

Diverse Piracy Patterns and Different Control Mechanisms

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Abstract

This paper compares different piracy patterns by region. It will also describe how differently piracy incidents have been controlled by different regional contexts. Thus, this paper suggests that patterns of piracy incidents indicate the crucial natures of onshore issues in piracy prone regions. This paper also suggests that effective counter piracy measures depend on regional threat perception and capacity of regional states in piracy prone regions.

Keywords: Piracy, Southeast Asia, Africa, Regional Contexts, Counter Piracy, Threat Perception, Regional Initiative

Introduction

Maritime piracy almost disappeared from the early 19th century onwards when the Western powers successfully institutionalized their power system into the seas, except for parts of East Asia such as Southeast Asia and the Sulu region (Konstam 2011). Even the pirates in Southeast regions were finally controlled during the World War I and II (Eklöf 2006). However, piracy has reemerged since 1980s taking advantage of the weak points of modern commercial vessels and geographic natures in Southeast Asia archipelago regions (Chalk 1998; Eklöf 2006).

Quite different from ancient piracy, modern piracy incidents have evolved diversely along different regional contexts. Somali pirates have sought only ransom by hijacking ships (Daxecker&Prins 2009; Hersi 2011) and kidnapping crew while Nigerian pirates have focused on oil theft (Marc-Antoine Pérouse 2012). On the other hand, piracy incidents in Southeast Asia have been shown in very diverse styles (Young 2007), such as politically motivated one (Chalk 1998; Zachary 2004; Hastings 2010) and transnational crime syndicate backed one (Vagg 1995; Eklöf 2006). Besides these three piracy prone regions, piracy incidents in other areas are generally opportunistic robbery type of crime (Shane& Lieberman 2009). The three piracy hot zones appear to provide a breeding ground of highly organized maritime crimes.

This paper first discusses general causes of piracy incidents not only from present literatures but also from results of statistical analysis for the last 18-year term from 1996 to 2013. Secondly, this paper shows different patterns of piracy incidents over the time period by the three piracy prone regions. By comparing the three piracy hot zones, this paper suggests that a specific pattern of piracy incidents can be viewed as a reflection of onshore problems in a particular

region. Finally, this paper discusses different counter piracy measures and comparative analysis of their effects along the three piracy prone regions.

Causes of Piracy

Generally, modern piracy incidents began to increase as maritime traffics rapidly increased since late 1980s (Eklöf 2006). As global trade has rapidly increased, the number of ships sailing along major seaways has increased. These ships have become easy targets for lightly armed pirates. High increase of trade vessel traffics supplied an abundant target pool for potential criminals (Young 2007). On the other hand, poverty and fragility of onshore states near the international vessel traffics give rise to a demand of crime activity. Additionally, geopolitical features, such as archipelago characters, long coastline, and weak border countries, function as a basic breeding ground of maritime crime.

David Marley (2011) suggests seven underlying preconditions for the reemergence of piracy: 1. the sharp reduction of Western merchant ships in the total number of trading ships around the world, 2. large automated ships with smaller crews, 3. a vast expansion of territorial waters, 4. persistent vacillation in defining piracy, 5. the shifting of trading centers to Asia, 6. abuse of flags of convenience, and 7. the proliferation of light arms (Marley, 2011, p.38-9). However, these preconditions do not provide an explanation for different piracy types in different locations. Martin Murphy (2008) suggests more analytical and case-wide factors that contribute to piracy emergence: (1) legal and jurisdictional opportunities, (2) favorable geography, (3) conflict and disorder, (4) under-funded law enforcement/inadequate security, (5) permissive political environments, (6) cultural acceptability/ maritime tradition, and (7) reward. These factors could be more appropriate to explain general features and regional differences in

diverse piracy incidents. Those factors are viewed actually as main obstacles for an effective counter piracy measures in major piracy prone areas.

The asymmetry in technological utilization between fishing industry in more advanced countries and artisan level fishery in less developed countries, such as Somalia, and Indonesia, is one of the primary causes of piracy. Along the Malacca Straits, and in other Southeast Asian coastal regions and off the Somalia coast, seafood resources have been devastated by the advanced fishing industries. Local people have lost their source of income, so they have turned their attentions to criminal activity. The depletion of fishery resources as well as the dumping of waste from ships outside the region have created resentment that, for some, justifies the piracy in the Gulf of Aden and the Malacca Straits (Russel and ebrary Inc. 2010). For example, people in Aceh, located in the upper western part of Sumatra, have suffered from the depletion of fishing resources by Malaysian and Singaporean crawling ships (Schulze 2004; Ong, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies et al. 2006). This technological asymmetry is also evident in the illegal dumping of waste by foreign ships, which pollutes the coastal environments. The most egregious case involved the dumping of toxic materials near the Somali coast, which severely damaged coastal living conditions (Abdullahi 2009).

The long-term instability of a state is also a cause of piracy occurrence (Menkhaus 2009). As Murphy mentions, a major contributor is the regional states' lack of resources - not solely their defense or security capabilities, but their comprehensive economic, political, and social resources (Chalk 2008). This does not simply mean the security capability of a state. Indonesia, the most frequent source of piracy in Southeast Asia, suffered from a lack of resources, including poor economic performance, political instability and social inequities, especially prior to the year

2000. As the Indonesian political economy has stabilized since 2003, the piracy there has been decreasing.

Generally, state failure has been ascribed to the emergence of Somali piracy (Sörenson 2008; Hastings 2009). Failed state concept (Ghani 2008; Gros 1996) and indexes (e.g. World/Global Governance index from the World Bank and Failed/Fragile State Index from Peace for Fund) have been widely used to describe the rudimentary cause of the rapid increase of Somali piracy (Hastings 2009). The concept and the views of troubled states have been criticized by regional and security experts (Patrick 2007; Beehner& Young 2012). In fact, Somali piracy did not begin to rise immediately after the collapse of the Siad Barre regime. Before 2005, the number of piracy incidents in the adjacent regions along the Gulf of Aden did not reach more than fifty. As Menkhaus (2004; 2009) argued, state failure is not a direct cause of the ransom seeking Somali piracy. Unlike other studies of piracy incidents with regard to the failed state concept, state failure provides poor evidence of different types of piracy incidents.

Table 1 shows an interesting fact that failed state hardly affects incidents of general maritime piracy incident and hijack because the effect sizes are too small (-.002*&.005***) to infer a meaningful implication of state failure on piracy incidents. Moreover, state failure has nothing to do with the ransom seeking piracy type. Other variables appear to support the general causes of modern piracy, except fragmentation and Indonesia.

Finally, the vulnerability of regional states to international crises, such as the 1997 financial crisis and natural disaster, is related to increasing piracy (Chalk 2008). It is believed, based on the IMB and IMO piracy reports, that piracy in Southeast Asia increased after the 1997 financial crisis. However, ironically piracy incidents in Indonesia began to decrease while

Somali piracy increased after the Tsunami on December 26th 2004. In the next chapter, this paper discusses how the different patterns of piracy incident are related to different regional contexts.

Table 1. Results of Logistic Regression on Three Piracy Incidents Types

	Model 1 (Incident)	Model2 (Hijack)	Model3 (Ransom)
Failed State	-.002* (.001)	.005*** (.002)	-.000 (.002)
Institutional Strength	-.001 (.018)	.051** (.025)	-.023 (.042)
Unemployment	-.044** (.014)	-.043* (.023)	.027 (.032)
Extreme Poverty	-.008*** (.003)	-.007** (.003)	-.016*** (.005)
Fragmentation	-.231 (.345)	-.755 (.517)	1.062 (1.078)
Police Rate	-.002*** (.000)	.001 (.001)	-.003*** (.001)
Success Rate of Piracy	1.175*** (.226)	-.366 (.362)	-.933 (.571)
Livestock Production	.008** (.003)	.004 (.005)	-.031*** (.008)
Cereal Yield	.000*** (.000)	.000 (.000)	-.000 (.000)
Number of Border Country	.055* (.029)	.063* (.033)	-.200* (.113)
Somalia	-.877*** (.229)	.674* (.346)	3.031*** (.602)
Indonesia	-.310 (.193)	.177 (.299)	.734 (.527)
Nigeria	.302 (.199)	.900*** (.281)	2.054*** (.565)

(Notes, ***p <.01, **p<.05, *p<.1.)


Different patterns of piracy incidents

Most of piracy incidents have occurred in four regions, such as Southeast Asia, East Africa, West Africa and South Asia. Total incidents of the four regions comprise 84% of the total number of piracy incidents (5846) from 1996 to 2013. Besides South Asia, the three main piracy prone areas comprise 71.8% of the total frequency, and 91.6% of total 541 hijack incidents

worldwide for the 18-year period. 97.8% of ransom seeking piracy incidents (259) occurred in the three piracy prone areas. Among them, Somali piracy exclusively focused on ransom acquiring, especially from 2004. Somalia takes 62.8 % (340) of the total worldwide hijacks and 73.7% (191) of the whole ransom seeking piracy incidents. The total amount of ransom gaining in Somalia (at least more than 380 million USD) was overwhelmingly larger than the other two areas (about 0.15~0.2 million USD in West Africa and 0.60 million USD in Southeast Asia respectively). Thus, the records of Somali piracy marked a unique type of piracy incidents in the modern piracy history.


Figure1 shows different trends of frequency of piracy incident led by different regions over the 18-year period. Before 2004, Southeast Asia led the total frequency trend of piracy incident. After 2004, Somali piracy showed the synchronizing frequency trend with the total incidence trend until 2011. These different trends in piracy incident frequency, along the different region with regard to the dynamic relations between the various external shocks and internal vulnerability, are also linked to different patterns of piracy incident types.

Figure 1. Frequency of Piracy Incidents by Major Piracy Prone Regions from 1996 to 2013




Two regions have led world maritime hijack incidents. Piracy in East Africa led the frequency of hijack incident from 2004 to 2011 while Southeast Asian piracy did until 2004. Piracy types in Southeast Asia are much more diverse than the rest of the world regions. For example, as figure 2 shows, the Southeast Regions including South/East China Seas recorded total 48 (90.6%) phantom ship (Abhyankar 2001) incidents out of total 53 worldwide incident for the 18-year term. The phantom ship type crime peaked in 2003 and began to decrease from 2005. It appears to almost disappear since 2013 as advanced technological tracking technologies (e.g. Automatic Identification System and Sea Lojack) have progressively applied to most international transiting vessels. Hijack incidents in Southeast Asia led the total trend until 2004 while those by Somali pirates did the total frequency until 2012 (See Appendix I). Piracy incidents in West Africa are also unique. Though their number is much smaller (645/11% of total 5846 incidence for the 18 year term) than the other two regions, their success rate (87.1%) is higher than those of two regions (78.7 in Southeast Asia & 38.3% in East Africa).

Figure 2. Frequency of Phantom Ship Incident by Region



As figure 3 shows that piracy incidents for oil theft are highly concentrated in Southeast Asia and West Africa. Total 17 incidents occurred in Southeast Asia and East/South China seas for the 18-year term. Most incidents were committed by transnational syndicates of Chinese triads and the syndicate tied local pirate gangs. Interestingly, piracy for oil theft began to rapidly increase from 2010. Reportedly, all the incidents were committed by the Niger Delta oil crime syndicates who were once members of the Niger Delta Emancipation Movement (MEND). The MEND was a political militia group based in the Niger Delta region (Peel 2010).

Figure 3. Piracy for Oil Theft



Additionally, there were total 71 piracy incidents for political purposes during the 18-year term. Among them, 29 (41%) incidents occurred in Southeast Asia. Many of the incidents were done by the GAM (Free Aceh Movement) rebellion (Aspinall & Crouch 2003) and their tied pirate gangs in northern Sumatra Island region until 2008. Other political incidents in Southeast Asia were committed by the MILF (Moro Islamic Liberation Front) or Abu Sayyaf in southern Philippine areas. In East Africa, most of the political type piracy (17 incidents) was committed

by SSDF (Somali Salvation Democratic Front) or al-Itihad al-Islam. The SSDF became a foundation military unit for creation of the autonomous Puntland state in northeast Somalia. The al-Itihad al-Islam became part of al-Shabaab rebellion groupⁱ (Stevenson 2010; Richard 2011). In West Africa, MEDN (The Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta) and their linked pirate gangs committed most of the politically motivated piracy incidents (13 incidents). Additionally, Tamil Tiger rebels (LTTE: The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam) committed most of the piracy incidents (8 incidents) in South Asia until 2006.

In overall, Piracy in Southeast Asia and the South China Sea has the longest and most enduring history (Burnett 2002). The types of piracy, levels of sophistication and networks are the most diverse in the world. Piracy in the regions has targeted almost everything on ships from crew members' personal belongings, to cargo, vessels and even the people on the boat for the purpose of human trafficking to a brothel. Though most piracy incidents in the Malacca Straits are classified as opportunistic robberies aimed at vulnerable targets (Valencia 2006), their linkage to other crimes is highly sophisticated (Chatherine 2009). As the phantom ship cases showed, piracy has been a vehicle of inland organized crime syndicates. The traditionally permissive environments of piracy in the region have been setting the regions apart from other piracy prone regions (Eklöf 2006). Their violence levels are equally diverse, ranging from simple theft to mass murder with automatic rifles and bombs. Highly organized local bandits and independent movement groups such as the Moro National Liberation Front, and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front, the Abu Sayyaf and Jemaah Islamiyah have inflicted the most serious violence (Hastings 2008; 2009).

These organized crime groups are mostly based in Southern Mindanao in the Philippines. Piracy has been decreasing since littoral states initiated multilaterally coordinated patrols

beginning in 2004. However, it appears that piracy is simply temporarily dormant, because the frequency of piracy incidents fluctuated as the Indonesian government attempted to crack down in the 1990s (Eklöf 2006). Thus, it would be premature to conclude that piracy has disappeared in the region because piracy incidents have increased again since 2010.

Somali piracy has maintained an international network of piracy crime from intelligence, plotting, financing, operation and booty money redistribution not just in the Somali region, but also in other international states such as Yemen and Kenya, and even among Somalis based in the Western world (AP 2008; James 2011). Somali pirates expanded their activity to the Indian Ocean and even the Hormuz Straits (Cold 2010). Somali piracy focuses mostly on ransom money through ship hijacking because the poor infrastructure of Somalia has made them prefer cash to realize the benefits (Hastings 2010). There are five piracy organizations in Somalia (Murphy 2011). Though most pirates are from Puntland, their major bases are in South and Central Somalia, such as Mudbug, Hobyo, and Mogadishu. Piracy organizations have expanded vastly both domestically and internationally through the unique clan networks of Somalia. Fishermen-turned pirates are just one part of the organization. There are muscle men, navigators, planners, locators, liaisons, negotiators, and financiers that are connected to the Islamic *hawala* remittance system (Murphy 2011). Somali piracy has grown rapidly threatening international maritime security around the Gulf of Aden region (Sullivan 2010).

Although there were earlier incidents, the Somali pirates were not so different from other pirates in the world until the 1990s. They began to evolve quickly to an enterprise level starting in 2005 (Murphy 2011). Supposedly, there were some triggering events that caused the Somali people to raise the criminal enterprises. For example, ransom money was not paid to the MV *Sea Johanna*, kidnapped in December 1998, in spite of initial demands for \$6.5 million by a group

from the Islamist organization Al-Irihaad Al-Islaami (AIAI). However, organized pirates calling themselves the ‘Somali Marines’ successfully received a ransom of over \$300,000 for the LPG carrier Feisty Gas in 2005 (Murphy 2011). The case seems to be one of the triggering events for the quick evolution of Somalia piracy to a highly organized level and suggests that success bred imitation and emulation.

Piracy incidents in the Gulf of Guinea are mostly related to oil theft. Pirates in the Gulf of Guinea mostly attack oil and gas tankers from oil producing regions, such as the Niger Delta and offshore oil rigs (Peel 2010; Marc-Antoine Pérouse 2012). Although these pirates are organized, they were not professionals according to the IMB reports at least until 2009. With the cooperation of regional states and outside forces supplied by countries such as the United States and the U.K., the Nigerian government has enhanced patrols, and incidents of piracy have decreased since 2009. The number of incidents was 40 in 2008, but decreased to 29 in 2009, 19 in 2010 and 10 in 2011 respectively. However, the piracy incidents have increased in coastal areas of neighbor states of Nigeria. Benin had 20 piracy incidents in 2011, a sudden jump from zero in 2010. Piracy records in Guinea also increased from zero in 2008 to 5 in 2009, 6 in 2010 and 5 in 2011 respectively. Reportedly, the Nigerian pirates have expanded their activity areas into adjacent seas avoiding the Nigerian government patrols. Pirates based in the Niger Delta region have recently shown more organized capacity with inside government networks. For example, pirate gangs stole five million USD amounts of jet fuel by hijacking Product Tanker *Itri* on January 16th 2013. The criminal operation was done within a week. Calling it Petro-piracy, Murphy (2013) recently argued that Nigerian oil piracy is the most profitable criminal business.

Table 2. Comparative Table of Different Piracy Incidents by Regions

Regions	Features	Types	Peak Time	Pirate Gangs	Regional Issues
Southeast Asia	Diverse	Opportunistic Robbery/Political Piracy/Phantom Ship/Hijacking for Smuggling	1996-2004 (Rising again from 2011)	Diverse: local bandits, international syndicates & political rebellion	Political economic instabilities in Indonesia & Philippines
East Africa	Ransom only	Startup Company	2006-2011	Political Militia (before 2004) & Clan based syndicates (after 2004)	Protracted civil wars, defunct paper state and fragile local governments
West Africa	Oil Theft	Oil Crime Syndicate	Intermittently (2001-04 &2011~)	MEND tied pirate gangs.	Distribution of oil wealth in the Niger Delta

As figure 4 summarily suggests, piracy incident patterns are explicitly or implicitly related to regional issues. Not just frequency trends, but also types of maritime crimes are closely related to the critical issues in each particular regional contexts. Modes of counter-piracy and their effects are also related to the regional contexts.

Counter Piracy Measures

Largely, two different approaches have been applied to the piracy prone regions. The first one is to control piracy by regional initiatives, which have been adopted in Southeast Asian areas around the Malacca straits and West African areas around the Gulf of Guinea. The second counter piracy measure is to curb piracy incidents with external forces by dispatching international naval ships. The costs are lower and the equipment is much simpler in the former

case (Graf 2011), where coastal guard units are a major counter piracy operation entity.

Information sharing is also important. Singapore has an Information Sharing Center (ISC) under the umbrella of the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP) since 2006 (Ho 2009), while Malaysia separately accommodates an IMB piracy reporting center in Kuala Lumpur since 1992.

There are approximately more than ten coordination networks against Somali piracy in the Gulf of Aden: 1) Operation Atlanta (EU), 2) Operation Ocean Shield (NATO), 3) The Combined Maritime Forces (CMF, The U.S. initiative), 4)The Combined Task Force (CTF 152), 5) the Maritiem Security Centre-Horn of Africa (MSCHOA), 6) Djibouti Code of Conduct (IMO Initiative), 7) New York Declaration (Multilateral Commitment Signs), 8) Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS), 9) The South Asia and Africa Regional Port Stability Cooperative (SAARPSCO), and 10) the African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM). Unfortunately, Somalia as a defunct paper state does not provide any active roles in any of the coordination networks for counter piracy measures. Though Somalia has launched its own counter-piracy measures, such as the Kampala Process in 2011 and the Puntland Marine Police Force (PMPF in 2012), the country does not prove any real evidence of actual control capacity (Ahmed 2013).

In regards to the cooperative and organizational aspects, there are diverse bilateral cooperative networks among the four littoral states and main user states in the Malacca Straits: Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia and Thailand. For controlling piracy in the Malacca Straits, there has been evolutionary progress from Shangri-La Dialogue (intergovernmental security forum since 2002), MALSINDO (Trilateral Coordinated Patrols since 2004), Malacca Straits Patrols (A set of cooperative security measures by four littoral states including Thailand) to ReCAAP (2006, an Information Sharing Center initially funded by Japan but managed under Singaporean

initiatives). Moreover, there are numerous multilateral networks centered on ASEAN such as ASEAN Plus Three, ARF, APEC, ASEM and EASⁱⁱ as well as other diverse defense networks.

In the Gulf of Guinea, Nigeria is the only one country with multiple naval vessels. Other regional states do not have such capacity. Even the Nigerian navy has very low operational capacity. Just 28% of the Nigerian navy is actually operational (Bridger 2013). The frequency level is also not high as much as the two piracy prone regions. It appeared that counter piracy measure has been applied to the region in an ad hoc mode. Thus, international community urged to establish a coordinated control over the regional piracy. For example, “the UN Security Council called for a comprehensive regional approach to combat threat of piracy and armed robbery at sea in the Gulf of Guinea” (UN News Centre, 2013). As a result of the effort, The Critical Maritime Routes in the Gulf of Guinea Programme (CRIMGO) with €4.5 million fund for 3 year duration was launched in January 2013. However, there is no clear sign of the effective control over the regional piracy around the Gulf of Guinea. Piracy incident records (41 in 2011, 52 in 2012, and 47 in 2013 respectively) show that West African piracy is not curbed. Reportedly, piracy incidents would increase ahead of the Nigerian election (Reuters 7 October 2014).

The different result and effectiveness of counter piracy measures are closely related to regional capacity and contexts. In assessing the effectiveness and efficiency of counter-piracy measures in the Malacca Straits, it has been found that high levels of controlling capability can be reached with limited resources and overlapped networks. This is in stark contrast with the results of piracy control in East and West Africa. Though there has been no hijacking incident around the Gulf of Aden since 2013, there is no clear sign of elimination of Somali piracy.

International intervention contributed to stopping piracy incidents just temporarily because problems with onshore status of Somalia still persist.

The contrasting results of counter piracy policy are also understood in the difference in regional capacity. For example, the share of export amount in world total exports in Southeast Asia is about 6.9%, while the number is around 0.1 at best in the states around the Gulf of Aden. The GDP gap between two regions also simply reveals the big different capacity for an effective counter piracy measure (See Appendix II for detailed data). The total GDP (947,715 million USD) was more than ten times of the total GDP of the Aden states (93,029 million USD).

The gaps in priority and capacity among littoral states and user states are obstacles. In Southeast Asia, Singapore and other main user states such as the United States, China, and Japan have treated piracy issues as a serious maritime security issues; Indonesia gave it a relatively low priority because domestic security issues are seen as much more serious (Eklöf 2006; Ong, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. et al. 2006; Murphy 2008; Hastings 2010). Indonesia and the Philippines had more serious domestic stability issues with the longest coastal lines and largest territorial waters in the region than other regional states until 2004 (Eklöf 2006). In East and West African states, like the status of Indonesia before 2004, they have more serious domestic issues. For them, piracy issue is not a direct threat to domestic stability. For example, Somali people, especially in Puntland region, welcomed the bonanza money and treated pirates as a hero for their coastal interests until 2011 (Shortland 2011; Bahadur 2012).

There are also other obstacles in making an effective counter piracy measure, such as vague legal codes for piracy prosecution, permissive environments and competitive relationships among the neighbor states. A maritime insurance company has ironically taken advantage of the overarching definition by imposing Warzone premium rates on most vessels passing through the

piracy incident regions (R.L.Seimens 2009; Bateman 2010). Another example is that thirteen Somali pirates captured by the Dutch frigate *Eversten* in early December 2009 were released because no country was willing to prosecute them. The problems with the definitions of piracy have revealed the limitations of modern international systems, at least in terms of their universal legality (Karim 2011; Kiser 2010). Sanctioning cultures of piracy (Eklöf 2006) and corruption (Murphy 2008; Hastings 2010) are also major hindering elements. Moreover, the competitive relationships among the littoral states have been a potential hurdle in establishing cooperative counter-piracy networks. For example, the three littoral states, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore, have had conflicting territorial and sovereignty issues since their independences.

Despite the difficulties, counter piracy control in the Southeast Asian areas has been evaluated as an effective one (Graf 2011; Bridger 2013), whereas two other areas are still troublesome (Ahmed 2013; Oliveira 2013). Figure 5 demonstrates comparing points of piracy issues among the three piracy prone regions. There are two primary reasons for the different results: low threat perception and poor capacity of regional states in the piracy prone regions. Though international communities, such as the UN, NATO, EU, and ASEAN, have urged the regional states to run an effective counter piracy measures, the regional people have perceived much low level of threat from the piracy incidents as in the example of Somali people's treatment of pirates as a hero. For local people in Somalia and Nigeria, the pirates were perceived as a defender against destruction of resources by foreign companies (Hansen 2009; Bahadur 2012). Ultimately, even the regional states in the piracy hot zones had no enough capacity to control by themselves, except for Southeast Asia. As the Indonesia economy has risen with increasing socio-political stability since 2004 (see Appendix III), piracy incidents had been remarkably decreased, especially around the Malacca Straits as a crucial bottle neck of the

global trade traffics. Unfortunately, two other regional states in both East and West Africa have not shown such a progressive capacity yet.

Table 3. Comparative Analysis of Counter Piracy Mechanisms by Regions

Region	Threat Perception	Major Targets	Risk	Mode of Counter Piracy	Effectiveness
Southeast Asia	High to International	Diverse	Increasing Cost	Regional Initiative	High
East Africa	High to International/ Low to Somalia	Large vessels for ransom/small vessels for mother ship	Increasing Cost	Outside Intervention	Temporary
West Africa	High to International/ Low to Nigeria	Oil Tanker and Supply ships	Increasing Cost	Ad hoc regional initiative	Low

Conclusion


There are some critiques of piracy threat arguments (Menkhaus 2009; Murphy 2011) because there has been no actual evidence that modern piracy incidents have threatened international security. About 0.1% of total transiting vessels (about 200,000 vessels annually through the Gulf of Aden) were attacked in East Africa in 2011. The actual incident number (86: about 0.03%) is much lower than the total incident number in the region. In other words, piracy is hard to be a direct threat to international security thought it appeared a global problem due to its international characters of shipping and media driven reportsⁱⁱⁱ. Nevertheless, the cost (up to

20 billion USD) of piracy should not be overlooked (Anna 2010; Financial Action Task Force 2011).


In other words, piracy is not an international threat, but a local problem in relation to regional contexts. The nature of piracy incidents and their patterns do reflect the onshore problems in the particular regional states as the three piracy prone regions demonstrate. Therefore, the threat perception and counter piracy initiative by regional states, not by outside forces, are crucial for the successful result of a counter piracy measure. For an effective and sustainable counter piracy policy regarding, it would be wise for future research of piracy to focus on the particular contexts of the African states.


Appendix I:

A: Different Frequency Patterns of Maritime Hijack Incident from 1996 to 2013



B: Changing Trends of Hijack Incidents by region





Appendix II: General Economic Indicators of the regional state in the piracy prone regions.

(Source from WTO data base: <http://stat.wto.org/Home/WSDBHome.aspx?Language=E>)

* ASEAN States in 2010 (million US\$, share=share in world total exports)

	GDP	Trade per Capita	Trade to GDP ratio	Export	Import	Share
Singapore	222,699	161,763	404.9	351,867	310,791	2.31
Malaysia	237,804	13,840	177.8	198,801	164,733	1.3
Indonesia	706,558	1,222	49.6	157,818	131,737	1.04
Thailand	318,847	5,737	138.3	195,319	182,400	1.28
Philippines	199,589	1,335	67.8	51,496	58,229	0.34
Brunei	10,732	33,621	103.8	9,200	2,950	0.06
Cambodia	11,343	984	128.3	5,030	7,500	0.03
Laos	7,492	454	51.8	1600	1800	0.01
Myanmar	35,226	141	52.8	8,749	4,807	0.06
Vietnam	103,572	1,774	157.3	72,192	84,801	0.47

* States around the Gulf of Aden in 2010

	GDP	Trade per Capita	Trade to GDP ratio	Export	Import	Share
Kenya	31,409	500	65.2	5,151	12,090	0.03
Eritrea	2,117	NA	NA	12	690	0
Djibouti	1,049	935	83.4	95	420	0
Ethiopia	29,717	145	44.1	2,238	8,552	0
Yemen	26,365	836	74	8700	9700	0.06
Somalia	2,372	NA	NA	300	798	NA

* Somalia data is obtained from CIA The World Fact Book)


	GDP	Trade per Capita	Trade to GDP ratio	Export	Import	Share
Benin	5,233	418	40	1,099	1,434	0.01%
Cameroon	19,147	678	40	3,289	4,943	0.02%
Equatorial Guinea	9,013	32606	170	6,947	6,259	0.04%
Gabon	9,684	8891	85	5,502	3,987	0.03%
Nigeria	159,017	1036	43	64,226	49,191	0.34%
Sao Tome	167	876	72	.	.	.
Togo	2,477	532	97	983	1,245	0.01%

* Data is obtained from the World Bank. Trade per capita (2010~2012) is gained from WTO

Appendix III: Economic Indicators of Indonesia

(Source: The Growth and Development of the Indonesian Economy by Stephen Elias and Clare Noone)


: <http://www.rba.gov.au/publications/bulletin/2011/dec/4.html>



Source: Economist Intelligence Unit, February 13, 2011.

Indonesia – Share of World GDP*

At PPP exchange rates



* IMF forecast from 2011

Source: IMF

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ⁱAl Shabaab insurgent (Mujahideen Youth Movement) is a militant Islamist group in Somalia, where the group try to impose a rigid form of Sharia law. Hizbul Islam was a Somali Islamist insurgent group, which is now merged to Al Shabaab.

ⁱⁱ ASEAN Plus Three is a forum to coordinate cooperation between ASEAN and three Northeast Asian nations (China, Japan, and South Korea) since 1997. Asian Regional Forum (ARF) is a multilateral dialogue for security issues in Asia Pacific Region since 1994. Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) is a forum for 21 pacific rim states to promote free trade and economic cooperation since 1989. The Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) is an inter-regional forum between the EU and ASEAN Plus Three since 1996. The East Asia Summit (EAS) is a forum of among major states in Asia including major stake holders such as the U.S. and Russia since 2005.

ⁱⁱⁱThere are only five actual maritime terror incidents during the 18 year term. Two incidents were committed by Al Qaeda (US Warship Cole on October 12 2000 and Tanker Limburg on Oct 6 2002). Actual damage levels were not serious as much as the terrorist group intended.