Bringing Back the Normality:
Norms and Interests in Germany and Japan

Sam-Sang JO, Ph.D.
Faculty of Letters
Chuo University
Japan
samsangjo@gmail.com

Prepared for Presentation at the International Studies Association International Conference, Hong Kong, June 15-17, 2017
The contemporary use of the term ‘abnormal,’ ‘deviant,’ or ‘psychopath’ describes people in a number of different categories, ranging from those who have committed extremely violent acts to those whose behavior might simply be described as eccentric. Foucault (1988) viewed the word ‘abnormality’ not as reflecting a single characteristic, but rather a complex variety of psychological responses and reactions. Foucault stressed its *relativity* in a sense that abnormality varies according to the circumstances, time, place, age, mental health of the individual, and even according to the social status of the person who does the defining. More importantly, as paradoxical as it seems, Foucault did not necessarily regard abnormality as a *negative* characteristic because those defined as abnormal often possess insights into the human condition that could be useful and productive. Much the same as Foucault pointed out, Dutton (2012), deconstructing the often misunderstood diagnosis of those labelled as abnormal, so-called psychopaths, through bold on-the-ground reporting, also mentioned that in controlled quantities abnormality is not entirely disruptive to society and, more significantly, it has a *positive* characteristic in some fields (e.g. sports, politics, or business). He put forward the argument that the abnormal activities of a minority of people are tailor-made for success in the twenty-first century and, furthermore, become imperative in all societies because those may contribute to social development and change by helping create the new and abandon the old norms.

As Hagström (2009, 2014), Soeya et al. (2011), Berger (1993, 1996, 2002), Katzenstein (1996), and Inoguchi et al. (2001) pointed out, in the current Westphalian international system where most of normal states are constitutionally able to deploy military force and attempt to maximise their national interests, some states can be referred to as ‘abnormal’ if they choose responses that might *differ* from those of most of normal states in identical situations. For instance, Germany and Japan have emerged as a different kind of great power in the post-war period, favouring diplomacy over force and abstaining from the pursuit of self-serving advantages. In other words, German and Japanese foreign and security policy has become abnormal in a *positive* sense because they have cultivated as low a profile as possible on security policy matters and have embraced communitarian goals by using positively, or restrain willingly, their abnormal modal personalities. They have been content with playing a secondary role on military issues, have been central players on economic issues, and have become world leaders on issues of environmental and aid policy. Maull (1990/91) argued that Germany and Japan have become “civilian powers” or “prototypes” of “a new type of international power” that have helped “civilise international relations through the development of the international rule of law” and “stabilise region in Europe and East Asia and world as well.” Even though a few states might be similarly described from time
to time, history is not replete with examples of great power’s self-restraint. Thus, it is no exaggeration to suggest that Germany and Japan had been viewed as the ‘abnormal state’ par excellence.

But the history of German and Japanese abnormality is not a seamless one. Over the decades, there has been propensity precisely for Germany and Japan to escape from what has been abnormal for themselves. Almost seventy years after the end of World War II, German and Japanese implicit and explicit tendency towards the return to normality seems to be more vivid. As Angela Merkel’s tough response to the Euro crisis demonstrated substantially, Germany’s power seems to embolden its leaders to turn away from multilateralism and to pursue a more assertive and self-interested policy. In a case of Japan, Abe Shinzo—who passed without hesitance controversial new security bill, ‘collective self-defense,’ and laid out a timetable for revision of Japan’s peace Constitution—is searching for a ‘normal state’ with a military or a great power status in the world by using the theme ‘Japan is back.’ It seems that German and Japanese foreign and security policy is ‘finally’ in the process of normalisation acquiring political, and probably military, power commensurate with its almost universally acknowledged great economic power. In other words, at the beginning of the 21st century, the German and Japanese ‘questions’ reemerge in a new form.

This research attempts to explore what kinds of abnormal state Germany and Japan were/are, and more specifically, what have been the sources of abnormality, whether there has been a fundamental shift to orient German and Japanese foreign and security policy towards embracing normality, what have made Germany and Japan to strive to escape from what has been abnormal for themselves, and whether Germany and Japan can become ‘normal states’ with ameliorating the regional stability in Europe and East Asia. To answer these questions, the first chapter provides a theoretical framework. The second and third chapters explore the nature of abnormality and the path to normalisation of German and Japanese foreign and security policy in the post-war and the post-cold war periods. The last chapter offers some reflections on some of the conspicuous remarks of German and Japanese normalisation for the future of Europe and East Asia.

**Normality vs. abnormality nexus: norms, interests and nation states**

Such constructivists as Berger (1998) and Katzenstein (1996) regarded Germany and Japan as ‘abnormal’ in that they relinquished their sovereign right to wage wars and to use military force as means of settling international disputes. According to them, peaceful cultural ‘norms’ are at the heart of German and Japanese abnormality. Their works have made an important scholarly
contribution to two countries’ foreign and security studies. The fact that a number of kindred studies have followed in their wake proves that the influence of the early ‘constructivists’ on the analysis of German and Japanese abnormality cannot be overestimated. Nonetheless, despite the richness of their insights, there are the incompleteness and limitations in explaining German and Japanese abnormality as following.

Firstly, the constructivist school tended to emphasise constitutiveness, highlighting the presence and evolution of intersubjective norms that shape states and their interaction. The constructivists argued that norms matter primarily as independent variable and abnormality is on the basis of the norms. However, the constructivist studies overlook or gloss over the another aspect—that is, interests—of the state’s behaviour. As Krasner (1999: 72) claims, constructivists have overemphasised the significance of international norms and have understated the importance of interests in global politics. Kissinger (2011) noted that “nations have pursued self-interest more frequently than high-minded principle,” and “[t]here is little evidence to suggest that this… is likely to change in the decades ahead.” It means that interests also can be perceived to be one of most important independent variables and vital elements of motivation and nature of states.

Secondly, the constructivists have tendency to regard German and Japanese abnormality as excessively or naively peaceful. But there are the negative adjectives associated with Germany and Japan, including ‘hegemonic,’ ‘arrogant,’ ‘selfish,’ and ‘nationalistic.’ Most glaringly, contrary to the constructivists’ expectations, throughout the Eurozone crisis, Germanisation of all Eurozone economies through austerity and structural reforms is inconsistent with the expectation that norm could restrain major increases in German power. Japan’s uncharacteristic assertiveness and unwillingness to compromise over territorial disputes and prime ministerial visits to Yasukuni Shrine undoubtedly do not match with its peace-loving image. In other words, in spite of the fact that the Germany and Japan have internalised antimilitarist norms since the Second World War, the very same norms have not prevent Germany and Japan from pursuing their national interests in the non-security fields.

Thirdly, it could be faulted for viewing ‘pacifist or antimilitarist’ Germany and Japan as an inherently identical group, thereby disregarding the different nature of their antimilitarism and their behaviours. The constructivists cannot illuminate why it has become much more difficult for Japan to exercise civilian or normative power than for Germany and why Japanese assertiveness to exercise its economic power is less fraught with obstacles than Germany.

In sum, a preoccupation with the norms is critically able to hinder understanding of a degree of abnormality in Germany and Japan, because the abnormality of state is not always the outcome
of norms, but could also be of interests. In other words, with the a priori separation of norms and interests, we cannot achieve an adequate understanding of their abnormality. Ultimately, the concept of interests can add balance to prevailing trends of casting German and Japanese foreign and security policy into purely normative terms. Nonetheless, it is not my goal to diminish the constructivism to the study of abnormality of Germany and Japan. On the contrary, this research upholds the assumptions that a focus on the interplay between norms and interests helps to better understand the historically and ideologically conditioned construction of abnormality and to define more comprehensibly the characteristics of abnormality and trajectory of normalisation in Germany and Japan.

The nature of abnormality and the path to normalisation of German and Japanese foreign and security policy can be sorted along two axes. The first axis is a measure of the norms in security policy. At one extreme is the ‘militarist’ norm that the use of military force is regarded as the most important in ensuring the states’ survival and protection of sovereignty from external threats. At the other extreme is the ‘antimilitarist’ norm that the use of military force should be prevented and disputes should be settled without recourse to violence. A nature and trajectory of abnormality is also captured by the second axis, the state’s interests in foreign policy. At one extreme is the ‘national’ interest based on the determination to maximise the selfish interests without caring about the interests of any other country in international affairs. At the other extreme is the ‘common’ interest based on the motivation to make a greater contribution to the international community, largely without the calculation of benefit and cost.

By expanding on the relationship between norm and interest, four groups, whereby normality vs. abnormality nexus is relationally constituted, can be illuminated so as to better understand the features of abnormality and pathway to normalisation in Germany and Japan: normal state, abnormal-normal state, normal-abnormal state, and abnormal state (see figure 1).

![Figure 1: Types of Nation States](image-url)
More specifically speaking, normal state in the international arena is characterised by a sovereign security and foreign policy, that is, not being constrained to use military forces and to pursue its own national interests. Most of states in the world are normal states which live with a geographically bounded sovereign community and are armed with military, diplomats, ambition and national interests. Abnormal normal state refers to the entity whereby the state is distinguished by approval toward the use of force but pursuit of common interests. Abnormal normal state would build an independent, full spectrum military that could use force, but it prefers itself to constrain its national interests and to maintain a multilateral cooperation with its neighbours. Contrary to abnormal normal state, normal abnormal state means that state does not adopt strategy based on augmenting its traditional military power or territorial expansion, but it pursues economic interests with clearly instrumental strategies. Because the use of force for territory, honour, or prestige goes out of fashion and favour, it seeks to achieve prestige by increasing prosperity while limiting its exposure to power politics. Abnormal state is characterised by not only its unwillingness to play a militarist role in the management of international security but also its political will to constrain national interest in foreign policy arena. Hence being an abnormal state is to demonstrate a distinct lack of instrumental, national interest-seeking practices, as well as the reticence of the use of force.

Based on this theoretical framework, this research examines the inherent characteristics of abnormality, a proclivity for normality, a path to normalisation and the future of abnormality in German and Japanese foreign and security policy in both the post-war and the post-cold war periods.

The German normalisation: from the abnormal state to the abnormal normal state

For the past 150 years, the German problems had dominated European history. Germany persistently had remained a focal point of unrest because it was too strong to be thoroughly integrated into the confines of Europe, but not strong enough to escape Europe and become a world power. In addition, pre-war Germany’s ambiguous spiritual and strategic position between East and Wes, and its size in the centre of the continent (Mittellage) as well, left Germany to be isolated and vulnerable and to become increasingly anti-Western, making it an inherently “destabilising rather than a stabilising force in Europe” (Thatcher, 1993: 791). To a certain extent, these factors created a precondition for rising of Nazi, that is, “the climax of the German rejection of the Western world” (Winkler, 2007: 571). Authoritarianism prevailed over democracy at home. Power politics dominated over commercial expansion abroad. Its fascist and military regime formed the military
alliance, adopted autarchic policies, waged imperialist wars, and conducted brutally violent military campaigns in the territories they conquered, which escalated into a genocidal Holocaust (Katzenstein, 2005: 96). It is said that pre-war Germany was a “microcosm of the political developments as well as tragedies of the twentieth century” (Markovits and Reich, 1997: 34). Put simply, in the thirty-years war that defined world politics between 1914 and 1945, Germany, while seeking obsessed militarism and national interests, was revisionist power or super-normal state.

The cold war period

Post-war Germany had developed an abnormality which premised the rise of the ‘culture of restraint.’ Germany, blaming the armed forces for the failure of party democracy in the 1930s, was committed to the eradication of the old militarism, whereas Germany nurtured Gemeinwohl (common interest) within the multilateral networks of governance in preference to national interest. Germany’s antimilitarism on the one hand and its self-restraint on national interest on the other, gave pause to standard interpretations of great power politics. And a sizeable body of scholarship claims that Germany, once at home in the realm of power politics, had emerged as a different kind of great power, now more concerned with the peaceful advance of multilateral networks of governance.

Norm: antimilitarism based on consensus

In the early post-war period Germany was overwhelmed by the task of trying to survive. In the midst of the chaos and misery the war had left behind, the primary concern of Germany as well as the international community was how to eradicate the old militarism in Germany in order to prevent the reemergence of a German militarism. It was imperative that Germany had to demonstrate that the new political systems differed from the old and its commitment to reticence toward the use of force was well-grounded. Germany’s antimilitarism had expression in the Basic Law, so-called a ‘peace Constitution,’ promulgated in 1949 (Berger, 1996: 332). Specific evidence of the Basic Law’s inherent reticence for the use of force can be found in Article 26 of the Basic Law which prohibited the Federal Republic from fighting wars of aggression, criminalising “acts tending to and undertaken with intent to disturb the peaceful relations between nations, especially to prepare for a war of aggression” (Basic Law, 1949).

However, just one year after the ratification of of Basic Law Germany was forced to rethink their antimilitarism because of the emergence of the cold war—the potential threat of Communism and the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950—and, for that reason, the growing pressure from the
United States. Under these conditions, the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) led by Chancellor Konrad Adenauer judged that they had no choice but to undo somewhat the antimilitary policy by pursuing West Germany’s remilitarisation and North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) membership to secure Germany from attack by the Soviet Union. Yet, the Social Democrats launched attacks on Adenauer’s new security policy, being against rearmament and NATO membership in the name of ‘peace’ and putting instead a high priority on the reunification of the two German states and the neutrality that would serve as a bridge between the East and West. In spite of the Social Democrats’ persistent opposition, the strict antimilitarism of the original Basic Law was soon overshadowed by Constitutional amendment pushed by Adenauer’s majority government in 1954. The amendment, particularly implicating Article 79 (1), paved the way for Germany’s remilitarisation and NATO membership by making it easier for Germany to commit to international security institutions and regimes. At last, in 1955, Germany rearmed and joined NATO (Miller, 2010: 200). Yet suffice it to say that the Constitutional provision did not mean the abandonment of antimilitarism. Rather it did just as much to ensonce Germany in the post-war antimilitarism in that Article 87 (a) empowered the newly formed federal armed forces to be used exclusively for the purpose of defending Germany and NATO territory and to be deployed “only to the extent expressly permitted by this Basic Law” (Basic Law, 1949).

Meanwhile, at the Bad Godesberg conference of 1959, the Social Democratic Party (SPD) had accepted the necessity and value of German rearmament and NATO membership. What led them to agree to the principles of post-war German security policy shaped by the CDU, was, firstly, the fact that in the 1953 election the SPD made only modest gains, while in 1957 the CDU actually received an absolute majority, something no other party in German history had been able to achieve. The worsening electoral prospects for the SPD subsequently generated internal pressures for the party in order to appeal more effectively to the German electorate as a whole. These pressures culminated in the development of the Godesberger Programm at the Bad Godesberg conference where the SPD transforming itself into a Volkspartei accepted the direction of security policy shaped by the CDU (Baker et al., 1981: 7-8). Secondly, the Social Democrats were not distrustful of the Christian Democrats’ principles of security policy. Rather, there was considerable consensus among the Christian Democrats and the Social Democrats in that both of them were deeply suspicious of the armed forces and blamed them for the failure of party democracy in the 1930s. They viewed militarism as a destructive force that had to be contained, both domestically, through the marginalisation of radical ‘anti-system’ forces, and internationally, through policies of engagement and integration into multilateral institutions.
For fifty years after the end of the Second World War, deeply imbued with the antimilitarism which became the animating norm that guided the CDU and SPD’s security policy, Germany had assiduously avoided the use of military power, had not made any deliberate effort to increase its power projection capabilities, and did not strive to assert itself once the cold war had routinised East-West relations. Germany had developed not only Constitutional constraints but also political mechanisms such as a democratic political control over the military. Germany’s soldiers were to regard themselves as ‘citizens in uniform’ responsible for acts carried out under orders. Germany was characterised by an almost pacifist stance which planted deep roots, given the Bonn Republic’s efforts to eradicate militarism (Berger, 1996: 332; Hyde-Price, 2003: 186). Germany had been relatively happy with this role, and so had its allies.

*Interest: Gemeinwohl with the Western alliance*

While it proved its commitment to reticence for the use of force, including the right to develop its own strategic deterrent or maintain an independent military structure, Germany laid the foundation for its post-war foreign policy of cooperation with its neighbours and its penchant for the *Gemeinwohl* by aligning Germany with the Western alliance, so-called *Westintegration* (European integration). The ambitious national interests of restoring the territorial unity of the country and of recovering the central role that Germany occupied on the European stage since its first unification in 1871 were subordinated to *Gemeinwohl* of aspiring to the stable peace order in Europe. Germany’s approach to the European integration had been based on a redefinition of national interest and a recognition of *Gemeinwohl*. Embedded on the definition of the *Gemeinwohl*, Germany as a ‘reflexive multilateralist’ (Paterson, 2010) had been remarkable and singular in its commitment to European integration and had always played a key and benign role in European integration. Germany also became much more humble in its foreign policy behaviour.

Adenauer had a clear understanding of how important to avoid a discourse of national interest and set about his Rhineland vision for Germany and Europe, that is, the European integration by transferring sovereignty to supranational organisation. The underlying principle of his vision was to reassure Germany’s neighbours that it could actively pursue *Gemeinwohl* in a new institutional context, and its intentions were benevolent. Although he recognised that European integration could serve simply as vehicle for the articulation of national interest, Adenauer believed that what was most significant about the European integration was that it could fundamentally alter “the way in which national interest was calculated” (Berger, 1996: 314).
Adenauer’s first step of the pursuit of *Gemeinwohl* was the Schuman Plan of 1950, which led to the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). The second step that further enhanced the *Gemeinwohl* was the Treaty of Rome in 1957, which created the European Economic Community and set a goal of “an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe” (European Economic Community, 1957). Both steps helped define German interests within the context of a larger, nascent European community of nations. The choice for the pursuit of *Gemeinwohl* in a new institutional context was not immediately accepted beyond the CDU in a similar way to the security field. Until the late-1950s the SPD preferred to give priority to German unity, rather than the European integration, as a state goal (*Staatsziel*) and accused Adenauer of pulling West Germany towards a bloc that was conservative, clerical and capitalist (Pulzer, 1995: 59). However, as mentioned above, at the Bad Godesberg conference of 1959, the Social Democrats had accepted the pursuit of *Gemeinwohl* as well as rearmament. It was only from the early-1960s that the major parties all moved towards a recognition of the pursuit of *Gemeinwohl* as a foundation of German foreign policy in Europe. The enduring strength of the pursuit of *Gemeinwohl* in Germany was evident over subsequent decades, beginning with Konrad Adenauer through Bill Brandt, Helmut Schmidt to Helmut Kohl. A pursuit of *Gemeinwohl* remained an object of broad domestic consensus, itself relying on a supportive ‘permissive’ public opinion.

In exercising its *Gemeinwohl* serving as a substitute and complement for national interest, Germany operated through a willing paymaster and within the Franco-German entente. Firstly, Germany’s commitment to *Gemeinwohl* was demonstrated well through its *bescheid* (modest) role as a paymaster for a Common Agricultural Policy (CAP)—and the EC Budget as well. The French suggestion in 1962 for CAP was disadvantageous to German interest. Given that France was a major producer of agricultural surplus and Germany a major importer of agricultural goods, the policy meant to export more French products without tariff barriers especially to Germany. Although CAP subsidies benefitted French farmers most—German industry profited from unhindered access to the hitherto protected French and Italian markets—Germany had shown its commitment to the *Gemeinwohl* by considering the financial cost and the burden of its substantial contribution to the CAP subsidies as a kind of war reparation as the defeated nation in the Second World War (Jo, 2011: 8). Secondly, *Gemeinwohl* was also presented through a *zurückhaltende* (reserved) foreign policy behavior toward France. The disastrous experience of unilateral attempts to exert German power in the first half of the 20th century had ruled against attempting to exercise an individual German leadership on prudential grounds. While France took the lead on the European scene, Germany accepted its unassertive role and was inclined to give a little more, and
take a little less. In other words, Germany, which accepted its fate humbly as a defeated state and strove for a reconciliation with its neighbours, did not seek European leadership and rather was willing to be a follower in action with France. Germany had no trouble in accepting its image as reserved, abnormal power which made the process of promoting common interests so successful.

The post-cold war period
Post-war Germany used to adhere to antimilitarism and Gemeinwohl. Germany appeared to have come close to what others always wanted Germany to be: a peaceful nation without hegemonic pretensions that no longer threatened its neighbours. But, ironically enough, as soon as the German abnormality began to enjoy increased stability, the sudden fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of the cold war in 1989 led Germany to achieve a full recovery of German sovereignty over its own divided territory, so-called ‘national normality’ and put Germany, not France, at the centre. Although in the beginning it was perplexed as to what to do with its national normality and Mittellage position, Germany in the mid-1990s began gradually to advance the normalisation by deploying its armed forces for purposes other than the defense of German or NATO territory. Germany also ushered in the normalisation project, seeking its own national interest as the core state in Europe and asserting unreservedly German rights within the EU.

Norm: fluctuating antimilitarism
The end of the cold war, Germany expected, would allow itself to continue to enjoy a benign security environment because it was shifted to a country encircled by friends from a front-line state in a divided Europe. However, Germany had come under the pressure from its allies, especially the US, to take greater responsibility (Verantwortung) for international peace and security—even though some in Europe worried about the power of the new, reunified Germany. Two events in the 1990s—the Gulf War and the Kosovo War—pressured to modify Germany’s antimilitarism forged during the previous 40 years. Then German elites began to engage into the most intensive debate on the normalisation of the new Berlin Republic (Hyde-Price, 2003: 185-188).

The Christian Democrats had suggested the idea of competence for the alliance (Bündnisfähigkeit) which was associated with normalisation, implying the ability to fulfil commitments as a member of NATO. Karl Lamers, foreign-policy spokesman of the Christian Democrat parliamentary group, for instance, using the concept of ‘normalisation’ before anyone else, argued in August 1990 that Germany should “accept that the military power plays a role even in today’s world” and “become a normal member of the international community” (Quoted in
Kundnani, 2014: 47). However, like the 1950s, the Social Democrats along with Greens rejected the Christian Democrats’ new normalisation approach, seeing in it a danger of ‘remilitarisation.’ After tremendous internal political debates and struggle, in July 1994 the Constitutional Court, grounded on Article 24 (2) of the Basic Law, ruled that, in favour of the Christian Democrats, the armed forces’ participation in any ‘out-of-area’ operations sanctioned by the UN subject to Bundestag approval could be Constitutional as long as they took place under UN auspices and were approved by the Bundestag. Then, in July 1995 German forces were authorised for the first time since the Second World War to use military force if possible in order to separate the warring parties in Bosnia.

Although many Social Democrats and Greens feared a ‘normalisation’ of German security policy, some members of the ‘realist’ faction in Green party, that is, former cold war peace activists including Joschka Fischer, began to reconsider their antimilitarism and embrace the idea of humanitarian intervention. The catalyst for their fundamental change of attitude on the issue of military intervention was the massacre of Bosnian Muslim males by Serbian forces in Srebrenica in 1995. Fischer came to accept the Christian Democrats’ normalisation approach. At last, in 1999 Fischer as Foreign Minister made the case to deploy German troops in a combat zone in Kosovo as part of Operation Allied Force (OAF) in conjunction with its NATO allies. Since then, the Bundeswehr has contributed to an array of military operations over a wide geographical area: the ISAF mission, KSK mission in Afghanistan as part of Operation Enduring Freedom, ESDP/CSDP missions in Africa, and maritime security operations in the Mediterranean and off the Horn of Africa etc.

The participation in the OAF seemed to be a ‘watershed’ in Germany’s antimilitarism in that a traditional German reticence to the use of force had been overcome and the Berlin Republic security policy was based on the normalisation (Miskimmon, 2009: 561). The normalisation to security policy and a cross-party consensus were formalised in the White Paper 2006 (Federal Ministry of Defence, 2006). It mentioned for the first time that protecting German interests such as free trade and energy security could be tasks for the German military. It also justified that “missions to prevent conflicts and to cope with crises” were to be the primary tasks of the Bundeswehr. Yet, since Guido Westerwelle became Foreign Minister under Chancellor Merkel’s second term, Germany has failed to nurture and sustain its normalisation, stopping the weakening of antimilitarism. Westerwelle, for instance, had discovered the ‘risks’ of humanitarian military intervention (Miskimmon, 2012: 397). Thus, the Merkel government has remained reluctant to deploy German troops abroad and resisted especially US pressures on it to provide more troops to join the fight and step up its overall
engagement. In this context, Germany refused to join its key NATO allies in enforcing UN Security Council resolutions on Libya in 2011, and it was unwillingness to participate in tackling the problem of Syria's chemical weapons. In the fight against Islamic State it sends kit but no soldiers. In the Ukraine crisis Merkel has ruled out arms shipments or any military response. Faced with the turmoil and instability around Europe's borders arising from the negative fall-out of the Arab Spring and a more assertive Russia, Germany has exposed its weaknesses of strategic culture that created consternation among its closest allies and partners. In other words, it becomes apparent that there remains still substantial antimilitarism which plays a role as political and logistical brakes on Germany’s willingness and ability to consider high-intensity military deployments around the globe (Hyde-Price, 2015: 601). Negative trends in defense spending (in 1989 defense spending was 2.7 percent of GDP, in 2000 spending dropped to 1.4 percent, between 2013 and 2016 defense spending dropped again at 1.2 percent), the slow pace of defense reform, too little action to realise normalisation, no political will to expand its military forces on the scale that nearly all of its allies are hoping for, and its quiet trial to build a European Army sharing Germany’s resources with smaller countries in exchange for the use of their troops also demonstrate how resilient antimilitarism is in Germany (Braw, 2017).

*Interest: just like the others*

Germany’s pursuit of *Gemeinwohl* through the European integration was a constant in its foreign policy throughout the cold war. However, the collapse of Soviet rule throughout Eastern Europe in 1989 led to the Constitution of a quite different kind of Europe with radically altered political opportunity structures. Unlike realists’s expectation that Germany might seek to exploit this opportunity to pursue its national interests and to abandon its commitment to further integration and to *Gemeinwohl*, in the years immediately following German unification, there was no normalisation movement and rather the thrust was towards ever closer union around an even more explicit *Gemeinwohl*. When the euro was launched on schedule on 1 January 1999, Germany’s pursuit of *Gemeinwohl* seemed to have worked in that the German question, which had been reopened by the fall of the Wall, appeared to have been resolved.

Yet, underneath this apparently tranquil surface, the normalisation, that is, a process of erosion of German commitment to pursuing *Gemeinwohl* through European integration was already taking place. In other words, it became increasingly clear that the enormous costs of reunification along with the unfavourable demographic profile (low birth rate and an ageing population), generous and expanding social welfare payments and the competition created by globalisation had
had a pervasive effect on Germany’s European policy, exhausted the Germany’s willingness to sacrifice a part of its national interests for the rest of Europe, and caused inevitably to weaken a symbiotic relationship between national interest and Gemeinwohl and its pronounced Bescheidenheit (modesty) and Zurückhaltung (reserve) in diplomacy as well.

Firstly, Schröder initiated the normalisation, emphasising on German national interests and claiming German rights within the EU without serious reservation, that would have been impossible for predecessors. For instance, in the Bundestag in 1998 Schröder stated: “We cannot and will not solve the problems of Europe with a German checkbook” (Cohen 1998). His remark meant that given the budgetary realities of the German state after reunification, the era of generous German side payments and cheque book diplomacy ended and Germany would be ‘leaner and meaner’ (Harnisch and Schieder, 2006), in particular, during a continuing process of enlargement which necessarily leads to heightened distributional struggles. This development has been demonstrated clearly in Merkel’s response to the Euro crisis. Merkel’s reaction started with her insistence that the crisis was not the European problem but a just Greek problem. Thus, Germany became the most prominent obstacle to the creation of shared banking resolution funds, common deposit insurance, and mutualised sovereign debt instruments. Germany to whom Bescheidenheit did not matter was more inclined to fight for its national interests (Soros, 2014: 17-18). The fiscal compact of 2012 initiated by Germany which imposed much tougher rules and the austerity policy on member states had led to the disintegration such as widening of the divergences between creditor and debtor nations.

Secondly, Germany’s zurückhaltende foreign policy behavior toward France was no longer as conspicuous as the past. According to Kornelius (2013, 23), Germany’s reserved attitude toward France did not appeal to Merkel, despite an intensive discussion between Merkel and her colleagues about why France was so much important to Germany’s European relationships. For instance, Merkel rejected France’s Growth and Employment Pact, imposing coercively its convictions on a number of important points including the participation of the IMF, the adoption of the Fiscal Compact and the intergovernmental character of the European Financial Stability Facility giving Germany full control of its operations and a strict conditionality. Given that France was unable to wield its influence on, and to tame, Germany, it was quite unavoidable for France to follow Germany’s determination. It meant an almost complete victory for German positions over French ones (Krotz and Schild, 2015: 208-209). It represented the materialisation of a new type of Franco-German asymmetry, a powerful position of Germany and the end of Zurückhaltung in diplomacy. As Beck (2013) had coined as ‘Merkiavellism,’ Germany gained political leverage against the elites
of France. Therefore, now Germany takes on a leadership role through making political effort to shape European integration in accordance with German own images.

**Summary: the emergence of a disconcerting normal abnormal state**

Post-war Germany which found itself occupied by four victorious allied powers had become introverted not only because of the scale of the destruction it had suffered in the war, but also because of shame over its role in starting and fighting the war. This awareness led Germany to choose to be an abnormal state on the eastern edge of western Europe (Grenzlage), through developing a commitment both to the reticence toward the use of force in the security field and to Gemeinwohl in the relationship with its neighbours—that is, German national interest was suppressed by multilateral process. In spite of the fact that it was vulnerable to the Soviet threat, for nearly half a century the antimilitarism and Gemeinwohl, which were supported not only by large segments of Germany’s political and economic elites but also German public, had been pursued. In this sense, Germany was nothing like a ‘normal’ nation. Until reunification in 1990, it was a ‘perfect abnormal state’ that was “dependent on its allies for protection against the Soviet threat and inhibited by the history of the Second World War from defining or explicitly pursuing its own national interests” (Hill, 1996: 11).

Germany’s abnormality had brought Europe great peace and security. The stable peace order in Europe would not have been possible if it weren’t for Germany’s consistent commitment to antimilitarism and Gemeinwohl. In particular, Gemeinwohl helped greatly overcome its bloody past, reduce Europe’s historic fears of German nationalism, remove the fears of a revival of German threat to its neighbours, especially France, make reparation for its grim past, regain the trust of its neighbours and international partners, make it possible for it to be the strongest member of the European bloc in terms of economic power and, finally, “achieve their long-term goal of German reunification” (Ash, 2012: 148).

The rise of Germany as a result of the end of the cold war and German reunification in 1989 raised concerns about the resilience of Germany’s abnormality. The presage that the fall of the Wall would be to reinstate Germany as “the natural hegemon of any European political system” (Wallace, 1991: 169-70) and the fear that there would be a resurgence of the anti-civilisational, anti-Western undercurrent of the German tradition were widely perceived (Paterson, 2011: 59). In the face of its neighbours’ uneasiness, Germany embraced itself so thoroughly in a European structure that it could never again dream of national and warmongering solutions. Germany was convinced that European unity had to be made ‘irreversible’ before another generation came to power on whom the
horrible events of the Second World War would not be personally imprinted. Nonetheless, the genocide in the Balkans in 1995 galvanised Germany to be engaged in the normalisation in security policy. New cross-party consensus about the normalisation based on ideas of humanitarian intervention, Germany’s international responsibility for crisis management and the role and purpose of the *Bundeswehr* seemed to begin to form. In this sense, Germany in this period became shortly an abnormal normal state which is distinguished by an approval for the use of force and a practice of common interests.

Meanwhile, while since 2005 Germany, which is still wary of its history as a military power, has not any more fostered its normalisation in the security policy, since 1998 the new boldness in the emphasis of the national interests—although it is still within the context of European integration—has emerged. Germany’s *Gemeinwohl* has already begun to change in an enlarged country preoccupied with its own problems. Suffice it to say that German reunification resulted in an untenability of Germany’s *Gemeinwohl* embodying European integration. Germany’s European diplomacy has become more assertive: Germany, if necessary, proceeds alone (*Alleingang*) rather engage in exhaustive consultation, and is more prepared to seek out alternative intra-EU policy venues to pursue its national interests. Having reached the end of a ‘long path to the west,’ it became once again ‘just like the others’ with its own interests and ambitions. The normalisation of German foreign policy throughout the Euro crisis led Germany to become the ‘centre,’ while others seemed to come to be ‘periphery’ which remained disempowered. What Europe has been experiencing has been not Europeanisation but Germanisation of all Eurozone peripheral economies through austerity and structural reforms and, at the same time, a creation of a new governance framework for the Eurozone, which was essentially an extension of the German view of capitalism. Habermas (2010: 19) warned “The current German elites are enjoying the return to normality as a nation-state.” It means that Germany has been gradually experiencing a transition from a relatively comfortable abnormal state through a short-lived abnormal normal state to a disconcerting normal abnormal state.

**The Japanese normalisation: from the abnormal normal state to the normal state**

Throughout the past 150 years, the Japanese problem much the same as German case also has prevailed East Asian history because Japan incessantly embarked on a frenzied path of Westernisation to ‘escape from Asia’ on the other hand, and it considered its East Asian neighbours to be backward and to be cast off on the one hand. A complicated and ambivalent relationship with
the West and East Asia led Japan to face its “ambiguous identity (aimaisa)” (Oe, 1995: 8) asking whether it was part of the West, or rather of Asia: “Japan vacillated between insisting on being not Asian at all, and declaring itself the epitome of Asianness” (McCormack 2001: 159). Despite Japan’s initial proven record of Westernisation, Japan was hypocritically excluded from the Western community in the context of the permanent racial superiority of the West over ‘yellow race’ Asians. This culminated in the arrival of militaristic authoritarian state—whose conducts engendered Nanjing massacre—bent on territorial expansion and maximisation of national interest as non-status quo power or super-normal state.

The cold war period
Post-war Japan was reborn as a new democratic country being timid and reactive in its foreign and security policy, thereby leading to a greater sense of abnormality. Japan relinquished the use of force for settling international disputes and the right of belligerency. Japan minimised its military role by forming an alliance with the United States that entailed only minimal involvement in its cold war strategy. Japan, which lacked any intention and ambition to engage in power politics, had not asserted itself in foreign policy as much as expected, rather pursuing a self-effacing diplomacy. Meanwhile, Japan concentrating on economic growth under the aegis of the United States promoted deliberately and consciously Japanese national interests for the accumulation of wealth which was labelled ‘mercantile realism’ (Heginbotham and Samuels, 1998).

Norm: antimilitarism as a source of the dissociation of national identity
Japan stayed on the sidelines of the cold war and bound itself in the antimilitarism: the self-abnegating restrictions on the use of forces, the three non-nuclear principle and the limiting of the military budget. Japan’s defeat in World War II, the trauma of atomic bombing, widespread fears of a militarist revival and unwillingness to divert resources from economic reconstruction compelled the Japanese to make a commitment to antimilitarism. The prime axiom demonstrating its antimilitarism was the US-written peace Constitution Article 9 in which the state relinquishes its sovereign right to wage wars and to use force or the threat of force “as means of settling international disputes,” and establishes that it will not maintain “land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential” (Constitution of Japan, 1946). The promulgation of the war-renouncing Constitution meant that Japan recognised that it was not ‘normal.’

However, the emergence of the cold war—the defeat of Nationalist China in 1949 and the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950—soon let the US to regret and reconsider the peace
Constitution. Then, similar to German situation, the US forced Japan to reverse the peace Constitution which meant the weakening of antimilitarism. Under American hegemonic pressure, Yoshida Shigeru, taking the centrist and pragmatic position, felt he had no choice but to reverse, at least partially, the antimilitarism, by accepting both the formation of a 75,000 Japanese National Police Reserve, which evolved into the Self-Defense Forces (SDF), and the 1951 US-Japan Mutual Security Treaty (Berger, 1996: 332; Rosenbluth et al., 2007: 593; Arase, 2007: 562). Yoshida’s primary goal was to eschew the pursuit of military power but to permit an exclusively defensive force through taking a ‘free ride’ on the US patronage for Japan’s security. Based on the Yoshida doctrine, in May 1957 the Cabinet Legislative Bureau issued the Basic Policy for National Defense to confirm the exclusive defense doctrine (senshuboei). It had continued to be the basis of the antimilitarism throughout the cold war (Igarashi, 2005: 276).

The majority of Japanese had supported the post-war antimilitarism. The SDF had never been very popular, and for that reason had been remarkably invisible. The Japanese people were keen to maintain tight civilian control of the military as well (Soeya et al., 2011: 5). In addition, any efforts to change Japan’s antimilitarism were restrained and most Japanese citizens shivered at the thought of weakening the antimilitarism and returning to a ‘normal state,’ as demonstrated by the popular opposition in 1960 to Kishi Nobusuke’s bid to revise the US-Japan Mutual Security Treaty and to weaken the antimilitarism by welcoming U.S. pressure to return Japan to the status of a normal, armed power and displacing the passivity of the Yoshida Doctrine (Hall, 1991: 186-187).

Successive administrations since the 1960s had maintained the position that Japan under the peace Constitution should not mandate it to take military measures in the face of challenges to peace, security and national survival, and thus it retained the right of self-defence (jieiken).

Nonetheless, the Japanese antimilitarism was caught in the discrepancy between a ‘peace’ state in line with the Constitution and a remilitarisation in line with the 1951 US-Japan Mutual Security Treaty. In contrast to German antimilitarism which was based on considerable consensus, the Japanese antimilitarism had been a source of “the ideological cleavage between revisionists and lefts” and “the dissociation of national identity” (Soeya, 2005: 17). Revisionists were dissatisfied by the peace clause which prevented Japan from playing a sufficient military role either independently or in alliance with the United States, while lefts were annoyed by the fact that the SDF, by cooperating with the United States, severely distorted the peace clause. Notwithstanding, Japan had failed to find the consensus, either by modifying the Constitution to make it more consistent with Japan’s actual security policy or by modifying its security policy in a way that was more clearly
consistent with the Constitution. Some Japanese had never been satisfied with centralist Yoshida doctrine, while most of Germans had been relatively happy with their antimilitarism.

**Interest: the pursuit of a ‘merchant nation’**

Although the orientation of post-war Japan’s foreign policy changed into a self-effacing diplomacy, Japan followed a clear and single-minded economic interest, being largely subject to “its ever-expanding economic muscle” (Pempel, 2007: 111). Under the American overwhelming authority and occupation, Japan, which was forced to find new ways to pursue its national interest that should not clash with American interest, regarded its urgent and short-term national interests as rebuilding its destroyed economy and ending the U.S. occupation as soon as possible. After the American occupation ended, Yoshida provided his country-men with a concept of a ‘merchant nation’ (*shonin kokka*) so that Japan could achieve the long-term national interest to create a more prosperous and modern Japan, while taking ‘free ride’ on the back of the established economic, and security, order maintained by the US (Pyle, 2006: 413). Although Japanese society was divided concerning the antimilitarism, there was a clear consensus on its primary national interest. In 1960, Japan’s focus on economic interest as a national goal was symbolised by the ‘income doubling’ strategy adopted by Hayato Ikeda. This approach bore fruit as the amazing economic growth not only improved the living standards of Japanese but also transformed Japan’s image from that of a humiliated loser in the Second World War into that of a dynamic Western democracy.

Japan applied the mercantile approach to its foreign policy towards East Asia, seeking to the expansion of its national interests through ‘economic diplomacy’—which was based on assumption that economic assistance and interdependence could result in deepening common interest (Tanaka, 2007; Johnson, 1992: 2). It meant that an arrogance and close-minded nationalism still crept into the mind-set of many Japanese, who believed the Japanese economic miracle was the result of unique attributes of Japan’s economy, business and culture (Inoguchi, 2007: 48). Such attitudes and beliefs were manifested in the overseas development assistance (ODA) and the ‘flying geese model’ in East Asia.

Firstly, although it had not used its economic power more assertively for greater benefit and political purpose, since its own economic rise in the 1960s Japan had used the ODA within its economic interests, taking advantage of its economic dominance in the region as other states began desperately seeking to revitalise their own economies (Hagström, 2009: 850-851; Wade, 1996). It harmonised the ODA with the needs of its industry so as to produce an amiable investment environment for Japan’s transnational corporations. Meanwhile, whereas Germany regarded the
financial cost to the CAP subsidies as a kind of war reparation, Japan refused to characterise the economic aid to its neighbours as compensation for its invasion, while assuming that helping East Asian countries to modernise them with ODA would generate mutually economic growth, mutual economic growth would increase interdependence between them, and interdependence would enhance common interest and ‘friendship’ with them and heal their wounds caused by Japan’s wartime invasion (Igarashi, 2005: 279; Ni, 2003: 47). For decades, such assistance was indispensable to East Asian countries’ economic growth and development, in particular, helping China to achieve its reform and openness. Yet, in spite of the ODA on a massive scale given to its neighbours, economic assistance and interdependence within Japan’s economic interests, unlike Japan’s expectation, did not act as a stimulus for enhancing common interest and reconciliation, as it has been demonstrated in the post-cold war period.

Secondly, Japan believed that given its political and economic asymmetry, Japan, rather than China, had to be the leader of East Asia (Tamaki, 2015: 26). Japan, for instance, sought a path to leadership in East Asia through the flying geese model as “Japanese foreign assistance, trade, production networks, and bank loans became increasingly pivotal in advancing the economic fortunes of much of East Asia” (Pempel, 2007: 111). The underlying motives of the flying geese model stuck around the Greater East Asian Coprosperity Sphere in the 1930s and 1940s, based on the pan-Asianism possessing the assumption of Japanese superiority in all spiritual, cultural, and material spheres over other East Asian nations and claiming Japanese special mission and leadership in East Asia (Peattie 1984: 24-25). Thus, the flying geese model was destined to the general effect of feeding national interests in East Asia rather than encouraging to create common interests.

**The post-cold war period**

The first half of the 1990s became a watershed moment for major shift of its abnormality. Internationally, the dismantling of cold war international structure placed more emphasis on an active political role for Japan in world politics. Regionally, the rapid growth of China began to challenge Japan which had been accustomed to a weak East Asia where it played comfortably a role as an economic leader. Domestically, a fundamental regime shift, that is, the collapse of so-called 1955 system, heralded the country’s movement toward establishing a new system with considerable political uncertainty. Those events, which coincided with the bursting of Japan’s asset bubble in 1990-91 and the entering in ageing society, became a new, more complex and demanding challenge to Japan. In the face of this challenge, Japan was not successful to use to good advantage toward a
future direction. This failure had a lasting negative impact that was destined to haunt Japan, eventually letting more nationalistic, assertive, and self-assured leaders to push forward the normalisation in Japanese foreign and security policy.

**Norm: impaired antimilitarism**

A crucial period for Japan’s reconsideration of antimilitarism was the first half of the 1990s. It started with the Gulf War, which tested Japanese aversion to the use of force under the emerging new international environment. Japan contributed its generous $13 billion in support of U.S. actions in the 1991 invasion of Iraq, but it caused just Japanese humiliation to the overt U.S. disdain. After the Gulf War, the Diet belatedly enacted the PKO law in 1992, enabling the SDF to join in peacekeeping operations under the auspices of the United Nations (UN). This law, setting a legal procedure to authorise sending the SDF abroad, broke the exclusive antimilitarism of keeping troops at home and signalled the normalisation in the security field (Hasegawa, 2007: 59-60).

Nonetheless, the normalisation was limited given the fact that Miyazawa Kiichi—a leader of the LDP mainstream faction as an adherent of the long-standing Yoshida line—“advocated more active participation in peacekeeping operations only under the constraint of the Constitution” (*Asahi Shinbun*, 2017) and emphasised the larger framework of a multilateral security system, while indeed the SDF played a role only to the SDF’s non-military activities for UN peacekeeping. Suffice it to say that there was a continuation of the antimilitarism in that Japan was still committed to Article 9 and antimilitarism.

Since the late-1990s the pursuit of civilian power has been fading, the policies conducted by the erstwhile pragmatists and adherents of the Yoshida line during the first half of the 1990s were replaced by self-assertive policies, and Japan has gradually made substantial institutional and normative progress toward the normalisation. For instance, the realm of Japan’s military actions under the system of the US-Japanese security alliance has been expanded. Domestic discourse on security policy has been shifting away from earlier, almost theological debate about the Constitutionality of maintaining armed forces to the practical desirability of specific policies (Inoguchi, 2007; Singh, 2002). And the revision of peace Constitution has been openly discussed and in May 2017 Abe has unveiled plans to revise Japan’s post-war peace Constitution by the year 2020 when Tokyo is set to host the Olympic Games. More specifically speaking, a number of recent events and processes can be referred to as evidence of Japanese normalisation: the passing of a cluster of national emergency bills that establish comprehensively how to respond to a direct attack; the dispatch of troops to the Indian Ocean in 2001, Iraq in 2004, Somalia in 2009, and Sudan in
2015; the transformation of the Defense Agency into a full-fledged Ministry of Defense; the provision of the SDF conventional capabilities to respond to guerrilla incursions; the introduction of Ballistic Missile Defense; the introduction of intelligence satellite program; the introduction of Japan’s National Security Strategy, National Security Council, State Secrecy Law, Complicity Law; increased defence budgets; the breach of the ban on the exercise of the right of collective self-defence; the claim of a right to intervene in the Korean peninsular and the Taiwan Strait; the proposal to develop the ability to strike preemptively at the missile facilities of North Korea, and a military exercise alongside the US in the Sea of Japan to put pressure on North Korea to halt its ballistic missile programme. The general trends of what have happened can be characterised as Japanese normalisation in the security policy.

Japan’s slow but irreversible normalisation process coincides with the decline of the lefts and the rise of neo-nationalists, so-called the trend of ‘the rightward drift’ (Ukeika) in Japanese politics (Nakano, 2015: 114-152; Hughes, 2015: 10-11). The left’s political power, which was for a long time a core organised political opposition to the use of force and Constitutional revision, had declined considerably during the 1990s. Meanwhile, after the end of the Cold War period with the collapse of the Japanese economic bubble, the LDP ‘mainstream factions’ faltered and the anti-mainstream, whose vision for Japan derived from a tradition of revisionism, was able to regain power in the guise of Mori’s faction which meant the final breakdown of Japan’s post-war 1955 system and the return of the descendants of the Kishi faction—including Koizumi Junichiro between 2001 and 2006 and Abe for his two terms in office—to capture power. During Koizumi and Abe’s premiership Japanese domestic politics has gone through a major transformation characterised by enhanced nationalism and prime ministerial power whereas bureaucratic autonomy and the power of the Left were in decline. Koizumi and Abe, who are more revisionist in their stand and less troubled by the antimilitarism held by their predecessors, have accelerated the process of the normalisation. They have been energetically seeking an enhanced role for Japan’s military and a much closer and more explicit overlapping with U.S. strategic planning, and have been, in their enthusiasm, adopting a more assertive, self-assured high-profile line to its neighbours such as China and North Korea. In particular, despite protestations that Abe is pragmatic in outlook, it is clear that his security policies including the full-fledged exercise of the right to collective self-defense and a plan to seek a first-ever change to the post-war Constitution underpinned by a strong revisionist ideology are bringing about loosening Japan from the historical limits and the decades of post-war taboos and breaking Japan’s earlier ‘culture of antimilitarism,’ leading to shift Japan onto a normal state.
The normalisation was also prompted and justified by the potential threats of the assertive China and a belligerent North Korea. The Taiwan Straits crisis in 1996, China’s burgeoning military power, China’s enhanced maritime power in and around the East China Sea, the territorial dispute over Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands and maritime rights, anxiety about China’s intentions toward Japan, the emotions about North Korean abductions, and the tests of North Korean missiles and nuclear bombs have led many Japanese policymakers to perceive China and North Korea as potential threats causing seemingly instability in East Asia and, then, have prompted Japanese revisionists—who are taking advantage of using the perception of the China and North Korea threat for their ambitions to emerge as a ‘normal state’—more leverage to breach the antimilitarism and to push normalisation (Jo, 2015: 523; Welch, 2011: 21-23).

Interest: the pursuit of common interests miscarried

The virtual end of the cold war brought a more favourable situation for Japan to review the kind of role it would play in the regional structure and to find common interests with its neighbours. Furthermore, the economic interdependence and cohesion of East Asia seemed to be accelerating amid growing need for new forms of cooperation. Japan became increasingly eager to seek common interests with its neighbours by forming the regional institution and fostering a reconciliation with its neighbours. Specifically speaking, Japan’s positive role in the region building was unmistakable, as the engine of growth for other Asian economies and the leading role in forming the regional economic consultations for the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), a new regional institutions such as the ASEAN + 3 and the currency swap arrangements set out in the Chiang Mai Initiative. In addition, the Japanese government took some decisive steps towards atonement for its past historical aggression against, and reconciliation with, its neighbours in the first half of the 1990s: Murayama Tomiichi (15 August, 1995) expressed clearly “feelings of deep remorse and state my heartfelt apology” for Japan’s twentieth century history, arguing strongly for reconciliation with China and South Korea. Moreover, Japan, although less directly touched by the 1997 crisis than their neighbours, had enthusiastically helped to bail out its neighbours. And, Japan embarked upon a conscious policy to bring China back to the international community. The Japanese cooperation to its neighbours during the 1997 crisis and Obuchi Keizo’s encouragement of China’s membership to the WTO in 1999 were the symbolic events that at last Japan seemed to become an abnormal state in foreign policy, establishing its national interest within the regional framework.

However, Japanese efforts to seek common interests miscarried, being coincident with the weakening of antimilitarism. Needless to say, when Japan’s bubble economy burst, “the positive
conditions for searching common interests began to deteriorate” (Inoguchi, 2007: 50). This is also a result not only of Japan’s too high expectation, assuming that deep-seated historical issues could be resolved on the basis of economic assistance and interdependence, but also of Japan’s recognition that China was a destabilising force in the region in which the flying geese formation pattern could not proceed as smoothly.

Firstly, Japan assumed that its sincere endeavour to become a peaceful nation, a substantial amount of ODA and development of economic interdependence during the cold war would give its neighbours, in particular China, an impression that the path to promote common interests and reconciliation was near. However, it turned out that Japan’s assumption was naive in a sense that it proved illusory when Japanese became aware that China, and other countries, accepted Japan’s economic assistance with lack of appreciation and, furthermore, interdependence with its neighbours was complicating Japan’s economic interests. Because the Japanese economy was now more extensively intertwined with China’s domestic market, Japanese manufacturers located in China became often targets of violence and its economic interest was hurt by the Chinese use of economic instruments of leverage (Hasegawa, 2007: 67; Smith, 2015: 255-256). As interdependence became uncomfortable and tensions with China have steadily multiplied, popular sentiment in Japan has grown more skeptical of China, making Japanese government to promote common interests more difficult, despite its shared economic interests with China, and compelling its leaders to take a more realistic and proactive foreign policy.

Secondly, Japan held on to rosy expectations of integrating China into a Japan-led regional system and promoting common interests, assuming primarily that China was bound to remain backward for the foreseeable future, incapable of challenging Japan’s economic power. However, Japan, experiencing the bursting of its asset bubble, came to be disturbed by a great shift in East Asia from the Japan-led flying geese model to the China-led development model as a result of the rise of China, implying that Japan’s regional economic muscle was considerably reduced and its strategy to use China as a major vehicle for its rise was totally derailed. China has increasingly used the China-led development model and regional framework to advance its influence throughout the neighbourhood, challenging Japan and colliding with Japan’s enhanced sense of realism. It means that China’s regional and global influence seemed to eclipse Japan’s international standing, and in Japan, China was viewed more and more as an antagonistic rival (Pempel, 2007: 118-119; Smith, 2015: 237). In order to counter the rise of China, Japan reshaped its regional policy from an ASEAN-led 10+3 approach to an ASEAN-led 10+6 and US-led TPP approach. Japan supports the continuation of the US-dominated East Asian regional order against China’s quest for a China-led
East Asian regional order. Therefore, containment of China rather than accommodation became a diplomatic strategy for Japan (Hasegawa, 2007: 68; Smith, 2015: 237; Welch, 2011: 20; Chun, 2013: 416). These steps were nothing but overarching claim to acting firmly based on the national interests.

**Summary: wedging open the door to a normal state**

Post-war Japan was far from a ‘normal’ nation. Like Germany, Japan had long committed to the antimilitarism dictated by its peace Constitution. The post-war Constitution had the effect of reassuring many Japanese that there would not be a resurgence of the militarism that had marked the pre-war period. Japanese antimilitarism greatly contributed to image of a cultured, peace-loving or abnormal state, and normalisation of Japan by revising the Constitution was unnecessary. Japanese abnormality in the security policy, therefore, “appeared to be deeply embedded in Japanese society, remaining unchallenged until the 1990s” (Tadokoro, 2011: 43). Yet, Japanese abnormality was more ambiguous and controversial than German one. It was not only because there was discrepancy in Japanese security policy that permitted divided elements in Japanese society, but also because Japan’s foreign policy was, to a large extent, based on “mixture of guile and goodwill” (Katzenstein, 2005: 101): the exclusive pursuit of its economic interests and a hope for building common interest and reconciliation with East Asia through economic assistance and interdependence, in contrast to German case grounded on the political will to build Gemeinwohl with its neighbours through regional institutions. Put simply, unlike Germany, Japan behaved like normal state in a sense that it was seeking to maximise its economic interests which was largely tied to economic interdependence, which would result in, Japan hoped simply, the promotion of common interest and reconciliation. Therefore, Japan can be described as ‘not quite abnormal’ or ‘normal abnormal’ in a sense that Japan was ‘abnormal’ because of militarily incomplete state with formidable economic strength and politically soft shell as Germany was, whereas Japan was ‘normal’ in that it had expressed its national interests exclusively through economic diplomacy and its economic power was actually being exerted. Japan came to content itself with becoming a ‘normal’ economic power, while not striving for a kind of ‘normalisation’ that included getting ready for war (Hagström, 2009: 851).

Japanese ‘normal abnormality’ allowed Japan to avoid excessive entanglement in power politics, defending itself from the threat of the Soviet Union by forming an alliance with the United States that entailed only minimal involvement in the Cold War, while facilitating itself and its neighbours’s economic prosperity. However, the discrepancy in Japanese security policy and the
attitude of ‘mixture of guile and goodwill’—which had given Japan a ‘dual identity’—did not help its neighbours to withhold “their suspicion to Japanese real intention (honne), while making them to wonder what Japan’s real face was” (Soeya, 2005: 27). Japanese efforts to be a peace nation and its goodwill were not well recognised and appreciated by its neighbours. Rather, Japanese dual identity, and its unapologetic and uncompromising attitude in interpreting historical events, remained ones of main sources of regional instability.

The first half of the 1990s was the turning point for major movement to normalisation. Like Germany, after the Gulf war, Japan sought normalisation in the security field, being more active to peacekeeping, international rescue and relief, and economic reconstruction largely on the basis of the notion of human security and taking a revitalised responsibility for its nation across the globe and East Asia (Schieffer, 2006; Inoguchi, 2007: 40-41). On the other hand, Japan focused on promoting common interests with its neighbours in East Asia, by envisioning the regional institution building and nurturing a reconciliation. As British diplomat Cooper (2003: 41) described Japan as a ‘post-modern’ state or the post-Westphalian nation-state, Japan seemed to be resembling Germany as an abnormal normal state.

Unfortunately, an abnormal normal status, which was “tainted and hijacked by the trend of the rightward drift” (Soeya, 2010: 36), did not last long time. Japan has incrementally experienced substantial movement toward the normalisation in its foreign and security policy. Like realists’ predictions that Japan might exercise commensurate political and military power, Japan under the leadership of Koizumi and Abe has explicitly and regularly campaigned to enhance Japan’s military power to a level commensurate with its economic heft. In particular, in October 2013 Abe mentioned assertively, “I’ve realised that Japan is expected to exert leadership not just on the economic front, but also in the field of security in the Asia-Pacific” (Baker and Nishiyama, 2013). Indeed, Abe has effectively opened and wedged open the door to a normal state. Meanwhile, the heightened expectation in building common interests with its neighbours was followed by stunning disappointment in the 2000s. Economic assistance and interdependence with its neighbours did little to assuage the resentment and even hostility toward the Japanese. In addition, as Japanese national interests have been challenged by China and the hyper-growth of China reduced the relative influence of Japan’s regional economic power, the pursuit of an abnormal normal state has been dwindling away. Japan’s long-standing focus on economic diplomacy was supplemented with its assertiveness and normalisation. Therefore, Japan is getting nearer to a ‘normal state.’
Conclusion

Pre-war Germany and Japan attempted to catch other Western powers up and searched for their identity, but their repercussions were the emergence of authoritarian states committed to territorial expansion as non-status quo or super-normal powers pushing towards obsessed militarism and national interests. In the end, Germany and Japan defeated by the United States and its allies in 1945 became atypical, so-called ‘abnormal,’ cultivating the unique ‘culture of restraint.’ According to Schwartz (1985), Germany and Japan have evolved from Machtsessenheit (self-aggrandizement before 1945) to Machtvergessenheit (an abstention from power politics after 1945). Their experiences contributed a new vision and model towards the peaceful development of international community.

Yet, the characteristic of abnormality and the path to normalisation of Germany and Japan are different (see figure 2 and 3). Post-war Germany was a ‘perfect abnormal state’ that was not interested in the use of force and explicitly pursued its Gemeinwohl, whereas post-war Japan was a ‘normal abnormal state’ in a sense that Japan was not only ‘abnormal’ because of its de-emphasising military power but also ‘normal’ because of the embodiment of its national interests exclusively by means of economic diplomacy. However, the end of the cold war enkindled anxieties about the would-be normalisation of German and Japanese abnormality. Both Germany and Japan pressured to play important roles in international peace and security by their allies had been giving way steadily to ‘normalisation’ in the security policy and, in the meantime, Japan strove for a kind of formation of common interests with its neighbours in the similar manner of Germany. In this sense, both Germany and Japan in the 1990s became, in a little while, abnormal normal states which are not reluctant to participate in military missions and adopt their identity in a practice of common interests. Nonetheless, in the security policy, Germany which, after the short-lived normalisation,
has not kept up its normalisation since the mid-2000s, while Japan has made considerable headway in bringing back the normality since the late-1990s. In the foreign policy, both of them have become assertive, reinforcing the long-standing image as an ‘economic power’ while behaving ‘just like the others’ with its own interests and ambitions. Germany, being uniquely positioned to fashion milieu goals and exercise leadership in Europe, becomes a normal abnormal state, while Japan, challenged by the rise of China and the emergence of multipolar rivalry in East Asia, is on the verge of a normal state.

For Germany and Japan, it seems that normalisation in the security policy had been an undesirable process because of the terrible memories of war. However, right after the end of the cold war, there had been normalisation in both countries—although the normalisation meant their active role on security issues in a multilateral context on the basis of the notion of human security—which represented deviations from the military-abnormality of the cold war. However, the normalisation in Germany was momentary, whereas in Japan it was durable. The reasons Germany has illustrated with particular clarity the deep-seated antimilitarism and, in sharp contrast, Japan has been transgressing its antimilitarist norm have to do with a ‘historical learning process’ and a continuous public deliberation about the past. For Germany, an antimilitarism in Germany is based on a sharp break with the past from which the appropriate lessons have been drawn. The events of the Second World War including Holocaust represented a seminal episode that profoundly forced Germany to change its militaristic tradition and to confront critically the past. Owing to an unabating public reflection and education on the past, the impact of Germany’s history still remains a cornerstone of the political discourse even after the German reunification. It can be said that antimilitarism is firmly ensconced both in the German psyche and its policy-making process. In this sense, Germany did not foster the movement toward normalisation in the security policy. In contrast to German case, Japanese antimilitarism is less well-grounded than German one, given that Japan has been not quite successful to make a rupture with the past—in other words, Japan still believes that there is “the continuity between prewar and postwar periods in terms of its steadfast pursuit of modernisation” (Inoguchi, 2007: 44)—and it has failed to execute rigorously the historical learning process—for instance, the Japanese Ministry of Education distorts the facts of World War II in their history textbooks and high ranking Japanese officials publicly deny the occurrence of the Nanking Massacre. Japan gives credit to the argument that because Americans imposed the Constitution on it, Japan, while challenging constantly the legitimacy of the Constitution, must repeal the peace Constitution—namely, the prime axiom of Japanese antimilitarism. It is obvious that Japan is more
anxious to make Japan a normal state, which recalls to its neighbours pre-war Japanese colonial rule, than Germany.

Post-war Germany pursued undeniably its *Gemeinwohl*, whereas post-war Japan expressed its national interests exclusively through economic diplomacy and its economic power was actually being exerted, although in the 1990s Japan was eager to seek common interests with its neighbours. Since the 2000s, both Germany and Japan have been getting more self-centred and self-assertive along with their national interests and objectives. The normalisation of both countries causes ‘the fear of Germany’s reemerging hegemony’ in Europe and ‘the fear of Japanese assertiveness’ in East Asia. Their normalisation has in a broader sense created a climate of instability and uncertainty in Europe and East Asia. Nonetheless, given that Germany still remains committed to preserving its integration with Europe and searches for the building of cooperative relations with its neighbours, despite its enhanced position of power in the centre of Europe, its domineering and self-interested policy, and various, often serious disagreements with its European allies over such issues as the Eurozone and the direction of European integration, its movement towards the normalisation is less plagued by its neighbours’s mistrust than Japanese one. In the case of Japan, it has not so much had the willingness of directly and outspokenly promoting common interests and accumulating mutual trust, and if so Japan kept a longing for deepening common interests through economic assistance and interdependence or Japan pursued the common interests which are largely tactical and instrumental in nature, aiming at providing short-term solutions to specific problems, usually economic in nature. The Japanese movement towards the normalisation lacks credibility and efficacy in East Asia.

It certainly appears that the transition to the normalisation Germany and Japan are making has been challenged because of the dilemmas associated with Germany’s past abnormality and Japan’s contradictory logic. As shown above, in matters of war and peace, it seems that Germany does not want to be ‘normal’ but, the new boldness in the emphasis of the national interest on foreign policy has materialised (Karp, 2009: 20). There is also increasingly a tendency in Germany to pursue a German way—a key element of its nationalism. However, no doubt the perilousness of the current situations caused by the Donald Trump challenges and Brexit are reviving the hope of many Europeans and Germans as well to restore a cooperative leadership together with a new and young French president, Emmanuel Macron, and to boost its commitment to incorporate national interests into a larger European setting. It means that there will be the pending tensions in German foreign policy between its short-term and self-centred interests and its long-term and common interests, between continuity and change, and between abnormality and normality. In the case of Japan,
Japanese normalisation is to strengthen its great power profile through deepening integration into the US. Yet, given that it can only spell dependency to the US, its normalisation is more likely to be a process of a failed and incongruous logic leading to enhanced dependence on the US, leaving Japan more isolated in the East Asia with no other feasible regional partners (Hughes, 2015: 92-96).
References


Banchoff, Thomas (1997) “German Policy towards the European Union: The Effects of Historical Memory,” German Politics. 6 (1), 60-76.


European Economic Community (1957) Treaty of Rome. Office for Official Publication of the European Communities (Luxembourg)


Hasegawa, Tsuyoshi (2007) “Japan’s Strategic Thinking toward Asia In the First Half of the 1990s.” In Gilbert Rozman, Kazuhiko Togo, and Joseph Ferguson (eds.) *Japanese Strategic Thought toward Asia* (New York: Palgrave).


Hughes, Christopher (2015) *Japan’s Foreign and Security Policy Under the 'Abe Doctrine': New Dynamism or New Dead End?* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan).


Oe, Kenzaburo (1995) あいまいな日本の私 (東京: 岩波新書)
It Looks from Japan,” *Asian Survey*, Vol. 47, No. 4 (July/August 2007), 584-600


Tanaka, Akihiko (2007) アジアのなかの日本 (東京: NTT出版)


