The Impact of Culture on Perceptual and Communication Processes in International Relations

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Introduction

This paper investigates the role of culture in international relations through consideration of two guiding research questions:

Primarily, in what ways do identity, values, and the epistemological and ontological differences converge to influence perceptual and interactional processes in international relations? Secondarily, what tools exist to avoid unnecessary conflict at this nexus?

It will not be possible, in this paper to address the entirety of these questions, and analysis will instead focus on a small portion of the first question: *In what ways do cultural values influence perceptual and international processes in international relations?* However, others have already begun to pave this path.

Hopf (2002), for example, noted that he intended to “find state identity and international political effects” at the level of domestic society, “not at the level of interaction among the states themselves” (xiv). Thus domesticizing constructivism, Hopf focuses on establishing the domestic identity of the Self before he explores “how these identities of the Self might affect the identities of Others in international affairs” (xiv). In exploring the connection between his work and international relations, Hopf’s analysis of neo-realism and constructivism finds both wanting. While neoclassical realism introduces some of the missing features from neorealism, state identity does not feature in that model (and Hopf is not cited) (Ripsman, Taliaferro, and Lobell 2016).

Both Katzenstein’s (1996) volume and Hopf and Allan’s (2016) volume explicitly tie identity to international relations, but neither of these volumes appear to address the perceptual interactional effects of identity in the intersubjective interactional space. Yet such a move seems warranted if identities “are prescriptive representations of political actors themselves and of their relationships to each other” (Kowart and Legro 1996, 453). If this is
so, and if some norms regulate morality, some norms prescribe accepted practice, and other norms regulate the character (identity) of actors (452), then these interrelated concepts potentially have significant influence on the intersubjective perceptual and interactional space between states.

Such is the argument of Friedrichs (2016), who proposes an *intercultural theory of international relations*. Friedrichs’s theory focuses narrowly on just one such type of norm structure, which is the self-perception related to self-worth as conceptualized through either dignity or shame and honor norms. While Friedrichs does explore what happens when dignity culture states and honor/face culture states interact with one another – a situation that he suggests suffers from serious intercultural problems.

Friedrichs (2016) clearly articulates that one of the main challenges is that diplomats lack the ability to shift their cognitive frames of reference. Indeed, even when diplomats understand that there might be a difference between their sense of worth (dignity-based) and that of their interactional partners (honor/face-based) Friedrichs suggests they do not fully comprehend the depth of difference between the views. If such is the case, then simply knowing this trait-oriented information (Putz, Schmitz, and Walch 2014) does little to facilitate positive intercultural (and thereby international) relations (IR).

Such a situation might lead an international relations scholar to imagine that cultural identity analysis ultimately yields little actionable information for IR. However, a whole literature of what happens in that perceptual interactional space has already been developed. Two important contributors to this literature are Ting-Toomey (1999) and Bennett (1986, 1998, 2013a). Ting-Toomey specifically advances an identity-negotiation theory of intercultural relations, which clearly has relevance for this study. However, it is Bennett who
identifies the key problem that Friedrichs pointed to but could not address: the issue of the ability to engage in adaptive intercultural frame-shifting. This capacity is built on radical (M. J. Bennett 2013a) and cybernetic (Hammer, Bennett, and Wiseman 2003) constructivism, the capacity to navigate embodied ethnocentrism (M. J. Bennett and Castiglioni 2004), and empathy (Hammer, Bennett, and Wiseman 2003), and has been explored by this author before (Jones 2015, unpublished). Moreover, this theory has already been operationalized as an empirically testable one at both the individual and group/organizational level (Michael Paige et al. 2003; Hammer, Bennett, and Wiseman 2003; M. J. Bennett 2007; Hammer 2009b, 2011, 2012).

The exploration of the intersection between intercultural competence and international relations is far from new (Casmir 1978; Iriye 1979). While the study has received occasional treatments (Cohen 1991; Slavik 2004), it appears that Friedrichs (2016) is the first to advance an intercultural theory of international relations. Many possible research questions accompany the advent of this attempt to generate a new theory:

1. What are the cultural ways in which states can vary, and which of these matter most to IR?
2. Does cultural analysis in IR risk the creation of reified, essentialized types?
3. How can cultural analysis in IR be used to advance accurate communication processes without resorting to essentialized types?
4. How deep are the cultural differences between states? That is, do they include differences at the epistemological (as anticipated by Cross (2008, 2013)) and ontological levels (as in Condon and Yousof 1974 and Hiebert (2008)), or does the international society (Bull 1977) or international system (Waltz 1979) socialize states to shed disruptively different epistemologies and ontologies?
5. If epistemological and ontological differences are present, how (if at all) do FPEs understand these deeply different systems of adversaries (and allies)?
6. Is constructivist adaptive cognitive frameshifting (as in Bennett 1986) used to navigate cultural differences in diplomacy?
7. Is constructivist adaptive cognitive frameshifting (as in Bennett 1986) a practically or theoretically useful tool for IR?
There are examples in the literature to indicate that the types of differences indicated here may in fact been influencing international relations. Art shares one such example related to North Korea and the USS Pueblo in 1968.

There was only one thing that secured the crew’s release [from North Korea]: the public humiliation of the United States. If nothing but humiliation worked, it is reasonable to conclude that humiliation either was, or more likely, quickly became North Korea’s goal. When an adversary is firmly fixed on humiliation, military posturing, economic bribes, diplomatic pressure, economic threats, or any other tool used in moderation is not likely to succeed. (Art 2015, 10)

However, not all theorists are convinced that such a pursuit is necessary. Waltz for example suggests that issues of perceptual difference are not particularly important in a nuclear age:

One of the drawbacks of the ‘theory’ of destruction, according to Henry Kissinger, was that ‘the Soviets did not believe it.’ The efficacy of nuclear deterrence, however, does not depend on anyone’s accepting it. Secretaries of Defense nevertheless continue to worry that Soviet values, perceptions, and calculations may be different from ours. (Waltz 2015, 91)

While Waltz acknowledges that “the varied qualities of governments and the temperaments of leaders have to be carefully weighted” in an arena of conventional force, he also argues that in the face of second-strike nuclear capacity “any state will be deterred.” One wonders though whether extremist ideology (as in Aslan’s How to Win a Cosmic War (2009)) offers a counterpoint. If such is the case, then certainly the capacity to frame shift so as to better understand one’s enemies is a skill that is more, not less, needed.

On what then, can the present paper focus to provide an incremental increase to the knowledge in the intersection of culture and international relations? Of the questions listed above, perhaps the most important to establish is number four: how deep are the differences between states? This paper will address this question through a 1) a comparative cultural
study of a dyad of great powers (cultural values orientations),¹ and 2) analysis of one or more diplomatic interchanges between those states to view explore whether any differences addressed in item one affected those interactions.

This is a theory-before research-(deductive) paper. Thus the hypotheses (nullled a la Popper (1963)) may be stated as follows, in two steps:

Step 1:

H₁ The states are culturally different in terms of values-orientations.
H₁₀ The states are not culturally different in terms of values-orientations.

Step 2 is only undertaken if H₁₀ is rejected.

Step 2:

H₂ The difference in cultural values orientations identified in step 1 influences the dyadic relationship between the two states.

The procedures used to investigate these steps are too detailed to cover in the introduction, though it may interest the reader that process tracing is used for Step 2 (hence the lack of a null). A thorough description of the methods is available in the Methodology sections. First though, the Literature review addresses the study of culture, types of cultural variance, the intercultural communication process (briefly), and culture and international relations.

¹ The paper should be extended at a later date to include values, ontologies and epistemologies, interactional frameworks, identities and histories.
Literature Review

The Study of Culture

Defining and studying culture is a complex undertaking. The concept is attended by a number of difficulties (Avruch 1998, 6), ranging from definition to application. The present paper does not involve a deep apologetic for any of these issues or the positions taken on them, but instead offers a brief overview of five important factors in the study of culture. First, culture is defined. Second, principles for studying culture are elucidated. Third, fourth, and fifth, respectively, are interactional, values, and beliefs frameworks, which form three of the major elements of cultural study as understood in this paper. Fifth, these frameworks are followed by identity models. Sixth and finally, a consideration of the application of the construct of culture at the national level is undertaken.

Following this explication of the study of culture, the literature review turns to the topic of culture and international relations. This literature review should be understood as illustrative but by no means comprehensive.

Defining Culture

Culture is certainly a complex and contested term, with a complex history (Shweder 2000). The application of culture in developmentalist terms is associated, for example, with the perspective that some cultural systems are “relatively devoid of truth, goodness, beauty, or practical efficiency,” trapping people in “error, ignorance, bad habits, immorality, and squalor” (160). Such a perspective on culture (which Shweder himself rejects) has been used to explain failures of development, or even to suggest that cultural change is the primary change needed in order for development to be accomplished (as noted by Valenzuela and Valenzuela 1978; Inglehart and Welzel 2005 have a complicated relationship to this claim).
As with other concepts addressed in this paper, the definition of culture is far from neutral, and may be used as a tool of power (Moon 2008). If for example, culture is conceptualized as existing only at the level of the nation-state, a move that Condon and Yousef (1975) reject, then subcultures including gender and social class may be overlooked, which may reinforce the power of hegemonic actors. Avruch (1998) suggests several problems with inadequate attempts to define culture, as well as a potential solution, but he notes that even the solution has limitations (Table 1).

Furthermore, which level of analysis is selected for examining culture is not neutral, the conflation of individuals or groups with institutional culture may not only result in reification, but may do so in such a way that enables disenfranchisement of non-dominant actors (M. J. Bennett 2013a). Culture may be understood at least at the levels of regional society, national, corporation or organization, and department within organizations (Trompenaars 1994).

Geertz suggests that culture is the semiotic web of meaning spun by people and ultimately defines culture as:

an historically transmitted pattern of meanings embodied in symbols, a system of inherited conceptions expressed in symbolic forms by means of which men [sic] communicate, perpetuate, and develop their knowledge about and attitudes toward life. (Geertz 1977, 89)

While Geertz suggests that words such as meaning, symbols, and conception need explanation, it is actually perhaps his use of the word “inherited” that requires clarification. Geertz clarifies (Ch. 3) that the modes of thinking that humans are able to accomplish are largely accessible due to social processes after birth, rather than due to genetic inheritance. Bennett (2013a) also addresses this tension:

While one is born into a cultural system, that system only exists because the previous generation kept on constructing reality more or less in the way they were socialized.
And the system will continue to exist insofar as the new members (elements) in the system enact the roles and rules of the system. (Bennett 2013a 8-9)

Table 1. (Author). Inadequate and adequate views and definitions of culture according to Avruch (1998, 14–18)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Inadequate Views of Culture</th>
<th>Adequate Definition of Culture</th>
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<tr>
<td>Culture is homogeneous</td>
<td>Proposed Definition: “Culture consist of the derivatives of experience, more or less organized, learned or created by the individuals of a population, including those images or encodings and their interpretations (meanings) transmitted from past generations, from contemporaries or formed by individuals themselves” (Schwartz 1992 as quoted in Avruch 1998, 17)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Problem: Presumption that culture is free of internal paradoxes and contradictions, and that individuals have clear and unambiguous guidance. Also problematic in that this suggests that a culture can be easily grasped by an outsider.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Culture is a thing</td>
<td>Strengths:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Problem: This is a reification. Culture is better understood as a “shorthand way of referring . . . to bundles of complicated cognitive and perceptual processes” (14). See also Putz, Schmitz, and Walch (2014) and Bennett (2013b).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>An individual can possess but a single culture</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Problem: Privileges tribal, ethnic, or national culture over other types of culture; Particularly problematic when political scientists privilege nation-state interpretations of culture and suggest “national character.” Individuals always possess multiple cultures.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Culture is custom</td>
<td>Limitations:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Problem: reduces culture to tradition or etiquette, downplays individual agency and struggle.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Culture is uniformly distributed among members of a group</td>
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<tr>
<td>Problem: Oversimplifies intracultural variation, which is ignored or dismissed as deviance.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Culture is timeless</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Problem: reduces culture to a changeless essential type.</td>
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</table>

This focus on the socially apprehended and constructed elements of culture results is well-captured by Ruben:

Those symbols, meanings, images, rule structures, habits, values, and information processing and transformation patterns an conventions that are shared in common by members of a particular social system or group, . . . [and which] result from the negotiated creation, shared use, and mutual validation of symbols, meanings, and communication rules and patterns. (1984, 143n7-8).

Although this definition is useful, Bennett’s (1998) more nimble definition of culture as “the learned and shared patterns of beliefs, behaviors, and values of groups of interacting
people” may be easier to apply. The approach to culture taken in this paper, then, relies on Bennett’s definition, which contains constructivist underpinnings, and which finds applicability at multiple levels of analysis. With this established, the paper turns to the study of culture in international relations.

**Studying Culture**

Two of the early works on culture (in the sense intended in this paper), are Hall (1959) and Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck (1961). These works have been cited extensively through the development of the intercultural approach over the decades (see for example: Condon and Yousef 1975; Paige 1993; Ting-Toomey 1999; Dan Landis, Bennett, and Bennett 2004; M. J. Bennett 2013a). While this literature review does not involve a comprehensive overview of those early works, it is worth making note of a couple of themes with which these earlier contributors have left an imprint on the approach to culture that is undertaken in this paper. While the approach to culture undertaken here may be somewhat uncommon in international relations, it is not particularly new.

Hall, whose 1959 schema for social scientists is presented in Table 2, provides the useful example of the difficulty of interpreting behavior in an unfamiliar country, relying specifically on a pattern of bargaining.

If people can recognize a pattern, it doesn’t much matter what specific events they perceive. These can, in fact, be quite different and still be part of the same pattern, just as houses are still houses even though made of different materials. Throughout the Middle East, for example, bargaining is an underlying pattern which is significantly different from the activity which goes under that name in our culture. Yet what is perceived on the surface (i.e., Arab methods of bargaining) looks familiar and is assumed to be the same. Nothing could be farther from the truth. (Hall 1959, 106–7)

Hall (1959) goes on to identify errors of value judgments and errors of classification that are problematic precisely because they are based on patterns that are taken for granted. But how
then to study such patterns? Hall suggests an approach focused on principal message systems of interaction, association, subsistence, gender, territoriality, temporality, learning, play, defense, and use of materials. These may be useful, and indeed some of these message systems have apparent relevance to international relations, it is actually an approach most profoundly forwarded by Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck (1961) that provides the practical basis for this study.

**Table 2. (Hall 1959, 192) Hall’s Schema for Social Scientists**

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<th>Schema for Social Scientists</th>
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**Values Frameworks**

It was Kluckhohn (with Strodtbeck 1961) who first developed the theory, typology, and research method for the study of cultural values known as value orientations (Condon 2015). While Hofstede’s (Hofstede 1991; Hofstede, Hofstede, and Minkov 2010) inductively derived values orientations are better known, Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck’s deductive values model, and derivatives thereof, may have more applicability even today (Condon 2015; M. J.
Bennett 2013a, 81). For Bennett, the problem with Hofstede’s model can be summarized in this way:

There is some paradigmatic confusion created by the use of that system, however. Unlike the other cultural value systems, the Hofstede dimensions are not constructed as etic categories. The methodology used to create the categories is positivist, and therefore the results of the research – the dimensions of culture – are assumed to have an objective existence. While this is a useful assumption for the purposes of complex rank-ordering of cultures, it is not very useful for the practice of intercultural communication. The more culture is considered a ‘thing’ and not an ongoing coordination of meaning, the less able people are to see their own role in creating that meaning. This restricts their ability to exercise either cultural self-awareness or perspective taking of other cultural worldviews. (M. J. Bennett 2013a, 81–82)

Condon (2015) concurs with Bennett that the Kluckhohn (1961) approach is uniquely useful – in part because it avoids the reduction of value orientations to “different cultural positions along continua between polar terms” (848). Instead, Klukhohn’s model presents three options for each theme:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 3. (Condon 2015) Kluckhohn’s 1953 model</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Inmate predisposition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Man’s relations to nature</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time dimension</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Valued personality type</td>
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<tr>
<td>Modality of relationship</td>
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</table>

Condon and Yousef (1974, 1975) acknowledge both strengths and weaknesses in the Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck (1961) approach. These include the possibility of deductively generating too few categories, or of generating categories that end up being only a moderately good fit. However “despite these problems, the advantages should be apparent. We have a structure and vocabulary that can be used as a standard for comparing different

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2 Indeed, Hofstede’s model is used for this purpose in the Methodology section. However, Hofstede’s model is not used for developing country profiles for the reasons mentioned by Bennett.
cultures and for describing variations within a single society” (Condon and Yousef 1975, 58).

Building their model on intersections between the self, society, and nature, Condon and Yousef suggest twenty-five sets, with three variations each (Table 4).

Table 3. (Condon and Yousef 1975, 60–62)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Self</th>
<th>Individualism – individuality – interdependence</th>
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<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>youth – the middle years – old age</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sex</td>
<td>equality of sexes – female superiority – male superiority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Activity</td>
<td>doing – being-in-becoming – being</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| The Family             | individualistic – collateral – lineal         |
| Relational orientations| democratic – authority-centered – authoritarian |
| Authority              | open – general – specific                     |
| Positional role behavior| high mobility – phasic mobility – low mobility, stasis |

| Mobility              | high mobility – phasic mobility – low mobility, stasis |

| Society               | independence – symmetrical-obligatory – complementary-obligatory |
| Group membership      | many groups, brief identification, sub-ordination of group to individual – balance of [the other two] – few groups, prolonged identification, subordination of the member to the group |
| Intermediaries        | no intermediaries (directness) – specialist intermediaries only |
| Formality             | informality – selective formality – pervasive formality |
| Property              | private – utilitarian – community |

| Human Nature          | rational – intuitive – irrational |
| Good and evil         | good – mixture of good and evil – evil |
| Happiness, pleasure  | happiness as goal – intricable bond of happiness and sadness – life is mostly sadness |

| Mutability            | change, growth, learning – some change – unchanging |

| Nature                | man dominating nature – man in harmony with nature – nature dominating man |
| Relationship of man and nature | abstract – circle of induction-deduction – specific |
| Ways of knowing       | mechanistic – spiritual – organic |
| Structure of nature   | future – present – past |
| Concept of time       | future – present – past |

| The Supernatural      | man as god – pantheism – man controlled by the supernatural |
| Relationship of man and the supernatural | abstract – circle of induction-deduction – specific |
| Providence            | good in life is unlimited – balance of good and misfortune – good in life is limited |
| Knowledge of the cosmic order | order is comprehensible – faith and reason – mysterious and unknowable |

However, the extensive focus on values orientations in Condon and Yousef (1975) does not represent the only way in which culture can be studied, though they are perhaps one
of the most important lenses. Condon and Yousef describe the preferential option for values orientation in this way:

We have allotted more space for our discussion of values than for any other topic considered in this book. Not only do values pervade all of the other topics, they also may provide the best guidance for understanding and adapting to other cultural patterns of communication. (Condon and Yousef 1975, 60)

Several additional values models should be briefly considered. Mentioned, above, Hofstede’s (Hofstede 1991; Hofstede, Hofstede, and Minkov 2010) model includes six value orientations measured at the level of national culture. These are power distance, individualism, masculinity, uncertainty avoidance, long term orientation and indulgence. Limits to Hofstede’s model were already discussed.

Trompenaars (Trompenaars 1994; Hampden-Turner and Trompenaars 1997) presents three categories, the first of which has several sub-dimensions. “Relationships with People” includes the themes of universalism vs. particularism norms, individualism vs. collectivism in identity, neutral vs. emotional expression, specific vs. diffuse focus, and achievement vs. ascription status (Trompenaars 1994, 10–11). The two remaining dimensions are “Attitudes towards Time” and “Attitude towards the Environment”. For Trompenaars, these orientations represent the range of specific solutions that cultures select to respond to problems.

The author of yet another set of value dimensions, Schwartz (2011) suggests that there are between two to nine distinct value dimensions, depending on which authors one reads. While he suggests that there is overlap between many of the dimensions, he suggests that “it is too soon to try to arrive at ‘the best’ set of dimensions. Choosing any one set of dimensions would lose the richness of cultural understanding that diverse theories permit” (314-15). Nonetheless, he suggests that it is worth the effort to clarify the overlap and distinction between the various sets of values dimensions. Schwartz’s model is different from
the others in that it began at the level of the individual (Knafo, Roccas, and Sagiv 2011) and then moved toward the social group (the others start with the social group and move toward the individual. His basic value dimensions include power, achievement, hedonism, stimulation, self-direction, universalism, benevolence, tradition, conformity, and security (Grove 2015b).

Several authors (Muller 2001; Lebow 2008; Friedrichs 2016) draw attention to key motivational structures. Muller presents the following couplets: honor and shame, power and fear, and guilt and innocence. Lebow suggests fear, interest, and honor. Friedrichs, drawing on Leung and Cohen (2011) and Kim Cohen and Au (2010) to the address the motivating power of the worth orientations of honor, face, and dignity.

The 2004 Global Leadership and Organizational Behavior Effectiveness (GLOBE) Study suggests nine cultural dimensions: performance orientation, uncertainty avoidance, ingroup collectivism, power distance, gender egalitarianism, humane orientation, institutional collectivism, future orientation, and assertiveness (Grove 2015a). Additionally, the GLOBE project identified six global dimensions of leadership: charismatic/value based, team-oriented, participative, humane-oriented, autonomous, and self-protected leadership (GLOBE 2016). From these, twenty one primary leadership dimensions were developed.

The World Values Survey, which has been run in seven iterations since 1981, includes topics such as the following:

Trust to social and political institutions, support for democracy and alternative political regimes, tolerance to foreigners and ethnic minorities, support for gender equality, the role of religion and changing levels of religiosity, the impact of globalization, attitudes toward the environment, work, family, politics, national identity, culture, diversity, local and national security in contemporary world, subjective well-being and happiness, social capital, social media, corruption, elections and electoral integrity, attitudes towards migration and influence of migration on national development, interest in politics, political participation and unconventional
political activity, development of science and technology, social, ethical and moral norms. (World Values Survey 2016b)

While there is a significant amount of data, much of which does not fit into the category of values orientations, analysis by Inglehart and Welzel (Inglehart and Welzel 2005) suggests that “there are two major dimensions of cross cultural variation in the world” (World Values Survey 2016a). These include traditional values and secular-rational values on one continuum, juxtaposed with survival values and self-expression values on the second.

Further Variation Across Cultures

What should be clear following the Values Frameworks section of the literature review is that there are many different approaches to the study of values orientations of various cultural groups. Yet even Condon and Yousef (1975) with their impressive 75 values orientations options (with even more permutations) do not claim that these represent the whole of cultural variation. They additionally draw attention to nonverbal communication, language, thought patterns, and even variations in styles of houses as necessary to understanding the range of cultural variation. For his part, Stewart (1978) provides a list of nine critical components of intercultural communication include language and thinking, values, interfaces in communication (particularly rapport between sender and receiver), orientation to action, forms, principles and representation, trust, private and public rules, cultural background (reserves) of meaning, and an implied observer agent. While further such lists could be developed, it is more useful to briefly address three more core areas of cross-cultural variance: ontological and epistemological frameworks, interactional frameworks, and history and identity models.
Ontological and Epistemological Frameworks

The values frameworks introduced above describe differences in orientations to world that can extend deep into the experience of the world and represent something beyond merely a different emphases within the world. Consider, for example, Condon and Yousef’s (1975) range of options for the knowledge of the cosmic order: order is comprehensible, faith and reason, and mysterious and unknowable. These represent not merely different emphases, but different episteme, and perhaps even different ontology. Discussing the question of ontological differences present in worldview, Osmera reflects:

A fundamental question is whether this is a case of labeling the same given world with a variety of terms by separate cultures or whether the world being labeled is fundamentally different for each culture. (Osmera 2015, 879)

The worldview metaphors offered by Pepper (1942 as cited in Hiebert 2008, 24) include conceptualizations of the world as organic “which sees the world an ultimate realities as living beings” and mechanistic “which looks at the world as an impersonal machine, like a watch, run by invisible forces operating according to fixed laws.” Such divergent views of the world certainly indicate a difference in ontology, as “that branch of metaphysics concerned with the nature or essence of being or existence” (“Ontology, N.” 2016). Hiebert underscores this view, defining worldview as “the foundational cognitive, affective, and evaluative assumptions and frameworks a group of people makes about the nature of reality which they use to order their lives” (26).

Given the presence of cognitive assumptions and frameworks in cultural worldviews, it is appropriate as well to consider that different cultural groups also rely on different ways of knowing. This has already been hinted at through reference to Geertz’s (1977) semiotic definition of culture and the recognition that symbolic forms are used to develop knowledge. An example of the intersection between ontological and epistemological cultural variation is
offered by Hiebert: In a culture that relies on modern materialistic realism, members “assume that the world is around them is real, orderly, and predictable, and that they can experience it with a measure of accuracy by means of their senses” (46). By contrast, a culture that relies on an idealism that assumes that the world is an illusion created by the mind may be more likely to:

See ultimate reality as existing inside the person. The external world is a sum of subjective inner experiences—a transitory, every-changing creation of our minds. It has no ultimate reality. It is maya, or virtual. In such a chaotic, unpredictable world, meaning and truth can be found only in oneself, in the deep innermost experiences of the self. Sensory experience and rational analysis are illusory and cannot be trusted. Consequently, true reality cannot be discovered by empirical experiments and analysis, but must come as inner flashes of insight, which ultimately show us that even we do not truly exist as separate individuals but are parts of one ultimate cosmic energy field. (Hiebert 2008, 46)

A separate paper would be required to explore the implications of different ontological and epistemological systems and the ways in which these lead to not only a different style of interacting with the world, but with a different experience of the world altogether (indeed, a different world). These types of differences can also be investigated in terms of patterns of thinking “or how people process perception,” on a range from concrete to abstract construction of percepts (M. J. Bennett 2013a). The author of this paper has, in a separate paper (Jones 2015, unpublished), explored some of these issues as relates to constructed knowledge and the intersection between constructivism and culture. Let it suffice for this paper to acknowledge that cultural differences can go beyond the values used to frame interaction with the world to the very understanding and experience of what the world is and how it can be known. Clearly the study of religion could also be used to extend this inquiry of ontological difference.
Interactional Frameworks

While similar to values frameworks, a distinct way to understand culture is through interactional frameworks. These frameworks address ways in which communication actually takes place. Hammer (2009a) suggests placing of the continuum of emotional restraint and expressiveness on a Cartesian plane with the continuum of directness and indirectness. The four resultant quadrants are four distinct strategies for conflict communication: engagement (expressive::direct), dynamic (expressive::indirect), accommodation (restrained::indirect), and discussion (restrained::direct). Hammer suggests that different cultural groups tend toward different primary conflict styles, and that mis-matched styles in conflict can easily lead to secondary conflicts (those not about the substantive issue). Elmer (1993) suggests that cultural values orientations can be used to explain why certain conflict styles are used, but does distinguish the conflict interaction style from the underlying value orientation.

There are many more such styles that could be considered, both in verbal and nonverbal communication. Sadri and Flammia (2011) draw attention to the following (verbal) styles: direct/indirect; instrumental/affective; elaborate/exact/succinct; personal/contextual; high/low context; and formal/informal. Bennett (2013a) suggests the categories of language use, leave-taking rituals, compliments and apologies, high and low-context, and paralinguistic elements such as pitch and tone as examples of interactional frameworks.

History

Two final elements of cross-cultural variation are history and identity. The distinctive histories of each cultural group shape the group’s understanding of themselves and of the world (Martin and Nakayama 2014). What is more, Martin and Nakayama suggest that
interaction events between groups require the negotiation of those histories – particularly when there are interactive histories between groups.

Linked to history is the concept of identity. Ting-Toomey (1999) suggests that cultural identity is “the emotional significance that we attach to our sense of belonging or affiliation with the larger culture” (30). Interestingly, Ting-Toomey ties the content of such identity back to the value orientation of individualism and collectivism. She also suggests that the salience of identity will vary depending on the interaction situation. Hopf (2016) applies very similar logic to the identities of states, suggesting that while “patterns of cooperation and conflict depend on how states understand themselves in the international system” (5) that such identities are not static. Instead, for both Ting-Toomey at the individual/cultural level and for Hopf at the national level, identities are intersubjectively negotiated. There, furthermore, many different strategies for arriving at, maintaining, and negotiating cultural identities (Salett and Koslow 2003).

Cultural Differences and Intercultural Communication

The previous section of the literature review has demonstrated that there is reason to believe that culture, through influence over values orientations, ontologies, epistemologies, interactional styles, and identity, could lead to significantly different perceptions of situations, others, and self. Adler explains the situation this way:

Do the French and the Chinese see the world in the same way? No. Do Venezuelans and Ghanaians see the world in the same way? Again, no. No two national groups see the world in exactly the same way. Perception is the process by which individuals select, organize, and evaluate stimuli from the external environment to provide meaningful experiences for themselves. . . . Perceptual patterns are neither innate nor absolute. They are selective, learned, culturally determined, consistent, and inaccurate. (Adler 2002, 77)
These claims about the intersection between culture and perception are not unique to Adler (Singer 1998 [1976]), and appear to be relevant in the consideration of international relations. Yet the study of culture is also incredibly complex and messy, and “the complexity of cultural diversity seems overwhelming” (M. J. Bennett 2013a, 61).

Cultural analysis is intrinsically incomplete. And, worse than that, the more deeply it goes, the less complete it is. It is a strange science whose most telling assertions are its most tremulously based, in which to get somewhere with the matter at hand is to intensify the suspicion, both your own and that of others, that you are not quite getting it right. . . . There are a number of ways to escape this—turning culture into folklore and collecting it, turning it into traits and counting it, turning it into institutions and classifying it, turning it into structures and toying with it. But they are escapes. (Geertz 1977, 29)

Bennett (2013a, 61) argues that the application of cultural general (deductive) frameworks such as those described in the previous section is a great advantage in the practical negotiation of relationships across cultures. The following extended quotation provides an important outline of how this approach is used to build understanding:

By identifying where one’s own and a particular other culture lie on the continua of contrasts, the user can create a broad picture of the other culture and how it differs from her own. It is a relatively simple matter to apply the framework to all the cultures with which one has contact. In some cases of light contact, there may be no need for more culture-specific information; the culture-general framework will be sufficient to identify and analyze relevant differences. In other cases, it is a straightforward matter to add culture-specific information (emic categories) to one or more of the culture-general frames.

The culture-general framework operates as an observational strategy and as a learning-to-learn technique (Bateson, 1972), since it calls attention to the areas of difference that are most important to consider when first encountering another culture. By initially identifying general cultural differences, a newcomer to the culture can avoid obvious misunderstandings and move more quickly toward learning relevant emic categories. In this way, the culture-general framework offers an entrée into the culture-specific knowledge that will be necessary to operate effectively over the long run. But of course it is insufficient to simply know any amount of culture-general or culture-specific knowledge. Eventually, cultural knowledge becomes a doorway into the embodied experience of another culture. (M. J. Bennett 2013a, 61)
If Bennett is correct, then it is not necessary to establish a fully-formed ethnography for each culture under consideration. Instead, cultural general frameworks can initially be applied even without significant emic work, and without needing to solve Geertz’s problem of infinite incompleteness. Rather, the intercultural approach involves using awareness of such differences to combat ethnocentric perception and ethnocentric interpretation (M. J. Bennett 2013a). Though the topic will not be further explored here, Yoshikawa’s (1980) double-swing model and Ting-Toomey’s (1999) identity negotiation model are two examples of the ways in which the intercultural communication process itself can be investigated.

**Culture and International Relations**

**The Study of Culture in International Relations**

*Culture* is a concept that is recognized to some degree in International Relations, though how and to what extent vary. Waltz (1954), in response to anthropologist Margaret Mead’s urgence to study and learn from cultures reflects “We had better pause and to ask what all this is for” (52). He notes in response to Frank’s urging of the increased knowledge of other cultures that in some people increased cultural knowledge provokes humility and in others arrogance – the deeper meaning of what Waltz was seeing may become plain to the reader as the intercultural competence model (the DMIS) used in this paper is considered below. Indeed it is perhaps unsurprising that Waltz is suspicious of the capacity of the study of culture to generate anything like peace – certainly the emphasis on structure he revealed later on (1979) is consistent with this view. Yet, Waltz does make an important clarification:

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3 The present paper would ideally contain insights from Lebow’s (2008) *A Cultural Theory of International Relations*. However, the author became aware of the work too late to incorporate it into the present inquiry, and an initial overview of the work suggests it may be less relevant to the approach to culture used in this paper than the title suggests.
The point of all this is not that every contribution the behavioral scientist can make has been made before and found wanting, but rather that the proffered contributions of many of them have been rendered ineffective by a failure to comprehend the significance of the political framework of international action. In such a circumstance, their prescriptions for the construction of a more peaceful world can only be accidentally relevant. (Waltz 1954, 76)

However, Weber provides a foundation of the importance of study of culture in international relations, particularly through the observation that “we are cultural beings with the capacity and the will to take a deliberate attitude toward the world and to lend it significance” (1949, 81 as quoted in Barnett 2013). This capacity to lend significance to the world was noted by Jervis (1976), who although he intended to ignore culture and psychology (8) when writing *Perception and Misperception in International Politics* nonetheless acknowledges that “the person’s background and culture” can have significant effects in “creating perceptual predispositions” (151).

Writing as a defensive structural realist, Walt (1985) implied that ethnocentrism (though the word was not used) could play a constraining role on international relations:

Reacting positively towards [ideologically similar states] and harshly towards [ideologically dissimilar states] will encourage good relations with one and drive the others to cling together more tightly in opposition. The hypothesis thus becomes self-fulfilling, and the result is then used to prove that the original belief was correct. (Walt 1985, 26)

This type of reification is certainly targeted by scholars of culture such as Bennett (2013a, 2013b), and suggests the study of the relationship between the self and “other” offered by interculturalists may be useful in international relations (IR).

Why, then, the relative paucity of cultural studies in international relations? Henderson (1998, 461) blames this lack on the “neorealism hegemony” over IR. This failure to incorporate culture in IR studies is not acceptable to Henderson because, like Jarvis, he recognizes the influence of culture on the perceptions of decision-makers (466):
Culture provides a basis for ‘changing meaning,’ whereby actions in one cultural context are filtered through an alternative cultural lens in ways that may distort the original meaning of the actions and the original intent of the actors. . . . Intentions and behavior that are evaluated through similar/dissimilar cultural lenses are less/more likely to be misperceived, thus reducing/increasing the likelihood of conflict. (Henderson 1998, 466–67)

The remainder of this section on Culture as Understood in International Relations, then seeks to address three areas of interest: 1) a brief look at international communication literature; 2) a short examination of civilizational studies in IR; and 3) a brief overview of intercultural communication and diplomacy.

**International Communication**

From a communication perspective, the idea that culture might in some way impact international relations is not a new one – in Casmir’s volume on *Intercultural and International Communication* Stacey wrote in 1978 that “there seems to be more and more communication with less and less success in resolving the foreign affairs problems of nations” (572). Yet Hopmann (1978) in the same volume expresses concern that communication frameworks may have limited utility when applied to international diplomacy in that they were not developed for such a purpose. However, while Casmir’s volume does bring intercultural and international communication into the same space, there is actually very little interaction across these disciplines even in that work.

A similar isolation of international communication takes place in Mody’s 2003 volume on *International and Development Communication*, and culture is such an insignificant part of the framing of the book that appears not to be defined within it. Even the title of Sadri and Flammia’s (2011), *Intercultural Communication: A New Approach to International Relations and Global Challenges* (emphasis added), notes that the intersection between international and intercultural communication and relations has not been well
developed. As they suggest “one major challenge is that neither discipline has integrated the concepts, theories, and methods of both fields to provide a comprehensive perspective on intercultural puzzles” (Sadri and Flammia 2011, xi). Yet while their book does more than most to tie together the fields, they miss critical elements of each, including no apparent reference to realism, liberalism or constructivism (at least as visible in the table of contents, the index, and a brief review), and no apparent reference to intercultural competence. Such oversights are puzzling but are clearly more the rule than the exception. The international communication literature thus providing only a limited understanding of the intersection between culture and international relations, the next topic to be considered is whether the civilization studies arising from international relations may be of more use.

Civilizational Orientations in Security Studies.

Avruch (1998), writing from a peace studies perspective, laments that “all of the inadequate ideas about culture” from Table 1 “can be found at work when, as in ‘national character’ studies, international relations, retaining the state as its foundational concept, has tried to grapple with culture” (23). Such critiques could be leveled at “clash of civilization” discourses such as those undertaken by Huntington (1993, 1996), as noted by Avruch (1998) and Jackson (2010). Katzenstein (2010) attempts to strike a balance between appreciating Huntington’s conclusion that cultural matters are a source of conflict a la Huntington, while also requiring that civilizations be understood as “pluralist and plural” (3). Katzenstein requires this as an improvement over an essentialist “succumbing to ‘the illusion of singularity,’ the view of collective identities as singular, unchanged, and unchanging traits of actors” (9, interior quotes from Sen 2006). Reviewing Katzenstein and others, Desch notes the hope that civilizationists place in the cultural approach:
Virtually all new culturalists in security studies are united in their belief that realism, the dominant research program in international relations that emphasizes factors such as the material balance of power, is an overrated, if not bankrupt, body of theory, and that cultural theories, which look to ideational factors, do a much better job of explaining how the world works. (Desch 1998, 141)

Indeed Katzenstein (1996) does view the interrelated concepts of identity, norms, and culture as having powerful explanatory utility. The differences in interpretation of global events lead to variations in responses that Katzenstein (2003) claims may be significant enough to strain even long-standing alliances. Yet for all of the promise of civilizational studies – and indeed the recent Civilizations in World Politics (Katzenstein 2010) does seek to offer thick, complex, explorations of sameness and difference – there is lacking an attendant exploration of how individuals or nation-states, or actors at other levels of analysis might think about the capacity to achieve shared perceptions of the world. Thus, the following section briefly considers the world of diplomacy and negotiation across cultures.

**Intercultural Communication and Diplomacy**

The art of international negotiation is known to be a difficult one (Zartman and Rasmussen 1997; Zartman 2007), and unsurprisingly different approaches have developed:

Paul Y. Hammond has noted the significant contrast which existed between Foreign Service officers like Kennan and Bohlen, who stressed reliance ‘upon the personal skills and noncommunicable wisdom of the career official,’ and administrators like Acheson, who accepted ‘the necessity ... of forward planning with all its rigidities, simplifications, and artificialities.’ (Gaddis 1974, 400)

While it is difficult to say what all personal skills and wisdom might be needed, it is likely that at least part of what is needed is a capacity to comprehend the world in a way that is unfamiliar (Cohen 1991). Reflecting on Szaley, Cohen explains it this way:

For there to be real understanding—true communication in the normative sense of the term—the parties engaged must be able to draw upon matching semantic assumptions. And this ability occurs optimally within the boundaries of common culture. . . . In the area of diplomatic negotiation the potential for dissonance inherent in intercultural communication finds its most sustained expression. Not the simple,
unmediated conversation of tourist and local here, but a complex and sustained interchange of proposals over time, overlaid by level after confusing level of interagency consultation, political supervision, and media and legislative oversight. At every stage of negotiations the possibility for misunderstanding exists, whether about the procedure, the content, or the institutional setting. It is a wonder that agreement is ever reached! (Cohen 1991, 20–21,22)

Cohen thus suggests ten recommendations for the intercultural negotiator (Table 2) that reflect his conclusion that cultural differences are not superficial and stylistic but are in fact deeply held differences.

| Table 2. (Author). Ten recommendations for the intercultural negotiator based on (Cohen 1991, 160–61) |
| Recommendation 1 | Prepare for a negotiation by studying your opponents’ culture and history, and not just the issue at hand. Language and the historical relationship are especially important |
| Recommendation 2 | (Try to ) establish a warm, personal relationship with your interlocutors. If possible make contact and invest in the relationship in advance. |
| Recommendation 3 | Do not assume that your verbal or nonverbal message is understood accurately from the other side. Do not assume that you have accurately understood their verbal or nonverbal messages. |
| Recommendation 4 | Pay attention to the use of indirect and nonverbal communication. Be prepared to read between the lines and be very careful about any signals you might unintentionally send. |
| Recommendation 5 | Be aware of status and face. Establish interlocutors as equals. Avoid anything that lead to the loss of face for self or other. |
| Recommendation 6 | Do not overestimate the power of good arguments – these may not sway your opponents even if they are well developed. Pay special attention to facts and circumstances. |
| Recommendation 7 | Adapt your strategy to reflect your opponents’ cultural needs. Be prepared for haggling – do not give away everything at once. But, be prepared to accommodate what you can. |
| Recommendation 8 | Do not be flexible if your opponents are intransigent. Repeated concessions may confuse rather than clarify the situation. Avoid compromising with yourself. |
| Recommendation 9 | Be patient. Haste almost always means making unnecessary concessions. Do not try to force them to short-circuit their bureaucratic processes. |
| Recommendation 10 | Outward appearances may be as important as content. Symbolic gains are important. |

It is Slavik’s (2004) (out of print) volume on *Intercultural Communication and Diplomacy* that appears to most intentionally bridge the divide between these two topics. In the preface, Ambassador and Director General of the Swiss Agency or Development and Cooperation Walter Fast notes that “diplomats, of course, have a long tradition of intercultural communication skills. Representing one’s country elsewhere and plunging into international relations and politics has a natural intercultural flavour” (Fast 2004, ix).

Moreover, Ambassador Fast instructs readers not to assume that intercultural communication “just happens” and instead points out that cultural differences extend not only to visible
differences such as language and clothing, but also to “deeper rooted values and modes of thinking” (x). The remainder of the volume might benefit from relating the insights to one or more of the major IR paradigms – surely they would have different application for realist, liberal, or constructivist perspectives.  

A future version of this paper would do well to discuss further the turns involved in moving from cultural analysis to intercultural, but such will not be undertaken now.

Conclusion of the Literature Review: Perception and Misperception

The reader of this literature review is invited to consider the role of culture on perception and misperception in international relations. This issue of perception is identified by Jervis (1976) as one of the most fundamental problems in international relations. Yet Jervis himself did not account seriously for the role of culture.

However, several limitations must be noted. First, some of what has been presented so far approaches culture as though it can be studied at the national level, while some does not. Condon and Yousef (1975) advocate for the latter position:

> When we speak of values or value orientations, our focus should always be on cultures, not nations. A nation is a political entity which may contain within it many quite different cultures; similarly national borders may politically distinguish areas which are culturally identical. (Condon and Yousef 1975, 48)

Clearly, state borders are poor proxies for cultural identities. Of course there is also a whole literature on the appropriateness of the state as a unit of analysis (P. B. Evans et al. 1985; Jarvis 1989). It is beyond the scope of this paper to answer these questions. Instead, the difficulty is acknowledged. The pattern of the paper will match much of the literature (e.g.

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4 Drezner (2015) gives an excellent overview of how international relations paradigms would play out in case of a zombie invasion, and one can perhaps superimpose the principles of intercultural and international communication onto the paradigmatically influenced responses he suggests.
Trompenaars 1994; Adler 2002; Hofstede, Hofstede, and Minkov 2010) in using the name of a state to refer to the dominant cultural tendencies and identities of that state, leaving to others (i.e., Migdal 1988) to work out the relationship between societies and states.

Yet despite the fraught nature of studying culture, it is worth the attempt. Geertz clearly expects to find cultural analysis engaging the “hard surfaces of life,” (1977, 30) including the political. After all, “warfare, which man uses against is human enemies, is . . . held in the tight vise of culture” (Hall 1959). Thus the paper moves now into an attempted exploration of culture in international relations.
Methodology

As described in the introduction, the purpose of this paper is to investigate the ways in which cultural values influence perceptual and interactional processes in international relations. In particular, the paper seeks to address the following hypotheses in relation to two major power states:

Step 1:

$H_1$: The states are culturally different in terms of values-orientations.

$H_{10}$: The states are not culturally different in terms of values-orientations.

Step 2 is only undertaken if $H_{10}$ is rejected.

Step 2:

$H_2$: The difference in cultural values orientations identified in step 1 influences the dyadic relationship between the two states.

The use of the null in $H_1$ is a Popperian acknowledgement of the author’s bias in favor of the alternative hypothesis and the risks present in non-falsifiable hypotheses. However, process tracing is not built for use with null hypotheses, and thus the null of $H_2$ will not be utilized.

Step 1: Comparative Analysis

To investigate whether a dyad of states are culturally different, the first step is to identify a pair of states for consideration. Then, a process for dyad comparison must be suggested.

Dyad Selection

The first part of the research will be to test the proposition that a dyad of states is not significantly different in terms of cultural values orientations. Random sampling is not a
reasonable approach for this type of study (Przeworski and Teune 1970). Instead, the goal is to select states based on “most different systems” (MDS) logic (ibid.).

The protocol to determine which dyad qualified as was “most different systems” was as follows.

1. First, it was determined that eligible countries would be drawn from the population great powers as identified by the Correlates of War Project (CWP) (2011) data set. The seven states listed as great powers in 2011 include China, France, Germany, Japan, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Great powers were selected given their influence on the international system.

2. Second, it was determined that Hofstede’s (Hofstede, Hofstede, and Minkov 2010) six dimensions would serve to provide quantified values for cultural factors.

3. Third, data were entered for each of the seven major powers countries\(^5\) for each of Hofstede’s (2010) six cultural dimensions. (Table 5).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State:</th>
<th>Power Distance (PDI)</th>
<th>Individualism (IDV)</th>
<th>Masculinity (MAS)</th>
<th>Uncertainty Avoidance (UAI)</th>
<th>Long Term Orientation (LTO)</th>
<th>Indulgence (IND)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Data from Hofstede, Hofstede, and Minkov (2010)

4. Fourth, the absolute value for difference in each dimension was calculated for each dyad.

5. Fifth, the absolute values were totaled for each dyad and the dyads were ranked (Table 6).

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\(^5\) Note that on the website (“Dimensions - Geert Hofstede” 2016) the United Kingdom is referenced, while in the book Great Britain is referenced.
Table 6. (Author). Dyads Ranked by Summed (Absolute Value) Difference in Dimensions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dyad</th>
<th>Absolute values of difference per dimension</th>
<th>Dyad Total Difference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PDI</td>
<td>IDV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia : United States</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia : United Kingdom</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China : United States</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan : United States</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan : United Kingdom</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China : United Kingdom</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China : France</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany : Russia</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France : United States</td>
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<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China : Japan</td>
<td>26</td>
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<tr>
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<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany : United States</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
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<td>Japan : Russia</td>
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<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany : Japan</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom : United States</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As may be seen in Table 6, the dyad Russia : United States was the most different system according to this method of selection. Several limitations should be noted. First, some authors (e.g., Palmaru 2012; M. J. Bennett 2013b) resist Hofstede’s conceptualization of culture as a “software of the mind” and may object to the essentialization and reification of culture represented by Hofstede’s approach. This is an important critique and is not dismissed. However, Hofstede’s model was selected given its usefulness in “the purposes of complex rank-ordering of cultures” (M. J. Bennett 2013a, 81). Second, the particular dimensions analyzed by Hofstede may or may not correspond with the elements of actually analyzed in the methods section. Indeed, given the areas intended for examination (values
and identities) Hofstede’s dimensions are only a moderately good fit. Rather more useful would have been the categories isolated by Hopf and Allan (2016).

However, Hopf and Allan’s categories were inductively derived which means, among other things, that not all categories are found in all assessed countries. What is more, Russia is not featured, though all of the other CWP great powers are. Hofstede’s dimensions at least provide a useful and quantified starting point that can be accessed for the purpose of determining most different systems. If it is later found that Hofstede’s numbers are not reliable this does not significantly affect this paper, as the utility of his numbers are in removing researcher bias in the selection of countries to be analyzed. The main impact could be on the claims made possible by most different systems design, but this too seems unlikely to cause a major disruption based on the intended topic of study.

**Dyad Profiles**

Limited cultural profiles will be created for the two states. The difficulty of analyzing culture at the state level is acknowledged in the literature review and will not be further discussed here. The cultural profiles would ideally consider at least all of the components of culture identified in the literature review: values, ontologies and epistemologies, interactional frameworks, identities and histories. However, the paper focuses on just values orientations. New research is not conducted, instead existing sources are used to generate a basic (not comprehensive) profile.

To develop state profiles, the frameworks in Table 7 were selected before analysis began in order to limit framework selection bias. It is not expected that the present paper will identify the outcome in each of the following frameworks. Instead, the goal is to find references from 1990 to present for at least half of the values orientations.
Sources will emphasize narrative texts and ethnographies. Hofstede will not be used, as this would be a duplication of the selection process. Values surveys such as GLOBE and...
Trompenaars may (or may not) be used to supplement such texts. The objective of this method will be to demonstrate that the dyadic states do not differ, according to the null hypothesis:

\[ H_{10} \text{ The states are not culturally different in terms of values-orientations.} \]

If this null of \( H_1 \) is not rejected, then the analysis will be complete. If it is rejected, then the analysis will proceed to step two.

**Step 2: Diplomatic Analysis**

If the null of \( H_1 \) is rejected, then the second major portion of the research will be to analyze a diplomatic issue-area relationship between the dyad.\(^6\) The diplomatic relationship issue of focus is the (now suspended) Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement (PMDA), from its origination in the late 1990’s through its clarification in 2010 and demise in 2016. The PMDA is the case, from the set diplomatic issue-area relationships between the United States and Russia, which is itself a case of dyadic issue-area relationships between states.

Process tracing (Collier 2011) will be used to analyze sources related to the PMDA (listed in Appendix 1.). The objective of this method will be to demonstrate that the diplomatic relationship between the states was affected by the cultural differences identified in the comparative analysis:

\[ H_2 \text{ The difference in cultural values orientations identified in step 1 influence the dyadic relationship between the two states.} \]

---

\(^6\) Given that the process of identifying the dyad implied that there is significant cultural difference between the states, the focus of diplomatic relationships was selected before Step 1 was complete to ensure adequate time to gather source materials. However, other than this, Step 1 was completed before Step 2 began.
One difficulty in testing this hypothesis is the tendency for actors to utilize the minimization of cultural differences as a strategy for interaction across cultures (M. J. Bennett 2013a; Jones 2016, unpublished). The process tracing method selected will thus need to be significantly robust in accounting for this tendency, given the risk of a type II error. The null is not directly tested as it is in Step 1 given that process tracing does not utilize a null.

**Description of Process Tracing**

Process tracing has a history in cognitive psychology, but has found application in political science as demonstrated by the various contributors to A. Bennett and Checkel’s 2015 volume. In its essence, process tracing “refers to the examination of intermediate steps in a process to make inferences about hypotheses on how that process took place and whether and how it generated the outcome of interest” (2015, 6). When defining process tracing, they authors intentionally drop “intervening variable” from a previous definition and:

Define process tracing as the analysis of evidence on processes, sequences, and conjunctures of events within a case for the purposes of either developing or testing hypotheses about causal mechanisms that might causally explain the case. Put another way, the deductive theory-testing side of process tracing examines the observable implications of hypothesized causal mechanisms within a case to test whether a theory on these mechanisms explains the case. (A. Bennett and Checkel 2015, 7–8)

Causality is, of course, a complicated thing to measure. Causal mechanisms are “in some sense ultimately unobservable” and while it is possible to make inferences about causality it is never directly observed (A. Bennett and Checkel 2015, 11). Along these same lines, while a causal explanation should be consistent with any and all levels of observed detail, it is not necessary to go to the most minute level in order to generate confidence for a hypothesis (ibid.). Researchers must therefore make and defend decisions about how far down (and back into history) into the phenomena under investigation they go. A further decision researchers must make relates to the tolerance of probability based arguments of
causality: “the core problem is that even if the world is deterministic, we observe it as probabilistic because of measurement error and specification error, including the omission of important variables from our models” (12). While such challenges in finding causality are not unique to process tracing, they are acknowledged in this approach.

For deductive studies, such as this one, the following procedures are recommended (A. Bennett and Checkel 2015):

1. Develop case-specific observable implications of the theories in question
2. Cast the net widely for alternative explanations, including theoretical explanations in the academic literature, theories of journalists and experts who have followed the case
3. Watch for particularly valuable kinds of evidence that allow for hoop, smoking-gun, and doubly decisive tests.
4. Iterate between inductive and deductive, seeking to identify additional observable implications (Lakatosian ‘new facts’) to test each modification (so as to avoid confirmation bias). Testable implications that would fit only the modified theory and not alternative explanations are especially useful
5. Acknowledge that unavailable (i.e. classified) evidence lowers the upper limit of probability. One option is to make predictions of what such evidence would indicate.
6. Modifications to the theory may be necessary when contrary evidence is found. Such modifications should trigger new tests.
7. Decisions must be made about when absence of evidence has meaning and when it does not.

Some of these steps, along with a few others are summarized for quick reference in Table 8.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 8. (Bennett and Checkel 2015, 21). Process tracing best practices.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Cast the net widely for alternative explanations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Be equally tough on the alternative explanations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Consider the potential biases of evidentiary sources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Take into account whether the case is most or least likely for alternative explanations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Make a justifiable decision on when to start</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Be relentless in gathering diverse and relevant evidence, but make a justifiable decision on when to stop</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Combine process tracing with case comparisons when useful for the research goal and feasible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Be open to inductive insights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Use deduction to ask “if my explanation is true, what will be the specific process leading to the outcome?”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Remember that conclusive process tracing is good, but not all good process tracing is conclusive.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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Process tracing makes use of four major tests (Table 9). While it can be challenging to know which causal inference test is appropriate (Collier 2011), familiarity with the tests can help.

- Straw in the wind tests: As these are neither sufficient nor necessary for accepting for accepting or rejecting a hypothesis, these tests are useful primarily for giving initial benchmarks of an investigation. Multiple passed straw in the wind tests may weigh heavily in the direction of a valid causal mechanism. While useful in early stages of research, on its own the straw in the wind test can neither accept nor reject a hypothesis (or rivals).
- Hoop tests: Passing a hoop test does not confirm a hypothesis and lead to rejection of rival hypothesis. However, failing a hoop test does eliminate the hypothesis under consideration. As a hoop test has necessary but insufficient evidence for establishing causation, a passed hoop test can weaken but not dismiss the plausibility of alternative hypotheses.
- Smoking gun tests: These tests can lead strong support to a hypothesis but failure to pass does not require the rejection of the hypothesis as it is not a necessary condition for establishing causation. When passed, such tests weaken rival hypotheses considerably. Failure to pass, however, does not considerably strengthen nor weakens the hypothesis or rivals.
- Doubly decisive tests: In the singular, these tests are rare in social science, as they provide both necessary and sufficient evidence for establishing causation. However, carefully combined tests of the other sorts can provide a triangulation that creates a test in which passing confirms the hypothesis and eliminates all rival hypotheses. Moreover, failure in such a test eliminates the hypothesis under consideration.
Table 8. (A. Bennett 2010, 210). Process Tracing: Four Tests for Causation (a)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Necessary to Establish Causation</th>
<th>Sufficient to Establish Causation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Straw in the Wind</td>
<td>Straw in the Wind</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Passing affirms relevance</td>
<td>Passing affirms relevance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>of hypothesis but does not confirm it.</td>
<td>of hypothesis but does not confirm it.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Failing suggests hypothesis</td>
<td>Failing suggests hypothesis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>may not be relevant, but does not eliminate it.</td>
<td>may not be relevant, but does not eliminate it.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hoop</td>
<td>Hoop</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Passing affirms relevance</td>
<td>Passing affirms relevance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>of hypothesis but does not confirm it.</td>
<td>of hypothesis but does not confirm it.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Failing eliminates it.</td>
<td>Failing eliminates it.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Smoking Gun</td>
<td>Smoking Gun</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Passing confirms hypothesis</td>
<td>Passing confirms hypothesis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Failing does not eliminate it.</td>
<td>Failing does not eliminate it.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doubly Decisive</td>
<td>Doubly Decisive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Passing confirms hypothesis and eliminates others.</td>
<td>Passing confirms hypothesis and eliminates others.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Failing eliminates it.</td>
<td>Failing eliminates it.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(b) In this figure, “establishing causation,” as well as “confirming” or “eliminating” an hypothesis, obviously does not involve a definitive test. Rather, as with any causal inference, qualitative or quantitative, it is a plausible test in the framework of (a) this particular method of inference and (b) a specific data set.

Collier (2011) recommends starting with a with a narrative or timeline to list the events in sequence. With the narrative established “one can then explore the causal ideas embedded in the narratives, consider the kinds of evidence that may confirm or disconfirm these ideas, and identify tests appropriate for evaluating this evidence” (828-29).

**Description of Analysis Plan**

Once Step 1 is complete, a timeline and/or narrative of the PMDA issue will be developed. Sub-hypotheses will be developed once Step 1 is complete, “making explicit the hypotheses about underlying causal mechanisms that are theorized to have caused an outcome, so that these can be rigorously assessed” (A. Bennett and Checkel 2015, 9). Tests will then be selected for those hypotheses. The tests will be used to determine the strength of the evidence for or against the sub-hypotheses, and in turn for or against Hypothesis 2.
Limitations

Condon and Yousef (1975, 34–35) distinguish between the “cultural patterns of communication” and “intercultural or cross-cultural communication.” As demonstrated above, it is possible to discuss how people from one or another cultural communicate. However, it is a rather different undertaking to consider what will happen when these cultures interact with each other:

It is difficult to talk about the encounters of persons from different cultures without also looking at the patterns within each of the cultures. We should not expect in all cases that what happens will be one pattern rather than another or a combination of both patterns. Often, a third pattern will emerge, and we cannot always guess what it will be by knowing what the ‘normal behavior;’ is for each of the parties involved. (Condon and Yousef 1975, 34–35)

There is a principle of indeterminacy in culture. Isolates turn into sets when they are studied in detail and are therefore abstractions. The more the precise the observer is on one level, the less precise he will be on any other. Only one level can be studied with precision at any one time, and only one level can be described at one time. (Hall 1959, 192)

There is also a principle of relativity in culture, just as there is in physics and mathematics. Experience is something man projects on the outside world as he gains it in its culturally determined form. Man alters experience by living. There is not experience independent of culture against which culture can be measured. (Hall 1959, 192)

Regarding generalizability, process tracing is used to establish causality only within a single case. This method is subject to the normal limitations on case studies (A. Bennett and Checkel 2015; Yin 2014).
Step 1 Findings

These sources are not primarily about the foreign policy relationship between the United States and Russia (or the Soviet Union,) although certainly that relationship has affected some of these works. Instead, these works were selected for their ability to paint a cultural profile of the states under consideration.

Russia and American Cultural Profiles

There is difficulty in identifying core Russian values, as there are traditional, west oriented, and soviet style subgroups (Fertelmeyster 2015). For this reason, Fertelmeyster’s goal was to “identify a number of core values that are most prevalent in today’s Russia” (91). Similarly, the United States is comprised of considerable diversity. Nonetheless, Althen (2003, xxiv) found it possible to talk about “American culture” by specifying that “American culture as talked about in this book . . . has been strongly influenced by white middle-class males.” Althen further specifies the importance of understanding that his observations relate to generalizations, and that no particular observation should be expected to match any particular (or every) individual.

The following set of tables is divided into the major sections presented in Table 7, with brief discussion following each. Four sources dominate this section: Richmond (2009) and Fertelmeyster (2015) for Russians, Althen (2003) and Saphiere (2015) for Americans. In a few cases the evidence found is only a loose fit to the original categories proposed by Condon and Yousef (1975) (and the other authors whose work undergirds Table 7). Three of the orientations have been left blank altogether, as no suitable data was found. Still, well over the 50% goal outlined in the Methodology section has been completed. Each section is briefly discussed before Step 1 Results are considered.
Self

The first category proposed by Condon and Yousef is “the Self” (Table 9). The first two categories (individualism/interdependence and age) are quite different from each other (against null). The third category, sex, also demonstrates some difference, but also some similarity, leading to a draw (no conclusion). The final category, activity, is underdeveloped on the Russian side and thus no judgement can be made (no conclusion).

Table 9. (Author). Dyad Analysis: Self Value Orientations.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Value Category</th>
<th>Russia</th>
<th>United States</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Individualism – Interdependence</td>
<td>“Sobornost (communal spirit, togetherness) distinguishes Russians from Westerners” and the roots of these precede communism, being necessary for survival. (Richmond 2009, 12)</td>
<td>“The most important thing to understand about Americans is probably their devotion to individualism. They are trained from very early in their lives to consider themselves as separate individuals who are responsible for their own situations in life and their own destinies. They are not trained to see themselves as members of a close-knit, interdependent family, religious group, tribe, nation, or any other collectivity.” (Althen 2003, 5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>“Individualism . . . has a pejorative meaning” in Russia. (Richmond 2009, 15)</td>
<td>“Personal success is linked to one’s own efforts and actions, a sense of independence and self-reliance” (Saphiere 2015, 100)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>“Everybody’s business is also everyone else’s” (Richmond 2009, 16)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Some Russians are individually oriented, but even for them group relationships are very important. (Fertelmeyster 2015)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>Deference to old age persists (Richmond 2009, 42). In the past it was taught to children so that the degree of respect (and fear) of older people increased with their age (84).</td>
<td>Americans “perceive aging as a progressive loss of function” and thus “social rules based on functionality narrow with age” (Althen and Bennett 2011, 112)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sex</td>
<td>On the one hand, women are highly regarded: “Mother Russia is the symbol of the nation. In this motherland, women are strong, hardworking, nurturing, long suffering, and the true heroes of Russia.” More women than men have college degrees but they make less money. Sexual harassment, male dominated leadership, and patriarchal prejudice make up the other half of this picture. (Richmond 2009, 45–48)</td>
<td>While they may violate the ideal of gender equality in terms of pay, Americans believe that men and women are created equal – different but neither is inferior. (Althen 2003, 15)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Activity</td>
<td>“Relations are more important than results” (Bergelson 2003, 2). Work relationships will often carry over into social activity. (Richmond 2009, 16).</td>
<td>Strong value on efficiency, action oriented, “focused on completing the task at hand more than on their relationships with other people” (Saphiere 2015, 99)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>There is a view that work itself is “virtuous and redemptive” (Saphiere 2015, 100)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Americans believe they should be “doing,” have a strong achievement motivation, and enjoy activity. (Althen 2003, 25)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Simply being together and talking seems like a waste of time to Americans. (Althen 2003, 41)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The Family

No data was found for positional role behavior (Table 10) (no conclusion). All three of the remaining orientations demonstrate more difference than similarity (against null). The relational orientations suggest different relational goals and styles. Both Russia and the United States have the potential of rejecting government authority, but for different reasons and in different ways – for the United States is seen as constant, whereas for Russia it happens when a line has been crossed. Mobility has happened for different reasons and with different understandings.

Table 10. (Author). Dyad Analysis: Family Orientations.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Value Category</th>
<th>Russia</th>
<th>United States</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Relational orientations</td>
<td>“Building relationships based on trust requires a serious time investment, soul-to-soul conversations” (Fertelmeyster 2015, 92)</td>
<td>Americans can be “quick to form friendships, effusive in their language, and swift with positive feedback and encouragement” (Saphiere 2015, 101)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Authority</td>
<td>“Russians have long been seen as submissive to authority, politically passive, and unswerving in policy. But when the breaking point is reached, the submissive citizen spurns authority, the docile worker strikes, the passive person becomes politically active, and rigid policies are reverse almost overnight” (Richmond 2009, 53)</td>
<td>Egalitarianism is a strong value in the US, although this can vary by region. (Saphiere 2015, 100)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>“Russians may respect authority, but they are not intimidated by it. Seeing themselves as coequal with others, they are not shy about speaking up in public or asserting themselves” (Richmond 2009, 80)</td>
<td>“Americans have a deep faith that in some fundamental way all people (at least all American people) are of equal value, that no one is born superior to anyone else. . . . Americans are generally quite uncomfortable when someone treats them with obvious deference.” However, there are subtle ways to indicate status distinctions. (Althen 2003, 14)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>“a classic Russian contradiction of a perfect coexistence of two opposites: acceptance of and protest against the hierarchy” (Fertelmeyster 2015, 92)</td>
<td>Americans “fear that a government can become too strong and thereby endanger citizens’ freedom” and prefer decentralization and inefficiency in government. Americans also feel great freedom to criticize political leaders. All people, including leaders, are supposed to be subject to the law. (Althen 2003, 78–81)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Positional role behavior</td>
<td>Mobility</td>
<td>The move to the city was forced for many, but life in the city is viewed as better by many. (Richmond 2009, 91–92)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>“Lacking obligations to class and social position, Americans move easily from one group to another as they shift position or residence” (Althen and Bennett 2011, 89)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Society

Society, the third category of value orientations contains five subcategories (Table 11). No data was found on intermediaries, which are dismissed (no conclusion). Social reciprocity is viewed differently; while both use networks, friendship is conceptualized differently and has different attendant responsibilities (against null). While group membership is similar in that there are two levels – acquaintance and friendship – the meaning and differentiation between these varies significantly between the two groups (against null). Formality is quite different, as is represented in language (against null). Property ownership has a strong distinction and history (against null).

(intentionally left blank)
**Table 11. (Author). Dyad Analysis: Society Value Orientations.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Value Category</th>
<th>Russia</th>
<th>United States</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Social reciprocity</td>
<td>Friends are very important, and there is an expectation that friends will host each other (even without notice) and take care of each other’s needs. (Richmond 2009, 16) Friendship networks are used to facilitate personal, bureaucratic, and business matters, and there is high reciprocity within networks. (Richmond 2009, 94–96)</td>
<td>“Networking, purposefully searching for contacts that might be in a position to help one accomplish one’s goals, is common in US society. It may seem that people are seeking first to determine whether a new acquaintance can be useful to them and only then to pursue a relationship” (Saphiere 2015, 102) American do not desire close involvement with other people “They will avoid becoming dependent on others, and they don’t want others, with the possible exception of immediate family members, to be dependent on them” (Althen 2003, 41–42). Americans are very friendly and open in first meetings and greetings, but it can seem short-lived. (Saphiere 2015, 99) Americans have many acquaintances but few friends, though they use the word friend for both. Friendship has limits, and is often compartmentalized between different groups. (Althen 2003, 41).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group membership</td>
<td>Russians have many friends, but have a noticeable distinction between friendship and acquaintanceship. <em>Us</em> and <em>them</em> is a common pattern of thought. (Fertelmeyster 2015, 92)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intermediaries</td>
<td>“The Russian language with its formal and informal you (Vy—formal and Ty—informal) clearly underlines the hierarchical nature of Russian culture. Not only does you change its form; verbs also need to be adjusted to correspond correctly with either Vy or Ty. The degree of hierarchical distance or closeness and familiarity can also be seen in the way Russians use names” (Fertelmeyster 2015, 92) “Another connection between the language and the hierarchical nature of Russian culture is evident in the difference between the official language and the everyday language. The official language, whether written or spoken, emphasizes the importance and status of the person communicating a message. Sentences and even words tend to get longer, and at times, speech gets harder to follow, even for native speakers of Russian.” (Fertelmeyster 2015, 93)</td>
<td>Americans’ notions of equality lead them “to be quite informal in their general behavior and in their relationships with other people” (Althen 2003, 16) Americans are very informal – this may be based on egalitarianism “First names are commonly used, even in the first meeting. Professional dress tends toward the casual (this varies by region and industry). U.S. Americans tend to favor informal postures, speech, and settings. . . . Salutations and closing are frequently omitted from e-mails. U.S. Americans’ informality does not indicate disrespect or lack of seriousness.” (Saphiere 2015, 100)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Formality</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Traditional property</td>
<td>Traditional villages would have a combination of private (family) land and shared land. This pattern continued into the cities. This was eventually replaced by the collective farm. (Richmond 2009, 13) Although private farming has returned to Russia “opposition to private land ownership is still strong” (32).</td>
<td>There is a strong belief in capitalism (though there has been an increase in socialism recently). (Saphiere 2015, 100) “The contrast between Russian communalism and American individualism can best be seen in the differences between Russian peasants and American farmers. America’s agricultural settlers were independent farmers and ranchers who owned their own land and lived on it, self-sufficient and distant from their neighbors.” (Richmond 2009, 15) Private ownership can extend to the level of children within a family (Althen 2003, 13)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Human Nature

The human nature set of orientations is comprised of four sub categories (Table 12).

Rationality does not match up between the two cultures, given the emotional emphasis for Russia and the linear logic emphasis for the US (against null). In relation to good and evil, a stronger case could be made for similarity; while there are differences in expression, both see good and bad (for null). Happiness, if the data points selected are good, does not line up at all (against null). While both view change as possible, the evaluation and process of change are quite different (against null).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Value Category</th>
<th>Russia</th>
<th>United States</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rationality</td>
<td>The “rational and pragmatic approach does not always work” for Russians. They can be obsessed with ideas but also driven by emotion (and the soul in particular), which is viewed as a valid source of knowledge. “More often, it is personal relations, feelings, and traditional values that determine a course of action. Westerners are more likely to depend on the cold facts and to do what works.” (Richmond 2009, 40–41) Reliance on fibs to avoid facing unfavorable facts. (Richmond 2009, 107).</td>
<td>Context is not important, but the point (the piece of information at the center) is critical. Precision, directness, and clarity about the point are expected. Thoughts should be organized linearly, using factual evidence as proof. (Althen 2003, 55–60) Americans look for and expect to find cause-and-effect relationships. (Althen 2003, 65)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Good and evil</td>
<td>The human soul is considered the darkest dark and the lightest light. (Fertelmeyster 2015, 93) Fear for the survival of the Russian soul bothers Russians – and Western values seem a particular threat. (Richmond 2009, 42)</td>
<td>“Americans assume that human nature is basically good, not basically evil” (Althen 2003, 19) Inasmuch as American culture is connected to Christianity, it also sees human nature as bad (Althen and Bennett 2011)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Happiness, pleasure</td>
<td>“Russian pessimism contrasts with American innocence and optimism. . . Russians expect things to go poorly and have learned to live with disappointments.” (Richmond 2009, 35)</td>
<td>“Americans expect things to go well, and they become annoyed when they do not” (Richmond 2009, 35)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mutability</td>
<td>Change of all kinds (but especially of character) tends to be resisted and slow. (Richmond 2009, xx,xxii,12,34)</td>
<td>Change is possible, and often desirable: Americans “have the idea that what happens in the future is within their control, or at least subject to their influence. The mature, sensible person, they think, sets goals for the future and works systematically toward them.” (Althen 2003, 18) People, like society and the environment, are improvable. (Althen 2003, 19)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Nature

The nature set of value orientations contains four value orientations (Table 13). The difference in fatalism, and the hostility to it from the US perspective suggest that the first category, relationship of man and nature, is more different than similar (against null). It is also quite difficult to make a case for sameness in the ways of knowing, given the preference for context and intuition for Russians, contrasted with the disdain for subjectivity and preference for “facts” on the US side (against null). The structure of nature is not sufficiently different at least using the data points presented here – both find chaos in the present and seek to overcome that (for null). The concept of time is also clearly different, for multiple reasons ranging from the emphasis on past or present to the difference in whether or not time is a commodity (against null).

(intentionally left blank)
The supernatural section contains three subcategories (Table 14). The first, relationship of man and the supernatural may not be developed enough to make a finding. However, in what was found, although the particulars are different, there is substantial similarity (for null). The providence section reveals a strong difference (against null).
knowledge of the cosmic order again probably needs further development. However, what was found points strongly in the direction of difference – Russia leans toward a single right way, while the US emphasizes pluralism (against null).

Table 14. (Author). Dyad Analysis: Supernatural Value Orientations.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Value Category</th>
<th>Russia</th>
<th>United States</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Relationship of man and the supernatural</td>
<td>“Messianism is still alive in Russia today, particularly among intellectuals, on the left as well as the right, who share a belief and pride in Russia as a great power with a special mission in the world” (Richmond 2009, 51)</td>
<td>“Americans generally believe that theirs is a superior country, probably the greatest country in the world” (Althen 2003, xxix)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Providence</td>
<td>“Russians willingly engage in lamenting over things big and small.” Routine emphasizing of what’s wrong without necessarily offering how to make it right … Russians would argue that it comes either from their genuine concern or from their genuine belief (often based on previous experiences—contextual knowledge) that “nothing ever changes here.” (Fertelmeyster 2015, 93)</td>
<td>The future is viewed with optimism (Saphiere 2015, 101)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Knowledge of the cosmic order</td>
<td>“Starting in the 15th century, Russia saw itself as the Third Rome—a true protector of the traditions of Orthodox Christianity and a source of spiritual salvation for the world. The word for “Russian Orthodoxy” in Russian is Pravoslavie. It has two roots—Pravyi (“correct,” “right”) and Slavit (“to praise”). The name strongly implies that there is a right way to praise God and it belongs to those who follow Pravoslavie (Fertelmeyster 2015, 91) “Russian culture has a long history of only one right way rooted in its religious tradition.” (Fertelmeyster 2015, 93) “The consensus of the Orthodox congregation was regarded as the truth—a singularity of truth in which there was no room for a pluralism of opinion.” (Richmond 2009, 24)</td>
<td>Americans hold to separation of church and state and view religious freedom (guaranteed by the government) positively. While many Americans are religious, there is a high level of religious pluralism including different denominations and religions. (Althen 2003, 120–24)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Relationships with People

The relationships with people category has five value orientations (Table 15). No data was found on the focus orientation (insufficient data was available in Trompenaars (1994), no conclusion). The norms section was quite different and does not support the null (against null). The identity section also reveals more dissimilarity than similarity (against null). Both Russia and the United States have variations in emotional expression, and both can appear uncaring. This section is too difficult to make a determination on (no conclusion). Both

S.W. Jones  Impacts of Culture in International Relations Processes  51
Russia and the US have forms of egalitarianism, though they are quite dissimilar when enacted (no conclusion).

Table 15. (Author). Dyad Analysis: Relationships with People Orientations.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Value Category</th>
<th>Russia</th>
<th>United States</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Norms</td>
<td>“In a culture that more often defines truth through emotions, the sense of what is morally right is often perceived as more right than what is legally right.” (Fertelmeyster 2015, 93)</td>
<td>The United States is “very rules bound; people are expected to behave in certain ways; rules are rules regardless of the situation; lawyers and contracts are everywhere; and the written word is generally binding (signs, contracts), reflecting what Fons Trompenaars calls universalism, the tendency to apply regulations uniformly. On the other hand . . . in their social lives U.S. Americans tend to desire freedom, choice, and a lack of obligation” (Saphiere 2015, 100)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identity</td>
<td>“Russians think of themselves as members of a community rather than as individuals” (Richmond 2009, 15)</td>
<td>“Americans, then, consider the ideal person to be an individualistic, self-reliant, independent person. They assume, incorrectly, that people from elsewhere share this value and this self-concept” (Althen 2003, 9). There is a belief in “the fundamental uniqueness of each individual” (Saphiere 2015, 100)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expression</td>
<td>A high level of emotional expression is normal, and appeals are made based on emotions and not merely facts. (Fertelmeyster 2015, 93) Russians “have a well-deserved reputation for extremes. When emotions are displayed, they are spontaneous and strong. Russian hospitality can be overwhelming, friendship all encompassing, compassion deep, loyalty long lasting, drinking heavy, celebrations boisterous, obsession with security paranoid, and violence vicious. With Russians, it is often all or nothing. Halfway measures simply do not suffice.” (Richmond 2009, 38) Can appear uncaring at times, unemotional. (Richmond 2009, 3)</td>
<td>Individualistic self-expression is preferred (Saphiere 2015, 100) “Words tend to be taken at face value” and body language cannot be counted on to mitigate or supersede words. (Saphiere 2015, 101) Americans have private thoughts that might never be shared with anyone, and confidentiality is expected if they are shared. (Althen 2003, 14). Americans “usually assume that conflicts or disagreements are best settled by means of forthright discussions among the people involved” but this expression is plain and direct. They do not mask their emotional responses, but are at the same time emotionally restrained, sometimes coming across as emotionless and cold. (Althen 2003, 28)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Focus Status</td>
<td>Russian egalitarianism “is a social philosophy that advocates the removal of inequities among persons and a more equal distribution of benefits” (Richmond 2009, 30)</td>
<td>“What is distinctive about the American outlook on the matter of equality are the underlying assumptions that (1) no matter what a person’s initial station in life, he or she has the opportunity to achieve high standing and (2) everyone, no matter how unfortunate, deserves some basic level of respectful treatment.” (Althen 2003, 15) The rags-to-riches story is much admired – status can be changed, and to do so is a good thing. (Saphiere 2015, 100)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Motivation

The final category is motivation, which has only one subcategory. Given Saphiere’s (2015) claim that fear is increasing as a motivator, no determination will be made in this category, as there is insufficient data (no conclusion).

Table 16. (Author). Dyad Analysis: Motivation Orientations.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Value Category</th>
<th>Russia</th>
<th>United States</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Motivational emphasis</td>
<td>“Fear is a major element of the Russian psyche, and strakh [fear] will be encountered in many places in Russia, even at the highest levels of government, where there is often fear of an outside enemy determined to destroy Russia” (Richmond 2009, 36)</td>
<td>Fear is increasing as a motivator, but has not traditionally been a strong motivator. (Saphiere 2015, 100) Guilt has been a stronger motivator in American society, and a distinction is seen between motivation from guilt and motivation from shame. (Wong and Tsai 2007)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Step 1 Results

In reviewing the above findings, and as summarized in Table 17, the dyad comparison does not support $H_{10}$. Thus, the null (below) is rejected in favor of the alternative hypothesis $H_1$. The finding of Step 1 of this research is that the states are culturally different in terms of values-orientations.

$H_1$ The states are culturally different in terms of values-orientations.

$H_{10}$ The states are not culturally different in terms of values-orientations.

With this established, the paper can now move on to Step 2 and the consideration of a particular case.

Table 17. (Author). Findings For and Against $H_{10}$.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Values Category</th>
<th>More Similarity than Difference (for null)</th>
<th>More Difference than Similarity (against null)</th>
<th>No Conclusion or Not Enough Information</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Self</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Family</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Society</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human Nature</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nature</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Supernatural</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relationships with People</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motivation</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Th Totals are not provided in the table given that this is not a quantitative study. However, even if those items that are for the null (4) and those that are inconclusive (7) are totaled, they are still quite fewer in number (11) than those that are against the null (19).)

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Step 2 Findings

Report on Actual Procedure

After Step 1 one complete, Step 2 was initiated. Potential sources for the PMDA had been gathered across two months (October through the first part of December 2016). A Google Alert was registered for two different queries: “plutonium management and disposition agreement” and “Russia ‘United States’ plutonium.” Altogether more than 60 sources were gathered in this way and through the ProQuest platform (Appendix 2), though not all were ultimately used.

The initial process of attempting the Step 2 process tracing was overwhelming, and it was difficult to tell where to start and stop the bounds of the issue area – a challenge anticipated by Bennett and Checkel (2015). In the initial attempt to develop a timeline per Collier (2011), the scope of the project broadened to include all of US-Russian relations. After all, how can the PMDA be interpreted apart from the larger context of the relationship? However, the scope of such a project was simply not feasible.

As this first broadening was occurring, a second potential pivot appeared: It would be possible to refocus the present research on the “Reset” initiated by the administration of US President Barack H. Obama, which is widely understood to have failed. The particular details of this case of the Reset, upon initial inspection, appear to be very promising for process tracing. As opposed to the PMDA, the details are much more human than technical. Thus, questions of cultural difference as a causal factor are much more approachable in that context. However, once again, a pivot to the Reset was outside the scope of the present research.
It was thus determined to return to the initial target issue area of the PMDA, and to use only straw-in-the-wind tests, which would neither confirm nor reject $H_2$, as well as to look for smoking-gun tests which could confirm but not reject $H_2$. Neither the hoop test nor the doubly-decisive tests were appropriate given the complexity of US-Russian relations outside of the particular PMDA issue area. Given the time constraints under which this project was completed, the decision was made that if any straw-in-the-wind test pointed in the affirmative direction for $H_2$ that the research would conclude immediately, leaving further exploration for future iterations of research. Sub-Hypotheses were developed based on Step 1.

Hypotheses

The following sub-hypotheses were developed based on those cultural value orientations that were found to be against $H_{10}$. As noted above, the research process will conclude if any one of these is found to be favorable to the $H_2$ in a straw-in-the-wind test. The intent of the present paper is not to provide a conclusive determination of any of the following, but instead to provide findings that may be suggestive for future research.

$H_{21}$ The difference between Russia and the US in the values orientation “individualism / interdependence” had an impact on the relationship between the two states.

$H_{22}$ The difference between Russia and the US in the values orientation “age” had an impact on the relationship between the two states.

$H_{23}$ The difference between Russia and the US in the values orientation “relational orientations” had an impact on the relationship between the two states.

$H_{24}$ The difference between Russia and the US in the values orientation “authority” had an impact on the relationship between the two states.

$H_{25}$ The difference between Russia and the US in the values orientation “mobility” had an impact on the relationship between the two states.
The difference between Russia and the US in the values orientation “social reciprocity” had an impact on the relationship between the two states.

The difference between Russia and the US in the values orientation “group membership” had an impact on the relationship between the two states.

The difference between Russia and the US in the values orientation “formality” had an impact on the relationship between the two states.

The difference between Russia and the US in the values orientation “property ownership” had an impact on the relationship between the two states.

The difference between Russia and the US in the values orientation “rationality” had an impact on the relationship between the two states.

The difference between Russia and the US in the values orientation “happiness / pleasure” had an impact on the relationship between the two states.

The difference between Russia and the US in the values orientation “mutability” had an impact on the relationship between the two states.

The difference between Russia and the US in the values orientation “relationship of man and nature” had an impact on the relationship between the two states.

The difference between Russia and the US in the values orientation “ways of knowing” had an impact on the relationship between the two states.

The difference between Russia and the US in the values orientation “concept of time” had an impact on the relationship between the two states.

The difference between Russia and the US in the values orientation “providence” had an impact on the relationship between the two states.

The difference between Russia and the US in the values orientation “knowledge of the cosmic order” had an impact on the relationship between the two states.

The difference between Russia and the US in the values orientation “norms” had an impact on the relationship between the two states.

The difference between Russia and the US in the values orientation “identity” had an impact on the relationship between the two states.
Summary of PMDA

This summary of the program was written around the time of the 2010 update:

The Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement (PMDA) signed by Vice President [Al] Gore and Russian Prime Minister [Mikhail] Kasyanov in 2000 committed each side to dispose of no less than 34 metric tons of weapon-grade plutonium. The Protocol is essential for full implementation of the PMDA since the Russian program set forth in 2000 proved incompatible with Russia’s nuclear energy strategy and was, thus, not financially viable. Russia’s announcement of its nuclear strategy in 2006, and clarification of its preferred disposition approach in 2007, provided a basis for the two sides to update the PMDA via this Protocol in a manner that coincides with that strategy. Existing nuclear arms reductions agreements have already led to the removal of weapon grade plutonium from the U.S. and Russian defense programs. More is envisioned to be removed as further reductions take place. The PMDA, as amended by the Protocol, details the goals, monitoring and other conditions to ensure that disposition of that plutonium is transparent and irreversible.(Crook 2010, 681)

Timeline:

1990s Clinton Administration suggests disposal, Russians object because this seems less permanent than using the plutonium in a reactor, eventually mixed oxide (MOX) is agreed upon.7
7/24/1998 Initial Agreement for Cooperation8
6/6/2000 Completion of Bilateral Agreement9
9/1/2000 Gore and Kayanov sign PMDA Agreement10
January 2002 Bush Supported but did not Fund MOX11
2006 A first Protocol is agreed upon12
8/1/2007 Work begins on MOX Site in South Carolina13
11/20/2007 Joint Statement of Mutual Understanding (Disposition Plan)14
Fall 2009 Areva had begun work on MOX facility in South Carolina15
4/13/2010 Sec. Clinton and Lavrov Sign PMDA Update Protocol16 resolving several key issues. Disarmament still expected to take decades.17

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7 (Wald 2010)
9 (M2 Presswire 2000)
10 (Anonymous 2010)
11 (Hafemeister and Zarimpas 2003)
12 (Targeted News Service 2011b)
13 (Targeted News Service 2011a)
14 (BBC Monitoring Former Soviet Union 2007)
15 (Lauvergeon 2009)
16 (Department Of State. The Office of Website Management 2010)
17 (Wald 2010)
2010 Obama and Mevdeev held a joint press conference in which Obama praised the PMDA.\(^{18}\)

5/20/2011 Russia ratified the PMDA and two protocols.\(^{19}\)

7/13/2011 Exchange of diplomatic notes between Sec. Clinton and Lavrov marks entry into force of PMDA.\(^{20}\)

11/16/2012 National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) announces that it has exceeded goal of 200 kg of plutonium MOX for fiscal year 2012.\(^{21}\)

April 2013 Obama administration signals problems with affordability with MOX disposal.\(^{22}\)

5/15/2013 US Senators from Georgia and South Carolina protest the Obama administrations plan to slow or scrap the MOX program.\(^{23}\)

6/26/2013 The NNSA issued a fact sheet claiming that “unanticipated cost increases for the MOX project and plutonium disposition program have prompted the Department to slow down the MOX project and other activities associated with the current plutonium disposition strategy while determining whether there are options to complete the mission more efficiently.”\(^{24}\)

3/19/2014 South Carolina sues the Department of Energy over the MOX site, which was associated with $3 billion in cost overruns, and delays, pushing the project back to a 2019 start (three years behind schedule). The administration had proposed a “cold standby” shutdown.\(^{25}\) The apparent preference instead is dilution and storage, which Russia believes is reversible.\(^{26}\)

9/24/2015 The MOX facility is at least 2/3 complete. Tension with Russia is cited by former Secretary of Energy Richardson as a reason to keep the project going. No alternative to MOX that fulfills the agreement currently exists.\(^{27}\)

2/4/2016 Former US Senator Lugar (who had previously been engaged in the PMDA) warns that changing the method of disposition away from MOX would violate the PMDA.\(^{28}\)

April 2016 Obama invites Putin to a nuclear summit. Putin declines “over insufficient prominence offered to Russia at the event.” Putin also cites Russian compliance with the PMDA and US failure to complete the MOX facility.\(^{29}\) Meanwhile, South Carolina Senators protest Obama administration’s plan to scrap the MOX program, citing Putin’s statements.\(^{30}\)

4/11/2016 US Embassy spokesman Stevens in Russia declares that the US has not violated the PMDA.\(^{31}\)

\(^{18}\) (Targeted News Service 2013a)
\(^{19}\) (Targeted News Service 2011b)
\(^{20}\) (Targeted News Service 2011c)
\(^{21}\) (Targeted News Service 2012)
\(^{22}\) (Clements, Lyman, and von Hippel 2013; Gellatly 2013)
\(^{23}\) (Targeted News Service 2013a)
\(^{24}\) (Targeted News Service 2013b)
\(^{25}\) (Colman 2014)
\(^{26}\) (Oliphant 2016)
\(^{27}\) (PR Newswire 2015)
\(^{28}\) (U.S. Newswire 2016)
\(^{29}\) (Dolgov 2016)
\(^{30}\) (Targeted News Service 2016)
\(^{31}\) (Interfax : Russia & CIS Diplomatic Panorama 2016a)
4/12/2016 US State Department deputy spokesperson Toner says that the decision to change from MOX to dilute and dispose would not require renegotiation of the PMDA.32

10/3/2016 Citing unfriendly actions by the United States towards Russia and US noncompliance with PMDA, Russia suspends the PMDA.33 Russia says that it may reinstate the pact if Washington agrees to a list of demands,34 including reducing troops in NATO countries in Eastern Europe and cancelling sanctions against Russia.35 Russia states that its own unprocessed plutonium will not be used for bombmaking or other military purposes.36 Russia also clarifies that the suspension is only in cooperation with the US, that it is reversible, and that it “is not renouncing its obligations in the nuclear disarmament field, including decrease in number of nuclear material involved in weapons programs.”37

10/3/2016 The US suspends negotiations with Russia over the Syria ceasefire, also referencing the PMDA decision by Russia.38

10/4/2016 Russia announced suspension of another nuclear agreement, this one on scientific research and development, not directly related to the PMDA.39

10/4/2016 US Under Secretary of State Gottemoeller states that the US has been offering talks to Russia about the disposition method but that Russia’s rejection of consultations has caused regret for the US.40

10/19/2016 Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Ryabkov claims that as early as the mid-2000’s that it was clear that the US was not acting like a partner.41

10/26/2016 Russian Federation Council voted in support of the suspension of PMDA citing US changes to the 2010 Protocol, but also citing strategic differences, including forward command posts in Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, and Estonia. The Russian Federation Council also cites the Sergei Magnitsky Rule, sanctions against Russia (and territories, legal entitites, and individuals). The bill suspending the PMDA stipulates its resumption if certain conditions are met, including the repeal of Magnitsky Act and reduction in NATO forces near Russian borders.42

12/12/2016 The US commits to International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Monitoring for disposition of six (metric) tons of plutonium. US confirms plans to use the dilute and dispose method and commits to not using the material in nuclear weapons again.43

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32 (The Philippines News Agency (PNA) 2016)
33 (Gardiner 2016)
34 (Kremlin Press Service 2016)
35 (Parfitt 2016)
36 (Oliphant 2016)
37 (Interfax : Russia & CIS General Newswire 2016a)
38 (Xinhua News Agency - CEIS 2016)
39 (BBC Monitoring Former Soviet Union 2016)
40 (Interfax : Russia & CIS General Newswire 2016b)
41 (Interfax : Russia & CIS Diplomatic Panorama 2016b)
42 (Interfax : Russia & CIS General Newswire 2016c)
43 (Asia News Monitor 2016)
Findings

To frame the findings section, an extended quote from Putin is useful. This excerpt is taken from a transcript that Senators Lindsay Graham and Tim Scott from South Carolina included in their letter to the Obama administration in April 2016:

*Question to which Putin is responding: Ilya Lochkanov: ‘Good afternoon, Mr President. My name is Ilya Lochkanov and I am from Belgorod. What interests me is the following question. A nuclear security summit recently took place in Washington, and many countries attended, but Russia did not - neither you, nor any Russian representative. Were you invited to take part? Why did things happen this way? My second question is more personal: Could you describe the Russia of your dreams? Thank you.’*

Putin: Let us start with the more important question, the second one. Russia should be an independent, strong, effective, modern and future-focused country. It should be a country in which it is comfortable, agreeable and prestigious to live.

As for your other question, whether I was invited or not, yes, I was invited, and my colleague invited me personally. Frankly speaking, I was not opposed to the idea of taking part, but our experts in the nuclear field and the Foreign Ministry did not recommend it for the following reasons.

First, as it became clear, this was an event 'amongst ourselves', a primarily American event. Normally, events of this sort and level take place on a consensus basis, with the possibility of taking part in drafting the final resolutions. In this case, however, it was all divided into five groups, I believe, and they proposed that we take part in only one. This meant that our representatives could make their contribution to the final decisions only in one area. In other words, we would not have been able to take part in drafting any overall documents that might have been adopted. However, a big nuclear power like Russia cannot take part in an event such as this and not have the possibility to influence the drafting of the final resolutions. We said so directly and frankly to our partners some time ago now.

The other circumstance is that back in the early 2000s, the Americans and we agreed on destroying weapons grade plutonium. This agreement covered surplus weapons-grade plutonium produced at US enterprises and at ours. This is the highly enriched fissile material that is used to make nuclear weapons. Each side had 34 tonnes. We signed this agreement and settled on the procedures for the material's destruction, agreed that this would be done on an industrial basis, which required the construction of special facilities. Russia fulfilled its obligations in this regard and built these facilities, but our American partners did not.

Moreover, only recently, they announced that they plan to dispose of their accumulated highly enriched nuclear fuel by using a method other than what we...
agreed on when we signed the corresponding agreement, but by diluting and storing it in certain containers. This means that they preserve what is known as the breakout potential, in other words it can be retrieved, reprocessed and converted into weapons-grade plutonium again. This is not what we agreed on. Now we will have to think about what to do about this and how to respond to this. By all indications, this will also be an irritant, which will provoke a corresponding reaction and a search for new offshores. However, our partners should understand that jokes aside, all their efforts to promote information products aimed against Russia are one thing, but serious issues, especially with regard to nuclear arms, are quite a different matter and one should be able to meet one's obligations. (Targeted News Service 2016)

The goal of Step 2 of this research is to identify a single-straw-in-the-wind pointing in the direction of a potential affirmation of $H_2$. While in the case of the above excerpt several such tests may be attempted, it was determined that $H_{210}$ and $H_{214}$, which bear certain similarities to one another, would be appropriate for the purpose. They are repeated here along with the descriptions from their respective tables from Step 1 (above):

$H_{210}$ The difference between Russia and the US in the values orientation “rationality” had an impact on the relationship between the two states.

Rationality

The “rational and pragmatic approach does not always work” for Russians. They can be obsessed with ideas but also driven by emotion (and the soul in particular), which is viewed as a valid source of knowledge. “More often, it is personal relations, feelings, and traditional values that determine a course of action. Westerners are more likely to depend on the cold facts and to do what works.” (Richmond 2009, 40–41)

Reliance on fibs to avoid facing unfavorable facts. (Richmond 2009, 107)

$H_{214}$ The difference between Russia and the US in the values orientation “ways of knowing” had an impact on the relationship between the two states.

Ways of knowing

Some level of intuitive knowledge is expected, based on the high-context communication and soul-level knowledge (Fertelmeyster 2015, 93)

With Russians, the world is perceived to be irrational: “one thinks and acts as if not able always rely on objective methods of analysis and logic. This is opposed to American positivism.” (Bergelson 2003, 2)

Americans tend to use low-context communication; clarity is valued. (Saphiere 2015, 101)

“Scientific facts,” as Americans think of them, are assumed to exist independently of the individuals who study or talk about them and the most reliable facts come in the form of numbers. Emotions, subjectivity, and theory, on the other hand are generally distrusted. (Althen 2003, 61–63)
When analyzing the change from MOX to another form of disposal, the following represents an approach that appears consistent with American rationality: context is not important, but the point (in this case plutonium disposal) is critical.

‘Axing MOX wouldn’t give Russia the right to scrap the agreement anyway,’ said Greg Jones, a senior defense policy analyst at the RAND Corporation. He said that’s because the 2010 disposition deal allows Russia and the U.S. to use other methods -- though it’s not clear what that method would be apart from MOX. ‘Certainly not using MOX raises the question of how the U.S. would dispose of its [plutonium], but it does not void the agreement,’ Jones said. (Colman 2014)

Contrast this to how Russia sees the agreement as represented in this quote from the announcement of the cancelation of the agreement. There appears to be both contextual and relational grounding:

In connection with a fundamental change of the circumstances and the emergence of a threat to strategic stability as a result of unfriendly actions by the United States towards Russia and the United States' inability to ensure compliance with the assumed commitments to utilizing excessive weapons grade plutonium under international treaties and also proceeding from the need for urgent measures to protect the security of Russia. (Gardiner 2016)

These interactions do not prove that the cultural differences suggested in $H_{210}$ and $H_{214}$ did in fact affect the relationship between the United States and Russia. While neither sufficient nor necessary to establish a causal relationship, the findings are suggestive. Initial investigation reveals that more such straw-in-the-wind tests would yield similarly suggestive findings, such as when Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov said (after Russia had suspended the PMDA) that “the Americans have not acted like partners from the very start as regards their promise to provide us with financial assistance,” and then linked this claim back to American conduct in the mid-2000s (Interfax : Russia & CIS Diplomatic Panorama 2016b). Further study, it seems, is warranted.
Conclusions

This paper has sought to investigate the relationship between culture and international relations. In particular, the idea of cultural value orientations was introduced and explored as a way to generate deductive qualitative profiles of states. A state dyad (the United States and Russia) was then selected using methodologies intended to minimize researcher influence over the selection process. That dyad was then compared using new data and $H_{10}$ was rejected in favor of $H_1$: the states are culturally different in terms of values-orientations.

With Step 1 thus completed, Step 2 involved the use of process tracing to investigate whether cultural difference had any causal effects on the relationship between the dyad vis-à-vis a particular issue area (the Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement). The test applied was a straw-in-the-wind test, which was not intended to affirm or reject the hypothesis, but instead to get an initial read of how the hypothesis might play out when tested. The straw-in-the-wind test leaned in favor of the hypothesis, and it is thus the conclusion of this paper that future research in this direction is warranted.

Directions for Future Research

Multiple directions for future research are possible. Much more development of the cultural values orientations is warranted if they are to be used. No attempt was made to update the research in each of those particular value orientations, though it is likely that such work has been undertaken.

The PMDA issue is more fertile ground than the author had originally anticipated. There are several authors whose work was not thoroughly explore but which would likely provide good direction for more process tracing tests in this areas (i.e. Dolzikova 2016; Hecker 2016; Podvig 2016; Yakovenko 2016; Zolotov 2016).
As mentioned in the ‘report on actual procedure’ in Step 2 of the Methodology section, the failed US-Russia “Reset” initiated by President Obama would be an excellent follow-up project. The hoop test would likely be able to be utilized in that context as well. More fully developed country profiles would be useful for that purpose.

Limitations

There are numerous limitations to this paper. Most significantly, the finding to Step 2 is only suggestive and should not be interpreted as anything more than this. This paper is not a thorough examination of the PMDA. Moreover, no attempt was made to locate the PMDA issue-areas within the larger context of Russian-US relations. The culture specific profiles relied on too few authors. Some of the value orientations used in the culture profiles were not distinguished clearly enough from one another by this author, and so more work is necessary there as well. Moreover, culture is clearly only one of the many potential causal factors that should be considered when evaluating the US-Russia relationship regarding the PMDA.

Final Reflection

Despite these limitations, there is much more needed to be done in this area of research. While Friedrichs’s (2016) exploration of self-worth as the basis for an intercultural theory of international relations is interesting, it is also too limited. Furthermore, there is a need to explore the practical implications of the types of differences discussed herein. A likely direction is found in the capacity for adaptive constructivist frame-shifting (M. J. Bennett 1986, 1998; Janet M. Bennett and Bennett 2004; M. J. Bennett 2013a; Jones 2015, unpublished). Perception and misperception are of central importance in international relations (Jervis 1976). If culture affects the accuracy of perception, it must be considered.
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Appendix 1: Potential Dyads

Combinations without repetition (n=7, r=2)

Using Items: China, France, Germany, Japan, Russia, United Kingdom, United States

(Alphabetical Order)

List has 21 entries.

- China, France
- China, Germany
- China, Japan
- China, Russia
- China, United Kingdom
- China, United States
- France, Germany
- France, Japan
- France, Russia
- France, United Kingdom
- France, United States
- Germany, Japan
- Germany, Russia
- Germany, United Kingdom
- Germany, United States
- Japan, Russia
- Japan, United Kingdom
- Japan, United States
- Russia, United Kingdom
- Russia, United States
- United Kingdom, United States

List of permutations calculated by:

Appendix 2: PMDA Issue Area Resources

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