“EU Security-Cooperation with Southeast Asia and Latin America: the case of transnational security issues”

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Abstract

We present a first exploratory approach for the study and comparison of the bi-regional security agendas between, on the one hand, the European Union (EU) and Southeast Asia, and on the other, of the EU and Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC), specifically on transnational security issues. We analyze how these agendas have changed in the last 15 years, both in terms of the issues addressed and the concepts used to frame the challenges posed by the rise of transnational security issues for bi-regional security cooperation. Additionally, we examine how two interrelated concepts (‘security-development nexus’ and ‘non-traditional security’ issues) have been deployed as framing devices to re-shape in these two bi-regional security agendas. This work does not provide conclusions regarding the case studies considered. However, it proposes to use strategic framing analysis as a path to further explore EU-ASEAN and EU-LAC cooperation and norm contestation on transnational security issues.

This paper is a first exploratory approach for the study and comparison of the bi-regional security agendas between, on the one hand, the European Union (EU) and Southeast Asia, and on the other, of the EU and Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC), specifically on transnational security issues. We analyze how these agendas have changed in the last 15 years, both in terms of the issues addressed and the concepts used to frame the challenges posed by the rise of transnational security issues for bi-regional security cooperation. We want to investigate how those security issues are interpreted and given meaning through language. Following strategic framework analysis (Barnett 1999), we argue that foreign policy actors in the European Union deploy frames that allow them to define and situate transnational security issues in a way that could be shared by foreign policy actors in other regions, in order to mobilize and guide political action and suggest specific policy options to confront these issues. However, for framing to be effective, it need to be consistent with the cultural and historical terrain of the international relations of the EU. Of course strategic framing is a “road that go both ways”: Also, foreign policy elites in, for example, Southeast Asia and Latin America and the Caribbean, will deploy and defend their own framing process of security matters, and in certain occasions they will also...

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1 This paper falls within the ‘EU-NormCon research project’ (Normative contestation in Europe: Implications for the EU in a changing global order) funded by the National R+D Plan of the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness (CSO2016-79205-P). For more information: http://www.ibei.org/en/normative-contestation-in-europe-implications-for-the-eu-in-a-changing-global-order-eu-normcom-49610
challenge EU’s narratives and frames about transnational security issues, and about the evolution of bi-regional security cooperation.

We examine how two interrelated concepts (‘security-development nexus’ and ‘non-traditional security’ issues) have been deployed as framing devices to re-shape in these two bi-regional security agendas. This work does not provide conclusions regarding the case studies considered. However, it proposes to use strategic framing analysis as a path to further explore EU-ASEAN and EU-LAC cooperation and norm contestation on transnational security issues. The sources we have used for the empirical part of this paper include joint declarations, communications, conclusions, multiannual indicative regional programs, actions plans, and foreign policy guidelines. In the case of the agenda on security cooperation between the European Union and Southeast Asia, we have review and analyzed fourteen documents from the years 2001 to 2017. For the bi-regional agenda on security cooperation between the EU and Latin American, we have analyzed fourteen documents from the period 1999 to 2015. The reviewed documents, reflect that the level of detail and specificity has continuously being increased. The action plans and the programming documents of recent years reflect not only the bi-regional commitment towards security cooperation, but also the shared understanding that transnational security risks and threats require more complex analyses, and more comprehensive and multidimensional responses.

The rest of this paper is organized as follows: first we review recent approaches to transnational security issues and to the so-called security development nexus, and we briefly review how the European Union has approached these matters in recent years. Secondly, we present the empirical evidence related to key texts on the agenda on security cooperation between the EU and Southeast Asia and Latin America (the complete analysis in included in Annexes “A. EU Documents on ASEAN 2001-2017” and “B. EU Documents on Latin America 1999-2015”). Thirdly, we comment the possibilities offered by strategic framing analysis for our two case studies. Finally, we present some final considerations.

1. Transnational security issues and the security development nexus

Nowadays, states and intergovernmental organizations are struggling to cope with a wide range of security threats and challenges, and it is quite clear that these issues not only include the traditional range of conventional, state-centered, military issues. Problems such as climate change, transboundary pollution, failed states, financial crisis, human and drug trafficking, epidemic diseases, cyber threats, water and food security, transnational crime and terrorism, all seem to have been intensified by growing economic globalization, interdependence, complexity and the transformation on the nation-state (Hameiri and Jones 2015, Ikenberry 2015).

In this context, transnational security issues can be defined as those interconnected processes or phenomena, which are transnational in nature, that require a comprehensive perspective based on needs and rights rather than a military response, for which international multilateral cooperation is critical. These issues represent a threat to the survival and security of individuals, communities, societies and states, and “their complexities often reveal levels of connectivity and synergy that make them difficult to separate analytically.” In fact, the “overlapping nature of many transnational threats, combined with the accelerating pace of change seen in this era of

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2 Parts of the following paragraphs were previously presented at the International Studies Association's 58th Annual Convention. “Understanding Change in World Politics” February 22nd - 25th, 2017, Baltimore, Maryland.
globalization, makes the evolution of these threats unpredictable and non-linear in their dynamics” (Fidler et al. p.3).

The governance of these emerging and potential threats and risks requires and active participation of different stakeholders, both non-state actors and international institutions (Caballero-Anthony 2016, p.14-15), challenging the state-centric premises on which the traditional multilateral system operates (Cockayne and Mikulaschek 2008, pp. 2-3). “In an interdependent world, the principle of state sovereignty is increasingly being put into question. At the same time, it has become obvious that security cannot be exclusively provided at the national level” (Ehrhart, et al. 2014, p. 24). This is why several states and international organizations have explicitly, or implicitly, implemented “comprehensive approaches” to cope with these transnational security threats. Nowadays, security is a complex interrelation between physical security, political freedoms, economic stability, and achieving an ecological balance for sustainable development.

These comprehensive and multidimensional approaches “stress the need to integrate security, social, economic and development policies and to ensure coherence and coordination among responsible actors at different levels” (Ehrhart, et al. 2014, p. 26). Providing security today, then, requires wide-ranging multidimensional analyses and actions that go beyond the realm of ‘high politics’ and comprise different policy areas, and even a wide constellation of public and private stakeholders (Gebhard & Norheim-Martinsen, 2011). This, in turn, requires increasing levels of coordination among different public policies; policies that, from a traditional security paradigm, have been kept separate (Ibid.).

During the past three decades, an important feature of the analyses of international security has been the emphasis on the connection, interdependence or fusion between different processes. Many of these connections and interdependences highlight the relation between domestic/internal and international/external contexts, the relationships between public and private actors, and the relation between security and development. Recent approaches in Security Studies have produced several accounts of the links, connections, interdependencies, fusions, or nexuses, between different kinds of actors, processes and levels of analysis (for example, Smith 2010; Spear & Williams 2012; Williams 2013; Brandão 2015; Caballero-Anthony 2016; Collins 2016; and Neack 2017).

The examples of how to characterize these links or nexuses are numerous: civil-military nexus, crime-conflict nexus, crime-terror nexus, energy-environment-security nexus, development-migration nexus, internal-external security nexus, justice-security-development nexus, peace-development nexus, migration-development-security nexus, poverty-conflict nexus, private-public security nexus, security-development nexus, security-migration nexus, terrorism-proliferation nexus, among others. Of course all this nexuses also have normative implications, in the sense that they direct the attention to certain dynamics and actors, and obscure others.

In recent years, the EU has integrated to its external action a broad range of new conceptualizations that link peace, development and security in a holistic and comprehensive manner. And this strategic framing of its international presence has also been applied to the EU’ international cooperation on transnational security issues. Throughout the last fifteen years, the foreign and security policy of the EU has been framed with concepts that symbolize the EU’s interconnected and comprehensive approach to peace, security and development. For example, EU institutions have deployed concepts such as ‘the security-development nexus’, ‘the external-internal security link’, ‘the human security approach’, ‘comprehensive security’, ‘an holistic
approach to security’, ‘the comprehensive approach to external conflicts and crises’, and the more multifaceted and comprehensive ‘capacity building in support of security and development in third countries’, among others.

Specifically, the security-development nexus has become a and important concept in both the elaboration and practice of EU’ foreign policy. For example, this nexus is a key element in documents such as: the 2003 European Security Strategy; the 2007 ‘Security and Development - Conclusions of the Council’; the 2007 ‘Council Conclusions on a EU response to situations of fragility’; the 2011 ‘Communication from the Commission. Increasing the impact of EU Development Policy: An Agenda for Change’; the 2013 ‘Joint Communication. The EU’s comprehensive approach to external conflict and crises; the 2015 ‘Joint Communication., Capacity building in support of security and development - Enabling partners to prevent and manage crises’, among others.

The implications of the interrelation between security and development, as defined by the EU, have been extensively analyzed in the literature, both from a conceptual point of view and from its practical implications for policy formulation and implementation (Waddell 2006; Youngs 2008; Gänzle 2009; Stern and Öjendal 2010; Gebhard and Norheim-Martinsen 2011; Boonstra and Shapovalova 2012; Sanahuja and Schünemann 2012; Smith 2013; Manrique and Claros 2015; Furness and Gänzle 2016; Merket 2016, among others).

We believe that concepts such as “the security-development nexus” and “non-traditional security issues” have been used by the EU not only as analytical tools, and to guide its policy initiatives, but also as political instruments “to maneuver between different interests and priorities of specific governments and institutions” (Boonstra & Shapovalova 2012, p. 8). And also, we propose that the bi-regional agendas on security cooperation established between the EU and Southeast Asia and Latin America and the Caribbean are part of the European efforts to build trans-regional systems of security governance for transnational security issues.

According to Sperling & Webber (2014: 138), trans-regional systems of security governance are “functional systems of global security governance that encompass security threats (money laundering, trafficking and transnational crime) that go beyond a region.” How these trans-regional systems of security governance emerge and operate (under which norms and practices), how they relate and coexist with more regionally centered systems, and how these twin forms aggregate toward global governance, are relevant matters.

The cases of bi-regional security cooperation against transnational threats in Southeast Asia and Latin America are relevant since governments in these regions historically have been highly preoccupied with their sovereignty, non-intervention in internal affairs and defending their autonomy from external powers. Additionally, the analysis and comparison of the agendas on security cooperation between the EU and these two regions is relevant because EU cooperation on transnational threats sits at the intersection of many instruments and conceptual approaches that the EU recently has developed to achieve more coherence in its foreign relations (Furness & Gätzle 2016). Through the analysis of our two cases, we can identify and assess the conceptual and policy tools that the EU is creating for managing risks and threats, and how power relations, normative structures, and practices can encourage, or disrupt, global and regional efforts in the fight against transnational risks and challenges.
2. EU security cooperation with Southeast Asia and Latin America and the Caribbean. Recent empirical evidence.

The “raw material” for this draft paper is composed by a sample of 28 documents on the EU relationship with Southeast Asia and Latin America and the Caribbean. This sample includes, on the one hand, documents prepared by European Union institutions (basically the European Commission, the Council of the European Union and the European Council) on the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and on Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC). On the other hand, we have included documents product of bi-regional summits or meetings between the EU and ASEAN, and between the EU and Latin America and the Caribbean (since 2013, summits between the EU and the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States - CELAC).

As result of our analysis of 14 documents on the EU-ASEAN relationship, and of 14 documents on the EU-LAC/CELAC relationship, we have produced five different charts that we are going to present and comment in this section. The complete analysis and summary of these 28 documents can be find in ‘Annex A. EU DOCUMENTS ON ASEAN 2001-2017’, and in ‘Annex B. EU DOCUMENTS ON LATIN AMERICA 1999-2015.’

For our analysis, we have identified issues that have been framed in the documents as ‘common global challenges’ for both regions, or directly as security threats or risks. These issues don’t include inter-state rivalries and confrontations, neither “traditional security” military-related issues. We only consider issues that the literature on transnational security has identified as new or emergent risks or threats, and those broader categories included in the documents, such as maritime security and citizen security.

In ‘Chart 1. EU-ASEAN Common Global Challenges 2001-2017 by issue and type of source’ and ‘Chart 2. EU-ASEAN Common Global Challenges 2001-2017’, we can see there are nine issues that have been emphasized in the agenda for security cooperation between the EU and ASEAN. These nine issues can be divided in three different groups: terrorism, organized crime and maritime security at the top of the agenda; drug trafficking and environmental issues/climate change/natural disaster preparedness in second place; and, cyber-security/cyber-crime/data protection issues and human trafficking in third place.

It is important to state that the issues in this list, and their order, doesn’t necessary reflect the level and impact of the “threats”. This list reflects the priorities of the EU and ASEAN in its shared security agenda. Interestingly, we can appreciate in the graphic of Chart 2 that issues such as drug trafficking and environmental issues/climate change/natural disaster preparedness have a central

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3 The Association of Southeast Asian Nations, or ASEAN, was established on 8 August 1967 in Bangkok, Thailand, with the signing of the ASEAN Declaration (Bangkok Declaration) by Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand. Later, other five states joined the organization: Brunei Darussalam, Viet Nam, Laos, Myanmar and Cambodia. More information at http://asean.org/asean/about-asean/

4 The Community of Latin American and Caribbean States consists of 33 sovereign countries in the Americas created on December 3, 2011. CELAC is the successor of the Rio Group and the Latin American and Caribbean Summit on Integration and Development (CALC), and includes: Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Barbados, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, The Bahamas, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay, and Venezuela. More information at http://www.itamaraty.gov.br/en/politica-externa/integracao-regional/7623-community-of-latin-american-and-caribbean-states

5 We have created this broad category since throughout the examined period similar issues have been framed with these three different concepts.
role from the point of view of the EU, but they don’t have the similar relevance in bi-regional statements. At the bottom of the list of the EU-ASEAN agenda on security cooperation we find corruption, trafficking in wildlife, energy security, counterfeiting, citizen security and gender-related violence. This doesn’t mean that these issues are not relevant for the security conditions in both regions; what we can see in the list is that these matters “have not entered” the bi-regional security agenda forcefully.

| Chart 1. EU-ASEAN Common Global Challenges 2001-2017 by issue and type of source |
|---------------------------------|-----------------|----------------|----------------|
|                                 | Documents from EU institutions | Documents from bi-regional summits | Total documents including the issue |
| Terrorism                       | 6                | 7              | 13             |
| Organized crime                 | 5                | 7              | 12             |
| Maritime security and sea piracy| 5                | 6              | 11             |
| Environmental issues/climate change/natural disaster preparedness | 7 | 3 | 10 |
| Drug trafficking                | 7                | 3              | 10             |
| Cyber-security/Cyber-crime/Data protection | 4 | 4 | 8 |
| Preventive diplomacy, conflict resolution, crisis management | 4 | 4 | 8 |
| Human trafficking               | 4                | 3              | 7              |
| Arms trafficking/smuggling      | 3                | 2              | 5              |
| Migrant smuggling               | 2                | 2              | 4              |
| Money laundering                | 2                | 2              | 4              |
| Border management               | 3                | 1              | 4              |
| Health issues                   | 3                | 0              | 3              |
| Economic crisis                 | 2                | 0              | 2              |
| Radicalisation and violent extremism | 1 | 1 | 2 |
| Migration flows and emergencies | 2                | 0              | 2              |
| Counterfeiting                  | 1                | 0              | 1              |
| Energy security                 | 1                | 0              | 1              |
| Trafficking in wildlife         | 1                | 0              | 1              |
| Corruption                      | 0                | 1              | 1              |
| Gender-related violence         | 0                | 0              | 0              |
| Citizen security                | 0                | 0              | 0              |

Source: ANNEX A. EU DOCUMENTS ON ASEAN 2001-2017
In ‘Chart 3. Evolution of EU-ASEAN Common Global Challenges 2001-2017 by year’, we can clearly identify those issues that have been central elements of the bi-regional agenda since the beginning of this century and up to this day: organized crime, drug trafficking, human trafficking, maritime security and piracy, and environmental issues/climate change/natural disaster preparedness.

It is also relevant to identify the evolution of the number of issues included in the agenda. In 2001 there were nine different issues; in 2012 this number had jumped to 15; and in 2017 the documents reviewed include at least nine different issues. So, in the last fifteen years the EU-ASEAN security agenda showed, between 2002 and 2012 a general trend towards expansion, and after 2012 there seems to be a general process of narrowing this agenda. Another relevant fact is that ‘Preventive diplomacy, conflict resolution, crisis management’ was included just in 2012, but now forms a very important part of the agenda. Also, it quite interesting that in the last years arms trafficking/smuggling and money laundering are not included as relevant concerns. This may be
the result of including these activities in the broad category of (transnational) organized crime. Finally, it is worth mentioning that the issue of ‘Radicalisation and violent extremism’ has just recently being introduced in the agenda, both through EU-made and bi-regionally agreed documents.

**Chart 3. Evolution of EU-ASEAN Common Global Challenges 2001-2017 by year**

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<thead>
<tr>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Organized crime</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terrorism</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drug trafficking</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>Human trafficking</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Maritime security and sea piracy</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environmental issues/climate change/natural disaster preparedness</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Cyber-security/Cyber-crime/Data protection</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Migrant smuggling</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Preventive diplomacy, conflict resolution, crisis management</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>Arms trafficking/smuggling</td>
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<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>Border management</td>
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<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>Health issues</td>
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<tr>
<td>Money laundering</td>
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<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>Economic crisis</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Migration flows and emergencies</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Radicalisation and violent extremism</td>
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<td></td>
<td>X</td>
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<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>Corruption</td>
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<tr>
<td>Counterfeiting</td>
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<tr>
<td>Energy security</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Trafficking in wildlife</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Citizen security</td>
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<tr>
<td>Gender-related violence</td>
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<tr>
<td>Number of different security-related issues</td>
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<td>10</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: ANNEX A. EU DOCUMENTS ON ASEAN 2001-2017

Within ‘Chart 4. EU-LAC/CELAC Common Global Challenges 1999-2015 by issue and type of source’ and ‘Chart 5. EU-LAC/CELAC Common Global Challenges 1999-2015’, we can identify seven relevant issues on the EU-LAC/CELAC agenda on security cooperation: drug trafficking and organized crime as the most important components; and human trafficking, terrorism, migrant smuggling, money laundering and arms trafficking/smuggling. If we compare with the EU-ASEAN agenda, we find several issues not included in this case: maritime security and piracy, radicalization and violent extremism, health issues, cyber-security/cyber-crime, and preventive diplomacy conflict resolution and crisis management. Terrorism, though highly present in bi-regional documents, is not included in the documents prepared by EU institutions as a central element of the bi-regional agenda on security cooperation. This may be related the fact that, in most cases, the reference to terrorism in the bi-regional statements uses a general formulation of condemnation of terrorist acts, pledging to combat it in all its forms.
## Chart 4. EU-LAC/CELAC Common Global Challenges 1999-2015
by issue and type of source

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issue</th>
<th>Documents from EU institutions</th>
<th>Documents from bi-regional summits</th>
<th>Total documents including the issue</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Organized crime</td>
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<td>Drug trafficking</td>
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<td>8</td>
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<td>Human trafficking</td>
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<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arms trafficking/smuggling</td>
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<td>Money laundering</td>
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<td>5</td>
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<td>Migrant smuggling</td>
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<tr>
<td>Corruption</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environmental issues/climate change/natural disaster preparedness</td>
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<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Migration flows and emergencies</td>
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<td>Citizen Security</td>
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<td>Counterfeiting</td>
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<td>Energy security</td>
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<td>Health issues</td>
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<td>Preventive diplomacy, conflict resolution, crisis management</td>
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<td>Radicalisation and violent extremism</td>
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<tr>
<td>Trafficking in wildlife</td>
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In ‘Chart 6. Evolution of EU-LAC/CELAC Common Global Challenges 1999-2015 by year’, we can see that between 1999 and 2015 at least seven issues considered to be key elements of the EU-ASEAN security agenda were not included in the EU-LAC/CELAC dialogue on security matters: maritime security and sea piracy (just included one, in 2012, in relation to the Caribbean), counterfeiting, cyber-security/cyber-crime, health issues, preventive diplomacy/conflict resolution/crisis management, radicalization and violent extremism, and trafficking in wildlife. Again, the issue here is not if these threats “exist” in Latin America, but why the bi-regional security agenda has evolved in a way that these matters have been left out of the official documents.
Contrary to the case of the EU-ASEAN agenda, in the case of Latin America we see constant presence of between five and seven security-related issues between 1999 and 2009. Starting in 2010, we see a tendency towards enlarging the agenda; in 2015 it reached thirteen different issues (more than double of the five issues highlighted in 2009). The EU-ASEAN agenda went from fifteen different issues in 2012 to nine in 2017. In addition, the constant presence of some issues throughout sixteen years is visible: drug trafficking, organized crime, terrorism, human trafficking, migrant smuggling, money laundering and arms trafficking. And we can notice how issues such as corruption and environmental/natural disasters issues have had an intermittent presence. It is important to indicate that in 2015 three new issues were included in the bi-regional agenda: border management, citizen security and gender-related violence; three critical problems in the region at least since the last decade.


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<td>Organized crime</td>
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<td>Human trafficking</td>
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<td>Arms trafficking / smuggling</td>
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<td>Environmental issues/climate change/natural disaster preparedness</td>
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<td>Migration flows and emergencies</td>
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<td>Economic crisis</td>
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<td>Border management</td>
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<td>Citizen security</td>
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<td>Energy security</td>
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<td>Gender-related violence</td>
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<tr>
<td>Maritime security and sea piracy</td>
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<td>Counterfeiting</td>
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<td>Cyber-security/Cyber-crime/Data protection</td>
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<td>Health issues</td>
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<td>Preventive diplomacy, conflict resolution, crisis management</td>
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<tr>
<td>Radicalization and violent extremism</td>
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<td>Trafficking in wildlife</td>
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<td>Number of different security-related issues</td>
<td>7 6 7 5 5 7 6 5 8 10 13</td>
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Source: ANNEX B. EU DOCUMENTS ON LATIN AMERICA 1999-2015

In the documents reviewed, we notice that in both cases the level of detail and specificity has continuously being increased. The action plans and the programming documents of recent years
reflect not only the bi-regional commitment towards security cooperation, but also the shared understanding that transnational security risks and threats require more complex analyses, and more comprehensive and multidimensional responses.

What we see in ‘Chart 7. The “security-development nexus” and “non-traditional security” in EU bi-regional security cooperation with ASEAN and LAC/CELAC’ is the result of identifying in the 28 texts if there was an explicit or implicit reference to the “security-development nexus” and to “non-traditional security” issues or areas.

The proposal that there is a close relation between security development was present in the EU-LAC/CELAC agenda thought the analysed period (1999-2015). And now the “security-development nexus” clearly is a central element of the documents on Latin America prepared by EU institutions; although it has not been introduced in the documents produced by bi-regional summits/meetings yet. In the case of the language used in the framework of the EU-ASEAN relationship, the nexus is not explicitly included, and sometimes not even implicitly.

Regarding the concept of “non-traditional security” issues/areas has been included in most EU-ASEAN bi-regional documents, especially since 2016. Also, this concept has been introduced into EU documents on ASEAN since 2015. It the case of the EU-LAC/CELAC relationship, though the ideas of new, or emergent, or rising, challenges/risks/threats has been present in their documents, the specific articulation of “non-traditional security” has not been introduced in any of the reviewed documents.

**Chart 7. The “security-development nexus” and “non-traditional security” in EU bi-regional security cooperation with ASEAN and LAC/CELAC**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Including the &quot;security-development nexus&quot; approach/concept</th>
<th>Without the &quot;security-development nexus&quot; approach/concept</th>
<th>Including the concept of &quot;non-traditional security&quot; issues/areas</th>
<th>Not including the concept of &quot;non-traditional security&quot; issues/areas</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>Documents from EU institutions on ASEAN</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Documents from EU-ASEAN summits</td>
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<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Documents from EU institutions on LAC/CELAC</td>
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<td>Documents from EU-LAC/CELAC summits</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
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</tbody>
</table>


3. **Strategic framing actors**

Frame Analysis assumes that political actors act strategically in a normative structure and in an institutional setting. Leaders, and their teams can create cultural spaces in which certain policies became desirable, acceptable and legitimate (Barnett 1999; Holland 2010; Jarvis & Holland 2014; Oppermann & Spencer 2016). From this perspective, people’s reaction to an event ‘is determined not -or hardly at all- by the event itself but by the way in which such events are interpreted and given meaning’ (Oppermann & Spencer, p. 688).
Frame analysis assumes that policymakers ‘are constantly attempting to guide political mobilization toward a particular outcome and for a particular goal by using symbols, metaphors, and cognitive signs to organize experience and fix meaning to events’ (Barnett 1999: 8-9). “Frame analysis is the attempt to unmask the underlying framework which is used in reporting to make sense of a certain empirical event such as a crisis or policy fiasco.” (Oppermann & Spencer, p. 688). In the field of foreign policy, policymakers try to ‘develop and communicate strategic narratives about the past, present and future of international politics and about their country’s identity as an international actor’ to form their ‘discursive environment and the behavior of other actors both domestically and internationally’ (Oppermann & Spencer, p. 688).

However, there is a danger with overemphasizing the role of normative structures for explaining the behavior of policymakers. Taken to the extreme, this view may present decision-makers as “cultural fools”, as “puppets” of the cultural-social-normative structures of their societies. However, political elites can create cultural preconditions to advance their policy choices. In the case of foreign policy, decision makers can act strategically to alter the socio-political and normative structures in which narratives are played. Because they have information and they can engineer social change; they are aware of the culture and social rules in their societies and at the international level, that presumably could limit their practices; they can participate in practices that attempt to modify the cultural landscape, and change social rules and norms, because of personal beliefs and/or instrumental gains; and, they are capable of appropriating important cultural symbols for framing policy ideas to convince the general public that certain policies are plausible and acceptable solutions to pressing issues (Barnett, 1999: 7-8).

In this sense, policymakers compete to frame an event because how the event is understood will have important consequences for mobilizing action and furthering their interests. Therefore, foreign policy actors engage in what Barnett has named as “strategic framing process”, to deploy frames that allows them: to situate events and to interpret problems, to design a shared understanding of the world, to consolidate sentiments to mobilize and guide social action, and to suggest possible solutions to current dilemmas (Barnett 1999: 15-16).

The process of strategic framing is no only focused on the domestic political environment of the foreign policy decision makers; it is also directed to the external environment. As has been highlighted decades ago, policymakers need to know how to play two-level games (Putnam 1988), because there is a dialectic interplay between the actor’s own strategy on the one hand and the context on the other hand. Strategic actors want to attain their objectives, and inevitably they must take into consideration the strategies of all other players. “Political elites are aware that to legitimate and to make plausible their policies requires demonstrating how they are consistent with the cultural terrain, and sometimes that will require revising the cultural terrain in order to legitimate their policies.” (Brighi & Hill 2012: 16).

Through discourse, powerful actors create knowledge that serves to demarcate what is adequate and what is not, ‘ways of talking and thinking.’ ‘By marking not only the limits of what is possible to say but also what is possible to do, foreign policy discourse thus helps to make foreign policy conceivable and realizable.’ (Holland 2012: 644). ‘Foreign policymakers are rarely free to construct any foreign policy discourse.’ (Holland 2012: 644). There is always an institutional context, a political space, in which political elites strategize and calculate their political interests. That institutional and political space gives incentives and disincentives for individual and group action (Barnett 1999). Therefore, what is possible and legitimate is also delineated by the institutional context. Although in his analysis of the Yitzahak Rabin government in Israel, Barnett
refers mainly to the domestic side of this institutional context, that context clearly is external as well. And this external context also shapes the calculations of strategically-minded political elites; shapes which narratives and frames are selected and become politically consequential; and shapes the societal aggregation and interaction processes that are the factory of new cultural configurations and policy making outcomes (Barnett 1999: 9).

Investigating about foreign policy failures, Oppermann & Spencer 2016)) argue that framing a foreign policy decision as failure/fiasco or a success/victory is a discursive political act. However, fiasco narratives will “be more compelling if they can draw on arguments and characterizations that are widely seen in a certain context as plausible criteria and ingredients of foreign policy failures, (Oppermann & Spencer p. 687). Narratives are “a mode of verbal representation which offer humans a way of comprehending their environment” (Oppermann & Spencer p. 687). Is “a means of structuring discourse”.

Using negative language to characterize a decision maker is also part of a strategic framing process (“lacks experience”, “is weak and dishonest”, “is arrogant and narrow-minded,” etc.). Also, frames could be deployed to justify actions (“this has been the result of intense and in depth deliberations”, “this decision will protect our national interest”, “this is a legitimate action in line with our history and ideals”, “we are doing this together with our allies”, etc.) (Oppermann & Spencer 2016)

It is quite a different thing framing the world of international relations as a scenario of “hard power politics among untrusting actors”, or as a realm of “cooperative friendship amongst long standing allies.” Both frames have concrete implications for foreign policy behavior. Also, it would not be the same if a policymakers presents the general public a scenario which allows the possibility of alternative behaviors (“this is a war of choice”), or an event offering no alternatives (“this is a war of necessity”), or a scenario that is beyond the control of policymakers (...). Framing also could refer to the way actors in a narrative are characterized. Policymakers may decide to label and not just describe the role of certain actors in an event, and by this ‘influencing the relation between the agent in the story and the audience’ (“the champion of multilateralism”, “a principled international actor”, “the leader of the free world”, “a global power”, “a global security provider”, etc.).

Applying frame analysis to our empirical cases on bi-regional security cooperation will help us to identify and understand the way regional actors strategically deploy, or resist, different frames to explain and justify their foreign policy ideas and practices. In the case of the EU, it is quite revealing how it presents itself and the international context in the different documents reviewed for identifying our empirical data. The documents we have analysed regarding the EU-ASEAN relationship, and especially those prepared by different EU institutions on ASEAN, present the international scenario as one of dangers and risks (“the dark side of globalization”), which generates “the same global challenges” to both regions (European Commission 2001). And because societies in Europe live in an interdependent “global village”, the EU needs “to increase

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6 Frame, and narrative, analysis requires reviewing official documents produced within the different institutions of the European Union in charge of external relations. And statements, speeches and press conferences from the highest-level policymakers, since this foreign policy elite reflect the foreign policy thoughts and conceptions of presidents, prime ministers, or foreign ministers (Barnett 1999; Holland 2010; Jarvis & Holland 2014; Oppermann & Spencer 2016). These groups of policymakers ‘serve as an indicator of a nation’s role conceptions’, ‘are the ones who make decisions about how a country should behave internationally,’ and they ‘supposedly behave based on their idea of what would be acceptable to the people’ (Cantir, C, & Kaarbo, J, 2012, p.7).
its ambitions to address a wider agenda” on new security concerns (European Commission 2003). In this context, the EU assumes that other regional actors, such as ASEAN, “value the opportunity of enhancing cooperation with the EU on security” (European Commission 2015b). Probably the EU makes this assumption because the Europeans have their own way to confront transnational security threats, linking together “broader issues of political, social, economic and financial governance” (European Commission 2003). This “broad approach to security” is based in the EU ability to bring together its political, development and humanitarian instruments (Council of the EU 2012). This, in turn, allows the EU to increase international awareness of its key role as “security actor and provider”, that acts in a “non-threatening” way, and that is ready to play its part in the fight against “non-traditional security challenges” (European Commission 2015b; European Council 2015).

Also, the recent efforts by EU’ foreign policy actors to build a new narrative for the international presence of the institution can also be analysed through narrative and framing analysis. Language helps to frame what it is possible to do, what is conceivable and realizable in foreign policy. Strategic-minded foreign policy elites in the EU select and deploy frames that help them to re-shape the narrative on the EU actorness in international relations. For example, through the narrative that the EU is a global power, that roots its actions both in principles and interests, whose actions are needed for maintaining and promoting international peace and security, and that is a reliable partner. This new narrative is designed also to try to leave behind a domestic and international image of the EU as being in constant political, economic, normative and institutional crises. Recent statements by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy/Vice-President of the Commission, Federica Mogherini, are examples of this. Since 20016, Mogherini has been deploying frames for shifting the EU international security identity: the EU as a “global player” (EEAS 2016a), as a “global power” (EEAS 2017b; EEAS 2017d), as a “super power” (EEAS 2016c; EEAS 2016d, EEAS 2016e), as a “global security provider” (EEAS 2016b; EEAS 2016c; 2016d; EEAS 2016e; EEAS 2017a; EEAS 2017b; EEAS 2017c; EEAS 2017d), as an “indispensable power” (EEAS 2016c; EEAS 2016e; EEAS 2017a), as “[a] power that builds on principled pragmatism (EEAS 2016e), a “principled global security provider (EEAS 2016d), as a “principled power and cooperative power” (EEAS 2016c), or “a reliable partner” in security matters (EEAS 2016b; EEAS 2016d; EEAS 2017a; EEAS 2017c).

4. Final comments

As stated at the begging of this paper, this research is in its initial stage. Further work is needed in order to:

- Analyse how and why the bi-regional security cooperation of the EU with ASEAN and Latin America and the Caribbean countries has evolved in certain ways during the 21st Century.
- Explore why these agendas have addressed transnational security issues through specific narratives and frames.
- Understand how the concepts of “non-traditional security” issues or areas and the “security-development nexus”, have shaped interactions between the EU and ASEAN and Latin America in bi-regional security cooperation.
- Analyse what is the translation of frames (security-development nexus, non-traditional security, comprehensive approach to security) into concrete practices, programming and budgeting in each bi-regional relationship.
- Explain how and why power relations and strategic framing shape the norms, structures and practices of bi-regional security cooperation on transnational security issues.
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A1. Analysis of the official documents from EU institutions on ASEAN.

The Communication from the European Commission ‘Europe and Asia: A Strategic Framework for Enhanced Partnerships’ from September 2001 (European Commission 2001) highlights the fact that Europe and Asia face the same “global challenges” related to “the dark side of globalization”, which include economic, environmental, health, terrorism and transnational crime (including trafficking in women and children, the smuggling of illegal migrants, the drugs trade and money laundering) issues. The document does not include any direct or general reference to the relation between security and development. On the issue of NTS issues, the text states that the EU should strengthen its engagement with Asia “in relation to old and new global and regional security issues”. Specifically, the communication states that the dialogue between the EU and ASEAN should help identify areas where both actors “can work together on global security questions, and on global challenges such as drugs and transnational crime.”

The 2003 Communication from the European Commission ‘A new partnership with South East Asia’ (European Commission 2003), contains a long and wide-ranging agenda on security matters, including specific proposal for large number of issues. This communication does not include the concepts of NTS, or any specific mentioning of the security-development nexus. Specifically, this communication identifies six strategic priorities, and among these priorities “Mainstreaming Justice and Home Affairs issues”, by systematically including “issues of migration, trafficking in human beings, money laundering, piracy, organised crime and drugs,” and maritime security, into the EU bilateral dialogues with South East Asia. The document states that organised crime and drugs are challenges of both regions, and highlights the interdependence in “the global village” and the need to address “global challenges”, such as: counterfeiting, data protection, environmental degradation and crimes, illicit traffic in drugs and arms, maritime security (including piracy), migration flows, money laundering, new health challenges, smuggling of migrants, terrorism, trafficking in human beings, and transnational organised crime (European Commission 2003). Although the is not a clear reference to the security-development nexus, there is a reference to these matters in the section on terrorism. The Communication states that:

“[E]ffective action against terrorism needs not only to include security and public order measures but also to be linked to broader issues of political, social, economic and financial governance. Only then can it tackle the complex root causes of terrorism. This is why fighting terrorism must be included in the development strategy of all countries concerned and should lead whenever necessary to longer term actions.” (European Commission 2003)

Finally, the Communication ‘A new partnership with South East Asia’ recognizes that the EU-ASEAN emerging program was directly related to the EU’s “increased ambitions to address a wider agenda”, by including, for example, migration and counter-terrorism. (European Commission 2003)

The security-related content of the ‘Regional Programming for Asia. Strategy document 2007-2013’ (European Commission 2007), prepared by the European Commission, is not very long if we compare it with the 2003 communication on Southeast Asia. This document doesn’t include concepts such as NTS or the security-development nexus, and, surprisingly, there is no reference to the concept of transnational crime, and only just a brief reference to drug trafficking. This documents mentions common challenges such as terrorism, drug production, nuclear proliferation and natural disasters. And highlights that the EU support to ASEAN will include three areas, the third one being “cooperation and policy reform in the field of security”, especially on border management at a national and regional level (European Commission 2007).

The ‘Guidelines on the EU’s Foreign and Security Policy in East Asia, from 2012 (Council of the EU 2012) doesn’t not include the concept of NTS. Also, the security-related content of this
document is not very broad, it only says that “East Asian security and stability is a precondition for the region’s continued economic success.” Also it states that the EU has “a broad approach to security” in East Asia and the wider world, including “the promotion of cooperative and sustainable policies to meet global challenges such as climate change, energy security, environmental protection, poverty, economic imbalances, and health issues.” Additionally, it mentions that the EU has the ability to bring together its “political, development and humanitarian instruments” to contribute to peace and security in Southeast Asia. The guidelines asks for the EU to expand its dialogue and cooperation in areas such as: “the fight against terrorism, piracy, drugs, illegal migration and human trafficking, non-proliferation of WMD, confidence-building, preventive diplomacy and conflict resolution.” (Council of the EU 2012).

The 2015 Communication ‘The EU and ASEAN: a partnership with a strategic purpose’ (European Commission 2015b) includes a very wide and comprehensive section on bi-regional security matters. Here we don’t have the space to summarize all its content, but it is important to highlight that this document reflects the idea of a link between security and development, and includes the concept of “non-traditional security areas.” Regarding the security-development nexus, the communication states that “the EU and ASEAN share a commitment to ‘Community building’, sustainable development and rules-based integration as the best way to provide their citizens […] with security and prosperity.” And regarding NTS issues, the text affirms that to turn the EU-ASEAN relationship into a strategic partnership, cooperation on NTS areas (such as maritime security, disaster management and relief, transnational crime, counter-terrorism, preventive diplomacy, crisis management, mediation, the rule of law and election observation) should be deepen (European Commission 2015b).

Other threats mentioned in the ‘The EU and ASEAN: a partnership with a strategic purpose’ as fields for increasing EU-ASEAN cooperation and capacity building include: “trafficking (in human beings, drugs, wildlife); cyber security and cybercrime (including countering online child sexual abuse); non-proliferation and disarmament (including the Arms Trade Treaty); de-radicalisation/countering violent extremism; situations of vulnerable minorities that have regional implications.” This Communication also states that EU should increase its role as a security actor and provider especially after the Lisbon Treaty provisions allowed for “more integrated approaches to foreign policy.” (European Commission 2015b) The documents states that “ASEAN values the opportunity of enhancing cooperation with the EU on security”, and that it “can draw inspiration from the EU’s experience of framing security cooperation at regional level and the EU’s involvement — active but non-threatening — can help it maintain multiple strategic options and centrality as the big powers assert themselves more forcefully in the region.” Also, the Communication proposes that the EU and ASEAN “should exploit the convergence of interests and make political and security issues one of the most dynamic vectors of their cooperation.” (European Commission 2015b).

The European Council ‘Conclusions on EU-ASEAN relations’ (European Council 2015), from June 2015, don’t include any reference to the security-development nexus, however, it includes NTS challenges as areas for bi-regional cooperation on security. The document recognizes “that both organizations share common challenges that have a global impact”, and that there are “new capacities on both sides to address security issues in a comprehensive way.” The Council stated that the EU would “play an active role” to address issues such as maritime security, non-proliferation and disarmament, counterterrorism, transnational crime, emergency response, cyber-security, migration emergencies, illegal drug trafficking and human traffic (European Council 2015).

Finally, although the 2016 ‘Regional Programming for Asia Multiannual Indicative Programme 2014-2020’ (European Commission 2016) doesn’t include the security-development nexus nor the concept of NTS issues, the programme states that in “fostering regional integration and cooperation in South and North-East Asia, the EU wants to promote cross-border cooperation between Asian countries in areas such as “climate change, environment and sustainable management of natural resources, disaster preparedness/risk reduction, decent work, social
protection, border and migration management, and the fight against illicit drugs and trafficking, in line with international standards and best practices.” (European Commission 2016)

A2. Analysis of the official documents from EU-ASEAN summits and meetings.

In their 2003 Joint Declaration on Co-operation to Combat Terrorism (ASEAN 2003), ASEAN and the EU made clear that there are a “complex set of new security challenges” that need to be addressed by both regions. These new security challenges comprise “terrorism, including its links with trans-national organised crime, such as money laundering, arms-trafficking and the production of and trafficking in illicit drugs, as well as illegal movements of nuclear, chemical, biological and other potentially deadly materials.” (ASEAN 2003).

For its part, the ‘Nuremberg Declaration on an EU-ASEAN Enhanced Partnership’ from 2007 states that there is an agreement to step up EU-ASEAN cooperation in security matters, for “addressing and combating terrorism, trafficking in human beings, drug trafficking, sea piracy, arms smuggling, money laundering, cyber-crime and related trans-national crime.” (European Council 2007). There is not a concrete reference to NTS issues nor to the idea of a nexus between security conditions and development achievements. It is important to point that this declaration includes the argument of a “a common understanding” on security, as a comprehensive concept “with a political, human, social and economic dimension.” (European Council 2007).

In the statement of 19th ASEAN-EU Ministerial Meeting of April 2012, there is just one point that pledges for the EU and ASEAN to intensify their cooperation for “building disaster resilient societies; enhancing maritime cooperation; combating sea piracy and armed robbery against ships in accordance with international law; combating terrorism and transnational crime; promoting cooperation in combating illicit drug production, trafficking and use; mitigating chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear risks.” (European Council 2012).

The ‘Bandar Seri Begawan Plan of Action to Strengthen the ASEAN-EU Enhanced Partnership (2013-2017)’, from April 2012, is a long and very detailed plan for straightening the ASEAN-EU partnership (European Commission 2012). Although this document includes a section on “Promoting regional cooperation to maintain peace, security, and stability”, the plan doesn’t explicitly mention the link between security-development nexus, or any reference to the concept of NTS issues. The long list of areas where further EU support to ASEAN countries could be expected include: maritime security (including combating sea piracy, armed robbery against ships, hijacking and arms smuggling), maritime safety and search and rescue, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, peacekeeping operations, military medicine, counter terrorism, transnational crime, human trafficking, people smuggling, border management, combating corruption, and promote cooperation in mitigating risks associated with chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) materials, among others. Finally, both regions propose to explore the possibilities of cooperation “in the field of crisis response through capacity building and sharing of experiences” (European Commission 2012).

The press release of the 23rd ASEAN-EU Joint Cooperation Committee (JCC), which took place in March 2016 (ASEAN 2016), re-state the need to strength bi-regional cooperation in “non traditional security areas, including on maritime security, preventive diplomacy, mediation, cyber security, counter-terrorism and transnational crimes” as part of the efforts to establish an ASEAN-EU strategic partnership. In this document, there is no reference to the security development nexus, neither to a comprehensive approach to security. (ASEAN 2016)

The October 2016 ‘Bangkok Declaration on Promoting an ASEAN-EU Global Partnership for Shared Strategic Goals’ includes several security-related items, and specifically to non-traditional security challenges or areas. However, there is no reference to the security-development nexus, or to a comprehensive approach to security (EEAS 2016f). In this declaration, the member states of ASEAN and the EU recognize that both regions are facing a “growing common challenges and threats”, “coming from within and outside the two regions, including both traditional and non-traditional challenges.” And this context emphasises the importance of closer cooperation
between the two regions. Through this document, the EU calls ASEAN to strength its “regional capabilities” to address traditional and non-traditional security areas (“such as maritime security, counter-terrorism, cyber security, preventive diplomacy and mediation and crisis management, and transnational crime”). (EEAS 2016f).

Finally, the final statement of the 24th ASEAN-EU Joint Cooperation Committee, of March 2017, makes no reference to the security-development nexus, nor to a comprehensive approach to security, and the idea of “new” security challenges or threats is not included (EEAS 2017f). However, it contains the concept of NTS areas. The statement of this bi-regional body states that in order “to elevate ASEAN-EU relations towards strategic partnership”, it is important to further develop the dialogue on security and crisis management.” Besides, the document highlights concrete NTS areas to develop additional common projects and initiatives: “maritime security, preventive diplomacy and mediation, irregular migration, trafficking in persons, cyber security, counterterrorism, counter violent extremism and transnational crimes.” (EEAS 2017f).

ANNEX B. EU DOCUMENTS ON LATIN AMERICA 1999-2015

B1. Analysis of the official documents from EU institutions on Latin America and the Caribbean

The ‘Latin America Regional Strategy Document. 2002-2006 Programming’ of 2002, includes a general reference to the security-development nexus, and the commitment of the EU to support the fight against transnational crime, and especially illegal drug trafficking, in Latin America (European Commission 2002). The way the document relates socio-economic conditions and insecurity in Latin America is as follows: “[e]xclusion and social marginalisation are factors that aggravate the insecurity, violence and rising crime levels that affect these societies.” And states that “[d]rug trafficking, combined with corruption and violence, is a factor of political, economic and social instability as is terrorism.” According to the EU, resolving these issues is one of the priorities of bi-regional political dialogue. Also, the strategy mentions that the fight against illegal drug trafficking, should be supported through the EU/Latin America coordination and cooperation mechanism, and the priority is given to the fight against cocaine trafficking. No reference is made to the concept of NTS issues. (European Commission 2002).

In its 2005 communication ‘A stronger partnership between the European Union and Latin America’ (European Commission 2005), the Commission articulates the security-development by stating that inequalities, “jeopardise growth and economic development. They can lead to social unrest and political instability and foster the growth of crime and insecurity (urban violence, violence against women, juvenile delinquency).” Furthermore, in the section on drugs and organized crime, the document reiterates that:

“[t]rafficking has had massive collateral effects along the main drug routes, with those leading to the EU tending to increase in number: organised crime activities linked to corruption and money laundering are spreading both within and outside the region. They have an adverse impact on the democratisation process and the stability of institutions and society.” (European Commission 2005).

According to the EU, the reasons for supporting the fight against drug trafficking were related to the increase in cocaine consumption in Europe; “hence the EU’s immediate interest in tackling the problems of production, consumption and trafficking of illegal drugs in Latin America.” This communication includes the principles of a “balanced approach” (reducing supply and demand, and promoting alternative development programmes) in the fight against drugs, based on a “shared responsibility.” Although there isn’t any reference to the concept of NTS issues, the document asks for strengthening bi-regional cooperation against money-laundering, other forms of crime, terrorism, corruption, fraud and tax avoidance and other methods of financial malpractice. (European Commission 2005).
In 2007, the European Commission presented the ‘Latin America: Regional Programming Document 2007-2013’ (European Commission 2007). This document also establishes a relation between insecurity and development problems in Latin America, with a strong emphasis on the negative impact of drug trafficking (“in terms of consumption, rising crime, corruption, money laundering and environmental damage that go far beyond the boundaries of the cocaine producing countries alone”). No reference is made to the concept of NTS. The Regional Programming identifies “the quest for stability and sustainable development” as one of the key areas for EU cooperation with Latin America. Challenges which are seen as crucial for the development on Latin American societies include: “trade liberalisation, security, drugs, migration, environment, energy, new technologies,” among others. The security-development nexus is presented in the following way: “In its search for sustainable development (including peace and stability) the region must try to reach greater convergence at all levels: political, economic and commercial, and systematically take account of social and environmental concerns.” The EU cooperation with Latin America on drug trafficking will be through a “balanced, integrated approach.” (European Commission 2007).

The 2009 Communication from the Commission titled ‘The European Union and Latin America: Global Players in Partnership’ (European Commission 2009) establishes a connection between organized crime and the disruption of stability, security, governance and development in Latin America. The security-development nexus is further articulated highlight the impact of crime: “Illicit drugs, human trafficking, organised crime and violence are on the rise and disrupt the stability, security, governance and development of the countries and regions affected.” According to the communication, since 2005 the context of EU-LAC partnership became “more complex” bi-regional context, and with “new global challenges” rising, it was important to device a new strategies and responses (European Commission 2009).

The Communication ‘The European Union and Latin America: Global Players in Partnership’ also proposes intensifying the bi-regional dialogue and strategic coordination to cope with global challenges (“such as macro-economic and financial issues, security and human rights, employment and social affairs, environment, climate change and energy, higher education and technology/innovation”) in a comprehensive way, including different stakeholders. The issue of migration flows is introduced as a non-security related subject: it should be approached in “an open, comprehensive and constructive way.” (European Commission 2009). Finally, this communication didn’t include the concept of NTS.

In June 2015 a document by the European Commission reflected a significant step in terms of the length and level of detail assigned to security matters in the Euro-Latin American relationship. The ‘Multiannual Indicative Regional Programme for Latin America 2014-2020’ (European Commission 2015c) is the first document that clearly includes the concept “security-development nexus” in the framework of the relationship, and the concept is introduced also as the title of a priority area for bi-regional cooperation, with the general objective of reinforcing the capacity of Latin American and Caribbean states “to effectively ensure security conditions conducive for inclusive development.”. The relation between growing crime and insecurity in the region and its impact on socio-economic conditions is articulated as follows:

“Crime rates [in Latin America and the Caribbean] are among the highest in the world. State institutions responsible for ensuring the key public goods of security, justice and rule of law are confronted in many countries with powerful and well-resourced organised crime interests (engaged in the drugs trade and other forms of trafficking), as well as high levels of regular crime. Porous borders are another serious issue. Insecurity in much of the region has important human, social and economic costs, and diminishes citizen trust in State institutions, thereby weakening the social contract which is essential for development to succeed.” (European Commission 2015c).

The Multiannual Indicative Regional Programme for Latin America 2014-2020’ identifies three specific objectives regarding the security-development nexus: (1) strengthening the rule of law, including justice and security sector reform and crime prevention policies; (2) promoting
integrated, balanced and human rights-based drug policies, including the principle of co-
responsibility; and, (3) strengthening migration management (including labour migration, 
migrants’ rights, irregular migration and linkages between migration and development). 
(European Commission 2015c). The document also presents several lines of actions and detailed 
expected results in public security, the fight against organized crime, illegal drug trafficking, the 
management of migration and borders, promotion of human rights, and elimination of gender-
related violence. As in the previous documents on the EU-LAC relationship, the concept of NTS 
is not included.

B2. Analysis of the official documents from EU-LAC/CELAC summits and meetings.

The 1999 ‘Declaration of Rio De Janeiro’ (European Parliament 1999), made during the First 
Euro-Latin American and Caribbean summit, doesn’t include a long list security-related issues. 
The document didn’t include the concepts of NTS, comprehensive approach to security, or a 
exus between security and development. References to security are made mostly in the 
framework of traditional international inter-state peace and security matters. As “threats to 
international peace and security”, the declaration includes: “weapons of mass destruction, 
including nuclear, chemical and biological weapons”; “organised transnational crime and related 
activities, such as money laundering, trafficking of women, children and migrants; the illegal 
manufacture and trade of firearms, munitions and other related materials; and “terrorism in all 
forms and manifestations.” The declaration also pledges that both region will “tackle the global 
drug problem under the principle of common and shared responsibility based on a global, 
comprehensive and balanced approach.” (European Parliament 1999).

The ‘Political Declaration: The Madrid Commitment’ (European Parliament 2002), of the Euro-
LAC summit of 2002, does not include specific sections presenting the link between security and 
development, although a clear link between crime and terrorism is presented. There is pledge to 
strength bi-regional cooperation to “combat the scourges of illicit drugs and related crimes, 
corruption and organised crime, by enhancing co-ordination mechanisms, combating the sources 
of funding of drug production and trafficking, and preventing their use in the financing of 
terrorism and criminal activities world-wide.” The declaration states that both regions “recognise 
the world-wide nature of the drug problem sustained by its economic profitability”, and “agree to 
join efforts to dismantle all its components, including: the control of demand and supply, 
precursors, drug trafficking (of all drugs including synthetic ones), money laundering, arms 
trafficking and related crimes.” (European Parliament 2002). The principles of shared 
responsibility, and comprehensive balanced approach, are introduced as cornerstones of bi-
regional cooperation in the fights against illicit drug trafficking. As in other documents on the 
EU-LAC relationship, the concept of NTS is not included here.

The 2004 ‘Declaration of Guadalajara’ (European Parliament 2004) of the LAC-EU Summit in 
Mexico includes several points in relation to security matters, although there is no reference to 
the concept of NTS. One of the first points clearly states the connection between security and 
development, by stating that “democracy, the rule of law and social and economic development 
are essential for peace and security in our regions”. Later in the declaration this idea is reinforced: 
“poverty, exclusion and inequality are an affront to human dignity”, and “they weaken democracy 
and threaten peace and stability.” Both regions condemn terrorism, and state their commitment to 
prevent, combat, sanction and eliminate it, “strictly adhering to international law and in particular 
to human rights and international humanitarian law” (European Parliament 2004).

Additionally, the ‘Declaration of Guadalajara’ emphasizes the need of further cooperation to 
address “the global problem of illicit drugs and their health consequences, as well as crimes 
related to their production and trafficking,” through “a balanced, multilateral, inclusive and non-
selective approach to this issue, based on the principles of common and shared responsibility, and 
subject to national law”. Both regions aim to “strengthen the prevention of illegal migration and 
the fight against trafficking in and smuggling of human beings.” Finally, prevention and 
mitigation of natural or manmade disasters in Latin America is introduced as a new area of 
cooperation (European Parliament 2004).
During the IV EU-LAC Summit in 2006, the ‘Declaration of Vienna. Strengthening the Bi-Regional Strategic Association’ (Council of the EU 2006) was signed. In this document, security issues do not have a very large presence (compared with the final declaration of the 2004 bi-regional summit). There is no reference to NTS issues or a comprehensive or multidimensional approach to security. However, at the beginning of the declaration there is a general reference to the security development nexus: “We strongly believe that democracy, the rule of law, the respect, promotion and protection of human rights, poverty eradication, social and economic development and respect for international law are essential for peace and security.” (Council of the EU 2006).

Regarding terrorism, ‘Declaration of Vienna’ reiterates its condemnation as well as fight against “the financing and supporting of terrorism, and the incitement of terrorist acts.” The section on “Drugs and organised crime” includes several points, and the declaration reiterates the common principle of “shared responsibility and on the basis of a global and integrated approach to the world problem of illicit drugs”, and the promotion of alternative development” for the cultivation regions. (Council of the EU 2006). Security-related issues on migration are not included in the section on organised crime, however, in the section on migration a reference is made to “strengthening the fight against the smuggling of and trafficking in human beings.” Finally, a “comprehensive dialogue on migration” is proposed to “further enhancing” cooperation “and mutual understanding of migration in all its dimensions in both regions.” (Council of the EU 2006)

In its almost sixty points, the final declaration of V Latin America And Caribbean-European Union Summit, ‘Lima Declaration: Addressing Our Peoples’ Priorities Together’ (European Parliament 2008), celebrated in Lima in 2008, includes very few references to security matters. The document doesn’t include the concept of NTS, neither the idea of comprehensive security. The declaration states that both regions “will cooperate on matters of security (inter alia, illicit drugs and weapons trafficking, organized crime and terrorism, including hostage taking).” And both regions acknowledge the relation between security and development as states need to address the impact of security issues “on democratic societies and their development”. The principle of “shared responsibility, in confronting the world drug problem” is mentioned, as well as the need to strengthen the established frameworks for the bi-regional dialogue on drugs. In the field of migration, the declaration also mention the willingness to intensify cooperation “in preventing and fighting the smuggling of migrants and trafficking in human beings, in assisting the victims, and promoting voluntary, dignified and sustainable return programmes.” (European Parliament 2008).

The ‘Madrid Declaration: Towards a new stage in the bi-regional partnership’ (Council of the EU 2010), of the VI EU-LAC Summit in 2010, didn’t include, not even in a general manner, the security-development nexus. This declaration includes in one single point a list of ten security challenges: terrorism, trans-national organized crime, corruption, illegal trafficking in arms and ammunition, the world drug problem, drugs related arms trafficking, money-laundering, trafficking in persons, especially women and children; and smuggling of migrants. Both regions reaffirm their rejection of terrorism, and reiterate their commitment to prevent, fight and eliminate terrorism and its financing, “with full respect to human rights and the rule of law and in compliance with international law.” (Council of the EU 2010).

The reference to combat trafficking in human beings, smuggling of migrants and in assisting the victims, in made under the framework of a “multidimensional approach” to migration. In the 2010 ‘Madrid Declaration’ there is a recognition that there is a growing violence related “to criminal organizations involved in the trafficking in illicit drugs”. Therefore, the declaration states the commitment to intensify bi-regional cooperation against “the world drug problem, in accordance with the principle of common and shared responsibility”, and straightening the existing LAC-EU cooperation mechanism on Drugs (Council of the EU 2010).

During the 2013 First Summit of the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) and the European Union that took place in Chile, the ‘Santiago Declaration’ was signed
(Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Chile 2013). This declaration includes several references to bi-regional efforts to increase security cooperation. There is a reiteration of their condemnation of terrorism, and their determination to combat it in all its forms and manifestations, in accordance with international law, human rights and humanitarian law. Also, there is a commitment to better address irregular migration and “to prevent and fight the smuggling of migrants and trafficking in human beings.” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Chile 2013).

The security-development nexus is included in the ‘Santiago Declaration’ as it recognizes that transnational crime “may undermine the legitimate economies and, in some cases, threaten the stability and security of States, weaken the rule of law, governance systems, national economies and their development, and human rights.” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Chile 2013). Regarding illegal drugs, the declaration proposed the possibility of adopting “measurable goals to reduce the impact of the world drug problem”, and to based bi-regional cooperation on a “comprehensive and balanced approach, to address both drug demand and drug supply reduction, under the principle of common and shared responsibility, and respect for human rights and international law.” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Chile 2013). Finally, once more there is no reference to the concept of NTS areas in the Euro-Latin American documents.

The 2015 declaration of the II EU-CELAC Summit, ‘Shaping our common future: working together for prosperous, cohesive and sustainable societies for our citizens’ (Council of the EU 2015a) includes many security-related issues, and introduces the new area of “citizen security” into the EU-CELAC Action Plan on security cooperation. However, there is no reference to the concepts of NTS issues or multidimensional security, and the concept of comprehensive is used only in the framework of the policies against drug trafficking. This declaration includes a reference to the security-development nexus by recognizing that “transnational organised criminal activities may, in some cases, threaten the stability and security of States, weaken the rule of law, governance systems, national economies and their development, and human rights.” (Council of the EU 2015a).

The section “Global challenges: shaping our common future” of the declaration of the II EU-CELAC Summit includes a condemnation of terrorism in all its forms and manifestations, and the commitment to effectively combat it, in accordance with international law. Both regions pledge to continue implementing, concrete actions, aimed at strengthening “law enforcement cooperation, mutual legal assistance, trans-border intelligence sharing, in order to dismantle criminal organizations, all within the full respect for human rights and international law.” (Council of the EU 2015a).

In the declaration of the II EU-CELAC Summit, migration is not framed as a security concern, neither management of borders. Also both regions commit themselves “to counter the Word Drug Problem and its negative effects, in all its dimensions”, on the basis of “the principle of common and shared responsibility, with a comprehensive, evidence-based, integrated, multidisciplinary and balanced approach to all aspects of the problem, including a perspective of public health.” Also, the documents states that, since “Citizen Security is a shared concern”, both regions will promote their dialogue on this subject and “explore opportunities to enhance” their cooperation, “with full respect for sovereignty and domestic legislation and according to national priorities”. Finally, the declaration states that both parties are convinced that the dialogue and cooperation to address “the world drug problem” have created solid “shared principles and supported a progressive convergence of views and practice.” (Council of the EU 2015a).

Finally, the ‘EU-CELAC Action Plan 2015-2017’ (Council of the EU 2015b) establishes a comprehensive list of objectives, activities and expected results in bi-regional security cooperation. This Action Plan doesn’t use the concepts NTS areas/issues, however, it includes the idea of a multidimensional approach in its very detailed and log approach to citizen security. The documents states that:

“i) that it [citizen security] is essential for the development of both regions and the improvement of the quality of life and the well-being of their citizens; ii) that progress in
citizen security does not stem from a single isolated policy or action, but from a multi-sector and multi-dimensional approach and a series of social and inclusive public policies including preventive measures, promotion of culture of peace and non-violence, respect, promotion, protection and fulfilment of all human rights, institutional reforms, sufficient public investment, genuine and effective participation of [multiple stakeholders], broad and sustained political will, and the adoption of more modern and effective systems of information, iii) that there is not a one-size-fits-all model in order to tackle the issue of citizen security, and iv) that the basis and the rationale of citizen security is the protection of all human beings with full respect to the dignity and fundamental rights of the individual by enabling a safe and stable social, political and economic environment at all levels, and implementing strategies in accordance with national legislation and international law while respecting the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of all States.” (Council of the EU 2015b).

Regarding migration, the ‘EU-CELAC Action Plan 2015-2017’ (Council of the EU 2015b) reiterates a comprehensive approach, and emphasizes the need to cooperate more on irregular migration flows, migrant smuggling and trafficking in persons. On drug trafficking, the document reiterates the principles of common and shared responsibility, with a comprehensive, evidence-based, integrated, multidisciplinary and balanced approach. Also, elimination of gender-based violence is identified as an objective. Finally, there is no reference to terrorism in this Action Plan.