaped by the perspectives and values of those who create it. This helps in understanding the traditional lack of focus on problem-solving theory in IR and IPE in particular by scholars from privileged positions in the Global North, who not infrequently do not have an interest in questioning the status quo. For far too long, disciplines subsidized by corporate capital have been dominated by scholars whose social and intellectual locations have mitigated against consideration of the marginalized around the world and how their circumstances can be ameliorated. Scholarship has been supposed to be objective, yet it has not been immune from self-interest, as most apparent when academics from Realist and Liberal schools of thought have become incorporated into policymaking circles to shape policy in accordance with dominant interests. The understanding that knowledge is inevitably value-laden is no less helpful in appreciating the importance and urgency of creating knowledge in the interests of South-South and North-South cooperation in an era of unequal development and power within the Global South itself.

A second key insight from Habermas that can further a critical approach to re-envisioning global public goods relates to understanding the importance of a public sphere for discourse among equals. Equality is clearly scarce at the domestic level and largely absent at the global level in the context of uneven development and exacerbated even further with neoliberalism. Yet Habermas’ (1987) insistence on the value of the public sphere, despite his most Marxist of tracts in Legimation Crisis (Habermas, 1975), alerts us of the importance of striving for the realization of this ideal locally and globally. This
is particularly so when considering responsible policy towards Southern states that have historically been exploited to advance living standards and domestic unrest in the North. With this historical exploitation the key issue at Bandung in 1955 informing the need for South-South cooperation, communication between postcolonial leaders was useful in setting the early agenda for cooperation, even if the substance of the ideas could have been more elaborate to account for the opposition to Southern interests by corporate interests in the North. Emphasis on the importance of public space highlights the need to critically consider issues of inclusion and exclusion, allowing us to begin to address how to best construct space for debate that is more genuinely globally inclusive in nature.

Habermas’s hermeneutic critique considers emancipation and action central, even with the jump from the local and national to the global. Fortuitously, existing scholarship, including attempts within the ISA’s Global South Caucus, supports movement in this direction. This can be expanded to provide not only the basis for South-South cooperation, but also for North-South cooperation, in a time of continuing if not untroubled hegemonic power in which more actors from the varied corners of the Global South are assuming leadership roles. Theoretically, this is important in a time when power disparities are keenly felt not only between the power of the West and the rest, but between the “growing economic standing of Brazil, India, and China, and the expansion of their influence beyond their traditional geographical backyards” and those subject to it, with increasingly fierce “intragroup competition for regional markets, natural resources, and political influence” (Vieira & Alden, 2011: 508, Acharya, 2014).

Habermas’ notion of communicative action in a non-coercive ideal setting offers space to begin to envision a globally inclusive debate about the essential components of the UNDP’s global public goods, which can be seen as the culmination of the debate that began in Bandung in 1955. Habermas’s (1987) *Theory of Communicative Action* can be read in terms of disagreements that are to be resolved not by fiat by the powerful, but rather via communication between parties such that consensus may be reached. In developing his argument, Habermas has underlined the importance of the use of logic and analysis to go beyond strategic (instrumental) calculation. He has made the case for the possibility of creating community that strives for agreement between different others—via communicative action—as rationality itself. In the case of global public goods, this involves reaching a consensus on the content and provision of global public goods that are emancipatory in nature through an inclusive debate in the context of uneven development and the profound inequalities in resources and capabilities that this has created.

The project outlined by Habermas requires pursuit of an ‘ideal speech situation’ for ‘citizens’ to raise moral and political concerns and to defend these by rationality alone. While such an ‘ideal’ situation seems distant from the muddy realities of global politics, it must be viewed through with the goal of problem solving, espoused at Bandung in 1955, and pursued in the interests of striving for as close an approximation as possible to this meaningful goal. When considering the plethora of suggestions and ideas that have been presented—for example the culmination of the Bandung Consensus in the G77 demands for a New International Economic Order (NIEO)—the problem of addressing
global inequalities has clearly not been related to a lack of ideas. Rather the issue has been one of deafness and the myopia, as recognized by Brown (2013a, 2013b) in his emphasis on the need for problem-solving theory to address the needs of the ‘underdog’ in world affairs. The rationality presented by Habermas, stretched to encompass language able to address a wider array of interests, would find itself consistent with inclusive debate about global public goods meaningful for those in the Global South as well as the Global North. Simply put, Habermas’s communicative rationality can be seen as an essential step towards addressing needs of all citizens of the planet instead of merely the most powerful.

In practice, in order to begin to realize this kind of communication, at the very least theorizing on global public goods must:

- Address the needs of the weakest and most marginalized—which is firstly a material issue—in the global system,
- Address exposition of the power of the hegemonic provider of global public goods at the global level, which is largely an ethical issue.

These key issues encompass both those most in need of global public goods and those best positioned to provide them. They provide grounds for moving beyond liberal approaches to public goods that do not acknowledge that the some powers are far better positioned to provide these goods than others, and for suggesting that would-be hegemons—understood here as leaders of willing followers—can have an interest in providing goods from which all can benefit in an era in which inequalities have become dangerous not only to those who experience them directly but also for those who shortsightedly perpetuate them.

Simply put, while peoples in the ‘South’ (and ‘North’) require public goods, it is a hegemonic powers, both regional and global in nature, that are best positioned to provide this category of good in material terms and which should be most motivated to do so given the importance of legitimation for hegemonic powers in general. To be clear, this is not to dismiss the significance of forms of South-South cooperation, which have been considered both more and less critically by a range of authors in a range of contexts (see, for instance, Campling, 2006; George, 2011; Vieira & Alden, 2011; Abdenur & Da Fonseca, 2013; Amanor, 2013; Vieira & Alden, 2011; Al Doyaili, Freytag, & Draper, 2013, Nel & Taylor, 2013). Rather this is to acknowledge that in addition to regional hegemons of the South, hegemonic powers of the North have a vital role to play in the provision of global public goods by virtue of both their economic capabilities and their need for legitimacy to underpin their hegemony.

Overall, this critical approach to global public goods involves two types of considerations, those of the marginalized and of the powerful, with both treated as vital in

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3 Even as recently as the writing of this paper, the G77 (within the UN) is not without its organization and followers as Bolivia took over the leadership of the group.
a truly inclusive global debate about public goods that are global in nature. This is a particularly complex project given that gaps between the rich and poor are not only vast but geographically complex, complicated by the (re)emergence of powerful China and India, and the growth of Brazil, South Africa, Nigeria, Turkey and Indonesia, among others, all stemming from uneven capitalist growth. In this complex context, Habermas’s (1987, 1990) work suggests a basis for a meaningful path to communication about the content and provision of these goods in the context of diversity and inequality shaped by neoliberalism in which transnational corporations have failed to deliver on public goods, with ever-expanding pursuit of private profit leading to an urgent need for alternative visions and practices.

In seeking a critical theory with universal values, Habermas has faced charges of Eurocentrism. Despite his critics, however, his problem solving path focused on communicative action for purposes of human emancipation allow him to move beyond the narrow limits of Eurocentrism. His ideas can be seen to provide a meaningful foundation for theory that seeks deliberation on the context and content of global public goods by key participants that include not only hegemons and immediate allies, who together are capable of providing these goods, but materially interested followers as well, who began to make their voices heard from Bandung onwards as legitimate leaders of the emerging Global South.

Ultimately, the key to global cooperation in the context of inequality lies in better understanding the benefits not only for those who receive public goods, but those who provide them. Theoretically, it is important to expose that the ideas expressed and elaborated since Bandung have always been in the interests of the more as well as the less powerful—all have a stake in a successful outcome, as we can attest to in 2015 with the ecology of poverty and the poverty of ecology. Habermas’s ideas are useful to deploy once we accept that followers at the global level do have agency to at least disagree, coming as they are from other political spaces. Disagreement can be—and is—expressed in a variety of ways. The reasonable and rational means offered by a global public goods agenda will contest hegemonic power peacefully and constructively. However, when public goods provision fails, the extremes take over, leading to actions from boycotting US as with the Chavez regime, to assaulting it as continues to be the case with the so-called “Islamist” groups in Africa and Asia, to purchasing weapons from another power as with the case of Iraq’s air force acquired from Russia despite US influence in setting

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4 A variety of charges of Eurocentrism have been made. Hostettler (2012: 11) suggests that in Habermas’s (1971) Knowledge and Human Interests the economic conception of the ideal speech situation as the very ground for rationality is Eurocentric. Moreover, as Gunaratne (2006) observes, ‘Giddens (1985) asserts that Eurocentrism raises its head when Habermas treats “oral cultures as inferior to civilizations, and particularly to the modernized West” (p. 118). Kaufman (1999) argues that ‘Habermas's theory of communicative rationality relies strongly on notions of common sense and, more seriously, cannot stand without the notion of Western superiority on which it is founded” (p. 348). Huang (1993) argues that the binary opposition between state and society in Habermas's theory of public sphere “is an ideal abstracted from early modern and modern Western experience that is inappropriate for China” (p. 216).’ These charges can be addressed without damage to the importance of a universal project when we consider the spread of the state, and the ugly re-emergence of authoritarianism through it, for the sake of maintaining capitalism and inequity.
up the regime after Saddam Hussein was overthrown and killed.\footnote{On the matter of Russia supplying the Iraqi air force see Norland (2014).} Ultimately, global cooperation over global public goods, necessarily encompassing South-South as well as North-South cooperation, stands to have important benefits for both the more and less powerful in a time in which deep-seated inequalities threaten populations in all countries in an increasingly interconnected world.

**Conclusion**

While scholars in the North and South have focused on understanding and explaining events, what has been left behind is discussion of public goods. The urgent need for these goods around the world requires creative problem-solving to address how debate about their content and provision can take place. With the liberal discussion of global public goods and its blindness to power merely ensuring yet another era of ‘Third World’ subservience, this paper has proposed a critical approach to global public goods that can overcome division between North and South, and within the South and North respectively, in an era in which these divisions are increasingly blurred by corporate dominance. Using insights from Habermas’s scholarship as a basis for reinvigorating efforts to theorize grounds for cooperation in the context of uneven development and deep-seated inequalities between and within states in a global system increasingly dominated by firms and their interests rather than citizens, the paper pursues this agenda in considering the inevitably value-laden nature of knowledge, addressing the notion of a revitalized public sphere, keeping the fundamental goal of human emancipation in view, and reflecting on communicative action in ways that can underpin a more truly globally inclusive debate about the nature and provision of global public goods in our times.

Overall, it has been argued that in the context of uneven development in the past and present and the blurring of traditional North-South dichotomies even as inequalities between ‘haves’ and ‘have-nots’ have continued to worsen, a critical approach to global public goods should be pursued as a basis for global cooperation in the interest of human emancipation. In making this argument, this paper is intended to offer a basis for furthering problem solving theory to address urgent human needs that firms ignore in the interest of private profits. Efforts to provide emancipatory alternatives, the raison d’être of critical scholars, must begin by considering how debate itself can take place in order to begin to provide a foundation for deliberation and progress. This task arguably requires both attention to history and appreciation of the divisions and inequalities that capitalism has created in its uneven development around the world. It also requires insistence on a vision of scholarly engagement with capitalism in our own age and the insights of our contemporaries around the world. Collaboration does not require commonality, but it is often inspired by a common cause. Global public goods, of benefit to all, are precisely such a cause in an era when the private interests of firms have come to dominate the public interests of peoples around the world.
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