Does participation make a difference? The transformative effects of international peacekeeping in South America and Southeast Asia

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Explanatory note to the panel members: The following is a research note that does not correspond to the abstract as submitted when preparing the panel. The original idea morphed into a bigger and slightly different project, which is described in this paper. The actual research is to be started in November this year and I welcome any suggestions in this regard. Please kindly accept my apologies for the inconvenience.
Project summary

By the 2010s many countries in the regions of South America and Southeast Asia have become significant contributors to international peacekeeping. Participation in peacekeeping operations (PKOs) was widely expected to have transformative effects on the military that would benefit the societies of the contributing states. However, we have little systematic knowledge on whether and under which conditions these transformative effects occur.

This project asks whether a country’s participation in peacekeeping changes dominant attitudes within the military in respect of two specific issue areas, civil-military and military-to-military cooperation. First, has peacekeeping led to more favourable views of civil-military cooperation within the military? Secondly, as peacekeeping brings with it a number of international education and training activities, have such increased the perceived utility of military-to-military cooperation on part of the military?

To answer these questions, I propose a comparative research design with two country studies from each region: Chile and Uruguay and Cambodia and Indonesia. These are permissive cases with favourable conditions for new attitudes to form which together provide variation on three theoretical dimensions of interest that I expect to influence the formation of new attitudes: the type of contribution and relevance peacekeeping has relative to other missions, the military’s prior existing missions and its level of professionalization. To trace the complex processes through which new attitudes are formed I combine the case study method with process analysis. Therefore, data will be collected using document analysis and three instruments that rely on the participation of members of the armed forces: interviews, surveys and focus groups. The multi-method approach will allow me to trace the processes of attitude formation that occur (or not) based on experiences from peacekeeping either through personal participation in a PKO (bottom-up) or through institutionalized learning and training (top-down).
Introduction

Since the end of the Cold War, international peacekeeping has expanded both in quantitative and in qualitative terms (Bellamy and Williams, 2010, pp. 93–103, 121–52). While the demand for peacekeepers has grown, these also perform an ever-increasing set of tasks that go well beyond peacekeeping’s traditional, generally more limited role in observing ceasefires between states (Diehl, 2008, p. 44). Today, peacekeeping activities reflect a broad security agenda with the “aim to establish liberal democratic political systems and societies within states” (NATO, 2001, p. para.0202). To meet these goals, many contemporary missions “combine robust military forces capable of limited peace enforcement tasks, should a ceasefire break down, with a strong civilian component that often includes civil administration, humanitarian agencies and police and justice officers” (Bellamy and Williams, 2010, pp. 279–80; NATO, 2001, para.0202). In the following, when I use the term peacekeeping, I refer to this kind of multi-functional mission mandated and carried out by the UN.\(^1\)

An additional dimension of the changing nature of peacekeeping since the 1990s was the continuous increase in the number of contributing countries. Today, all countries of South America and Southeast Asia, except for Suriname and Laos, have participated in at least one United Nations (UN) peacekeeping operation (PKO) with military, police and/or civilian personnel. In addition, several countries from the two regions have participated in non-UN missions such as the Military Observer Mission Ecuador-Peru (MOMEP, 1995-1999) and the Australian-led, UN-authorized International Force for East Timor (INTERFET, 1999-2000), amongst other. The reasons for why states contribute to international peacekeeping vary (Blum, 2000; Sotomayor, 2010a; Ward and Dorussen, 2016). Yet, it is nevertheless possible to identify a set of benefits peacekeeping contributors in South America and in Southeast Asia expected to gain through participation, especially those with traumatic experiences of military dictatorships. Both, countries with no prior history of international peacekeeping (e.g. Vietnam until 2014) and others with a long-standing record (such as Argentina and Indonesia) hoped that sending their troops abroad

\(^1\) There is no consistent use of terminology. In the British doctrine (HMSO, 1999, p. 1.1) and in NATO (NATO, 2014), these operations are known as peace support operations (PSOs). The same concept is found in the UN’s so-called Brahimi Report (UN, 2000), although UN missions embodying the same characteristics are often called stabilization missions.
would have transformative, including democratizing effects on their military and defence establishments (Caballero-Anthony, 2005, pp. 2, 4; Findlay, 1996, pp. 9–10; Sotomayor, 2010a). This project asks whether peacekeeping actually led to such transformative effects in selected areas and if so, under which conditions. In doing so, it follows a recent call to fill a void in the literature on military missions in regions where external security threats have played only a marginal role (Pion-Berlin, 2016, p. 21). As Pion-Berlin states, we lack “in-depth case study analysis of the military. None [of the studies surveyed] examined actual military conduct to see whether there were any contributions made to bettering the lives of citizens. Never did these studies analyse specific military missions […] to discover whether there may have been real and perceived benefits to military action” (Pion-Berlin, 2016, p. 21).

What were the benefits South American and Southeast Asian governments hoped to obtain through participation in international peacekeeping? This project focuses exclusively on peacekeeping’s transformative effects on the military, leaving aside the contribution peacekeeping can make to improve military-society relations (Cutillo, 2013, p. 7) and to broader foreign policy and security objectives (see Bellamy and Williams, 2012, pp. 3–5). Specifically, I am interested in changes in attitudes within the military with implications for both domestic and foreign policy, as these were widely expected to result from peacekeeping in South America and in Southeast Asia. Following the definition from social psychology, attitudes describe the mind's predisposition to certain principles, institutions, values, peoples and systems; they are a way of applying prior knowledge and beliefs to objects and situations an individual is confronted with (Hogg and Vaughan, 2011, p. 150). For each, the domestic and foreign policy field, I will examine attitudes in one specific issue area: civil-military interoperability and military-to-military relations.

First, regarding domestic political objectives, PKOs were seen by many governments as a welcomed opportunity to enhance civil-military interoperability. The importance the UN has ascribed to functional cooperation between the military and civilian agencies, including humanitarian ones, has steadily increased since the 1990s and is reflected in a series of policy guidelines that culminated in the 2013 Policy on Integrated Assessment and Planning (UN, 2013). In the domestic context, the competence for and appreciation of civil-military interoperability on part of the military is desirable because it is central to a number of contemporary military
missions such as disaster relief, public benefits enhancement, rescue and social programs (Kraisoraphong and Howe, 2014, p. 243). Combined with the financial incentives UN PKOs provide to comply with international standards, the general expectation was that international missions result in increasingly greater interoperability.

In addition, there were other benefits governments associated loosely or directly with the enhancement of civil-military interoperability. Through working hand in hand with civilian partners and engaging directly with civilian populations, the military supposedly learned adherence to liberal democratic principles such as respect for civilian leadership and human rights, which was especially relevant to those countries where the military had a history of intervening in politics (Diamint, 2010, p. 670; Findlay, 1996, p. 10; Kathman and Melin, 2016). Thus, civilian participation would render the armed forces more democratic, liberal and civilianized (Moskos, 2000).

Second, with regards to foreign policy, participation in PKOs was seen as a form of international defence diplomacy that would contribute to better relations with other countries (Caballero-Anthony, 2005; Capie, 2015, pp. 122–3; Kenkel, 2010). Accordingly, peacekeeping, often couched in terms of solidarity in the ‘Global South’, would lead to similar knowledge and create contacts between security personnel that outlast a specific mission.

However, whether peacekeeping actually yielded all or some of these effects is far from clear. The UN, like other institutions that carry out PKOs (the European Union, the African Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO]), continue to highlight obstacles to successful civil-military cooperation. In Thailand, the military’s commitment to peacekeeping in East Timor (1999-2004) led observers to believe the military had “submitted to civilian control an [sic] non-interference in domestic governance in line with international norms” (Kraisoraphong and Howe, 2014, p. 247). In 2006, however, within two years after the mission had ended, the Army staged a coup. True, some Southeast Asian and most Latin American countries underwent democratic transitions and successfully increased control over their armed forces. Yet, whether this was a result of PKOs distracting and socializing the military is debatable.

Conversations with several researchers at the Asia-Pacific Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, University of Queensland, April and May 2017.
The military is a conservative institution generally resistant to change and reforms. Indonesia, for example, the largest contributor from Southeast Asia to UN peacekeeping, has a long history of participation dating back to the early observer missions in the 1950s. Yet, as one analyst observed, “the history of independent Indonesia is full of civil-military conflict and domestic political struggles illustrating potential contradictions with its external image projection and domestic realities” (Cook, 2014, p. 155). Have these contradictions been reduced in recent times, and if so, what were the conditions facilitating military change?

The available evidence suggests that participation in PKOs yields divergent effects with regards to the expected changes mentioned above. For example, one study on US Marines finds that deployments abroad did not by themselves further the cross-cultural skills required for successful defence diplomacy (Holmes-Eber, Tarzi, and Maki, 2016). Examining the effect of peacekeeping on civil-military relations in South America, Sotomayor concludes that participation increased rather than decreased differences in civil-military relations between countries (Sotomayor, 2010b). This is perhaps little surprising considering that training and preparation for peacekeepers is the sole responsibility of the sending country, with the UN offering only a limited set of mandatory, mainly online-based courses in ethics and safety (see UN, 2017a).

While it is plausible to assume that peacekeeping may simply fail to have an effect in some cases, there is evidence also for counter-productive results. (Ruffa, Dandeker, and Vennesson, 2013) suggest that the type of complex mission that is now common in UN peacekeeping raises the profile of soldiers at the tactical level, thus politicizing civil-military relations with potentially negative implications for the military’s coordination with civilian agencies. Furthermore, countries with a track-record of the military meddling in politics face a paradox that is often overlooked. Most contemporary missions are mandated to pursue “internal enemies, with the justification of bringing peace, which leads the armed forces to return to the role of society’s guardians”, precisely what participation in PKOs abroad often sought to avoid (Diamint, 2014, p. 104). Other negative consequences with immediate implications that are worse still stemmed from peacekeepers’ involvement in sexual exploitation and abuse, an experience that is certainly counterproductive to favourable

To the best of my knowledge, the question under which conditions the positive-transformation thesis holds has not received systematic attention. A recent review of the peacekeeping literature concluded that the rapidly growing field has seen “increased attention to the local dimensions” of PKOs (Paris, 2014, p. 501) to the detriment of what we know about the broader patterns of peacekeeping and its implications for the actors carrying out the task.

Theoretical and conceptual framework

To increase our understanding of the transformative effects participation in international PKOs yields on the military, this project proposes a comprehensive, comparative study that focuses on changes in military attitudes. In doing so, it goes beyond studies such as (Albrecht and Haenlein, 2015) who demonstrate how PKOs can update the military’s operational capacity through the accumulation of experience and training. Such practical knowledge is relevant for the governments and citizens of contributing countries as it affects the performance of the military in other missions. Yet, whether the military will turn into a long-term advocate for keeping and upgrading its newly acquired capacity will depend on the prevailing attitude, a relatively stable organization of beliefs, feelings and behavioural tendencies towards an object that carries an inherent evaluative component (Eagly and Chaiken, 1993, p. 1). Attitudes are relevant because they guide the behaviour of individual officers and soldiers (Eagly and Chaiken, 1993, 1998; Stone and Cooper, 2001) and influence the deep beliefs underpinning a country’s strategic culture (on the role of attitudes in strategic culture Johnston, 1995, p. 52; Kier, 1997; on the relation between attitudes and beliefs see Marsh and Wallace, 2005). Therefore, in this research I focus on whether and how new knowledge contributes to changing existing attitudes within the military. In the formation of new attitudes, the role played by new experiences (a country’s participation in PKOs, for that matter) and the knowledge acquired through these is illustrated in Figure 1.
New attitudes are formed based on prior knowledge and new external information. There are two ways through which existing knowledge is “updated” by the incorporation of new information (O’Toole and Talbot, 2011, p. 55). First, for the purpose of this research, bottom-up learning refers to the learning of individuals through actual participation in a PKO on the ground. However, not all individuals in the military participate in PKOs. They may still acquire new attitudes through a second, top-down process if they are exposed to education and training; in other words, if new knowledge on the military’s peacekeeping mission has become institutionalized. For Haas (1990, pp. 17–49), this latter process requires a higher-order form of “theoretical” knowledge that is less context-specific and concerns concepts and ideas in connection to each other rather than technical details. Thus, new knowledge carries over into the post-deployment period, “modifying the organization’s […] sense-making constructs in a significant way” (Catignani, 2014, p. 37).

Since our knowledge of the transformative effects of peacekeeping on the military is limited, this study will include cases from different political environments and geographical regions to provide a comprehensive analysis of whether and when changes in attitudes occur. Although there is a rich literature on organizational learning and military innovation (see Grissom, 2006), given peacekeeping’s distinct nature as compared to the military’s traditional role in security and defence and the multinational setting in which it takes place, it is necessary to cover an exhaustive variety of experiences.
The cases include in total four countries from South America and Southeast Asia (Cambodia, Chile, Indonesia, Uruguay; see the section on methodology below). Both regions, particularly Southeast Asia, are underrepresented in the study of peacekeeping although in line with the global trend, both have seen a significant increase in contributions from the 1990s on and again in the 2000s. Albeit to different degrees, the two regions have been affected by the third wave of democratization that redefined military missions to the effect that many countries are still in a transition or consolidation phase regarding their security and defence establishments. This condition implies a bias towards greater permeability for new knowledge that should favour changes in attitudes, which suits the objective of this study to map the mechanisms and permissive conditions under which such changes take place.

Broadening the range of cases and thus the number of explanatory factors requires a narrowly defined objective (explanandum) as otherwise a large number of independent variables stands against an equally large number of dependent variables with no means to assess what brings the latter into being. Therefore, amongst the different effects that have been expected to result from participating in PKOs, I focus on two aspects of what Rubinstein et. al. (2008) summarized under the term horizontal interoperability: civil-military and military-to-military. While civil-military interoperability is an inherent requirement of PKOs, different militaries do not work together on the ground on a day-to-day basis. Contact between the armed forces takes place mainly through activities aimed at training future peacekeepers and exchanging information and best practice. Both in South America and in Southeast Asia, several regional organizations established such cooperation schemes.

The chosen cases are similar in two conditions that define the general background against which new attitudes regarding civil-military and military-to-military cooperation, respectively, can emerge. First, the level of civil-military interoperability all four militaries are exposed to in the complex PKOs this research is concerned with, is higher than in most of their other missions. Therefore, it can generally be expected that participation in peacekeeping leads to greater familiarity and in consequence to greater appreciation of the civil-military model, at the very least with regards to specific PKOs. To call it a transformative effect, however, the same favourable

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3 On South America see Mares and Martínez (2014). The third wave affected fewer countries in Southeast Asia, where in some cases a reverse trend has set in Mietzner (2011).
attitude would need to become detached from its specific context and turn into a mind-set applicable to other missions as well.

With regards to the second issue area of interest, military-to-military cooperation, the cases are similar in that none of the four countries has treaty allies but their militaries all undertake a range of different activities with other militaries from their respective regions and internationally (primarily with the United States). Thus, it has generally been expected that an increase in such cooperation initiatives through new activities in the area of peacekeeping further increases the mission-specific and general value attached to military-to-military cooperation.

Although attitudes vary across the chosen cases, their respective value in comparison to each other is of lesser concern to the question at hand. Put differently, I do not compare the prevailing attitudes in country A at point $t_0$ in time to attitudes in country B at $t_0$. Rather, I am interested in comparing the magnitude of relative changes across the different cases. As a consequence from participating in PKOs, have new attitudes formed in country A? Has the same change occurred in country B, to a comparable extent? Based on the process of attitude formation in Figure 1, I expect that the formation of new attitudes and the magnitude of change depend on three sets of factors (see Table 1 and the section on Methodology below).

First, the type of information against which new attitudes are formed will depend on a state’s contribution to a particular PKO and peacekeeping in general. Peacekeeping is but one of the military’s missions, and only in Uruguay can it be considered to be a primary mission. Although a certain threshold in the quantity of personnel exposed to personal and institutionalized learning is necessary to propel changes at the level of the military as an institution, individuals distinguished by their rank or standing can make a disproportionate contribution if they enjoy authority within the military. Second, old attitudes towards and prior knowledge about civil-military and military-to-military cooperation will be greatly influenced by the military’s prior missions. Militaries are reluctant to take on new tasks that are incompatible with their competences, organizational strength and more generally with their military culture (Jaskoski, 2013; Pion-Berlin, 2016). Thus, the armed forces are unlikely to embrace new elements without, at the very least, some level of suspicion and resistance (Tardy, 2014). Thirdly, both prior knowledge and the possibilities of institutionalized learning will depend on the military’s level of professionalization. I rely on Huntington’s
classical definition of military professionalism that comprises expertise, responsibility and corporateness (Huntington, 1957; for an operationalization thereof see Sirivunnabood and Ricks, 2016). Unlike Huntington, however, I allow for variation between the different branches of the military as the level of professionalism in each is seldom the same.

Table 1. Preliminary overview of the conditions expected to influence the process of attitude formation per country.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Generally less present in missions other than peacekeeping</th>
<th>Existing ties with regional and global partners</th>
<th>Type of contribution/mission relevance</th>
<th>Prior missions</th>
<th>Level of professionalization (overall)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Secondary mission of growing importance: mainly expert units</td>
<td>Mainly internal, including guerrilla war</td>
<td>low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Secondary mission</td>
<td>External and internal</td>
<td>high</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Important, although not primary mission</td>
<td>Mainly internal</td>
<td>Medium-low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uruguay</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Main mission</td>
<td>Mainly external</td>
<td>high</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The chosen case studies provide sufficient variation in these three sets of factors to capture different experiences of attitude formation within the military, successful and unsuccessful. It is likely that not all factors are equally relevant to all cases with some conditions being fundamental in one country/mission but irrelevant in others. In order to adequately address the complexity of the process bringing about durable changes in the military’s attitudes towards civil-military interoperability and military-to-military cooperation, I will employ different data-collection techniques including interviews, surveys and focus groups, where possible (see the section on methodology below). To the best of my knowledge, this is the first study employing these methods to answer the question at hand in a systematic manner.

**Hypotheses**

Does participation in peacekeeping operations yield transformative effects on the military? In particular, does peacekeeping change the military’s attitudes towards cooperation with civilian agencies and towards cooperation with other militaries? In order to answer these questions, the research is guided by a set of general and specific hypotheses that will be further refined as the research progresses.
Given that not all new experiences lead to the formation of new attitudes, why should we expect that a country’s participation in peacekeeping operations does? First, it is worth noting the relevance peacekeeping has acquired as it has become an important mission for nearly all militaries in South America and Southeast Asia. To be sure, the military’s attitudes on horizontal interoperability are shaped by a variety of experiences, yet the methodology described below is well suited if not to isolate, then at least to capture the specific effect of peacekeeping. Secondly, peacekeeping is a generally different experience as compared to other missions and is therefore likely to alter the configuration of facts, knowledge and beliefs that underpin attitudes. In particular, the military’s external mission of national defence differs from peacekeeping’s basic principles, the so-called holy trinity, which continues to define contemporary peacekeeping mandates (Bellamy and Williams, 2010, p. 190): consent, impartiality and minimum force. Thus, unlike in strictly national missions, peacekeepers’ home countries have in principle no stake in the conflict where they deploy. Second, there is no designated enemy; third, peacekeepers do not aim at military victory but have a range of mission goals including the protection of human rights; and fourth, in the pursuit of these goals peacekeepers interact with numerous civilian agencies and actors. Therefore, I hypothesise that:

H1: Participation in PKOs affects how members of the armed forces individually and collectively perceive and evaluate their professional roles depending on the type of a country’s contribution, the military’s prior missions and its level of professionalization.

Specifically:

H2: Through participation in PKOs the military will develop more favourable views towards enhanced cooperation with civilian partners. These comprise humanitarian agencies and political, diplomatic and administrative bodies who operate within or on the fringes of missions. Changes towards more favourable views will be observable through institutional change and/or through self-reporting by members of the armed forces.
a. The military will develop more favourable attitudes towards working with civilian partners the more individuals are exposed to personal or institutionalized learning.

b. The military will develop more favourable attitudes towards working with civilian partners if the individuals exposed to personal learning have a special standing within the armed forces.

c. The military will develop more favourable attitudes towards working with civilian partners if the requirement of civil-military interoperability is compatible, that is, has already been part of, the military’s prior missions.

d. A lack of institutionalized learning as a result of low levels of professionalization hinders the formation of new attitudes towards civil-military cooperation.

e. Alternatively, the contrast between a low level of professionalization and the requirements of civil-military cooperation in PKOs accelerates the formation of new attitudes.

H3: Through participation in PKOs the military will develop more favourable views about the utility of military-to-military cooperation.

a. The military will develop more favourable attitudes towards military-to-military cooperation the more individuals are exposed to personal or institutionalized learning.

b. The military will develop more favourable attitudes towards military-to-military cooperation if the individuals exposed to personal learning have a special standing within the armed forces.

c. The military will develop more favourable attitudes towards military-to-military cooperation through cooperating with a counterpart that has the same or a relatively higher level of professionalization.

Methodology

A mainly qualitative research strategy is best suited for the goals described above. Detailed information is necessary to establish causality between new attitudes and
participation in peacekeeping and to separate peacekeeping’s effects from those of other experiences. To reach both breadth in the experiences and depth in understanding the constellation of factors leading to changes in attitudes, I selected two countries from each South America and Southeast Asia: Chile, Uruguay, Cambodia and Indonesia. For each, this project analyses participation in UN peacekeeping missions that are generally referred to as peace support missions, missions with a broad mandate “designed to create a secure environment in which civilian agencies can rebuild the infrastructure necessary to create self-sustaining peace” (NATO, 2001, para. 0203; see also footnote 1 above). From these missions, I am interested in those where a country made significant contributions of several hundreds of persons or smaller contributions of several dozen, if these formed a specialized team or unit. Including more than one mission per military creates within-cases that multiply the number of explanatory factors to the effect that the robustness of the findings can be increased. The selected missions are listed in Table 2.

Table 2. Missions of primary interest for participatory research methods.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Mission(s)</th>
<th>Participation</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>UNMISS (South Sudan)</td>
<td>2012 – 2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MINUSMA (Mali)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>MINUSTAH (Haiti)</td>
<td>2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>UNAMID (Sudan)</td>
<td>2008 – 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MONUSCO (Dem. Rep. of Congo)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uruguay</td>
<td>MINUSTAH (Haiti)</td>
<td>2004 – 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MONUSCO (Dem. Rep. of Congo)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Researching cases from South America and Southeast Asia has several methodological advantages. Both are regions of small and middle powers that contribute mainly with troops rather than money to international peacekeeping (UN, 2017b, 2017c). Each has developed regional security organizations but no regional peacekeeping force.⁴ Therefore, although some mechanisms exist to share experiences (Capie, 2015; Kenkel, 2010), their governance structures are far less determining than Europe’s, for instance, where supposed learning and socialization effects are likely to stem from multiple institutions including the EU and NATO. In most countries in the two regions, the military has undergone major reforms in the past two decades, which

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⁴ Note that Argentine and Chile created the Combined Peacekeeping Force of Cruz del Sur in 2006 to be deployed under the UN Stand-by Arrangements System (UNSAS). To date, however, Cruz del Sur has not been deployed.
should render the prevailing attitudes in the armed forces more permeable for new influences. The cross-regional design has another added benefit with regards to the issue area of military-to-military cooperation (H3), as it provides a control for existing regional security cooperation especially in the area of peacekeeping.

Having taken into account practical considerations such as access and researcher familiarity, the cases were selected based on two sets of criteria. First was their status as permissive cases, meaning that their scope conditions indicate that new attitudes are likely to form. This methodology is suitable to phenomena where little is known about, such as in the case at hand. This selection strategy has the disadvantage that the findings cannot be generalized to lesser permissive cases if the research supports the argument that under the given conditions new attitudes formed. However, if the results show that participation in peacekeeping had no or very little transformative effect, we can fairly surely conclude that this holds for other, similar cases of countries in the two regions and possibly beyond. What renders the cases permissive for new attitudes to emerge, on the one hand, is the fact that all are amongst the most significant contributors to peacekeeping within their regions (Capie, 2015, pp. 114, 118; Kenkel, 2013). Moreover, all have seen substantive transformations of the military in recent times. Importantly, however, none of them is in the midst of such transformations, which would render attitudes likely too fluid to capture.

The second criterion was the aim to achieve variation on the theoretical dimensions of interest (see Table 1), the general ones of which I will broadly sketch. As for individual and institutionalized learning, I expect the greatest potential for learning in Uruguay, followed by Indonesia, since these have a longer and more expansive experience in peacekeeping as compared to Chile and Cambodia. With regards to the military’s predisposition to civil-military cooperation, the possibilities for peacekeeping to change prevailing attitudes should vary according to different sets of prior missions across the four cases. The Uruguayan military is the one with the strongest external orientation (external defence requires no civilian partners), with the other three cases differing substantially in the type of their internal missions and the cooperation with civilians each of these has implied. Lastly, the Royal Cambodian Armed Forces (RCAF) are, on the aggregate level, the least professionalized although important exceptions exist within RCAF, and these units have so far been those most

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5 This is not to be confused with most-likely cases (Bennett, 2004, p. 29).
frequently deployed in PKOs. The Indonesian military (TNI) occupies a middle ground before Uruguay and Chile, which have comparatively more professionalized militaries. Differences within each military will need to be further specified as the research progresses.

The resulting research design, although not perfectly controlled, allows matching findings from the individual countries and within-cases to control for at least a number of crucial explanatory variables. Thus, it will be possible to develop an explanation under which conditions the military acquires new attitudes through its mission of international peacekeeping.

Data collection and analysis

Assessing attitudes is one of the main branches of social sciences research and yet there is no consensus on how to do it (Kapiszewski, MacLean, and Read, 2015, pp. 266–7). For the purpose of this research, I take an interpretative approach to studying changes in attitudes that takes into account military elites, lower-ranking officers and soldiers and the institutional contexts in which they operate. The beginning of the study period will vary across countries depending on the timing of domestic military reforms and the moment when countries began to send significant numbers of peacekeepers abroad. Since assessing attitudes at $t_0$ is difficult to achieve in retrospect, I will work backwards from $t_i$ by tracing prevailing attitudes through one or several moments $t_{0-}$ in time. (Alternatively, there might be no change in attitudes between $t_0$ and $t_i$.) I will do so by identifying crucial events, experiences or institutional changes that are directly linked to how the military individually and collectively came to view civil-military and military-to-military cooperation. It is likely that the different methods of data collection will yield different results; for instance, specific circumstances on the ground motivate a new policy strategy on civil-military cooperation, but peacekeepers attach no importance to these circumstances and the new policy strategy. Therefore, it will be important to carefully corroborate and contrast the respective results, for which I will employ a technique of process analysis described below.

To collect the necessary information, I will combine four methods to the extent that this is possible: review of documents and policy-papers, interviews (H2, H2b, H2c,
H2e, H3, H3b, H3c), surveys (H2, H2c, H3, H3a, H3c) and focus groups (H2, H2b, H2c, H2e, H3, H3b; H3c).

The detailed possibilities for surveys and focus groups are yet to be defined, although according to preliminary consultations with researchers knowledgeable about the military in all four countries and with the Centre for Peacekeeping Operations (CECOPAC) in Chile, it will be possible in principle to administer them. Both instruments are commonly used in multi-method designs as a powerful tool to corroborate and triangulate information (Bloor, 2001, p. 12) and have proven to yield robust insights into military culture and military learning (Ben-Ari and Elron, 2001; Holmes-Eber et al., 2016; O’Toole and Talbot, 2011). In the highly unlikely event that it will not be possible to carry out surveys and/or focus groups in one country, the research will rely on a large number of individual interviews. Given the scarcity of similar studies, these in themselves would constitute valuable new data.

**Review of documents:** The basis for each of the country studies will be an analysis of relevant policies, reports from the respective governments, UN agencies and NGOs, and internal military documents such as Rules of Engagement (RoE), Standard Operation Procedures (SOPs), after action reviews, debriefings and proposed operational requirements (POR) from peacekeeping missions. As access to such will likely be restricted and to contextualise changes in how the military assesses, plans and implements civil-military cooperation and military-to-military cooperation, I will use complementary participatory methods.

**Interviews:** Interviews will be conducted mostly, but not exclusively with elites (at least 15 per country). Elites are broadly defined (Meuser and Nagel, 1991) to include persons with responsibilities in the process of planning and/or implementing policies on civil-military and military-to-military cooperation as well as persons with privileged access to information on these decision-making processes and the individuals involved. Following previous experience with interviewing military leaders in South America and Southeast Asia (Jenne, 2016), I will write transcripts after the interviews that will be processed with NVivo software to help analyse the interviews according to dominant codes and categories. The information obtained in the interviews will be used for different purposes in the research process: to inform
the questions for the surveys and focus groups; to interpret their results; and to establish causal attributions in the process of attitude formation.

**Surveys**: More learning opportunities in civil-military and military-to-military cooperation do not necessarily mean more favourable attitudes. Surveys are the primary tool to assess attitudes but require considerable preparation and “localized” information to which the survey questions can be linked. Therefore, surveys will be conducted once the basic elements of the research design will have been further refined. Both the Ministries of Defence and the peacekeeping centres in each country will be asked to cooperate in the task of sampling and organizing the surveys. To carry these out, I will rely on local research assistants.

Depending on the possibilities in each country, I will do panel surveys with members of the armed forces before and after deployment (usually six months). Alternatively, surveys will be conducted with persons with and without personal peacekeeping experience. Sample size and the data gathering mode (in presence, web-based questionnaires, e-mails) will be decided accordingly based on Fowler (2014, pp. 63–71). Even if these vary across different countries, the breadth of information achieved through the multi-method design will help ensuring a level of comparability.

**Focus groups**: In each country, I plan doing a small number of four to five focus groups assisted by a local assistant moderator, each consisting of six to eight persons organized according to rank and unit in order to facilitate openness. The sampling will depend on the specific possibilities. Focus groups give researchers privileged access to in-group conversations that generate information on collective views while, at the same time, capturing points of disagreement within the group (Kapiszewski et al., 2015, p. 202). The set of questions will revolve around significant experiences in civil-military and military-to-military cooperation in the area of peacekeeping, for instance from internal audit processes or training. This will allow knowing what situations the groups think of when they talk about cooperation, the meanings they attach to certain events and how these are normatively assessed (Bloor, 2001, p. 4). Thus, the findings will provide complementary and corroborative information to assess, for instance, whether a change in attitude occurred in fact due to peacekeeping.
Method of inference: process analysis

The project combines the comparative method with process analysis in order to handle a large number of factors that influence the process of attitude formation (Hall, 2006). Based on the theoretical propositions described above, I will build theory-oriented narratives for each case (Bates et.al. 1998). In various iterations, these narratives will systematically deal with alternative arguments until the collected data are systematized into an internally consistent set of information.

Expected contribution

The results will add to the existing literature in three ways. On the one hand, the study is novel in so far as its cross-regional character will produce more robust conclusions than the bulk of mission-specific or individual country studies allow drawing. In this way, secondly, it addresses issues of growing importance in the area of peacekeeping as contributions have come increasingly from the global south. Lastly, the project will produce new data from two regions that have received less attention in the literature on peacekeeping than Africa or Europe. The results are relevant to all countries that destine resources to maintain a military that has the capacity to participate in international peacekeeping operations (PKOs). Besides the commendable contribution peacekeeping can make in the host country, it is at least equally important to ask what implications it yields for the contributing militaries and their role in national security and defence.
Bibliography


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