

Regional Challenges in an Uncertain Global Order: The Case of East Asia

Derrick V. Frazier

(Air University, School of Advanced Air and Space Studies)

Nicholas K. Sobecki

(The University of Alabama, Department of Political Science)

Author Correspondence: Nick Sobecki; nksobecki@crimson.ua.edu; Department of Political Science, University of Alabama, Box 870213 The University of Alabama Tuscaloosa, AL, USA 35487

Abstract

Current conceptualizations of international and regional order lack sufficient depth. This is due in large part to economic and security orders being examined independently of one another. Furthermore, their discussion tends to reflect the assumption that they are a part of a more coherent global order that conditions state behaviour in local environments. This paper argues against this assumption, and contends that an ill-defined global order allows regional challenges on salient economic and security issues. We focus on the East Asian regional order to examine our argument. Our research illustrates how the supposed global and regional orders interact with and co-constitute one another while also creating points of friction that are open to potential conflict. As a result, we are able to draw a few key implications as they relate to the future of East Asia, the rise of China and the role of the US as a defender of both global and regional order.

Disclaimer

The views and opinions expressed in this presentation and accompanying paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of any agency of the U.S. government.

I. Introduction

The end of the Cold War, climate change, and the increasing amount of terrorist attacks in North America and Europe are just a few events in the late twentieth and early twenty-first century that primed scholars and practitioners to begin asking questions about the future global order. The rise of the BRICs, the two longest and costliest conflicts in U.S. history, and the backlash of nationalism in response to globalization have not only increased the necessity for understanding what global order we are operating in, but also what place do the current highest and rising powers have in this or a future order. Ikenberry's statement that "the central problem of international relations is the problem of order – how it is devised, how it breaks down, and how it is recreated" appears not only as a sound understanding of International Relations, but nearly prophetic 16 years on in terms of relations between nations (2001, 22).

Many of the theories in IR are clearly focused, in whole or in part, on understanding the various questions Ikenberry points to or, at the very least, make some claim about international order as a key assumption. Examples include, but are not limited to, the following. Neo-realism claims that order is the structure of the anarchic international system (Waltz 1979, 88-93). This leads to the claim that states are spontaneously creating the structure based on their material capabilities and actions, which then conditions them to act in particular ways to insure their survival (Ibid; see also Niou and Ordeshook 1994 as cited by Stewart-Ingersoll and Frazier 2012, 16). This focus in academia has a parallel focus in domestic and world politics. Scholars and practitioners alike, especially in the U.S., are constantly clamoring over the dangers of a rising China.

However, even with this increasing interest and the proliferation of predictions international order is still an underdeveloped concept. This not to say that there have not been

many insightful texts written on the concept. To the contrary, scholars have been increasingly churning out pieces on international order as well as various related concepts. Liberal international order (Ikenberry), international security order (Ikenberry 2011, 2015), regional orders (Katzenstein 2005; Lake 2009, 35), regional security orders (Morgan 1997; Stewart-Ingersoll and Frazier 2012; see Buzan and Wæver 2003; Lake 2009 for regional security “complexes”), international financial order (Leffler 1979, 257), regional economic order, specifically a European one (Lake 1983, 535), international economic order (Leffler 1979, 257; Ruggie 1982; Stein 1984; Jacobson and Oksenberg 1990 ; Gilpin 1981, 2011 ; Lang 2011), liberal economic order (Smith 2011, 148), liberal trading orders (Stein 1984, 356), global trading order (Ibid.), political order (Leffler 1979, 257; Lake 1983, 535), a “multiplex world” order (Acharya 2014), global order (Smith 2011, 149), are just a handful of the myriad conceptual perspectives (concepts in their own rights) that have been discussed in the literature. In large part this has led to confusion about the nature of the future global order and the place of both rising powers and those powers occupying the top positions in the system, not to mention the concept itself and the various manifestations of order fit together.

Therefore, this paper’s research question is, how do current conceptualizations of the international order affect our perceptions of changes in the region of East Asia? To answer this this paper has two aims. The first is to provide the next step in the evolution of our conceptualization of international order. The second is to successfully argue that the assumption that order is a coherent concept that supposedly identifies both economic and security dimensions is fundamentally flawed. While the two are related and condition actors as a result, there exists sufficient lacunae between the two that creates ambiguity with respect to security. As a result, rising powers, while more or less willing to contribute to the stability of the current economic orders (both globally and regionally) only in the context of protecting their strategic interests in

terms of security. This second aim will rely on an interpretive analysis of East Asia providing both a clearer understanding of actors' actions and their perceptions.

II. Argument

Current conceptualizations of international order tend to point toward a coherent set of rules, norms and behaviors among states. We contend that these conceptualizations are inaccurate and lack sufficient depth when accounting for regional variation. In other words, international order is sufficiently wide but not necessarily deep. One reason for the mischaracterization of the international order is that scholars tend to conflate economic and security orders as two parts of a whole, predicting that established rules, norms and behaviors work similarly across these two domains. This paper argues against this assumption, and contends that an ill-defined global order with respect to security rules, norms and behaviors allows regional challenges on security issues.

III. Conceptualizations of international order

The concept of “international order” (a.k.a. “order” and “political order”) has hitherto had a diverse and extensive theoretical treatment. Liberalism (Ikenberry 2011), Realism (Gilpin 1981), Social Constructivism (Stewart-Ingersoll and Frazier 2012), the English School (Bull 1995, Hall 1996, Paul and Hall 1999), and the Copenhagen School (Buzan et al. 1997) represent only a very small portion of the International Relations theories that have dealt with international order and fewer still the scholars that have directly worked with or on the concept. While such attention is to be applauded, several gaps remain. These gaps remain because studies have either

focused on individual parts or have treated the concept as single whole.¹ To date there has not been a comprehensive aggregation of the disparate parts that make up the concept of international order. Such an aggregation is not only necessary to understand this concept, it is even more necessary for the understanding its geographically described daughter concepts: global and regional order. The first aim of this paper is to establish an aggregated conceptualization of “international order” follows. Before doing so, it is necessary to provide a review of the literature as a launching point.

Gilpin (1981) argues that “the system does exercise an element of control over the behavior of states” (cf. Bull 1977, Young 1978 as cited in Gilpin 1981, 28) and that “the dominant powers in the international hierarchy of power and prestige organize and control the processes of interactions among the elements of the system” (29). From Gilpin’s arguments we can glean three separate claims about order. First, the system, or order at the systemic-level, guides the behavior of states. Second, the most materially capable and (**prestigious = ??? legitimate**) states exert influence over the system and/or systemic-wide order that guides interactions. Third, the interactions that are guided occur between all elements of the system including state-like and non-state units (e.g. domestic, transnational, and international actors). It should be mentioned, however, that this paper does not agree that it is necessary to include the observation that the most powerful states will have a preponderant influence over the direction of the order (for more examples see Stewart-Ingersoll and Frazier 2012). While it is not necessary to include this observation it is without a doubt an important extension of the most basic level of a general concept of international order; because after understanding what an order is it is only

¹ At the time of this writing, the only text that this paper has found that discusses more than one part of the concept is Buzan 2003.

logical to explore how they come about, how they end, how they change, what types there are, etc.

Alagappa (2003) builds upon this foundation of a general concept of international order, which he:

Defined as a formal or informal arrangement that sustains rule-governed interaction among sovereign states in their pursuit of individual and collective goals. Rule-governed interaction makes for a predictable and stable environment in which states can coexist and collaborate in the pursuit of their national, regional, and global goals, differences and disputes can be adjusted in a peaceful manner, and change can occur without resort to violence. [...] The type of order will vary with the organizing principle of the international system, the distribution of power, and the dynamics of international politics that is influenced by ideational and material factors (39).

Alagappa's conceptualization revises Gilpin's more general conception in four important ways. First, he expands our understanding of what is guiding states by claiming that rules, whether formally or informally arranged, govern states interactions. Second, state-centrism is introduced because the interactions that are governed are those of states, not other elements within the system. Third, Alagappa backs away from Gilpin's assertion that those states with the most material and ideational capabilities will be the ones to influence the international order for a less specific, though agreeing, statement that order is affected by these same considerations. Finally, the "goals of the order" are projected onto the concept (33).

Alagappa's assertion that interactions among states are "rule-governed," while adding specificity, also smuggles in normative baggage in terms of how the order "controls" states' interactions (see Bull 1995 as cited in Alagappa 2003). Fortunately, Alagappa clarifies to some

degree how rules make up an order and affect states' behavior. For instance, "rules must exist and they should be clear to the relevant parties", "rules in place must be acknowledged, especially by the key actors" with some understanding that they should be obeyed and enforced, most states' behavior needs to be consistent with the rules without severe or numerous deviations occurring, and there needs to "be a cost to violation" (40-41). Furthermore, these rules may be codified (i.e. formal) or "emerge from practice" as 'rules of the game' (i.e. informal) (40, see also Bull 1995, 64).

However, Alagappa's conception of order is not without its faults. As mentioned earlier, his conception includes some "goals of order," located in the claim that orders are supposed to create "a predictable and stable environment in which states can coexist and collaborate in the pursuit of their national, regional, and global goals, differences and disputes can be adjusted in a peaceful manner, and change can occur without resort to violence" (2003, 39). By claiming that this is what the result of an order is he is running afoul of his own critique of other conceptualizations, namely that the goals of, pathways of and instruments of order need to be separate from the general conception (33). Similarly, he uses a state-centric conceptualization while asserting that other transnational actors, such as international organizations, play a role in an order, specifically in the enforcement of rules (41, e.g. see discussion of war 39). Other more recent texts are also plagued by state-centrism (Ikenberry 2011, Lascurettes N.D.) and the inclusion of goals of order (Ibid., Stewart-Ingersoll and Frazier 2012). Such a conception smuggles in positive connotations that falsely characterize what an order is and prematurely reject various theories, practices, rules, etc. that are equally valid. First, the rule-centric nature of this conceptualization rejects other behavior constraining concepts (e.g. norms, institutions, regimes, etc.). Any concept of order, and many conceptualization do include things other than

rules, needs to include behavior constraining concepts other than rules. Second, the claim that “[r]ule-governed interaction makes for a predictable [...] environment” needs to be qualified (Alagappa 2003, 39). Once one understands the international order that is being operated in and the patterns that emerge, the environment, and actors’ future actions, should be *more* predictable. To claim that they *will* be predictable flies in the face of our understanding of the international system, decision making, and actors’ interactions as operating under various levels of uncertainty. To be sure, one of Neo-liberalism’s main assumptions is that repeated interactions, within an institutional framework, will make future interactions more predictable. This is not disputed here. What is disputed is the idea that international order is comparable to, say, a trading institution that governs the negotiations of two states in scope, content, or complexity. Third, to claim that a given international order will make an environment stable is to claim that all international orders are relatively free of violence and uncertainty. This automatically rejects any rules, practices, norms, etc. related to the use of force, which, in turn, rejects all of Realism.

Finally, and following from the previous two critiques, the idea that “differences and disputes can be adjusted in a peaceful manner, and change can occur without resort to violence” (Alagappa 2003, 39) is to assume that the international order that is in place does not compel actors to use violence in order to achieve their goals. One simple example of how this is clearly false is the Cold War. Mutually assured destruction (MAD) played a key role in the international order of the time. It, along with the rise in insurgencies, social movements, civil wars, etc. and the continued acceptance of the use of violence as a legitimate, and often expedited way of achieving ones goals, conditioned states (esp. the U.S. and U.S.S.R.) to use their, or compel others to use, hard power capabilities in proxy wars.

Therefore, this paper conceptualizes the basic-level of order as the formal and informal experiences, rules, norms, institutions, and regimes that condition a system's units. By using this conceptualization this paper adheres to the claims and critiques it has made above in the following ways: 1) formal and informal allow for both codified and interpreted (i.e. "rules of the game" conditioning mechanisms to affect (i.e. condition) the units; 2) The use of the term "condition" communicates the idea that the stimuli units in the system experience affect them in such a way that they will act in patterns while at the same time allowing for exceptions and even revisionism; 3) A system and an order occur simultaneously, however, an order is dependent upon a system for its existence given that it is only through the actions of two or more units that a pattern can emerge in regards to interactions; 4) It is not state- or state-like-centric, which not only allows for the inclusion of other important actors, but also is a step toward 5) expressing the world historical perspective of the concept, just like its counterpart "system" (Buzan and Little 2000).

A prime example of how this basic-level conception of order avoids the many pitfalls biasing any one particular paradigm is in the circular logic of those that claim the current global order is a liberal one (e.g. Ikenberry 2001, 2011, Acharya 2014). The focus of this section will be on Ikenberry's work given that he is one of, if not *the*, paramount scholar propagating the claim that the post-World War II order amongst "Western" capitalist-democracies (2001, 154) and the current order (2011) are liberal. It is at least unquestionable that his work is the most thorough in terms of both articulating and furthering these, and other related, claims (e.g., 2001, 2006, 2009, 2011, 2015; Ikenberry and Jongryn 2013).

The second-level (Goertz 2006) of order is made up of the things that make up an order, namely: experiences, which in this case subsume rules, institutions, norms, and regimes, and

conditioning. Experiences (i.e. “learning experiences”) allow units to learn (Billet 2009, 32) and become conditioned in a way that they respond to stimuli in increasingly predictable ways (i.e. a pattern emerges) (Encyclopaedia Britannica 2015). These experiences are gained through units’ choices of action or inaction and the results that they must interpret via occurrences at the unit- and social-levels as well as the mediation of “brute facts (i.e., nature)” (Billett 2009, 32). In this case a preliminary understanding of this paper’s projection of Billett’s concepts, which he uses for human learning, onto units studied by International Relations, and other, scholars would be that: 1) the individual is the internal aspect of the unit, 2) the social is the interactive environment aspect that takes place external to the unit and includes one or more other units, and 3) brute facts are those natural stimuli that are neither of the individual nor of the social, specifically, but may mediate either of the two (e.g. natural disasters, geography, the mortality of individuals, etc.). In turn, these learning experiences occur, most observably, through the use of instruments of and pathways of order to, but not necessarily, attain goals of order. This occurs at the unit-level, interpolity-level (between two or more units), the regional-level, the global-level, etc.

This paper will further its conceptualization of order by explaining how order is organized in the current systems. International order is the broad concept that can be applied to any system (e.g., a system two or all units). The international order is the supra-order that is made up of both a security sub-order and an economic sub-order (See Figure 2.1).




Figure 1. Basic makeup of international order.

These two sub-orders represent categorical descriptions that units find their actions being governed by. To some degree, all issue areas can be placed into either or both of these domains.

First, there is the global system, which is the largest system currently in existence. This global order is made up of two sub-orders, which are categorical descriptions of the two issue areas that units find their actions being governed; i.e. the global security and economic sub-orders.² It is understood that actions, policies, etc. in both of these sub-orders have effects on other and may even be located in both sub-orders simultaneously (e.g. economic sanctions).

These orders in turn exist independently from one another and together form the global (supra)order through their independent existence, coexistence, and interaction with one another.

Often, research has only been focused on one of the sub-orders at a time (for security, see:

Alagappa 2003, Buzan and Wæver 2003, Frazier and Stewart-Ingersoll 2010, Stewart-Ingersoll

² While some texts discuss the political order the research that went into this paper has determined that such political characteristics of the units (e.g. regime type) are neither necessary nor sufficient for participation in an order and that no such order exists in terms of governing these aspects of the units. For instance, the vast majority of the world's states participate in the global economic sub-order directly via membership in the WTO regardless of their regime type, human rights records, degree of liberalism and conservatism, etc. Furthermore, given the sheer number of units directly involved in the global economic sub-order those that don't participate in the organizations designed to create, maintain and/or revise the current order are affected by it and participate indirectly. This paper does concede, however, that the supraorder could be understood as a political order.

and Frazier 2012; for economic, see: Ruggie 1982, Gilpin 2011). Therefore, this paper brings the two together and claims they are a part of a supraorder.

The global supraorder, and its two sub-orders, are also separate from and made up of the various regional supraorders, and their two sub-orders. Therefore, the global security sub-order is influenced by and made up of (uploading) the regional security sub-orders of: the Transatlantic, Europe, Middle East, East Asia, Southeast Asia, etc. Oftentimes, these regional orders overlap with one another (e.g. Transatlantic and European). This regional supra- and sub-orders also affect one another (intraloading) and are affected by the global supra- and sub-orders (downloading).

In turn, the global supra- and sub-orders along with the regional supra- and sub-orders are affected by interpolity supra- and sub-orders. These are the experiences and conditioning experienced by two or more units fewer than and/or outside of a regional classification. For instance, those experiences and conditions of the G-groupings (e.g. G8) are sometimes smaller than many regions (e.g. G7) and/or contain members from across the globe, but are not “global” in the same geographic sense that the global supra- and sub-orders are considered (e.g. G20).

IV. Methods

So how can we evaluate our argument? If the international order is as coherent as conceptualized (e.g. Ikenberry 2011) in the literature, we should, first, observe rules, norms, and behaviors across regions to be more or less the same (i.e. wide breadth). In addition, a second aspect of the wideness of the global order’s breadth we should also perceive similar rules, norms, and behaviors in the economic and security sub-orders (e.g. both should be liberal or non-liberal, conflict prone or cooperation prone, etc.). Second, we should also observe said rules, norms, and behaviors to be more or less the same in terms of the global order and the regional orders (i.e. deep

penetration). If not, we should see considerable variation between one or more regions and the global order in terms of their security and/or economic sub-orders. This variation we explain by limited penetration of the global order in a given region and, therefore, between regions. As we argue though, we think this lack of depth and breadth will be located more so in the security arena than the economic one.

In this paper we examine the East Asian region as a plausibility probe. Deep penetration of the global order should be reflected in rules, norms, and behaviors by states in East Asia. At the very least, we should see indications of the region moving in these directions. We compare both the economic and security arenas to evaluate the argument.

This study cannot and will not provide empirical answers, but will instead endeavor to establish the plausibility of our arguments. In doing so, it will contribute to the literature on conceptualizing order, in several of its forms, and on determining what order(s) we are currently operating in. Furthermore, this plausibility probe is the first step in an expanding research agenda. Just as “*concept formation stands prior to quantification*” so too do conceptual and theoretical explorations stand prior to empirical analysis (emphasis in original Sartori 2009, 18 “Concept misformation in comparative politics”). The research agenda that follows from the successful completion of this paper will include the theoretical work necessary to support said future empirical work.

V. East Asia

First, it is necessary to specify what we mean by “East Asia” given that not only is the concept of “region” hotly contested, but so too are the boundaries of these geopolitical systems (Lemke 2002, 60 as cited in Frazier and Stewart-Ingersoll 2010, 732). Just like Frazier and Stewart-

Ingersoll, we start with Buzan and Wæver's concept of a "Regional Security Complex", which they define as "a set of units whose major processes of securitization, de-securitization, or both are so interlinked that their security problems cannot reasonably be analyzed or resolved apart from one another" (2003, 44) and combine it with Lake and Morgan's emphasis on security externalities and their importance in linking a region's various states together into an aggregate whole (1997, 12). However, this study is not only concerned with the security sub-order. Therefore, we then translate this into what one may dub a "Regional Economic Complex." Borrowing heavily from Buzan and Wæver's language in order to create a parallel concept, a Regional Economic Complex is essentially a system of units whose major processes of economics, trade, finance, etc. together or apart are so interlinked that their economic activities cannot reasonably be analyzed or acted upon apart from one another. The main point is that the units of these particular sub-global systems experience such a high-level of interdependence that it creates a new level-of-analysis in so far that they can be systematically identified. In combining these concepts, this study defines a region as a sub-global system of units that exudes both a security and an economic complex that encompass the same units.

Therefore, this paper defines East Asia as incorporating the following states: Australia; Bangladesh; Brunei; Cambodia; India; Indonesia; Japan; Lao People's Democratic Republic (Laos); Malaysia; Myanmar (Burma); Nepal; New Zealand; Pakistan; the People's Democratic Republic of Korea (North Korea); the People's Republic of China (China, including Hong Kong and Macau); the Philippines; the Republic of Korea (South Korea); Singapore; Sri Lanka; Taipei, China (Taiwan); Thailand; Viet Nam (Vietnam). This is an extension of Buzan's "Asia

Supercomplex”, which, according to his map, does not include New Zealand and may not include some of the smaller states listed here for analytical reasons (2003, 147).³

Now that the sub-system we are investigating has been delimited it is possible to begin the interpretive analysis of what the East Asian regional order appears to be and how this compares to the global order. As stated above, the two most purported conceptualizations of what the current global order is appear to be: 1) a liberal global order, or more specifically a liberal hegemonic global order, (Ikenberry 2011) or 2) the international system is now a “multiplex” order (Archarya 2014). The purported multiplex order that would come about after the end of the U.S. “unipolar moment” include the following speculated possibilities: 2a) a “concert model” (Ibid. 108-110), 2b) the “regional worlds approach” (110-113), or 2c) “a hybrid” (113).

We can set aside two of the multiplex order models from the beginning. The global order, from a material capabilities perspective, is still hegemonic. And while events over the past decade-and-a-half, some as recent as within the last few months, point to a shift in the political tectonic plates (e.g. Russian and Chinese pushback, German, French, and EU movements towards autonomy) there is no official coordination between the great powers, which is a necessary criteria for a concert to exist. If the concert model is not currently in existence, then neither is the hybrid model. Therefore, this section will compare the East Asian regional order to the global order under the assumption that the global order is either a liberal one with great depth and breadth (1) or it is an order that has neither, or at least superficial, depth and breadth (2b). We will not be able to reject the null hypothesis (i.e. the global order is liberal) if the global and regional economic *and*

³ Buzan never explicitly lists each state that he does and does not include. Instead, he discusses various state that, one can assume, meet his criteria of being sufficiently *interdependent* upon each other in terms of security.

security sub-orders meet the requirements of liberalness when compared.⁴ However, if one of the regional sub-orders and its corresponding global sub-order are the same, whether that be liberal or not, then we can reject that the world has entered the multiplex order's regional worlds approach. Of course, if either of these is proven to be the current order, then the other is negated.

A. The Global and East Asian Economic Sub-orders

We will begin by examining the global and East Asia economic sub-orders as they are the clearest. In order to do so, we operationalize the liberalness of an economic sub-order to rely on three primary indicators: multilateral rules and institutions, free trade, and it must be rule-based (Ikenberry 2011). As discussed above, there are other criteria for an order of any kind to be considered liberal. These include that the order be: (“relatively”) open (Ibid. xi, 2), stable (7), (“at least loosely”) rule-based (xii, 2), manifest “progressive change” (2), and include a (“loose system”) of multilateral rules and institutions (2, 7, 18). According to Ikenberry, “[o]penness is manifest when states trade and exchange on the basis of mutual gain” (18). While there are obvious theoretical issues at play, given the importance of Neo-realism's power for Ikenberry's conceptualization, it is not possible at this time to discern whether states are trading and exchanging for mutual gain (i.e. absolute gains) or if their doing so in order to better themselves at the cost of their trading partners (i.e. relative gains). Openness therefore will be loosely discussed here in terms of the inclusion of states other than great and middle powers. The ability to discern what constitutes a manifestation of “progressive change” will, unlike openness, not be discussed even tangentially. This is due to the conceptual and highly ethno-, politico-, etc. –centric issues that arise from using the concept “progression.” What constitutes progression? Does it, perhaps, depend on one's perspective as to what changes are progressive and which regressive?

⁴ Naturally, without further corroboration of the world's other regions we cannot make a definitive claim that the global order is completely liberal.

Progressive for whom? States? People? Unlike the previous two stability is, if anything, relatively simple to discern. One must only look at the evolution of the Bretton Woods system, the proliferation of similar regional institutions, and the accession of almost every state in the international system to Bretton Woods and other economic institutions since their inception after World War II. The continual increase in members, to include nearly all states, and the mirror image institutions populating the world are strong enough on their own to demonstrate the stability of the global economic sub-order *and* the regional economic sub-order in East Asia given the rise of similar institutions, rules, organizations, etc. (more on this below) (Dooley et al. 2004). That leaves us with multilateral institutions, rules, and free trade.

As signaled by the discussion of stability (see above) the global economic sub-order includes a strengthening and proliferation of multilateral institutions. The foundation of these multilateral institutions are found in two pillars. The first pillar is the Bretton Woods system, which is made up of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Trade Organization (WTO)⁵, and World Bank.⁶ The second pillar of the global economic sub-order is the United Nations (UN) with its various economically oriented bodies including, but not necessarily limited to: the Economic and Social Council, United Nations Development Programme, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, and International Labor Organization. Other regimes exist outside of these two pillars, but are nonetheless a part of the lattice work between the two pillars. Such multilateral regimes include, but are not necessarily limited to: the World Customs Organization, Bank for International Settlements, International Chamber of Commerce, and International Organization for Standardization. Such organizations were instrumental in the establishment of

⁵ Formerly the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).

⁶ The World Bank and IMF are a part of the United Nations although they are autonomous.

the current global economic sub-order and continue to be instrumental in maintaining said sub-order (Dooley et al. 2004). The WTO is the clearest example of this.

The WTO's membership includes nearly every state in the international system⁷ (notable exceptions include South Sudan and North Korea), has 21 observer states at various stages of accession⁸, and even includes a member that is itself a regional organization (i.e. the EU) (WTO 2017a). It is also one of the few international organizations seen as having the capability and prerogative to overcome national sovereignty and demand changes of states' policies and laws. The WTO's dispute settlement system (DSS) is of particular importance. For instance, "enforcement' proceedings do protect the pro-free trade interests so overwhelmingly supported in substantive adjudication" (Colares 2011, 403). Furthermore, the development in the current Doha Round, namely the pushback of developing and underdeveloped states with the goal of producing a WTO round that specifically addresses the needs of said "revisionists," demonstrates a further liberalizing of this liberal bastion even though orders are supposed to be overwhelmingly influenced by, and therefore provide the most benefits for, those states with the greatest relative capabilities (Gilpin 1981, 28-33; Ikenberry 2011, xv; Stewart-Ingersoll and Frazier 2012, 18).

The global economic order is also highly rule-based, surpassing even Ikenberry's qualified "loosely rule-based" parameter (2011, xii). Again, the WTO is the quintessential example (e.g., Croley and Jackson 1996; Maton and Maton 2007 as cited by Colares 2011; for counter examples see: Colares 2009 as cited by Colares 2011; Turk 2011). Colares explains that Respondents almost always comply when they receive an unfavorable decision. When non-compliance does occur the Complainants still have much to gain even after litigating. These include "allowing for the redress

⁷ The WTO has "164 members since 29 July 2016" (WTO 2017a).

⁸ These include: Algeria, Andorra, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Belarus, Bhutan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Comoros, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Iran, Iraq, Lebanese Republic, Libya, Sao Tomé and Príncipe, Serbia, Somalia, Sudan, Syrian Arab Republic, Timor-Leste, and Uzbekistan (WTO 2017a).

of grievances [...and] advantages in ongoing trade negotiations” (Colares 2011, 404). Furthermore, Colares posits that such rare non-compliance actually acts as “an essential escape valve in a system driven by increasing judicialization and adjudicator activism” (405). To be sure, very few complaints are brought before the DSS (see Table 1). What is of great interest is the decline in complaints brought before the DSS indicating a negative relationship with the rise in WTO membership. In addition, it should be noted which states are bringing the most complaints and are often the respondents of others’ complaints (see Table 2 and 3).

Of the named members the U.S. has brought the most complaints (112) while the combined members of the EU have brought the second most complaints (97). However, it is not as if only those “western” states making up the creators and maintainers of this aspect of a supposedly liberal global economic sub-order are the ones taking advantage of the DSS. So called, “Developing” states hold the highest combined amount of complaints (128) surpassing even the U.S. In addition, the BRICs—minus Russia—have a combined total of 68 complaints. If Mexico is combined with these rising non-western states, then the total becomes 91; nearly as much as the combined EU total (Leitner & Lester 2017, 173).

Of more interest may be who the respondents have been since the inauguration of the WTO. Of the named members the western ones have predominantly been the Respondents. The U.S., again, holds the greatest amount (130) with the EU in second place (83). The other named western states listed (i.e. Canada, Japan, and South Korea) tie or surpass rising members, but of greatest interest is that combined they have been Respondents 49 times. Surprisingly, given the media coverage of such disputes, China has only been a Respondent 38 times since becoming a member. The other named rising members have Respondent rates similar to Canada (18), Japan (15), and

South Korea (16), those being Brazil (16), India (24), and Mexico (14). Unnamed “Developing” members have only been Respondents 115 times (Leitner & Lester 2017, 174).

The most difficult criteria of liberalness to locate in the global economic sub-order is that of free trade. To date there are no global free trade agreements that include either all states or a clear majority of states. Instead, the entire existence of the WTO is to move the world towards one free trade area. To that end, nearly “60 agreements and decisions” have been negotiated and makeup the legal texts of the WTO, since the Uruguay Round (1986-1994). Other agreements have also been negotiated (e.g. “the Information Technology Agreement, services and accession protocols”) and the Doha Round (2001-) is set to provide more agreements (WTO 2017b).

In conclusion, the global sub-economic order is clearly liberal when it comes to multilateral institutions and its status as a rule-based order. The third criteria developed from the operationalization of liberalness, free trade, is by far the order’s weakest characteristic. However, this is more or less to be expected given the difficulty of getting so many states to agree to the various WTO texts that directly bypass those same states’ sovereignty. That being said, it is not as if there has been no movement towards a global free trade area. The global economic sub-order cannot be viewed dichotomously, given that there only needs to be one global free trade area, whereas regions and states may have multiple often overlapping free trade areas, for it to be successful. Rather, viewing the achievement of free trade agreements as a process allows not only a more nuanced understanding; it also allows for the tracking of the changes that are being made to global economic sub-order.

The East Asian economic sub-order is not all that different from the global economic sub-order. In fact, it is stronger, especially in terms of free trade agreements.

Like the global economic sub-order, the East Asian economic sub-order includes a plethora of multilateral institutions that fulfill various and, sometimes, overlapping roles that maintain and perpetuate the liberal East Asian economic sub-order. Indeed, some of these institutions are, in fact, transregional in membership and participation. To begin, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and its additional forums (i.e. ASEAN+3 and ASEAN+6) are the quintessential multilateral institutions of the East Asian economic sub-order. Other multilateral institutions have been emerging as well. The Asian Development Bank (ADB) and Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) are, in fact, similar in design to the World Bank and IMF. The last major multilateral institution to be mentioned here is that of the Asia-Pacific

Unlike the global economic sub-order, but in a positive way, the East Asian economic sub-order both contains an ever increasing number of free trade agreements and is set to become one of two or more regions in transregional free trade agreements. Free trade agreements that have entered into enforcement include, but are not necessarily limited to: the ASEA-Free Trade Area, -China Free Trade Area, -Korea Free Trade Area, -Japan Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement, -Australia-New Zealand Free Trade Area, and the -India Free Trade Area. In addition, the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), which includes the states within ASEAN+6, is under negotiation (Asian Regional Integration Center 2015a). Furthermore, there is the ASEAN-EU Free Trade Agreement, however, negotiations were suspended in 2009 and there has not been any sign that they will continue (Asian Regional Integration Center 2015b). Of great interest has been the recent discussions following the U.S.' pullout from the Transpacific Partnership (TPP) and its disbandment. That is that there is a very real possibility that there may be a TPP-minus one under negotiation in the near future between all of the original states to the TPP negotiations, minus the U.S. (Muñoz 2017; Capri 2017).

In conclusion, what we see is that the global and East Asian economic sub-orders are, in fact quite similar. So similar in fact that in many ways the East Asian economic sub-order has either mimicked (e.g. multilateral institutions) or surpassed (e.g. free trade agreements) the global economic sub-order. Furthermore, they both are clearly liberal given that they, more or less, meet the criteria of an operationalized liberal order. Because of this we can safely conclude that we are not operating under a pure form of Acharya's regional model of a multiplex order. However, we cannot conclude that Ikenberry's liberal order has achieved the required width.

[Insert Table 1]

[Insert Table 2]

[Insert Table 3]

B. The Global and East Asian Security Sub-orders

This next section investigates how liberal the global and East Asian security sub-orders are. It contains the same criteria that are generic for the two sub-orders (i.e. open, stable, and be progressive). It also contains two of the same major criteria that are easily operationalized and makeup the brunt of what an order is; multilateral institutions and that it be rule-based. The security-specific criteria are more numerous than the economic sub-order. These are that the order be characterized by “cooperative security”, “collective problem solving”, and “shared

sovereignty” (Ikenberry 2011, 2). This paper uses third-party mediation as a proxy for observing these three criteria.

At first glance, it appears that the global security sub-order is doing well in regards to the number of multilateral institutions. The foundation of the global security sub-order is the UN and acts as the hub from which the rest of the network of institutions branches off from. The primary multilateral security institutions of the UN include, but are not necessarily limited to: the UN Security Council (UNSC), International Maritime Organization, UN Peacebuilding Commission, UN Office for Disarmament Affairs, and UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations. Other multilateral institutions, and regimes, include, but are not limited to: the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO), Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), Zangger Committee, and Interpol.

A number of problems appear under closer scrutiny. The first, and most obvious, is the lack of diversity and the proliferation of regimes focused on weapons of mass destruction (WMD); especially nuclear. The UN’s internal bodies and agencies are the most diverse and the most focused on traditional security issues. The second, is the lack of multilateralism or openness in the UN Security Council, which more or less has the final say on legitimizing, or even sending out, both UN and non-UN security missions (Imber 2006; Weiss 2003). The third, is the overall weakness of the nuclear non-proliferation regime both through its design (e.g., largely leaving non-Russian and non-U.S. nuclear powers out of disarmament negotiations) (Haynes 2016, 2). For instance, China is not a part of either the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) or the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) and so is not limited in the vertical proliferation of its own capabilities (3). Another piece of this particular issues lies in the dissolving or flaunting

of various parts of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. For example, the various U.S. missile defense systems violate the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM) and because the U.S. flaunted and then left that particular treaty, Russia then left the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) II in response (Boese 2002).

RULE-BASED

THIRD-PARTY MEDIATION

VI. Analysis & Conclusion

A. Current conceptualization of international order creates impression of China challenging international order

B. Analysis suggests that wide coverage of international order also has deeply penetrated economic order in East Asia (but even then there are discrepancies – SOEs, state capitalism, etc...) but there is lacking deep penetration of security order

C. As a result, in East Asia and probably elsewhere, there is wider room for variation in security behaviors because the “rules” and “norms” are less stable.

D. This is likely to continue creating points of friction between the US and other states across different regions where the influence of the “international order” is rather shallow...Does this imply limited use of the concept of international order in terms of security? Probably.

Tables, Figures, and Graphs

Table 1. WTO Complaints Addressed in Dispute Settlement System (Leitner & Lester 2017, 172)

	1995-99	2000-04	2005-09	2010-14	2015-16
Complaints	185	139	78	86	30
Avg complaints per year	37	27.8	15.6	17.2	15

Table 2. Complaining parties in WTO disputes (Leitner & Lester 2017, 173)⁹

	1995-99	2000-04	2005-09	2010-14	2015-16	Total
Brazil	6	16	2	3	3	30
Canada	15	11	7	1	1	35
China	0	1	5	6	3	15
EU	47	21	13	14	2	97
India	9	7	2	3	2	23
Japan	8	4	1	6	4	23
S. Korea	3	9	2	3	0	17
Mexico	8	5	8	2	0	23
USA	60	20	13	14	5	112
Developed	12	6	4	6	4	32
Developing	34	40	20	28	6	128
LDCs	0	1	0	0	0	1
Total	204	148	78	86	30	546

⁹ “Note that because some complaints were brought by multiple Members, the total number of complaining parties exceeds the total number of responding parties for some periods” (Leitner & Lester 2017, 173).

Table 3. Responding parties in WTO disputes (Leitner & Lester 2017, 174)

	1995-99	2000-04	2005-09	2010-14	2015-16	Total
Brazil	9	3	2	1	1	16
Canada	10	3	2	3	0	18
China	0	1	16	15	6	38
EU	28	23	16	13	3	83
India	13	4	3	2	2	24
Japan	12	2	1	0	0	15
S. Korea	11	2	1	0	2	16
Mexico	3	9	2	0	0	14
USA	39	49	20	16	6	130
Developed	20	4	1	9	2	36
Developing	37	32	11	27	8	115
LDCs	0	0	0	0	0	0
Total	185	139	78	86	30	518

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