(Re)considering Japan’s ‘Pacifism’ in Eastern Asia as ‘Global Public Goods’ Provision: Avoiding a 50 Year Crisis and Engaging Pathways to Regional Peace

Abstract

Japan’s ‘pacifism’, or a non-nuclear and self-defense oriented security polity, has been under scrutiny for decades and its analysis dominated by forms of realism vs. domestic politics within Japan. In this context, narratives either advocating rearmament commensurate with its economic status or explaining its domestic politics ignore Japan’s contributions to Eastern Asia’s peaceful development for over half a century. Keeping in mind that policy advocacy has to keep reality in sight, in contrast to current debates, this paper (re)considers the situation and integrates interdisciplinary political economy enhanced by a metaphorical understanding of concepts to interpret Japan’s late 20th century ‘pacifism’ as ‘global public goods’ within the Eastern Asian security structure to offer a deeper 50 year understanding of its continuity into the 21st century. Drawing on history, data, and interviews, it argues Japan’s unilateral stance on ‘pacifism’ and multilateralism that engaged collective security measures has together checked Japan-US bilateralism seeking full rearmament. Offering insight into ‘public goods’, the Japanese example provides new pathways to understand regional security based on self-defense and regional cooperation as is appearing in the region in the 21st century.

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Introduction
Japan has for over 50 years avoided a security crisis in Eastern Asia with its ‘pacific’ approach to the region. In this sense not fully appreciating Japan’s contribution to global governance via ‘pacifism’ is tantamount to throwing a promising contribution to global governance by a ‘middle power’ out with the proverbial bathwater (Moses and Iwami 2009). The uniqueness of Hiroshima and Nagasaki nuclear holocausts in shaping Japanese ‘pacifism’ is recognized even in China—ironically though, in the so far dominant West, Japan is perennially passed over, signified by lack of recognition to deserve the Nobel Prize for Peace as a nation. Such ‘Japan passing’ also miss adroit approaches to ‘self-defence’ oriented security and a ‘growth-with-equity’ economic model that structurally enabled the ‘Asian miracle’ (Takahashi 1992; Yamazawa, et al 1993; Page 1994, Jayman 2004), thus avoiding crisis via multilateral engagement (Hughes 2009), while also finding pathways between ideal-realism for regional collective security (Kawasaki 1997). Meanwhile Acharya (2011) notes of claims that Asian powers offer meagre contributions to global governance, even though the implications of metaphors—‘pacifism’ and ‘growth-with-equity’—alluded to above on Japan’s post-war policies mean actual normative change as suggested by Cox (1989) and Higgott (1998). In the context of a country that has already been armed well enough while its peace constitution acts as a break (Berkofsky 2012) that puzzles some, while others seek a realist disciplinary discourse seeking to construct a ‘normal’ Japanese military commensurate with its economic power, as lately with Midford’s (2011) long peddled prescription, this paper makes the case for taking Pempel’s (2011) lead to consider actual meanings of practices of Japan’s ‘bilateralism’, ‘unilateralism’ and ‘multilateralism’ via a wider interdisciplinary framework that accounts for the nation’s phenomenal successes via ‘pacifism’ and ‘growth-with-equity’ (Jayman 2004).

With international relations, a Kuhnian paradigm shift can give meaning beyond dominant realism that is unable to understand Japan’s ‘pacifism’ beyond the internal institutional institutions to also account for the postcolonial Asian region long over looked by the dominant discourses especially the neo-neo debate, but also the Western academy inspired constructivists who claim to have moved beyond Marx somehow. This paper offers an interdisciplinary approach enhanced by formally acknowledging metaphorical concepts to interpret post-war Japanese ‘pacifism’ in terms of ‘public goods’ easing insecurity in Eastern Asia over the last half of the 20th century, a period when the purpose and fit of Japan’s economic power was questioned (Gilpin 1989), even while the ‘growth with equity’ model was resuscitating Eastern Asia from Japan to South Korea to Taiwan all the way to the emerging Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) nations. Encouraged by Katzenstein’s and Okawara’s (2001-2) eclecticism on Japan the paper shifts towards interdisciplinary social science integration via Repko (2012) that is enhanced by a metaphorical—via Lakoff (1973), Lakoff and Johnson (1980) and Lakoff (1992)—use of disciplinary terms. With this, the paper acknowledges an interdisciplinary political economy paradigm ground in criticism of capital to then conceptually include and understand Japan’s ‘pacifism’ via UNDP-sponsored work (Kaul et al 1999) on ‘public goods’ desired by postcolonial actors that then begins the process of legitimating Japanese power in Asia in general. With two key metaphors of ‘pacifism’ and ‘public goods’ engaging global governance the paper interprets Japanese policy as
minimizing a Jervis’s (1978) ‘security dilemma’ by not threatening insecure states (Beeson 2002). The outcomes for economic development in postcolonial Asia that in turn enabled legitimate self-defence capabilities via stable collective security arrangements continues to be beneficial in the long run and is the absolute key to legitimation of Japanese power in Asia (Jayman 2004).

In considering how Japan has avoided being mired in crises for over fifty years, the paper considers the state, and to a lesser extent firms, in setting regional ‘structures of power’ by (Strange 1975 and 1988) giving insight into Japanese policy from 1950 to 2000 and beyond defying predictions of its imminent return to a realist inspired story of a ‘normal’ power with a normal non-pacifist military role in the world, perhaps similar to Germany’s dangerous forays into Afghanistan in support of NATO articles. Relying on interviews with officials within the state and leading firms active in policy circles during the period, it also uses the literature, time series data and documents to make the case that Japanese ‘pacifism’ as a ‘public good’ is realized in its unilateral practice via limited expenditure on self-defence capabilities that was qualitatively unthreatening to a region with memories of Japanese imperialism. Japan’s multilateralist ‘middle power’ contribution to global governance has not only ushered in the Asian Regional Forum (ARF) and peace, but also economic plenty. The unilateralist and bilateralist ways of understanding Japanese policy, complements it bilateral security treaty, the sum total of which provides needed stability in the region as evidenced recently with the growth of Chinese power and the latest phase of the Korean nuclear arsenal that seeks to deter the US itself, having long been a threat to nearby Japan.

Solving the Puzzle of ‘Pacific’ Japan: Interdisciplinarity and ‘Global Public Goods’

For some there is no consensus over Japan’s security policy and who shapes it (Gilson 2007; Hirata 2008). However, those with a longue durée vision do appreciate Japan’s consistency in policy after WW II (Pempel 1977), but even after (Pempel 2011). Literatures from International Relations, International Political Economy, and Peace Studies, as well as Japanese Studies and Comparative Politics, offer important insights, yet Japanese ‘pacifism’ and its consequences are better understood when knowledge of its domestic and international/global role is examined comprehensively. Such an ambitious task, represented by an interdisciplinary political economy approach, is complicated given decades of intellectual investment in separate disciplines and schools within them, leaving some discourses more influential than others, as is the case with Realist emphasis on Japan’s rearmament along with bilateral ties to the US compared to the weaker emphasis on multilateralist cooperation in the region let alone giving any value to unilateralist ‘pacifism’. Regardless, Japan’s ‘pacifism’ is an ideal type for a former Great Power that has become a ‘middle power’ from the perspective of postcolonial states (Jayman 2004). Yet, Japan’s post-war leadership in the Eastern Asian region in this pacifist sense is overlooked including in the realm of global governance except for some notable voices led by Hook (1996) and Hughes (2009).

Given relative peace and prosperity in Eastern Asia that Japan has heavily contributed to, an appropriate theoretical framework is needed. One that goes beyond the focus on its bilateralism with the US to make sense of its unilateral ‘pacifism’ and multilateral
security cooperation, both of which contribute to global and regional governance, even if Japan is not known for making normative rules for the world or region (Funabshi, 1992). In accounting for Japan’s bilateralism, unilateralism and multilateralism, how can theory begin to give meaning for Japan’s ‘pacifism’ when what this means remains unclear in an epoch of Western domination that has largely marginalized non-Western ideas?

For Thomas Kuhn a normal science gets on with ‘puzzle-solving’ (1962/1970, 35–42). However, in many ways understandings of Japan’s ‘pacifism’ have reached a Khunian paradigmatic crisis in the ‘science’ of the study of international relations that itself is in crises when domestic drivers have been overlooked. That is, we have reached a time when there is low confidence in the ability of the existing ‘IR’ paradigm to account for the ‘anomaly’ of Japan, when perhaps the longue durée provides the answer along with more robust theory. Realists have dealt with Japan by attempting to either ignore it or explain it via new forms of realism (see Kawasaki 2001) or a continual prediction of a realist outcome (see Midford 2011). However, the accumulation of troublesome anomalies ala Kuhn poses a serious problem for the dominant theory when considering ‘pacifist’ Japan. To move beyond positivist-influenced realism—no matter what version pure, neo, etc.—what comes after has to be able to account for the set of insights offered by the preceding works as noted by Kuhn (1962/1970, 169). In this sense progressive theory must account for these observations about ‘pacifism’ in a single framework in which Japan’s various approaches to policy towards the world can be told as one story, including with contradictions, which is normal, but which the ‘science’ of realism cannot deal with. This is to say, the unilaterally ‘pacifist’ Japan and the bilateral Japan-US security treaty have to be considered as parts of policy, along with elements of cooperative regional multilateralism, all of which will not necessarily be cohesive though it might be so as well. In this sense it important to incorporate Gilpin’s (1987) thesis of a nichibei political economy along with Katzenstein’s (1996) and Hook’s (1996) insights on a domestic institution driven ‘pacifist’ ‘civilian’, while also accounting for the history of the ‘Greater Co-prosperity Sphere’ ideology that was used by Japan to justify its imperialism, but which was rejected leading to anti-Japanese sentiments that have endured, only slowly overcome by ‘pacifist’ Japan.

The paradigm shaping work via eclecticism (Katzenstein and Okawara, 2001 and Katzenstein and Sil 2008) suggests integration of the many disciplinary views on Japan’s internationalism to make sense of the whole, promising a path to understand its unilateral abeyance with ‘pacifism’, its bilateral Japan-US Security Treaty, and its multilateralism in the Eastern Asian region and beyond seeking to build security cooperation and collective self-defence with a comprehensive policy extend to each domestic political economy. To extend eclecticism to its logical conclusion in reaching a more complex paradigm is to commit to understanding the world through actual interdisciplinarity, and it thus a very difficult task with no theoretical parsimony on offer, at least initially, given the need for sober distillation of what is important and what is to be done for forms of legitimacy within nations and within the region. To lead to a path of an integrated social science it would, help to utilize metaphors offered by Lakoff (1973) and Lakoff and Johnson (1980) such that disciplines be inter-accessible, increasing the crossing of disciplinary boundaries in analysis.
In achieving a greater paradigm, interdisciplinary integration is a process by which ideas, data and information, methods, tools, concepts, and/or theory addresses the challenge of complexity (Repko 2012: 3-4). For Repko (2012) interdisciplinarity leads to addressing:

- the contested space between disciplines
- the action taken on disciplinary insights, called integration
- the result of integration that constitutes a cognitive advancement, called a more comprehensive understanding.

In the sense of meaning offered by Repko (2012) above, metaphorical ‘pacifism’ is at the least contested intellectual space between forms of Liberalism, Realism and historical understandings of violence rooted in a materialist critique following especially Marx that is not overlooked in international relations in favour of what is only a method of constructivism that has for the most part been an off-shoot of liberalism so far. It is complicated when the insights of these three major world perspectives grounded as back as Polybius’s universal history if not before that leads to actions that have different outcomes: kingship to authoritarianism, aristocracy to oligarchy, and democracy to populism. The implications of each action can be clear when normative ends—peace and prosperity—are not just catch phrases, but real with means ends calculations being made to achieve them, as democratic system do tend to deliver better. It is here that there can be integration, provided in this case ‘pacifism’ is acknowledged for its actual deployment rooted in imposition (by the US occupation), acceptance (by the defeated Japanese) and demand (by Japan’s neighbours). That is not as idealised formation as non-violence in the purist sense that disallows Japan from using lethal force even to defend its home islands making the a Japanese Self Defence Force (JSDF) illegal. Rather, only that the Japanese forces are no longer a factor in aggression abroad, because that is really what pacifism in Japan actually means and is welcomed in the region unless there is another shift such as a rising China that then requires Japan to help the US and ASEAN to counter balance.

In actual practice, evolving over time after WW II to meet new realities with the defence perimeter extended thousands of kilometres from the home islands, ‘pacifism’ is used metaphorically in Japanese security policy. This ‘pacifism’ actually involves degrees of military abeyance supported by another appealing metaphor, ‘self-defence’. Japan’s contribution to global governance via ‘pacifist self-defence’ occurs in the context of public resistance that underpins Japanese unilateralism to maintain its ‘peace constitution’ (yet another metaphor) however frayed by Japan-US bilateralism. This ‘pacifist self-defence’, occurs against a background of hopeful Japanese multilateralism (Funabashi 1992; Klein 2002), including encouraging regional ‘growth-with-equity’ (metaphor) of economic development that enhances security; all moves that promise enduring peaceful coexistence often overlooked in ‘middle power’ roles (Cox 1989).

If ‘pacifism’ is contested space, what of ‘action taken on disciplinary insights, called integration’? Repko’s (2012) goals above are more smoothly addressed if there can be a prior commitment to acknowledge metaphorical use of language. This allows the necessary concepts to work at thicker intersections that are truly interdisciplinary in
nature, before they speak past each other through disciplinary specialization and ‘tunnel vision’ (Nissani 1997). Disliked by those extolling philosophically consistent positions as Lakoff (1973) suggests, metaphors can however help us visualize an unfamiliar concept (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980).

Aided by metaphors, integration via interdisciplinarity results in cognitive advancement that tells about the value of a new paradigm in multiple ways with multiple cases that covers a wide range of issue—in this case the value of political economy largely still in the margins of American political science. For example, quickly forgotten in the discourse was Asian resentment towards the Washington Consensus over the financial crisis of 1996; this even while Japan attempted to create an alternative financial structure via the Asian Monetary Fund that was vetoed by the US (Higgott 1998 and 2001), and as history now tells it was to undermine US prestige. After the Obama administration attempted an Asian pivot following the Twenty Year Wars in the ‘middle east’ against non-state actors, there seems to have been a return to the historical leadership role for the US in Eastern Asia with Japan in a new form of the ‘nichibei’ vision. However, more recently the Trump administration’s reversal over the Trans Pacific Partnership (TTP) has left Thitinan Pongsudhirak, director of the Institute of Security and International Studies at Bangkok's Chulalongkorn University, to note “was imperative for ASEAN to regain leverage by bringing Washington back into the equation and expanding the influence of Japan” (Petty and Manuel Mogato 2017).

In contrast, Japan’s steady role in human security (Peng 2006)—via its ‘pacifism’ and ‘growth-with-equity for the region—is a crucial contribution that is under played, and where there is much more mileage for Japanese prestige. Sensitive to postcolonial interests that are rarely expressed in Realism or Liberalism, Higgott’s and Peng’s integrated interdisciplinarity is a contrast to dominant narratives and offers a richer paradigm of political economy oriented work on Japan. These approaches to financial or security structures are about ‘public goods’ that are appreciated best via political economy that sees its use as legitimacy gaining rather than in the language of international relations and ‘free-riding’ as given light to in Snidal (1985). When provided—or not—by hegemonic power such as the US or leading ‘middle powers’ such as Japan ‘public goods’ are a metaphor: thus Katada (2001) touches on Japanese provision of ‘public goods’ in the management of the region’s financial crises in 1997. However, the full value of this meaning is realized when understanding structural change via ‘public goods’ is at the core of an explicitly integrated interdisciplinary political global economy that offers a richer paradigm to analyse all sorts of issues that are in the real world interconnected. As this is so, it is important for International Relations and Peace Studies, and fundamentally for Economics, Political Science and Sociology that have been artificially separated, to be once again reconnected as, for example, suggested famously by Susan Strange (1970) when it came to international politics and international economics.

Within a richer paradigm of integrated global political economy, who provides ‘public goods’, how, and for what purpose, is a debate worth having again as the dominant debate within a narrow realist-liberal defined debate within mainly American
International Relations on ‘international public goods’ failed to ask postcolonial peoples what they saw as crucial in terms of security, thus failing at interdisciplinarity. Liberal economic historian Kindleberger (1986) argued that the leading power must provide international ‘public goods’ (in a non-exploitative manner), including security, as essential for a stable world capitalist system. Gilpin’s (1987) Realist version developed the idea of a nichibei political economy in response to the crisis of US hegemony, acknowledging Japanese plenty was crucial for ‘international public goods’ provided by the US. In contrast to the Liberal and Realist views, an interdisciplinary Global Political Economy that includes the postcolonial space offers insight into security, but not just from the perspective of the powerful. It addresses economic and political power in the global historical context, or more specifically, in terms of structures of power, which for Strange (1988), were the key to understanding who/what actually ‘had’ power to set rules over time. Such power was for Strange (1975:219) ‘the product of the economic structure; and the economic power to influence and direct the course of that world economic development [that] lies predominantly with the rich countries and with the large multinational enterprises and banks that have grown out of these economies.’ A critical Global Political Economy that Strange helped pioneer offers a framework to acknowledge that power is structural, leaving those with such power to decide on the pursuit of wealth, security and freedom/justice that has to be prioritized (Strange 1988).

As a paradigm, critical Global Political Economy emphasis on ‘public goods’ is useful to address Japan’s efforts to meet the security needs of postcolonial states in Eastern Asia, making sense of various disciplinary strands at odds with each other, as contradictions are expected in a setting influenced by Marx. Familiar to many in theory if not in practice, ‘public goods’ can be understood metaphorically as a category of good from which most can benefit—that is, rather than via a pure reading insisting on absolute non-excludability and absence of rivalrous consumption, as noted in UNDP sponsored work by Kaul, et al (1999) on ‘global public goods’. For these authors, global ‘public goods’ meet two criteria:

The first is that their benefits have strong qualities of publicness—that is, they are marked by nonrivalry in consumption and nonexcludability. These features place them in the general category of public goods. The second criterion is that their benefits are quasi universal in terms of countries (covering more than one group of countries), people (accruing to several, preferably all, population groups), and generations (extending to both current and future generations, or at least meeting the needs of current generations without foreclosing development options for future generations) (Kaul, et al, 1999: 2-3).

These criteria allow one to envision a category of good that is broadly public in nature, not only within a country but within the global system, and thus able to address security—such as the practice of Japan’s powerful armed forces restricted by constitutional ‘pacifism’—not in isolation but in relation to other major areas of global political economy, such as knowledge, finance and production, following Strange (1988), and which are consistent with Polanyi’s (1944) ‘four pillars’ of the liberal state, balance of power, the gold standard, the self-regulating market economy in explaining the 100 year peace. It is in this meaningful context that ‘unilateralism’, ‘bilateralism’ and ‘multilateralism’ have actual historically meaning: ‘pacifism’ is gives meaning to each
strand of Japan’s policy over the decades after WW II as a non-imperial actor in Eastern Asia.

With nearly 500 years of wars and violent occupation the norm of global order from a postcolonial perspective, peace is a vital public good that can be addressed via an integrated interdisciplinary Global Political Economy dedicated to addressing power in historical terms and attentive to the matter of ‘who gets what’ (Lasswell 1936). Indeed, the insecurity dilemma in post-colonial societies is more acute than has been generally acknowledged, as a range of scholars have underlined (Buzan 1983; Sayigh 1990; Job 1992; Ayoob 1995; Nueman 1998). Not coincidentally, UNDP sponsored work on ‘global public goods’ was spurred after the crises of the 1990s that ranged from finance to security that required better global governance.

Influencing and influenced by the UNDP, Japanese scholar and practitioner Takahashi (1992 and 2000), who headed the Foundation of Advanced Studies International in Development (FASID), saw issue linkages between various ‘public goods’. He acknowledged ‘global public goods’ as a valuable contribution by the UNDP, with its focus on postcolonial interests. Use of the language of global ‘public goods’—Takahashi was leading FASID that advised the government—to consider needs of postcolonial states and societies shows how Japan successfully re-engaged postcolonial states in Eastern Asia in ways that ensured security in the region and in the world more generally. When metaphorical ‘global public goods’ are considered broadly, this allows an approach to security that encompasses not only attention to traditional military issues but also other unilateral, bilateral and multilateral endeavours of Japan. With Yamamoto (1996) maintaining that peace builders’ objectives must be regional and global, bilateral and multilateral, and Pempel (2011) asking to directly consider “bilateralism and multilateralism”, and indirectly also unilateralism in areas of policy struggles over time at home and the pushes and pulls of Asia and the US, this analysis proceeds to make sense of Japan more systematically developing the frame work developed above.

*Japan’s bilateral and unilateral security approach: the public good of ‘pacifism’*

Occupied by the US, bilateralism with Washington was the dominant track available to Tokyo with planned deindustrialization a cost of reparations in the early years after WW II. However, rather than deindustrialization, Japan’s capability to ensure its own wealth and security increased further with its post-WW II access to Asia, beginning with the multilateralism of the Colombo Plan, allowing it to be defined as a ‘middle power’ right at the beginning of the era of US-USSR rivalry, a designation developed by Canadians and Australians perhaps resisted by Japanese thinkers even now, who prefer world power status despite the realities of a global system in which a fully awakened China has appeared in Eastern Asia (Jayman 2014) and an emerging India despite internal divisions has appeared in Southern Asia (Jayman (2016). With further increase in power that came with Colombo Plan it was possible for a unilateral track for Japanese policy where it became clear ‘pacifism’ had become a choice internally and also one that resonated in the region still afraid and suspicious of Japan. While it was bilateralism with the US supported by regional multilateralism that led to the early revision of the ‘peace constitution’ to allow Japan to upgrade to a ‘Self Defence Force’ (SDF) from a mere
domestic police force, it was unilateralism that enshrined the limits of the SDF as it became popular with a traumatized people abhorring war and suspicious of its leaders. The ‘pacifist’ limits on the SDF meant Eastern Asia, including East and Southeast Asia, from China to Papua New Guinea, had assurance that Japan was not a threat again. Consistent with concerns of postcolonial people in the region, so Japan’s ‘public goods’ provision in the realm of security began to emerge in Eastern Asia.

Postcolonial demands for major powers to not threaten them were ignored by victorious powers in the 20th century and beyond, with British, French and US aggression in Africa, Asia, Latin America and the Middle East a marked contrast to Japanese and German ‘pacifism’. Costly foreign wars weakened the US by the late 1960s, forcing US president Nixon off the Gold Standard to finance the war with debt (Strange 1988). Not without irony, with Japan buying US debt, the bilateral engagement that included the Japan-US Security Treaty became important not just for Japan, emerging from the shadows of twin mushroom clouds, but also for US hegemony that was in crisis. Under pressure of ill-advised wars in Indo-China in particular, with the Nixon Doctrine, the US attempted to draw Japan towards more responsibility for regional security (Komine 2014), setting the stage for a nichibei system as Japanese unilateral ‘pacifism’ took greater meaning in terms of the ‘public goods’ role of not threatening the region, while its economic dominance ensured knowledge, finance and production areas of public goods to flow to the region ensuring economic ‘growth-with-equity’ (Jayman 2004).

With encouragement by the US for Japan to rearm in the face of Soviet and Chinese power, the post-World War II constitution of 1947 embodied tensions, with some interpreting it as denying any meaningful role for the Japanese military (Izumikawa 2010) while others saw it as a means to focus on the economy as they interpreted the Yoshida Doctrine. However, under the auspices of this complex peace constitution Japan proceeded to develop military capabilities focused squarely on self-defence—meaning that it was a defence force incapable of projecting military power to invade, and rather focused on deterring invasion—meeting the minimum bilateral expectations of the US, but not the full extent requested as it emerged over time. Thus, Japan’s military abeyance due to pressure from the growing peace movement—led for example by the left and teachers—within Japan made it ‘pacific’ unilaterally. It was nonetheless also in accordance with multilateral regional expectations that Japan not re-emerge as a threatening power, sweetening Pempel’s (2011) metaphorical ‘sweet spot’ further.

In terms of theoretical meaning to connect to wider debates, what emerged over the decades was a Japanese unilateral, bilateral and multilateral policy that is best captured by a ‘public goods’ lens in the critical sense of the metaphor that places the recipient to thus be able to afford Japan some legitimacy. That is, rather than the sense conveyed in international relations of the problems of free-riding without consider the colonized and then dominated “other”. It was under this self-defence provision focused on Eastern Asia that Japan went on to expand its ‘global public goods’ role in security through military abeyance rather than expansion, accompanied by economic engagement and growing assistance to smaller Eastern Asian nations allowing them economic development (Wade
1996; Dent 2008) that in turn led them to develop security infrastructures independently. Japanese ‘public goods’ to Eastern Asia was thus a legitimating process (Jayman 2004).

Japanese rearmament in a ‘self-defensive’ frame that was legitimating regionally was gradual. By the 1990s through spending 1% of GDP to remain within the constitutional limits of the world’s second largest economy, Japan’s military was one of the most technologically advanced in the world, but without the ability to project power (see International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1997-2014) to threaten postcolonial Eastern Asia. In 1960, Japan’s military expenditure was ¥157,900 million, but by 1995 it had become ¥4,723,600 million, a 2.76% average annual growth rate over 35 years (Asahi Shimbum 1996: 64–66).

The limit of 1% of GNP-GDP for defence under the peace constitution was maintained even as pressure to re-arm increased from the US. However, this amount was vast given that Japan’s economy dwarfed all in Asia all except China’s (see Chart 1). Ranked fourth in the world in terms of total defence expenditures in 1997, at end of the 20th century Japan spent about $50 billion a year, and meant its defence budget ranked third among all US allies (International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1998; 2000).

Low long term trends in military expenditure, as outlined in Chart 1, show Japan’s spending below the US, UK and France, and just below Germany. Similar to Germany in Europe, this trend emphasizes how unthreatening Japanese policy in Eastern Asia is ‘public goods’ oriented compared to aggressive US, British and French roles are in Asia, Africa, Latin America and the Middle East. In Asia, ‘pacific’ Japan, has been has been surpassed by China, which has fought wars with India and Vietnam causing regional insecurity.
Significantly, Japan’s expenditure was flat from the 1990s onwards, even with higher personnel costs, making it important to consider how the budget was actually used. As the *Honolulu Star Bulletin* (2001) observed,

> Japan spends more than 40% of its budget on personnel and another 10% to support US forces in Japan. Thus, the Japanese have spent half of their military budget before they have bought the first bullet, tank, or airplane. In addition, they get few economies of scale in arms production because they procure weapons in small lots. In some cases their costs are nearly twice those in the United States. In sum, in military power, it's not what you spend but what you buy, and the Japanese don't get much for their defence yen.

Thus, a vast budget was devoted to personnel and equipment purchased at comparatively high cost, while expenditure did not increase significantly, as seen in both actual dollar amounts (Chart 1), and in terms of military expenditure as a percentage of GDP (Chart 2). As observed by Nester and Ampiah (1989) in the post-World War II period Japan’s self-defence orientation meant it could not defend its vital oil supply route, which in reality stretched from the Persian Gulf to Southern Sri Lanka to the 500 km long Straits of Malacca, all over 2000 km away from Japan. Crucial for ‘public goods’ in security and the process of legitimation of its role from the perspective of postcolonial states, Tokyo relied on South and Southeast Asian nations that it had helped develop economically with substantial Japanese aid along with the regional production network established by Japanese firms (Hatch and Yamamura 1998), along with US and other allied navies operating in the Indian Ocean.

In considering production structures, Hatch and Yamamura (1998) show how ‘East Asia’ is in Japan’s metaphorical ‘embrace’ to enrich itself. Japanese wealth meant it was able to have one of the most powerful militaries in Eastern Asia in terms of self-defence (Samuels1994; Calder 1996), but only in terms of deterring a conventional attack on the main islands. While formidable compared to the militaries of less powerful postcolonial...
states in Eastern Asia, Japan’s SDF is relatively small compared to the military of China, or even that of unstable North Korea, both with nuclear weapons. Thus Japan’s ‘pacifism’ has much weight considering not just its inability to project military power, but also due to the ongoing rejection of nuclear weapons that is actually the more crucial issue in the era of such weapons and its deterrent value conveyed by mutually assured destruction (MAD). The non-nuclear policy is firm grounded in the unilateralist sense, in the middle of the Cold War, as it was in 1967 that Japan formulated its three non-nuclear principles: not to produce, possess, or introduce nuclear weapons into Japan. Japan's post-war pacifism in the nuclear realm has remained firm despite expectations to the contrary (Kahn, 1970: 165; Waltz, 1993) and changes to the global environment with the end of the Cold War and beyond, as signified by 21st century challenges.

Japan’s ‘pacifist’ unilateralism, acceptable to postcolonial states, caused tension for the bilateral security treaty with US, though not to the degree seen with trade wrangles (Destler, et al 1979; Bello and Cunningham, 1994). Each iteration of the treaty increased Japan’s role in its own defence of its home islands. The Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defence Cooperation (US-Japan Security Consultative Committee, 1997) committed Japan to deploying mine sweepers, enforcing UN embargos, and assisting in communications and surveillance, allowing the Japanese to support US actions surrounding Japan. Assuming a significant role in financing US forces, by the mid-1990s Japan provided approximately $6 billion a year to support the US military (Woolley, 2000: 140). Its commitments via the bilateral relationship with the US were supportive of the defensive orientation of its policy trajectory more generally, and thus within the ‘pacifist’ orientation that was part of a legitimating process at home in Japan and abroad in Eastern Asia.

Thus, in terms of broader meaning, between 1950 and 2000 Japan’s development of ‘pacific’ ‘self-defensive’ capabilities can be understood as a key aspect of it broader ‘global public goods’ role in keeping with Eastern Asian expectations. ‘Pacifism’ meant that Japan did not pose a military threat to emerging postcolonial economies the region, as would have been the case had Japanese military developed traditional offensive capabilities. With Japan not posing a military threat, and not fanning the flames of an arms race in Eastern Asia, postcolonial states focused less on security infrastructure and more on economic development during the early stages in the 1960s and 1970s, allowing them to invest in their own military capabilities later.

**Unilateralism and multilateralism: Japan’s ‘public goods’ role**

Overlooked by ‘Japan passing’ when considering its ‘middle power’ role in terms of peace and economic development, Japan’s unilateral emphasis via a non-threatening military combines well with its multilateralism at the global and regional levels. The multilateral track grew significantly from the 1950s to the end of the century making Japan’s global ‘public goods’ role meaningful not only in security via its unilateral ‘pacifism’, but also in structures of knowledge, finance and production, that influenced Eastern Asian ability to create institutions to enhance collective defence capacity. Clear indications of multilateral policy emphasis are found in Japan’s engagement and deep support for the UN at the global level, while at the regional level it is involved in
initiatives in Asia, as with encouraging the ASEAN regional Forum (ARF), with both enhanced not only with its unilateral stance on pacifism, but also via a similar willingness to engage and bring in Vietnam and rest of Indo-China into the regional fold displaying a strategic vision, which looks extremely well-thought out from the distance of the second decade of the 21st century and the chaos of US and Russian military adventurism.

Japan’s multilateralism was initiated by one of the most vulnerable of postcolonial nations in Asia. Quoting the Buddha that ‘hatred ceases not by hatred but by love’, Sri Lanka’s J.R. Jayewardene championed Japan’s place among free nations at the 1951 Peace Treaty Conference at San Francisco. Japan gradually re-joined the community of nations. After the Colombo Plan, the manifestation of its multilateralism came with its growing role in the UN with membership in 1956 and assured its ‘middle power’ status right away. Rapid economic growth, stimulated by supplying the Korean War and the Vietnam War, fuelled Japan’s re-emergence as the second most powerful economy. US departure from the Gold Standard in 1971 left Japan with a highly advantageous exchange rate and access to the North American market.

Japanese ‘miracle’ economy dominated world trade (Johnson 1982) with the favourable exchange rate from 1971 bequeathed by Nixon. With the production structure so established, Japan nonetheless moved rapidly up the value chain with its exchange rate appreciating, allowing purchase of US debt while making Japanese economic aid in Eastern Asia a deciding factor in building its production network that also meant training and employing millions of Asians while helping them gain trade surpluses leading to what Stubbs (1995) terms ‘performance legitimacy’. Thus, Japan became a bulwark against Soviet influence via its ‘public goods’ role in knowledge, finance and production in the region while helping the Eastern Asia compete and win against Western economies, however, more importantly, this was a process of legitimation in the region as it was ‘pacific’ in nature.
Increased Japanese power meant its global and regional multilateral shift was more potent and at times able to resist even the US, its bilateral partner. By 1989 Japan became the second leading contributor to the UN after the US, maintaining this hierarchy well into the 21st century (see Chart 4), while seeking to establish a rules based world. With demands for funding increasing after the Cold War, Japan’s financial backing for UN funding was strategic (Itoh, 1995), shoring-up the ‘public goods’ role of international institutions essential for peace.

![Chart 4: UN Assessed Contributions 1975-2015](image)

Originally elected to the Security Council in 1958—the height the success of multilateralism and ‘middle power’ status—Japan was more or less retained its non-permanent seat on the UN Security Council through the early 1980s (Drifte 2000). Seeing multilateralism as a viable alternative to going it alone Nakasone Yasuhiro, one of Japan’s longest serving prime ministers, from 1982–1987, led factions within the country seeking a permanent UN Security Council seat, seeing the UN as a key vehicle for world peace. With multilateralism in general and membership in the UN in particular popular in Japan, Orr (1990) was hopeful of its role, even if sceptics such as Arase (1995) saw ‘buying power’. Ultimately, Japan’s contributions effectively guaranteed the viability of the UN in a unipolar moment when the US, the largest contributor, was in arrears.

Japan had added support for UN peacekeeping operations (UNPKOs), thus extending its pacifism beyond Asia to the wider community of nations. The 1992 Liberal Democratic Party report, *Japan’s Role in the International Society*, made the case that Japan should increase its role in these operations and become more assertive on regional security issues (Asahi Shimbun, 1993). Significantly, Thailand’s decision to lead ASEAN’s support of a Japanese UN peacekeeping unit in Kampuchea (Donnelly and Stubbs, 1996) suggests expectation in the region that Tokyo should do more on the security front than bankroll the efforts of others.

When the UNPKO law finally came into operation, a leading newspaper observed:
Putting the United Nations at the centre of the efforts to solve major international problems is one of the pillars of Japan’s diplomacy. Participation in UN peacekeeping operations is Japan’s responsibility in contributing to global peace and stability. It is in line with the spirit of pacifism enshrined in the Constitution. Whether they are in the ruling or opposition camps, political parties are responsible for improving and strengthening the system of the nation’s contribution to UN peacekeeping operations (Daily Yomiuri, 1998).

Japanese multilateral UNPKO ‘public goods’ contributions were more of a non-military type, consistent with demands at home and regional expectations. Even in soothing Washington during the Persian Gulf crisis of 1990–1991, Tokyo contributed in monetary terms. Japan dispatched SDF personnel under the US, but still with strict rules of engagement given concerns from the public and the rest of postcolonial Eastern Asia uninterested in an expanded role for the Japanese military. After 1992 Japan participated in several peacekeeping operations:

- 1992 United Nations Angola Verification Mission II (UNAVEM II)
- 1993 United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC)
- 1993 United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ)
- 1994 United Nations Observer Mission In El Salvador (ONUSAL)
- 1996 United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF)
- 1999 United Nations Mission in East Timor (UNAMET)
- 2002 United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET)
- 2002 United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor (UNMIS)
- 2007 United Nations Mission in Nepal (UNMIN)
- 2008 United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS)
- 2012 United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH)

[Source: MOFA 2015]

In UN force of some 98,444 in 2014, Japan contributed only a paltry 271 personnel. The leading contributors came from Pakistan, India and Bangladesh, poorer nations needing to defray their expensive militaries. However Japan’s contributions were consistent with Canada and other ‘middle powers’ such as Germany. Japan’s military component even for peacekeeping has been small historically, but far exceeding them when considering non-military contributions.

Given societal discomfort with abandoning ‘pacifism’, the traditionally anti-military Japan Socialist Party (JSP) and the Japan Communist Party (JCP) opposed the passage of this law in the Diet in the years after WW II. However, losses in the 1993 parliamentary elections, in part as a result of their opposition to the PKO Law, saw the JSP drop its opposition to this change and even the hostility to the constitutionality of the SDF. By 1994 the Socialists were in power as part of a coalition government, and Prime Minister Murayama presided over the overseas dispatch of the SDF to Zaire and Kenya and made preparations for a posting to the Golan Heights (Arrington, 2002: 546), reflecting growing consensus on Japan’s peacekeeping activities.

In 1998, PKO collaboration rules were further revised due to changes in UNPKO activities. Among the changes were rules regarding provision of personnel to supervise elections, material assistance, and usage of arms. Suggesting how well Japan’s reputation
traveled in the Global South following this groundwork, with the US invasion of Iraq coverage by BBC News suggested that while Japan's deployment of troops to Iraq may have been controversial at home, it was greeted with high expectations in Iraq itself (Luthra 2004). With the significance of paying significant portion of the overall UN budget, Japan’s unilateral ‘pacifist’ commitment to UN activities is still part of a broader strategy of multilateralism that advanced collective security in Eastern Asia, in effect performing a regional ‘public goods’ role that benefit all, but one that still needed institutionalization at a deeper level in as far as the region was concerned.

Following the end of the US sponsored Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), Japanese officials were conscious that the Asia-Pacific region had no institutionalised regional mechanism related to security comparable to NATO or the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). Instead, with Japan playing a multilateral role, regional stability was maintained on the basis of the build-up of bilateral security agreements centred on the US (ASEAN Regional Forum, 1999). ‘Pacific’ Japan prepared for the possibility of US withdrawal and the rise of China by building regional efforts that still involved a pacific Japan and a relatively weaker US commitment.

With leadership roles in the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation (APEC) summits, Japan-ASEAN, and ASEAN+3 (Japan, China, and Republic of Korea) meetings, Japan made its ‘public goods’ role in supporting collective security deeper in the region than anywhere else in the world. In the 1990s, Japan promoted the idea of collective security in Eastern Asia under the auspices of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). In this context, small states within ASEAN could attempt to play a regional role in constructing a security community (Acharya, 2001). Japan sought to anchor the region’s nations to this forum while also seeking to enlarge it. In thus embedding the region into its ‘public goods’ sphere in mutual support, Japan invited Pakistan to join India within the ARF (ARF, 1999), thus suggesting a larger Asia Pacific vision.

Dialogues took place in organisations including the Council for Security Co-operation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP) and the Northeast Asia Co-operation Dialogue (NEACD), playing a significant role in confidence building measures in the Asia-Pacific region (ARF, 1999). While the ARF is seen as a mere ‘talking shop’ by the sceptical (The Economist 2015), it nonetheless encouraged consultation. Japanese efforts were enhanced by its Track II efforts, most conspicuously with engagement of Vietnam, despite Washington’s sanctions against Hanoi that Tokyo officially supported (Khamchoo and Reynolds (1988: 248). Japan’s role in encouraging Vietnam into ASEAN ranks among one of the most successful of Tokyo’s Track II efforts, setting a regional precedent to enhance collective security. When the Thai Prime Minister questioned then Japanese Prime Minister Fukuda over the wisdom of engaging Vietnam diplomatically, his reply was suggestive of the Japanese approach to security as a public good in its totality. Fukoda explained:

I can understand your anxiety. However, if destitution and poverty continue in the three Indo-Chinese nations, those three countries will rely on the big powers all the more. What will happen in such a case? At the present time
Vietnam is trying to reconstruct itself with its own efforts, without relying on big powers. After all we should not be in confrontation. We should abide by peaceful co-existence (Cited in Khamchoo and Reynolds 1988: 245).

For the Japanese leader, engagement of Vietnam achieved important political objectives, with peace in the region a key concern.

Track II efforts were aided by Japanese firms and their regional production network. With the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) not outlawing these firms’ contact with Vietnam, a safe interpretation is that of the state’s tacit approval. The Japanese trading firm Nissho Iwai, for example, carried on in Vietnam, understanding that Ho Chi Minh had been a nationalist. As with other firms, it was their view that the US government was underestimating the strength of nationalism in the region and overestimating ideology.

With ‘unofficial’ ties crucial in building confidence it can be said that MOFA succeeded in bringing its vision of Vietnam within ASEAN to fruition, and that Tokyo pursued a forward-thinking policy of pacific engagement despite the ideologically moribund US view. Learning from the ‘pacifist’ Japanese approach that allowed Vietnam into ASEAN, regional leaders invited Yangoon to join ASEAN, much to the chagrin of Western powers. Tokyo was anxious to repeat the process with Myanmar/Burma, engaging the ‘outcast’ regime despite Western opposition. Unlike with Vietnam, however, Tokyo played a minor role in this affair as Myanmar/Burma was dependent on Beijing.

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Within MOFA the pro-China stance of the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) was not taken as an indicator of the future, and this became clearer when Myanmar/Burma entered ASEAN with major foreign investors still Western (Mason, 1998). Continued Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) guarantees for Japanese firms in Myanmar/Burma, along with renewed ODA flows under MOFA, suggest Myanmar/Burma continued to be important for Tokyo with significant consensus on the issue within Japan’s bureaucracy. With Japanese aid and investments gradually increasing in the 1990s, as pointed out by Mason (1998), and given that SLORC was not a popular regime, the expectations were that Yangon would gradually adopt ASEAN modes of behaviour. By the turn of the century, Myanmar/Burma was a focal point for Chinese power into the Indian Ocean. US and Indian interests followed Japan in attempting to wean the country away from China, while Japan continued to strengthen ASEAN as the alternative for Yangon.

North Korea has been and continues to be a different category of challenge to any neighbour and any type of power, and in many ways a failure for all concerned powers, the US included, except of course there has been relative peace since the end of the Korean War. A ‘pacifist’ Tokyo was, of course, at the forefront of the North Korean nuclear weapons issue, understood as an existential threat to Japan at the National Defence Academy in particular. The Economist (1991) pointedly noted that countries in Eastern Asia, including China, were ‘delighted that Japan has taken the initiative in trying to get North Korea, bankrupt but still belligerent, to end its isolation’. It suggested that progress was slowly being made due to Japanese persistence and potential for hard currency and soft loans. Some success was indicated by North Korea's decision to apply
for UN membership. While Japan could also claim credit for North Korea's decision to accept the UN nuclear-safeguards accord, over time it has clearly failed. Though it signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1985, North Korea refused to accept the mandatory safeguards included. In 1991 the outcast regime signed the accord that provided for international checks of its nuclear plants, no longer insisting that US nuclear weapons in South Korea also be inspected. Yet, by the turn of the century, it had become a nuclear power as it conducted successful nuclear tests in 2006, 2009, 2013 twice in 2016 (BBC).

Even with mixed results, it is crucial to recognize the importance of Japan’s unilateral Track II efforts in helping maintain Eastern Asian security over the decades. North Korea represents the limits of unilateral ‘pacifism’ and multilateralism towards collective security, particularly given China’s role in keeping the regime in power. It also represents, along with the nuclear threats from China and Russia (with which Japan is still technically at war!) means the bilateral part of Japanese policy remains crucial, but with the caveat that most other Eastern Asian country views this treaty as essential and legitimate.

**Conclusion**

If the interwar crisis in Europe could have been avoided by containing Germany early as E.H. Carr (1939) insisted through his realism, the solution to the post WW II world for him was via wider cooperation in the manner post-nuclear holocaust Japan avoided crises in the second part of 20th century. The Lynch pin to this avoidance of crisis in Eastern Asia in the 20th century was Japan unilateral ‘pacifist’ doctrine that balanced its bilateralism with the US, while encouraging multilateralism in a way that the great historian might have appreciated as signified in this later work (Carr 1942). Japan’s innovative approach to regional order, is however over looked by the propensity of many in the powerful Western academy to approach long periods of war in Europe as the historical standard for theory. It has come at the cost of neglect of Asian origins for theory as Alagappa (2002) notes, while overlooking Japan’s historical relationship with Asia for the most part without adequate complexity that it requires. Along with consequences for understanding the conditions for an enduring peace (Kang 2003), it has in addition also meant neglect of postcolonial perspectives informed by 500 years of insecurity (Jayawardene 2012 and Jayman 2004). Furthermore, the neglect of Japan’s policies outside of its bilateralism with the US, means overlooking the contributions of ‘middle powers’ to ‘advancing a defensible normative aspiration’ that contributes to making the world ‘a better place’ (Beeson and Higgott 2013: 19).

Japan’s policies interpreted via ‘global public goods’ provision leads to deeper appreciation of its role in averting crises in Eastern Asia in second half of the 20th century in stark contrast to the first half. In terms of public goods its unilateral ‘pacifism’ in the period 1950-2000 has deepened security in Eastern Asia and in the world more generally, to benefit not only Japan itself, but its postcolonial neighbours in the region, leaving the world a better place over the last decades of the 20th century. Attention to Japan’s multifaceted security approach 1950-2000 reveals a more active ‘middle power’ role obscured by scholarly focus on bilateral arrangements with the US, thus risking the gains
made for multilateralism as seen in the 21st century where it is ‘resentfully’ being pushed into ‘normality’ (Hughes 2015; Hagström 2015).

For Tokyo, the most comfortable form of meeting Japan’s international obligations as a ‘middle power’ (Cox, 1989; Soeya 2008; Dent 2008; Wang and French, 2013) was one that conceptualized security as a good important for all via ‘pacifism’, recognizing the ‘security dilemma’. Rather than pursue security at the expense of weaker Eastern Asian neighbours, Japan provided a context conducive to the development of poorer countries and thus allowed for collective development of defence capabilities over time (see Wattanayagorn, 1996; Bitzinger, Rochard and Kosiak, 1995). This metaphorically ‘pacifist’ path was ultimately successful in securing a lengthy period of peace in Eastern Asia amid the tensions of the post-WW II period, the Cold War, and neoliberal triumphalism that fed instability and military aggression around the world. The long peace allowed each Eastern Asian nation greater economic capacity to invest in defensive measures and the emergence of the idea of collective security (Hughes 2009).

When considering discourses on global governance, Japan’s ‘pacifism’ of the second half of the 20th century deserves recognition, including the Nobel Prize for Peace. While rarely presenting itself as a rule-maker in the world (Funabshi, 1992), its ‘pacifism’ understood metaphorically in terms of ‘public goods’, nevertheless offers a reproducible practice as it is sensitive to and valued by smaller postcolonial states in Asia. Japan’s metaphorical ‘pacifism’ offers a key example of the role of a powerful state in the promotion of not merely of ‘negative peace, in the sense of reducing war’, but also of ‘positive peace, in the sense of cooperation or integration’ (Gelditsch, Nordkvelle and Strand, 2014: 145). This ‘public goods’ assurance in Eastern Asia is now being challenged by an emergent nuclear armed China—a global ‘public bad’—outspending the defence budgets of all other Eastern Asian countries combined. This is creating new geographical realities where postcolonial states, such as the Philippines, look to Japan to play a greater role, in one of the deepest ironies in recent history induced by its ‘pacifism’ (Heydarian 2015).10 However, an even deeper commitment to development of the Asia’s smaller nations would enable them to more effectively organize collective self defence against which Chinese prestige will have to be risked—this is an unlikely prospect how the US lost wars in Vietnam and the Middle East and how the Soviet Union collapsed faced with determined resistance from Afghanistan. Chinese misadventure will only result in the break-up of China itself, and that is warning to Beijing and should make Japan’s recent return to a regional public good approach that also includes Africa very welcome indeed (MOFA 2015).
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3 Interviews were conducted with Japanese researchers as well as corporate and government officials during the author’s fieldwork in Japan 1996-1998 with a Monbusho grant. Due to constraints of confidentiality, officials are not identified by name.

4 For a comprehensive and systematic presentation of the interdisciplinary research process and the theory that informs it see Allen F. Repko, *Interdisciplinary Research: Process and Theory*, Sage 2012. For him, generalist interdisciplinarians understand interdisciplinarity loosely to mean ‘any form of dialog or interaction between two or more disciplines’ while minimizing, obscuring, or rejecting altogether the role of integration. He notes that ‘integrationist interdisciplinarians, on the other hand, believe that integration should be the goal of interdisciplinary work because integration addresses the challenge of complexity. Integrationists point to a growing body of literature that connects integration with interdisciplinary education and research, and are concerned with developing a distinctively interdisciplinary theory-based research process and describing how it operates. They advocate reducing the semantic evasiveness surrounding the term interdisciplinarity and point to research in cognitive psychology that shows that integration is both natural and achievable.’

5 As Moses and Iwami (2009) observes, the pacifist commitment contained in Article 9 in particular has been a key point for debate. Fisher (1999) explains that the initial interpretation of Article 9 allowed Japan self-defence under international law, but waived it in the second paragraph, with Japanese law schools taking on this interpretation. Until 1952 the Japanese government claimed that the article prohibited a self-defence force (SDF), presenting the case to the public as an absolute prohibition rather than a flexible standard. The advent of the Korean War, however, led the US to direct Prime Minister Yoshida to create a 75,000 man National Police Reserve. Subsequently, Yoshida differentiated war-making potential from potential for self-defence (Fisher, 1999: 398). See also Akiko Hashimoto’s work on historical trauma in Japan in its defeat and formation of identity in Japan.

6 As discussed in ASEAN Regional Forum (2011), ‘The objectives of the ARF are outlined in the First ARF Chairman’s Statement (1994) namely: 1) to foster constructive dialogue and consultation on political and security issues of common interest and concern; and 2) to make significant contributions to efforts towards confidence-building and preventive diplomacy in the Asia-Pacific region’. Moreover, ‘The 27th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting (1994) stated that ARF could become an effective consultative Asia-Pacific Forum for promoting open dialogue on political and security co-operation in the region. In this context, ASEAN was to work with its ARF partners to bring about a more predictable and constructive pattern of relations in the Asia Pacific’ (ASEAN Regional Forum, 2011).

7 Morrison (1987) argues that Tokyo adopted ASEAN positions on Vietnam after the latter’s occupation of Kampuchea (Cambodia) caused international furor.

8 The seeds sown by Japan via ASEAN came to fruition when the US and Burma/Myanmar normalized relations in the twenty-first century. See Baker (2012) on the gradual rapprochement between the US and Myanmar.

9 While he was criticized for using work that was controversial to base his views, it is Carr’s own proclivity to understand the economic roots of conflict that is unfortunately overlooked.

10 Richard Javad Heydarian is a policy adviser at the Philippine House of Representatives.