The Rise of Reluctant Powers: The India-Japan Strategic Partnership and the Evolving International Order of the Indo-Pacific

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Abstract:
What impact would the rise of India and Japan, formerly reluctant security players, have on the international order? This policy-oriented paper restructures the prevailing narrative that often views the Indo-Pacific region merely through a great power relations framework between the US and China. The strengthened relationship between Delhi and Tokyo reflects a maturing, multilateral security collaboration between the United States, India, and Japan. Japan and India, who both were hesitant in the use of force since 1945 are emerging as proactive players in the realm of international security with an articulate identity as maritime powers and a sense of internationalism. I argue that the emergence of these formerly reluctant major powers reveals that the transformation of the security environment in the region exhibits an “order transition” rather than a “power transition,” where China simply takes over America’s preponderance position. The rise of these powers are consequential not only because they are maritime powers but also because it exhibits a shift in US alliance politics in the region from a bilateral-based one to a multilateral security network. While the changes in Japan and India’s security policies are informed by balancing behavior towards China, the resurgence and collaboration of these two powers reveal an intricate and profound transformation of the international order.
Introduction

The future of the Indo-Pacific region has been one of the hottest topics in the studies of international security. China’s emergence as an active security actor has triggered various intriguing questions on the future of the international order in the region. The increasingly destabilizing security environment in the region, particularly in the maritime domain, has triggered fears of a major confrontation. This pessimistic prediction is manifested in popular analogies observers make over the similarity of the current situation in Asia and Europe in the dawn of the First World War. A popular focus on the rise of China, associated with speculations over the potential decline of the US, triggered debates over a possible “power transition” in the region, where Beijing replaces Washington’s preponderance position in the Indo-Pacific. On the contrary, the rise of India and Japan rather implies a “order transition”, which has occurred steadily since the end of the Cold War. What impact would the rise of India and Japan, formerly reluctant security players, have on the international order?

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1 This relatively new term covers the geographical space in parallel with the area of responsibility (AOR) for the U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM), which includes both the Pacific and parts of the Indian Ocean. U.S. government officials have now increasingly been using the phrase “Indo-Asia Pacific”.

2 As many scholars often indicate, the international “order” and “system” are often used interchangeably in an ambiguous way. In this paper, I specifically use the phrase “international order” based on the definitions used by Hedley Bull as “a pattern of activity that sustains the elementary or primary goals of society of states, or international society.” As Bull writes the “international society” is rule-based and includes shared values and common interests. In this paper, I discuss the rule-based order in the region hence use the word “order” instead of “system”. Please see, Bull, Hedley, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics, London: Palgrave macmillan, 1977. However, I use the word “system” when that is the original quotation and when I refer to networks of specific actors such as the “alliance system”.


4 This is a concept used by Evelyn Goh to explain the geopolitical changes in East Asia. Goh, Evelyn, The Struggle for Order: Hegemony, Hierarchy, and Transition in Post-Cold War East Asia, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013.
Merely viewing the rise of India and Japan, where military power was not considered a major component of national power since the end of World War 2, as a mere response to Chinese aggression fails to acknowledge the more profound impact of this phenomenon. What animates this emerging partnership is the rise of internationalism in both capitals, a developing identity as maritime states and also the evolution of the US-led alliance system in the Indo-Pacific. China’s increasingly assertive behavior is a definite trigger. Debates over the evolving security environment in the Indo-Pacific has, therefore, naturally developed through the framework of Sino-US relations. Nevertheless, the resurgence and collaboration of these two powers reveal an intricate and profound transformation of the international order. Moreover, the vital role that maritime powers play in the international order makes the rise of these two powers even more consequential.

The strengthened relationship between Delhi and Tokyo reflects a maturing, multilateral security collaboration between the United States, India, and Japan. The Malabar Exercise, a trilateral joint naval exercise among the three nations, which Japan joined as a permanent member in 2015, is a testament of this partnership. This highlights the transformation of the US alliance system in the region underpinned by bilateral alliances into a more multilateral scheme. Some argue that US intentions to restrain and control its allies produced this bilateral-based system during the Cold War5. As Washington now encourages, rather than restrain, the increasingly proactive security policies of these countries and as the network of bilateral alliances gradually shifts to a multilateral one, the nature of regional alliance system is changing.

Japan and India, who used to be reluctant powers since 1945 are now turning into aspiring rising powers in the realm of international politics. Both have hesitated to view military power as an instrument of foreign policy, eschewing substantive roles in international security. However, after the Cold War, they have been steadily changing. The mid-2000s, in particular, was a transformative period in Tokyo and Delhi’s security policies. Coupled with a reorientation in Washington’s Asia strategy, Japan and India have demonstrated increasing willingness to view

hard power as a component of their national strategy. As the security policies and capabilities of these powers change, the nature of the international order changes accordingly.

This article restructures the prevailing narrative that often views the Indo-Pacific merely through a great power relations framework between the US and China. This narrative also rests on the assumption that China becomes a global superpower, which has been questioned by some observers. I rather argue that the strategic partnership between India and Japan deserves more attention, not only as a mere counter to China’s aggression but also as a means to maintain and cultivate a robust, open and liberal international order in an uncertain Indo-Pacific through the rise of internationalism in both capitals.

*The Rise of Two Maritime Powers and the Maritime Order of the Indo-Pacific*

The international order of the Indo-Pacific is almost a synonym to the maritime order of the region. America’s position in the international order as is often debated, is underpinned by the US military’s supremacy over the maritime domain. Barry Posen argued that “command of the commons is the key military enabler of the US global power position” and that the “command of the commons is analogous to command of the sea.” Furthermore, Colin Gray underscores that

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“Sea Power” is “the great enabler”, functioning “as and complement to a continental balance-of-power policy, not as a blue-water unilateralist alternative”.

While heated discussions over America’s optimal role in the international order exists, there appears to be a general consensus over US primacy as a military power, particularly over the global commons. Advocates for a grand strategy of restraint argue that such a strategy is best served by a maritime-focused strategy, which will most effectively exploit the advantages of the command of the commons. While this paper does not go as far as offering a prescription to American grand strategy, the focus on the maritime domain by grand strategists, who advocate for America’s lesser commitment offers some interesting food for thoughts, regardless of whether one is in favor of retrenchment or not.

Ideas presented by founders of modern maritime strategies such as Alfred Thayer Mahan assist us in comprehending the vital importance of maritime powers in the international order as reflected in Posen’s argument. He emphasized “the profound influence of sea commerce upon the wealth and strengths of countries” as the sea is something like “a great highway” or “a wide common”. Mahan’s message was clear: “being a great power meant being a seapower and that seapower meant commercial and naval strength.” The United States, therefore, needs to build up her seapower to play an international role in the global arena. These views presented more than a century ago confirms Barry Posen’s argument that the command of commons, namely

\[\text{Gray, Colin, } \text{The Navy in the Post-Cold War World: The Uses and Value of Strategic Seapower, University Park: The Pennsylvania University Press, 1994,101.}\]


\[\text{Mahan, Alfred, Thayer, The Influence of Sea Power upon History: 1660-1783, New York: Little, Brown and Company, 1890, 1.}\]

\[\text{ibid, 25.}\]

America’s naval supremacy, underpins America’s global role and exploiting this advantage benefits the United State’s global position.

On the other hand, coined as China’s “Naval Nationalism” by Robert Ross\(^\text{17}\), China has rapidly expanded their naval capabilities pursuing their dream to become a major naval power in the Asia-Pacific. The reasons behind China’s rapid naval expansion is multilayered. For some observers, Beijing’s sense of “vulnerability to threats is the main driver of China’s foreign policy\(^\text{18}\).” Furthermore, a prominent China scholar, David Shambaugh illuminates that “a deep angst” “about the structure of the international system and disposition of power with which China must contend—particularly the global predominance of the United States\(^\text{19}\)” exists in Beijing’s strategic thinking. For China, the United States, who is the most dominant naval power inside the first island chain, including the seas adjacent to Taiwan is a primary strategic threat\(^\text{20}\).

Hence, with the help of military innovation, China’s People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) has been seeking to develop anti-access/ area-denial (A2/AD) strategies against the US navy\(^\text{21}\). Beijing’s rapid military modernization has, therefore, been a huge concern for the United States. China’s military modernization could potentially erode America’s command of the commons in


\(^{21}\) Mahnken, Thomas (2011), ‘China’s Anti-Access Strategy in Historical and Theoretical Perspectives,’ *Journal of Strategic Studies*, 34:3, 299-323. On the other hand, in Biddle, Stephen & Oelrich, Ivan (2016), ‘Future Warfare in the Western Pacific: Chinese Antiaccess/Area Denial, US AirSea Battle, and Command of the Commons in East Asia,’ *International Security*, 41:1, 7-48, the authors offer a more sober view. They state that the A2/AD “threat’s magnitude is smaller than often assumed” and that “it will be very difficult for China to extend A2/AD’s effects over distances great enough to threaten most US allies if China’s opponents take reasonable precautions.”
the Indo-Pacific region as well as America’s military technological advantages. Maintaining military technological advantages so as to resist A2/AD strategies has, thus, become one of the cores of America’s military strategy.

Moreover, the very Mahanian concepts that shaped US maritime strategy appear to also be informing China’s maritime strategy. Experts on China’s naval strategy at the US Naval War College, James Holmes and Toshi Yoshihara illuminate that “Mahan has left an indelible imprint on China’s strategic community.” In other words, based on China’s needs to expand their commerce to generate wealth and national power, Beijing is seeking to secure sea-lanes, which are crucial means in their pursuit of economic growth.

China is, therefore, exploiting their geopolitical advantage as being both a continental and maritime power “shifting the balance of power in the Eastern Hemisphere” so as to fulfill their economic needs. China’s military expansion could potentially result in a naval rivalry with India in the Indian Ocean as the two Asian giants seek to secure access to natural resources as

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22 This concern has been highlighted by US government reports on China’s military, including Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military Power of the People’s Republic of China (Washington, DC.: US Department of Defense, 2006),


they pursue economic development. In other words, the Indian Ocean and its littoral is a theater where “India’s and China’s aspiration for great-power status, as well as their quest for energy security” is playing out. Borrowing the Mahanian concepts of commons, the likely struggle in the Indo-Pacific will be a contest over the command of the commons, which are crucial for stability and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific.

Amid these circumstances, the rising tensions in the contested waters of the South China Sea, in particular, upset the maritime order in the Indo-Pacific. Gaining supremacy over the South China Sea allows a power to have unparalleled command of the order in the Indo-Pacific. Intensifying tensions in this strategically critical waters, especially for trade and commerce of this vibrant region, therefore, not only exhibit a crisis in the maritime order but also the future of the international order of the region as whole. The close linkage between the international order and the maritime order makes the rise of these two maritime powers, namely Japan and India, even more consequential.

Some observers have argued in the past that China’s dominance of continental Asia and America’s supremacy in maritime Asia contributed to regional stability and mitigated the chances of volatile confrontations in the region. As this balance is shifting, exercising


28 The strategic importance of the South China Sea in the maritime domain as well as the regional order is highlighted in the following literature. Kaplan, Robert, Asia’s Cauldron: The South China Sea and the End of a Stable Pacific, New York: Random House, 2014 & Hayton, Bill, The South China Sea: The Struggle for Power in Asia, New Haven: Yale University Press, 2014.

American seapower and maintaining US commitment to Asian security\(^{30}\) will be integral for robust American hegemony in the region as well as ensuring secure and open access to the commons in the Indo-Pacific. As Robert Kaplan further underscores, “the task of the US Navy” is “to quietly leverage the sea power of its closest allies -- India in the Indian Ocean and Japan in the western Pacific -- to set limits on China's expansion.”\(^{31}\) The following tales on Japan and India’s respective evolution of their security policy exhibits a case where two maritime powers are gradually shaping their role in the maritime order in the Indo-Pacific. The two nations are not only becoming major actors in the regional security environment but as I further investigate, they are highlighting their identity as maritime states as their official positions.

**Japan Rising: Tokyo’s Evolving Security Policy since the End of the Cold War**

Japan’s pacifism, shaped by the so-called Yoshida Doctrine, which focused Japan’s attention on economic growth while the alliance with the US guaranteed security, has guided Japanese foreign and security policy for nearly seven decades. The security reforms in summer 2015 that allowed Japan to exercise the right to collective defense in limited and specific cases were often seen as a stark departure from this foreign policy tradition. Japan’s focus on trade and economic growth, where military strategies were subordinate to economic ones, was once described as “Mercantile Realism.”\(^{32}\) However, Tokyo is now gradually changing such an approach with larger attention on the military component of its grand strategy, a transformation that some observers have coined as a “Security Renaissance.”\(^{33}\) Nevertheless, it does not mean that Japan will pursue expansionary ambitions as in the past. As Yasuhiro Izumikawa argues based on his

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“Hybrid Model”, it had been unlikely that Japan’s increasingly active military role transforms the nation into an active military power. As opposed to popular speculations that the reforms were clearly aimed towards China or that the reforms satisfied Prime Minister Abe’s nationalistic dreams, the security reforms were modest in nature and were a culmination of steady transformations of the U.S-Japan alliance in the past quarter a century.

However, this past quarter-a-century was no simple path for policy-makers in Tokyo. Taizo Miyagi, argues that the “end of the Cold War” hit Japan twice. The first is the literal termination of East-West tensions and the other is the Gulf War of 1991. In this First Gulf War, Japan’s contribution was financially significant but the failure to provide physical contribution resulted in the limited appreciation that Tokyo’s assistance in the war received. This event left a deep trauma to Tokyo in conducting foreign policy in the post-Cold War world. At that point, Japan did not have a clear answer how to contribute to preserving the international order. In other words, the past 25 years has also been a quest for Japan to seek its role in the post-Cold War order and the current upgrades in Tokyo’s security policies are a culmination of such a journey.

Japan’s recent national security related reforms contain 1) the establishment of a Japanese version of a National Security Council that strengthens the power of the Cabinet Office 2) the Security related bills that equips Japan with the right to Collective Defense in limited and specific cases and 3) the release of the National Security Strategy (NSS). Amid these revisions of Tokyo’s security policies, a striking factor is their increasing use of the word, “international order” in their official statements. The Abe Statement released in August 2015 on the occasion of the 70th anniversary of the end of the Second World War, for example, stated that during the

34 Izumikawa, Yasuhiro (2010), “Explaining Japanese Antimilitarism: Normative and Realist Constraints on Japan’s Security Policy”International Security, 35:2, 123-160. In this article, Izumikawa discusses that Japan’s antimilitarism could be explained by the Hybrid Model. He argues that the interplay between pacifism, antitraditionalism, which concerns defending Japan’s liberal democracy and the fear of entrapment sufficiently explains the reasons behind Japan’s antimilitarism as well as recent moves to enhance Japan’s role in security.

War, “Japan ended up becoming a challenger to the international order.” Resonating such a spirit, the Japanese National Security Strategy announced by the cabinet in December 2015 recommended that “Japan should play an even more proactive role as a major global player in the international community.” Furthermore, another major point worth highlighting is Tokyo’s enhanced self-awareness as a maritime state. The NSS clearly defines Japan as a “maritime state (kaiyou kokka)” that pursues “Open and Stable Seas (hirakare anteisita kaiyo)” for trade and resources that supports the country’s economic growth. These statements highlight Tokyo’s goal of being a “Proactive Contributor to Peace” with an identity as a “maritime nation”.

These concepts are nothing new, which have rather been advocated by the late scholar Kosaka Masataka, the dean of international politics in Japan. Kosaka is one of the first scholars that underscored the importance of realism and the invaluable role that the US-Japan alliance played in Japan’s defense in his first article “An Realist’s Idea for Peace (Genjizutsu Shugisha no Heiwaron).” In the 1960s, when Japanese intellectuals typically embraced idealistic and progressive ideologies, Japan’s opinion leaders often opposed military forces altogether including the alliance with the United States advocating that Japan should adopt neutralism. His article that challenged such prevailing views was, thus, epoch-making and phenomenal. In another article entitled, “Japan as a Maritime State (Kaiyo Kokka Nihon no Kōsō),” he states that the national objective of a country is based on that country’s position in the realm of international politics. He illuminates that Japan is neither a Western nor an Asian country and also is an island country indicating that Japan will benefit from pursuing being a “mercantile

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38 ibid.


nation” with “an original position” being neither Western nor Asian. Describing the United
Kingdom as a “maritime nation” while calling Japan an “island nation”, he states that the ocean
could either be a gateway or a barrier to the outside world. Japan was often lured into isolation as
an “island nation”. However, Kosaka proposed otherwise that Japan needs a “grand design” to
open up their horizon to become a genuine “maritime nation”.

These profound and incisive thoughts on Japan’s position in international politics were
written half a century ago. Nevertheless, Japan’s security policy today now clearly echoes the
grand design for the nation that Kosaka depicted back then. This fact both underscores the
monumental impact Kosaka had on the field of international relations both in academia and the
policy-making world in Japan and more importantly, the fact that Japan was unable to fully adopt
the path Kosaka proposed up till now. Whether it stems from pacifism, buck-passing or a
hybrid of several factors, aversion of use of force and a restraint foreign policy has shaped
Japan’s strategic culture hindering Tokyo to play an active role in regional security. Japanese-
American diplomatic historian, Irye Akira’s argues that the contrasting nature of Japanese foreign
policy, where the government tends to be realists whereas the public often advocate for idealistic
diplomacy is rooted all the way back to the Meiji Restoration. We could still observe a similar
dynamic in contemporary Japan, where the government pursues realist policies and the often
pacifist public expresses suspicion to it. This dichotomy over war and peace is still a prevailing

42 In recent years, the following literature resonates with Kosaka’s views that Japan should embrace more
internationalism. For example, Hosoya Yuichi, Kokusai chitsujo: 18 Seiki Europe kara 21 Seiki Asia e
& Hosoya Yuichi, Rekishi ninshiki towa nanika? Nichiro senso kara Asia Taiheiyo senso made (What is
Historic Recognition: From the Russo-Japanese War to the Asia-Pacific War) Tokyo: Shincho Sensho
2015. An English book review summarizes the content of these books. See Matsuda, Takuya (2015)
‘Japan and the International Order in the Age of Shifts in Power in the Indo-Pacific’ The Asian Forum, 3:6,
age-of-shifts-in-power-in-the-indo-pacific/)

International Security, 29:1, 92-121. Lind argues here that “buck-passing better explain Japan’s restraint
in foreign policy and pacifism in essentially a “bargaining rhetoric.”


Shinsho 1966.
view among the Japanese public. Persuading the public of these updated security policies is a major hurdle for Tokyo to go through in the coming years.

In the contemporary context, as the international order of broader Asia is at stake with an assertive China, Tokyo is increasingly portraying itself as the guarantor of the intentional order, contrasting itself from its wartime mistakes. Japan’s proactive foreign policy is a product of the change in the international security environment in the Asia-Pacific in the past 25 years with a combination of shifts in Tokyo’s perception of the world and external pressure (gaiatsu) from Washington to enhance Tokyo’s role in regional security. In other words, as a leading Japan expert at Washington University, Kenneth Pyle argues, “the foreign policy of modern Japan ‘has been influenced and shaped to an unusually large degree by the international system’\textsuperscript{46}. Since George Kennan envisaged the containment strategy that shaped the framework of the post-war order, Japan has been the cornerstone of Washington’s Asia-Pacific and global strategy. Such role not only survived but was rather reinforced after the conclusion of the Cold War. Tokyo’s increasing awareness of their position in the U.S-led intentional order is actively shaping their foreign policy.

Despite the often claimed linkage between Japan’s security policy and disputes over history, Tokyo’s policy shift rather contains a more constructive flavor that aims to strengthen the alliance to enhance its function as a provider of international public goods, especially in maintaining peace and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific\textsuperscript{47}. Japan’s security reforms coupled with an updated defense guideline with the United States allows Japan to become a more open and constructive player in the global order. This is the total opposite from the militaristic, parochial and self-isolated path under Imperial Japan, which some opponents of the security bills claim that Japan is taking under the current national security policies.


As we have seen how the development of Japan’s security policies since the end of the Cold War has been modest and steady, it is possible to interpret that the changes are occurring within the framework of the Yoshida Doctrine. Japan’s foreign policy has evolved within a seemingly contradictory combination of pacifism as embedded in Article 9 of the constitution and the security alliance with the United States. Such contradiction (nejire), Soeya Yoshihide argues, led to Japanese foreign policy’s constant shift between expansion (kakudai) for more responsibilities and extraction (Shushuku) due to the constraints imposed by Article 9 of the constitution48.

Soeya, therefore, sees that there has been a continuity of Japan’s post-war pacifism despite the constant shifts that emerged along the way. In contrast, Kenneth Pyle, for example, views it oppositely by arguing that “Japan’s future foreign policy will be very different from the grand strategy that Yoshida Shigeru pioneered49.” Based on his point that Japan’s foreign policy has been predominately shaped by the international environment, he claims that the post-Cold War strategic environment will urge Japan to take a new approach different from the Yoshida Doctrine. Regarding such a tug-o-war of Japan’s security policies, MIT Japan expert, Richard Samuels seeks a balance by writing that “we await the appearance of Japan’s Goldilocks, the pragmatic leader who will get it ‘just right’50.”

Tokyo has been gradually but steadily developing their legal infrastructure for better coordination with US armed forces along with their own defense capabilities. Paralleling with India, which will be examined later, “military security was soft-pedaled, and never became the predominant focus on Japan’s grand strategy.51” That mindset has been changing as demonstrated by the Japanese Defense Agency obtaining ministerial status as Ministry of Defense (MoD) and the establishment of the National Security Council. In the 1990s, Tokyo enacted several sets of


laws pertaining to national security, complementing the upgraded U.S-Japan Defense Guideline, mainly focusing on contingencies in the Korean Peninsula, announced in 1997. Furthermore, Japan’s build-up of their defense capabilities has been remarkable particularly in the maritime domain. Maritime space, particularly the Sea Lanes of Communications (SLOCs) are vital to Japan’s survival as a mercantile nation. As a result, Japan’s capacity and capabilities as a seapower expanded over the years, “targeting increased effectiveness and enhanced capabilities to meet an expanded portfolio of missions." This enhanced capacity and capabilities supports Japan’s upgraded role in regional security, particularly in the maritime domain, where the majority of the region’s flash-points exists.

Moreover, Washington’s role in facilitating these changes in Tokyo has also been crucial in Japan’s shift in its foreign policy. Tokyo’s policy shifts have been shaped by the trajectory of America’s reformulating of their Asia policy since the end of the Cold War. The so-called Nye Initiative that emphasized the necessity of US commitment to post-Cold War East Asia became a rationale behind Tokyo’s revision of its security policies including the 1997 U.S-Japan Defense Guideline. The Armitage Report, entitled “The United States and Japan: Advancing Toward a Mature Partnership” released in 2000 encouraged Japan to play larger roles in the international order, which included a request to consider exerting the right to collective self-defense since Japan’s prohibition of it was a seen as “a constraint on alliance cooperation." Without doubt, Washington did play a certain role in encouraging Tokyo to take steps to upgrade their security policy. Nevertheless, Japan is not merely passively answering to Washington’s requests. Japan’s revision of their security policy is based on their will to further strengthen and develop their alliance with the United States so as to transform it into a genuine “public good” that provides


54 “The United States and Japan: Advancing Toward a Mature Partnership” INSS Special Report (October 11, 2000), Institute of National Strategic Studies, National Defense University.
security and prosperity to the region. The US-Japan Alliance has been the cornerstone of America’s Asia Strategy since the Cold War. Supported by Tokyo’s reaffirmed determination to play a constructive role in the international order, the alliance is transforming itself into a foundational and indispensable component of the international order of the Indo-Pacific.

The resurgence of Japan as major maritime power in the international order of the Asia-Pacific exhibits how US commitment and Tokyo’s own adaption to the shift in the external security environment converged producing steady but solid changes in foreign policy. It was not only triggered by America’s external pressure nor merely by Japan’s long harbored aspiration to become a normal country (futsu no kuni) with more flexibility in use of military power. It was rather the synergy of the both elements that guided Japan to take steps in enhancing their security posture.

The Elephant Awakes: India’s Security Policy since the Early 1990s

In parallel with Japan, India’s security policy trajectory had also been shaped by its aversion towards military power. Such a policy trend is rooted in their idealistic policy as well as the “non-alignment” policy that sought to avoid entanglements in alliances amid the Cold War. These policy inclinations often encourage the view that India’s foreign policy lacks strategic insights. The end of the Cold War that created a new international environment also transformed Indian foreign policy into a more proactive one. An Indian security expert, Raja Mohan, argues that the end of the Cold War eliminated “benchmarks that guided India’s foreign policy” ushering in a new era as “the center of gravity of Indian policy shifted from idealism to realism in the 1990s.” Under Prime Minister Modi’s reign, the steady change in Delhi’s foreign policy has accelerated and became more visible as exhibited in his “Act East Policy,” which involves India’s enhanced and active roles in Asia-Pacific security. India’s emerging identity as a

57 ibid, 266.
maritime power, exploiting their unique geographical advantage in the Indian Ocean plays an enormous role, in parallel with the case of Japan\textsuperscript{58}. Taking advantage of their geographical advantage in the India Ocean, Delhi sees the maritime space as the key to their ascendance to a major power. The Indian Maritime Security Strategy underscores that “the 21\textsuperscript{st} century will be the ‘Century of the Seas’ for India and that the seas will remain a key enabler in her global resurgence.\textsuperscript{59}”

Prime Minister Modi’s increasingly proactive foreign policy, assuming more geopolitical role in the Indo-Pacific and viewing military power more as an integral part of foreign policy is an aberration from India’s past foreign policy tradition. Nevertheless, it is also a culmination of several significant changes regarding India’s international standing that occurred in the past quarter a century. First of all, pulling India out of the narrow framework shaped by the rivalry between India and Pakistan is a fundamental and dramatic change in US-Indian relations\textsuperscript{60} that allowed Delhi to enhance their role in the broader Asian region. Such a new approach, Raja Mohan argues, “has long been one of the central aims of India’s grand strategy\textsuperscript{61}.””

Washington’s response to the Kargil Crisis in 1999 that favored India also steered US-Indian relations to that direction. This was a huge aberration from past formulas where Washington supported their anti-Communist ally, Pakistan rather than India, who insisted on their neutrality during the Cold War.


\textsuperscript{61} Mohan, Raja. Crossing the Rubicon: The Shaping of India’s New Foreign Policy. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003, 108
Described by both Indian and American policy experts as “a paradigm shift\(^{62}\)” and an event that “marked the beginning of a new era in American diplomacy\(^{63}\)” in South Asia, it fundamentally transformed the geopolitics of the subcontinent. The Bush administration in the 2000s with emphasis on shared values naturally brought the United States and the world’s largest democracy together. In March 2005, the administration explicitly announced that it is their intention “to help India become major world power in the twenty-first century\(^{64}\).” Furthermore, the civilian nuclear deal between the two countries signed in 2007 accelerated such a trend and India’s strategic role in Asia started to gain spotlight. In other words, policy shifts in Washington played essential roles in assisting India to pursue more ambitious policies in regional security beyond the subcontinent. This reflects the American view that “the rise of India is itself an inherently stabilizing development in the security order of Asia\(^{65}\).”

Furthermore, the remarkable economic growth India has gone through since the 1990s gave rise to the perception that India is now a significant and capable player in the realm of international politics coupled with the gradual reorientation of the strategic thinking among Indian political leaders. The enormous role that India could play in the regional balance of power given its size and population encouraged the United States to develop ties with India. However, history tells us that the current development of US-Indian relations is not the first time Washington actively sought to strengthen ties with Delhi.

While in overall, Washington favored Pakistan over India as a Cold War ally, in the early 1960s, there was a strategic reevaluation of India’s role in subcontinent. Under the Kennedy administration, Washington viewed India as a potential strategic partner. The Sino-Indian border clashes in the Himalayas in 1962 raised concerns that China may harbor intentions to intervene into South Asia. It was argued that Washington “must not lose sight of the long-term geopolitical

\(^{62}\) ibid, 98.


\(^{64}\) U.S. Department of State, “Background Briefing by Administration Officials on U.S.-South Asia Relations,” March 25, 2005.

significance of India as the only non-communist country in Asia capable of becoming a counterpoise to Communist China\textsuperscript{66}.” However, the development of the India-Pakistani War of 1965 rather urged Washington to think otherwise. The war rather made it “apparent that New Delhi was not going to emerge as a local hegemon that could dominate South Asia.” “The hegemonic power shift was incomplete\textsuperscript{67}” given that India’s focus was on deterring Pakistan coupled with sluggish economic development under a rigid bureaucracy that did not allow them to become a full-fledged major power. Back then, in Washington’s eyes, India did not possess adequate power to play a major role in regional security. Nevertheless, the sheer size of the country indicated its future potential, which resulted in the recent pursuit of stronger ties between the two nations.

On the other hand, as India becomes “the swing state in the global balance of power\textsuperscript{68}” as the country’s capabilities and capacity have expanded, the expectation of Delhi’s role in the geopolitics of the Asia-Pacific has been rising\textsuperscript{69}. However, the past trajectory of Indian foreign policy since the early 1990s warns us that India is not immediately going to be a cornerstone of the American camp of the Asia-Pacific. To begin with, India’s foreign policy tradition to seek autonomy, avoiding entanglements of alliances implies that Delhi’s revision of their security policies are intended to meet their own ends rather than merely to function as an instrument in Washington’s Asia policy. Moreover, doubts remain that the structure and capabilities of the Indian armed forces matches the geopolitical role it seeks to assume.

First of all, Delhi’s changes in foreign policy is not completely free from past traditions. America’s clear intentions to assist India’s rise and Delhi’s military developments imply that India’s increasingly proactive security policy exhibits robust realism amid the emerging security challenges in the Indo-Pacific. However, according to some experts attributing India’s rise to


\textsuperscript{67} Montgomery, Evan Braden. \textit{In the Hegemon’s Shadow:Leading States and the Rise of Regional Powers}. New York: Cornell University Press, 2016, 112


realism is insufficient in comprehending the topic. They argue that India’s “goals of foreign policy seem to have derived from historical experience embedded in Nehru’s ideals such as pursuit of strategic autonomy and “non-alignment.” The tradition of “non-alignment” still dictates India’s foreign policy to some degree. Such a trend is clearly demonstrated in India’s hesitance to become a formal ally with the United States. The India-US strategic partnership is often perceived as a containment strategy towards China. Delhi’s foreign policy is, therefore, often shaped by its desire to wipe out this perception, cautiously avoiding any entanglement in the Sino-US great power rivalry. One indication of this is India’s repeated attempts to improve ties with Beijing. Prime Minister Modi also has shown attempts to reach out to China while collaborating with Japan for more obvious strategic reasons. The adoption of regional balancing and an emphasis on multilateral cooperation in security also highlights Delhi’s reluctance to straightforwardly embrace America’s rebalancing strategy. Seeking multilateral security collaborations with like-minded countries such as Japan and Australia also satisfies Delhi’s pursuit of strategic autonomy inherited in the traditional “non-alignment” doctrine. Though these multilateral frameworks were facilitated and encouraged by Washington, the multilateral nature of the emerging security network in Asia is coincidently easier for Delhi to embrace.

Delhi’s increasingly proactive foreign policy could be also interpreted as a product of their own pursuit of primacy. India’s aspiration as a great power is rooted in the geopolitically strategic role that the British Raj played in the Indian Ocean littoral. Such a view is often


inspired by Lord Curzon, the Viceroy of India and British Foreign Secretary, who “emphasized India’s centrality in the Indian Ocean littoral.” Such geo-strategic perspectives that London had during the time of the Raj also inform India’s national security experts today, animating their proactive foreign policy as a maritime power. India’s Act East policy underscores the importance of ASEAN centrality in sharing the regional order. This mirrors the role that the British Raj used to play as the “principal shaper of the regional security order in Southeast Asia.” As a major component of the British Empire, the Raj had its own sub-imperial system as a recognized regional power within the international system.

Furthermore, India’s search for its role in regional security may perhaps be further translated into their goal to consolidate their primacy in the subcontinent and the Indian Ocean littoral. Some naval strategists argue that the Monroe Doctrine, which discouraged European powers from interfering into affairs in the Western hemisphere, is informing India’s maritime strategy. This doctrine that seeks to keep the subcontinent free from external intervention resonates with the Indira Doctrine that insists that conflicts in the subcontinent will be dealt with through bilateral frameworks without external intervention. India has, thus, historically sought to achieve and maintain primacy in the Indian subcontinent. India’s pursuit of strategic autonomy as illustrated above “is the sin qua non of great power status” for many Indian security hands.

In many cases, regional powers’ hegemonic ambitions as India is seeking are seen with suspicion by external superpowers. There is fear that the regional power’s pursuit of primacy

75 Mohan, Raja. Crossing the Rubicon: The Shaping of India’s New Foreign Policy. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 204-5.


could erode the superpower’s standing in the region through measures that deny access of the superpower to the region. Superpowers “often have a say in the type of order that exists” and “can promote regional powers through various forms of assistance or undermine them through various forms of coercion.” As Washington seeks to bolster an inclusive and principled regional security network, the US is rather promoting India to take a constructive part in it. As former Secretary of Defense, Ashton Carter described the U.S-Indian strategic embrace as “a strategic handshake.” India acting east and the US rebalancing to the west, the strategic interests of the two nations appear to converge perfectly.

Such a role that India plays is considered to be beneficial for the international order that America is seeking to develop. A new strategic guidance released by the Department of Defense in 2012, for example, underlines the centrality India has in America’s Rebalancing strategy. This report states that the US is “investing in a long-term strategic partnership with India to support its ability to serve as a regional economic anchor and provider of security in the broader Indian Ocean region.” Despite some concerns over India’s independent foreign policy inclinations, the country “remains a deeply status-quo state, one that needs international stability to develop at home.” “American primacy has been helpful for India’s rise in the global system” and it is,

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therefore, in India’s interests to play a constructive role in developing the international order the US is facilitating to strengthen. This rather illuminates that India’s strategic thinking is being more internationalized, overlapping with the case of Japan, adapting to the “changed political environment.”

On the other hand, while India’s outward looking foreign policy is seen from a positive light, many observers also point out that the lack of strategic planning still remains a major obstacle to India’s ascendance to a major power status. India’s thinking of national security revolving “around the balance between considerations of realpolitik and its idealist inclinations” often led to the perception that Delhi lacks a strategic culture. Stephen Cohen and Sunil Dasgupta argues that “India’s military modernization suffers from weak planning, individual service-centered doctrines, and disconnect between strategic objectives and the pursuit of technology.” The authors emphasize that a fundamental problem in Indian military modernization is organizational and “strong institutional reforms” and “clear statements of strategic national goals” are necessary in order to “enhance Indian capacity sufficiently to alter the military balance with its main rivals.”

Moreover, the traditional aversion towards the use of military force has haunted Delhi’s foreign policy making. The suspicion towards the armed forces isolated the Indian military from political decision-making, a trend that stems from India’s colonial legacy that views military power as associated with the imperial power that ruled the subcontinent through force. However, as some Indian security experts highlight, “India’s rise as a major global player will depend on the ability of the nation’s policymakers to leverage their hard power more effectively.” While many experts on India’s foreign policy see Delhi’s increasingly proactive policies positively, they


91 ibid, 25.

still highlight the reluctance of the political leadership to expand the country’s role in regional security, which some call “cautious realpolitik.”“Some are skeptical that India will finally end their “strategic restraint” that has guided Delhi’s foreign policy for decades stating that such a shift in policy will be “revolutionary”, which requires “a major and unforeseeable disruption at home or abroad.” Prime Minister Modi, so far, appears to be making a significant contribution in changing Delhi’s perceptions towards military power. The appetite for strengthening military ties with like-minded countries illuminates that such change may be occurring in India’s thinking of national security.

Despite the prospects of a deepening partnership between Washington and Delhi, a brief observation of India’s foreign policy and strategy does warn us that high expectations on India’s resurgence is unhelpful. The capacity of the Asian giant still does not match their ambitions and the country is still in the midst of realigning their foreign policy. Despite these challenges, ever since Washington’s tilt to India in the Kargil Crisis in 1999 to the US-India civilian nuclear deal in 2007, the path was cleared to integrate India into a broader security architecture of the Indo-Pacific. The dramatic changes in the subcontinent’s geopolitics, India’s strategic thinking and US-Indian relations are all producing a new norm where India plays an active role in a broader regional security framework.

The India-Japan Strategic Partnership, American Grand Strategy and Asia’s Future

The emergence of the India-Japan strategic partnership and their respective developments in their security policies exhibit changes in the relationship between these individual states and the international order as well as the regional alliance system. As the analysis above on the transformation of the respective countries’ security policies illustrates, the interests these countries seek in the regional order is reflected in their evolving security policies, while simultaneously the development of their capabilities shaped their role in the order. Civilian


interventions into military affairs are often informed by “an overall pattern of balancing behavior.” In other words, balance of power calculations have prompted statesmen to integrate the military organization into a nation’s grand strategy as Japan and India’s cases exemplifies. Furthermore, “the process of international political change ultimately reflects the efforts of individuals or groups to transform institutions and systems in order to advance their interests.”

First of all, how has the debate over the regional order evolved in the past decades? In the 2000s, before the current maritime tensions surfaced, views towards the regional order were more optimistic. China’s neighbors, Southeast Asian countries in particular, appeared to be accommodating the rise of China as a major power in the regional order. David Shambaugh, back in the mid-2000s, underscored that China was increasingly being viewed as a status-quo power in Asia and that “the nascent tendency of some Asian states to bandwagon with Beijing is likely to become more manifest over time.” Furthermore, David Kang argued that the traditional hierarchal order in East Asia has prevented balancing acts against China’s rise rather prompting regional states to accommodate it. The emphasis was more on integrating China into the existing order. Evelyn Goh, for example, claimed that “Southeast Asian security strategies strive to adjust the regional order, to avoid having to face a power transition” instead of balancing or bandwagoning. Amitav Acharya emphasized the emergence of “regional norms, rising economic interdependence, and growing institutional linkages” in Asia are clear evidences that the region could expect a more stable path.

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These are still valid arguments that assist our understanding of the regional order. However, the increasing assertiveness of China, especially in the maritime domain as we examined earlier, demands us to readjust our perception towards China’s rise and regional security. America’s Asia strategy, coined as the “Pivot” to Asia, later renamed as the “Rebalancing” policy under the Obama administration, illustrates the evolution of how Washington views the region. The policy was intended to “move away from the kind of ‘China first’ or ‘G-2’ approach that has often dominated US policy toward Asia” to a strategy that “instead involve embedding China strategy in a larger regional framework.” The emphasis on the broader regional order has also been illuminated by the Department of Defense under the Obama administration. At the Shangri-La Dialogue in June 2016, former Secretary of Defense, Ashton Carter advocated for “Asia-Pacific’s Principled Security Network.” While bilateral relationships underwrote regional security in Asia for a long time, the United States is now “weaving together bilateral, trilateral, and multilateral relationships into a larger, region-wide network.” It is also underscored that this security network is inclusive and “aimed at no nation and excludes no one” including China.

These statements expressed by major architects of American strategy to the Indo-Pacific reveal how Washington’s focus is more on bolstering a regional order rather than merely focusing on China itself.

The interests of India and Japan seeking a liberal and open international order are closely aligned with that of the US as they “are looking for wider and more inclusive multilateral mechanisms to manage increasingly complex political and economic challenges.” Not only do


they share same values as democratic nations, they also have vital interests in the freedom of navigation in the maritime domain. The way they perceive the international order manifests itself in these countries’ initiatives. The idea to integrate India into a broader regional framework, often coined as Indo-Pacific, emerged way before the word gained attraction in Washington.

Tokyo’s strategic thinking of the maritime domain has developed into what is now called “Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy (jiyu de hirakareta Indo Taiheyo senryaku).” This latest foreign policy strategy was unveiled by Prime Minister Abe at the sixth Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD) meeting that was held in Nairobi in August 2016105. In the speech, the Prime Minister described how the two oceans are crucial in connecting Africa and Asia, linking it with Japanese intentions to actively engage Africa.

This maritime-oriented foreign policy strategy is the latest culmination of Japan’s strategic concepts towards the maritime domain. First of all, it resonates foreign policy principles during the first Abe administration in the late 2000s that emphasized shared values(kachikan gaiko). Such an idea was further translated into actual policy such as the “arc of freedom and prosperity (jiyu to hanei no ko),” which argued that Japan would play an active role in promoting freedom and prosperity in the areas that consists the rimland of the Eurasian continent, including the Middle East, South Asia and Southeast Asia. Prime Minister Abe, during his first term in 2007, spelled out this concept in his speech in front of Indian parliament members in Delhi, entitled the “Confluence of the Two Seas.” Discussing the maritime connection between the Pacific and Indian Oceans, the Japanese Prime Minister used the term “broader Asia (kakudai Asia)” to support his argument to strengthen ties between the two countries106. Tokyo’s pursuit of closer ties with Delhi resulted in the Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation between Japan and

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India announced in October 2008\textsuperscript{107}. India then joined the list of nations that Japan had signed Joint Declaration of Security Cooperation with, which is only preceded by the United States and Australia. This illuminates the significance of India in Japan’s national security thinking.

The strategic value of India for Tokyo was further consolidated by new initiatives such as “Asia’s Democratic Security Diamond\textsuperscript{108}” that Prime Minister Abe announced in his second term. Advocating for stronger ties between Australia, India, Japan and the US, it highlights Tokyo’s concern over maritime security in the region and Japan’s effort to envisage a regional security architecture out of such concerns. As the shared interests by regional allies and partners also influence Washington’s future vision of the international order in the Indo-Pacific, the enhanced role of these nations has contributed to the shift in the regional alliance system. The emergence of multilateral frameworks is a huge aberration in the region traditionally animated by a network of bilateral alliances based on the so-called “hub-and-spokes” system. This transformation is indicative of the changing role of US allies and partners in the international order in the Indo-Pacific.

The US relied on asymmetric alliances “designed to exert maximum control over the smaller ally’s actions” to discourage them from taking “aggressive behavior against adversaries that could entrap the United States in an unwanted larger war,\textsuperscript{109}” a strategy named as “Powerplay” by Victor Cha. In other words, the US alliance system in Asia was designed to constrain or control the behavior of the allies in order to avoid unintended entrapments into regional conflicts. The alliances intended function “as a form of “constraint” obviated the need for a larger


multilateral security alliance framework in Asia. This conventional alliance system is changing as the capabilities of regional allies and partners are enhanced and the nature of the international order itself evolves. The United States is now rather encouraging regional allies and partners to contribute effectively to the emerging multilateral security network rather than “constraining” their behaviors. Some scholars describe this phenomenon as a “Neo-Nixon Doctrine”, as Washington encourages regional allies and partners to assume enhanced roles in regional security.

The alignment of India and Japan exhibits a classical case of the “balance of threat” theory, discussed by Stephen Walt. Perceiving China’s increasingly assertive behavior as a “threat”, they are strengthening their partnership with closer coordination with the most powerful power, the United States. This also demonstrates an example of “Empire by Invitation”, where the United States is “invited to play a more active role” in restoring the balance of power in the Indo-Pacific and more importantly, facilitate the development of the regional international order. These two interwoven factors shape the nature of this strategic partnership with significant impact on the international system in the region.

The role that the United States plays in these developments, therefore, deserves close attention. America’s optimal role in the world has triggered numerous debates often between

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those advocating for retrenchment\textsuperscript{114} and those opposing it\textsuperscript{115} from an all-or-nothing approach\textsuperscript{116}.

In the context of security in the Indo-Pacific, many observers fret that a combination of an increasingly assertive China and America’s potential retrenchment has induced instability in the Indo-Pacific and that the rise of India and Japan is a natural reaction to this. Some experts, for example, argue that India’s proactive foreign policy “is also a hedging strategy against America’s potential retrenchment from Asian geo-politics\textsuperscript{117}.” This is certainly part of the story but does not represent the entire portion of it. While Washington is certainly encouraging local allies and partners to enhance their security posture, this does not directly translate into retrenchment. Simultaneously, America’s commitment to this increasingly volatile region does not necessarily result in entrapment or excessive overreach. It rather played a profound and indispensable role in encouraging these two important maritime powers to upgrade their security posture so as to support the existing open and free maritime order of the Indo-Pacific.

While noting that India and the US are not formal allies despite closer alignments in recent years, the relationship between Washington and regional capitals with like-minded interests exhibit a case of dilemma in alliance management. Coined as the “alliance security dilemma” by


Glenn Snyder, allies are subject to two opposing fears: the fear of abandonment and the fear of entrapment. Such dilemma “interacts closely with the security dilemma between opponents” as the tensions within the alliance could easily affect the relationship with the adversary that the alliance targets. In East Asia, for example, the conditions of the US-Japan alliance not only impact Beijing’s perception towards this alliance but also their behavior in regional security. Japan’s security reforms and stronger security ties with the United States in recent years have alarmed China as they perceive it as part of a containment strategy against them. However, interestingly, Beijing used to view the endurance of the US-Japan Alliance after the Cold War favorably as it seemingly placed a lid on potential Japanese aggressions, as Washington constrained Tokyo’s actions. The strengthened alliance, which entailed Japan’s enhanced security role, encouraged by the United States, now started to raise concerns in Beijing that the alliance may be aiming to contain China.

However, the anticipation that America’s increasingly visible commitment to East Asian security may rather trigger entrapment and exacerbate tensions in the volatile region fails to acknowledge recent findings in alliance politics. While strong commitments to allies are often perceived as a symbol of a preponderance strategy or an expansion of America’s role in the international order, the US alliance system rather functioned to avoid entrapments or expansionary wars. As Victor Cha’s “Powerplay” theory also depicts, the alliance system in

119 ibid, 192.
120 This point is also mentioned in Christensen, Thomas, Worse than a Monolith: Alliance Politics and Problems of Coercive Diplomacy in Asia, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011.
the Asia-Pacific were aimed to control the allies so as to avoid unnecessary entanglements to regional affairs. A continued American commitment is, therefore, beneficial not only for regional stability but also to husband American power. Moreover, some observers have been highlighting the danger of the challenges that China’s military development imposes on the United States even if China is far from catching up with the US as a superpower.\(^{124}\)

It is also unhelpful to interpret Washington encouraging regional allies or partners as a sign of retrenchment. The new security architecture in the Indo-Pacific is not solely driven by regional rivalries or geopolitical competitions. Borrowing former Secretary of Defense, Ashton Carter’s words, “the United States has been an important builder, cement, and participant\(^{125}\)” in these regional trilateral mechanisms. The security network in the Asia-Pacific envisaged by Washington “needs a networker: a nation and military to enable it\(^{126}\)” and the United States is actively pursuing such a role. Such a role that America plays are not only helpful in developing the international order in the Indo-Pacific but also in ensuring that it will be a stable and well-managed one. On the contrary, the enhanced security postures of India and Japan as well as their maturing strategic partnership also demonstrate their attempt to create an environment that allows the United States to commit to regional security. While their evolving national security policies are reflective of their interests in the evolving international order of the Indo-Pacific, the two Asian powers cannot easily maintain the balance of power solely by themselves.

How could this new security infrastructure deal with the increasingly proactive China that seeks to resist American influence in the Indo-Pacific? The principled and inclusive “Asia-


Pacific Security Network” proposed by former Secretary Carter is a potential answer to this inherently complex question dealing with China’s assertiveness while leaving the path for engagement. The emergence of the India-Japan partnership is not a tool to encircle China but rather a cornerstone of the international order that is open and liberal based on the rule of law with America playing a leading role in facilitating the network. This resonates the view that the America has been the “owner and operator”127 of the liberal international order, which Washington seeks to defend and develop in the Indo-Pacific. The United States “have the power to shape the choices of a rising China so as to encourage Beijing to adopt policies that are positive for regional and global stability and to forgo policies that could destabilize East Asia and undercut the global order128.”

In that regard, how Washington frames and portrays their approach towards Asia, including dealing with an increasingly proactive China will be crucially important. The rise of India and Japan as major powers willing to assume enhanced roles in regional security reflects the sense of internationalism that is emerging among policy circles in these countries. Reluctant and hesitant regional powers that used to be constrained by pacifists or non-alignment ideologies and in capacity are shifting their course. The emergence of these two nations, therefore, does not exhibit a rise of parochial nationalism that may push the region to confrontation but rather a spread of internationalism that has constructive impact on the international order in the region. The events occurring in the Indo-Pacific, particularly in the maritime domain, raises fear of escalation, including potential military confrontation. Amid such tense situation, the emerging partnership between two major maritime powers is a new trend that may chart a more positive future course in developing a viable international order in the Indo-Pacific.


Conclusion

As the international order appears to be in disarray and the future of American leadership uncertain, assessing regional security and American strategy may sound like a futile exercise. However, it is rather in these unpredictable times when a focus on major powers in the region becomes more important than ever. Two like-minded major powers, who used to be reluctant powers in the regional security architecture have been developing their capabilities and has also nurtured their identity as responsible maritime powers in the international order. As initiatives started by Tokyo or Delhi offer visions to the future of the entire Indo-Pacific region, this emerging strategic partnership now function as two poles for the “tent”, which could be called the liberal international order of the Asia-Pacific. While there has been some skepticism over the rise of Japan and India as proactive powers, it is noteworthy that the rise of these powers rather reflect emerging internationalism, exhibiting an opposite trend from other liberal democracies where parochial nationalism increasingly has prevailing voices.

As this article examined, the emerging strategic partnership between Japan and India is a product of several multilayered factors. First of all, it is clearly informed by a balancing behavior as the power distribution in the region changes. In addition, it also reflects the two nations’ sense of purpose or in other words, internationalism. After the end of the Cold War, both countries searched their role in the international order. In both countries, the origin of the shift towards a more proactive security policy could be found in the 1990s. While the rise of Japan and India is a strategic reaction towards China’s assertiveness, the origins of changes in their security policies imply that it is unhelpful to attribute the policy changes solely to China’s behavior. Furthermore, as illuminated throughout this article, Washington’s role in encouraging these two powers to upgrade their security posture and developing the regional security architecture has been crucial in realizing this encouraging trend. At the same time, the gradual shifts in Tokyo and Delhi’s security policies were informed by the nature of the international order that they desire, which is a open and liberal order based on the rule of law. The two powers’ emerging identity as maritime powers also make their role in shaping the regional order given the foundational part that the maritime domain, namely the commons have in underpinning the order The development of the strategic partnership between Japan and India, therefore, suggests that there could be positive
developments in the regional order in the Indo-Pacific despite fears of confrontation and intensifying tensions.

The analysis provided in this paper contains implications for both academics and policymakers. From a theoretical standpoint, a focus on regional major powers and their role in developing the international order as well as alliance systems has been limited. While there is a developing number of literature on alliance politics, many focus on how American policy affects these alliances instead of the other way around. Perspectives and initiatives by allies themselves surprisingly hasn't received much attention. At a time when American leadership in the global order is uncertain, the response by allies and partners to develop the existing order deserves closer academic and theoretical attention.

Moreover, this point resonates with Evelyn Goh’s argument that “order transition” is a more accurate description of the changes occurring in the Asia-Pacific region rather than the popular “power transition” thesis. The fact that the transformation of Japan and India’s security policies occurred gradually since the 1990s, as illuminated in this paper, underscores this point. Furthermore, the increasingly multipolar nature of Asia’s security network, though not fully institutionalized at the moment, as highlighted in this paper demands us to adjust our understanding of the regional security framework. The reasons that hindered the emergence of multilateral security frameworks in Asia such as NATO has long intrigued scholars. The changing nature of the region’s security framework that this paper delineated will contribute in adjusting and enhancing our understanding of this long-held quest.

On the other hand, for policymakers, this paper may have two major takeaways. First, the complex situation in the Indo-Pacific hinders one from having a clear framework in crafting policies towards the region. The article’s focus on other “rising powers” in the region playing crucial roles in the regional order offers an alternative framework from the often held one that focuses on Sino-US relations. This view assists Washington in forging an Indo-Pacific strategy that has a focus on network building among allies and partners so as to defend and develop the existing international order. In addition, as policymakers strive to protect the existing

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international order in the Indo-Pacific, the Japanese-Indian partnership could be an useful means in such an effort. In that vain, further investing in this strategic partnership is an effective way in consolidating and developing the international order in the region that is open, liberal and based on the rule of law.

The synergy between American strategy and these two powers’ own initiatives suggests that the order is evolving to something more solid and viable despite valid fears that the region contains risks of intensifying rivalries. Henry Kissinger once wrote that “a reconstruction of the international order is the ultimate challenge to statesmanship in our time.” The rise of previously reluctant powers, Japan and India has enormous potential in weathering the disarray of the world and uncertainty of American leadership as a foundational partnership for the Indo-Pacific international order. It is up to policymakers in the US, Japan and India to seize this unique opportunity.

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