RATS Play Whack-A-Mole:
The Shanghai Cooperation Organization and the Problem of Radical Islamic Terrorism

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Abstract

Scholars examining the Shanghai Cooperation Organization have noted that the Regional Anti-Terrorism Structure (RATS) is among the most successful of its substructures, coordinating efforts through information sharing, the capture of terrorists, and anti-terrorist military exercises. The RATS SCO director and member-state representatives have touted the number of terrorists killed or arrested, operations interrupted, and weapons intercepted by member countries. Such figures, while reflecting strengths in information sharing and coordination, also reflect a fundamental challenge to the SCO’s ability to fight the “three evil forces” of terrorism, separatism, and extremism: the inherent contradiction created by the counterinsurgent operations by the member states. Russia, China, and other Central Asian members of the SCO have had significant success in tamping down larger-scale insurgencies. However, while the methods used to achieve these victories have reduced immediate separatist challenges to the states, they have failed to respond to the underlying grievances of the population, worsening the threats of extremism and terrorism. This paper argues that it is this dynamic, as well as the structural weaknesses and limits to interstate cooperation among the SCO states that affect the ability of RATS to succeed.
Introduction

Fighting terrorism in Central Asia is made more problematic by the difficult relations among the states in the region. Although each government clearly has an interest in preventing terrorist violence from groups affiliated with Al Qaeda and the Islamic State, cooperation is hampered by rivalries, ethnic disputes, imperfect borders and porous boundaries. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) was founded in 2001 to help deal with these problems, and set up the Regional Anti-Terrorism Structure (RATS). The relative success of that structure and its corporate body is the focus of this paper. Following a brief overview of Central Asia after the collapse of the Soviet Union and a discussion of regional organizations designed to improve relations and enhance stability among China, Russia, and the Central Asian states, this paper will examine how these countries have approached the challenges of the “Three Evils”, separatism, extremism, and terrorism, both individually and as a body.

Central Asia After the Soviet Union

The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 created five new states in Central Asia out of what had been rather artificial sub-national territories, SSRs. The borders of these republics did not correspond to the complex mixture of ethnic groups, and changed frequently during the Soviet period (ICG 2002: 1). The new Central Asian republics did show initial border continuity, and their first leaders had previously been the communist party leader of that republic, spoke Russian fluently, and valued stability. None of these new states was entirely ready to be independent, and each lacked the foreign ministries, border maps, border guards, checkpoints, consulates, customs and immigration facilities, intelligence agencies, law enforcement and legal organs that are necessary for conducting relations as a sovereign state with sovereign neighbors.
What they did inherit were problematic borders and relations. These in turn have made fighting terrorism and related problems in Central Asia all the more difficult. Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan all acquired borders with Afghanistan, and each new republic has co-ethnics across that border, as well as each other’s borders. Afghanistan was fighting a civil war following the Soviet pullout in 1989. In 1994, the Taliban rose and by 1996 had secured Kabul and most of Afghanistan, and hosted Al-Qaeda. Map 1 shows the region:

Map 1 – Central Asia

Kazakhstan’s border with Uzbekistan has areas in which there is still no agreement for demarcation, Uzbekistan has been reluctant to demarcate its border with Kyrgyzstan or Tajikistan,
and Turkmenistan does not cooperate with anyone. It has been highly insular, and has largely sealed its border with Uzbekistan and Afghanistan.

Particularly problematic is the area where Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan “swirl” together in the Fergana Valley. Making this region even more difficult from a boundary perspective are the enclaves that exist within the different states, seven of them in Kyrgyzstan linked but not connected to Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. Map 2 shows those in Kyrgyzstan:

Map 2 – Kyrgyz Republic

The relative populations and economies of the regional states are worth examining, since some of these states have far more capacity than others. Table 1 shows these in 2000, just before the founding of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Population (million)</th>
<th>GDP current PPP</th>
<th>GDP per capita current PPP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>1,262.6</td>
<td>$3,703.7</td>
<td>$2,933</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>146.6</td>
<td>$1,000.6</td>
<td>$6,825</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kazakhstan</td>
<td>14.9</td>
<td>$117.4</td>
<td>$7,888</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The SCO and the CSTO: Origins and Evolution

The origins of the SCO lie in the collapse of the USSR. Following Mikhail S. Gorbachev’s visit to Beijing in May 1989, the Soviet Union and China had undertaken a variety of Confidence-Building Measures (CBMs) along their borders, pulling back troops, and reducing the aggressive patrolling that had previously been taking place. The CBMs continued under the new governments, and in 1996 Russia, China, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan and Tajikistan signed the “Agreement on Confidence-Building in the Military Field Along the Border Areas,” and the grouping was nicknamed the “Shanghai Five” after the summit meeting in that city (Yahuda 2008: 77). This was followed by the 1997 “Agreement on Reducing Each Other’s Military Forces Along the Border Regions” (Yahuda 2008: 77). To the extent that the “Shanghai Five” could be considered an organization, it was a summit-only one; it featured meetings among the heads of state only in its Moscow (1997), Almaty (1998), Bishkek (1999) and Dushanbe (2000) summits.

The shift to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization occurred in Shanghai in June 2001 (before 9/11 and the US invasion of Afghanistan), when Uzbekistan joined the group and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization was formally created. The difference of this approach is well-summarized by Wang Jianwei:

Northeast Asia and Central Asia have had little tradition of multilateralism, due to the polarizing effect of the Cold War….China could deal bilaterally with the Soviet Union as well as other former Soviet republics bordering China. But China chose a different approach. Here the issue of border disputes common to all parties involved facilitated
this choice….To a great extent, multilateralism in this area is more an unintended result of practice rather than of design (Wang Jianwei 2008: 105).

China was a major force behind the increasing institutionalization of the SCO. The organizational momentum of the SCO is largely due to Chinese enthusiasm. As Song Weiqing observes, “…this organization is largely a Chinese initiative and …China plays a ‘leading role’ in the SCO process. China is clearly more motivated to promote the SCO than the other members” (Song 2014: 87). The second summit meeting in St. Petersburg of the SCO (June 2002) approved the creation of the Secretariat (headquartered in Beijing, headed by Zhang Deguang, a Chinese diplomat, and formally opened in January 2004), and with formal meeting mechanisms for the heads of state, heads of government, foreign ministers, heads of agencies. The full list is worth quoting just for its extent:

…there are also mechanisms of meetings on the level of Speakers of Parliament, Secretaries of Security Councils, Foreign Ministers, Ministers of Defence, Emergency Relief, Economy, Transportation, Culture, Education, Healthcare, Heads of Law Enforcement Agencies, Supreme Courts and Courts of Arbitration, Prosecutors General. The Council of National Coordinators of SCO Member States (CNC) is in charge of coordinating interaction within the SCO framework (“Brief introduction to the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation,” n.d.).

A center point of the SCO from early on was the fighting of the “Three Evils” of terrorism, separatism and extremism. Chinese leaders were particularly interested in setting up a joint anti-terrorism mechanism. This would be accomplished with the Regional Counter-Terrorism Structure (RCTS but also called the Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure, or RATS), discussed below. China did engage in bilateral joint counter-terror military exercises with Kyrgyzstan in October 2002, the first joint military exercise China had participated in, and a broader exercise in 2003 in both Kazakhstan and Xinjiang involving hostage rescue, terrorist base destruction, air drops and aircraft interception (Yang Tao 2012: 97). During the 21st century it has continued to grow and evolve, and China in particular has seen to it that its
institutionalization has continued, but at the same time has sought to make sure that it does not
turn into a politico-military alliance. As an international organization, 2004 might be marked as
“the end of its beginning,” and the Chinese Foreign Ministry’s official yearbook, *China’s
Foreign Affairs* characterizes it as “In 2004, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO)
completed smoothly its institutional build-up and entered a new period of comprehensive
cooperation” (2005: 397).

After September 11, 2001, governments around the world were virtually unanimous and
united behind anti-terrorism. If terrorists could attack the United States and kill nearly 3,000
people there, it could happen anywhere and to anyone. For countries in the newly-established
SCO, it complicated their joint efforts because the USA effectively became a Central Asian
power: it invaded Afghanistan, overthrew the Taliban government, fought the remnants of Al-
Qaeda, and stayed. Transport into land-locked Afghanistan was essential, since the United States
does not fight wars without an enormous logistical effort. Pakistan was naturally the first and
most important approach, but access to the northern areas of Afghanistan and air transit rights
were needed as well. The US and Kyrgyzstan reached an agreement for access to would be later
called Manas Air Base in December 2001, which has been used for transport and air-combat
purposes. The US reached a similar agreement with Uzbekistan for the use of Karshi-Khanabad
Air Base. Other NATO partners in ISAF (International Security Assistance Force) had Central
Asian air bases as well.

China’s initial reaction to the developments was mixed. On the one hand, it perceived
itself as having a common cause with the United States: fighting Islamic terrorism. Michael
Yahuda summarizes this attitude:

> Notwithstanding the views expressed in some Chinese strategic journals that China faced
a renewed danger of encirclement by the United States, the Chinese government made no
objections to the physical presence of American power for the first time near its vulnerable Western region of Xinjiang and, in fact, it lent its support to the American defeat of the Taliban in Afghanistan and the American attempt to establish a democratic government there. Beijing sent a lone police officer to serve with UN peace-keepers in Afghanistan….his presence spoke volumes about China’s official approval of the American-led venture (Yahuda 2008: 82).

Russia, too, had mixed feelings about US involvement. Like China, it fully supported the fight against Islamist terrorism, having faced wars in Chechnya and related terrorist attacks around Russia. It also hoped to “position itself as a crucial player in the postwar reconstruction of the world while also directly influenced how the United States conducted its campaign against the Taliban and al Qaeda.” To that end, Russia engaged in significant intelligence sharing and acquiesced to American requests to station troops in both Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. On the other hand, Central Asia was long part of the Russian sphere of influence and US presence there threatened that role (Mankoff 2012: 104-5).

In September 26th, White House press spokesman Ari Fleischer, for the first time under the Bush administration, linked the Chechen separatists to al Qaeda, saying "Chechnya leadership, like all responsible political leaders in the world, must immediately and conditionally cut all contacts with international terrorist groups, such as Osama bin Laden and the Al Qaeda organization" (Quoted in McFaul 2001). Similarly, the United States in 2002 did China a favor and declared the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM) to be a terrorist organization, one of a handful of organizations seeking to end Chinese presence in Xinjiang (“East Turkestan”). The US State Department summarized its dual position, however:

China continued to express concern that Islamic extremists operating in and around the Xinjiang-Uighur Autonomous Region received training, equipment, and inspiration from al-Qaida, the Taliban, and other extremists in Afghanistan. Several press reports claimed that Uighurs trained and fought with Islamic groups in the former Soviet Union, including Chechnya. Uighurs were found fighting with al-Qaida in Afghanistan, and some Uighurs who were trained by al-Qaida have returned to China. Previous Chinese crackdowns on ethnic Uighurs and others in Xinjiang raised concerns about possible
human rights abuses. For example, while the United States designated the East Turkestan Islamic Movement as a terrorist organization under Executive Order 13224 in 2002, it continued to emphasize to the Chinese that the war on terrorism must not be used as a substitute for addressing legitimate social and economic aspirations (US State Department, Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism. 2003).

Both Russia and China grew concerned about US presence in Central Asia. Russian views of American forces in the territory of the former Soviet Union continued to worsen, especially after the Tulip Revolution in March 2005 in Kyrgyzstan and US criticisms of Uzbek president Islam Karimov. China was also concerned, that with the US making bilateral agreements with Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan without reference to the SCO, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization was becoming a marginal player in the rapidly-changing strategic situation in Central Asia (Wang Jianwei 2008: 108). The SCO’s 2005 Astana Declaration reflects this shared concern, noting that the member states “deem it necessary for the relevant participating states of the antiterrorist coalition to set a deadline for the temporary use of said infrastructure and presence of their military contingents in the territory of the SCO member states” (SCO Secretariat 2005).

However, China and Russia do not always agree about the role of the organization. Most notable was the disagreement over the position the SCO should take on the Russia-Georgia war in August 2008. During that conflict, Russia forcibly intervened in Georgia on behalf of the separatist South Ossetians and Abkhazians, and sought a stamp of international approval from the SCO. All of the Central Asian republics have regions with ethnic discontent, and China in particular views any support of secessionist movements through the lens of Taiwan, Tibet and Xinjiang, parts of China which have seen significant break-away movements. Thus, to the Chinese, the approval of the South Ossetian republic would be the same as allowing Taiwanese independence. As one journalist summed it up, “In the tug of war between Russia’s desire to
secure international backing and China’s fear of encouraging any separatist movements, the Chinese position apparently won out” (Stern, 2008). China was also reluctant to see the SCO intervene in Kyrgyzstan during violence there in 2010 following the April unrest that unseated President Kurmanbek Bakiyev (who had risen five years earlier in the “Tulip Revolution”), and the subsequent violence between Kyrgyz and ethnic Uzbeks. Furthermore, Chinese attitudes toward the Central Asian republics is far less exclusionary than Russian attitudes, where the concept of the “Near Abroad” — in effect an exclusionary Neighborhood concept — still dominates foreign relations. One western analyst summarized the differences in approaches:

While Russia seeks to be the dominating actor in the region and to reduce the presence of Western countries, China agrees that the Central Asian states have the right to form their own regional organizations. Chinese experts have asserted that, contrary to speculations, the SCO is by no means an anti-American or anti-Western alliance. According to Pan Guang, Head of the SCO Studies Center in Shanghai, China affirms the right of Central Asian states to organize and deal with other states, including Western ones, while Russia alone opposes such outreach (Marat 2013, 135).

Another of the major differences is that the Chinese were much more in favor of institutionalizing the SCO than the Russians, who have generally preferred that it remain a weakly-instituted organization (Yuan 2010: 863, Song 2014: 92-93). There have been variations in this theme: the Russians have generally supported the SCO’s security function, and have pushed the idea of its becoming a military bloc, an ‘energy club’ and an anti-terrorist organization (Contessi 2010: 105-106), but China has been largely focused on promoting its economic and its social/cultural functions. The result was a deadlock of purpose that lasted “[b]etween 2006 and 2008 the SCO was widely seen as a dysfunctional organization, plagued by a protracted impasse, due to the fact that is two key members were divided over what trajectory its future development should take” (Contessi 2010: 103). Beginning in 2009, a tacit compromise was struck, with Russia accepting a nominal increase in economic rhetoric (if not
reality) of the SCO, and China emphasizing the anti-terrorist function, particularly at the Yekaterinburg Summit in June 2009, reinforced a month later by the “7/5” attacks in Urumqi.

China wants the SCO to become an economic/cultural organization as well as a security body, though it has dropped the idea of a Free Trade Area which it raised in 2003 by 2007 (Contessi 2010: 107). Its regular description of the organization in *China’s Foreign Affairs* usually emphasizes its “…cooperation in the political, security, economic and cultural fields.” In 2009 and again in 2012, China offered $10 billion in support of bilateral and multilateral initiatives of the SCO, but quiet Russian opposition made sure the money was not loaned (Cooley 2012). The SCO development bank, food security cooperation mechanism, e-commerce platform were among the several proposals that Chinese representatives to the various SCO meetings have raised, and despite winning “high acclaim” have not been implemented (*China’s Foreign Affairs 2011*: 401). China especially touted the 2014 “Agreement on the Facilitation of International Road Transport among the SCO Member States,” since it worked well with both its economic agenda and the “One Belt, One Road” infrastructure initiative (2014: 391). Chinese scholars view China’s economic contributions to the SCO as part of its role in providing economic public goods to the region, while noting Russia’s reluctance, and the lack of capacity in most of the Central Asian republics, Kazakhstan notwithstanding (Chen Xiaoding & Ma Ru 2015: 77). SCO-based cultural initiatives have been fairly limited. As Plater-Zyberk & Monaghan note, despite regular meetings of cultural ministers for “further strengthening cultural cooperation in the SCO framework in the coming decade,” the results have been meagre: “…in common with many other SCO meetings on topics other than security and law enforcement, the SCO Culture Ministers have been engaging in these meetings since 2002 with no visible achievement as a result” (Plater-Zyberk & Monaghan 2014: 20).
The issue of future expansion was another area in which China and Russia disagreed, leading to a long moratorium on new members (2006 – 2017), though not observers or dialogue partners. The SCO brought in new Observers and Dialogue-Partners: Mongolia as an observer in 2004, and Pakistan, India, and Iran as observers in June 2005 (Scheineson 2009). In June 2016, India and Pakistan both signed a memorandum for full membership, acceding at the June 2017 summit in Astana. India’s membership was substantially pushed by Russia, and Pakistan’s in response by China, though the latter is concerned that bringing both in will also import the problematic India-Pakistan relationship. Iran has also made it clear that they wish to join, something that China has spoken (mildly) in favor of, but which the Russians were somewhat more in favor of; yet the organization declined because of UN sanctions against Tehran. In general, it appears that China is most concerned about expanding the organization, and would prefer to “deepen” it instead (Song 2014: 98). The other Central Asian members are also reluctant to add yet more members, let alone another big member to dilute their already small share of power, and the fear that the organization may become too large to work well (Blank 2016). Belarus became an observer in 2010, though its location in Europe and not Asia seems odd, and Afghanistan became an observer in 2012. The United States is reported to have requested observer status between 2002 and 2006 but was turned down because it was not part of Central or South Asia (Hiro 2006, Fedoruk 2011). There are also a number of dialog partners, including Sri Lanka, Turkey, Nepal, Cambodia, Armenia and Azerbaijan. Turkmenistan, however, is not a member, though it has been often invited as a “guest.”

Part of the challenge with the SCO is that it is not the only organization in Central Asia, and Russia has its own favorite, the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO - Организация Договора о Коллективной Безопасности, Organizacija Dogovora o Kollektivnoj
Bezopasnosti) which was founded in May 2002 and is much more akin to a military alliance, and includes Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Russia, Armenia and Belarus, and formerly Uzbekistan, which has twice withdrawn from it. Most importantly, it does not include China. The SCO and the CSTO signed a Memorandum of Understanding in 2007, but the two organizations overlap to the point that they are competitive. The CSTO also gives Moscow – where the organization is headquartered – a veto over foreign basing rights in member states, which was part of the reason Uzbekistan left. In the area of counter-insurgency/counter-terror, the CSTO sponsors annual “Rubezh” COIN joint exercises, “Kanal” anti-narcotics, “Arsenal” anti-weapons, “Proxi” anti-cyber and “Nelegal” anti-illegal migration operations with its partners (Contessi 2010: 117). In May 2015 it conducted a large exercise in Tajikistan, practicing dealing with an incursion from Afghanistan with the 2,500-strong counter-terrorism Collective Rapid Reaction Force (KSOR) (ICG 2016a: 9).

However, the SCO has important members which the CSTO lacks: China, most prominently, Uzbekistan, and India and Pakistan which are crucial to the Taliban insurgencies in Afghanistan (an observer). It is interesting to note that in China’s 2017 White Paper on Asia-Pacific Security Cooperation, it listed a Chinese-Afghan-Pakistani- and Tajikistani coordination mechanism, “…on counter-terrorism cooperation among the military forces of the four countries, aimed at conducting coordination on situation analysis, verification of clues, sharing of intelligence, capacity building, joint training and personnel training and providing mutual assistance” (State Council Information Office 2017).
RATS: Functions

The relative weakness of the economic and other functions of the SCO notwithstanding, the most effective element of the SCO beyond its summitry is the Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure or RATS (上海合作组织地区反恐怖机构 *Shanghai hezuo zuzhi diqu fan kongbu jigou* in Chinese, Региональная антитеррористическая структура Шанхайской организации сотрудничества *Regional'naia antiterroristicheskaia struktura Shankhayskoy organizatsii sotrudnichestva* in Russian, the two official languages of the SCO). Since terrorism, along with separatism and extremism were designated “The Three Evils” early on in the Shanghai Five and then the SCO’s existence, they are usually treated as the same phenomenon, a position that the USA and western governments do not necessarily agree with.

The RATS had been agreed to in 1999, during the Shanghai Five period, but only in June 2002 was it designated in the SCO Treaty and even then controversies dogged its establishment. Russia wanted the RATS headquarters to be in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, which China and Uzbekistan objected to, and in 2003 the headquarters was placed in Tashkent, Uzbekistan instead. The launch of the Executive Committee was in June 2004 under an Uzbek Executive Director, with thirty employees and an initial budget of about $2 million (Plater-Zyberk & Monaghan 2014: 21-22). China and Russia provide one quarter of the funding and seven experts seconded from their security bureaucracies each (Gill and Murphy 2005: 27). An SCO Convention on Counter Terrorism was signed in 2009 at the Yekaterinburg Summit, and issued a statement supporting China after the “7/5” attack in Urumqi. The current director of the RATS is a Russian, Vevgeniy Sergeyevich Sysoyev.

The RATS has claimed to have prevented a variety of terrorist attacks, contributed to the arrest of hundreds of suspects, and acted against a number of groups. Perhaps most importantly, it is building a database of suspected terrorists and organizations based on information sharing.
among the member states, though the database itself is only in Chinese and Russian (Plater-Zyberk & Monaghan 2014: 23-24). Classified information is controlled by the transmitting party, according to the June 17, 2004 Agreement on Protecting Classified Information in the Framework of the Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. The Executive Committee of the RATS is also designated as the coordinating body for sharing information on border crossings, border conditions, violations, training, laws, and experiences, according to the 2015 Agreement on Cooperation and Interaction of the Member States of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization on Border Issues (SCO Secretariat 2015).

Joint counter-terrorism training and cooperation is handled by the (RATS). Similarly, border disarmament supervision is handled by the Joint Supervision Group on Border Disarmament of Russia, China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan (China’s Foreign Affairs 2015: 477-478). Some Chinese scholars have called for a more active joint anti-terror aspect of the RATS, even raising the possibility of a joint operations force (Yang Tao 2012: 98), but so far neither the interests of the major players nor would the miniscule budget of the RATS seem to allow this.


**RATS: The Goal and Its Limitations**

The primary function of RATS is to “coordinate SCO member activities against terrorism, separatism, and extremism” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2004), also known as the
“Three Evils.” In Article 1, the 2001 Shanghai Convention on Combatting Terrorism, Separatism, and Extremism defines the three as:

1) “terrorism”:
   a) any deed recognized as a crime in one of the treaties listed in the Annex to the present Convention (hereinafter referred to as Annex), and as it is defined in this treaty;
   b) any other deed aimed at causing death of any civil person or of any other person not taking active part in hostilities in the situation of an armed conflict, or causing him a serious bodily injury, and causing a considerable material damage to any material object, as well as the organization, the planning of such a deed, assistance in its commitment, incitement to it, when the purpose of such deed due to its character or nature, consists in intimidation of the population, breaching the public security or forcing state authorities or an international organization to commit any action or refrain from its commitment, and that are subject to criminal prosecution in accordance with the national legislation of the Parties;

2) “separatism” – any deed aimed at breaching the territorial integrity of a state, including those aimed at separation of a part of its territory or disintegration of the state, committed by violence, as well as the planning and preparation of such deed, assistance in its commitment, incitement to it, and that are subject to criminal prosecution in accordance with the national legislation of the Parties;

3) “extremism” – any deed aimed at a violent seizure of power or violent holding of power, and at violent change of the constitutional order of the state, as well as a violent encroachment on public security, including the organization, for the above purposes, of illegal armed formations or participation in them, and that are subject to criminal prosecution in accordance with the national legislation of the Parties.

(Federal Financial Monitoring Service)

In 2009, the heads of state signed the SCO Convention against Terrorism which further sought to clarify the issue of terrorism, defining both it and a terrorist act in Article 2.

Terrorism - an ideology of violence, and the practice of exerting influence on the decision-making of governments or international organizations by threatening or committing violent and (or) other criminal acts, connected with intimidating the population and aimed at causing injury to private individuals, society or the state

Terrorist act - any act connected with intimidating the population, endangering human life and well-being, and intended to cause significant property damage, ecological disaster or other grave consequences in order to achieve political, religious, ideological or other ends by exerting influence on the decision-making of governments or international organizations, or the threat of committing such acts (Human Rights in China 2011: 45)
Interestingly, terrorism is a tactic (or a strategy) utilized by groups; separatism and extremism are goals or belief systems. By linking terrorist actions to the political goals of separatism and ideological goals encompassed in extremism, the role of RATS becomes more challenging. This is particularly the case given the definition of separatism which does not exclude nonviolent actions. The goals of local groups, especially those seeking autonomy or even independence, may be ameliorated through greater political access, improved governance, and economic development. Immediately equating them to terrorists can limit government’s ability to negotiate (Boyle 2010: 339). Relatedly, even when local separatist movements turn into active insurgencies, there are risks in conflating them with international terrorist groups. “At the tactical and strategic level, there are at least four possible offsetting costs—popular backlash, countermobilization of enemy networks, a legitimacy gap and diminished leverage—that may be incurred when counterterrorism and counterinsurgency are deployed simultaneously” (Boyle 2010: 336).

Anti-Terrorism Approaches and Results

**China and Xinjiang.** The security of the Uyghur Autonomous Region of Xinjiang (新疆维吾尔自治区, the official name of the province-level political unit) is core to China’s relations with its Central Asian neighbors, Russia, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and much of China’s foreign relations in general. As its name implies, Xinjiang is traditionally populated by Uighurs, a Sunni Muslim Turkic-speaking people. The history of the province includes previous brief separatist episodes, a looming Soviet military threat, and a minority of Han Chinese in the region.
By the 21st century, these conditions were changing, but their replacement was with Islamist terror strikes and the difficulty of dealing with cross-border terrorist movements. According to the START (Global Terrorism Database), out of 242 total incidents counted as “terrorism” between 1989 and 2015, 105 occurred between 2004 and 2015, with 782 fatalities and 899 injuries recorded. Many of these incidents are not Islamist-based, and are only recorded as “unknown.” However, beginning in 2005, a single Uighur attack was followed by a notable pause between 2006 and 2007. Then in 2008 a series of attacks began in Xinjiang attributed to the East Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM), or more generally to “Uighur separatists.”

Geographically, the incidents since 2013 are especially concentrated in southern Xinjiang, with Kashgar (Kashi), Hotan (Hetian), Yarkand (Shache), Aksu (Akesu), Luntai, and other cities were also struck in a variety of attacks using explosives, incendiaries, vehicles and melee attacks. There was a series of attacks in Bachu County near Kashgar in April 2013 targeting government offices (Qiao Shunli 2015: 16). Total deaths in the fifteen attacks in 2013-15 were over 100 (Qiao Shunli 2015: 17). The single most deadly incident was on July 5, 2009 in Urumqi when rioting led to the deaths of over 180 individuals, primarily Han Chinese, leading to the term “7/5” (乌鲁木齐七·五暴力事件) as a reference to the terrorist attack comparable to “9/11” in American English. Less deadly in overall casualties but even more disturbing for the Chinese government have been a handful of attacks outside of Xinjiang, such as knife assaults in Guangzhou in May 2014 and March 2015 and in Kunming in March 2014 which killed 33 people, and suicide car bombings in Tiananmen Square near the Zhongnanhai leadership compound in October 2013. For a government/party which rests most of its legitimacy on the foundations of prosperity and stability, these incidents represent a serious threat.
Beijing has cast these attacks within the context of global terrorism, since the alternative would be to accept that Chinese government policies in Xinjiang are contributing factor. The war in Afghanistan has attracted a number of ethnic Uighurs to the fighting, and a number were captured in the fighting there in 2001-2006 (Wayne 2009: 250). The East Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM, the acronym used internationally for the organization), an offshoot of al Qaeda, has taken responsibility for many of the attacks in China, cooperates closely with the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan. Fortunately for China, the Central Asian republics all openly oppose this and other movements described as “the three evils: terrorism, separatism and religious extremism,” and see the threat of Islamist terrorist organizations as a serious common threat. What is less commonly mentioned is that these countries have their own Uighur communities, speak Turkic languages as well, and have quiet popular – but not government – sympathy for the condition of Uighurs in Xinjiang. It is difficult to say whether the publics of the Central Asian states are affected by sympathy for Uighurs in China. An exception to this may be in Tajikistan. Tajikistani attitudes toward Chinese appear to be slightly more positive than other Central Asian publics, though whether this is because of the public infrastructure being built, or the more professional (and limited) contact with migrant Chinese may be the case. It could also be related to Tajik linguistic identity: unlike the Turkic-speaking peoples of the other Central Asian republics, Tajik is a Persian-related language, limiting both information from their neighbors and sympathy for Turkic-speaking Uighurs (Olimova 2008: 70).

The Chinese approach to the problem of Xinjiang is multi-faceted. The Chinese government takes great pains to discuss the improvements in the standard of living in Xinjiang, reduction of unemployment, increase in disposable per-capita income, educational improvements including bilingual education, public health provisions, social security, poverty alleviation and
all of the other areas normally associated with “population-centric” approaches to insurgency and terrorism (State Council 2015). There is no doubt that the Chinese Communist Party and government consider these to be major improvements. Whether local Uighurs appreciate them is another question, and much more difficult to answer, given media restrictions in Xinjiang. Those reports coming out of Xinjiang paint a less harmonious picture, in which Han Chinese receive preference in employment, and Uighurs are excluded from security positions, cannot obtain passports, cannot grow beards, wear veils, attend mosques as minors, experience cuts in Internet access and cellphone service, curfews, and the trivialization of Uighur history (Jacobs 2013a, Jacobs 2013b, Jacobs 2014). The Chinese Communist Party in May 2014 reaffirmed its policies in Xinjiang and has called for continued Han Chinese migration to Xinjiang, and for Uighurs to be settled in other parts of China, learn Mandarin Chinese and integrate into the broader (Han) Chinese society (Wong 2014).

The other side of the Chinese approach to the Xinjiang problem has been a vigorous use of military, then paramilitary and police forces in the “Strike Hard” campaign that began in 1996. Although there had been incidents that might have been described as Uighur resistance as early as the April 1990 uprising in Baren, near Kashgar, they had not been reported in the Chinese media. That changed in 1996 when the government in Beijing acknowledged what was happening, and posed it as part of a larger international problem (Gill and Murphy 2005: 24). After riots in Yining (Gulja) in 1997, the government in Beijing applied more force. China has used overwhelming numbers of paramilitary People’s Armed Police (PAP, 中国人民武装警察部队 Zhongguo renmin wuzhuang jingduì) to monitor potential trouble spots, and an impressive array of technological tools to monitor the situation in Xinjiang.
Uzbekistan. The most populous Central Asian state with the biggest military, Uzbekistan has been fighting an Islamist insurgency in the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU). Formed by two ethnic Uzbeks from the Ferghana Valley around 1997, the group sought to overthrow President Karimov and establish an Islamic state in Uzbekistan. After the Taliban took over the government of Afghanistan in 1996, the IMU established close relations with the Taliban and were reported to have support of Osama bin Laden (Hill 2003). Guerrillas from that group began to infiltrate Uzbekistan in 1999/2000 from Afghanistan through Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, crossing borders that were not demarcated or agreed upon or particularly well enforced. The START Global Terrorism data base shows eight incidents during this period, with 18 fatalities and 126 injuries. The government in Tashkent charged the Tajikistani and Kyrgyzstani governments with neglect and failure to control their borders, and planted mines along the ill-defined boundary to stop infiltration, and bombed areas they suspected had insurgents (ICG 2002: 3). Uzbekistan also has deep suspicions of Tajikistan and Tajiks, both because of historical claims of the latter to the cities of Samarkand and Bukhara, and because after the end of the Tajikistan civil war in 1997, Islamic-oriented parties are allowed in the Tajikistani parliament (ICG 2002: 11). The US invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 helped reduce the IMU insurgency in Uzbekistan, and the group retreated into Pakistan. But in 2004-05 there were seven more incidents, with 46 fatalities and 65 injuries, according to the START database, two more in 2009 and one in 2015, for a total of 21 listed incidents.

The tensions between Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan over enclaves, border controls and visa requirements are not helped by the poor condition of Uzbekistani border guards: “...Uzbekistani border guards must bear much of the responsibility for these continuing incidents. They are often
very poorly trained in handling confrontations with local residents, badly educated and frequently corrupt” (ICG 2002: 15-16).

The ICG summarized the lack of cooperation in 2002:

In the long term, the increased division of peoples of the Ferghana Valley is reinforcing negative stereotypes and hardening national identities. These new borders in the minds of people in the valley threaten the cooperation and trade that is vital to all three countries of the region. They also feed into existing inter-ethnic strains in the region between Kyrgyz and Uzbeks. There is little cross-border cooperation or interaction between local governments, and many attempts by international organisations to establish such programs have been blocked by inter-state rivalry. In particular, Uzbekistan’s antipathy to valley-wide programs has made such activities difficult (ICG 2002: 16).

None of this helps the process of joint action against terrorism.

**Russian Federation.** In 1992 when the Russian Federation arose from the former Soviet Union, the Russians had the advantage of established state structures. From 1992 to 1995, however, Moscow paid little attention to Central Asian republics, and focused mostly on the West and its own dire economic straits. In 2000, the Russians announced that they were withdrawing from the Bishkek Accord which had granted visa-free travel for citizens of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). This was done for security reasons (ICG 2002: 3).

Domestically, Russia, like China, has faced threats from separatist groups, most notably from the Chechens. As the Soviet Union was collapsing, the newly elected president of Chechnya, Dzhokhar Dudayev, declared independence. War would break out in 1994 as the Russian government invaded, intending to quell violence in the region and maintain Russia’s territorial integrity. For two years, a war for independence was fought, resulting in what was seen by many as an embarrassing loss for the Russian Federation against a region of little more than one million people. During the conflict, the Russian government had repeatedly referred to the war as one against terrorism and emphasized the role of foreign fighters.
The first war, however, was one driven by nationalist, separatist goals. The balance of power between nationalists and Islamists began to shift during the interwar period, from 1996 to 1999. Aslan Maskhadov, the Chief of Staff of the Chechen armed forces, was elected as president in an election termed largely free and fair by the OSCE. He was a nationalist and more moderate than the other two candidates and he voiced interest in working with Russia. Weakening Maskhadov (intentionally or not), Russia failed to provide the financial aid to Chechnya provided for in the agreement ending the first war and, indeed, prevented Chechnya from seeking external assistance (Cornell 2012: 132). Maskhadov would soon be unable to control much outside of Grozny, the capital city.

The second Chechen war was triggered by Islamist actions. In August 1999, Shamil Basayev, a Chechen, along with Ibn al-Khattab, a Jordanian-born Islamist who had come to Chechnya with others wishing to fight in a *jihad* in 1995, launched raids into Dagestan, seeking to spread Wahhabism and encourage a broader uprising. Between 31 August and 16 September, there were five bombings in Russia that were attributed to Chechen terrorists: the Manezhnaya shopping complex in Moscow, a military housing facility in Dagestan, and three apartment buildings in Moscow and Volgodonsk were bombed, killing nearly three hundred people (Kramer 2005: 212). The terrorist attacks made the second Chechen war far more popular than the first and the Russian government emphasized the extremist, terrorist nature of the rebels when discussing the war. Indeed, rather than referring to the operation as a “war”, it was widely termed a “counter-terrorist operation”. In 1999, the Russian press reported that Osama bin Laden’s al Qaeda and Pakistani terrorist groups Lashkar-e-Taiba and Hizb-ul’Mujehiddin

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2 Whether the apartment bombings were actually carried out by Chechens remains a topic of debate.

3 (Контртеррористическая операция). That term continues to be used to describe the conflicts in Chechnya, as evidenced by the children’s page of the Russian Ministry of Defense (http://stat.kids.mil.ru/for_children/history/articles.htm?id=10484768@morfArticleWithChapters)
(among others) had trained Chechen forces and sent mercenaries from Afghanistan, Yemen, and elsewhere to Chechnya (Oliker 2001: 40).

By equating the separatist movement with terrorists, particularly, foreign terrorists, the Russian government was successful in demonizing it both domestically and internationally. The emphasis on the Islamist groups facilitated Russian victory. Wahhabism as a concept and practice is largely foreign to the people of Chechnya. “Few were willing to support the holy war that [Basayev], his friend Khattab, and their ‘band of madmen’ had promoted.” (Evangelista 2002: 68, see also Kramer 2005: 215). Insurgents who lack public support are unlikely to be successful as they will not be provided the hiding places, material aid, and intelligence that is so essential for weaker groups to cause sufficient harm to the governments.

In the war, the government used overwhelming force, particularly aircraft and artillery, to counter the rebels. Upon gaining control of territory, “Russian troops have engaged in systematic human rights abuses, including torture, rape, forced disappearances, mass arrest operations (zachistki), kidnapping, and summary executions” (Kramer 2005: 214). These zachistki involved “the isolation of settlements and detention of ‘suspicious’ people, resulting in the disappearances of 3,000-5,000 “without a trace” from 1999 to 2003 (ICG 2012: 12-13). “[H]undreds or thousands of boys and men are rounded up in fields or placed in pits, where many are tortured and some are summarily executed” (Washington Post editorial quoted by Evangelista 2002: 176).

By 2009, the Russians declared an end to counterterrorist operations, indicating the war in Chechnya was at an end. While large-scale civil war became impossible, extremist groups such the Chechen Emirate, an al Qaeda-linked group, and Wilayat Qawqaz, an ISIS affiliate, have presented Russia with a persistent low-level terrorist threat across Russia, most commonly
in regions near Chechnya such as Dagestan and Ingushetia. Terrorist attacks in Russia continued well after the 2009 declaration of the end of the war. In 2011, some 750 people were killed in the North Caucasus with more than 500 killed in the first eight months of 2012 (ICG 2012: 1). Well outside the region, attacks have continued, including against the Moscow Metro in 2010, Domodedovo Airport in 2011, a bus in Volgograd in 2013, and, in 2016, the St. Petersburg Metro.

The continuation of violence in Russia has been, in part, attributed to this harsh treatment of the population during and after the war. The grievances that led to demands for autonomy and independence have not been met. While large amounts of money have flowed into Chechnya, and Grozny has been rebuilt, much of the aid has disappeared, believed to go into the hands of elites, including Ramzan Kadyrov, the son of the previous president, who was himself appointed president in 2007. Kadyrov has coopted elements of the Salafists, the Islamist rebels who rose to notoriety during the second Chechen War. Nonetheless, these shifts have not necessarily won hearts or minds of the majority of the population (see, among others, Clarke 2017). The Salafist tenets often run afoul of the Sufi tendencies common within Chechnya. The presence of immunity for those loyal to Moscow has also encouraged behaviors by Kadyrov and others that fail to win over the population. Collective punishment against relatives of suspected insurgents is practiced under Kadyrov (Human Rights Watch 2013), including the destruction of homes and crops and the holding of families under threat of death until the insurgents surrender. These methods have contributed to vendettas within Chechnya, continuing the violence (Nichol 2010, 19).
Tajikistan. The poorest of the Central Asian republics in both total and per capita GDP and second smallest in population, Tajikistan is also the most exposed to Afghanistan. In 1992, following independence, a devastating civil war broke out between a coalition of liberal democratic forces and Islamic forces – the United Tajik Opposition -- and the government of Emomali Rahmon. In 1997 with over 100,000 dead, a cease-fire and a political compromise was reached, which allowed members of the United Tajik Opposition seats in the parliament and a share of power. That is also the period in which the START Global Terrorism database shows the greatest number of incidents: 17 in 1992, 31 in 1994, 34 in 1995, 22 in 1996, 40 in 1997, and then dropping down to 11 in 1998, 4 in 1999, and single digits for the rest of the period to 2015. That last until 2015 when Rahmon’s party won all parliamentary seats, unseating the Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan (IRPT), then banning it, then labeling it a terrorist organization (ICG 2016a: 1). Although Rahmon’s actions might indicate a power-grab, it hardly indicates stability, and the government in Dushanbe does not control all of the national territory, is corrupt, incompetent, and narrow in its appeal (ICG 2016a: 2-3). Illegal drugs coming north from Afghanistan also contribute to the porous nature of the Tajikistani borders. Several high-level government officials have defected to Islamic State-affiliated organizations, and the appeal of radical Islamic organizations in a poor country cannot be underestimated. Nor does the government’s crackdown on all aspects of Islamic expression such as beards help its appeal (ICG 2016a: 6-7).

The situation along the Tajikistan-Afghanistan border is also likely to come under increased pressure as insurgent forces move out of Waziristan in Pakistan. “Pakistan’s decision to attack militants in North Waziristan, close to the Afghan border… drove foreign fighters, including a significant number of Central Asians, to take refuge in Afghanistan’s Badakhshan
province. The militants, including Tajik, Uzbek, Kyrgyz, Chechen and Uighur fighters, have since fought the Afghan army in Kunduz, Badakhshan, Baghlan, Faryab and Takhar provinces (ICG 2016a: 8).

Uzbekistan’s government has charged that the government in Dushanbe allows forces to infiltrate through Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan into Uzbekistan. As the International Crisis Group summarized in 2002, “Uzbekistan views Tajikistan as helping to sponsor terrorism aimed directly at Tashkent; while Tajikistan sees Uzbekistan as a belligerent neighbour using direct military force to advance strategic aims” (ICG 2002: 12).

Kyrgyzstan. Although a parliamentary democracy since the “Tulip Revolution” of 2005, the situation in Kyrgyzstan is complicated by regional and ethnic tensions. Ethnic Uzbeks are a minority (around 14%) largely in southern Kyrgyzstan, and violence such as clashes in the city of Osh in 2010 led to the deaths of over 400 people and the destruction of over 2,000 homes (ICG 2016b: 8). Kyrgyz suspect the Uzbeks of plotting secession, and of joining terrorist groups. Uzbeks lack confidence in the educational, legal, and social system of the Kyrgyzstani state. Yet within Kyrgyz society, the marginalized also gravitate toward Islamic organizations that provide social services that the state fails to. Hizb ut-Tahrir is a pan-Islamicist organization that attracts both ethnic groups, even though it is illegal in Kyrgyzstan since 2004; the government argues that it is linked to the Islamic State. The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) has also been reported (by the government) to be recruiting (ICG 2016b: 13). The START Global Terrorism database lists 28 total incidents in Kyrgyzstan, beginning in 1996 with attacks on police in Bishkek, and then three in 1999, four in 2000, and then a slowdown with one or two incidents per year, and then none in 2008 and 2009, and two each in 2014-15.
Conclusion

All of the countries in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization agree that they oppose terrorism, and that cross-national terrorism is a serious problem in Central Asia. Yet cooperation in the Regional Anti-Terrorism Structure (RATS) is tiny compared to the stated problem. Why is this so?

Several problems of cooperation stand out from the preceding analysis. First and foremost, there is a serious disagreement between the two principal players in the SCO – China and the Russian Federation – about the organization and what roles it should take on in the region. The result has been a general stalemate between the two states which might provide the SCO in general and the RATS in particular with more resources. China would like to see the SCO become something broader as a regional organization, including economic and cultural activities, not only because China would profit but because the Chinese see prosperity and strong state structures as keys to fighting terrorism, separatism, and extremism. It might be said that China is suffering from the “Law of Instrument” (“When all you have is a hammer, every problem looks like a nail”): the One Belt One Road initiative reflects China’s abilities in infrastructure building, but whether a Silk Road Economic Belt would solve the problems of insurgency and terrorism in Central and South Asia remains a long-term approach that few of the other countries involved have to patience to try.

The second problem with the SCO is that the Central Asian republics do not get along well, do little to enforce modern border crossing processes, are fundamentally weak and fractious, where poverty, alienation, corruption all make for a ripe ground for extremist recruitment. The position of Tajikistan, the smallest and poorest member of the SCO along the critical border with Afghanistan, further aggravates the problem.
The third problem is that the domestic policies of the SCO members to curb the “Three Evils” is likely to prolong terrorism and, indeed, worsen the threat. The governments are, almost without exception, focusing on counterinsurgent and counterterrorist techniques which, while successful at quelling widespread violence, are failing to quell the underlying anger of the population. By “steadily squeeze[ing] the space for legitimate political opposition and broad-based political participation in politics”, the states of Central Asia has fueled the extremism more so than political Islam (Hill 2003). The states of the SCO have relied heavily on policies that include collective punishment rather than the economic, political, and social development seen—at least by western advocates—as reducing the attraction of extremism,

“Fighting Islamic militancy is an exercise in whack-a-mole” (Editorial Board 2017); only by responding to the underlying grievances of the population and strengthening economic development and governance within the region will it be quelled. More than anything else, this is why the countries of the SCO will continue to face terrorism in their borders. This is likely to worsen as ISIS is further weakened in Syria. Syria has been the cause celeb for many and has been used, in part, to explain the reduction of terrorist attacks there. An estimated 2400 Russians are fighting with ISIS (Aron 2016). Between 2,000 and 4,000 citizens from Central Asia are thought to have gone, either as fighters, supporters or fodder. This does not bode well for the future stability of Central Asia: “Should a significant portion of these radicalised migrants return, they risk challenging security and stability throughout Central Asia” (ICG 2015: 1). All of this suggests that the member states have helped create a job that will keep RATS, despite the challenges in structure and cross-border cooperation, whacking moles for years.
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