Beyond Eurasian Mediation: The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict and Azerbaijan’s Global South Diplomacy

Jason E. Strakes
Visiting Research Fellow
Foreign Policy Analysis Department
Center for Strategic Studies (SAM)

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Introduction

In recent years, the foreign policy establishment of the Republic of Azerbaijan has increasingly expressed its dissatisfaction with the structure and performance of the OSCE Minsk Group, which remains the primary institutional arrangement designated to implement the resolution process in the Armenia-Azerbaijan Nagorno-Karabakh conflict since its formation in December 1994. Yet, while in previous decades this issue has most often been considered from the perspective of the successes or failures of European approaches to post-Soviet regional conflict management, contemporary conditions may reflect a broader and longer-standing dynamic within the international system. It is arguable that doubts among Azerbaijani policymakers regarding the legitimacy of the Co-Chairs (U.S., Russian Federation and France) exhibit certain parallels with the classical Third Worldist critique of global institutions such as the UN Security Council (UNSC): given the significant political representation of major Armenian diasporas in the former, and the lack of implementation of four previous resolutions supporting the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan (822, 853, 874 and 884) by the latter, both are perceived by certain governments as a permanent membership dominated by major powers that repeatedly vote in favor of national or vested interests (the “veto power”) rather than upholding impartiality and equality under international law, and maintain recourse to the threat of armed intervention to impose peace upon smaller states. In accordance with the “balanced foreign policy” doctrine introduced by second post-independence President Heydar

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2 A recent household survey of public opinion on foreign policy in Azerbaijan revealed that out of 1,502 respondents, 71.2 percent have a negative perception of the OSCE Minsk Group, while 53.6 percent expressed the same view of the UNSC. See “20. Siz bəynəlxalq ictimaiyyətin Qarabağ probleminin hallində rolu nəçə qiymətlendirirsiniz (How do you assess the role of the international community in handling the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict)”, in Rauf Garagozov and Sahib Jaffarov eds. Foreign policy of Azerbaijan Republic in public opinion: sociological survey. Unpublished account, SAM, 2014.
3 Kamal Makili-Aliyev, Nagorno-Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict in International Legal Documents and International Law, Center for Strategic Studies under the President of the Republic of Azerbaijan, Fall 2013, pp 76-82.
Aliyev in the early 1990s, on 25 May 2011, Azerbaijan became the fourth former Soviet republic (following Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Belarus) to enter full membership in the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), which has often been conventionally regarded as an ineffectual relic of the Cold War era. As such, the official justification extended by Foreign Minister Elmar Mammadyarov at the NAM 16th Ministerial Conference and Commemorative Meeting in Bali, Indonesia was to establish an auxiliary platform for conflict resolution, as well as to promote its position within wider international forums, especially the UN organization. As a decision which challenged the popularly held contention among observers of Azerbaijan’s fundamentally “pro-Western” and “Euro-Atlantic” orientation, it has been suggested that this action motivated the joint statement by the presidents of the Co-Chair countries at the G-8 summit in Deauville, France on the need for a renewed commitment to achieving a final settlement. The successful campaign for a non-permanent UNSC seat representing the Group of Eastern European States from 2012 to 2013 is further indicative of the above objectives. By gaining an unprecedented position within the global status quo among former Soviet republics (also sought by Kyrgyzstan in recent years), Baku was able to extend its presence to entirely new issue areas, such as potential contributions to humanitarian aid and security in the Great Lakes subregion of Africa.

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7 One such publication suggests that the country exhibits greater identification with Continental Europe than even EU candidate Turkey, as the absence of a ‘Kemalist legacy’ and the experience of Czarist and Soviet colonization ostensibly imbued its elites and society with Western cultural norms (i.e. secularism and literacy campaigns), while in contrast to popular support for authoritarianism in contemporary Russia, public opinion surveys purportedly demonstrate democratic values akin to those of Central European countries. See Svante E. Cornell, Azerbaijan since Independence, M. E. Sharpe, 2011, pp. 300, 425-426.
institutions related to South-South cooperation in which it has received substantial support, including
the Organization for Islamic Cooperation (OIC), which has passed a total of 22 resolutions opposing
Armenian occupation between 1993 and 2014\footnote{Asiya Mahar, \textit{Assessment of the Contribution of OIC and its member states in the resolution of Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict}, SAM, 2014.}, and the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO)
and International Conference of Asian Political Parties (ICAPP), which in addition to NAM all
most recently by a statement adopted at the 4\textsuperscript{th} Summit of the Conference on Interaction and
Confidence Building Measures in Asia (CICA) in Shanghai, People’s Republic of China (PRC) in May
2014, which identified the conflict as a threat to international security and called upon the Minsk Group
to intensify its efforts at peaceful resolution.\footnote{“CICA urges OSCE MG to intensify Nagorno-Karabakh peace process”, Vestnik Kavkaza, 21 May 2014. http://vestnikkavkaza.net/news/politics/55476.html} The perception of a shift in Baku’s diplomacy away from
an emphasis on engagement with the U.S. and Europe is reinforced by evidence derived from in-depth
interviews with 54 Azerbaijani elites in 2001 and 2009 that revealed mistrust with the conduct of
Western governments as well as Russia and Turkey after the signature of the Armenian protocols,
which has possibly motivated a search for alternative partners in pressing its case in Nagorno-
Karabakh.\footnote{Cengiz Tokluoglu, “The Political Discourse of the Azerbaijani Elite on the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict (1991–2009).” \textit{Europe-Asia Studies}, Vol. 63, No. 7, September, 2011, pp. 1223-1252.} However, these developments have been largely overlooked due to the overwhelming
preoccupation of observers with the role of Euro-Atlantic institutions in addressing security issues in
the South Caucasus. The present study seeks to analyze the linkage between conventional approaches
to the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute and Azerbaijan’s growing engagements with international
deliberative bodies representing the interests of the Global South\footnote{The term “Global South” is used in contemporary international studies to refer to the geographic areas (Asia, Africa, the Middle East and Latin America) formerly known as the “Third World” or “developing nations”, or in the Russian/Soviet Orientalist tradition as “Southern” or “Asian and African” countries.}, and to assess how and to what
extent it has provided potential strategic advantages as well as alternate organizational resources for its successful resolution. This approach eschews the common emphasis on competing historical, ethnic, religious or territorial claims as a justification for the relative position of both parties to the conflict, which tends to dominate popular and academic discussions of the issue. In addition, it questions the assumption of the process as being driven by geostrategic competition between outside powers\textsuperscript{16}, or collusion and control by Russia and/or Armenian lobbyists. The conceptual framework draws from several social science subfields, including international law and organizations, conflict management and resolution, international relations (IR) theory, and diplomatic studies. It utilizes the qualitative methodology of process tracing of historical patterns\textsuperscript{17}, as well as quantitative data in order to test the hypothesized relationship between several variables. The research design proceeds in the following stages: first, it applies theories of international system structure in order to evaluate the legal and structural foundations as well as evolution of the Minsk Process, and the level of dissatisfaction of Azerbaijan with the resultant regional and international status quo. Second, it examines the composition and functions of NAM in comparison with contemporary European institutions, and how it presents an alternative to prevailing Western conceptions of international cooperation. Third, it documents the chronology of Azerbaijan's participation in NAM and other Global South forums and conventions, as well as policy statements, resolutions and declarations pertaining to Nagorno-Karabakh. Finally, it will explore the presence of a “feedback loop”, or the potential degree of impact of increased Global South support for Azerbaijan upon the perspectives and decisions of the mediators. The empirical analysis utilizes a wide range of data sources, including existing literature on the evolution of the negotiation process since 1992, government websites, policy documents, proceedings of international organizations, and translated and English-language media reports, supplemented by


\textsuperscript{17} David Collier, “Understanding Process Tracing”,

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interviews and surveys of appropriate personnel in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, members of the National Assembly, academics and independent analysts. The ultimate expectation is that by applying a new perspective on approaches to international institutions and conflict resolution in Nagorno-Karabakh, it will potentially contribute insights beyond conventional conclusions in post-Soviet and European security studies.

**Conceptual and Theoretical Foundations**

In order to proceed with the analysis outlined above, it is first necessary to establish logical assumptions about the nature of world politics and related propositions about the behaviour of states. Since the late 20th century, much discussion in IR theory in U.S. and European academic circles has been occupied by a contention between two major intellectual traditions. The structural or neorealist perspective posits that as there exists no central authority to exert control over state actors, a “self-help” system prevails in which the relative distribution of resources (i.e., economic and military capabilities) and their competitive use by governments (based upon mechanisms such as the “balance of power” and the “security dilemma”) are the primary drivers of international interactions. The maintenance of equilibrium or parity is therefore associated with the preservation of peace among political units.

In contrast, liberal institutionalism or neoliberalism asserts that commercial activity represented by trade, financial transactions and foreign investment, supported by the conclusion of legal agreements by both horizontal and vertical regulatory and decision-making bodies, rather than strictly alliances and power balancing, fosters cooperation and integration among nations. Thus, even where systemic

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anarchy prevails, rational actors will be constrained from conflict by norms of reciprocity and the value of their mutual investments.

Yet, a parallel development in the structural IR tradition that has sought to more closely link theory with policy applications is the power preponderance perspective. This school of thought purports to subsume both liberal and realist assumptions into a general and empirically supported model. In opposition to the anarchic condition assumed in neorealism, preponderance theory suggests that the organizing principle of world politics is a series of multi-level hierarchies composed of great, middle and minor powers. These vertical structural arrangements are assumed to operate simultaneously in all domains of the international system, ranging from hegemons to micro-states, which facilitates the comparison of their dynamics across differing geographic regions. The relative positions of states within each hierarchy are further defined by the domestic components of national development, including economic productivity, political capacity and demographic trends. Thus, while Azerbaijan has recently reached a dominant position among the South Caucasus states due to its geographic size, rapid economic growth, relative political stability and positive population indicators, its capabilities are at the same time dwarfed in comparison with the remaining regional and global actors (the U.S., EU, Russia, Turkey and Iran respectively). Secondly, their orientation toward other states is linked to

their status within this hierarchal system. The characteristics of the most materially endowed or “preponderant” states enable them to project their sociopolitical preferences throughout the international realm, thus minimizing their incentives to engage in major conflicts. This therefore assumes that the state system is led by a single great power and its coalition of satisfied states, unified by acceptance of the status quo and highly integrated by fixed military alliances, trade, communications, currency exchange and technology transfers. The United States, NATO and EU at the global level, and the Russian Federation, Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) in the regional domain are the most prominent contemporary examples of such spheres of influence. These hierarchical relationships are in turn replicated at the domestic level of states in the system: for societies in which strong governments enjoy broad popular legitimacy will face minimal resistance to activities such as the extraction of taxes, while weak governments faced with well-organized challengers will be more likely to experience increasing instability and violence.

At the same time, the lower levels of each respective hierarchy are occupied by a certain number of dissatisfied states that abstain from or reject the international conventions promoted by the leading power and its coalition. These actors are still concerned with the dangers posed by “relative gains”, and therefore continue to behave as if the system is anarchic, often pursuing alternative diplomatic or military strategies to oppose the status quo although they lack the resources to directly challenge the preponderant power. This “conditional anarchy” dimension thus introduces a means of interpreting

Francisco, California, March 26-29, 2008, pp. 8, 10.
24 In this sense, the U.S. occupation of Iraq from 2003-2011 and the Russian invasion of Georgia in August 2008 represent the imposition of major power preferences in response to perceived local challenges to the status quo, and did not substantially alter the structure of the international system.
25 This functions differently from the “tragedy of the commons” in hegemonic stability theory, as in this view the preponderant state does not generate public goods that are consumed by all states in the system, but distributes only private goods within its immediate coalition.
27 Seifeldin Hussein and Jacek Kugler, “Conditional Anarchy: The Importance of the Status Quo in World Politics”, paper
foreign policy disputes—such as between Azerbaijan and the major powers which govern the Minsk Process—that remain below the level of major interstate conflict.

The premises of power preponderance may also be viewed as logically compatible with alternative propositions regarding the international relations of small developing or former Soviet countries. The “subaltern realism” perspective posits that contrary to the assumptions of the Western realist tradition, the leaderships of developing nations often perceive the international system as a hierarchy presided over by great powers, while at the same time the domestic political environment is regarded as a struggle to maintain control of the state against anarchic popular forces.28 Analogies have also been drawn in the literature between the internal circumstances of post-colonial and post-communist states, as the Soviet dissolution initially left governments in many former republics with a weak tradition of national sovereignty and a lack of capable administrative structures, including technically competent foreign ministries and diplomatic services.29 Save for the major intrastate conflicts in Georgia during 1991-1992 and Tajikistan from 1992-1997, Azerbaijan at the return of national independence was a virtual archetype of post-Soviet civil strife, experiencing dual revolutions (the Popular Front-led mass uprising against the Communist Party of Azerbaijan SSR and first president Ayaz Mutalibov from 1990-1992), the escalation of the 1988-1990 Armenian insurgency in the former Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast (NKAO) into an interstate war between the Armenian and Azerbaijani republics in 1991-1992, ethnic autonomy and/or secessionist movements (the establishment of the Talysh-Mugan


Autonomous Republic from June to September 1993) and attempted military coups (the resignation of second president Abdulfaz Elcibey and revolt against Heydar Aliyev led by rebel commander and later Prime Minister Colonel Surat Huseynov from 1993-1994), each concentrated within a single four-year period. Further, these simultaneous conflicts are significant in the extent to which they are regarded as having been engendered by supporting links between domestic actors and external influences, particularly the governments of Russia, Iran, and subsequently, “Deep State” elements in Turkey. Some scholars have observed that even by the turn of the twenty-first century, despite the successful consolidation of executive power, the Azerbaijani state had only just begun to develop its capacity beyond reacting to the lingering effects of previous internal conflicts. Thus, political leaders in these settings are often preoccupied with suppressing domestic unrest and preserving their incumbency, while also pursuing those external policies that enhance their ability to manage tensions and maintain centralized control. The immediate dangers posed by the lack of resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict—a self-regulating line of contact (LoC) between the Azerbaijan and Armenian Armed Forces, and the absence of internal sovereignty over nearly one-fifth of the national territory, have in turn motivated the Aliyev administrations to continually calibrate their relations with each of the Co-Chair states and secondary parties.

The theoretical scheme in Figure 1 specifies the role of system structure in the relationship between Azerbaijan’s participation in international organizations and the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. The first stage of the model represents the evolving organizational structure and function of the Minsk Process from its origins in the 1992 “hot war” phase to the present (t-1), and its impact on the manner in which Azerbaijani foreign policy elites (both decision-makers and advisors) interpret prevailing regional and global conditions, especially as they constitute the conflict situation or “facts on the ground”. However, this relationship is at the same time influenced by an intervening variable, or the distribution of capabilities and preferences among states in the international and regional environment. The second stage indicates the relationship between these status quo evaluations and the pursuit of Global South diplomacy, or the participation of Azerbaijani policymakers in international institutions that have traditionally promoted cooperation among developing countries (“South-South” or Asian, African and Latin American regionalism) or sought to represent their collective economic, political and security interests. This activity is in turn assumed to project potential influence upon the positions and approaches of actors in the negotiation process. Finally, the last stage seeks to identify evidence of a
two-directional relation or “feedback effect”, or the probability that changes in approaches to conflict resolution could directly affect the Minsk Process itself, including new types of exchanges or interactions between actors and organizations. It is this fourth segment of the analysis which seeks to determine whether Azerbaijan is simply engaging in realist counterbalancing behavior by aggregating its resources via political support from a large number of states, or whether innovations might be introduced through more direct involvement and contributions by member states of NAM and other Global South institutions to the conflict resolution process.

**Evolution of the Minsk Process: From Conference to Hierarchy**

While a vast number of previous studies have presented a descriptive historical account of changes in the composition and approaches of the Nagorno-Karabakh negotiations and their consequences, few if any have examined the Minsk Process within the deeper context of how it represents Western European conceptions of constructing international organizations, as well as their situation within the larger interstate system. What accounts for its transformation from an essentially informal, horizontal conference format consisting of multiple actors (intergovernmental institutions, states and “interested parties”), to a rigid, formal and hierarchical troika often viewed as a projection of the geopolitical interests of dominant powers? How has this trajectory motivated Azerbaijani leaders to seek alternatives to both regional and Western institutions in addressing the conflict?

The most common explanation presented in the literature emphasizes the failure of mediation efforts and the resultant perpetuation of the dispute due to the pursuit of conflicting national objectives, divergent approaches to resolution and lack of coordination among the actors involved.33 One prominent master’s thesis on the topic reviews several problematic characteristics of the Minsk Group

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which have ostensibly hampered its effectiveness as a conflict resolution mechanism.\textsuperscript{34} This identifies several variables including differing perspectives on the conduct of international relations, lack of credibility and bias on the part of the mediators, which attributes realism to the Russian Federation and liberalism to the U.S. and European Union (EU). However, this categorical assignment of traits is potentially arbitrary, while failing to recognize shared qualities or crosscutting cleavages between the actors involved. Similarly, while a critical examination of the conduct of the Co-Chairs asserts that lack of transparency, recurrent changes in leadership and structure have complicated and delayed the negotiations, it does not consider the manner in which these reflect the overall influence of the international system on the process itself.\textsuperscript{35}

Instead, the present study suggests that more significant for Azerbaijan’s situation is the impact of shifts in the distribution of resources and orientations among states on the formation of the Minsk Group during the early post-Cold War era. The conceptual roots of Nagorno-Karabakh resolution efforts lie in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) and the resultant ten-point Helsinki Accords (or “Declaration on Principles Guiding Relations between Participating States”) concluded from 1973-1975, and three follow-up meetings held in Belgrade, Madrid and Vienna from 1977-1989. These conferences possessed the distinctive characteristic of a technically non-binding agreement which was reached by consensus via extended dialogue with the maintenance of strict equality among participants (especially advantageous for small countries), unlike the implementation of formal treaty-based resolutions by permanent legislative bodies which has since become the hallmark of European institutions.\textsuperscript{36} Among these provisions were the declared norms of non-intervention in internal affairs, equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and cooperation among states\textsuperscript{37} that

\textsuperscript{35} Ibid, pp.
\textsuperscript{37} The Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Aug. 1, 1975, 14 I.L.M. 1292 (Helsinki
sought to challenge the strictures of East-West divisions, which were also familiar to the principles promoted by Third Worldist or Asian-African forums such as NAM, and subsequently by successful regional organizations such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). In particular, the central role of the former Yugoslavia and the participation of small Mediterranean states such as Cyprus and Malta in both the Helsinki process and NAM are indicative of this basic compatibility during the late Cold War decades.

Yet, major disruptions in the international environment caused by the collapse of state socialist regimes in Central Eastern Europe and the dissolution of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, which led to the admission of over 20 new member states, as well as the need to respond to violent ethnopolitical and intrastate conflicts in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Moldova, Georgia, Azerbaijan and Tajikistan resulted in the eventual alteration of these principles of equality, decision by consensus rule and non-interference in domestic affairs. The Charter of Paris for a New Europe concluded in November 1990 established a permanent secretariat composed of the Council of Foreign Ministers and its subsidiary Committee of Senior Officials (CSO). In addition, the legal validation of CSCE by the UNSC was affirmed with the A related contention that emerged during this period was that the sheer multiplicity of actors initially involved in mediation efforts such as in Nagorno-Karabakh, ranging from UN representatives, to regional organizations (CSCE, CIS), to global and regional powers (U.S., Russia, Turkey and Iran) and newly independent states (Kazakhstan) undermined their effectiveness, fostering the need to consolidate the process under a unified entity. After the Budapest Summit in December

Declaration), Minnesota Human Rights Library.


1994 this central function was assumed by the Permanent Committee/Council (PC) and its deployment of ad hoc steering groups and fact-finding missions, which ordained the status of the Minsk Process as a crisis management and tentative post-conflict peace-building group, rather than a conflict-prevention mechanism.41

However, the Minsk Process founding document identified three categories of participants in the Nagorno-Karabakh negotiations: 4 international institutions, including the European Community (EC), Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), North Atlantic Co-operation Council (NACC), and UN Secretary-General; 11 states, including Azerbaijan, Armenia, Belarus, Czech and Slovak Federal Republic (later replaced by Hungary), France, Germany, Italy, Russian Federation, Sweden, Turkey and the U.S.; and an unspecified number of sub-state actors, or “elected and other representatives of Nagorno-Karabakh”.42 The three largest powers and France were ostensibly identified due to their historical involvement in the South Caucasus region, while Germany, Sweden and the former Czechoslovakia served as rotating CSCE chairs.43 Thus, the ad hoc or emergency creation of this original broadly inclusive “Minsk Group” outstripped the deeper institutionalization of the CSCE that began at the turn of the decade, as it continued to be defined as a “peace conference”44 rather than a “mission” until the inauguration of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) in January 1995.45 It has further been suggested that it was high-level initiative by the U.S. to begin negotiations prior to the May 1994 cease-fire (signified by the introduction of the “Baker rules”46),

46 These refer to the guiding principles for the negotiation process introduced by former Secretary of State James A. Baker, which identified two principal parties (Armenia and Azerbaijan) and two interested parties (the Armenian and Azerbaijani
rather than the 1992 Helsinki Council Meeting, which provided the actual impetus for its formation.\textsuperscript{47} In addition, the sheer diversity of the participating states, combining major powers, advanced industrial democracies of Western Europe, small Central Eastern European nations and former Soviet republics belied the significant variation in their capacity to influence the settlement process. At the same time, it has been observed that while Russia was a core member of the Minsk Group from its creation as well as a regional power, as it entered a period of post-Soviet decline it negatively perceived the aggregate influence of NATO and the Western European Union (WEU) as a hierarchy (which subsequently evolved into the “multipolarity” doctrine in opposition to U.S. hegemony during the first Putin presidency\textsuperscript{48}), while the remaining member states have equally supported further centralization of the OSCE only to the extent that it did not impinge upon their sovereignty.\textsuperscript{49} The effort to increase Russia’s satisfaction by offering it the position of permanent Co-Chair and its provisional acceptance of a proposed multinational peacekeeping force at the Budapest Summit, followed by the introduction of a Personal Representative of the Chairman in Office (CiO) and team of five attendant special envoys based “on the ground” in Tbilisi, Georgia in August 1995 are therefore identified as milestones in the formalization of the Process.\textsuperscript{50}

However, it is also necessary to consider how and why the chairmanship evolved from a monadic, to a dyadic to a trilateral structure with a five-year time frame. The first designation as simultaneous chair of the Minsk Conference and formative Group was assigned to Italy in March 1992, as former Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Mario Raffaelli previously served as mediator in the 1977-1992 communities of Nagorno-Karabakh).\textsuperscript{47} John J. Maresca, “The International Community and the Conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh”, in Bruce W. Jentleson ed. \textit{Opportunities Missed, Opportunities Seized: Preventive Diplomacy in the Post-Cold War World}, Rowman & Littfield Publishers, 2000, pp. 78, 81.\textsuperscript{48} This concept was formulated by former Foreign Minister Evgenii Primakov as an analytical tool for informing effective balancing against U.S. dominance by forming coalitions among opposing poles. See Lena Johnson, \textit{Vladimir Putin and Central Asia: The Shaping of Russian Foreign Policy}, I.B. Tauris, 2004, pp. 137-138.\textsuperscript{49} Rexane Dedashti, “Nagorno-Karabakh: A Case Study of OSCE Conflict Settlement”, in Michael Bothe, Natalino Ronzitti and Allan Rosas Eds. \textit{The OSCE in the Maintenance of Peace and Security: Conflict Prevention, Crisis Management and the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes}, 1997, p. 467.\textsuperscript{50} Ibid, pp. 470-471.
Mozambican Civil War, which significantly influenced his efforts to achieve a cease-fire agreement. Yet, his tenure actually contained three different formats: the “3 + 1 initiative”\(^{51}\), in which a leading Italian role was appended to ongoing confidential talks led by the U.S., Russia and Turkey; the direct inclusion of the main parties to the conflict (Armenia and Azerbaijan), which increased the formula to “5 + 1”\(^{52}\); and finally “9 + 1” with the addition of the remaining Minsk Group member states.\(^{53}\) The dual co-chairmanship of Sweden/Finland and Russia which formed from 1993-1996 can be linked to two factors. First, the two Nordic Minsk Group participants as “Neutral and Non-Aligned” states shared a strategy of seeking balanced bilateral relations with Moscow, thus preserving their autonomy by maintaining a position of “neither for nor against” Russia. This accompanied a dynamic in which smaller member states sought to utilize their positions within CSCE structures to constrain the number of stakeholders directly involved, as well as limit the ability of larger powers to impose unilateral preferences on the process. The shift to a “shuttle diplomacy” format by Swedish mediator Jan Eliasson prioritized direct contacts between the Personal Representative and the conflict parties, which assumed that by including rather than isolating Russia, it would be easier to manage and contain its influence over the negotiations.\(^{54}\) However, this innovation was interpreted by the U.S. CSCE representative as opposing Western interests in favor of Russia, which indicates that it was not only Moscow that sought to project its preferred political and economic vision upon the resolution process.\(^{55}\) Secondly, the Mandate promulgated by Hungarian CiO Marton Krasznai in March 1995 established a formal Co-Chairmanship, which was assigned fifteen tasks under the auspices of the Minsk Conference.\(^{56}\)

\(^{55}\) Hungarian OSCE Chairmanship, Mandate of the Co-Chairmen of the Conference on Nagorno-Karabakh under the
December 1996, the position held by Finland was finally transferred to France, marking the end of the transitional period. Observers maintain that the permanent triad arrangement was regarded as optimal due to their contrasting relations with the conflict parties and the “unsurpassed collective political influence” of the member states.\(^{57}\) Similarly, the appointment of Russia has been attributed to its “special status” due to the immediate significance of the Caucasus region to its geopolitical and strategic interests.\(^{58}\) It was also during this period that the presence of the “interested parties” in the negotiations was terminated, thus rendering the Minsk Group a closed, state-dominated institution.\(^{59}\) The Azerbaijani leadership openly rejected the proposed troika formula due to its perceptions of France as an Armenian patron, advocating for the maintenance of a dual format including the U.S. or Germany, while then-Minister of Foreign Affairs Hasan Hasanov requested that France withdraw its candidacy in meetings with OSCE representative of Denmark Susan Christiansen.\(^{60}\) In addition, Baku was reportedly joined in its opposition to the appointment of France by the U.S. as it prioritized its economic interests in emerging regional energy markets, which was welcomed by Azerbaijan as a counterweight against the Russian-Armenian military alliance later formalized with the September 1997 Treaty of Friendship, Partnership and Mutual Assistance.\(^{61}\) Yet, these objections were ultimately ignored, as the OSCE secretariat did not recognize an alternative to the established selection process.

The graph displayed in Figure 2 presents data on the national capabilities of all states involved in the Minsk Process in the period from its initiation in 1992 to the consolidation of the permanent Co-

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Chairs in 1997. Relative political capacity (RPC) is defined as the ability of governments to extract resources from the national population through taxation relative to the level of economic development, including the agricultural, mining, export and crude oil sectors. According to this definition, values below 1 percent indicate less than average political performance, those at 1 reflect average or normal capacity, while those greater than 1 percent are more successful in mobilizing and taxing their populations relative to other states.

Figure 2 Capabilities of Minsk Group Member States 1992-1997

First, Belarus is seen to have entered a phase of post-Soviet decline after 1993, which despite having first proposed to host the Conference, rendered its contribution to the negotiations essentially nil.

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Germany in the first decade after reunification experienced a shock to its domestic system from the absorption of the territories of the former German Democratic Republic, with the newly separated Czech and Slovak republics also experiencing declining capacity, while Hungary entered a period of instability marked by sharp upswings and downturns. While Finland began a gradual climb from a low point at the turn of the decade, Sweden exhibited a relatively more successful position among the two Nordic Co-Chairs. Turkey is shown to have occupied the middle range of the power distribution, exhibiting a gradually upward sloping plateau during the government of Prime Minister Tansu Çiller. While Italy’s capacity began a sharp downturn after its brief stint as Conference Chair from 1992-1993, at this point France is shown to have reached a plateau ranking just below the level of the U.S., as consistent with its assuming the position of third Co-Chair state. Following the Soviet collapse and reduction of its status to a middle-level power, the Russian Federation exhibited an inverse U-shaped curve of decline and recovery, while the United States passed through a period of economic recession gradually climbing upward towards the end of the decade. Both are therefore shown to have assumed predominance among the Minsk Group countries, as is intuitive given their position as the prevailing global and regional powers. Finally, due to lack of consistent records for former Soviet republics, data on Armenia is unavailable for this period, while figures for Azerbaijan exist only for 1996-1999. As the republic had only begun to emerge from a period of war and severe instability in the late 1990s, it occupied the bottom level of the Minsk Group hierarchy, demonstrating its disadvantageous position relative to the Co-Chair states.

Yet, paradoxically, while in previous years Azerbaijani policymakers have advocated changing the Minsk Group membership, most recently Deputy Foreign Minister Araz Azimov has publicly rejected structural reform of the Co-Chairs as an option. In particular, it is maintained that because of the

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flexibility and high level of visibility enjoyed by the three powers, they remain the most capable parties for managing the mediation process. Thus, the current agenda of Azerbaijani foreign policy opposes the conduct and performance of the member states, rather than seeking to alter the negotiation format. Thus, as demonstrated by its successful pursuit of a non-permanent seat within the UNSC (rather than simply advocating UN structural reform), Baku’s primary strategy has been to develop alternate means to gain advantages within status quo institutions, rather than to mount radical challenges against the system.

Azerbaijan and Global South Diplomacy: A New Approach to Nagorno-Karabakh?

The participation of former Soviet republics in organizational structures historically associated with the “Third World” remains a highly understudied topic. This has likely been reinforced by popular assumptions of the inevitable gravitation of these countries toward European institutions as beacons of democratic reform or providers of economic and security guarantees against malign Russian influence. Earlier studies on the factors influencing foreign policies of post-communist states conclude that, save for Moldova, Turkmenistan and Belarus, post-independence governments have generally rejected neutrality as a conceptual guide for their external relations due to its lack of relevance in the post-Cold War era. One recent observation of Azerbaijan’s growing assertiveness and the narrowing of its foreign policy agenda to energy exports and the Nagorno-Karabakh issue, along with increased engagement with Asian countries, characterizes its decision to enter NAM as “an initiative with no real political significance”. On one hand, such commentaries reflect traditional appraisals dating to its early years, which have often concentrated upon its supposed contradictions and failings as a political

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movement (Jansen, 1966). In particular, these writings typically emphasize its essential lack of cohesion and ineffectuality, as idealistic pronouncements (e.g., Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru’s Five Principles of Coexistence) and lofty goals such as neutrality or disarmament were frequently overruled by the “national interest”. Many of the NAM member states eventually convened treaties with either of the superpowers, and both purchased and produced massive quantities of conventional or in some cases, nuclear weapons. Yet, such critiques are often based upon a misconception of the practical purposes of nonalignment, which were to maintain strategic autonomy and flexibility while promoting the cultural, political and economic interests of developing nations through both formal and informal instruments. Reflecting the intent to overcome the legacy of colonial domination, its proponents have therefore advocated a multilateral balancing doctrine, in which fluid alliances are self-help mechanisms and the pursuit of parity in both economic and military capabilities is a necessary corollary of interstate cooperation (Mortimer, 1983: ; . Yet rather than a sole reliance on power politics, nonalignment also assumes that international law should set standards for diplomatic conduct. It therefore reflects a progressive view of anarchy: rather than relying upon a central institution for enforcement, state behavior is tempered by international legal agreements and strictures that regulate state interaction and reduce the likelihood of conflict. It is further important to recognize that the political leaders who defined the NAM did not seek to form a third or alternate bloc in order to serve as a counterbalance against the influence of the great powers. This conclusion is supported by early empirical research which indicates that, contrary to common Western assumptions, nonalignment was not conceived in response to a perception of an impending military threat from the

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Thus, common assumptions of the obsolescence of NAM fail to recognize its continued function as a forum for the expression of varying state preferences, as member governments seek to manage or oppose the grand strategies of preponderant powers, especially the pursuit of unilateralism by the U.S. since the 1990s. As such, some native scholars contend that pressures for democratization imposed by the U.S. and Western governments are perceived by Azerbaijani elites as a form of “neo imperialism” equivalent to Russian dominance. Additionally, arguments for the contemporary irrelevance of NAM cannot account for a considerable increase in membership to 120 countries (a total of 24 since 1989) as well as participation with observer status (a total of 17) including several former Soviet republics, while the applications of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Costa Rica were rejected in 1995 and 1998 respectively. These far exceed the withdrawal of Argentina (which rejoined as an observer in 2009), the suspension of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) and the loss of Cyprus and Malta to the EU between 1991 and 2004. It is also arguable that the U.S.-Soviet opposition was a necessary but not sufficient condition for the emergence of NAM, as its inherent purpose was for developing states to establish themselves within the international order while maintaining their autonomy, and the pursuit of political and economic equality via maximizing their collective resources for representation.

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79 These include Argentina, Armenia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Brazil, People’s Republic of China, Costa Rica, Croatia, El Salvador, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Mexico, Montenegro, Paraguay, Serbia, Tajikistan, Ukraine, and Uruguay.
in international forums. As such, Azerbaijani policymakers have publicly justified their participation in NAM not according to common assumptions about its roots in bipolarity, but to its original normative vision of international politics:

“The end of the Cold War has in no way diminished the unique role of the NAM. In our view, the philosophy of the NAM was not about rejecting the bipolar world… [nor] disengaging neutrality. For us, its primary mission was and remains to help maintain justice and equality in international relations, to ensure respect for norms of principles of the (sic) international law and the right and freedom of sovereign nations to consider every issue on merit and take action against injustice irrespective of who perpetuates it.”

\textit{NAM as an Alternative to European Institutions}

The essential distinction between NAM and contemporary European institutions such as OSCE is that it possesses neither a formal charter or constitution, nor a treasury, nor a central decision-making apparatus. Instead, it is administered by a rotating secretariat or Coordinating Bureau (CoB) first introduced in 1973, which is based at UN headquarters in New York and chaired by the Permanent Representative of a single country for a three-year period. This intimate linkage to the UN system thus has historically served as a mechanism for the internationalization of domestic issues, thus providing a common foreign policy for weaker states. However, the CoB has a largely functional status as the primary deliberative bodies of NAM are the collective Summit (formally the Conference of Heads of State and Government) held in the chairing country every three years, which defines policy positions and adopts resolutions, and the interim Senior Officials Meeting (SOM) and Ministerial Meeting, which resolves to implement Summit decisions and action plans. These activities are subsequently summarized and published in the Final Document. The nearest equivalent that NAM possesses to the OSCE Ministerial Council or CiO is the Troika, an advisory and discussion group.

\begin{enumerate}
\item Houman Sadri, “Nonalignment as a Foreign Policy Strategy: Dead or Alive”, \textit{Mediterranean Quarterly}, Vol. 10, No. 2, Spring 1999, pp. 128-129.
\end{enumerate}
composed of past, present and future CoB chairs which was established in September 1997. An analysis and defense of the NAM project from the perspective of the late Cold War era emphasizes that NAM is inherently non-hierarchical and inclusive in design, in order to provide smaller states with a means of challenging the hegemony of great powers.

The contemporary structure of NAM has also become more streamlined and less bureaucratic than the classical organization. While in earlier years each member state assumed a desk within multiple functional bodies or expert groups that dealt with specialized policy areas, in the present these have been replaced by Drafting Groups which produce analytical documents, and Working Groups, Contact Groups, Task Forces and Committees, which are either presided over by the chair country, or coordinated by individual states. These define the positions of NAM on high-priority issues, promote and seek support for decisions and resolutions in international forums, manage the participation of NAM in UN bodies and debates, and submit reports for review by the CoB. An agenda for internal reform and revitalization of NAM was introduced at the 11th Summit in Cartagena, Colombia in October 1995, which resolved to establish a rotating Ministerial Committee on Methodology focused on enhancing and improving the efficiency of its working methods and practices. The official Ministerial Committee Meeting held in May 1996 defined this as an ongoing process, and focused particularly upon adopting criteria for timely admission of members, observers and guests and enhancement of the role of NAM. In addition, it emphasized the norm of gradual achievement of consensus through interactive dialogue rather than seeking unanimity. The proceedings resulted in the Cartagena Document on Methodology, which was reaffirmed at the 14th Summit in 2006 and continues

87 Ibid.
to serve as the closest facsimile of a formal foundation for NAM procedures.90

Another important contrast is that rather than a staged accession process which involves the asymmetric imposition of requirements for domestic legal and institutional reforms to render compatibility with the European *acquis communautaire*, the criteria for NAM membership are limited to adherence to and solidarity with the ten normative principles established at the founding 1955 Bandung Conference and reaffirmed by each Summit. These are distinctive in the extent to which they prioritize sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-interference, as well as the rejection of “collective defence” imposed by the major powers. Most importantly, according to the five principles declared at the 1961 Preparatory Conference of the 1st Summit in Cairo, Egypt, a potential member state should both exhibit an independent foreign policy, and should not participate in multilateral alliances, bilateral military agreements or regional defense pacts, or host foreign bases *when concluded in the context of great power conflicts*.91 Upon this basis, applications submitted to the Chair are evaluated by the CoB, which then refers its decision to the Summit and Ministerial Meeting for consensus approval.92

According to this view, the primary division within NAM in the post-Cold War decades has been between those states which continue to utilize it as a platform for radical challenges to the political and economic positions of the major powers, and those which have adopted a more moderate and accommodating stance within the international system.93 One commentary from a Russian perspective suggests that its continued viability may lie in that despite its standard of inclusion of highly diverse participants, it has possibly achieved greater commonality of positions on major international issues than attempts at integration among a smaller number of actors such as the Commonwealth of

92 Document on the Methodology of the Non-Aligned Movement, pp. 5-6.
Independent States (CIS). Another critical Russian analyst identifies its lack of unanimity on international problems as both a weakness and a strength: while its decentralized structure inhibits the formation of formal coalitions in response to major security concerns, its horizontal format and wide diversity of preferences contribute to its democratic internal character and ability to interface with global institutions. Its essential significance thus lies in enabling developing countries to select policies and practices according to their national interests, rather than those determined by alliances or institutions dominated by the major powers. Interestingly, according to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, while Azerbaijan has had relatively limited experience with the mechanisms and practices of NAM, during its brief period of membership it has identified the need for improvement and revision of the Cartagena methodology, particularly the lack of clearly defined procedures—which might reflect its greater degree of familiarity and experience in engaging with the OSCE, Council of Europe (CoE), EU, NATO and Eastern Partnership (EaP) since independence. This is corroborated by Mammadyarov’s statement at the 16th Ministerial Meeting: “In order to realize a more coordinated and efficient Movement capable of responding to a rapidly changing international environment in an effective manner, we have to explore new ways and means. It could be both strengthening the existing mechanisms, including Coordinating Bureau, Working Groups or Caucuses and finding new ways of better coordination and representation…” In addition, the relative freshness of post-Soviet activity in NAM (as further exemplified by the acceptance of Tajikistan as an observer in 2009) suggests an opportunity to utilize the institution for novel purposes, especially as an alternative means to achieve regional foreign policy goals.

97 Interview with Qaya Mammadov, International Security Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 9 December 2014.
**NAM and Azerbaijan’s Extraregional Diplomacy**

While mainstream scholars have increasingly begun to acknowledge non-alignment as a natural extension of Azerbaijan’s longstanding foreign policy principles, few if any have seriously explored its implications for cross-regional cooperation. One recent study which concedes Baku’s nonaligned choice omits Uzbekistan, which entered NAM in 1993, while stating incorrectly that “Turkmenistan has been officially neutral since independence, but never joined the NAM”. Causal explanations for Baku’s approach extended by analysts, observers and policymakers tend to identify the country’s precarious physical location between regional powers, geostrategic jockeying between Russia and NATO in the context of the 2008 South Ossetia War, or signaling to Western governments of a change in orientation in response to lack of support. Yet, the precedents for enhanced post-Soviet-Global South ties were actually laid in preceding decades, when Eurasian states increasingly began seeking like-minded partners in the Middle East, South and Southeast Asia. These have been augmented in recent years by increasing ties with Latin American and African countries. Azerbaijan was first granted observer status in NAM at the 11th Ministerial Meeting in Cairo, Egypt in May-June 1994, nearly concurrent with the Bishkek Protocol cease-fire agreement and following Armenia by two years. In a subsequent address to the 49th Session of the UN General Assembly, Heydar Aliyev asserted that it “provides us with a broad opportunity for the establishment of bilateral contacts in various fields and for the rapprochement of our positions with those of the States (sic) members of the Movement.”

While perhaps reflective of Azerbaijan’s strategy of joining multiple international organizations, this

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last statement is significant, as analysts instead often place emphasis on this period for the conclusion of the “Contract of the Century” with predominantly U.S. and UK-based oil prospecting firms and entry into the NATO Partnership for Peace (PfP) as evidence of the country’s firm Western orientation. However, while Azerbaijani representatives attended the Ministerial Meeting of the CoB in Indonesia and the 11th Summit in Cartagena, Colombia in 1995 along with Armenia and Kyrgyzstan, as well as the 12th Ministerial Conference in New Delhi, India with Ukraine in 1997, according to published documents Baku did not send delegates to the 1998, 2000, 2002, 2003, or 2004 summits or interim meetings. This extended period of inactivity in NAM despite initial interest demands deeper empirical examination. The Table links the Minsk Group and Evaluation of the status quo integration two variables 1), Azerbaijan’s response to the successive settlement proposals extended by the Minsk Group Co-Chairs, and 2), integration into Euro-Atlantic institutions. This assumes that rejection of the Minsk Process is positively associated with participation in NAM. However, the level of dissatisfaction with the status quo in Nagorno-Karabakh is at the same time offset by moves toward membership in major power alliances or institutions.


104 Communiqué: Ministerial Meeting of the Coordinating Bureau of the Non-Aligned Countries, Bandung, Indonesia, 25-27 April 1995, p. 6; Cartagena 95, Basic Documents, Cartagena de Indias, Colombia, October 18-20, 1995, pp. 3-4.


Table 1 Azerbaijani Status Quo Evaluations and Participation in NAM 1995-2004

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Minsk Process</th>
<th>Status Quo Evaluation</th>
<th>NAM Participation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>“Shuttle Diplomacy”/Confidence-Building Measures</td>
<td>Rejected</td>
<td>Ministerial Meeting, 11th Summit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>Lisbon Principles</td>
<td>Accepted</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>Package Deal Phased Solution Third Co-Chair</td>
<td>Rejected Accepted</td>
<td>12th Ministerial Conference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>“Common State” Proposal</td>
<td>Initially rejected, tentative acceptance in negotiations</td>
<td>Signed NATO Partnership for Peace (PfP) Status of Forces Agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>Territorial Exchange</td>
<td>Supported by president, rejected by ministerial cabinet</td>
<td>Entry into force of EU PCA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>Stalemate</td>
<td></td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>Paris Principles/Key West</td>
<td>Rejected</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>Stalemate</td>
<td></td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>Stalemate</td>
<td></td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>Stalemate</td>
<td>Rejection of Paris Principles/Key West</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The presidential election in Azerbaijan in October 2003 and entry into office of Ilham Aliyev followed with strong dissatisfaction with the Minsk Process in its entirety, which rejected both any concept of a precedent for final settlement established in previous negotiations, and insistence on revision of all previous proposals to begin *tabula rasa*. This negative evaluation was also expressed

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112 Elkhan Mekhtiyev, *Armenia-Azerbaijan Prague Process: Road Map to Peace or Stalemate for Uncertainty?*, Conflict
through an increasing appeal to institutions at the global level, as represented by the effort to introduce a resolution condemning the resettlement of diaspora Armenians in the seven occupied districts at the 59th UN General Assembly during November 2004.\textsuperscript{113} In October 2006, UN Ambassador Yashar Aliyev also introduced a draft resolution on fires in the mountainous plains within the occupied districts.

However, NAM did not take a position on the issue, while Pakistan expressed its support on behalf of OIC.\textsuperscript{114}

The catalyst for Azerbaijan’s renewed activity in NAM was therefore its evolving bilateral relations with two founding states, Cuba and Indonesia. In accordance with its burgeoning relations with the latter as the world’s most populous Muslim-majority nation and leading player in OIC, representatives of Azerbaijan and all five Central Asian republics were attendees of the April 2005 Asian-African Summit held in Jakarta on the 50th anniversary of the 1955 Bandung Conference—the precursor to NAM—while Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Tajikistan were signatories to the Declaration on The New Asian-African Strategic Partnership (NAASP), which sought to revitalize its objectives for the 21st century.\textsuperscript{115} The document also laid the foundations for the NAASP Capacity Building for Palestine Coordinating Unit co-chaired by Indonesia, South Africa and implemented by the Palestinian National Authority, through which Jakarta has served as program funding coordinator for Azerbaijan (despite its burgeoning relationship with Israel) along with twenty other developing nations.\textsuperscript{116} Perhaps in corollary with these activities, Azerbaijan was the only former Soviet state to contribute to the United Nations...
Fund for South-South Cooperation (UNFSSC) established by UN General Assembly Resolution 60/212 in December 2005.\textsuperscript{117} Azerbaijani representatives also attended the follow-up mechanisms NAASP Ministerial Conference on Capacity Building for Palestine in July 2008 and Second NAASP Senior Officials Meeting (SOM) in October 2009, as well as the Asia-Africa Youth Forum of NAASP member countries on achievement of the UN Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) in August 2010.\textsuperscript{118}

After receiving a formal invitation to attend the 14\textsuperscript{th} Summit in Havana, Cuba\textsuperscript{119} along with delegations of Russia, Armenia, Kazakhstan and Ukraine, Azerbaijan was first encouraged to apply for full membership during a state visit by Foreign Minister Mammadyarov in September 2006, which was suggested in the context of their simultaneous chairmanship of the NAM CoB and OIC Council of Foreign Ministers.\textsuperscript{120} It is often emphasized that (in possible response to American sanctions imposed on Baku such as the International Traffic in Arms Regulations and Section 907 of the Freedom Support Act) Azerbaijan was the only member of the CIS to vote in support of UN Resolution 48/16 on ending the U.S. embargo against Cuba in September 1993.\textsuperscript{121} In February 2007, Cuban CoB Chair Rodrigo Malmierca Diaz was invited to a discussion by the Permanent Representatives of the member states of GUAM—Organization for Democracy and Economic Development (Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova), in which he was provided with information on agenda item 27 “Protracted conflicts in the area GUAM and their implications for international peace, security and development” to be submitted to the 61\textsuperscript{st} Session of the General Assembly.\textsuperscript{122} During the same month, UN Permanent

\textsuperscript{117} “How to Partner With Us”, United Nations Office for South-South Cooperation (UNOSSC).
http://ssc.undp.org/content/ssc/partner/how_to_contribute.html

\textsuperscript{118} “Azerbaijan-Indonesia Relations”, Embassy of the Republic of Azerbaijan to the Republic of Indonesia.
http://www.azembassy.or.id/eng/rel.shtml; Asia-Africa Youth Forum: Reviving Asia-Africa Spirit To Accelerate the Achievement of MDGs, Administrative Arrangements, 23\textsuperscript{rd} -27\textsuperscript{th} August 2010, Bandung, Indonesia, p. 3.
http://sman28jkt.sch.id/userfiles/file/Administrative%20arrangement%20AAYF%20final.rtf

\textsuperscript{119} “Azerbaijan to be invited to international conference of Movement of non-aligned countries”, 27 May 2006.
http://en.trend.az/azerbaijan/politics/855109.html

\textsuperscript{120} “Cuba invites Azerbaijan to apply for membership in Non Aligned Movement”, Today.Az, 30 September 2006.
http://www.today.az/news/politics/30852.html


\textsuperscript{122} XV Ministerial Conference Of The Non-Aligned Movement (Inter-Summit), Report Of The Chair Of The Non-Aligned Movement, September 17, 2006 – July 5, 2008, 15\textsuperscript{th} Ministerial Conference of the Non-Aligned Movement, Tehran, 27-30
Representative and chair of the OIC Group Agshin Mehdiyev also participated in a joint delegation with Arab League (AL) and NAM officials, which met with UN Secretary General Ban-Ki-Moon and Slovakian UNSC president Peter Burian to address Israeli archeological excavation activities under the compound of the Al-Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem.\(^{123}\)

However, despite such previous expressions of common interests, the support of NAM for the Draft Resolution on the Situation in the Occupied Territories of Azerbaijan (document A/62/L.42) introduced in March 2008 was far from unanimous. While Mehdiyev in his new capacity as Ambassador to Cuba held a prior meeting with Díaz to request the backing of NAM for the initiative\(^{124}\), ultimately only 35 member and 2 observer states (roughly 30 percent) voted in favor and Angola, India and Vanatu against, while at least 40 members abstained or were absent from the session (including Cuba and the Islamic Republic of Iran).\(^{125}\) Although Mehdiyev also actively engaged with the Cuban government to secure its support, Havana responded that its concurrent position as NAM Chair prevented it from publicly taking a position, in addition to a general lack of awareness regarding the Nagorno-Karabakh issue. The Iranian government extended an official apology that its absence was due to a technical mistake, and submitted a written note to the UN Secretary-General declaring its support for the resolution, although this did not affect the final tally.\(^{126}\) It is possible that Angola’s opposition was linked to its being a joint beneficiary of the U.S.-British HALO Trust landmine-clearing programme with both Armenia and the unrecognized Nagorno-Karabakh Republic (NKR), while India’s strong bilateral relations with Armenia and the latter’s support for its 2005 bid for permanent membership in the UNSC and position in the Kashmir conflict made its negative vote inevitable. Although the


\(^{126}\) Interview with former UN Ambassador Agshin Mehdiyev, 18 December, 2014.
representatives of Pakistan and Uganda justified their support for the resolution on behalf of OIC, the Permanent Representative of South Africa declared its abstention and support for the efforts of the Minsk Group as a NAM member, while Indonesia and Libya endorsed their positive votes in accordance with more general international principles. Nevertheless, in the interim period Baku actually increased its participation in NAM conventions, attending the Ministerial Meeting in Havana and the 15th Summit in Sharm El Sheikh, Egypt in April and July 2009, while then Ambassador to Indonesia and the Philippines Ibrahim Hajiyev raised the Nagorno-Karabakh issue in his address to the Special Non-Aligned Movement Ministerial Meeting on Interfaith Dialogue and Cooperation for Peace and Development (SNAMMM) in Manila in March 2010. In the period since its admission, Azerbaijan has sent several delegates representing the State Committee for Family, Women and Children Affairs and the Azerbaijan Future Studies Society (AFSS) to the Third Ministerial Meeting of the Non-Aligned Movement on the advancement of Women in Doha, Qatar, 12-14 February 2012, while the Preparatory Senior Officials Meeting for the 16th Summit in Tehran, Iran in August 2012 recommended Azerbaijan to the attending foreign ministers as a candidate for election as Vice-Chair of the CoB for the European Region. Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Mohammad Mehdi Akhunzade also suggested that a NAM European Office would be established in Baku, although this appears not to have taken place. The landmark inclusion of paragraph 391 in the Final Document of the Tehran

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127 Ibid.
131 Participants: Third Ministerial Meeting of the Non-Aligned Movement on the advancement of Women, Doha, Qatar, 12-14 February 2012. http://qatarconferences.org/nonalignedwomen/participants.php
134 Interview with Agshin Mehdiyev, 18 December, 2014.
Summit “reaffirmed the importance of the principle of non-use of force enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations, and encouraged the parties to continue to seek a negotiated settlement of the conflict within the territorial integrity, sovereignty and the internationally recognized borders of the Republic of Azerbaijan.” Thus, for the first time, the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict became a subject of broad recognition by governments otherwise far removed from the policy concerns of the South Caucasus or post-Soviet Eurasia. Most recently, Azerbaijan served as chair of the 17th Ministerial Conference in Algiers, and has declared its intention to stand for elections for Chair of the CoB for 2018-2021 at the 17th NAM Summit to be held in Caracas, Venezuela. Such a position would provide a paramount opportunity to utilize NAM as a platform for promoting its strategic perspective.

**Azerbaijan’s Participation in Other Asian-African Institutions**

Baku’s entry into NAM has been further supplemented by its interactions with a growing number of lesser-known South-South and Asian regional organizations, which have increasingly incorporated the Nagorno-Karabakh issue into their platforms. The most recent example of activity in this sphere is ICAPP, which was founded in Manila, Philippines by Jose de Venecia Jr., Co-Chairman and former Speaker of the House of Representatives in September 2000. It is currently composed of 350 political parties from 54 countries, 23 of which form its Standing Committee (SC), and includes five affiliated subsidiary non-governmental organizations (NGOs): ICAPP Youth Wing, ICAPP Women’s Wing, Centrist Asia-Pacific Democrats International (CAPDI), the Asian Peace and Reconciliation Council (APCR), and the International Ecological Safety Collaborative Organization (IESCO). Azerbaijan first joined ICAPP in 2007, and was elected to the SC in 2009. According to an interview with Member of Mili Majlis and chairman of the international relations department of New Azerbaijan Party (Yeni Azərbaycan Partiyasi/YAP) Asaf Hajiyev, ICAPP is particularly innovative in that it includes both

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137 Interview with Qaya Mammadov.
incumbent and opposition forces within the same forum. At both the 17th ICAPP SC Meeting and 7th General Assembly held in Baku during June and November 2012, the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict was recognized by Jose de Venecia Jr. as a significant concern for the organization in solving the problem in accordance with international legal norms.\textsuperscript{138} The latter resulted in the Baku Declaration authored by the Drafting Committee chaired by representatives of Azerbaijan, Pakistan, the Philippines and South Korea\textsuperscript{139}, which included a paragraph addressing the need to uphold the UN resolutions on the question of Nagorno-Karabakh and the inviolability of Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity.\textsuperscript{140} However, in response to a protest speech during the Assembly proceedings by representative of Armenia Rafi Hovisannian, SC Co-Chairman and Secretary General Chung Eui-Yong expressed a concern that given the opposition of some member states, as in the previous case of Argentina and the Falkland/Malvinas Islands the addition of the paragraph violated the principle of decision by consensus.\textsuperscript{141} Thus, it was removed from the main document and appended as a separate statement.\textsuperscript{142}

Azerbaijan has also been active in the ICAPP Youth Wing founded in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia in October 2012, and hosted its 2\textsuperscript{nd} Meeting in Baku in August 2013. Deputy Chairman of the YAP Youth Union and MP Ramin Mammadov was elected its first Vice-President for the Caucasus and Central Asia in February 2014. According to interviews, the organization has recently participated in the UN Youth Platform on developing programs related to international disaster relief. Drawing upon the concept of Azerbaijan as a bridge between Europe and Asia, it has also been active in establishing a new platform within the European Youth Forum on general approaches to conflict resolution issues. However, the emphasis is upon current global challenges, principles of international law and territorial integrity.

\textsuperscript{141} ICAPP Update (12-75), 2012/12/11. http://www.theicapp.org/bbs/board.php?tb=sub06_03&flag=read&pid=189
rather than a specific agenda to participate in or affect the Minsk Process, as the coordinators seek to avoid politicization. While an invitation was also extended to the representatives of Armenian youth NGOs to join this forum, they reportedly declined to participate. Finally, plans are currently underway to organize a joint NAM-ICAPP youth conference.\textsuperscript{143}

The ICAPP Women’s Wing is the third new Asian-African structure which was also established in 2012 \textsuperscript{144, 145}

Despite this increasing activity in ICAPP-affiliated NGOs, at the same time Azerbaijan has not yet sought membership in APRC, which was originally conceived by the Finland-based Peace Architecture and Conflict Transformation Alliance (PACTA) which was instrumental in negotiating the settlement of the 1977-2005 Aceh conflict in Indonesia, and was officially inaugurated in Bangkok, Thailand in September 2012.\textsuperscript{146} The current Secretariat chairmen and Council Members are composed of 25 individuals including former government officials, academics the concept of “soft” or “quiet” diplomacy, non-invasive has sent consultation missions to Brunei Darussalam, the People’s Republic of China, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines and Singapore.\textsuperscript{147} A track record of successful mediation in \textsuperscript{148}

While Azerbaijan has also held observer status in the former Association of Asian Parliaments for Peace (AAPP), currently the Asian Parliamentary Assembly (APA) since 2000, and MPs Asaf Hajiyev and Mubariz Gurbanli have raised awareness about the Nagorno-Karabakh issue (especially in terms of foreign occupation, a prominent concern within the institution) at the 6\textsuperscript{th} Plenary in Islamabad, Pakistan

\textsuperscript{143} Interview with MP Ramin Mammedov, 27 October, 2014.
\textsuperscript{144} Interview with MP Malahat Ibrahimgizi, 3 December 2014.
\textsuperscript{148}
in December 2013\textsuperscript{149}, ICAPP officials have described it as being largely inactive, focused more upon economic development issues, while its member states are resistant to political cooperation. In addition, the current chairmanship of APA by Iran creates some limitations for participation by Baku. However, planning for future joint ICAPP-APA meetings is reportedly underway in order to revitalize the organization.\textsuperscript{150}

Finally, the participation of Azerbaijan in CICA regional cooperation, multilateralism and dialogue among Central, South and Southeast Asian and Middle Eastern states. initiated by Kazakhstan but in reality dominated by mid-level and rising powers Russia and China, managing interests.\textsuperscript{151} In an address to the 12\textsuperscript{th} NAM Summit in Tehran, Foreign Minister Yerzhan Kazykhanov of Kazakhstan identified the shared goals of NAM and CIA, and recommended the strengthening of links as well as mutual attendance of upcoming summits.\textsuperscript{152} In addition OSCE-CICA Forum,

\textbf{“Feedback Loop”: Potential Impacts on Conflict Resolution}

The frontier of the present study lies in evaluating the prospects for practical application of these institutional developments to the ongoing processes in Nagorno-Karabakh. Critical observations point to the limited record of success of NAM in contributing to regional conflict resolution, as first demonstrated by the failed Colombo Plan extended by Egypt, Burma, Cambodia, Sri Lanka, Ghana and Indonesia during the 1962 Sino-Indian Border War (which uncritically backed China), as well as essentially supporting the position of one side in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict rather than serving as a forum to bring both parties to the negotiating table.\textsuperscript{153} In addition, it has been suggested that its effectiveness in this area might be further limited by Baku’s support for Pakistan in


\textsuperscript{150} Interviews with MPs Ramin Mammedov and Asaf Hajiyev, 27 and 29 October, 2014.

\textsuperscript{151} Interview with Qaya Mammadov, 9 December 2014.


the Kashmir conflict in opposition to India, a key player in the Global South and founding member of
NAM, while Armenia’s formal alliance with Moscow and Russia’s traditionally positive diplomatic
relations with India and Iran will potentially shape the approaches of NAM and OIC. There is
possible prior evidence of such a “flanking maneuver” or “grand chessboard” effect, as in January
2005 a memorandum of understanding (MoU) was concluded between Armenian Minister of Foreign
Affairs Vardan Oskanian and Secretary-General Amr Moussa of the AL—which constitutes the largest
participatory bloc of OIC—granting observer status, despite the lack of diplomatic relations with Saudi
Arabia and Yemen. This instrument was the result of a previous request submitted in order to
counteract OIC resolutions condemning Armenian aggression against Azerbaijan in recent years.

The problem of political divisions as well as partiality within NAM has also historically constrained
its ability to serve as a conflict mediator, as represented by past summit final documents on Cuba,
Cyprus, South Africa, Israel-Palestine and the Western Sahara. Finally, it has been posited that the
NAM standard of upholding sovereignty and non-interference in internal affairs against the norms of
humanitarian intervention and “responsibility to protect” (R2P) in the post-Cold War era represents a
strategy pursued by weak and nondemocratic states that comprise a large proportion of its membership
against possible intervention in local conflicts by the major powers.

Yet in response to such critiques, Ministry of Foreign Affairs personnel contend that the amendment
to paragraph 361/362 between the Ministerial Meeting in Sharm El-Sheikh and the Tehran Summit

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154 Email correspondence with Aurobinda Mahapatra, 22 September 2014.
156 “Observer status for Armenia in the Arab League”,
157 See Resolution No.10/30-C. On the destruction and desecration of Islamic historical and cultural relics and shrines in the
occupied Azeri territories resulting from the Republic of Armenia's aggression against the Republic of Azerbaijan Tehran
28-30 May, 2003, and Resolution no. 12/10-p(is). On the aggression of the Republic of Armenia against the Republic of
Azerbaijan, Putrajaya, Malaysia. 16-17 October 2003.
159 Hennie Strydom, “The Non-Aligned Movement and the Reform of International Relations”, in A. von Bogdandy and R.
which replaced the neutral language of the former with a direct reference to “the territorial integrity, sovereignty and the internationally recognized borders of the Republic of Azerbaijan”, was the result of significant deliberation among member states, and therefore reflects a broad consensus reached through dialogue and debate rather than a biased or one-sided position. Thus, it is possible that the real potential of Global South structures in the field of security lies in their critical engagement with the contemporary international status quo. This interpretation maintains that while the divergent ideological preferences of the major powers has constrained their ability to implement effective conflict management in response to global crises (the Syrian civil war, the Korean peninsula, South Sudan and Israel-Palestine), the multilateral approach of Global South institutions contributes to international rule-making, which provides cost-sharing and legitimacy functions that have a greater capacity to influence the foreign policies of individual states than the unilateral use of military force. Further, central to the NAM agenda is the comprehensive involvement of actors at both the civil society and state levels, which seek to influence their counterparts in other states. During the Cold War era, NAM was thus moderately successful in influencing international policy decisions regarding the apartheid and Israeli-Palestinian issues, as well as engaging with national liberation movements in Zimbabwe and South Africa.

It is therefore necessary to identify what actual mechanisms pertinent to peace and conflict presently exist within Global South institutions. Previous NAM task forces and committees specific to conflict resolution, such as the Drafting Group on Preventive Diplomacy and Peace-Making coordinated by Zimbabwe, and the Drafting Group on Post Conflict Peace-Building chaired by Egypt appear to have been discontinued. While the 1996 Cartagena Summit resolved to mandate the CoB

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162 Interview with Qaya Mammadov, 9 December 2014.
with submitting a proposal for an international dispute settlement mechanism to the Ministerial Committee on Methodology, as of 2012 this has reportedly not been completed.\textsuperscript{165} However, three structures that currently remain active as of the 17\textsuperscript{th} Summit are the Working Group on Disarmament chaired by Indonesia, the Working Group on Peacekeeping Operations chaired by Thailand and Egypt, the Nonaligned Security Council Caucus and the Caucus on the UN Peacebuilding Commission (PBC).\textsuperscript{166} As a non-permanent UNSC member from 2012-2013, Azerbaijan has participated in the Security Council Caucus along with Colombia, Guatemala, India, Morocco, Pakistan, Togo and South Africa.\textsuperscript{167} At the same time, since its establishment in December 2005, PBC has been focused only upon six African countries: Burundi, Sierra Leone, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia and the Central African Republic (CAR).\textsuperscript{168} In order to acquire information and experience in the area of post-conflict reconstruction, in May 2011 Azerbaijan submitted a request to the PBC Organizational Committee to participate in future meetings of the Country-Specific Configuration (CSC) devoted to Sierra Leone, which was accepted without objections.\textsuperscript{169} In an open debate on post-conflict peacebuilding at the UNSC 6805\textsuperscript{th} meeting in July 2012, Permanent Representative Agshin Mehdiyev stated in alignment with NAM that the UN must commit to enhancing the impact of PBC in the field by improving the CSCs (in effect, addressing the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict) while also “strengthening its relations with key actors at Headquarters.”\textsuperscript{170}

Perhaps the most direct example of potential Asian-African contributions to the Nagorno-Karabakh

\textsuperscript{165} Document on the Methodology of the Non-Aligned Movement, 14\textsuperscript{th} Summit Conference of Heads of State or Government of the Non-Aligned Movement, Havana, Cuba, 11\textsuperscript{th} to 16\textsuperscript{th} of September 2006, p. 9


\textsuperscript{167} P. 40, n20.


problem was the ICAPP SC meeting with Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon held on the sidelines of the 67th session of the UN General Assembly in New York during October 2012 (which included officials of Azerbaijan, South Korea, Cambodia, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Nepal and Pakistan\textsuperscript{171}). During the proceedings, MP Hajiyev addressed a query regarding the risks of renewed conflict due to lack of implementation of the 1993 resolutions and the need for a “new mechanism” for enforcement.\textsuperscript{172} This elicited some acknowledgement from the Secretary General regarding the need for the OSCE to fulfill its designated role. According to MP Hajiyev, this exchange occurred in the context of a second application by ICAPP for observer status in the UN General Assembly\textsuperscript{173}, which was supported by eight states but had been previously opposed by Argentina due to previous objections over the possible pursuit of UN recognition by the Falkland/Malvinas Islands.\textsuperscript{174}

A joint conference organized by three ICAPP NGOs in Dili, Timor-Leste in April 2012, which formally inaugurated the newly founded APRC, incorporated the “Situation in the Caucasus” into its agenda for civil society action and possible applications of “track two diplomacy” to resolving internal conflicts in Asia.\textsuperscript{175} The 7th ICAPP General Assembly in Baku Jose de Venecia Jr., SC Co-Chairman and former Speaker of the House of Representatives of the Philippines extended a tentative proposal that Asian Peace and Reconciliation Council (APRC) might inform the OSCE in its efforts to mediate the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.\textsuperscript{176} During May 2013, President Ilham Aliyev attended the 4th General Assembly of the Centrist Asia-Pacific Democrats International (CAPDI) in Makassar, Indonesia, which

\textsuperscript{171} List of Participants in the meeting with H.E. Ban Ki-moon, Secretary General of the United Nations, October 11, 2012.
\textsuperscript{174} Interview with MP Asaf Hajiyev, 29 October 2014.
\textsuperscript{175} The Timor Leste Declaration Of The Joint Conference On “Peace And Reconciliation in Asia”, Sponsored By The Government Of Timor Leste, ICAPP, CAPDI, AND IESCO, Dili, 25-26 April 2012, p. 10.
included former and current government officials, corporate and political leaders from Cambodia, People’s Republic of China, Philippines, East Timor, Pakistan, Malaysia, Myanmar, Mexico, Zambia and Thailand. In a statement on efforts at addressing Asian internal conflicts, “CAPDI and ICAPP urge the OSCE Minsk Group to advance its peace process with Armenia on Nagorno-Karabakh and the U.N. Security Council to enforce its resolutions on the disputed enclave”.\(^\text{177}\)

However, despite these developments, the Azerbaijani representative to ICAPP expressed strong dissatisfaction with the UN due to its failure to implement the 1993 resolutions, and called for a more aggressive approach to addressing Armenian occupation through appeals for international sanctions. In addition, he expressed little interest in pursuing conflict resolution efforts via ICAPP structures, as he asserted that the model of cooperation between political elites and civil society is inapplicable in the case of Armenia, due to their lack of true independence from the current government which is influenced by Russian and Karabakhtsi Armenian forces.\(^\text{178}\)

**Conclusion and Policy Recommendations**

The present study has sought to conduct a systematic analysis of the linkages between Azerbaijan’s growing participation in Global South institutions and its reaction to hierarchical arrangements sponsored by the major powers in regional conflict mediation. The main policy implication of the present study is that Azerbaijan might better utilize its presence within these structures in order to diversify its strategic options in Nagorno-Karabakh, which would complement as well as extend its core foreign policy doctrine of multidirectional balancing. Two main objectives: to create alternatives to the exclusivity of the Co-Chairs or reliance on the UN by multiplying the number of states and organizations with an interest or stake in the Minsk Process, and to utilize linkages between international organizations as a springboard for extra-regionalization of the Nagorno-Karabakh issue beyond the boundaries of the South Caucasus to include both Europe and Asia. These might be


\(^{178}\) Interview with MP Asaf Hajiyev, October 2014.
implemented through several tactical approaches, including both a realist or “hard” variant, which would involve seeking options for coercive diplomacy independent from the Minsk Process, as well as idealist/liberal or “soft” policy approaches, which would necessitate a willingness to explore options for “track two” and/or “silent diplomacy” as a complement to the Minsk format.

First, it is possible that Azerbaijan has been inhibited from becoming more deeply involved in NAM by its unresolved national identity and lack of common experience with the mid-20th century lineage of post-colonialism. Former officials assert that Afro-Asia has historically been a weak point in Azerbaijani foreign policy, as attested by the lack of embassies in developing countries.\(^{179}\) This condition might also be partly attributed to the emphasis in its public diplomacy since the 1990s on presenting a “European” image in order to elicit support from Western governments and institutions. Such a view is reflected in a comment on the presence of South Caucasus states in the ICAPP 7th General Assembly by Caucasus Elections Watch:

“The participation of Armenian and Azerbaijani political parties in this event has caused some amused bewilderment since both countries, as well as their political elites, have for the last two decades since they attained their independence, insisted very emphatically that they were European countries, and both countries are now full members of the Council of Europe.”\(^{180}\)

Secondly, unlike Belarus, which endorsed NAM initiatives such as the New World Information Order (NWIO) as early as the late 1980s via its individual seat in the UN General Assembly\(^{181}\), Azerbaijan has had little practical experience with the concept of “Third World solidarity” outside of Soviet-era doctrine. These conditions could be remedied by several steps. First, Azerbaijan should become more active in the participatory structures and methodology of NAM in order to move beyond simply eliciting recognition of the Nagorno-Karabakh issue among a larger number of states, toward fulfilling its potential as a forum for developing alternative strategic approaches toward the prevailing international order. One potential means for this is that in addition to joining and contributing to

\(^{179}\) Interview with Agshin Mehdiyev, 18 December, 2014.


existing task forces and working groups related to peacekeeping and security, representatives of Baku should propose to the NAM CoB to establish a Working Group on Occupied Territories and/or a Committee on Nagorno-Karabakh, which would be coordinated by Azerbaijan and staffed by delegates with expertise in international law and organizations and conflictology. Such structures could provide a potential platform for generating more specific policy tools, such as organizing a coalition of member states to impose bilateral economic sanctions or more symbolic forms of censure (for example, travel bans) upon Armenia for failure to comply with the 1993 UNSC resolutions. However in order to maintain legitimacy, it would be important to couch such a campaign in upholding existing international law, in order to avoid charges of bias and partiality toward Baku based upon common Muslim identity or energy cooperation. Given the extent to which the Palestinian issue has been a central concern within NAM for decades, Azerbaijan could draw upon this experience in order to launch a parallel campaign on Nagorno-Karabakh. The presence of Armenia in NAM would not pose an immediate obstacle, as observers may attend or address meetings but are barred from participation in committees or working groups.¹⁸²

In the sphere of complementary approaches, the suggestion extended by Iranian Ambassador to Azerbaijan Mohsen Pak Ayeen to return to its brief status as mediator in the context of its NAM chairmanship and positive relations with both conflict parties has likely been met with skepticism by observers.¹⁸³ Yet, the current rapprochement in bilateral relations between Tehran and Baku, as signified by the signature of a joint declaration on friendship and cooperation in November 2014¹⁸⁴, might provide a means to overcome the ideological investment in the view that has developed among Azerbaijani elites and society during the past decade—often encouraged by U.S. and Israeli

representatives—that Iran is an “ally” of Armenia in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. This contention persists even though Iranian officials have on repeated occasions publicly declared support for Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity, while Tehran and Yerevan have no formal alliance (military or otherwise), exhibit relatively small proportions of total trade and foreign investment, and planned energy and transportation infrastructure projects including the Southern Armenia Railway, the Meghri Dam hydropower plant and the Iran-Armenia oil pipeline remain incomplete.

Secondly, Azerbaijani policymakers should apply for membership in the APRC, which could confer several potential advantages. First, despite its title, both the Chairmen and Council Members also include former policymakers from Austria, Italy, Poland and Finland, as well as David W. Kennedy, current director of the Institute for Global Law and Policy (IGLP) based at Harvard Law School. In addition, in 2013 the Council admitted its first post-Soviet representative, Chief of Staff of the Presidential Office and former Prime Minister of Kazakhstan Karim Massimov. As representatives of OSCE member states, this might provide a channel for contacts with the Minsk Group outside of the Co-Chairs. Once included within the APCR directorate, it could then extend an invitation to Armenian representatives from the civil society sector rather than political elites, particularly specialists in international humanitarian law and conflict resolution. Finally, the strategy or cementing linkages between international structures in order to counter the exclusivity of the Co-Chairs.

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185 It is also seldom recognized that in March 1994, an Iranian military transport plane carrying families of diplomats en route from Moscow to Tehran was shot down by Nagorno-Karabakh Armenian forces when it strayed from Georgian airspace, killing all 32 passengers on board. See Ashed Kotchikian, The Dialectics of Small States: Foreign Policy Making in Armenia and Georgia, Germany: VDM Verlag, 2008, p. 47.


188 Asian Peace and Reconciliation Council (APRC), p.