Why a Small Ally Betrays the Powerful Boss: Explaining a Small Ally’s Cooperation and Non-Cooperation with the Leading Ally*

Leo Tamamizu†

June 16, 2017

Abstract

Why do several small allies (clients) violate alliance commitments with the leading ally (patron) even when they face a powerful adversary and have weak military capability to counteract it, while others support the commitments? Utilizing the concept of costly signal, this paper classifies client’s cooperative and non-cooperative behaviors into four types (Violation, Persuasion, Observance and intimidation). Moreover, the research hypothesizes conditions where a client takes a particular action of the four, and argues that the a client adopts one from the four actions, based on its perception of following two factors: an adversary’s intent and costs of punishments by the patron. This paper attempts to demonstrate the empirical validity of my argument by analyzing two controlled cases: New Zealand and Australia. The case studies based on primary documents limit the validity of existing explanation on client’s cooperative or non-cooperative behaviors to the patron and are likely to the validity of my argument. The paper’s causation does not originate from disappearance of threatening states and ally’s acquisition of powerfully military forces but from threats that states pose and also suggests that implementing violation is a turning point from peace achieved through deterring enemies to peace realized by cooperation with them.

1 Introduction

Why do several small allies (clients) weaken alliance commitments with the leading ally (patron) even when it faces a powerful adversary and has weak military capability to coun-

---

*The core argument of this paper was presented in Western Political Science Association at Vancouver on April, 2017. This paper is the refined version. Citation is not allowed without author’s permission.
†Ph.D. student of Graduate School of Political Science (GSPS), Waseda University, Tokyo, Japan. E-mail: leo.tamamizu@gmail.com.
tervail it, while others observe obligations of an alliance? To understand the mechanism behind client’s attempt to violate or observe its alliance with the patron is important to develop a theory of alliance politics. Implicitly focusing on a defensive alliance, Glenn Snyder (1997, 194) divided alliance politics into ‘adversary game’ and ‘alliance game’. Since then, IR studies have basically concentrated only on the adversary game. These studies have dealt with the question of whether an alliance can be a device to deter an adversary’s aggression or a device to cause a conflict with the adversary (Weitsman 2004; Johnson and Leeds 2011). Meanwhile, few studies have investigated the mechanism behind an ally’s cooperative or non-cooperative behaviors to the patron (Leeds and Anac 2005; Leeds and Savun 2007). Therefore, building a theory on ally’s behavior in alliance game will contribute to maturation of alliance theory.

The question above is indeed an intriguing puzzle to mature theoretical understanding of alliance politics. A few existing studies attribute a shift in client’s attitude toward the patron to disappearance of an adversary (Walt 1997) and a shift in an ally’s military capability (Morrow 1991). Nevertheless, a client often weakens its alliance commitment to the patron even though it is facing a powerful adversary and experiences no shift in its power. For instance, New Zealand denied introduction of nuclear-armed vessels within its territory under Article II of ANZUS in 1985 even though it was facing expansion of the Soviet power toward the South Pacific region and had no increase or decrease in its military capability. This deviation from existing explanations suggests that to analyze the mechanism behind such behaviors enables a researcher to find a new element to influence client’s cooperative and non-cooperative actions to the patron.

This question is also important for policy practitioners because current superpowers need to predict their allies’ behaviors toward themselves. The United States, the most influential player in current world politics, has thirty-two allies in 2017 (U.S. Department of State 2017). Its alliances are classified into defensive and asymmetric alliances. Hence, predicting client’s behaviors toward the patron in a defensive and asymmetric alliance is a crucial task of Washington to maintain the U.S. alliances. Notwithstanding this common problem that superpowers are facing, the predictions of policy analysts on what actions a client will take in the future are still ambiguous. For instance, leading policy analysts have argued that prevailing U.S. alliances are now under danger of small allies’...
To address these shortcomings, this paper attempts to deductively generate hypotheses of conditions where a threatened client violates or observes its alliance with the patron and test the hypotheses. Firstly, the paper conceptualizes a smaller ally’s actions toward the patron, based on what intent the ally signals and the degree of costs that an ally incurs if it takes one of the four actions. The paper also clarifies the conditions where a client is motivated to take an action of the four. It proposes that the combination of two perceptual variables affects client’s cooperation or non-cooperation to the patron. The first variable is the perception of a client on whether its adversary is security seeker or greedy. Based on this perception, the client decides to weaken or strengthen alliance commitment with the patron. The second is the perception of the client on whether punishment that the patron implements against the former to take an action will be endurable or not. Based on this perception, the client decides whether to attempt to gain a permission of the patron when it denies observing or observe provisions of an alliance. Based on these propositions, the paper generates four hypothetical situations where a combination of the variables drives a client to adopt an action of the four.

This paper, next, tests the four hypothetical scenarios. Based on most similar system design, the paper selects two cases: New Zealand, Australia during the Cold War, the allies of the United States, the patron. Each ally of both differently behaved to the same patron, although they were in similar theoretical situations. Based on declassified documents and secondary sources, the paper found that the combination of ally’s perception about the Soviet Union’s intent and about punishment cost of the United States were likely to shape the client’s approach toward the patron. This finding will contribute to theoretical development in alliance politics.

This paper is organized as follows. The second section typifies client’s behaviors to the patron and generates hypotheses of what motivate the ally to adopt one of the typified actions. The third section explains why the paper selects the cases for case studies. The fourth section assesses whether the cases support my explanation. Finally, the paper presents the conclusion and extracts theoretical and practical lessons from the case study.

2 Client’s Behaviors Toward the Patron

This section discusses factors that clients consider in determining whether to violate or observe an alliance commitment. Here I conceptualize non-cooperative behaviors of a client and review the concept of cooperative behavior to the patron. And, I build concepts of client’s non-cooperative behaviors, utilizing theory of costly signal. Snyder had
dichotomized the behaviors of an ally toward the other ally into “weakening commitments” and “strengthening commitments” (Snyder 1984; 1997). Nevertheless, it can be further dichotomized if client’s behaviors to the patron are viewed as actions of signaling client’s intention to its main adversary. The reason why the paper is based on logic of costly signal is because state’s motivation to renege on alliance commitments with the patron can be to signal its intention to an adversary, if its motivation to form or maintain its alliance commitment with the patron derives from aim to signal its intent to the adversary (Morrow 1991, 1993, 1994).

2.1 Violation

Violation refers to client’s non-permitted cessation of the actions stipulated by alliance provisions. This is the riskiest option of weakening alliance commitments because it generates four types of costs that abate a violator’s military strength. Firstly, violation will decrease security benefits that the violator originally enjoyed by abiding obligations because the patron will lose motivation to support the violator. An asymmetric alliance is an assurance that the patron supply security a client in peacetime and wartime in place of the client’s sacrificing its diplomatic freedom to the patron (Morrow 1991). Violation will decrease the utility of violating ally to the patron because the violator limits freedom of the patron’s action. Hence, the patron will lose motivation to provide security that the violator will enjoy by complying with an obligation. Moreover, violation will provoke the patron’s excessive retaliation as punishments. If the patron does not penalize the violator, perception that violation will be feasible option will spread across the other allies. Thus, to deter the emergence of new potential violators, the patron will castigate an explicit violator with excessive punishments like trade sanctions, militarily attacks and so on. Moreover, violation can form negative reputation of the violator that it betrayed the partner. This reputation will render difficult for the violator to organize a new alliance with the other alliance in the future (Gibler 2008: 432-433 Crescenzi et al 2012). Finally, the client’s violation can arouse domestic oppositions to impair the leaders’ political basis of the ally (Morrow 1993: 216).

Nevertheless, because of these costs, violation can be an optimal tool for a client to signal benign intention to an adversary. To believably signal state’s type to the other states in the anarchical system of the world, the state needs incur costs for signaling (Schelling 1960; Fearon 1995: 396; Morrow 1999: 88). Specially, the behavior to increase a state’s military vulnerability such as violation is likely to signal the benign intention that it desire conciliation with an adversary (Jervis 1978; Glaser 1994, 1997; Kydd 1997). For instance, both of a state desiring conciliation with an adversary (hereafter peace type) and a state willing to deter the adversary’s aggression (hereafter hostile type) can just announce that they desire for conciliating with it. This is because “announcing” itself does not incur great costs which is called “cheap talk” (Morrow 1999). Thus, an adversary, an observer of the announcer, cannot distinguish between both of types even though a peace type state announces its intent to reconcile with the adversary. To differentiate the peace type from the hostile type (if the paper put itself on the peace type state’s position), the
peace type state needs to increase its military vulnerability. Because this action means to reveal its weak points in terms of military operations, which incurs so large costs that the hostile type state cannot accept (Glaser 1994; Kydd 1997). Observing the behaviors to weaken military strength that the peace-type state takes, the adversary will be assured that the state will be motivated to reconcile with itself. Conversely, a hostile type state attempts to keep its military vulnerability as low as possible. In short, violation will be a costly gesture to send violator’s benign motive to its adversary because violation costs will abate a violator’s military strength.\textsuperscript{3}

2.2 Persuasion

The second option is an attempt to persuade the patron to permit the ally’s cessation of performing alliance obligations. As is the case with violation, persuasion can convey benign motive to an adversary because persuader will not receive security benefits that it originally enjoyed by complying with the obligations. However, the costs of signaling by persuasion will be lower than violation since the persuaded patron will lose the motivation to penalize the ally. Furthermore, persuasion will not form negative reputation of the persuader because persuasion is not to betray the patron. Although a client will easier adopt persuasion than violation because of less cost, persuasion will render the persuader’s motive for conciliation more ambiguous to the adversary.\textsuperscript{4}

2.3 Observance

The third is observance, to comply with obligations of an alliance with the patron. In this case, the messages of a client supporting an alliance to an adversary is that the it will be prepared to conflict with the adversary and be protected by the patron (Morrow 1991; Morrow 1994 ; Morrow 2000 ). While to maintain an alliance inflicts costs (aligning allies’ foreign policies and coordinating the allies’ military forces), these costs render a supporting ally’s messages credible to an adversary. By supporting the alliance, the client will attempt to deter the adversary’s aggressions.\textsuperscript{5}

2.4 Intimidation

The final option is an attempt to intimidate the patron into more supporting while complying with the alliance obligations. This behavior is the riskiest way to strengthen alliance commitment with the patron (Snyder 1997: 184-185). To intimidate the patron, a client will often argue that it will infringe on the patron’s interests unless the patron more supports. Since this type of behavior coerces the patron, it is likely to cause the leader’s backlash responses such as reducing military aids or implementing economic


\textsuperscript{4}The examples of persuasion are Romania in 1968, France in 1966 and Spain in 1970.

\textsuperscript{5}Almost all the allies’ behaviors in existing alliances belong to this category.
and, what is worst, abandoning. However, if this attempt succeeds, the client can acquire the patron’s more aids and robust assurance of defense without more conceding to the leading state. Thus, successful intimidation will signal the adversary that the ally will fight with the patron against the adversary.6

This conceptualization of client’s behaviors generate a new question: what condition where a client takes a particular action of the four to communicate with an adversary is. To answer this question, the paper focuses on two independent variables. The first variable is client’s perception of an adversary’s intent. The second is a client’s estimation on costs of the punishments caused by the patron. The paper argues that the combination of the two variables decides what option the client adopts.

As Stephen Walt indicates, “Perceptions of [an adversary’s] intent are likely to play an especially crucial role in alliance choices” (Walt 1987: 25). Since a state’s intent of how to maximize its security interest generally dictates what military doctrine and weapons the state adopts, the other state attempts to detect the former’s intent. In examining an adversary’s intent, a state will estimate that an adversary is motivated to secure status-quo interests (a security-seeking adversary) or to expand its interests at the sacrifice of others’ interests (a greedy adversary). Based on this evaluation, a client will select following two option to increase its security: weakening an alliance commitment for conciliation with an adversary or strengthening an alliance for deterrence against an adversary. If the client estimates that the adversary’s intention is security seeking, it will attempt to weaken alliance commitments for diluting its military capability. In this situation, this client will envisage that the reason why the adversary issues threats against the ally is because the client is regarded as a threat by the adversary.7 Hence, to mitigate unnecessary tension with the adversary, the ally views abating alliance commitments as an optimal way to signal benign intention to the adversary. Conversely, if the ally perceives that the adversary has greedy intention, it will be motivated to maintain or strengthen alliance commitments for repressing desire of the greedy adversary.

How does a state perceive an adversary’s intention? Jervis and Glaser have argued that current offense and defense balance between a state and its adversary has a crucial role in revealing each state’s intent. Jervis points out that when distinguishing defensive weapons and offensive weapons is possible, a state assesses the other state’s intention based on which weapons that the state effectively uses (Jervis 1978:199). According to his argument, the state will regard an adversary as a greedy state when the adversary makes full use of offensive weapons that penetrate the former’s defense barriers. When the adversary utilizes defensive weapons that is not likely to threaten a state’s territory, the other state will predict that the adversary’s intention is security seeking. Moreover, Glaser (1994: 67-70) has maintained that limiting the production of offensive arms, unilateral

---

6 For instance, Japan pressured the United States to revise the US-Japan Security Treaty in 1960 by arguing that Japan would have neutralized its political and diplomatic posture if Washington had not accepted Tokyo’s request to stipulate defense obligation in the text of the USJST (Yoshida 2012: 51-71).

7 This situation is called security dilemma. It refers to the situation where “an increase in one state’s ability to protect itself from an attack by others will diminish the ability of other states to protect themselves from an attack by the first state” (Wagner 2007: 26).
taking defensive military doctrine and curtailing offensive-military capability are the ways to demonstrate a state’s security-seeking intention. The other indicator of a state’s intention are past actions of an adversary. When an adversary took offensive behaviors, offensive doctrines and increasing offensive military capabilities in the past, the other state is likely to view the adversary as an greedy predator even if the adversary does not currently take an offensive posture (Press 2005: 11-12).

However, client’s cooperative behaviors and non-cooperative behaviors are not only decided by its evaluation of an adversary’s intent. Its assessment of the costs that the ally will incur if its actions provoke the patron’s punishment also affect how a client weakens or strengthens alliance commitments. Olson and Zeckhauser (1966: 267) argues that joining an alliance is a collective action among allies for gaining public goods of external security. This argument indicates that the patron can punish the allies who does not cooperate with the patron. Therefore, the client motivated to violate an alliance will be concerned that the patron can punish the disloyal ally by reducing aids, halting security commitment and even attacking the disloyal (Snyder 1997: 181). This concern will be emerged even if the client desires strong relationships with the patron. This is because the patron can castigate the client, if it evaluates that more supporting the client will reduce the it’s interests by involving itself into the client’s dangerous actions against an adversary.

The degree of the concern on the patron’s penalty will vary according to costly actions of the patron. For example, such actions as public statements of the patron’s policymakers that it will punish its clients (Fearon 1994b), stationing the patron’s forces near the border of a client (Fearon 1997) and records of the patron’s punishments against its clients in past times will improve credibility of the patron’s threat to penalize. When, by observing these actions, the client perceives that costs of the patron’s punishment will be endurable, it will be motivated to act without seeking for the patron’s permission of client’s actions. If perceiving that costs of patron’s penalization will be unendurable, the client will act with the patron’s permission to its actions.

Based on these two perceptual variables, I construct following hypotheses.

**Hypothesis 1**
If a client views an adversary’s intent as security seeking, and perceives the patron’s punishment as endurable, this client will violate provisions of an alliance.

**Hypothesis 2**

---

8 A leader of collective actions theoretically has two ways to prevent free-riding (Olson 1965). One is to give positive incentives to a potential free rider. That is, by selectively giving to the potential free rider additional benefits as reward for joining collective actions, the leader can induce it to cooperate. The other is to selectively punish a potential free rider. By threatening to punish against a potential free rider, the leader can prevent the emergence of a free rider. In the case of alliance politics, giving positive incentive the potential free riding ally will motivate the other members to be potential free riders, which will result in an increase in the number of potential free riders. Hence the patron will mainly use the punishment to hinder the emergence of a freeriding client.
If a client views an adversary’s intent as security seeking, and perceives the patron’s punishments as unendurable, this client will attempt to persuade the patron to permit its nonfulfillment of an alliance.

_Hypothesis 3_

If a client views an adversary’s intent as greedy, and perceives the patron’s punishments as durable, this client will observe provisions of an alliance.

_Hypothesis 4_

If a client views an adversary’s intent as greedy, and perceives the patron’s punishments as undurable, this client will attempt to intimidate the patron into observing provisions of an alliance to support the client.

Following case study section demonstrates that these alternatively independent variables have limited explanatory power and the combination of independent variables that the paper proposes well explains the variance of the outcome in each case.

## 3 Case Selection and Alternative Variables

This paper tests the _H1_ and _H3_ with two cases because dealing with these hypotheses most clearly demonstrates the mechanism behind a client’s violation and observance. Based on the logic of most similar systems design, the paper selected the cases of the clients’ behaviors: New Zealand and Australia. These clients had been allies of the United States through the ANZUS Treaty since 1952. Although these clients had accepted visits of the United State’s nuclear-armed ships into their ports based on an article of the Treaty, New Zealand alone banned port access to these ships in 1985. In these cases, the three potent independent variables (causes) can be controlled although the cases’ dependent variables (effects) are different from each other (George and Bennet 2005 ; Brady and Collier 2004 :94, 247). In other words, these independent variables cannot explain the difference of each client’s actions toward the patrons (the United States). Here, I review the theoretical accounts.

The first alternatively independent variable is the existence of an adversary. Large literature affirms that an alliance is formed to aggregate potential allies’ capabilities for deterring aggressions of an adversary that the allies commonly regard as a threat (Morgenthau 1948; Waltz 1979 ; Walt 1987 ; Morrow 2000). This theoretical causation of an alliance formation indicates that when a target that the allies attempt to deter disappears, each ally will not be motivated to support the other partner (Walt 1997: 158-159). The second independent variable is a shift in an ally’s military capability. A state has two grand strategies to increase or maintain its security: building arms and forming an alliance (Morrow 1993 : 214). Morrow argued that a state selects an option based on calculation of each option’s benefits and costs (Ibid.: 215). Thus, this dichotomy suggests that when an client acquires military capability to allow to defend its security by itself,
it is less likely to comply with an alliance with a patron. This is because maintaining an alliance becomes less attractive to the client with military capability for self-defense. The final independent variable is a change in domestic politics of an ally. Because domestic change such as change of government and regime change in an ally can alter the leader ’ s preference of the ally (Bueno de Mesquita, et al 2003 ), this kind of change can make a shift in the ally ’ s approach to a patron (Leeds and Savun 2007: 1121).

4 Case Studies

4.1 Potential Explanations

This section tests whether existing variables can explain the cases that I selected. While Catlinac (2010) tested several possible explanation with the New Zealand case, I demonstrate that the possible accounts cannot figure out why New Zealand and Australia initiated a distinguished approach to the United States from each other. For two years, I have conducted extensive archival research (e.g. Archives New Zealand, National Archives Australia and Reagan Presidential Library) in New Zealand, Australia and the United States to scrutinize the case of New Zealand and Australia. Firstly, New Zealand and Australia was facing similar security environments. Both of the clients in the beginning of the 1980s faced an adversary ’ s advance into the South Pacific area. The Soviet Union conducted a large maneuver “ Ocean 75 ” in the Pacific Ocean. Moreover, the Soviet Pacific Fleet at first time introduced two Kiev class carriers, one Kirov class guided missile cruiser and four Kara class aircraft carriers in 1978 (Acharya 1988 : 282-285). The primary change in the power balance of the Pacific area was the Soviet lease of the bases in the Cam Ranh Bay from Vietnam. Although the base of Cam Ranh Bay had not had strategic importance to the Soviet Union yet, high-performing vessels of the Soviet Union occasionally called at the bases (Ibid.: 287-288).

New Zealand and Australia viewed that the advance of the Soviet Union toward the South Pacific area was likely to disturb its regional security. New Zealand Defence Review published in 1983 stated that ”it is clear that the sprit of detente has largely evaporated” by the Soviet bases in Cam Ranh Bay, which had ”brought new dangers” (New Zealand Ministry of Defence, 1983). The External Intelligence Bureau of the Prime Minister’s Department reported a similar view on New Zealand’s external security (Report of External Intelligence Bureau, 9 May 1984, 2005-338-036, Wilkes Owen Papers, National Library of New Zealand). Likewise, Australia had feared that the possibility of the attack by the Soviet Union. The Strategic Basis paper, the policy paper submitted by the Cabinet, Defence Ministry and Foreign Ministry, stated ”It would be prudent to assume that the facilities would be seen by the USSR to be directly assisting the US and might be attacked in a super-power nuclear exchange ” (”The Strategic Basis of Australia Defence Policy, A1116 CA805 Part 1, August 1983, A11116 CA805 Part 1, AN). These findings indicate that Power Aggregation model cannot explain the difference between New Zealand’s

---

9This work was supported by the Sasakawa Scientific Research Grant from The Japan Science Society.
behavior and that of Australia.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The Tendency of The Three Allies' Military Expenditure</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>-----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>million ($)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>billion ($)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Figure 1: The Tendency of The Two Allies’ Military Expenditure

Moreover, two clients had no military capability enabling self-defense. Although they had gradually increased each military budget during the research periods, they had no powerful forces enabling self-defense (see figure 1). They had no nuclear weapons and had conventional forces designed to cooperate with the patron’s force, which indicates that Arms versus Alliance model has the difficulty in explaining the difference between them. Finally, these clients experienced a shift in domestic politics. In New Zealand and Australia, the leaders of the Labour Party assumed the position of Prime Minister immediately before they took a certain action toward the United States (Castles 1996). This demonstrates that Domestic Politics model’s account is limited.

4.2 New Zealand (1984-1985): Violation

New Zealand had been a client of the patron, the United States through the Australia, New Zealand and the United States Security Treaty (ANZUS) since 1952. However, their relationship experienced serious hardship since July 1984, when the leader of the New Zealand Government and the New Zealand Labour Party (NZLP), David Lange, initiated to deny complying with an obligation of the ANZUS treaty: introducing the U.S. nuclear-armed vessels within New Zealand ports. New Zealand publicly announced that New Zealand would deny the introduction of U.S. nuclear-armed ships within its territory. The United States verbally criticized Lange’s policy and indicated to Wellington that banning the entry of U.S. nuclear-armed vessels into the ports would violate the Article

---

10I investigated each military expenditure and military equipment of these allies by the data of Military Balance from 1961 to 1981. During 1979-1986, New Zealand had had several tanks (M113) and carriers (M113), Leander-class frigates and attack aircrafts (A-4K and TA-4K). During the same period, Australia had had tanks (Leopard 141) and carriers (M113), Oberon-class submarines and Perth Class destroyers, and strategic bombers (F-111C and RF-111C) and fighter aircrafts (Mirage IIIO) (IISS, 1979, 1980, 1981, 1982, 1983, 1984, 1985, 1986). As for military expenditure of each state, see appendix A.

Despite the United States’ warning, New Zealand put into practice the policy by deciding to ban the U.S. nuclear-armed vessels within its territory in February 1985. Responding to Wellington’s decision, the United States recognized that New Zealand violated the ANZUS treaty and halted several parts of military cooperation with New Zealand.

The aim behind banning port calls of nuclear-armed ships was to avoid nuclear strikes of the Soviet Union. To do so, Wellington demonstrated to Moscow that there were no nuclear weapons within the New Zealand territory and New Zealand was not worth attacking. I find evidence that Labour party made an agreement to deny port access of superpower’s nuclear-armed ships for avoiding possible nuclear strikes against New Zealand in its Policy Council Meeting of the party before Lange took office, stating that New Zealand should exclude nuclear weapons within its territory because “being an ally of the U.S., and harbouring U.S. weaponry, makes U.S. enemies also the potential foes of New Zealand” (Labour, ANZUS and Nuclear Ship Visits: Background Paper and Options,” 25 March 1983, AAWW W4640 7112, Box 31, ANZ). NZLP politicians also made statements backing the council’s decision. They argued that to recant permission of nuclear-armed ships’ visits within New Zealand was needed for avoiding the Soviet nuclear attacks. Richard Prebble, Bill Rowling, Frank O’Flynn and Helen Clarke, the leading politicians, requested a ban of the vessels’ visits for signaling its benign intention to the Soviet Union (Hansard 1982: 655, 659, 661; Hansard 1984: 261, 264). Therefore, I regarded New Zealand banning nuclear-armed vessels’ visits as the case of client’s “Violation”.

As for the origin of New Zealand’s denuclearizing policy, abundant literature attributes the impact of the anti-nuclear movements in New Zealand to Wellington’s policymaking of the non-nuclear policy (Albinski 1987; MacMillan 1987; Klements 1989; Pugh 1989; Templeton 2006). Nevertheless, this explanation does not necessarily make the genesis clearer. What should be noted is that the large majority of the public in New Zealand began with supporting denial of the U.S. nuclear armed ships after the victory of NZLP in the election of July 1984 (Jackson and Lamare 1988: 181). However, the motivation of banning the U.S. nuclear armed ships existed before 1984. Moreover, the proportion of pro-denuclearization citizen in New Zealand had been lower than that of public support to New Zealand’s membership of ANZUS (Catalinac 2010). Notwithstanding, why did Wellington banned the U.S. nuclear ships’ visits that was likely to hurt the relationship with the United States? Previous studies cannot give the questions correct answers to these points.

---

11 The article II dictates that “In order more effectively to achieve the objective of this Treaty the Parties separately and jointly by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack” (Donnni 1991: 162).
4.2.1 Analysis: Client’s (New Zealand’s) Perception of an Adversary’s intent

Although New Zealand viewed the Soviet Union as the major source of potential threats against New Zealand, it evaluated that the Soviet Union was a security seeker.

Responding to expansion of the Soviet Union toward the South Pacific area, the 1983 Defence Paper of New Zealand Defence Forces (NZDF) evaluated that “it is clear that the spirit of détente has largely evaporated” because the Soviet expansion “brought new dangers” and was a “menace” for the Asia-Pacific states (NZDM, 1983: 9). The external Intelligence Bureau of the Prime Minister’s Department assessed that “the base at Cam Ranh Bay in Vietnam has significantly altered balance of forces in Peacetime” (Note for Parliamentary Committee on Arms Control and Disarmament, 9 May 1984, Owen Wilkes Papers, 2005-338-036, National Library of New Zealand [hereafter: NLNZ]). Lange also viewed the Soviet Union as an adversary to deter through cooperation with the United States although he did not regard the Soviet actions as urgent threats (Lange 1990: 60).

Taking the same position as Lange, Labor Party’s politicians in the parliamentary debates initiated an non-nuclear campaign since the latter of 1970s, arguing that the Soviet Union had the power to launch nuclear missiles toward New Zealand, which was a clear threat (Hansard 1976: 1314; Hansard 1982: 655-661). However, their argument seems not to have any realistic grounds because it did not display the reason why banning nuclear-armed ships within New Zealand enabled New Zealand to avoid the nuclear strikes of the Soviet Union.

It was the Foreign Ministry that helped NZLP find the grounds. Considering the interview of the Tass with Dimitri Ustinov, the Soviet defense minister, the New Zealand embassy in Moscow reported that the Soviet Union pursued a security-seeking posture of military doctrine and conducted attempts for disarmament (Embassy in Moscow to Wellington, 29 July 1982, BRU 133/1/1, ANZ). Although it is unknown whether the embassy’s opinion reached the Foreign Ministry in Wellington, the Ministry took a same position as the embassy’s and went so far as to propose to the Parliament Committee of Arms Control and Disarmament in May 1984 the plan to ban the port access of the U.S. nuclear armed ships as a way to communicate with the Soviet Union. The Ministry argued that

“The permanent and binding renunciation by New Zealand of the option to base nuclear weapons in New Zealand would be likely to restrict any disposition that those in the Soviet Union who plan the targeting of nuclear weapons might have to include New Zealand among their targets” (Note for Parliamentary Committee on Arms Control and Disarmament, 9 May 1984, Owen Wilkes Papers, 2005-338-036, NLNZ).

This advice to the committee would have been a hint for NZLP to install realistic ground in their denuclearizing policy. Generally speaking, a parliament committee is a significant arena where several parts including the ruling party, opposition party, ministries and interests groups can freely communicate with each other to review submitted
bills (Mulgan 1994: 116-121). By hearing the Foreign Ministry's suggestion, the NZLP members would have acquired the idea that the Soviet Union was so security seeker in nature that it can refrain from attacking New Zealand by observing New Zealand's renunciation of nuclear weapons stationed by the United States. This idea seems to be reflected in O’Flynn’s comments when Richard Prebble introduced the law to ban visits by the U.S. nuclear-armed ships on June 1984. He said that “we are not under any obligation...to aim ourselves at the enemies of our friends...we ought not to treat our friends’ enemies as our enemies, making ourselves a nuclear target...” (Hansard 1984, 262). This logic had never existed in the NZLP politician’s remarks before the introduction by Prebble. This fact indicates that the Foreign Ministry’s idea formed the rationale of the NZLP’s denuclearizing policy and encouraged the politicians to adopt a ban of the U.S. nuclear-armed ships’ visits as the formal policy of Wellington. In sum, Wellington’s perception that the Soviet Union would be a security-seeker was likely to create its motive of banning the U.S. vessels visits.

4.2.2 Analysis: Client’s (New Zealand’s) Perception about Punishment by the Patron

Although Wellington’s perception about the Soviet Union’s intent motivated Wellington to deny the entry of the U.S. nuclear armed ships, Wellington had not decided how to implement it. Wellington’s concern was focused on the possibility of the punitive reactions taken by the patron, the United States. New Zealand was vulnerable to the U.S. reprisals that had negative impact on economic and military relationships with the United States. As showed above, New Zealand depended for its security for the United States’ protection as well as for its economy for export to the U.S. markets (Castles 1996: 24-26). Thus, the United States’ punishment such as withdrawal of security commitment to New Zealand and shutting out New Zealand’s exported goods from the U.S. market was fatal to the Lange Cabinet’s political survival (Lange 1990: 58; Hensely 2013: 151, 178, 242).

Nevertheless, immediately before New Zealand initiated the non-nuclear policy, Wellington expected that the costs of the United States’ punishment would be acceptable. Before announcing the non-nuclear policy, Lange and his associates expected that the United States would never terminate the military ties with New Zealand nor launch economic sanctions against New Zealand. In respect of military relations with the United States, Lange thought that New Zealand had little strategic importance to the United States’ global deterrence policy, Neither Confirm Nor Deny (NCND). According to Lange, New Zealand’s denial of port access was a minor issue that would not have serious impact on the nuclear deterrence of the United States because New Zealand “didn’t rank as much as a pawn [of the United States]” (Lange 1990: 47). And he also predicted that the United States would not abrogate the ANZUS tie with New Zealand because the end of the ANZUS treaty with New Zealand would lead to the halt of the alliance between Australia and the United States (Ibid.) Bill Rowling, former New Zealand Prime Minister, had the same view as Lange. Rowling envisaged that the U.S. punishments against New Zealand would create negative image of the United States bullying its client. Thus,
the United States would refrain from punitive measures against New Zealand in terms of the military relations (Ibid.).

As for economic sanctions, Wellington expected that the possibility would be low. Lange noted that “American policy [has] sufficient integrity and authority to make it capable of standing on its merits unfortified by threats of sanctions, or restrictions on New Zealand imports” (Lange 1990: 58). Frank O’Flynn, New Zealand Defence Minister of the Lange Cabinet, commented that the friendly relationship between New Zealand and the United States deterred the United States from conducting economic retributions against New Zealand because it would violate the U.S. spirit of free trade (The Radio Interview with O’Flynn, 18 December 1984, 370/1/20 Part 25, National Archives of Australia [hereafter: NAA]).

They were convinced that their expectation would be correct by the United States’ assurance that it would not abandon New Zealand and not launch economic reprisals even if New Zealand reduced the degree of military cooperation. When Lange met George Shultz, the U.S. Secretary of State, in Wellington in July 1984, Shultz did not mention the possibility of punitive reactions such as terminating the ANZUS tie with New Zealand (Memo of Discussion, 24 July 1984, 111/3/3/1 Part 22, ANZ) and went on to say that New Zealand and the United States would maintain their friendly relations whatever happened to their military alliance” (Lange 1990: 61). Moreover, Shultz provided an assurance that the United States would not initiate economic reprisals against New Zealand when Lange discussed the port access issues with Shultz in October 1984 (Washington to Wellington, 15 October 1984, 111/3/31 Part 22, ANZ).12 These American soft responses to the non-nuclear policy and Wellington leaders’ expectation formed the perception of the Lange cabinet that the punishments costs of denying the U.S. nuclear armed ships’ access to New Zealand’s ports would be acceptable.

This perception would have provided a good opportunity for violation for New Zealand by activating NZLP politicians’ pressure. During the leader of the NZLP and the early period (July-December 1984) of the Prime Minister, Lange hesitated to support the non-nuclear politicians. He feared the negative impact of banning the U.S ships on the security relationship with the US and on domestic support toward the ANZUS treaty (Lange 1989: 35). Nevertheless, after the meetings with Shultz, the labour party politicians resumed applying pressure to Lange. Margaret Wilson and Helen Clarke strongly opposed to the acceptance of the U.S. nuclear armed ships visits. Jim Anderton issued clear threat to Palmer by saying that if the government acknowledge the U.S. request for port access, he would mobilize politicians and citizens (Lange 2005: 205; Hensley 2013: 100).

In the end, Lange accepted their firm request to defy the U.S. offer by gaining their assurance that they would welcome Lange and Roger Douglas’s economic policy, that’s “Rogernomics” (Lange 2005: 205-206; Hensley 2013: 100). Although the current research cannot fully demonstrate the reason why the non-nuclear politicians resumed

---

12The course of Washington’s restrained responses derived from its concern that conducting coercive measures against New Zealand would construct negative image among New Zealanders supportive to New Zealand’s stay in ANZUS (The Report of United States Information Agency 26 February 1986, David Laux Files Box 27, Ronald W. Regan Library).
the pressure against Lange due to the lack of the documents, presumptive evidence shows that they would have regarded punishment cost of the United States acceptable. The key was Washington’s assurance that it would not abrogate security commitment to New Zealand and not initiate economic retaliations against New Zealand. After Shultz gave the assurance not to punish New Zealand Lange in October 1984, the non-nuclear politicians’ pressure was reactivated. This fact indicates that by acquiring Washington’s promise, they would have regarded costs caused by the U.S. punishment as acceptable. This perception of Wellington was likely to drive itself to deny complying with the ANZUS obligations without Washington’s permission.

4.2.3 Result

New Zealand had two kind of perception: it faced the security dilemma with the Soviet Union with security seeking intent and that violation of the ANZUS treaty would not generate unacceptable costs of the U.S. punishment. The former assessment induced Wellington to refute observing an alliance obligation to signal its benign intention to Moscow. The latter encouraged Wellington to take an action without the leader’s permission. Thus, New Zealand decided to ban the U.S. nuclear-armed ships’ visits within its territory despite no the U.S. permission.

4.3 Australia (1983): Observance

Australia (client) also had been a reliable ally of the ANZUS treaty since 1951. Immediately before New Zealand initiated a campaign of banning the introduction of the U.S. nuclear-armed ships, Australia witnessed the domestic movements opposing to accept the U.S. nuclear ships and facilities in the territory (Wittner 2009: 159). Moreover, Don Chipp, a Democratic Senator, had introduced a bill to ban the introduction of the U.S. nuclear-armed ships within the Australian waters (Pugh 1989: 122). Notwithstanding domestic anti-nuclear pressure, the Australia government led by Bob Hawke, the leader of the Australian Labour Party (ALP), adopted a decisive policy to observe the obligations of the ANZUS treaty in September 1983 by accepting the entry of U.S. nuclear-armed ships visits.

Canberra’s aim behind accepting the U.S. nuclear-armed ships was mainly to deter the Soviet expansion toward the South Pacific areas. The Strategic Basis of Australian Defence Policy published by the Defence Committee of the Defense Ministry in 1983 argued that “Australia’s defence development and military preparedness should continue to demonstrate our resolve to promote and contribute to the Western strategic community’s deterrence of the USSR and its associates” (Paper of Strategic Basis of Australian Defence Policy, 15 August 1983, A11116 CA 805 Part 1, Chapter I para 23, NAA). Thus, the paper continued to say that “we [Canberra] should continue to support deterrence through our working defence relationship with the US, including our hosting of, and participation in, the defence-related facilities, and through provision of port, staging and training facilities for US forces” (Ibid., Chapter 1 para 24). Based on these remarks, I
identify the Australia observing the ANZUS treaty with the case of a client’s observance.

4.3.1 Analysis: Client’s (Australia’s) Perception of An Adversary’s Intent

Viewing the primary threat as the Soviet Union, the ALP government evaluated that the Soviet Union initiated military advance toward the South Pacific region and was motivated to target Australia. Moreover, Canberra viewed that the current motive of the Soviet Union was greedy although Wellington assessed that the Soviet Union was a security-seeker as shown above. For instance, the Strategic Basis warned the possibility of the Soviet targeting policy against the U.S. facilities and the nuclear-armed ships within the Australian territory. The paper noted that

“[if the nuclear exchange occurred between the United State and the Soviet Union], It would be prudent to assume that the facilities would be seen by the USSR to be directly assisting the US and might be attacked in a super-power nuclear exchange” (Ibid, Chapter 1 para 13)

In addition, the Strategic Basis paper viewed the Soviet motive as greedy as follows,

“Soviet access to the port of Cam Ranh Bay allows it more easily to move its naval forces between its European and Pacific bases through the Indian Ocean, and to maintain a maritime presence abreast of the sea lanes in the region...It also places it favourably to exploit opportunities arising in regional political developments. Continuing Soviet access to air and maritime facilities in Vietnam must be a cause for concern for Australian defence policy” (Ibid, Chapter 4 para 12).

What is noted is that the cabinet adopted the suggestions of the paper as the ALP government’s security policy despite the paper being a just recommendation of the Defence Ministry (Cabinet Minute Decision No. 2165, 27 September 1983, A1116 CA 805 Part 2, NAA). That is, the ALP government had the perception about the Soviet Union’s motive showed in this paper.

Why did Australia envisage that the Soviet Union had greedy intention although then New Zealand saw the same state as a security seeker? Although the factor behind this perception has remain to be fully clarified, one possibility is that Australia had been one of the largest resource exporters in the Asia states (McMillan 1987: 58). This circumstance generated constant fear that a potential external enemy would direct its greed toward Australia in pursuit of strategic resources or in order to insulate supply routes to the other allies of Australia in the future (Ibid,: 59). This Australian deep-rooted fear would have formed Canberra’s view that the Soviet Union was a greedy state, which was different from New Zealand’s perception about the Soviet Union’s intent.
4.3.2 Analysis: Client’s (Australia’s) Perception about Punishments by the Patron

The ALP government was likely to regard the punishment of the United States, the Australia’s patron, as unacceptable. Thus, it refrained from adopting the option to extract more commitment from the United State by intimidation, only to comply with ANZUS commitments.

What Australia had sought for during the Cold War was the assurance of a superpower to defend Australia. From 1955, Canberra had sought for the assurance of the U.S. nuclear retaliation against attackers against Australia. However, Washington did not provide clear assurance to protect Australia with nuclear weapons with Canberra due to the U.S. focus on Japan (Leah 2016: 525-529). Hence, Canberra had secretly planned to gain nuclear weapons to increase deterrent power and extract the defense commitment from the United States. Consequently, this plot was abandoned in the early of the 1970s because Australia joined the Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) (Walsh 1997; Reynolds 2000; Hymans 2006) as well as because it had experienced no threat since 1973 (Leah 2016).

Notwithstanding, Australia seemed to regain its nuclear ambition in the early 1980s, as the Strategic Basis and the testimony of the policymakers in Canberra indicated. Clarke, Fruhling and O’ Neil (2015: 95-99) suggested that Australia might have attempted to acquire nuclear weapons. One indication of that point was statements in the strategic basis that:

"Developments relating to nuclear capability in countries within Australia’s neighbourhood should be monitored in order to ensure that the lead time for Australia could be matched with developments in other countries should Government so decide (Paper of Strategic Basis of Australian Defence Policy, 15 August 1983, A11116 CA 805 Part 1, NAA).

Also, the paper stated that “were a power in our region to move to acquire nuclear weapons we would need to assess the prospects for our security, including appropriate counter-measures” (Ibid). Their research cited testimonies of Australian Defence Minister. Gordon Scholes, the defence minister, commented that “there was a decision by Hawke, [Foreign Minister] Heyden and me along those lines [acquisition of nuclear weapons] and I was to prepare a letter which was to be sent to Hawke if it became necessary” (The Weekend Australian, 1996, cited in Clarke, Fruhling and O’ Neil 2016).

This ambition was likely to derive from Australia’s fear against the USSR’s advance toward the South Pacific. This shift in strategic situation around Australia would have driven Canberra to rekindle its ambition to acquire nuclear weapons to fend off the long-termed Soviet aggressions. Moreover, the fact that the United States concentrate its security efforts on the European region to meet the danger of the Soviet stationing intermediate range missiles would have concerned Canberra. Because Australia’s nuclear forces would be very limited even if it could obtain weapons, Canberra still needed to the U.S. assurance of protection. Thus, by showing the attempt at gaining nuclear
forces, Canberra would have attempted to intimidate the United States into providing the defense commitment.

Why did Canberra not acquire nuclear weapons, however? Australia’s membership of NPT was likely to be the critical factor that prevented Canberra from procuring them. Australia ratified the NPT in 1973 under the Whitlam government. Since then, Australia had not taken specific actions to acquire nuclear forces (Walsh 1997: 13). If a member state would take actions to procure nuclear forces, the leading state of the NPT like the United States severely punished the state with economic sanctions or reduction in military cooperation with Australia. This concern was likely to discourage Canberra to gain nuclear weapons in the early of 1980s.

4.3.3 Result

The two perceptions in the Canberra leaders were likely to drive itself to support the ANZUS relationship with the United States. Firstly, Canberra’s evaluation that Australia still faced the Soviet Union’s greed against the South Pacific region was likely to motivate Canberra to comply with alliance obligations. Furthermore, to intimidate the United States into defending Australia by showing nuclear ambition to Washington was refrained by the assessment that the United States would punish potential holders of nuclear weapons. This assessment spurred Canberra to adopt permitted actions by the United States. In short, the case of Australia is likely to support the hypothetical situation of client’s support.

5 Conclusion

This paper attempts to build a coherent explanation to capture client’s cooperation and non-cooperation with the patron. It firstly conceptualizes client’s non-cooperative and cooperative actions toward the patron, based on what the client need to signal to an adversary by taking an action of the four and the degree of costs pertaining to the action. The paper, secondly, theorized that the four combinations of client’s strategic assessment on an adversary’s intent and on the punishments by the patron shapes the client’s non-cooperative or cooperative behaviors toward the patron. Finally, by using primary documents and secondary sources, this paper indicates that the cases of New Zealand and Australia, the allies of superpowers during the Cold War, support my hypotheses (H1 and H3), although the paper has not analyzed the cases of persuasion (H2) and intimidation (H4) yet.

The first contribution of the paper is to a theoretical debate about under what condition a client can shift its attitude toward the patron. As mentioned earlier, existing literature maintains that a shift in power balance between the client and an adversary, a change in the client’s capability and a shift in its domestic politics of the client state are likely to shape the attitudes of the client toward the patron. In contrast, this paper suggests a new causal mechanism: the combination of client’s assessments over an adversary’s intent and over punishments by the patron. This suggestion clarifies the condition
where a client fears entrapment or abandonment, which Snyder’s seminal work did not answer (Snyder 1997: 180-192). Furthermore, this suggestion opened a way for future research. This paper has no intention to ignore the importance of the other factors above. The one of objectives in the future research will be analyze what kind of security policies such factors are likely to have an impact on.

As for the broader implication, the concept of violation and its causes the paper theorizes indicates a driving factor behind the formation of “stable peace”. Stable peace means “a relationship between two states in which neither side considers employing force, or even making a threat of force, in any dispute, even serious disputes, between them” (George 2000: xiii). Kracowicz and Bar-Siman-Tov (2000: 26) attribute a source of stable peace to opened communication to construct trust and respect between states. Nevertheless, they do not make clear how such communication can be conducted. My paper theorizes that client’s violation is attempt to change adversary’s hostility against the client into benign. If so, this behavior can be communication to create an adversary’s respect toward the client that is a necessary condition to form stable peace. Moreover, suggesting the situation where a client takes an action of violation that can lead to stable peace will provide deeper insights on the origin of stable peace. Originally, exploration of the condition where stable peace can be constructed is put in the realm of Peace Science. Meanwhile, my attempt means that study of alliance can contribute to peace science.

References

[8] National Archives of Australia, Canberra, Australian Capital Territory (NAA), A11116 CA 805 Part 1, 2.


