Cosmopolitan Harm and Re-Examining Kant’s Hospitality: The Residue of United States Foreign Policy, Violence and Central American Migration to the United States

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**Introduction**

With an ever increasing number of people from Central America attempting entry into the United States in order to flee political, criminal and structural violence, it may be an appropriate time to examine and consider re-defining Kant’s notion of hospitality. While Kant was the first significant political philosopher to privilege the international in understanding politics (Booth, 2007; 81), it seems fitting that in “Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch,” Kant set out to formulate an ethical guideline for promulgating the duties and obligations underpinning cosmopolitan law. For Kant, the laws of hospitality would be seen as the first stage in establishing a more viable cosmopolitan legal order (Brown, 2009; 66). As will be discussed below, there are limitations to Kant’s formulation of hospitality; however, there is still relevance in his duties-based theory and any analysis of hospitality can contribute towards a richer understanding regarding the freedom of movement by human beings within the current era. In describing the “conditions of universal hospitality,” Kant argued:

> [f]or all men are entitled to present themselves in the society of others by virtue of their right to communal possession of the earth’s surface. Since the earth is a globe, they cannot disperse over an indefinite area, but must necessarily tolerate one another’s company (Kant, 1795/1970; 106).

Notwithstanding Kant’s view with respect to the freedom of movement, taking into consideration the nature political debates regarding the presence of foreigners currently being conducted within the United States and the European Union, Kant’s conception of
hospitality is far from being realized (Popke, 2007; 511). In short, as Derrida asks: "How can the right to asylum be redefined and developed without repatriation and without naturalization?" (Derrida, 2001; 7).

Briefly raising the criticisms raised by Derrida, the more problematic aspect of Kantian hospitality can be examined through an analysis of the principal of international harm. Of major import to this paper is harm perpetrated upon certain states at the hands of states governed by republican constitutions. These "republican" states in question, form the bulwark of the "peaceful confederation of states" that Kant envisions as being the basis for establishment of perpetual peace. For example, it is Brown's contention that Kant argued that a state formed upon a republican constitution is the only political structure capable of securing and maintaining justice both internally and externally. Moreover, these well-constituted states could provide both justice and human development, while "poorly constituted states" or non-republican constituted states, have historically been major violators of rights and human dignity (Brown, 2009; 46). In this regard, such theories of international relations do not emphasize a level playing field of juridically-equal sovereign states; but an unequal field characterized by a hierarchy of global/civilized states with gradated sovereignties (Hobson, 2012; 19).

Given the framing of the well-constituted state versus the poorly-constituted state, the overarching research question is: Should harm (both physical and structural) perpetrated by well-constituted states upon poorly-constituted states, provoke a re-examination of Kant's formulation of hospitality when such harm results in the movement of human beings from their home country on to another. As Popke notes in his

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1 According to Brown, it was Kant's view that republican states were "well-constituted" states (Brown, 2009; 46).
call for a “post-colonialist cosmopolitanism,” cosmopolitanism is experienced by many people in the form of involuntary migration, predatory capitalism on a global scale, threats to culture and/or identity and ultimately through xenophobia. Such conditions create an environment in which mutual human respect, the very cornerstone of cosmopolitanism, becomes impossible. Accordingly, researchers must account for the material histories and the current existence of deprivation, exploitation and inequality that emerge from Kantian cosmopolitanism, e.g. liberal democratic capitalism (Popke, 2007; 511-512).

Such an examination could make a useful contribution to the study of the ethics of migration. First and foremost, notwithstanding Kant’s lack of theorizing on issues of social and economic justice (Brown, 2009; 198), he forthrightly expressed the view that “the peoples of the earth have thus entered in varying degrees into a universal community, and has developed to the point where a violation of rights in one part of the world is felt everywhere” (Kant, 1795/1970; 107-108) (emphasis in original). While assigning causal and moral responsibilities may be complex when addressing the presence of refugees, examining migration within discussions about harm (both physical and structural) is indeed plausible.² It becomes more plausible when one analyzes the role of Western governments in facilitating the emergence of refugees through military interventions (physical harm); and the harm arising from the destabilizing effects of neoliberal economic policies as well as structural adjustment policies imposed by

² David Held maintains that the avoidance of serious harm is one of the eight paramount principles of cosmopolitanism (Held, 2004; 171) (emphasis added). On the one hand, Held’s claim could sit comfortably with the objectives of this paper. However, Held does not clearly define the term “serious harm” other than to state that serious harm gives rise to conditions that lead to “life and death” situations. This leaves open the theoretical possibility that other more banal forms of structural harm, such as racism and sexism, do not fall within the purview of cosmopolitan human concerns.
Western funded international financial institutions ("IFIs") such as the International Monetary Fund (Gibney, as cited in Linklater, 2011, 98).

The ultimate aim of this paper is to investigate the interplay between physical and structural harm inflicted by the United States upon the countries of Central America, migration and hospitality. This paper seeks to demonstrate, as Gibney notes above, the harm caused by, among other things, the United States’ role in both Central American military interventions and the imposition of neoliberal globalization upon the region as a function of the migration of Central Americans. To that end, the paper will be structured in the following manner. The first section will address a brief overview of cosmopolitanism and Kant’s formulation of hospitality as set forth in “Perpetual Peace.” The next section will provide a critique of the limitations of Kant’s hospitality by introducing criticisms as articulated by Derrida. The third part of the paper will examine the issue of “harm” in both its both physical and structural forms. The penultimate section of the paper will present a case study to examine how harm inflicted upon Central America has facilitated migration to, among other countries, the United States. Finally, the paper will conclude on how hospitality can be re-evaluated to provide not only safe sojourn for Central Americans visiting the United States; but also having hospitality serve as a basis for refuge whereby facilitating the process for providing permanent residence.

**Cosmopolitanism, Kant’s Perpetual Peace and the Concept of Hospitality**

**What is Cosmopolitanism?**

While an examination of cosmopolitanism is well beyond the scope of this paper; it should suffice to note that most formulations of cosmopolitanism are underpinned by the supposition that the world is both an interconnected and interdependent community.
Moreover, this interconnected and interdependent community is spatially bounded by the spherical shape of the planet earth. Accordingly, cosmopolitanism proffers a normative theoretical perspective in which moral responsibility toward all human beings is understood as being a universal and globalized concern (Brown, 2009; 2). As Pogge argues, cosmopolitanism is composed of three essential elements. First and foremost, there is an emphasis upon individualism insofar the main unit of analysis is the human being. While larger units such as the family, tribes and community are contemplated by cosmopolitanism, these larger units are matters of concern in that they are comprised of individual human beings. The second component of cosmopolitanism is the concept of universality in that the inherent value of human life is attached to all human beings equally. The third element of cosmopolitanism is the notion of generality whereby people being the ultimate unit of analysis, have concern for literally, all human beings (Pogge, 2002; 169) (emphasis added).

In order to shed some additional light on the definitional parameters of cosmopolitanism, Pogge also unpacks it by addressing legal and moral cosmopolitanism. For Pogge, legal cosmopolitanism centers on the political idea that a global order exists in which all persons have equivalent legal rights and duties as fellow citizens of a universal republic.³ Moral cosmopolitanism is relational insofar as all persons should respect one another’s status as the ultimate unit of moral concern; which in turn imposes limits upon human conduct (Pogge, 2002; 169). A point that Kant himself develops in

³ Brown adds a seemingly Eurocentric perspective to legal cosmopolitanism by arguing that while cosmopolitans do seek to create a global order that is privileged over state sovereignty; legal cosmopolitans contend that only properly constituted states can uphold and advocate for cosmopolitan legal principles (Brown, 2009; 12). As previously noted, Kant and cosmopolitans in general tend to argue that properly constituted states are confined to ones that would fall under the category of being liberal democratic.
his political writings in which many scholars attribute this as Kant’s major contribution to liberal [democratic] peace theory.

Lastly, Brown does move beyond Pogge to offer up two other essential elements in cosmopolitanism: (i) political cosmopolitanism, which emphasizes the transformation of the architecture of global governance into supranational organizations predicated upon an international consensus and democratic accountability; and (ii) cultural cosmopolitanism, which emphasizes a sense of common humanity, entailing moral duties and obligations that supersede localized ethnicity, culture and nationality (Brown, 2009; 13). As Grovogui points out, cosmopolitans contend that the current framing of international relations as a state dependent international morality can longer be an acceptable condition of political agency and legitimacy (Grovogui, 2005; 104). In brief, cosmopolitanism provides a moral compass on how the world should be normatively understood as a co-existing whole; while laying the foundation to answer the questions regarding global cohabitation and justice (Brown, 2009; 14).

**Kant’s Perpetual Peace**

In his 1797 seminal work on international politics, “Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch,” Kant set out to demarcate the power of what is morally right within the state by attempting to mediate the potential despotism of a world government and the violence inherent in international warfare. However in “Perpetual Peace,” Kant’s work exhibited a tension between sovereign authorities, which Kant assumes have some measure of practical reason; and an international environment that could be characterized by war, anarchy and chaos (Hutchings, 1996; 147). As noted above, the contemporary formulations of cosmopolitanism focus on issues of justice, which in reality, echo Kant’s
own teleological view in the power of progress and history to uplift the human condition. Yet, Kant’s formulation of cosmopolitanism also exhibited what Hutchings refers to as “fragility of progress” in which the world could relapse back into war and conflict. In this regard, perpetual peace resembles a condition of mutual deterrence (Hutchings, 1996; 51). As Kant argued in “Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose:”

[and hence that nature develops man’s original capacities by a perfectly regular process within this apparently disorderly arrangement; or whether we should rather accept the third possibility that nothing at all, or at least nothing rational, will anywhere emerge from all these actions and counter-actions among men as a whole, that things will remain as they have always been, and that it would thus be impossible to predict in that nature, by barbaric devastation, might perhaps again destroy this civilised state and all the cultural progress hereto achieved...We are civilised to the point of excess in the all kinds of social courtesies and proprieties. But we are still a long way from the point where we could consider ourselves morally mature (Kant, 1784/1970; 48-49) (emphasis in original)

It is at this point that Kant foreshadows the notion of the peaceful federation of states in he lays the foundation for one of major contributions attributed to “Perpetual Peace.” He notes the following:

While the purposeless state of savagery did hold up the development of all the natural capabilities of human beings, it nonetheless finally forced them, through the evils in which it involved them, to leave this state and enter into a civil constitution in which all their dormant capabilities could be developed. The same applied to the barbarous freedom of established states...For they compel our species to discover a law of equilibrium to regulate the essentially healthy hostility which prevails among states and is produced by their freedom. Men are compelled to reinforce this law by introducing a system of united power, hence a cosmopolitan system of general political security. This state of affairs is not completely free of danger, lest human energies should lapse into inactivity, but it is not without a principle of equality governing the action and counter-actions of these energies, lest they should destroy one another (Kant, 1784/1970; 49) (emphasis in original).

Of importance here and consistent with Hutchings’ view of the fragility of progress, is that Kant had reservations about the capacity of humans to become “perfect”

4 It should be noted that Linklater and Suganami take issue with Hutchings by arguing that Kant felt that the balance of power was illusory in maintaining peace. However, the balance of power could serve as a precursor to the establishment of perpetual peace. To the extent that Kant believed that republican states could co-exist in a state of perpetual peace, such a belief would ultimate problematize the balance of power as a paramount requirement for a stable international order (Linklater and Suganami, 2006; 164).
and that perpetual peace may never be realized. Therefore, unlike the current cosmopolitans, Kant's own sense of cosmopolitanism is tempered by a sense of skepticism. Yet, like the current political cosmopolitans, Kant's view was that the ultimate task of international politics is to set into motion a process whereby a system of states becomes a society of states, which ultimately transforms itself into an international society heavily influenced by a sense of duty to humanity (Linklater and Suganami, 2006; 166). So for Kant, perpetual peace could only be attainable by the construction of a peaceful confederation, freely and voluntarily entered into by a grouping of republican constituted states in which "individuals and states coexisting in an external relationship on mutual influences, may be regarded as citizens of a universal state of mankind" (Kant, 1795/1970; 99).

Notwithstanding the fact that Kant's insistence that this pacific federation be composed of willing republican constituted states, free to leave the pacific federation at any time, as opposed to "despotic world government," he still argued that "[p]erpetual peace is not arbitrary, but necessary...the state of peace must be instituted for a suspension of hostilities is not in itself a guarantee of peace" (Kant, 1795/1970; 98-99). Yet, in the end, Kant's perpetual peace, no matter how tenuous, always held the promise of transcendence whereby reason\textsuperscript{5} lays the foundation for a teleological progression of history toward the institutionalization of moral law. As Brown maintains, "Perpetual Peace" seeks to set out to put forth a cosmopolitan legal condition that is not only concerned with the rightful relations between individuals within states, but also prescribes the relations that should exist between state actors and their rightful treatment of all human beings (Brown, 2009; 45).

\textsuperscript{5} For Kant, reason represented the human capacity to think of new possible worlds (Hutchings, 1996; 137).
It is within the rightful treatment of human beings, that Kant develops his conception of universal hospitality. As alluded to earlier, Kant is regarded as one of the initial theorist comprising democratic peace theory. It was liberals, such as Kant in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries who put forth the proposition that war and commerce were incompatible. While mercantilism could be violently imposed, free trade was deemed a more peaceful mode of accumulating national wealth relying upon the emerging economic theory of comparative advantage. Of importance to Kant’s notion of perpetual peace, is that the expansion of free trade would break down the divisions between individual states, encourage international friendship, human understanding and ultimately facilitate the unification of individuals all over the globe into one community (Burchill; 2009; 64-65).

Kant himself addressed the issue of trade in the First Supplement of “Perpetual Peace” by noting that trade became important to perpetual peace as humans abandoned their “lawless freedom” as hunters gathers and transitioned themselves into more sedentary agrarian economies which gave rise to trade between nations. He adds that international trade was facilitated and furthered by the fact that salt and iron become the first articles to be subject to international supply and demand. And with the development of trade, nations began to enter into peaceful relations with each other initiating a process of a community of interests (Kant, 1795/1970; 111). He expanded even further upon the issue of trade by arguing:

[n]ature also unites nations which the concept of cosmopolitanism right would not have protected from violence and war, and does so by means of their mutual self-interest. For the spirit of commerce sooner or later takes hold of every people, and it cannot exist side by side with war. And all of the powers (or means) at the disposal of the power of the state, financial power can probably be relied upon on most. Thus states find themselves compelled to promote the noble
cause of peace, though not exactly from motives of morality (Kant, 1795/1970; 114) (emphasis in original).

Within Kant’s formulation of perpetual peace, the expansion of trade yields the advent of the cosmopolitan right of the conditions for universal hospitality. Within cosmopolitanism, the law of hospitality is meant to lay the foundation for a broadened sense of global community (Brown, 2009; 47). However, as will be discussed below, in the era of neoliberal globalization with its concomitant growth in the personal insecurity for the people in Central America and its resulting migration; the question must be posed: does hospitality even exist; much less lay the groundwork for the basis of a global community.

Kant and Hospitality

For Kant, the term hospitality is defined as “the right of a stranger not to be treated with hostility when he arrives on someone else’s territory” (Kant, 1795/1970; 105). On the one hand, he does set forth an inalienable right to travel in that a human being can “claim a right of resort, for all men are entitled to present themselves in the society of others by virtue of their right to communal possession of the earth’s surface” (Kant, 1795/1970; 106). Kant reiterates this point in his later work, “The Metaphysics of Morals” by stating:

[The rational idea of a peaceful (if not exactly amicable) international community of all those of the earth’s peoples who can enter into active relations with one another, is not a philanthropic principle of ethics, but a principle of right...Thus, all nations are originally members of a community of the land...It is a community of reciprocal action, which is physically possible, each member of it accordingly has constant relations with all the others. Each may offer to have commerce with the rest, and they the right to make such overtures with being treated by foreigners as enemies (Kant, 1797/1970; 172) (emphasis in original).
However, within this universal law of hospitality, Kant displays the tension within his own work between a vision of cosmopolitan universalism and the sovereignty of the state. This tension arises from the fact that Kant did privilege sovereign states over the despotism of world government. In this manner, hospitality entails limitations. First and foremost, hospitality was contingent upon a stranger’s peaceable behavior within the territory for which he is traveling. Moreover, a human being can only claim the right of resort (Kant, 1795/1970; 106) (emphasis in original). Kant did expand upon this limited right to note: “this natural right of hospitality, i.e. the right of strangers, does not extend beyond those conditions with make it possible for them to enter into relations with native inhabitants.” Kant also opines that irrespective of hospitality, a sovereign state does have the right to turn someone away assuming that it does not result in that person’s death (Kant, 1795/1970; 106). A point that is particularly relevant within the current era in that there has been criticism of the Obama Administration’s record number of deportations, some of which have resulted in the deaths of Mexican and Central American deportees.

Kant did believe that the right of hospitality only entailed visitation and accordingly did not circumvent a state’s right to deny residence to a foreigner (Kant, 1797/1970; 172). Consistent with this limitation, it is interesting to note that migration theorist such as Myron Weiner accept the notion that asylum policy tends to be a function of foreign policy.⁷

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⁶ While Hobson contends that there are Eurocentric flaws within Kant’s work (Hobson, 2012); it does not necessarily follow that his use of the term “native inhabitants” refers to the peoples of Africa, Asia and/or Latin America.

⁷ Weiner observes that refugees are potentially a tool in inter-state conflict. While “refugee” status is predicated upon a well-founded fear of persecution, the granting of asylum by the receiving country can create an antagonistic relationship insofar as “refugee status” acknowledges the refugees’ political and
As will be addressed in the next section of the paper, there are criticisms of Kant’s formulation of hospitality in that given its limited view of solely visitation, hospitality would not be extended to asylum seekers. On the one hand, it is accurate to point out that Kant did contemplate migration in light of the arranging of a special contract (Brown, 2009; 64). On the other, this is surprising in light of Kant’s own theorizing on the issue of war and human displacement. In a little referenced passage in “Perpetual Peace,” Kant alluded to the violent displacement of people in his observation concerning the unity of people via the unity of language as he noted the following:

We can observe nations which reveal the unity of their descent by the unity of their language. This is the case of the Somoyeds on the Arctic Ocean and another people with a similar language living two hundred miles away in the Altai Mountains; another people of Mongol extraction, given to horsemanship and hence to warlike pursuits, has pushed its way between them, thus driving one part of the tribe far away from the other into the most inhospitable Arctic regions, *where it would certainly not have gone by its own inclinations* (Kant, 1795/1970; 111) (emphasis added).

In brief, irrespective of the critique below, Brown contends that even in the current era, the concept of hospitality represents legal claims with respect to the hospitable treatment of people. At the same time, it imposes restrictions on how states can treat all human beings regardless of nationality (Brown, 2009; 77).

**Kant, Hospitality and Its Current Day Contradictions**

This next section of the paper provides a critique of Kant’s cosmopolitanism with respect to the contradictions within Kant’s formulation of hospitality. This is especially relevant given that the overarching research question of how the issue of harm (both physical and structural) perpetrated by well-constituted states upon poorly-constituted states results in migration. The act of migration under these conditions should call for a moral right to oppose their country’s regime (Weiner, 1993). This aspect was very much in play with the Regan Administration’s classification of Salvadoran and Guatemala refugees as economic migrants.
re-examination of Kant’s formulation of hospitality. Pushing aside the seemingly Eurocentric focus upon Kant’s emphasis on the progressive nature of well-constituted states,\(^8\) as Popke posits: who has the right to ask for hospitality?; and who has the obligation to grant it? (Popke, 2007; 513).

As was discussed above, Kant’s articulation of hospitality addressed only visitation and not asylum seeking, save the caveat for the person who could face death if expelled by the country he entered. Once again, this represented the tension in Kant’s work between universalism and state sovereignty. And as Popke accurately points out, Kant limited hospitality to only citizens of sovereign states, which in essence excluded stateless people. Furthermore, hospitality was predicated upon a right embedded in a contractual obligation, as opposed to an ethical obligation (Popke, 2007: 512). Yet, Derrida in his critique of France’s treatment of asylum seekers, began to expand the theoretical parameters and possibilities of hospitality. Of importance to Derrida was that France, and assuming no misreading, any other country for that matter, should not conflate a refugee’s status with that of the immigrant (Derrida, 2001; 11-12).

Derrida’s main critique of Kant’s articulation of hospitality is that it implies conditional hospitality, whether hospitality is public or private. Derrida defined private hospitality as housing a guest in one’s home. For Derrida, conditional hospitality is contingent upon sovereignty, whether it is the person owning the property housing the

\(^8\) It should be noted that Kant did not advocate colonialism and believed in an non-interventionist view of international relations. However, as Hobson correctly notes, Kant does create the theoretical space for interventions to occur in order to bring civilization to a non-European nation. This contradiction is found in the following passage from “Perpetual Peace” (Hobson, 2012; 65). “It is usually assumed that you cannot take hostile action against anyone unless one has already been injured by them. This is perfectly correct if both parties are living in a legal civil state...But man (or individual people) in a mere state of nature robs me of any such security and injures me by virtue of this very state in which he coexists with me. He may not have injured me actively, but he does injure me by the very lawlessness of his state, for he is a permanent threat to me, and I can require him either to enter into a common lawful state along with me or to move away from my vicinity” (Kant, 1795/1970; 98).
guest; or in the case of public hospitality, state laws and/or the police (Derrida, 2001; 22). Furthermore, conditional hospitality implied some measure of contractual reciprocity.

Unconditional or absolute hospitality requires:

[That I open up my home and that I give not only the foreigner...but to the absolute, unknown, anonymous other and that I give place to them, that I let them come, that I let them arrive, and take place in the place I offer them, without asking of them either reciprocity or even their names (Derrida, as cited in Popke, 2007; 512.)

In his book *On Cosmopolitanism and Forgiveness*, Derrida appealed for the replacement of Kant’s conditional hospitality with a medieval conception of the Great Law of Hospitality. In his view, this referred to as the condition in which borders were open to every human being without question and without the need to identify themselves, nor where they came from. The General Law of Hospitality granted sanctuary in which churches could provide secure immunity and survival for refugees (Derrida, 2001; 18). Of import to the case study of Latin America discussed later in this paper, Derrida referred to unconditional hospitality as the response to crime, violence and persecution, which could give rise to a new order of law and democracy (Derrida, 2001; 22-23). In this regard, Derrida seeks to reveal the contradiction between hospitality and cosmopolitanism.

Notwithstanding Derrida’s impassioned plea for a re-examination of Kant’s formulation of “conditional hospitality,” he was not without his critics. For example, Hobson agrees with Brown that Derrida’s critique of Kant misunderstands the historical context by which Kant initially formulated the law of hospitality in “Perpetual Peace” (Hobson, 2012; 64). Hobson, Harvey (2000) and Brown (2009) all concur that the essence of hospitality was to govern the actions of European states and non-European
states vis-à-vis colonialism and imperialism. This point becomes clear as Kant argues in “Perpetual Peace” that:

[If we compare with this ultimate end the inhospitable conduct of the civilised states of our continent, especially the commercial states, the injustice which they display in visiting foreign countries and peoples (in their case is the same as conquering them) seems appalling great...This led to oppression of the natives, incitement of the various Indian states to widespread wars, famine, insurrection, treachery and the whole litany of evil which can afflict the human race (Kant, 1795/1970; 106) (emphasis in originial).

He reiterates this anti-imperialist/anti-colonial perspective in “The Metaphysics of Morals” by stating the following:

[These visits to foreign shores, and even more so, attempts to settle on them with a view to linking them to the motherland, can also occasion evil and violence in one part of the globe with ensuing repercussions which are felt everywhere else (Kant, 1797/1970; 172).]

On the one hand, Brown may be correct that Derrida is misapplying Kant’s view of hospitality by incorrectly historizing hospitality whereby bypassing Kant’s anti-imperialist view. Yet, Brown cannot dispute that, for example with the case of Montezuma and Cortez in México, colonialized persons of color had once extended hospitality and solidarity to strangers who later turned into colonizers, bringing little in return that was morally and/or materially fulfilling. Furthermore, whether it was in Latin America, Asia or Africa, the decolonization process left intact, structures of violence and repression that protected subjective privileges (Grovogui, 2005; 111-112). And following Grovogui, given the harm that foreign colonialism/imperialism imposed, and quite possibly continues to impose upon the countries of what we now refer to as the Global South, it hardly seems implausible to reconsider an ethical move from “conditional hospitality” to “unconditional hospitality.”
Furthermore, in response to Brown’s criticism of Derrida’s critique as being historically misplaced, one point should be raised with respect to Brown’s defense of a literal and static interpretation of Kant’s hospitality. In this current era that is marked by the growth of international terrorism, it does not seem apparent that cosmopolitans such as Brown are contesting the inhospitable treatment of foreign visitors at the hands of immigration officials at international airports and other ports of entry. On the one hand, Brown does not allow Derrida to expand the conditional hospitality of Kant to unconditional hospitality insofar as Kant grounded hospitality within a certain historical juncture that Kant himself imposed limits upon. A point that Hobson and Brown both concur upon. On the other, Brown does not seem aggrieved by agents of the U.K. Border Agency and/or the United States Department of Homeland Security, inquiring as to where a foreign visitor is going, where is he/she staying; and whom is he/she staying with. The only requirement for Kant’s visitor was that he conduct himself in a peaceful manner and abide by the laws of the territory in which he was visiting. These contemporary questions posed by agents of the state, are queries that Kant never contemplated; but would be deemed acceptable even under a literal and static interpretation of hospitality.

Lastly, returning briefly to Popke’s questions of how is deserving of hospitality and who is obligated to give it, this paper will seek to shed additional light on answering those questions. While Popke and Grovogui appeal to a post-colonialist interpretation of hospitality to engage with the literal and static formulation, this paper will eschew such an approach, no matter how valuable such an approach may be. With that said, the following section of this paper seeks to expand upon Derrida’s attempt to move beyond
Kant's hospitality by briefly examining the issue of "harm" within the realm of international relations and its affects upon hospitality.

**The Concept of Harm and Re-Envisioning Hospitality**

A departure point for this section of the paper can be found in Kant's claim that human society may be able to survive without acts of benevolence, but it would be impossible for human society to survive without prohibitions on harm (Linklater and Suganami, 2006; 179). As Linklater and Suganami argue, there are three reasons as to why the harm principle is essential in applying a critical approach to international society. The first reason being that the empirical historical evidence indicates that the willingness to inflict harm upon on other people has been the central feature of relations between political communities for over 5,000 years. The second reason, related to the first, is that for 5,000 years, human beings have identified with bounded political communities. The third reason emerges from political theory which contends that at times societies and individuals have competing visions regarding the good life, but such contending visions can still facilitate the need for eliminating or controlling harmful (injurious) action (Linklater and Suganami, 2006; 177).

While an examination of the harm principle would be too extensive for this paper, Linklater argues the that international order must be judged on what it contributes to world order (*e.g.* an environment in which individuals some measure of enjoyment from violence and insecurity). In this view, "world order" is the condition in which cosmopolitan harm conventions have a central role in protecting individuals and sub-state groups from unnecessary harm be they caused by national, international, or transnational actors, structures or processes (Linklater, 2011; 37). With respect to harm, the
penultimate part of this paper will address, in Linklater’s words, “concrete harm” and “abstract harm.” Concrete harm involves the intention to cause suffering upon some designed other, for example, enemies in a war. Concrete harm will be addressed in the next section of this paper as it relates to the conduct of the United States during the civil wars in Central America from the late 1970s throughout the 1980s.

In contrast to concrete harm, abstract harm is the result of the actions of impersonal forces where human intent is less significant than the global structures and processes that cause them to act in ways that cause harm. The main characteristic of abstract harm is that it is either unintentional or results from indifference; as opposed to malice (Linklater, 2011; 39). Linklater unpacks abstract harm by focusing on “structural harm.” Structural harm is associated with high levels of economic interconnectedness augmented by coercive global regulatory regimes. Of importance here is that structural harm is more central to the modern state-system than in any previous epoch (Linklater, 2011; 246).

An example of abstract harm/structural harm, that will be addressed in next section of this paper, is the harm resulting from neoliberal globalization. As Tombs and Hillyard proffer, during this era of neoliberal globalization, business interest which are technically sectional interests, derived from activity for private motives, become represented as national interests. The major ramifications of this type of structural harm is that it is systematically produced by markets and market inequalities whereby states permit unaccountable IFIs and transnational corporations act in an unconstrained manner (Tombs and Hillyard, 2004; 41-52). Under the rubric of “global competitiveness,” this
mode of accumulation is characterized by flexible labor relations, accompanied by business and environmental deregulation.

As Tombs and Hillyard contend, the direct harm resulting from the imposition of structural harm is that significant sections of the globe’s population are forced to live at or below subsistence level with accompanying indirect harms created are in the form of poor health, illiteracy and anti-social and criminal behavior. In fact, a large proportion of the criminal behavior stemming from structural harm emerges from deprivation, lack of income and lack of material possessions. Finally the most odious aspect of structural harm in the era of neoliberal globalization is that there is limited empirical evidence that neoliberal globalization has place constraints upon states and governments. Conversely, states and governments have willingly and enthusiastically pursued neoliberal policies whereby states and governments have been pivotal actors in producing inequality and social harm (Tombs and Hillyard, 2004; 41-52). Given this state of the human condition, struggles to promote cosmopolitan harm conventions have increasingly embraced resistance to neoliberal economic institutions (Linklater, 2011; 39). The main issue is that a dialogue regarding unconditional hospitality seems to be absent from cosmopolitan discourses.

As stated above, concrete harm will be addressed in the next part of this paper during an examination of the United States vis-à-vis the Central American civil wars. The aspects of structural harm will focus on the affects of neoliberal policies with México and Central America in the form of the North American Free Trade Agreement, the proliferation of drug and criminal violence and draconian deportation policies. The objective being as to ascertain whether hospitality can be granted to those coming to the
United States from México and Central America where poverty, fragmented family units, fear, insecurity and the instability of everyday life co-exist with neoliberal “democratic” governance (Arias and Goldstein, 2010: 17).

**Concrete Harm: The United States and the Civil Wars in Central America**

The Central Americans who came to the United States over the past twenty or so years, constituted a cross-section of Central American societies. They included persons from both urban and rural areas, factory workers, students, professionals, union leaders, former political prisoners, military deserters and religious workers. While some traveled by themselves, many others with families. While some left under the threat of death in their country of origin; others were fleeing the general climate of political and non-political violence. The common thread for these Central Americans was that they were *all in need of safe haven* (García, 2006; 85) (emphasis added). The main contention is this portion of the paper is that the United States set forth a policy to intentionally inflict harm in the countries of Central America, especially El Salvador.

**The Civil War in El Salvador**

In their 1980 article “Oligarchs and Officers: The Crisis in El Salvador,” William LeoGrande and Carla Anna Robbins, described the country as being burdened with the most rigid class structure in Latin America where the economic and social life were dominated by the so-called “Los Catorce” or the “Fourteen Families.” By their own admission this characterization was inaccurate, yet El Salvador had a *bona fide* oligarchy in which out of a population of five million people, 2,000 persons directly owned sixty percent of the arable farmland, the entire banking system, a vast majority of the country’s industrial capacity and received over fifty percent of the country’s national income.
Given the dominance of these oligarchic elements exacerbated by rural poverty, there was an immense potential for class conflict. The class situation in El Salvador being even more polarized by the alliance of Los Catorce and the military which emerged in 1932 when the military took control of the government in order to suppress massive peasant uprisings spearheaded by Farabundo Martí. The result was the massacre of some 30,000 Salvadorans in what became known as La Mananza (LeoGrande and Robbins, 1980; 1084-1085).

In their essay, LeoGrande and Robbins opined that the the Carter Administration needed to forego its support it’s the Salvadoran government’s “reform and repression” policies insofar the political center was non-existent. And while civil war may be inevitable, in light of the possibilities for peaceful evolutionary change were exhausted, the best policy for the United States would be to engage the non-violent Salvadoran left. Yet, they believed that domestic pressure for intervention of some kind was most likely, given a heated presidential campaign against Ronald Reagan. They concluded that any intervention by the United States would be a disaster from both this country and the people of El Salvador. Furthermore, they noted that it would be impossible to predict which side would win a civil war, but the conflict would be bloody and horrific (LeoGrande and Robbins, 1980; 1100-1102). With the Carter Administration’s growing militarization of the region even prior to the election of Ronald, Regan, it goes without saying that LeoGrande and Robbins showed themselves to be quite prophetic.

While the situation in Central America is more nuanced than Linklater’s definition of concrete harm would indicate, it must be noted that when the Reagan Administration took office in 1981, critics argued that they (the Reagan Administration)
ignored the indigenous factors driving the insurgency in El Salvador (e.g. the massive amount of human rights violations by the Salvadoran junta, long standing social injustice and lack of bona fide democratic reform) and focused too heavily on the alleged external interference by Cuba and the Soviet Union. This myopic view wedded the Reagan Administration to a strategy of conflict in which the use of force was perceived as an essential determinate of counterinsurgency. This ultimately led the United States to view El Salvador less as a national security threat; and more as opportunity to establish United States resolve (Schulz, 1984; 46). This point is very consistent with David Cunningham’s work on civil wars. In his research he noted that external states will often intervene into a civil war not so much to end the conflict; but to pursue a specific objective that are in addition to the goals of the internal combatants. Thus, such a scenario hinders the settlement of the conflict leading to longer civil wars. Furthermore, the literature lends support to the argument that civil wars occurring during the Cold War period were actually prolonged by external actors (Cunningham, 2010; 116; 122). Accordingly, the concrete harm analysis developed herein should not be considered a theoretical reach.

It should be noted that as early as 1982, the armed left in El Salvador approached the government for a negotiated settlement of the war. Yet the United States and the Salvadoran military were opposed to such overtures. President Napoleon Duarte of the Christian Democratic Party who won the presidency with vast United States technical and economic support, attempted to initiate negotiations with the armed and un-armed left in order to halt the ever growing bloody military stalemate. These efforts were also opposed by the United States and the Salvadoran military (Booth, et. al, 2010; 122). The insurgency/counter-insurgency efforts lasted until 1989, when the FMLN launched its
final offensive. It was during the so-called Final Offensive in which Salvadoran army personnel murdered hundreds of civilians in the capital of San Salvador that the military considered guerrillas or, at least, guerrilla sympathizers. However, it was the murder on the campus Central American University of six Jesuit priests, their housekeeper and her daughter, coupled along with the end of the Cold War that convinced the United States to seek for a negotiated settlement at a time when “winning in El Salvador no longer mattered” (Booth, et. al., 2010; 126).

It was at this time that direct United States sponsored concrete harm ended in El Salvador. While peace without justice did emerge in the country, the genuine residue of the United States’ concrete harm was cogently described by Philippe Bourgois when he argued that due to vicious nature of the civil war in El Salvador, human life became cheapened. A condition compounded by that the normalization of internecine violence in which the pain and terror of political repression becomes the “pressure cooker generating everyday violence through the distortion of social relations and sensibilities. For this is the reason that El Salvador has one of the highest per capita murder rates in the western hemisphere (Bourgois, 2001; 20). The nexus between social/criminal violence and migration is examined in Sanchez’s research who concludes that violence has in fact been a factor in migration (Sanchez, 2006; 179-180).

In closing, the United States’ policy in Central America during both Cold Wars was not only ill-advised but it was destructive and counterproductive to both the interests of the United States and the people of Central America. As a result of yielding to domestic pressure and responding to outdated formulations of national security and economic interests as opposed to the reality of Central America, the United States
combated a vastly inflated threat of communism for more than forty years. In the end, the United States threw its support to a small and exploitative elite in strategies to counteract popular mobilizations which ultimately cost the lives of over 300,000 persons⁹ (Booth, et. al., 2010; 239).

It should be noted that according to García, some 30,000 Salvadorans returned to El Salvador within the first year of the signing of the Esquipulas peace accords in 1987 (García, 2006; 43). However, as will be discussed below, sky rocketing violence in El Salvador since the late 1990s can be attributable to the structural harm manifest in the among other things, enactment of the draconian Illegal Immigrant Reform and Immigration Responsibility Act (“IIRIRA”) by the United States Congress in 1996.

**Structural Harm: From Low Intensity Democracies to Violent Democracies**

As alluded above, unlike concrete harm, Linklater defines structural harm (or abstract harm) as the result of intense levels of economic interconnectedness augmented by coercive global regimes of regulation (Linklater, 2011; 246). In the aftermath of the end of the civil wars in Central America, the region witnessed the emergence of “low intensity democracies” in which the United States could stave off further popular mobilizations by incorporating a broader base of popular organizations to participate in elections while permitting continuity with the anti-communist and anti-reformist elements within the military. In this regard, low intensity democracies serve as “halfway houses” between the previously “unstable” representative Global South democracies and the military dictatorships that characterized the region in the 1960s and 1970s. Of import

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⁹ Dunkerley estimates that during the 1980s alone, there were 160,000 persons killed in Central America along with an estimated 2 million persons displaced (See, James Dunkerley, *The Pacification of Central America*).
to the imposition of structural harm is that low intensity democracies more able to pursue painful and repressive social and economic policies with more impunity and with less popular resistance than openly authoritarian regimes (Gills, *et al.*, 1993: 8-9). However, these low intensity democracies have morphed into violent democracies in which migration, in many ways, offers an emancipatory escape. In the following sections, the paper will briefly address several issues of structural harm relative to México and Central America.

**NAFTA**

The North American Free Trade Agreement ("NAFTA") which became effective on January 1, 1994, may illustrate some of the most egregious structure harm within the Western hemisphere. NAFTA was the agreement between the United States, Canada and México which provided, among other things, that trade tariffs would be reduced over a ten to fifteen year period depending on the sector. NAFTA immediately lifted the tariffs on most agricultural products, with the significant exception of corn. NAFTA also allowed United States and Canadian investment in the entire Mexican financial system in 2007. While North American trucks could travel anywhere between the three countries, immigration was not generally covered (Dicken, 2007: 199). Harkening back to the comment by Tombs and Hillyard, countries under neoliberal globalization become complicit in imposing harm upon their people. For example, México unilaterally lifted the tariffs on the importation of both yellow and white corn several years prior to the fifteen year expiration date. Furthermore, in 2014, Mexican President Peña Nieto also unilaterally permitted for foreign investment in the oil parastatal PEMEX. A move that was not necessarily covered by NAFTA.
Furthermore, even prior to the passage of NAFTA, the Mexican Constitution was amended to provide for the privatization of communal or *ejido* lands, which were the cornerstone of México’s agrarian reform in the wake of the Mexican Revolution. In his 2009 research on changes in land tenure since NAFTA, Barnes does indicate that there has not been a rush to acquire *ejido* lands by private owners. However, he does conclude that the overall impact of NAFTA had been negative with deteriorating conditions relative to poverty, income inequality and agricultural employment. While there has been resiliency in community based land tenure systems in México, market forces have had a serious impact on the *ejido* through livelihood changes whereby younger prospective farmers are no longer interested in agriculture. Given this situation, chances for emigration were greatly enhanced (Barnes, 2009; 398-399).

Despite the conclusions drawn from Barnes' research on patterns of land tenure in México, of greater importance to Mexicans concerned the “dumping” of United States agricultural products in México. Timothy Wise argues that as a result of the reduction/elimination of tariffs, Mexican agriculture lost $12.8 billion on eight specific agricultural products equaling an average loss of $99 per hectare of land. Yet, most of the dumping in México consisted of yellow corn, which is utilized mostly as feed for livestock. He further estimated that in constant 2000 dollars, the average annual loss of $1.4 billion was equivalent to ten percent of the value of all Mexican agricultural exports to the United States. In short, this facilitated a retreat to subsistence among Mexican landowners (Wise, 2009 3, 33). What is more ominous to Mexican farmers is that the United States’ exports of maize (white corn) for human consumption have rapidly increased since the tariffs were listed in 2008. This has led Barta to proclaim that as a
result of NAFTA, México lost both its food and labor sovereignty which has led to a mass exodus of Mexicans looking for security in the United States that México has denied its own citizens (Barta, 2004; 31).

Lastly, returning to the structural harm imposed by the United States upon México concerns the lack of the free movement of people embedded into NAFTA. NAFTA provided for the free movement of goods, services and capital, but not for the free flow of people. As Massey notes:

Not only was the free movement of labor excluded from the otherwise integrated North American market being established, but the same year [1994], the United States launched Operation Gatekeeper to block the flow of migrants through the busiest border sector, as part of the two decade long process of border militarization. Apparently, the contradiction between the stated goals of integrating all the factor markets in North America and the exclusion of Mexican labor from participating never occurred to leaders in Washington (Massey, 2013; 11).

However, Massey did not account for the fact that NAFTA, as part of a class project linked to neoliberal globalization, did provide for the free movement of white collar professionals from México. Section 16 of NAFTA governed the temporary entry of business persons and permitted the temporary entry of 5,500 Mexican professionals in a myriad of occupational sectors in order to transact business within the United States. In accordance with Appendix 1603.D.1, anyone permitted temporary entry would be required to have attained at least a baccalaureate degree to be eligible for temporary entry.

What may be interesting to note is that this presents an irony. It is truly ironic that, other than the educational requirements, these NAFTA provisions would actually comply with Kant’s law of universal hospitality. However, in the final analysis it bears pointing out that in the fifteen year period prior to the implementation of NAFTA (1980-1995),
according to World Bank estimates, 3.2 million Mexican emigrated. In the fifteen year period subsequent to the implementation of NAFTA (1995-2010), the World Bank estimates that 8.2 million Mexicans have migrated.

**Maras, Pandillas and Violence:**
The Offspring of Concrete Harm and Structural Harm

The last section of this paper addresses the presence of maras in Central America as a function of harm. As previously noted, Bourgeois alluded to how the pain and terror of political repression and the normalization of internecine violence generates everyday violence. The proliferation of maras or gangs in countries such as El Salvador, Honduras and Guatemala give substantial credence to his claim. Furthermore, following the recurring theme of harm, the growth of maras\(^{10}\) in these countries stems from the intersection of concrete harm and structural harm. Wolf speaks to this point in her study of maras in El Salvador, when she observes that the culture of violence which promotes and legitimizes violence in interpersonal relations, has been aggravated by both a long history of social repression and El Salvador’s intense and protracted civil war (Wolf, 2011: 53). In addition, it bears noting that the proliferation of gangs in Central America is also deeply rooted within the United States and its imposition of structural harm upon the region.

On the one hand, Wolf takes the position that the emergence of El Salvador’s street gangs can be traced back to the early 1960s; however, she adds that the *Mara Salvatrucha* (MS-13) and the 18\(^{th}\) Street Gang gained their ascendancy in El Salvador the early post-war period (Wolf, 2011: 48). It must be pointed out that in many ways, the

\(^{10}\) Bruneau makes the distinction between maras, such as MS-13 and the 18th Street Gang, which are more hierarchically structure and engage in transnational criminal activity; whereas pandillas are more localized in nature and tend not to have an established organizational structure (Bruneau, 2011: 3).
maras were not only the result of the concrete harm attributable to the United States' role in the civil wars in El Salvador and Guatemala; but also attributable to the structural harm stemming from the imposition of neoliberalism within the region coupled with draconian immigration policies enforced by the United States. As the initial departure point, Hamilton and Chinchilla contend that to the extent that the United States' prolonged and intensified the conflicts in Central America, those efforts resulted in refugees fleeing the violence that that United States was exacerbating (Hamilton and Chinchilla, 1991).

To support their claim, the demographic statistics contained in the 1990 U.S. Census indicated that approximately seventy percent of all Central Americans residing in the United States arrived after 1980 (Johnson, 2006). Furthermore, it is estimated that one million Salvadorans and Guatemalans arrived in the United States between 1980 and 1990 (Gzesch, 2006). At first blush, this statistic does not appear credible, yet the World Bank estimated that between 1980 and 1990, there was net emigration of 775,000 Guatemalans and 726 Salvadorans. This influx of persons from Central America during this timeframe is directly attributable to people fleeing violence and repression in El Salvador and Guatemala compounded by the concrete harm at the hands of the Reagan Administration in its attempt to secure a military victory.

However, it was not just the brutality of the civil wars and the United States' concrete harm which laid the groundwork for the modern day maras and pandillas, it was the complete absence of, in Derrida's words, unconditional hospitality extended to Central American refugees. Briefly returning to Weiner's point regarding a country's asylum policies is an extension of its foreign policy, the classification of Central Americans in the United States as "economic migrants" alleviated any responsibility the
United States would have toward protecting them. In essence, these “migrants” became victims and pawns of the prerogatives of the United States’ foreign policy. Consequently, applications for political asylum were categorically denied (García, 2006; 34). The abstract harm perpetrated upon these asylum seekers could not be more evident by examining the 1984 statistics for the approvals for political asylum applications. The approval rates for Salvadoran and Guatemalan applicants were approximately three percent. During the same year, the approval rates for applicants from Iran, Afghanistan and Poland were sixty percent, forty percent and thirty-two percent, respectively (Gzesch, 2006). Thus, the Salvadorans and Guatemalans who fled the concrete harm of the wars in order to find safety, traded one source of personal insecurity attributable to concrete harm for another form of personal insecurity attributable to abstract harm.

The ramifications of having to live clandestinely as undocumented persons were devastating for those refugee populations, especially those living in Los Angeles. The marginalization and social exclusion was manifest in being relegated to living neighborhoods which were void of educational and recreational facilities; yet fraught with the presence of crime and gangs. Central American families living in cities such as Los Angeles, not only struggled with the trauma of war, but faced a day-to-day struggle for survival characterized by culture shock, language barriers, overcrowded homes combined with precarious and racialized forms of labor. The day-to-day battle for survival was compounded by the constant threat of deportation caused intra-family strife, child neglect and domestic violence (Wolf, 2012: 17).

While not specifically addressing the issue of subjectivities in any detail, the marginalization and social exclusion of having to live clandestinely, the transition for
Salvadorans was made more difficult by the fact that they were ethnically “Hispanic” and were deemed outsiders by the existing Mexican culture and community. Their outsider status encouraged local gangs and local business owners to view Salvadorans as prey insofar as given their undocumented status, they would not report crime to the police for fear of deportation (Valdez, 2011; 24-25). Therefore, the Salvadorans, like the Hondurans who fled Honduras in the 1980s, felt not only the need for security, but also felt the need to belong. Thus, they came to view gang membership as means of survival, especially in the wake of the Rodney King incident in Los Angeles with created tensions between the black and Latino communities. Thus, it was in the United States that Salvadorans and the Hondurans encountered and fostered an organized and violent gang culture (Mateo; 2011; 93).

As the Salvadoran and Honduran gangs began to proliferate in the Los Angeles area, the Salvadoran gangs began in earnest to deal in extortion and drug trafficking. Abstract harm especially directed towards Salvadorans was furthered through the passage of draconian anti-gang laws in California. The effects of such laws were that young gang offenders were charged as adults, resulting in hundreds of young Latinos being incarcerated for felonies as opposed to being charged as juveniles which would have entailed lesser penalties. California also enacted the so-called “three strikes and you’re out” legislation which immeasurably increased prison sentences for offenders convicted of three or more felonies.

The abstract harm imposed on undocumented persons was furthered even more with Congressional passage in 1996 of the IIRIRA. While undocumented persons could be deported back to their countries of origin for felonies in which the prison sentence
would be five years or more, the IIRAIRA, revised sentencing guidelines for the
deporation of undocumented persons for prison sentences of one year as opposed to the
previous threshold of five years (Johnson, 2006). The list of deportable crimes was also
expanded to include more minor infractions as driving under the influence and petty
larceny (Arana, 2005, 101). The end result being that under the provisions of IIRAIRA,
between 2000 and 2004, some 20,000 Central Americans convicted of a myriad of crimes
were deported back to countries of origin.

As Wolf maintains, the deported youth often felt disoriented in a country in which
they had few, if any memories. They also felt alienated by the humble surroundings they
encountered back in El Salvador, yet still hoping to make a fresh start. However, with
weak family ties and continued marginalization even in their country of origin, the
departees quickly reverted back to carry on the gang life they knew best. Their “flashy”
clothing, money, tattoos and the romantic tales of gang life back in the United States,
held a fascination for young Salvadorans that they found hard to resist (Wolf; 2011; 49).
As Arana points out, as an increasingly number of hard core violent gang members were
exported to Central America from Los Angeles, the number of mara members grew
among the region’s large number of disenfranchised youth (Arana, 2005; 101).

The real problem for the region was that state-society relations were undergoing
very complex social changes in the movement from war-torn societies to low intensity
democratic post-conflict societies. This complex peace without justice scenario was
exacerbated by the fact the Central American governments had absolutely no idea that
these new arrivals were criminals. The reason being that IIRAIRA prohibited the
disclosure of the deportee’s criminal background (if any) to the countries to which they
were deported (Arana, 2005; 101). With the deportations under the IIARIAIRA, Central America unwittingly, but painfully encountered a circular flow of criminals and violent maras, in what has transpired into the globalization of violent gang culture (Valdez, 2011; 23) that was accompanied by a nexus of crime, violence, personal insecurity and migration.

Lastly, during the so-called second Cold War, Honduras which did not witness the United States sponsored concrete harm that did El Salvador and Guatemala suffered, but Honduras did serve as an important country in the Reagan Administration’s “rollback” on Communism and saw massive increases in military assistance. At the same time, Honduras’ initial return to fragile civilian rule in the early 1980s, President Suazo Córdova relied heavily upon the military. Over the course of the 1980s, the country saw a creeping “dirty” war against purported supporters of the FMLN, labor groups and peasant organizations via the increased use of disappearance, torture and death squads. The militarized nature of Honduras did subside after the end of civil wars in El Salvador and Guatemala (Mateo, 2011; 90). As the second Cold War became a historical footnote and ushered in the period of Honduras’ “low intensity” democracy, the structural harm of neoliberal globalization provided a very fertile terrain to bring about in the era of the maras.

One of the claims that this paper seeks to make is the relationship between non-political violence and neoliberal globalization. Given neoliberalism privileging of individual initiative and self-reliance with the context of poverty, increasing inequality, decreasing economic opportunities and eroding safety nets, it not surprising that some sectors of the poor in Latin concluded that survival would be predicated upon the
accumulation of resources through illegal means (Portes and Hoffman, 2003; 79). Consistent with Portes and Hoffman, Mateo clearly assigns structural harm to the United States when she alludes to the economic stabilization plan that was initiated for Honduras in 1990. She states that that the neoliberal economic policies pushed by the United States in the wake of civil conflicts did not foster the much needed economic growth that was anticipated. For within three years of imposing neoliberal economic the percentage rate of the urban poor skyrocketed (Mateo, 2011; 92) (emphasis added). For Honduras, as well as in El Salvador, criminal violence has proliferated in the region as the social conditions for the poor and the young have deteriorated as a result of austerity imposed by neoliberal globalization. In short, crime becomes a survival strategy (Sanchez, 2006; 179) whether or not the mano duro (the heavy hand) strategies of the police and/or armed forces are employed. It is to the point now that urban populations in Latin America, especially Central America, fear the “everyday” economic and social violence much more than they ever feared political violence (McIwaine and Moser, 2007; 119-121). Currently, there are whole sections of Guatemala City and Tegucigalpa that are under the control of the maras (Burneau, 2011; 15) and if Burneau is correct, the future for the region is dim at best.

In sum, the “age of insecurity” where violence has become a defining problem in Latin America (Davis, 2006; 180; 178), arrived during the advent of the region’s low intensity democracies, which have now transformed, or regressed if you will, to being violent democracies. As Wood, et al., argue, economic and security concerns have become interrelated reasons for migration. While the desire to flee crime may not be the only justification for emigration, their qualitative research indicates that crime
victimization in Latin America has become a significant consideration in people’s decision to leave their respective homelands in search of jobs and safety (Wood, et. al., 2010; 7). Unfortunately, when they arrive on the border of the United States seeking refuge, they will be lucky to even encounter a literal and static interpretation of conditional hospitality insofar as the residue of United States foreign policy in the region, renders unconditional hospitality null and void.

**Concluding Remarks**

This paper has sought to engage the reader in reconceptualizing Kant’s cosmopolitan formulation of universal hospitality. For all the positive concepts put forth in “Perpetual Peace,” especially Kant’s stands against exploitation, imperialism and colonialism, his notion of universal hospitality is trapped by the tension in his own work between the sovereign state and the despotism of world government. While it was acceptable to advocate his conception of hospitality in the age of the emergence of free trade as a way to bind the globe in the easing of war and a system of international anarchy. It is however, another thing for cosmopolitans to advocate this literal and static interpretation of Kant in the current age of insecurity and violence.

Grobogui was absolutely correct when he asserted that the hospitality granted to strangers by persons of color was soon transformed into colonialism accompanied by all of its abuses. As pointed out earlier, this is exactly what happened to Montezuma when he provided hospitality to Cortez. However, hopefully the real contribution of this paper is to move an analysis of hospitality by utilizing Derrida’s eloquent critique of cosmopolitan hospitality and infusing his work with the concept of harm.
As was noted in the earlier portion of this paper, there is overt Eurocentrism in his view that only well-constituted states were eligible for entrance into the peaceful confederation. For all intensive of purposes, I would agree with that proposition in that the well-constituted state republican state assumes some sizeable measure of popular participation. The issue at hand in this paper is how can hospitality be reconceptualized when well-consisted states, such as the United States, perpetrate both concrete and structural harm.

To the extent that cosmopolitans privilege the human being and/or human collectivities comprised of human beings, it is time that they move beyond conditional hospitality to unconditional hospitality. For it is human beings that are most affected by the presence of concrete and/or structural harm. And the residue of the foreign policy of the United States in Central has caused and continues to cause harm. All one needs to do is to look at the thousands of Central Americans risking their lives to attempt entry be it clandestine or otherwise. For it is now time for cosmopolitan to reinvigorate its emancipatory program to move beyond Kant to Derrida. It would have been a whole different outcome in countries like El Salvador, Honduras and Guatemala, if the United States had just simply opened to door to legalization for those fleeing the repression and violence at their of their allies. Yet, they did not and more will die; and more will come to seek refuge. The question is will the United States ever attempt to rectify the concrete and structural harm done. It certainly does not look as if this country ever will.
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