Abstract: China and India, two growing economic powers, have become increasingly influential actors in global climate governance. At the international level, both countries have engaged in dual-track climate diplomacy. On the one hand, both countries have adopted a strategy of alignment to forge new alliances while maintaining their traditional one to facilitate their bargaining power against developed countries in international climate change negotiations under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). On the other hand, China and India have been voluntarily bandwagoning developed countries especially the US and the European Union (EU)-initiated mini-multilateral and bilateral climate arrangements. Sino-Indian dual-track climate diplomacy has made it less possible for a top-down, comprehensive global architecture to address climate change in a collectively way to be established. In other words, Sino-Indian climate diplomacy has led to the formation of “bottom-up” regime to address climate change. Moreover, Sino-India bandwagoning the non-UN climate arrangements has not only increased the scale and scope of fragmentation in global climate governance but also undercut the effectiveness, appropriateness and legitimacy of the UNFCCC process.

Key words: China; India; Climate diplomacy; Alignment; Bandwagon; Global Climate Governance

Introduction

China and India, two growing economic powers, have become increasingly influential actors in global climate governance. Given their increased greenhouse gases (GHG) emissions especially their carbon dioxide (CO₂) emissions, global climate governance could hardly hope to make a real difference without Sino-Indian meaningful participation. In other words, China and India’s policy behavior on climate change especially their climate diplomacy has significant implications on global climate governance. However, the existing literature on Sino-Indian climate diplomacy has been rather limited. For instance, using “Sino-India” and “climate diplomacy” as two key words to search in google scholar, no closely relevant results appear. Even though there is some research on both states’ climate diplomacy, the existing literature has intended to treat both states’ climate diplomacy separately. For instance, both Wu and Stalley only explore China’s climate diplomacy in international climate change negotiations, while Michaelowa examines India’s negotiation strategies. Stevenson investigates India’s policy toward international norms of global climate governance and Vihma explores India’s relationship with global
climate governance.\textsuperscript{3} Yu explores China’s climate diplomacy under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC).\textsuperscript{4} There are two exceptions that have handled both states’ climate diplomacy in an integrated way, that is, one on Sino-Indian climate cooperation and its implications for international climate change regime, that is, the UNFCCC and its Kyoto Protocol,\textsuperscript{5} and another on both states’ climate diplomacy under the UNFCCC negotiations.\textsuperscript{6} However, both fail to employ IR theoretical tools to explore Sino-Indian climate diplomacy and fail to note the implications of such diplomacy on global climate governance. This paper makes up for these limitations in the existing literature.

I argue that China and India have been conducting two-track climate diplomacy. On the one hand, both states have consistently engaged in international climate change negotiations under the UNFCCC or the UN-track climate diplomacy, which is characterized by their strategy of forging new alliances while maintaining their traditional alliance to facilitate their bargain power against developed countries. On the other hand, however, both states have also been bandwagoning developed countries especially the US and the EU-initiated mini-multilateral and bilateral arrangements aimed at solving the climate change problem outside the UNFCCC process or the non-UN track climate diplomacy. Such a dual-track climate diplomacy conducted by China and India has significantly undercut the UN-track efforts to address climate change and increased the scale and scope of fragmentation in global climate governance.

To test this argument, in section two, I develop an analytical framework for Sino-Indian climate diplomacy, that is, alignment and bandwagon. In the third section, I explore in detail Sino-Indian climate diplomacy under the UN- and non-UN track, in addition to highlighting the main features of this dual-tack diplomacy. In the fourth section, I evaluate several implications of Sino-Indian climate diplomacy for global climate governance. And a brief conclusion is drawn in the final section.

Alignment and Bandwagon: an Analytical Framework for Sino-Indian Climate Diplomacy

I adopt “alignment” and “bandwagon,” two concepts usually characterized as Realists’ theoretical paradigm for states’ foreign policy in general and security policy in particular,\textsuperscript{7} to an analytical framework for Sino-Indian climate diplomacy. In terms of alignment, I draw on Steven David’s definition, that is, “a state has aligned when it brings its policies into close cooperation with those of another state.”\textsuperscript{8} According to David, the main goal of alignment for both states is to “prevent (by balancing against) any other state or group of states from achieving preponderance.”\textsuperscript{9} Obviously, such a goal of alignment is only fit for the traditional power politics typically illuminated by the works of Hans Morgenthau,\textsuperscript{10} Kenneth

When it comes to climate change politics, an issue-area having been consistently plagued by the problem of free riding, the goal for a state’s alignment with another state or group of states is to buck-pass the obligations to mitigate GHG emissions to other states or group of states or to minimize their obligations if they could not buck-pass such obligations under the UNFCCC process. With regard to the term “bandwagon,” I use its conventional definition, that is, a bandwagon refers to “a candidate, side, or movement that attracts adherents or amasses power by its momentum, and the phrase ‘to climb aboard the bandwagon’ implies following a current or fashionable trend,” or a “wave of the future,” and states usually voluntarily choose to bandwagon based on their rational reasoning to gain profits. Beyond doubt, the topic to address climate change has been a current trend or a “wave of the future” since the early 1990s when the UNFCCC was created and later in the late 1990s when the Kyoto Protocol was adopted through international climate change negotiations. The UNFCCC has 196 Parties and the Kyoto Protocol has been ratified by 192 of the UNFCCC Parties. The universality of the membership of the UNFCCC/Kyoto Protocol means that almost all the countries across the world have joined the international efforts to address climate change. Such a “climate change bandwagoning” can be even more vividly reflected by the large participants in the Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC (COP). For instance, at COP 20 held in Lima in December 2014, according to the International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD)’s report, “over 11,000 participants, including approximately 6,300 government officials, 4,000 representatives from UN bodies and agencies, intergovernmental organizations and civil society organizations, and 900 members of the media” attended this event. Even so, however, after more than two decades’ efforts to address climate change under these universal climate change negotiations, the international community has made little real progress in either reducing GHG emissions or reaching another universal climate agreement like the Kyoto Protocol to govern the international community to address climate change in a collective way. So some Parties of the UNFCCC, especially the US and the EU have initiated some arrangements outside the UNFCCC to address climate change, which has attracted some developing countries’ bandwagoning since the latter can gain some profits through their bandwagoning with developed countries. Sino-Indian dual-track climate diplomacy has been a typical case in point.

Sino-Indian Dual-track Climate Diplomacy

One noticeable feature of Sino-Indian climate diplomacy in the recent decade has been dual-track, that is, both states have not only consistently engaged in international climate change negotiations under the UNFCCC (or UN-track) but also have participated in some mini-multilateral or bilateral climate-related arrangements outside the UNFCCC process (non-UN track). The characteristic of Sino-Indian UN-track diplomacy is that both states have tried to forge some new alliances to facilitate their bargaining power

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14 Ibid, p.96.
15 Ibid.
against developed countries especially the EU and the US while maintaining their traditional alliance with the Group of 77 plus China (G-77/China) in the UNFCCC negotiations. On the other hand, however, under the non-UN track climate diplomacy, China and India have been voluntarily bandwagoning the US and the EU-initiated mini-multilateral and bilateral climate arrangements in order to obtain some profits that they could not procure through their UN-track climate diplomacy.

**Sino-Indian UN-track climate diplomacy: forging new alliances while maintaining the old one**

China and India forging alliances to defend their negotiating stances under the UNFCCC’s various negotiation forums is nothing new, given the fact that China and India have aligned with the broad coalition of developing countries—the so-called Group of 77 and China (G-77/China) since the inception of the international climate change negotiations in the early 1990s. Nevertheless, in recent years, a new characteristic of Sino-Indian alignment strategy under the UNFCCC negotiations is that both states have tried to forge new alliances to defend their traditional negotiating stances.

The central tenet of Sino-Indian approach to address climate change at the global level for most of the past two decades has been equitable burden sharing, which is guided by the principles of historical responsibility for GHG emissions and “common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities.” In other words, maintaining the norm of “equity” has been a priority for Sino-Indian climate diplomacy. Practically, both China and India have refused to take on binding emissions reduction obligations, and pushed for developed countries to undertake their historical responsibility to address climate change. In order to maintain this traditional stance in international climate change negotiations under the UNFCCC, China and India have adopted the strategy of forging new alliances to facilitate their bargaining power against developed countries and some of developing countries stemmed from the fact that both states’ increased CO\(_2\) emissions have made them increasingly hard to maintain the unity of their traditional alliance with the G-77/China to bargain against developed countries.

It is well-known that China and India’s CO\(_2\) emissions have increased dramatically over the past decade. By 2011, for instance, China’s emissions were almost equal to the US and EU’s combined while India has become the third largest emitter (see Table 1). China’s per-capita emissions (6.72 tCO\(_2\)) have already surpassed the world average (4.63 tCO\(_2\)) while India’s has been much lower. In terms of cumulative CO\(_2\) emissions between 1990 and 2011, China accounted for nearly 19% of the world total, only after the US. In contrast, India only accounted for 4% of global cumulative CO\(_2\) emissions in the same period. However, according to the International Energy Agency (IEA), India’s CO\(_2\) emissions will increase 34% by 2020 and double by 2030 under its existing policies and it will overtake the US in terms of annual CO\(_2\) emissions before 2040.

**Table 1. Current and Historical Carbon Dioxide (CO\(_2\)) Emissions (2011)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>MtCO(_2)</th>
<th>Share of global emissions (CO(_2))</th>
<th>Per capita emissions (tCO(_2))</th>
<th>Cumulative CO(_2) emissions as share of global emissions (1990-2011)*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>5,603.82</td>
<td>17.4%</td>
<td>17.92</td>
<td>21.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>3,774.27</td>
<td>11.7%</td>
<td>7.43</td>
<td>15.9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<p>| | | | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>9,034.97</td>
<td>28.0%</td>
<td>6.72</td>
<td>18.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>1,860.92</td>
<td>5.8%</td>
<td>1.52</td>
<td>4.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World</td>
<td>32,273.73</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>4.63</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Note: figures in this column are calculated by the author, based on WRI’s CAIT2.0. The total CO$_2$ emissions (MtCO$_2$): world (555454.74); US (119843.31); China (102628.75); EU (88159.11); India (24325.14).

Under such circumstances, not only developed countries but also some developing countries especially the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) and the Least Developed Countries (LDCs) in the G-77/China have required China and India to undertake emissions cut obligations. Thus, it has become increasingly hard for China and India to defend their traditional negotiating stances under the UNFCCC negotiations. Consequently, both states have adopted a strategy of forging new alliances to facilitate their bargaining power against developed countries and some developing countries. So far, China and India have not only formed strong bilateral alliance but also two new mini-multilateral alliances.

In terms of Sino-Indian bilateral alliance on climate change, in October 2009, both states signed a Memorandum of Agreement on Cooperation on Addressing Climate Change, in which both states announced that an India-China Working Group on Climate Change would be established to “exchange views on important issues concerning international negotiation on climate change.” Thus, Sino-Indian bilateral climate alliance has been officially created. Since then, both states have coordinated with each other at the UNFCCC’s various meetings.

The most recent coordination between the two states is that, in September 2014, neither Indian Prime Minister Modi nor Chinese President Xi Jinping attended the UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon’s climate summit in New York even though there were more than 120 countries’ leaders attended this summit. This coordination confirms an observation made by Jairam Ramesh, India’s former Environment Minister, that is, cooperation between India and China on climate change has been “one of the outstanding success stories of this bilateral relationship” in spite of a huge gap between their GHG emissions.

In order to strengthen their bilateral bargain power that has been weakened by the divergence among the G-77/China, China and India have also forged two mini-multilateral alliances. More specifically, in November 2009, in the run-up to Copenhagen climate summit, China and India formed a negotiation alliance called the BASIC group, together with another two emerging economies – Brazil and South Africa. This group meets four times a year, once in each of the BASIC countries by rotation. By the end of 2014, this group has held 19 ministerial meetings. This group had succeeded in maintaining its unity in UNFCCC negotiations until COP17 held at Durban in late 2011 when both Brazil and South Africa not only agreed to take their own GHG mitigation actions but also “indicated an openness to the idea” of

24 Wu, “Sino-Indian Climate Cooperation.”
negotiating a binding climate change agreement,\textsuperscript{28} which obviously ran counter to China and India’s traditional negotiating stances discussed above. Given the divisions among the BASIC group, it seems unlikely for China and India to continue to rely on this group to strengthen their bargaining power.\textsuperscript{29} Against this backdrop, China and India have forged a new alliance – the “Like-Minded Developing Countries (LMDC)” – an informal negotiation bloc. This group has negotiated together under the UNFCCC process since 2012.

Although the LMDC is an informal negotiation bloc, compared with the BASIC group, this alliance has been more active. For instance, this alliance has submitted its official positions to the UNFCCC. Specifically, it submitted a document in 2013 called “Implementation of all the elements of decision 1/CP.17, (a) Matters related to paragraphs 2 to 6; Ad-Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action (ADP)” to illustrate the common positions of this group on how to address climate change.\textsuperscript{30} At the negotiations in Bonn in June 2014, the LMDC presented its formal base paper for the 2015 pact.\textsuperscript{31} Moreover, it has turned out that this group has given strong support to Sino-Indian negotiating stances. For example, at COP 18 held in Warsaw in late 2013, thanks to the strong support from the LMDC, India and China succeeded in insisting the principle of equity be remained in the agreement when they negotiated hard against developed countries on this issue. So a media commentary remarked about the importance of LMDC for China and India’s negotiation in this episode: “The support from the LMDC group helped both [China and India] save the day.”\textsuperscript{32} Realizing such an importance of LMDC’s support for their bargaining power under the UNFCCC negotiations, Beijing hosted a week of talks among LMDC group in September 2014 to strengthen the unity of this group. During this meeting, Beijing especially called for “stronger cooperation and coordination among developing countries in countering climate change.”\textsuperscript{33}

Although China and India have tried to forge new alliances stemmed from the fragmentation among the G-77/China, their traditional alliance, both states have also tried to maintain their unity with this group so as to avoid its complete split. To do so, not only have China and India invited some representatives of other countries from the G-77/China to attend their new alliances’ meetings, especially those of the BASIC Group,\textsuperscript{34} but also China and India as well as the BASIC group repeatedly iterated their desire to strengthen the coalition of the G-77/China. In April 2010, for instance, at the BASIC group’s third ministerial meeting, it stated that “Ministers of the BASIC countries agreed that, remaining


\textsuperscript{5} submission_by_malaysia_on_behalf_of_the_lmdc_crp.pdf}, accessed December 27, 2014.


\textsuperscript{34} Hochstetler, “The G-77, BASIC, and Global Climate Governance,” p.60.
anchored in the G77&China.”  

35 Once again, in the Joint Statement of their 11th Meeting in July 2012, the BASIC Ministers wrote, “Ministers emphasized that BASIC countries, as part of the G-77 and China, continue to work to maintain the strength and unity of the Group. The Ministers reaffirmed the importance of the unity of the G-77 and China as the common voice of developing countries in the climate change negotiations.” 36 In other words, although China and India have formed new alliances to facilitate their bargaining power, they have still tried to remain in the G-77/China.

Developed countries, faced with China and India’s diplomatic efforts to forge alliances to undermine their bargaining power, have tried various means to dissolve Sino-Indian old and new alliances. For instance, according to the Wikileaks cables, the US and the EU had tried to employ their financial influence over small countries such as the AOSIS and the LDCs in the G-77/China. As a result, the AOSIS and the LDCs allied with the EU against India and China in several climate summits especially at Copenhagen, Cancun and Doha. 37 However, developed countries’ alliance with the AOSIS and the LDCs had been significantly weakened at Warsaw climate conference in 2013 when the EU had tried to block the progress of negotiations on the issues such as climate finance commitments and the assessment of who should pay the poor countries’ costs of loss and damage caused from inaction over climate change, two of the issues most concerned by the AOSIS and the LDCs. After this episode, the AOSIS and the LDCs returned to the G-77/China to strengthen their bargaining power to force developed countries to fulfill their financial promises to help developing countries to adapt to climate change. In other words, the EU’s reluctance on the two finance-related issues has led to relatively greater unity in the G-77/China. For another instance, the EU and the US have also tried to dissolve the LMDC. Specially, it was reported that the US and some countries in the EU had put pressure on Philippine to disassociate from the LMDC Group. 38 Thus far, Their efforts have turned out to be successful, given the fact that the Philippines have not only publicly stated that they were not a member of the LMDC at the Lima climate summit, 39 but also pledged to cut its emissions and urged other developing nations to follow suit, a significant shift from the stance of the LMDC’s. 40 According to a retired Indian negotiator, the US and the EU’s efforts to pressure the Philippines to leave the LMDC “is a typical divide-and-rule tactic and an attempt to isolate India and China.” 41

In sum, given their increased GHG especially CO2 emissions, it has become increasingly hard for China and India to maintain their traditional stances on how to address climate change under the UNFCCC negotiations. Against this backdrop, both states has adopted a strategy of forging new alliances

37 Ibid.
38 Ibid.
39 Ibid. According to a news commentary, when Philippine climate change commissioner and head of delegation Lucille Sering being asked by Reuters why the Philippines left the LMDC group, she responded by denying that the Philippines had ever been a part of the coalition: “We were never part of it. I never met them. Maybe Yeb Saño,” and “we were never part of it, not officially.” See Denise Fontanilla, “The Philippines: From Like-Minded to Climate Vulnerable,” Adopt a Negotiator, December 9, 2014, available at http://adoptanegotiator.org/the-philippines-from-like-minded-to-climate-vulnerable/, accessed December 23, 2014.
including their bilateral alliance, the BASIC and the LMDC while maintaining their old alliance – the G-77/China – to boost their bargaining power against developed countries especially the EU and the US.

_Sino-Indian non-UN track climate diplomacy: bandwagoning for profits_\(^{42}\)

Apart from their UN-track climate diplomacy, China and India have also been conducting non-UN track climate diplomacy. More specifically, China and India have been voluntarily bandwagoning the developed countries especially the US- and the EU-led climate arrangements so as to get the profits they cannot procure through the UN-track climate diplomacy. So far, the US and the EU has initiated both mini-multilateral and bilateral arrangements to engage some emerging economies especially China and India to address climate change outside the UNFCCC process, which is regarded by Keohane and Victor as developed countries’ club-making efforts.\(^{43}\)

The first climate club China and India have been bandwagoning is the G8 plus 5. In 2005, China and India, together with Brazil, Mexico and South Africa, accepted the invitation by Tony Blair, then Prime Minister of Britain, to attend the G8 summit at Gleneagles to join the talks on some topics, including climate change. In 2006, the G8+5 Climate Change Dialogue was launched and has been institutionalized at the G8 summit held in Heiligendamm in 2007. At this summit, Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh announced that India would ensure that its per capita emissions would never exceed those of developing countries.\(^{44}\) This was regarded as “a subtle (perhaps unintended) shift away from India’s emphasis on historical responsibility.”\(^{45}\)

The second climate club China and India had once bandwagoned is the Asia Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate Change (APP), created by the US under the George W. Bush administration in 2006. China and India had been this club’s two of its 6 original partners, besides Australia, Japan, South Korea, and the US.\(^{46}\) The goal of APP was “cooperating to meet both their increased energy needs and associated challenges, including those related to air pollution, energy security, and greenhouse gas intensities.”\(^{47}\) Through being a member of the APP, China and India can gain some benefits from their cooperation with other member states through 8 public-private sector Task Forces which have been established to focus on three energy supply sectors including cleaner fossil energy, renewable energy and distribution generation, power generation and transmission, and five energy intensive sectors including aluminium, buildings and appliances, cement, coal mining and steel.\(^{48}\) Thus, APP had special attraction for China and India, given the fact that these two countries have been two of the world largest energy consumers that have been depending highly on coal – a major source of CO₂.

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\(^{42}\) Schweller, “Bandwagoning for Profit,” pp. 72-107.


emissions. However, it turns out that APP Public-Private Sector Task Forces have not been as successful as expected. As Table 2 shows, although more than 100 projects have been initiated, only 9 projects have been completed before April 2011 when APP was concluded.

Table 2 The projects under APP 8 Public-Private Sector Task Forces

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project Task Force</th>
<th>Project Number</th>
<th>Completed</th>
<th>Cancelled</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aluminium Task Force</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buildings and Appliances Task Force</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cement Task Force</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cleaner Fossil Energy Task Force</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coal Mining Task Force</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Power Generation and Transmission Task Force</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Renewable Energy and Distributed Generation Task Force</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Steel Task Force</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The third climate club that China and India have been bandwagoning is the US-initiated Major Economies Forum on Energy and Climate (MEF). In 2007, the US’s George W. Bush administration initiated the Major Economies Meetings on Energy Security and Climate Change (MEM) to include more countries to address climate change, drawing on the lesson from the APP’s little practical consequences due to its too limited membership. In MEM, China and India have been two of the 16 original member states plus the EU. Later, under the US’s Obama administration, this club was renamed the MEF on March 28, 2009. Its aim is to set its own rules for a more flexible strategy to reduce emissions among its member states. This group has conducted a series of meetings on how to address climate change. At the 7th MEF meeting held in Rome in 2010, Jairam Ramesh reframed the concept “equity” as “equitable access to sustainable development.” This is another “clear evidence of new substance in India’s stance.”

Moreover, China and India have also been bandwagoning the group of 20 (G-20) to address climate change. This club was originally created by Canada and the US to handle the global financial issues in the wake of Asian Financial Crisis in the late 1990s. It has resumed functioning since late 2008 global financial crisis when the leaders of the G-20 countries began to meet regularly and issued communiqués on global financial issues, in addition to how to adopt some measures to help its member states to cut their GHG emissions. At the forum, both China and India have agreed to not only reduce their fossil fuel subsidies over the medium-term as a way to reduce their GHG emissions, but also report on their efforts to reduce these subsidies.

51 MEM’s member states are: Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, the EU, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Korea, Mexico, Russia, South Africa, the UK, and the U.S. See MEF’s website at http://www.majoreconomiesforum.org/, accessed December 24, 2014.
52 Ibid.
55 Aaron Atteridge et al., “Climate Policy in India,” p.70.
implementation strategies and timelines to the following G-20 meeting. So far, one of the most significant achievements related to climate change by the G-20 is that in September 2013 the G-20 leaders signed an agreement to cooperate on phasing down the use of hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), gases used in refrigerators, air conditioners and some industrial equipment, through which as much as 90 billion tonnes of CO\textsubscript{2} equivalent between the current and 2050 can be reduced.

In parallel, China and India have also been bandwagoning the bilateral climate-related agreements initiated by the EU and the US. In terms of China and the EU’s bilateral agreements related to climate change, for instance, in 2005, China and the EU established the EU-China Partnership on Climate change. In 2009, this Partnership was upgraded to the ministerial level. Under this partnership, both sides have established some projects to facilitate the EU to transfer some know-how and technology to China. Moreover, under the bilateral partnership, the EU has not only helped China in its efforts to draft the legislation related to renewable energy, energy efficiency that are directly contributed to the cut of GHG emissions, but also supported China’s participation in the Kyoto Protocol’s Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) through the CDM Facilitation Project. Similarly, the EU has also established a bilateral cooperation with India on climate change. Specifically, in September 2005, the EU-India Summit in New Delhi announced the “India-EU Strategic Partnership - Joint Action Plan,” in which both sides agreed to launch an “EU-India Initiative on Clean Development and Climate Change.” This initiative has focused on voluntary practical measures, emphasizing both sides’ cooperation on the increased use of cleaner technology as well as bilateral cooperation in the CDM projects.

When it comes to India and China bandwagoning the US-initiated bilateral climate arrangements, in India’s case, the US initiated a civil nuclear agreement in 2005 to help India reduce its GHG emissions relative to the expected level. However, this agreement has been highly controversial. For one thing, this deal broke the global nonproliferation regime. Specifically, according to the Guidelines of the Nuclear Suppliers Group, states are forbidden to export nuclear technology and nuclear related items to non-signatory to the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT). Since India has never signed on to the NPT, it is ineligible to enter the global nuclear market. For another, under this agreement, India must separate its nuclear facilities into civilian and military and will put its civilian nuclear facilities under the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)’s safeguards, which was regarded by Indian left parties as an intrusion upon Indian sovereignty so this deal was strongly opposed by Indian left parties. In spite of the international and domestic hurdles, the US and India officially signed the civil nuclear cooperation

agreement in October 2008. From then on, India has been able to gain access to the US as well as global civil nuclear technology.

In China’s case, the most recent evidence of its bandwagon diplomacy is the US-China climate deal signed on November 12, 2014. According to a news commentary, the idea for such a bilateral deal on climate change was first initiated by the US Secretary of State John Kerry in early February 2013 when he visited Beijing. After the Chinese leaders seemed “potentially receptive” to his idea, the US President Barack Obama sent a personal letter to Chinese President Xi Jinping suggesting the two countries start to move to cut CO₂ emissions. Then after a series of bilateral negotiations, both states eventually reached this deal, which will be discussed in detail in next section. Apart from this deal, the US has also signed a bilateral agreement with China to phase out HFCs, alongside the same agreement within the G-20 mentioned above.

The motivations for China and India to voluntarily bandwagon the US and the EU’s mini-multilateral and bilateral climate arrangements lie in the fact that both states can gain some profits. First and most important of all, China and India can obtain some economic benefits. More specifically, Sino-Indian participation in these arrangements can facilitate both states’ domestic ambitions to embark on a low-carbon economic growth. It is well-known that China and India’s economic growth has been highly relying on fossil fuels especially coal – a major source for their increased CO₂ emissions as well as their air pollution. In order to adjust the high-carbon economic growth to low-carbon development, both states need cleaner energy technologies that have been largely mastered by the US and the EU. Thus, China and India have been willingly bandwagoning the US and the EU-initiated climate arrangements for all of those arrangements adopt the sector approach to address climate change, that is, cutting CO₂ emissions through using cleaner energy and improving energy efficiency; in addition, those arrangements facilitate their members’ cooperation on clean energy technology, especially carbon capture and sequestration (CCS), a critically important technology that would facilitate China and India’s transition to low-carbon economies. For instance, the annual carbon savings from the Indo-US civil nuclear deal, according to Victor’s testimony at the US Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, could be nearly as large as the entire commitment of the EU to meet the Kyoto Protocol. Similarly, if the target to peak its CO₂ emission around 2030 announced by China in the US-China climate deal is to be reached, China’s reliance on fossil fuels for its economy will reduce 20% by then.

Aside from the economic benefit through their bandwagoning the US and the EU’s climate arrangements, China and India also accrue some reputational profits. First, through their bandwagoning,

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65 Ibid.
67 The White House, “United States, China, and Leaders of G-20 Countries Announce Historic Progress Toward a Global Phase Down of HFCs.”
both states can significantly build up their reputation as great powers in the international community.\textsuperscript{70} This is especially true for India. Specifically, through the Indo-US civil nuclear agreement, India’s nuclear weapon power status has been eventually recognized by not only the US but also the international community even though such kind of recognition has been accompanied with many grudges.\textsuperscript{71} For China, its bilateral climate deal with the US shows China’s leadership on the climate issue alongside with the US, which is highly symbolic for its great power status.\textsuperscript{72} Moreover, China and India bandwagoning the US and the EU’s climate arrangements signals to the international community that both states have already taken actions to address climate change, which can mitigate, to a certain extent, their negative reputation as two “obstructionists” in the UNFCCC negotiations.

In short, China and India bandwagoning the US- and the EU-initiated mini-multilateral and bilateral arrangements on climate change has brought them not only economic but also reputational profits.

**Implications for Global Climate Governance**

China and India’s dual-track climate diplomacy has had significant implications for global climate governance that have “clustered” around the UNFCCC and its Kyoto Protocol, the only legal instrument with legally binding constraints on GHG emissions at the international level.\textsuperscript{73} Although there is “the regime complex for climate change,”\textsuperscript{74} the UNFCCC/Kyoto protocol has been the central mechanism for global climate governance.\textsuperscript{75} In the context, the implications of Sino-Indian climate diplomacy explored in this section mainly focus on its implications for the UNFCCC/Kyoto Protocol.

First of all, Sino-Indian alignment diplomacy under the UN track has significantly watered down the binding level of any future climate agreement. More specifically, at the 2011 Durban climate summit, in the final negotiations, the EU and its allies, namely, the AOSIS and the LDCs, were strongly insisting that all the Parties to the UNFCCC should commit to “a protocol or other legal instrument” as the ultimate goal for a comprehensive global treaty in 2015. In other words, the EU and its allies intended to create a legally binding agreement like the Kyoto Protocol to assign legally binding emissions reduction targets on all countries including China and India. These two states, in order to block the formation of such a binding instrument, strongly opposed this language put forth by the EU and its allies and sought to water it down by insisting on the inclusion of a new phrase, that is, “or an agreed outcome with legal force.”\textsuperscript{76} Faced with Sino-Indian intransigence on this issue, the EU had to make concession. As a result, the final text adopted by Parties at the 2011 Durban climate summit read: “to develop a protocol, another legal

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\bibitem{Keohane2} According to Keohane and Victor, there is “the regime complex for climate change” that is made up of many regimes and institutions, including the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol. See Keohane and Victor, “The Regime Complex for Climate Change,” pp.7-23.
\bibitem{Betsill} Liliana B. Andonova, Michele M. Betsill, and Harriet Bulkeley, “Transnational Climate Governance,” *Global Environmental Politics* 9 (2), May 2009, p.52.
\end{thebibliography}
instrument or an agreed outcome with legal force under the Convention applicable to all Parties.”

In addition to this concession to China and India, the EU had also conceded to the BASIC group’s another insistence on the year of enforcement of such an instrument be 2020, which incited fierce criticism on the EU from its AOSIS allies because according to these countries, the year 2020 would be “be too little too late.”

Moreover, during COP20 held in Lima in December 2014, China and India, backed up by their LMDC and BASIC, succeeded in watering down the level of so-called Parties’ “intended nationally determined contributions (INDCs).” Specifically, during the negotiations, Parties disagreed on how INDCs would be communicated and what their possible ex ante consideration or review might look like. China and India and many developing countries insisted that the negotiations should only focus on the process of communication while the US preferred a “consultative” process or period. But the EU and the AOSIS demanded a strong review that would assess the aggregate effect of INDCs against the latest climate science and what is deemed necessary to avoid dangerous climate change. Due to LMDC’s strong opposition to the EU and the AOSIS’s position, the final decision text adopted by the summit simply requests that the Secretariat publish the communicated INDCs on the UNFCCC website and prepare, by November 1, 2015, a synthesis report on their aggregate effect. This result implies that there will be no any kind of ex ante review of individual countries’ contributions in 2015. And this text also leaves Parties with less than a month for possible upward adjustment prior to COP 21 in Paris in December 2015. It is no surprise that this decision text on INDCs becomes “the weakest link of the Lima outcome.”

Simply put, Sino-Indian new alignment diplomacy under the UNFCCC negotiations has significantly undermined the “top-down” approach to form a legally binding-all agreement like the Kyoto Protocol while it has facilitated their preferred “bottom-up” approach to address climate change at the global level. Under such circumstances, it will be highly unlikely for China and India to allow the formation of a top-down international climate change treaty to set some binding emissions cut targets on themselves at COP21 to be held in Paris in 2015. In other words, the prospects of forging a global climate agreement like the Kyoto Protocol in Paris in 2015 are very dim, given the strong support China and India have accrued through their dynamic alignment climate diplomacy under the UNFCCC process. Thus, I echo Keohane and Victor’s observation, that is, “efforts to create an integrated, comprehensive regime are unlikely to be successful.”

Such dim prospects for the progress of the UNFCCC process would only become worse when considering the ramifications of Sino-Indian non-UN track bandwagoning climate diplomacy on global climate governance.

As discussed above, in parallel with their UN-track climate diplomacy, China and India have been bandwagoning the US and the EU’s climate arrangements that are outside of the UNFCCC process, which has significantly undercut the UNFCCC process in several ways. Firstly, Sino-India bandwagoning the US and the EU-initiated climate arrangements has further undermined the prospect to reach a top-down climate treaty through the UNFCCC negotiations. As noted above, all of the US- and the EU-initiated climate arrangements are a bottom-up approach in nature. For instance, APP focuses on “voluntary practical measures,” and on “national strategies, experience-sharing, and technology development and

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deployment.”\textsuperscript{81} MEF, the US efforts to build on the APP, is on an unidentified “long term goal” to reduce GHGs, and the path towards this goal is clean energy technology coupled with national strategies.\textsuperscript{82} Such a voluntary, technology focused approach is in stark contrast with the top-down approach embodied in the UNFCCC’s Kyoto Protocol that grouped countries into Annex I and Annex II based on their responsibility in contributing to global warming and prescribed for Annex I (developed countries and countries in transition) their respective quantitative and economy-wide emissions-reduction commitments as well as for both developed and developing-countries other obligations such as reporting.\textsuperscript{83} For another instance, in their bilateral climate deal, the US announced it “intends to achieve an economy-wide target of reducing its emissions by 26%-28% below its 2005 level in 2025 and to make best efforts to reduce its emissions by 28%” while China announced it “intends to achieve the peaking of CO\textsubscript{2} emissions around 2030 and to make best efforts to peak early and intends to increase the share of non-fossil fuels in primary energy consumption to around 20% by 2030.”\textsuperscript{84} A crucial word in this deal – “intends” implies that this deal is by no means meant to create any legally binding obligations. In other words, both China and the US will use a bottom-up approach rather than a top-down approach to mitigate their emissions. Also, it implies that both states will not accept any legally binding targets assigned by any international climate agreement reached under the UNFCCC negotiations or they would completely block the formation of such an agreement to be reached in Paris in 2015.

In addition, Sino-India bandwagoning the US’s climate arrangements would make it impossible for the international community to reach the emissions cut targets set by the UNFCCC negotiations. More specifically, according to the Cancun Agreement adopted at COP 16 held at Cancun in December 2010, Parties not only reached the agreement on the need for deep cuts in global emissions in order to limit the global average temperature rise to 2°C above pre-industrial levels, but also agreed to consider strengthening the global long-term goal during a review by 2015, including in relation to a proposed 1.5°C target.\textsuperscript{85} However, the practical outcome embodied in Sino-US climate deal makes such an ambitious goal unachievable. In this deal, China has failed to indicate clearly at what level its CO\textsubscript{2} emissions, not to mention its greenhouse gases emissions, would peak by 2030. According to a research, in recent years the annual increase rate of China’s CO\textsubscript{2} emissions is 3%.\textsuperscript{86} If such an increase rate continues for the next 16 years, China’s emissions would reach 16 gigatons by 2030. In the US’s case, its CO\textsubscript{2} emission was equivalent of 7.26 gigatons in 2005. If the US fulfilled its announcement to cut its emissions by 28% by 2025, it would emit 5.23 gigatons by then, which is about the amount that the U.S. emitted in 1992. Thus, even if China’s emissions did peak in 2030, it could emit three times more than the

\textsuperscript{81} See APP website.
\textsuperscript{82} See MEF website.
U.S. by then. According to India’s Centre for Science and Environment (CSE), the emissions cut targets announced by the U.S. and China means that both states’ per capita emissions will converge at 12 tons by 2030, more than doubling the current global average. Such kind of efforts would lead the global temperature to rise about 3.7°C to 4.8°C, a result projected by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), which is far above the 2°C target set out in the Cancun Agreement. Not surprisingly, Chandra Bhushan, CSE Deputy Director-General, made such a comment on this deal in an interview by Bloomberg, that is, “If this is the benchmark set by the world’s two biggest economies - and two biggest polluters - we are on a completely catastrophic path.”

Glen Peters, a researcher at Norway’s Centre for International Climate and Environmental Research and the Global Carbon Project, echoed such a concern: “Overall, the Chinese and US emissions target represent a political step forward, but are broadly not consistent with a likely chance of keep temperatures below 2°C. The targets themselves are not so different from the continuation of existing trends.”

In other words, the targets and measures announced by the US and China fall well short of what is needed to avoid dangerous climate change at the global level.

As a consequence of Sino-Indian non-UN track bandwagoning diplomacy, the scale and scope of fragmentation in global climate governance has increased. Put in more detail, the UNFCCC/Kyoto Protocol is universal in scope, whereas all the non-UN climate arrangements are based on small-group negotiations among their limited parties; the UNFCCC/Kyoto Protocol is legally binding, whereas all the non-UN climate arrangements stress voluntary measures; the UNFCCC/Kyoto Protocol focuses on GHG emissions reduction, whereas the non-UN climate agreements are mainly focused on fostering technological innovation and energy efficiency and cleaner energy; the UNFCCC negotiations set the goal of limiting the global average temperature rise to 2°C above pre-industrial levels, however, none of the non-UN climate arrangements has such a goal. Moreover, regarding the compliance mechanisms, according to the Cancun Agreement, mitigation actions taken by developed and developing countries would be subject to certain top-down evaluation process. Specifically, for “Nationally appropriate mitigation commitments or actions by developed country Parties” are required to be subject to “reporting and review guidelines, processes and experiences,” while “Nationally appropriate mitigation actions by developing country Parties” would be subject to either international consultations and analysis or measurement, reporting and verification.

In stark contrast, none of the US or the EU-initiated climate mini-multilateral or bilateral arrangements has any compliance arrangements at all (see Table 3).

Table 3 Comparison of the UNFCCC/Kyoto Protocol and the non-UN climate arrangements

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90 Morales, “China-U.S. Move to Curb Global Warming Loosens Climate Logjam in Developing World.”


93 Ibid, pp.10-11.
The UNFCCC/Kyoto Protocol (Top-down) | The Non-UN climate arrangements (Bottom-up)
---|---
Participation | Universal | Limited
Goals | Limitation to 2°C above pre-industrial levels | no
Legal options | rules-based, legally binding | Voluntary pledges
Methodology | GHG emissions reduction | Technological innovation on energy
Compliance | Developed countries: reporting and review guidelines, processes and experiences Developing countries: monitoring, reporting and verification /international consultation and analysis | no

Furthermore, Sino-Indian bandwagoning climate diplomacy has undercut the UNFCCC process stemmed from the fact that China and India have preferred to announce their readiness for climate actions under the non-UN track rather than the UNFCCC process in order to enhance their great power status. As mentioned above, India announced its willingness to cap its per capita emissions not exceeding those of the developed countries at G-8 plus 5 while China announced for the first time to peak its CO₂ emissions around 2030 through its bilateral climate deal with the US. Moreover, according to a media commentary, Chinese vice-premier Zhang Gaoli, who has been in charge of climate and energy, during his meeting with the US President Obama on the sidelines of the United Nations climate summit in September 2014, plainly told Obama that China wanted to move ahead quickly on a separate climate deal.⁹⁴ Thus, Sino-Indian non-UN track climate diplomacy confirms Ramesh’s earlier observation, that is, China and India have “delinked emissions control actions from the international negotiations.”⁹⁵ Obviously, these actions themselves have called the effectiveness of the UNFCCC process into question, in addition to the image of the COPs as the most appropriate forum to conduct negotiations, in spite of the universal membership of both bodies and, thus, their legitimacy.⁹⁶

To sum up, Sino-Indian dynamic alignment strategy under the UNFCCC process and their bandwagoning the US and the EU-initiated climate arrangements has made it less possible for a top-down, comprehensive global architecture to address climate change in a collectively way to be established. Rather, Sino-Indian climate diplomacy has led to the formation of “bottom-up” regime under the UNFCCC. Moreover, Sino-India bandwagoning climate diplomacy has significantly undercut the UNFCCC process by not only increasing the scale and scope of fragmentation in global climate governance under the UNFCCC/Kyoto Protocol, but also challenging the effectiveness, appropriateness as well as legitimacy of the UNFCCC process.

**Conclusion**

China and India, the world largest and third largest CO₂ emitters, have been conducting dual-track climate diplomacy. Under the UNFCCC negotiation track, China and India have adopted a strategy of forging new alliances, i.e., the BASIC and the LMDC while maintaining their traditional alliance with the G-

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⁹⁴“Secret Talks and a Personal Letter.”
⁹⁶Matteis, “The EU’s and China’s institutional diplomacy in the field of climate change,” p.37.
China to facilitate their bargaining power against developed countries stemmed from the fact that their increased CO2 emissions has made it increasingly hard for them to maintain their traditional negotiating stance characterized by the norm of equity based on the principle of “common but differentiated responsibilities,” which requires developed countries to take the lead to undertake the obligations to mitigate GHG emissions while exempting China and India and other developing countries from such obligations. In parallel, China and India have been voluntarily bandwagoning the US and the EU-initiated mini-multilateral and bilateral climate arrangements to gain both economic and reputational profits.

Sino-Indian dual-track climate diplomacy has significant implications for global climate governance centered on the UNFCCC/Kyoto Protocol. Not only Sino-Indian new alignment strategy under the UNFCCC process but also Sino-India bandwagoning the US and the UE’s climate arrangements have facilitated a bottom-up approach to address climate change at the international level so both states’ climate diplomacy has largely reduced the possibility of the formation of another top-down international climate treaty like the Kyoto Protocol, and therefore led to the increased scale and scope of fragmentation in global climate governance. Moreover, Sino-Indian climate bandwagoning diplomacy has noticeably undercut the UNFCCC process in terms of its effectiveness, appropriateness and legitimacy. As a result, the universal UNFCCC process has become a weakened regime in global climate governance.