Introduction

From the Iranian Revolution in 1979 to the overthrow of Hosni Mubarak and Ben Ali in 2011, the potential for civil resistance to topple entrenched dictatorships is now well established, and it is fast becoming the “modal category” of large-scale contentious political action. Yet from Cambodia to Hong Kong to Belarus, many campaigns have failed to achieve substantial goals of reform or regime change, being violently repressed, subverted by promises of reform that are never fulfilled, or simply shut down by compliant security forces. Existing research largely attributes campaign outcome to the actions and characteristics of the opposition movement itself, emphasizing agency over structure (e.g. Schock, 2005; Stephan and Chenoweth, 2008; Nepstad, 2011; Chenoweth and Stephan, 2011). But so far there has been a relative lack of attention paid to how the internal dynamics of authoritarian regimes themselves influence campaigns. This paper thus addresses the question: is there a link between the internal dynamics of autocratic regimes and the outcome of anti-regime civil resistance campaigns?

As Lee (2015) has argued, one aspect of authoritarian rule in particular is likely to influence the outcome of nonviolent campaigns: the power balance that exists between autocrats and the political elite. Although most authoritarian regimes begin with a power-sharing agreement at the top levels of government, over time autocrats’ desire to consolidate their personal control over decision-making and resource allocation gives them incentives to exclude other members of the ruling elite from power (Geddes, 2004). This is personalization, the process of an autocrat gaining personal control over the executive, legislative, and coercive instruments of government at the expense of the remaining political elite. The struggle between the autocrat and the political elite can encourage divisions within the regime as those who lose out begin to consider alternatives to the status quo. Mass civil resistance campaigns offer such an alternative, encouraging elites to consider defecting from the regime to form a coalition pact with the opposition movement in the hopes of improving their position in the future. By increasing the likelihood of divisions within the political elite, personalization thus increases the probability that a civil resistance campaign will be successful in forcing regime change.

This paper focuses on two cases of civil resistance against regimes where personalization has occurred: the Marcos regime in the Philippines (1965-1986), where personalization led to regime collapse in the 1986 EDSA revolution, and the Hun Sen regime in Cambodia (1985-present), which remained cohesive and stable through a large protest campaign over the allegedly fraudulent results.

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2 A note on terminology: This research follows, for example, Alvarez et al. (1996), Przeworski et al. (2000), and Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland (2010) in adopting a minimal, either/or definition of dictatorship and democracy, identifying authoritarian regimes as those in which the government has not been elected in genuinely free and competitive elections. The terms autocracy, dictatorship, authoritarian, etc., are used interchangeably.
of the 2013 general election, despite high existing levels of personalization. The paper proceeds by setting out the theoretical argument linking personalization in authoritarian governments to the outcome of civil resistance campaigns. It presents the Philippines case study, showing how Marcos’s personalization caused divisions at the elite level in the years prior to EDSA. It then outlines the Hun Sen regime in Cambodia and highlights some potential explanatory factors that may have accounted for the failure of the 2013-2014 protests movement to achieve substantial progress.

Theoretical framework

This study is based in existing theories of authoritarian politics. All dictators rely on the support of figures in society who control political, economic, administrative, and coercive resources, including political parties, courts, internal security agencies, the military, and the bureaucracy (Haggard and Kaufman, 1995; Helvey, 2004). Within this broad governing network is the autocrat’s core group of supporters, the ruling coalition, which is made up of those political elites whose support is necessary for the autocrat’s continued position in power (Svolik, 2012, 57). Autocrats agree to share power with this group, at least in the initial stages of the regime, in order to secure its continued backing (Geddes, 2004). They often also agree to distribute the resources that come from control of the state, such as favourable business contracts, profits from natural resource exploitation, and opportunities for bribery and graft (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003). Power-sharing agreements within the ruling coalition can be explicit or implicit, but involve constraining the ability of the autocrat to increase personal power at the expense of the elite. Typical features include functioning legislatures and governing councils, assignment of key government posts to members of different factions of the elite, and imposition of term limits, amongst others (Gandhi and Przeworski, 2007; Gandhi, 2008; Svolik, 2012).

Yet power-sharing agreements in autocracies are tenuous. Indeed, the biggest challenge to power-sharing is autocrats’ desire to acquire more power through carrying out power grabs, through increasing their individual powers and responsibilities, eliminating constitutional or informal constraints on their position, or removing members of the ruling coalition who would otherwise need to be bargained with (Svolik, 2012, 58). Examples include doing away with term limits, carrying out purges, securing key appointments for loyalists, and expanding the size, funding, and responsibilities of loyalist-dominated ministries and branches of the armed forces. This process of increasing the autocrat’s individual power is what is referred to here as *personalization*. Personalization as a process is related to the concept of personalism/personalist as a regime type—after all, personalization is necessary to build a personalist regime—yet it can occur in any kind of regime, whether single party, military, or some form of hybrid (cf. Hadenius & Teorell, 2007; Svolik, 2012). The autocrat’s motivations for personalizing power may be based on the logic that shrinking the ruling coalition by excluding some of its members increases the benefits of holding power to those who remain, as fewer supporters need to be satisfied with resources (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 1999, 2003; cf. Riker, 1962). An additional factor may be the principal-agent problem that comes from delegating political, military, and economic power to subordinates who may threaten to use that power against the autocrat (Svolik, 2012).

In contexts where autocrats have substantially carried out personalization, a civil resistance campaign provides an alternative option for those elites who have been marginalized by the autocrat’s actions. Mass resistance indicates that there is a high level of discontent with the current regime and that there would likely be support for a regime change. It also challenges areas of society which support the regime, imposing costs on and splitting the loyalties of important sectors like the business community, media, civil service, or trade unions (Sharp, 1973, 2005). Civil resistance

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3 The second case study has included field research in Cambodia, but the results of are still being analysed and have not yet been included.
movements can aid elites by acting as a focal point for coordination, as well as giving a veneer of legitimacy to alternative claims to power, while civil society, church, and trade union leaders provide partners for negotiating a transition from the current regime (Karl, 1990; Cook, 2006; Lee, 2015). Once elite defections begin occurring they can signal that political space is opening up and suggest that change may be possible, thus galvanizing mobilization and increasing the number of participants to a level that the regime may not be able to withstand, while internal regime divisions greatly increase the chances that the regime will collapse (O’Donnell and Schmitter, 1986; Przeworski, 1991; Bratton and Van de Walle, 1997).

Personalization is therefore argued to be related to an increased likelihood of civil resistance campaign success in overthrowing an autocrat because it generates divisions within the political elite between those who benefit from the autocrat’s continuation in power and those who have been marginalized. When a nonviolent civil resistance campaign emerges, this latter group may look outside the regime for ways to improve their situation, leading to elite defections that in turn increase the odds of regime collapse.

**Research design**

Studies of internal authoritarian politics are based on the characteristics of authoritarian institutions and relative power distribution at high levels of government. However, authoritarian regimes have strong incentives to conceal or misrepresent internal power dynamics (e.g., Barros, 2016; Schedler & Hoffman, 2016). This poses substantial methodological difficulties, and has on occasion resulted in misclassification of and mistaken conclusions regarding particular authoritarian regimes (Art, 2016; Barros, 2016; Morgenbesser, 2017).

In an attempt to deal with this challenge, this research adopts a mixed methods approach, which treats research first and foremost as problem solving and uses ‘whatever works’, including both qualitative and quantitative methods (see, e.g., Teddlie & Tashakkori, 2009; Thaler, 2017). This paper is part of a larger doctoral project utilising a sequential mixed methods design, as illustrated in Appendix 1. In the first stage, large-n quantitative analysis has identified a statistically-significant correlation between civil resistance campaign outcome and an indicator of personalization, the autocrat’s time in power, summarised in Appendix 2. Civil resistance success is found to be more likely against autocratic leaders who have been in power longer, which I have argued elsewhere implies that personalization makes civil resistance more likely to be effective in overthrowing authoritarian regimes.

The second stage, reported in this paper, involves the identification and analysis of two cases based on the statistical results to explore this association in more detail. The first case is an analysis of the EDSA revolution, which is an 'on the regression line' example where the outcome of the case fits the statistical results well. The purpose is to examine whether the theorised causal process is plausibly present, as well as to illustrate and clarify this process. The second case, the 2013 civil resistance campaign in Cambodia, is a 'deviant' or 'off-the-line' case where the outcome is not predicted well by the quantitative study. Within-case analysis is again used to examine whether the causal process is plausibly present, but also to look for other factors that may account for the unexpected outcome but have been missed during the process of theory development.

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4 See also other contributions to *Social Science Quarterly*, vol. 97(4), 2016.
5 Article currently under peer review.
In November 1985 Ferdinand Marcos, president of the Philippines since 1965, called a snap election for February 1986 in an attempt to deflect international criticism over his continuing authoritarian rule. Confident of his control over the legislature and bureaucracy, Marcos allowed a citizen’s election watchdog, NAMFREL (National Citizens’ Movement for Free Elections), to conduct an independent count of the vote. On February 7th the government’s Commission on Elections (COMELEC) announced that Marcos had won with 54% of the vote. Yet the election had been widely discredited by reports of violence and fraud, and NAMFREL announced that Marcos’s rival, Corazon Aquino, had won instead. A decisive blow to the legitimacy of the result was a highly public walk-out staged by a group of COMELEC staff in protest at its role in the fraudulent count. On the 14th the influential Catholic Bishops Conference of the Philippines condemned the election, and two days later Aquino called for a nationwide boycott of Marcos-related establishments and further civil resistance in front of a crowd of up to 2 million people at Rizal Park in Manila.

Capitalising on the civil resistance campaign, a group of military officers calling themselves the Reform the Armed Forces Movement (RAM) launched a coup on February 22nd; warned in advance, however, loyalist forces repulsed the attempt (Davide et al., 1990). Amidst rumours that Marcos was about to reimpose martial law, the rebels retreated to two large military camps on the EDSA highway in the centre of Manila, surrounded and protected by more than a million Aquino supporters. A cascade of defections in the military ensued, including almost all of the Metropolitan Police Force and large segments of the air force, as units ordered to clear EDSA refused to fire on unarmed civilians who were offering them prayers, food, and flowers. U.S. president Ronald Reagan finally withdrew his support completely from the regime, and on February 25th Marcos fled the country.

This case study examines the background to the EDSA revolution, also known as the People Power revolution. It argues that personalization influenced the outcome of the civil resistance campaign by creating divisions within the elite between those who benefited from the Marcos regime and those who were marginalized. These divisions encouraged the formation of an elite opposition coalition that was capable of mounting a credible challenge to the regime in the snap election and leading the civil resistance campaign against the fraudulent result. Furthermore, they signalled to dissatisfied sectors of the military that a coup attempt could gain elite support and thus have a higher chance of success. Although personalization did not have a direct causal effect on the outcome of the revolution, it therefore created the necessary preconditions for its success. The case study thus illustrates the link between personalization and campaign outcome and highlights the importance of understanding autocrat-elite power dynamics in explaining the success or failure of anti-regime civil resistance campaigns. It begins by describing the background of the political elite in the Philippines, showing that a power-sharing agreement was in place during the initial years of the Marcos regime. It then describes the ways in which Marcos personalized power, both before and after the declaration of martial law in 1972. It concludes by outlining the effects of personalization on the elite, and the consequences of this for the EDSA revolution.

**Political elite in the Philippines**

Since the invasion and colonisation of the Philippines by the United States in 1898, Filipino politics has been dominated by a national elite made up of a number of influential families. The dominant social group, the mestizos, had begun accumulating land holdings and agricultural wealth under Spanish control in the 19th century (Larkin, 1972; Hawes, 1987). It was the conquest of the Philippines by the United States at the turn of the 20th century, though, that consolidated this group into a cohesive ruling elite, as imported American democratic institutions were co-opted to act as vehicles for intra-elite contestation over control of the state apparatus, which effectively became
subordinated to elite interests (Wolff, 1961; Anderson, 1988; Sidel, 1999). Elite wealth was primarily based on agricultural production, although this came to be supplemented by industrial manufacturing after WWII and Philippine independence (e.g. Makil, 1975; Wurfel, 1979; Doronila, 1992). Although differences at the elite level existed, overall they were relatively muted and the elite remained homogenous as a group in the pre-Marcos era (Fast, 1973; Hawes, 1987). Politics was based on patronage, with money and power being closely linked, and government positions necessitating spending hundreds of times the average annual income on pork barrel projects and outright bribery (Abueva, 1969; Kiunisala, 1969). The two major political parties, the Nacionalistas and the Liberals, have been characterised as being solely vehicles for gaining power, as they did not have a clear programme nor distinguishable policies (Lande, 1965). Intra-party solidarity was low, and defection from one party to another common (ibid.).

The 1935 constitution had instituted a powerful presidency, with direct authority over appointments in many areas of government, discretionary pork barrel spending, veto powers over the legislature, the right to suspend the writ of habeas corpus, and more (Constitution of the Philippines [1935], art. VII, sec. 10). Yet there were also substantial checks and balances. The constitution limited the president’s tenure to two consecutive four-year terms (ibid., sec. 5), while the legislature could constrain the president by, for example, rejecting or watering down bills, controlling committees, or withholding appropriations for executive spending (Wurfel, 1988; Abinales & Amoroso, 2005). Canoy (1980, 121) characterises the legislature prior to the rise of Marcos as an “unruly crowd” made up of “old political pros” who were experts at political blackmail and other underhanded tricks:

Rich landowners, sugar barons and the millionaire land speculators…delighted in fancying themselves as the kingmakers of the country – as indeed they were. No politician of national stature, no President whether incumbent or aspiring, dared to antagonize this entrenched and privileged group unless he desired to commit political suicide.

It is clear that despite the existence of a powerful presidency, before the Marcos dictatorship presidents were substantially constrained by the political elite in the country.

**Personalization**

Marcos was elected in 1965 on a promise to make the country ‘great’ again, but lacked strong support in the legislature and his party (Abinales & Amoroso, 2005). Immediately upon taking office he began hinting at ambitions to consolidate personal power, calling for revisions to term limits and denouncing the ‘oligarchs’ who controlled the country (Canoy, 1980; Celoza, 1997). At the same time he began politicizing the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) by appointing officers from his home region of Ilocos to key positions and expanding the military’s official roles to include economic development and internal security (Canoy, 1980; Hernandez, 1984; Wurfel, 1988). Marcos drew heavily on state resources and ran a severe budget deficit to secure an unprecedented second term in 1969 (Thompson, 1995). Despite the accepted use of patronage to gain office, Marcos’s misappropriations and widespread use of fraud and violence were seen as ignoring the “ground rules” of “our kind of politics” and many of the elite began to suspect that his actions indicated a lack of commitment to the interests of the elite as a whole (Thompson, 1995, 37).

On September 23, 1972, Marcos declared martial law. Although it was justified in response to a claimed threat by leftist movements, and particularly a grenade attack on an opposition rally in August 1971, an additional and possibly driving motive was Marcos’s realization that a national convention to amend the constitution would fail to extend his term in office, requiring him to step down (Canoy, 1980; Wurfel, 1988; Celoza, 1997). Instead, the military closed Congress, which had been the main route through which the elite could constrain the president, and arrested major opposition figures, while others fled into exile (Hawes, 1987; Wurfel, 1988). Elites’ private militias were forcibly disbanded and local police brought under a national authority commanded by the
military, with both actions curtailing local-level elite coercive power that had until then operated largely autonomously of the central government (Hernandez, 1984; McBeth, 1989).

During the initial phases of implementing martial law Marcos specifically targeted some of the largest and most powerful political families, with businesses either forcibly sold to the government or seized outright (Wurfel, 1979). Marcos further challenged the powerful families’ agricultural strength by placing key agricultural industries, particularly sugar and coconut, under government control, then siphoning off the surplus that would have gone to the landowners (Hawes, 1987). This undermined elites’ political strength as the profits from agricultural production were central for mobilizing local political support during elections. In conjunction with the cutting off of institutional access to Marcos through the closing of Congress, this resulted in the marginalization of what had until then been the most powerful political blocs in the country (Hawes, 1987). By 1975 the majority of influential business leaders had also either lost political influence or been excluded from the ruling coalition entirely, with observers noting that those who survived had been largely subordinated by Marcos (Makil, 1975).

Throughout the 1970s Marcos continued to expand his patronage network while removing anyone from government who did not have direct ties to him, involving periodic purges in the name of ‘rooting out corruption’ and the centralisation of decision-making in the office of the president (Wurfel, 1988). After 1972 he took personal control of appointments in all areas of government (Lee, 2015). The military, as an alternative base of support, was nearly quadrupled in size and saw its budget increased tenfold between 1972 and 1977 (Hernandez, 1984; Wurfel, 1988). A new constitution was drafted, removing term limits on the presidency, legalising the declaration of martial law, and giving Marcos extensive legislative powers (Celoza, 1997). Further amendments to the constitution also granted almost unlimited legislative powers, including the ability to rule by decree even after the lifting of martial law (1973 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, Amend. 5 & 6 [1976]).

By the mid-1970s Marcos had succeeded in gaining substantial personal power. A contemporary observer noted that “a person’s influence [in 1975] depended on how much he was listened to by the man on top, specifically, the President. The crucial direction is upward, and only upward” (Makil, 1975, 32-33, emphasis original). An anonymous panellist in Makil’s study puts it more bluntly:

Unlike in 1969-1970, when power was broadly based [sic], there is only one power now. There is a polarization—no, not even that—a monopoly of power and influence by the President and his wife. The others have disappeared. (Makil, 1975, 33, emphasis original)

Evidence for the narrowing of the ruling coalition during this period can be seen in the decreasing number of influential in the same period, reducing 40% from 3290 cited by observers and participants in the political sphere in 1969 to 1675 in 1975, indicating a concentration of political influence in fewer figures and correspondingly a larger number who had during that time been excluded from power (Makil, 1975).

Effects on the political elite

Despite high levels of personalization, elite divisions during martial law remained relatively limited. In the 1978 election for an ‘interim’ National Assembly in which a small opposition was permitted to campaign. Most of the political elite joined Marcos’s newly-established New Society Movement (Kilusan Bagong Lipunan, KBL) party in order to ensure their continued positions and access to patronage (Wurfel, 1988). The opposition—led by former Senator Benigno Aquino from jail—had a high degree of public support but was not able to seriously challenge Marcos’s hold on power (Celoza, 1997). This was in part due to the fact that there was a widespread belief at the elite level that the martial law situation was only temporary and that once lifted Marcos would not be able
to retain personal control. The possibility of “anyone but Marcos” winning the presidency in a subsequent campaign prevented the leading contenders from uniting behind a single candidate (Canoy, 1980, 56).

As the ‘normalization’ process begun in 1978 towards the lifting of martial law progressed, however, elite opposition to Marcos began to grow, as figures who had been passed over for positions in the KBL began to defect from the regime. Two of the most significant defections were the brothers House Speaker Jose Laurel Jr. and former Senator Salvador Laurel, who had cooperated with Marcos during martial law but become disaffected; as Jose Laurel Jr. stated, “I am fighting Marcos because I have an investment in him. I was hoping to collect but I have waited long enough” (cited in Thompson, 1995, 103). The Laurels revived the hitherto-defunct Nacionalista party and began attracting other defectors and opportunists from the KBL (Wurfel, 1988; Thompson, 1995). The United Democratic Opposition (UNIDO) was formed in August 1980, with those involved making up a “Who’s Who” of pre-martial law politicians from both of the major parties, all of whom had been excluded from political influence by Marcos during the martial law period (Thompson, 1995, 104).

Benigno Aquino was a central figure in the elite opposition, having widespread popular appeal despite having been incarcerated since 1972; recognising this, Marcos effectively sent him into exile in the United States in 1980 (Wurfel, 1988). By 1983 Aquino believed that he would be able to safely return to the Philippines, apparently in the hope of negotiating a transfer of power with Marcos, who was beginning to show signs of ill-health (ibid.). Upon landing at Manila International Airport on August 21, 1983, however, he was shot dead, an act which shocked the country and led immediately to the widespread politicisation of large sectors of the population, most of whom believed Marcos to be ultimately responsible. One particularly important result was the open defection of the Makati Business Club, a group of economic elite associated with the ‘old wealth’ of the political elite, which began supporting growing protests from September 1983 onwards; the shift in support amongst the economic elite from Marcos to the opposition had “profound consequences” as it “made it easier for U.S. policy makers to think about alternatives to Marcos” (Wurfel, 1988, 278). The Catholic church also lent its informal support to UNIDO, aiding the elite opposition with its extensive organizational and communication networks (ibid., 279-280).

The 1984 to 1985 period saw intense politicking amongst the UNIDO leadership, as they tried to settle on a presidential candidate who would be capable of defeating Marcos. While Salvador Laurel was the leader of the coalition, he was deeply distrusted by much of the business and church community, who were suspicious of his ties to Marcos and saw him as “too much like the guy we’re trying to get rid of” (cited in Thompson, 1995, 133). The alternative was Corazon Aquino: despite the fact that Aquino was a member of one of the wealthiest and most powerful political clans in the Philippines, and had been heavily involved in her family corporation’s finances prior to her political career, she had broad appeal due to her perceived moral stature in the aftermath of her husband’s assassination and her public image as a “simple housewife” (Anderson, 1988, 4). In the end she agreed to run for the presidency and the opposition movement united behind her candidacy.

**The road to EDSA**

Elite divisions were not, of course, occurring in a vacuum, and the excesses of the Marcos regime were also provoking discontent in other areas of society. In particular, as Lee (2015) has argued, Marcos’s personalization of power had a pernicious effect on the military. During martial law the AFP had become heavily involved in politics, acting as a major part of Marcos’s patronage network (Davide et al., 1990, II.C.1.h.). In order to enhance his personal control over the military, Marcos took sole charge of promotions, with personal loyalty being the primary criterion for advancement (ibid., II.D). Mid-ranking officers were blocked from promotion due to the extension of
senior officers’ positions, while organizational cohesion suffered from internal jockeying for position and inefficiency in the face of ongoing insurgencies (ibid.).

MGen. Fabian C. Ver, known as a Marcos loyalist, was made AFP Chief of Staff in 1981 over a non-loyalist alternative, Lt Gen. Fidel V. Ramos. Ver, Ramos, and Defence Minister Juan Ponce Enrile, amongst others, had all been part of a group of military officers who had been in consultation with Marcos over the implementation of martial law (ibid., ILC), but Enrile in particular had been marginalised in comparison to Ver as part of Marcos’s personalization of power. As Ver expanded his control over the military, a number of subversive organizations emerged, most notably the RAM, which was formed around 1982 (ibid.). Although it cited discontent over corruption, favouritism, lack of professionalism in the military, and the scandal caused by the military’s alleged involvement in the Aquino assassination, it was also intended to protect the political interests and personal safety of Enrile, who felt threatened by Ver and Marcos’s wife Imelda (ibid., IV.A).

RAM organising increased in 1985 as its members began actively preparing for a coup attempt (Davide et al., 1990, IV.A). Before initiating the attempt, however, its leaders needed to assess that there were the appropriate political and economic conditions for a coup to be successful, including widespread support for a change of government at both the popular and elite level. Military involvement in the campaign prior to the February election—secretly funded by anti-Marcos businesspeople—gave RAM officers a clear signal that there was widespread public discontent with Marcos (Davide et al., 1990, IV.A). The organisation also met repeatedly with prominent opposition figures in 1985 and early 1986, including Corazon Aquino and Cardinal Jaime Sin as well as organisations representing business, media, and civil society (ibid.). The RAM was thus able to judge that there were favourable political conditions for coup success. The relationship between elite divisions, popular mobilisation and the coup attempt are summed up in the testimony of a senior RAM members given after the fact:

the signal and encouragement from the different sectors of society to unite and move against the dictatorship of Mr. Marcos were too loud and strong to be ignored. Eventually, we were subtly encouraged, if not practically pushed, by the Opposition groups . . . to either stage a coup or start a revolution (Davide et al., 1990, IV.A, ¶13)

It is therefore clear from the evidence gathered by the Davide Commission that the coup attempt which triggered the events of the EDSA revolution was made possible by the presence of an elite opposition coalition that was unified and credible enough to actually challenge Marcos and attract a high degree of public support. As I have attempted to show in this section, this was in turn encouraged by Marcos’s personalization of power, which created divisions within the elite between those who benefited from his rule and those who were marginalized and encouraged elite defection once it was clear that he was intent on maintaining and further consolidating personal rule.

Connection to research question

In relation to the research question, this within-case analysis of the overthrow of Ferdinand Marcos in the Philippines suggests that the theorised link between personalization and campaign outcome was plausibly present. The causal pathway is illustrated in Figure 1 below. Personalization included the violation of elite norms to secure an unprecedented second term in office in 1969; the declaration of martial law and closure of Congress in 1972; moves to undermine independent sources of elite political power, including strong attacks on prominent families’ interests in the mid-1970s; the extension of Marcos’s personal patronage network throughout the state structure. This process led to both divisions within the elite and grievances amongst military officers. Encouraged by a unified and credible elite opposition coalition made up largely of defectors from Marcos, as well as widespread signals of public discontent with the regime, disgruntled officers saw an opportunity to launch a coup attempt. Although the attempt failed, it was the direct proximate cause of the mass mobilization along EDSA which was large enough to trigger further military defections and the loss
of support by the U.S. which caused Marcos to flee Malacañang. I thus conclude that elite divisions caused by Marcos’s personalization of power were a necessary precondition for the success of the EDSA revolution.
**Figure 1**: Role of personalization in 1986 Philippines campaign success. Arrows represent direction(s) of effect.

**Figure 2**: Role of personalization in 2013 Cambodia campaign failure. Grey text and dashed arrows represent missing factors and effects.
Cambodia: Personalization and cohesion

In an attempt to legitimise upcoming general elections, in mid-July 2013 Cambodia’s ruling Cambodian People’s Party (CPP), led by Hun Sen since 1985, allowed exiled opposition leader Sam Rainsy to return to the country. The move backfired, however, and he was met by crowds numbering in the tens of thousands (Strangio, 2014, 259). Supported by Rainsy’s popularity, a shift in demographics towards a younger population, and increased access to information, the opposition Cambodian National Rescue Party (CNRP) shocked the CPP by securing 44.5% of the vote against the CPP’s 48.8% (ibid., 259-260).

The election itself was tainted by accusations of electoral fraud, with the number of suspect ballots much greater than the margin of victory claimed by the CPP. Supported by calls from independent observers and foreign governments for an independent investigation, the CNRP boycotted parliament and began a campaign of civil resistance. Rolling protests began in early August in Phnom Penh’s Freedom Park, regularly attracting 20,000 participants or more, while a petition calling for an impartial investigation into the election results gathered more than 2 million thumbprints and was delivered to the embassies of the United States and other foreign countries in October. Protests escalated in December that year, with the largest demonstration attracting at a minimum 100,000 and possibly as many as 300,000 participants or more. The campaign was centred on CNRP activists but also included a wide range of social groups, including young Buddhist monks, teachers’ and workers’ unions, and large numbers of ordinary Cambodians; by the end of 2013 claims had begun escalating from demands for an election inquiry to calls for broader political change, including the resignation of Hun Sen. The CPP had been stunned by the election result and for several months was unable to coordinate an effective response to the civil resistance campaign. Prompted by growing mobilisation and increasingly radical demands, however, it launched a crackdown in January 2014, using the army to disperse protestors and clear Freedom Park (with the use of live rounds by security forces resulting in the deaths of several striking garment factory workers) and banning public demonstrations. In February the ban was lifted and sporadic protests occurred over the next few months. However, they failed to generate the same momentum seen prior to the January crackdown, and open civil resistance has since largely subsided.

This case study examines factors that account for the failure of the 2013 campaign despite high levels of personalization of power by Prime Minister Hun Sen. Counter to theoretical expectations outlined above, he has been able to do so without creating serious divisions within the political elite, limiting the CNRP’s ability to effectively challenge the regime using civil resistance tactics. The case study proceeds by giving a history and description of the Cambodian political elite and shows how Hun Sen has gained supremacy over this group. It then identifies several factors that have helped to maintain the ruling party’s cohesion in the face of personalization. It concludes by identifying a

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7 Phnom Penh Post, “No coalition, both sides insist”, 15 August 2013.
9 A government spokesperson put the largest demonstration at approximately 100,000 participants, while Sam Rainsy claimed 500,000, and independent analyst Kem Ley estimated 300,000 to 500,000 (Phnom Penh Post, “Size me up: Calculating crowds at Cambodia’s demonstrations”, 3 January 2014).
11 Interview, Dr. Lao Mong Hay, Phnom Penh, May 2017; Interview, anonymous CPP official, Svay Rieng province, May 2017.
12 Reuters, “Cambodia’s strongman affirms pre-eminence as opposition challenge falters”, 11 June 2014.
13 Ibid.
number of other plausible explanatory factors that may have also contributed to the failure of the civil resistance campaign, including the difficulties the CNRP has had in building a coalition with other groups which oppose the government and the continued support of the regime by much of the Buddhist sangha hierarchy.

**Cambodian political elite**

During its brief period of rule, the Khmer Rouge’s Democratic Kampuchea regime (1975-1979) completely destroyed the pre-existing Cambodian state structure and “nearly erased a national memory of how government worked” (Gottesman, 2004, 50). After the Vietnamese invasion and conquest of Phnom Penh the newly-installed People’s Republic of Kampuchea (PRK) government and its Vietnamese “guiding committee” were therefore forced to reconstruct government institutions from the ground up (Duc, 2012, 381). Positions were assigned to figures from two main groups. Communist revolutionaries who had been based in Hanoi since the 1950s had the socialist credentials and skills to run an administration, and were thus mainly assigned to central government positions in Phnom Penh (Gottesman, 2004). The second group, which primarily received positions outside Phnom Penh, was made up of defectors from the Khmer Rouge who had fled to Vietnam to avoid bloody purges beginning around 1977. While they were seen as untrustworthy and “difficult to use” by the Vietnamese, they had the local support that was necessary to rebuild state institutions in the provinces (Duc, 2012, 378). Amongst the latter group were Chea Sim, the most influential of the former Khmer Rouge cadres at the time, and a young Hun Sen, who stood out amongst other defectors for his ambition and intelligence (Gottesman, 2004; Duc, 2012).

In the early days the government had little control of the countryside, and many of the Khmer Rouge defectors took advantage of the opportunity to build personal patronage networks in areas under their control (Gottesman, 2004; Duc, 2012). Chea Sim, for example, by 1981 had appointed hundreds of former Khmer Rouge as police officers and other security officials, effectively clearing them of any wrongdoing under the previous regime and building a loyal force of his “‘children and grandchildren’” (Gottesman, 2004, 122). Likewise, in the early 1980s Hun Sen focused on building a power base, attracting many of the remaining best and brightest in the country to the Foreign Ministry, which he headed before becoming prime minister in 1985 (Gottesman, 2004, 211; Duc, 2012, 381 n. 574). The Hanoi-based group, on the other hand, had failed to effectively build political support independent of Vietnamese sponsorship, and by the mid-1980s had become a liability as Vietnam focused on withdrawing from Cambodia. At the time of Hun Sen’s appointment as prime minister in 1985 most of the remaining Hanoi revolutionaries had been purged from the PRK and replaced by former Khmer Rouge cadres (Gottesman, 2004; Duc, 2012). The elite was largely divided into two factions, one centred on Hun Sen and the other aligned with Chea Sim and Heng Samrin, another prominent Khmer Rouge defector. Yet open factional conflict was avoided, as struggles within the regime focused more on ideology versus pragmatism in rebuilding the state and the economy. Even as Hun Sen began expanding his patronage network into the wider state bureaucracy and provinces he avoided challenging Chea Sim directly, leading to a presumably implicit power-sharing agreement at the top levels of government between the two factions (Gottesman, 2004).

**Personalization**

Vietnamese forces withdrew completely from Cambodia in 1989 and a comprehensive peace agreement to end the ongoing civil war was signed in 1991. The agreement established the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) to oversee the transitional period to multi-party democracy. In reality, however, the UNTAC mission was denied control of key areas of government, failed to fully demobilise the armed factions, and was unable to secure anything more
than ‘devious consent’ from the government, leaving existing power structures in place (Lee, 2011). The 1993 election, which was intended to inaugurate multi-party democracy, was extensively manipulated by the government’s Cambodian People’s Party (CPP) through a combination of patronage and violent coercion (e.g. Ledgerwood, 1996; Frieson, 1996; Hughes, 2003, 127). It was won, though, by the royalist FUNCINPEC party, an outcome that was unacceptable to the CPP leadership, which had no intention of relinquishing power. Hun Sen and Chea Sim responded by demanding a power-sharing arrangement with the head of FUNCINPEC, Prince Norodom Ranarriddh, while several senior CPP members launched a secession attempt in the east (Widyono, 2008).\textsuperscript{14} Intimidated by the show of force, King Sihanouk and Prince Ranariddh folded, agreeing to a ‘power-sharing’ formula, with Hun Sen securing the role of ‘second’ prime minister over Chea Sim (Shawcross, 1994, 34).\textsuperscript{15}

Hun Sen’s increasing personal power during this period provoked a rebellion from within the CPP for the first time in July 1994 when National Security Minister Gen. Sin Song and internal security head Sin Sen, both of whom were known as long-time rivals of Hun Sen’s and had been excluded from the power-sharing agreement with FUNCINPEC, launched an abortive coup attempt (Strangio, 2014, 36).\textsuperscript{16} Internal sources have stated that most of the CPP leadership, including senior members of the Chea Sim faction, was aware of and supported the move.\textsuperscript{17} Aware of their probable knowledge of the plot, Hun Sen pressured Chea Sim and Interior Minister Sar Kheng, a key ally of Chea Sim’s, to accept his chosen appointee as head of the national police. The position went to Hok Lundy, a close ally of Hun Sen’s from the eastern zone. Obtaining direct control over the nation’s internal security forces was, as Morgenbesser (2017, 9) notes, “a crucial power grab” that greatly strengthened Hun Sen’s personal power in relation to the rest of the Cambodian elite.

A second and much more public power grab came in July 1997. The so-called power-sharing agreement between the CPP and FUNCINPEC had proven to be a “tenuous compact among competing patronage systems” rather than a democratic system of government, and it soon began to unravel as FUNCINPEC members were excluded from decision-making processes and lost lucrative positions to the CPP (Gottesman, 2004, 353). FUNCINPEC’s leadership responded by building up a military wing to push for a greater share of power (Widyono, 2008, 213-214). At the same time Hun Sen had been building up his personal bodyguard into a private armed capable of challenging other segments of the security forces. Open fighting broke out in Phnom Penh on July 5\textsuperscript{th}, resulting in a swift victory by Hun Sen’s forces, followed by a wave of arrests and extra-judicial executions against FUNCINPEC, eliminating it as a military force (ICG, 1998). A further result was the assertion of Hun Sen’s dominance over the rest of the CPP leadership. He had been losing popularity within the CPP, with the factional division causing conflict and many CPP members wanting to replace him with someone more palatable to voters.\textsuperscript{18} Chea Sim-aligned figures opposed military action and refused to mobilise their forces in support of the coup, fearing that Hun Sen would gain too much power at their expense if he was successful.\textsuperscript{19} Yet in the end they chose to accept Hun Sen’s increased personal power rather than to rebel.

A third, albeit less dramatic, power grab was carried out in 2004. Following the 2003 general election an alliance between opposition parties FUNCINPEC and the eponymous Sam Rainsy Party (SRP) had been able to prevent the CPP from forming a government by boycotting the National Assembly (Heder, 2005). In an attempt to split the alliance, Hun Sen proposed another power-sharing deal with FUNCINPEC, involving the creation of more than 160 new cabinet positions and hundreds more at lower levels of government (ibid.). A constitutional amendment to formalise the deal needed

\textsuperscript{14} Also Phnom Penh Post, “Sihanouk back at the helm”, 18 June 1993.
\textsuperscript{15} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{16} Also Cambodia Daily, “Marking the anniversary of the Cambodian coup attempt”, 2 July 2014.
\textsuperscript{17} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{19} Ibid.
the signature of Chea Sim as acting head of state. The deal, however, would dilute the power of Chea Sim-aligned figures within the cabinet: for example, Sar Kheng had been one of two deputy prime ministers, but would be reduced to being only one of seven after the agreement, the others all chosen by Hun Sen.\textsuperscript{20} The day he was expected to sign the amendment, Chea Sim was instead ‘escorted’ to the airport by police (led by Hok Lundy) and flown to Thailand, where he stayed until the following week, leaving a more compliant figure to provide the required signature.\textsuperscript{21} Although the Chea Sim faction remained influential after this point, the episode was a humiliation and marked a further substantive shift in the power balance towards Hun Sen.\textsuperscript{22}

**Explaining the negative outcome**

Events of the 1990s and early 2000s clearly indicate that Hun Sen gained a high level of personal power at the expense of other members of the ruling coalition, particularly the rival Chea Sim faction.\textsuperscript{23} Yet this did not result in elite defections in the face of the 2013 civil resistance campaign. This section discusses several possible explanations for this in relation to the theoretical argument set out above.

To preface this section, it is important to emphasise that although some commentators have dismissed the 2013 campaign as unimportant (e.g. McCargo, 2013), it was in fact a significant movement that had at least the potential to seriously challenge the CPP’s hold on power. Conversations and interviews with Phnom Penh residents, political analysts, and politicians have confirmed that during the protests there was a very strong atmosphere of discontent and feeling that substantive political change was possible. Particularly of note is that the protests featured a much wider range of participants than previous demonstrations in support of opposition parties, as indicated by both newspaper and eyewitness accounts, a factor which is likely to contribute to the ability of protest movements to obtain concessions from governments (Denardo, 1986). Furthermore, the campaign did have several other features that civil resistance researchers have linked to success. These included utilisation of a number of different tactics (although more were threatened than actually carried out), training in nonviolent discipline, large numbers of participants, inclusion of social groups with substantial social and moral authority, sustained action in the face of government repression, ethnic homogeneity between protestors and security forces, and clear, well-defined goals (e.g. Ackerman & Kruegler, 1994; Schock, 2005; Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011; Nepstad, 2011, 2013).\textsuperscript{24} Certainly the CPP took it seriously enough to allow the use of live rounds on unarmed protestors, an action which carries substantial risks for repressive regimes (see, e.g., Sutton, Butcher & Svensson, 2014). It is therefore taken as a starting point here that features of the campaign alone are insufficient to explain its lack of success, particularly considering the difficulties of predicting the trajectories of mass civil resistance campaigns \textit{ex ante} (e.g. Kuran, 1989).

\textsuperscript{20} \textit{Cambodia Daily}, “Hun Sen scoffs at rumors of rift within CPP”, 29 July 2004. There are currently 8 deputy prime ministers in the Cambodian government, down from 9 after the death of key Hun Sen ally Sok An in March 2017.

\textsuperscript{21} It was also reported that members of Hun Sen’s bodyguard unit had been posted outside Chea Sim’s residence the night before (\textit{Phnom Penh Post}, “New government formed after Chea Sim leaves the country”, 16 July 2004.)

\textsuperscript{22} \textit{Phnom Penh Post}, “The slow demise of Hun Sen’s greatest CPP rival”, 15 November 2014.

\textsuperscript{23} Morgenbesser (2017) makes the same argument, although the precise timing and degree of Hun Sen’s personalization of power is perhaps still up for debate.

\textsuperscript{24} One area where the campaign did fall short was its perhaps over-reliance on tactics of concentration (i.e. protests in Freedom Park) over tactics of dispersion, such as strikes and boycotts, which can help a campaign survive high levels of repression (Schock, 2005).
a. Cambodia’s ruling coalition

The first explanation for the relative stability of the Hun Sen regime is that he has personalized power without the typical consequence of shrinking the ruling coalition and marginalizing substantial numbers of the political elite. Instead, the ruling coalition has remained a broad and relatively open group (Cock, 2010b). Intra-regime competition does occur, losers in these contests are typically given lower but still profitable roles within the party or the administration rather than being ejected from the ruling coalition altogether (ibid.). An illustrative example is the career trajectory of former Commander-in-Chief of the Cambodian armed forces General Ke Kim Yan. A top member of the Chea Sim faction, he had been an obstacle to Hun Sen’s consolidation of control over the military, for example disputing the use of force against FUNCINPEC in 1997 and refusing to mobilise the military in support of the coup. In January 2009 he was removed from his post and replaced by a Hun Sen loyalist in an apparent power grab. Yet two months later he was appointed deputy prime minister, a substantially less powerful but still influential position in the government. This openness and inclusivity extends to the opposition, with defections from opposition parties to the CPP a regular feature on state-run media. At the limit virtually the entire FUNCINPEC party was incorporated into the CPP’s patronage networks following the 2003-2004 standoff in exchange for turning on the SRP, with its members accepting a role that was “subordinate, subservient, [but] lucrative” (Heder, 2005, 121).

The maintenance of a broad ruling coalition requires abundant resources, as it has involved the proliferation of government posts to be given to clients of influential patrons, all of which need to provide opportunities for graft and rent-seeking (Cock, 2010b). There are two main ways that Hun Sen allegedly funds this: exploitation of Cambodia’s natural resources and misappropriation of foreign aid flows. Natural resource exploitation and accompanying rent-seeking has included logging, sand mining, the sale of rights for oil and gas exploration, and the sale of rights over land for ‘agribusiness’ (in reality, speculation), all of which have been accompanied by accusations of pervasive corruption linked to the political elite. Calavan, Briquets and O’Brien (2004) have also highlighted the ways in which the state captures external aid. Donor money is gradually whittled down as it passes through relevant ministries through, for example, ubiquitous ‘facilitation payments’. Money extracted in this way is redistributed upwards through patronage networks to enrich the most powerful patrons, while very little actually makes it to the intended recipients. Foreign aid continues to pay for minimal levels of service provisions, while substantially supporting the elite’s continued dominance (Cock, 2010a).

b. Political opposition

A further factor encouraging regime cohesion is related to the political opposition, which has been active since the 1993 election. Until recently it has been primarily represented by Sam Rainsy, 25 Notably, this occurred shortly after the untimely death of Hok Lundy, suggesting that Hun Sen may have been biding his time so as not to antagonize the rival faction but had his hand forced by the potential loss of control over the national police (Morgenbesser, 2017).

26 VOA News, “Sacked General proposed for Deputy PM”, 04 March 2009
28 All of these areas have been documented extensively by Global Witness (https://www.globalwitness.org/en/campaigns/cambodia/); of particular relevance are the reports “Country for Sale” (2009) and “Hostile Takeover” (2009), which link corruption to the ruling elite. See also Transparency International’s 2016 Corruption Perceptions Index, which lists Cambodia as continuing to be the most corrupt country in Southeast Asia and one of the most corrupt countries in the world (https://www.transparency.org/news/feature/corruption_perceptions_index_2016)
29 On the elite character of the Cambodian opposition, see, for example, Hughes (2003).

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29 On the elite character of the Cambodian opposition, see, for example, Hughes (2003).
with his SRP performing well despite repression in the 1998 and 2003 elections, although it lost ground in the 2008 election. A second major opposition party, the Human Rights Party (HRP) led by Kem Sokha, was founded in 2007. Although there was suspicion amongst the SRP leadership that Kem Sokha was trying to usurp Sam Rainsy as the face of the ‘legitimate opposition’, the two parties merged in 2012 to form the Cambodian National Rescue Party (CNRP).  

A major problem faced by the opposition is that the CNRP has had a difficult time presenting itself as a credible alternative that is capable of guaranteeing elites’ interests in the event of regime change, thus raising barriers to defection. This has can be seen in the CNRP’s zero-sum political style, which challenges the entire CPP regime, rather than limiting its attacks to Hun Sen and a core group of supporters (cf. Future Forum, 2017). In particular, the CNRP (and the SRP before it) have drawn heavily on racist and nationalist rhetoric in opposing what they claim to be Vietnamese influence over the CPP; indeed, virulent racism against ethnic Vietnamese often goes hand-in-hand with courageous resistance to the CPP. The CNRP has thus been accused of engaging in “gutter politics” instead of building a constructive alternative program for the country. In attacking the fundamental legitimacy of the entire CPP regime as being effectively ‘Vietnamese puppets’, the CNRP gains a degree of popular support, but it may also communicate an implicit threat to CPP members that their positions would be threatened in the event of regime change.

An additional aspect is the organizational structure and political culture of the largest opposition party. It is widely known in Cambodia that Sam Rainsy had a highly authoritarian leadership style and saw himself as the undisputable leader of the opposition. The CNRP’s leadership is characterised by observers as highly centralized and focused on a tight inner circle, with an “almost obsession with consensus […] from the top down.” There are also reports that the party runs on similar patronage-based lines to the CPP, with claims that donations go to individuals rather than the party and Sam Rainsy and Kem Sokha benefitting the most. If these claims are accurate, the CNRP could at least partly be described as a competing patronage network—much like the CPP and formerly FUNCINPEC—rather than a truly democratic opposition. This would pose a further obstacle to attracting elite defections as a change of regime would potentially see positions go first to clients of the existing CNRP leadership, substantially impacting the interests of members of the current ruling coalition, whose wealth is first and foremost derived from holding government positions (e.g. Cock, 2010a).

c. Armed forces

The role of the armed forces also warrants attention, given the importance of security force loyalties in civil resistance campaign outcomes highlighted by Lee (2015). The Cambodian military has been a political actor with roles including development and internal security as well as national

30 See, for example, comments to this effect by U.S. Ambassador Carol Rodley (disclosed by Wikileaks: https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/10PHNOMPENH75_a.html).
33 Multiple interviews, political analysts and opposition politicians, Phnom Penh, May 2017.
34 Diplomat, “The trouble with Cambodia’s largest opposition party”, 26 Nov 2016, emphasis added. See also, for example, a report by U.S. embassy staff in 2010 published by Wikileaks (10PHNOMPENH75_a).
35 Cited in Diplomat, “The trouble with Cambodia’s largest opposition party”
36 Ibid.
37 This and the following paragraph drawn from Chambers (2015).
defence since at least the Sihanouk regime (1953-1970). Hun Sen came close to achieving personal control over the armed forces during the 1980s, although they remained outside central control at the local level. The peace process and UNTAC administration put a hold on this personalization, integrating former insurgents into the military as part of a DDR process. As a result, the CPP had only “paper-thin” control over the military from 1993-1997, as 40% of its personnel came from anti-CPP armed factions (Chambers, 2015, 187). The 1997 conflict between Hun Sen and Prince Ranariddh re-established much of Hun Sen’s control over the armed forces as he became acting chief of the armed forces following the fighting and purged the security apparatus of non-CPP-aligned members. Despite this, however, internal CPP factionalism prevented him from gaining complete personal control; this was achieved only relatively recently with the replacement of Gen. Ke Kim Yan with Hun Sen loyalist Gen. Pol Saroeun noted above.

In many ways the Cambodian armed forces show notable similarities to the AFP under Marcos (as also pointed out by Chambers, 2015). Military leaders have close personal ties to Hun Sen, and inside sources claim that promotion is based primarily on loyalty and support for the CPP. The military has been informally involved in ensuring CPP victory in elections from 1998 onwards. It has also seen its budget increased substantially in recent years, taking as much as 22% of the government’s budget in 2014. Factionalism and enduring rivalries within the armed forces hierarchy have also been present, at least until 2008, although the current situation is less clear and whether subversive organisations similar to RAM exist within the military’s hierarchy is (to the best of my knowledge) unknown by outside observers. Yet, unlike in the Philippines, Cambodian security forces repeatedly obeyed orders to use force on demonstrators, including beating monks and using live rounds on unarmed civilians. Thus, despite theoretical expectations, personalization of the armed forces in Cambodia has not had the expected effect of encouraging security force defections in the face of large-scale protest. This suggests that, while security force defections may indeed approach being a necessary condition for anti-regime civil resistance success (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011), personalization alone may not be sufficient to cause defections to occur (cf. Lee, 2015). Indeed, the experience of the Philippines hints that elite marginalization as part of the personalization process may also play an important role in determining whether security forces support the regime or choose to undermine it.

d. Other factors

There are a number of other possible explanations for the failure of the 2013 civil resistance campaign in Cambodia. One is the divided role of the Buddhist sangha, with different factions supporting or opposing the government (Harris, 2001, 2005). Another is the growing influence of China as a major foreign donor, which may have helped the government deflect international criticism. A third factor may be the role of insufficiently critical international actors—such as Australia, New Zealand, France, and Japan—in legitimating fraudulent elections and allowing the Hun Sen regime to credibly present itself as a ‘democracy with problems’ instead of recognising its true autocratic basis. At this stage, whether these factors had a major influence on the campaign outcome is not clear; they are, however, currently being investigated further.

Connection to research question

This case study argues that a substantial amount of personalization has almost certainly taken place in Cambodia under Hun Sen’s rule. Yet counter to theoretical expectations, it has not generated the kind of elite divisions that played such an influential role in the Philippines’ EDSA revolution. In

39 On the last point see, for example, VOA News, “Cambodian opposition begins three-day protest”, October 23, 2014.
particular, Hun Sen has been able to maintain a broad ruling coalition, personalizing power without marginalizing political elites. Rather than attacking the wealth of some sectors of the elite to pay for patronage networks, as Marcos did, the Hun Sen regime instead obtains funding by exploiting Cambodia’s natural wealth and misappropriating foreign aid flows, placing the expenses of funding autocratic rule on the international community and the people of Cambodia themselves. As a consequence, the political elite remained cohesive up to and throughout the 2013 civil resistance campaign, not showing the kind of regime divisions that might have signalled an opening of political space and increased the numbers involved in the campaign, encouraged subversive coalitions within the military, or lent credibility and resources to the elite opposition movement; this argument is illustrated in Figure 2 above. This analysis thus goes some way to explaining Cambodia’s position as a deviant case in relation to this research, with the causal mechanisms of personalization leading to marginalized elites possible but in this case avoided.
Conclusion

This paper thus concludes that that the internal power dynamics and the outcome of civil resistance campaigns against autocratic regimes are linked through the process of personalization, the seizing of executive, legislative, and coercive powers of government by an autocrat. Personalization is theorized to make campaign success in overthrowing the regime more likely because it marginalizes important sectors of the political elite, creating divisions which can encourage the formation of subversive coalitions in the military, increase participation in civil resistance campaigns, and increase the credibility of opposition parties as alternatives to the incumbent regime. Analysis of the EDSA revolution in the Philippines finds empirical support for this argument. Marcos’s narrowing of the ruling coalition and attacks on elite wealth encouraged the formation of UNIDO, a major opposition force that was able to seriously contest the 1986 snap election and act as a focal point for civil resistance and security force defections.

Analysis of the 2013 campaign in Cambodia nuances this argument, however, showing that personalization does not always lead to the narrowing of the ruling coalition that is the primary causal pathway linking internal power dynamics to campaign outcome. In this case, easily-exploitable sources of wealth that do not involve attacks on elite interests exist, allowing Hun Sen to continue funding a broad ruling coalition. In addition, several factors related to the Cambodian opposition potentially imposed barriers to elite defection from the CPP, including its reliance on an all-or-nothing politicking style with a heavy reliance on demagogic appeals based on nationalist, racist rhetoric. Yet there are signs that this situation may be changing. The death of Chea Sim in 2015 has resulted in the disintegration of his patronage network, greatly reducing constraints on Hun Sen’s personal power.40 The replacement of Sam Rainsy by Kem Sokha as leader of the CNRP in early 2017 may also make it easier for the opposition to negotiate with moderates within the CPP, as Kem Sokha has a reputation for being less authoritarian and more open to genuine dialogue than his predecessor.41 And as Chambers (2015) points out, Hun Sen’s interference in the RCAF is beginning to resemble that of Marcos in the AFP. Hun Sen himself appears concerned by what he refers to as ‘color revolutions’, frequently exhorting the military and police to support his government in the event of mass protests, suggesting that he may view such an event as being a possible threat.42 Whether personalization is likely to lead to political change via people power in Cambodia thus remains to be seen.

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40 Interview, Dr. Lao Mong Hay, Phnom Penh (May 2017).
41 Multiple interviews, Phnom Penh, May 2017.
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Appendix 1: Visual model of research design

Role of this paper in relation to overall project highlighted in red.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phase</th>
<th>Procedure(s)</th>
<th>Output(s)</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Quantitative data collection</td>
<td>• Cross-sectional data from existing datasets (n = 71)</td>
<td>• Numeric dataset</td>
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<tr>
<td>Quantitative data analysis</td>
<td>• Cross-tabulation</td>
<td>• Descriptive statistics and test results</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Means &amp; median testing</td>
<td>• Parameter estimates</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Regression analysis</td>
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<tr>
<td>Connection of quantitative to</td>
<td>• Purposefully selecting 1 ‘on-the-line’ case</td>
<td>• Identification of cases for qualitative analysis (n = 2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>qualitative phases</td>
<td>• Purposefully selecting 1 ‘deviant’ case</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qualitative data collection</td>
<td>• Secondary sources including academic works, newspaper articles, 'grey'</td>
<td>• Textual data</td>
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<td></td>
<td>literature</td>
<td>• Transcripts of interviews</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• In-depth interviews obtained through semi-purposive snowball sampling</td>
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<tr>
<td>Qualitative data analysis</td>
<td>• Within-case analysis</td>
<td>• Narrative case studies illustrating causal</td>
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<td>• Plausibility test of theorised causal mechanisms</td>
<td>pathways</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Coding and thematic analysis of interview data</td>
<td>• Similar and different themes</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Identification of alternative explanations for deviant outcome</td>
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<tr>
<td>Integration of quantitative</td>
<td>• Interpretation and explanation of quantitative and qualitative results;</td>
<td>• Theory development</td>
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<tr>
<td>and qualitative results</td>
<td>assessment of plausibility of causal mechanisms</td>
<td>• Discussion</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>• Extension of theory</td>
<td>• Identification of areas for future research</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix 2: Summary of quantitative results

Summary of quantitative results (campaign outcome by leader’s time in office, 1946-2013) used for case selection. The x axis gives the time that the leader of an individual autocratic regime was in power prior to the onset of a mass civil resistance campaign; this is theoretically expected to be positively associated with the likelihood that the regime has become highly personalised. The y axis gives the number of outcomes by success (regime overthrow or leader exit) or failure (regime survival).