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To cite this article: Hao Chen (2021) Resisting Bandung? Taiwan's Struggle for 'Representational Legitimacy' in the Rise of the Asian Peoples' Anti-Communist League, 1954-57, The International History Review, 43:2, 244-263, DOI: [10.1080/07075332.2020.1762239](https://doi.org/10.1080/07075332.2020.1762239)

To link to this article: <https://doi.org/10.1080/07075332.2020.1762239>



Published online: 06 May 2020.



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Resisting Bandung? Taiwan's Struggle for 'Representational Legitimacy' in the Rise of the Asian Peoples' Anti-Communist League, 1954-57

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ABSTRACT

In April 1955, representatives of the People's Republic of China (PRC) attended the Bandung Conference in Indonesia. The conference epitomized the peak of *Asian-African Internationalism*, which sought to pursue independent and neutralist foreign policies that forged a path in-between the United States and the Soviet Union. This Conference helped the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) gain new ground in the ongoing struggle for 'representational legitimacy' against its rival the Kuomintang (KMT, Chinese Nationalist Party) in the Third World. How did the Nationalist government, exiled on Taiwan since 1949, view this Bandung moment? This paper investigates the connections between Taiwan's perception of Asian-African Internationalism and its efforts to initiate the Asian Peoples' Anti-Communist League (APACL). It argues that, as a piece of its own representational struggle with the PRC, the Republic of China (ROC) co-developed the APACL with South Korea and the Philippines in order to open up an anti-Bandung platform for Asian solidarity and postcolonial national emancipation. Critically, however, it emphasized 'anti-Communism' as the essential key to succeed in the anti-imperialist struggle against both Communist China, the Soviet Union, and the Bandung Conference. Therefore, Taiwan worked to integrate its struggle for 'representational legitimacy' into its response to the ideological concerns of Afro-Asia.

KEYWORDS

Anti-Communism;
Neutralism;
Decolonization; Legitimacy

Introduction

The Asian Peoples' Anti-Communist League (APACL) originally served as a regional collective defense network among the non-Communist halves of the 'divided nations' in East Asia, including Taiwan, South Korea, and South Vietnam. However, I contend that the triumph of the Bandung Conference spurred the political and ideological regeneration of the APACL, which henceforth would aim to counter the appeal of Bandung with an alternative vision for regional unity. The Bandung Conference of April 1955 represented the peak of Asian-African Internationalism, a movement which combined the promotion of postcolonial national liberation with a neutralist diplomatic stance in the Cold War, aligned neither with the United States nor the Soviet Union.¹ It became a crucial venue for the CCP's diplomatic efforts to obtain new international standing at the time when the majority of the international community still did not

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This article has been corrected with minor changes. These changes do not impact the academic content of the article.

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officially recognize the PRC. Recognizing the threat posed by the PRC's diplomatic gains at the conference, the ROC/Taiwan played a significant role in turning the APACL into an alternative institution that addressed the same agenda of decolonization, but which resisted Bandung and preached a message of anti-Communism as the sole legitimate route to post-imperial emancipation. Taiwan's promotion of the APACL was primarily driven by its determination to compete with the PRC for 'representational legitimacy' as the 'real' China. I define 'representational legitimacy' in two dimensions. First, it refers to the KMT's claim to legitimacy as the only true post-war Chinese government. However, it also refers to the ROC's broader legitimacy as the true government of a postcolonial Asian power, namely the Chinese nation-state since the 1911 Revolution.

Throughout the past decade and a half, new studies have provided fresh perspectives and interpretations of the Bandung moment.² However, due to Taiwan's exclusion from this First Asian-African Conference in April 1955, most of these new studies have not addressed Taipei's perception and reaction to this symbolic international event. Taiwan was only relevant to the proceedings of Bandung because the PRC Foreign Ministry accused the KMT of plotting an aircraft bombing assassination targeting the CCP representatives traveling to Indonesia on the Indian plane "Kashmir Princess". The CCP claimed that this attack was designed to prevent Chinese representatives from participating at Bandung. Although it was arguably driven by the wish to elevate China's international status in Afro-Asia, this accusation has influenced popular and even academic views of the KMT's reaction to CCP's activities at Bandung to this day.³ Nevertheless, it is still not possible to draw any definitive conclusion on the 'Kashmir Princess' incident, largely due to insufficient disclosure of related archival documents and personal memoirs from mainland China, Taiwan, and the Anglo-American countries.⁴

While the debate on the authenticity of the 'Kashmir Princess' conspiracy remains an open one, I argue that the KMT's reaction to the Bandung Conference and the CCP's exploitation of Asian-African Internationalism was *best* demonstrated not by this possible assassination plot, but rather in its dedication to the APACL. I will focus on the earliest three conferences between 1954 and 57, where the institutional structure, operational creed, and course of developmental direction of the APACL was formulated and expanded. I will show that in organizing these conferences, the ROC government was convinced of the geopolitical centrality of post-war Japan in the postcolonial Asian united front against Communist China, following Japan's military defeat and imperial disintegration. Hence, It made persistent attempts to recruit Japanese anti-Communist representatives into the organization, even at the risk of openly clashing with the anti-Japanese Republic of Korea (ROK). Thus, Taiwan helped shape the founding organizational principles of the APACL, and had developed it into a venue where it could embrace decolonization and compete with the 'New China' for 'representational legitimacy'.

The dawn of an Asian anti-Communist alliance

During its disintegration in the 1946-9 Civil War and retreat from the Chinese mainland, the KMT was desperately hoping for a forceful intervention from the United States against the CCP. However, in the meantime the ROC government was pursuing a variety of geopolitical partnerships in order to reduce its reliance on traditional Western allies. The best place to search for such alliances after World War II was still in East Asia, a region in the midst of a sweeping transition following the collapse of the Japanese empire. In 1950, Chiang Kai-shek argued in his work *Soviet Russia in China* that 'the international struggle against Communism has a goal which is to preserve the freedom of mankind, and liberate all oppressed nations and their people.' To Chiang, realizing this goal required concerted efforts by both 'western capitalist powers' and 'oriental movements for national liberation'.⁵ Chiang's first step was to align the ROC with South Korea and the Philippines. During early 1949, he visited the president of South Korea, Syngman

Rhee, seeking Seoul's support during the KMT's existential crisis on the Chinese mainland. Yet, on a later trip to Baguio where he met the Filipino president, Elpidio Rivera Quirino, Chiang proposed a more comprehensive alliance between the ROC, the ROK and the Philippines, which he termed a 'Far Eastern Union'. Chiang wanted the anti-Communist united front to be focused particularly on post-war Asian interests, but his ambition extended to the wider Pacific region in terms of geostrategic as well as ideological influence.⁶

Chiang received favourable responses from both presidents. Both Rhee and Quirino 'began to feel the necessity of forming a collective security system comparable to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) that was concluded in Washington on April 4 (1949)'.⁷ However, the emulation of NATO was more a matter of formality and presentation than a matter of substance. As historian Timothy Andrew Sayle has noted, the establishment of NATO was less driven by the fear of a Soviet invasion than it was by the fear of potential Soviet blackmail to post-war European states, where Moscow tried to force them to accept its hegemonic geopolitical demands at the risk of another war.⁸ In contrast, the strategic goals of the proposed 'Far Eastern Union' were rather different. Chiang, Rhee and Quirino desperately wanted to use this 'Eastern NATO' to attract geopolitical protection and financial assistance from the United States in order to resist the aggression of the CCP. To some extent they actually looked forward to a larger world-wide armed conflict with Communist forces.

At the same time, the United States had been pushing forward 'Pacific Pacts', which soon became the pivot of its regional anti-Communist policy in Asia.⁹ However, the United States did not specifically identify Taiwan (after the gradual resettlement of the ROC government there in 1948-49) and South Korea as part of its integral defensive perimeter.¹⁰ Both Chiang and Rhee were worried that Washington was reluctant to commit to the defense of their countries. These concerns drove the announcement of Chiang-Rhee communiqué for official collaboration on 11 July 1949.¹¹ However, in contrast to Chiang's enthusiasm, most Asian nations remained indifferent. As Amita Acharya has indicated, the suspicion regarding a potential organization for collective security was quite strong among many Asian leaders because they were concerned about 'a new form of western dominance damaging to their newfound national sovereignty and regional autonomy'.¹² Furthermore, a large group of Asia-Pacific states were former British colonies, such as India, Pakistan, Burma, Ceylon (Sri Lanka) and Australia. These later Commonwealth nations did not express any immediate interest in participating in an Eastern NATO. Their hesitation might have been influenced by British leaders who 'refused to talk about any concrete steps toward a defense treaty in Asia'.¹³ And they gradually followed the footsteps of the British in recognizing 'New China' (Beijing) and abandoning the ROC at the start of the 1950s.¹⁴

Even President Quirino had to confront vehement domestic opposition to his alliance with Chiang, placing himself into a difficult position.¹⁵ And the largest newly independent Asian state, India, was especially reluctant. The prime minister of India, Jawaharlal Nehru, rejected outright an invitation from Nationalist diplomat Chen Zhiping (陳質平).¹⁶ The ROC ambassador to India, Luo Jialun (羅家倫), also noted that Nehru was persuading other decolonizing Asian countries not to diverge too greatly from London's geopolitical interests, interests which Luo deemed would run contrary to the KMT's anti-Communist interests in Asia.¹⁷ Chiang criticized this development in his own memo, on 20 April 1949, arguing that the United Kingdom deliberately attempted to 'prevent Far Eastern countries from building an anti-Communist establishment, which could lead former colonies to rid themselves of its imperial control'.¹⁸ Chiang's anxiety did not come from nowhere. Although the Anglo-Americans strongly promoted anti-Communist nationalism across the Asia-Pacific region, they shared and perpetuated 'pre-existing local antipathy toward China and diaspora Chinese' especially with Southeast Asia.¹⁹ This sentiment was arguably an additional factor dampening their willingness to support the ROC's geopolitical aspirations.

Hence, the ROC government gradually came to recognize that it could not realistically hope to further advance the alliance proposal. On 9 August 1949, Chen Zhiping told the Filipino diplomat, Carlos Peña Romulo, that the Philippines and other Asian countries should not pursue an

immediate realization of the proposed anti-Communist 'Far Eastern Union'. Chen argued that patience was necessary since 'they lacked a "Marshall Plan equivalent" in Asia' that could resolve the differences of East and Southeast Asian governments.²⁰ In the same month, the ROC ambassador to the United States, Wellington Koo, also heard from the Burmese Foreign Minister, E Muang, that a Pacific alliance was currently 'ineffective' and 'lacked sufficient foundation' because many Asian countries 'perceived difficulties in managing the differences between each country's strategic interests'.²¹ Even Chiang himself temporarily shifted his attention to other matters.²²

Throughout the first year of resettlement in Taiwan, the KMT's primary focus was simply to survive. Hence, the ROC government warmed to the idea of an Eastern NATO with at least the same urgency as South Korea or the Philippines, at such an organization could create a military shield for the beleaguered regime now based in Taipei. Nevertheless, this idea was met with indifference from the United States. There was no consensus within the Truman Administration over the fate of Taiwan until the onset of the Korean War forced a reappraisal of US strategy in the region. Washington's geopolitical commitment to Taipei in 1949-50 was thus uneven and volatile.²³ Hence, Chiang's initiative was put to the side until the outbreak of Korean War rejuvenated discussions. And it was not just South Korea that would face a serious Communist threat. The First Indochina War, alongside the decline of French imperial power, meant that the anti-Communist Vietnamese based in Saigon faced a growing threat from the Việt Minh (League for the Independence of Vietnam), which was headed by Ho Chi Minh and supported by the PRC government.²⁴ Although the Philippines did not have a crisis on the same scale, it had been fighting the Huk Revolt (a Filipino domestic Communist insurgency) and felt threatened by the PRC's geographical proximity.²⁵

Both the Korean and the First Indochina Wars accelerated discussions between Taipei, Seoul, Manila and Saigon with the goal of resurrecting a regional anti-Communist coalition. Reciprocating Chiang's visit a of four years earlier, Syngman Rhee came to Taipei on 28 November 1953, and advocated the creation of a brand new anti-Communist united front bringing together the people of the independent Asian nations. Rhee emphasized the term 'people' in an attempt to differentiate his project from the US-directed 'Pacific Pacts', which was purely about government-to-government alliances.²⁶ While hosting the ROK President, the ROC Foreign Ministry defined three basic guidelines for future cooperation between Taipei and Seoul: the protection of national security was imperative, the participation of the United States was crucial, and the ideology of 'anti-Communism' was to inform all decisions.²⁷ This was not to be a one-off alliance. According to the Foreign Ministry's working report, the ROC government intended to negotiate with Cambodia and Laos for another triangular anti-Communist coalition in addition to its existing alignment with South Korea.²⁸

Both Taipei and Seoul welcomed Washington's decision to take a leading role in the fight against Communism since the declaration of the Truman Doctrine on 12 March 1947, and the decision to intervene in the Korean War on 27 June 1950. Nevertheless, the Americans were actually keener on creating its own multilateral defense institution which would have broadly the same purpose as Chiang's Asian anti-Communist league.²⁹ The United States signed bilateral defense treaties with several East Asian states in the first half of the 1950s, including Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan (in 1954). Washington intentionally dissuaded East Asian states from developing alliances themselves.³⁰ It was therefore able to retain its dominant position in East Asia and 'make any further Asian plans to create regional alliances unnecessary'.³¹ In response to growing demands from its Asian allies for greater economic as well as military support, the United States established the Southeast Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO) in 1954, alongside a number of bilateral alliances it built with Asian countries respectively.³² SEATO demonstrated 'that the alliance (with anti-Communist nations like the ROC) occupied a foremost position in American policy towards the region'.³³ It arguably offered the ROC government a sense of security and confidence about their own survival that they had lacked since 1949.³⁴

With its new America-centric security alliance as SEATO in place, the United States became even less involved in strengthening the unity among the Asian anti-Communist nations themselves. Therefore, I argue that SEATO did not entirely suit the interests of Taiwan, South Korea and even South Vietnam because it deemphasized their active agency in the anti-Communist struggle in East Asia.³⁵ After his personal visit on 9 March 1954, Syngman Rhee sent again another group of representatives to Taipei, led by his chief delegate Lee Pon Nyong (Young P. Lee 李範寧).³⁶ Meanwhile, the ROC Embassy in South Korea, echoing the South Korean representatives touring Southeast Asia, quickly delivered a memo to the Foreign Ministry that supporting rebooting 'an Asian, even world-wide, anti-Communist crusade'.³⁷ After meeting the South Korean officials, the ROC Foreign Ministry revised the memo, and indicated the centrality of the ROC-ROK alliance to the broader anti-Communist enterprise in East Asia. It argued that neither Taipei nor Seoul should be excluded from any kind of anti-Communist meeting to be held anywhere in East Asia.³⁸

While joining together with South Korea to propose the first Asian Peoples' Anti-Communist Conference (APACC), Chiang Kai-Shek reinterpreted the rationale of this anti-Communist alliance. During the KMT's Central Standing Committee (CSC) meetings in June 1954, Chiang repeatedly encouraged the Nationalist representatives to 'utilize whatever opportunity' to verbally attack Communist China.³⁹ The goal was to leave other APACC attendees with the inerasable impression that the CCP was fundamentally 'guilty' in either directly or indirectly causing all violent regional conflicts, poverty and insecurity in Asia.⁴⁰ Unlike in 1949, this anti-Communist alliance now came to serve the ROC more as a venue for the pursuit of its political/ideological legitimacy rather than as a tool for survival, strengthening Taipei's international representation as the 'real' China.

In the meantime, Chiang picked his subordinate Gu Zhenggang (Ku Cheng-Kang, 谷正綱) to lead the Chinese Nationalist delegation that would attend the APACC. Gu had been Chiang's devout follower since the latter's ascendancy to power in the 1920s, and he had earned his nickname 'anti-Communist Iron Man (*fangong tieren*)' in the 1940s. As an impeccably loyal member of the KMT, Gu was among the last group of Nationalist military leaders that left Nanjing right before the Communist takeover.⁴¹ He imitated imperial tradition by his continued steadfast loyalty to the ROC government. Gu declared that he would not surrender to the CCP as Hong Chengchou (洪承疇) had to the Manchus in the seventeenth century. Hong served the imperial Ming dynasty as a high-ranking government official but defected to work for the later Qing during the Manchu conquest. In order to demonstrate his resolute support for the anti-Communist struggle, Gu had even prepared arsenic for suicide in case he was captured by the CCP.⁴²

The First APACC, or Jinhae Conference, was held in Korea from 15 to 17 June 1954. Syngman Rhee (the newly elected honorary chair) advised the conference 'not to establish a central institution for the APACL', but instead to keep the organization as the hub of a 'loose network of regional contacts'.⁴³ Only the Filipino delegate agreed with this suggestion. Other attendees, especially those from Ryukyu Islands and South Vietnam, strongly opposed Rhee's suggestion that there should be no central organization.⁴⁴ Lee Pon Nyong tried to find a middle ground between the different positions. He emphasized that the 'Communists are successful everywhere because they are organized'.⁴⁵ Gu Zhenggang concurred, and followed up by arguing that the Asian resistance against Communism was 'not merely a struggle between military forces but a struggle between methods of organization'.⁴⁶ In the end, the Conference decided to set up a temporary APACL coordination center in South Korea, and agreed that the ROC would host the next meeting in Taipei.⁴⁷

Thus the APACL had been officially formed. However, it still lacked a permanent institutional structure. Born in the East Asian political turmoil of the late 1940s and early 1950s, the APACL reflected multilateral commitments to collective security among anti-Communist states in the region. Until the summer of 1954, the ROC, the ROK and the State of Vietnam had conceived of the APACL as the new NATO for East Asia.⁴⁸ However, looming international developments

unexpectedly nudged the KMT to direct the APACL in a rather different direction. The following convention of the 1955 Bandung Conference on Afro-Asian decolonization would reshape both Taipei's relationship with the APACL once more, and the very nature of this nascent institution.

Perilous neutrality? Bandung, Japan and the APACL's thwarted expansion

In contrast to the PRC, the ROC had been involved in the process of postwar decolonization in Asia right from the beginning. Following the Japanese surrender on 15 August 1945, postcolonial state formation was about to lead to an unprecedented restructuring of Asian politics and society. Previous studies of post-1945 East Asia often neglect the fact that the KMT seized on this historical moment for the promotion of its own 'representational legitimacy' after the war. This was partly because most of these studies have been produced by US-based historians. They perpetuate an American-centric view of the ROC's role in Cold War history as Washington's anti-Soviet and anti-PRC ideological proxy, rather than an independent power for decolonization in the Third World.⁴⁹ In fact, as early as 1949 Chiang Kai-shek had already conceptualized the ROC's place in the shifting East Asian geopolitical landscape, with a strong nationalistic mentality derived from his experiences in China. Chiang believed that not only should the colonies of the Japanese enemy be liberated, but also that all colonized subjects the allied European empires should break free from the chains of their former masters.⁵⁰

Driven by this conviction, which was widely shared by Nationalist elites, the ROC (while still in control of the Chinese mainland) joined the 1947 *Asian Relations Conference* initiated by Nehru, and attended the subsequent ministerial level meeting in New Delhi.⁵¹ This *A conference* arguably marked the genesis of Asian-African Internationalism in the early Cold War. It grew out of Nehru's vision for India's socio-political reconstruction alongside the process of British, French and Japanese imperial dissolution. The Conference implemented Nehru's vision for India's post-war trajectory, which was to develop into a modern nation-state that embraced neither US Capitalism nor Soviet Communism.

Meanwhile, the ROC government also drew on a developmental state model similar to India in the immediate post-war period. As historian Rana Mitter argues, China resembled European states in the sense that it was a 'post-war society' that had suffered enormous physical and social damage during the war, but it was also similar to India in that it was a 'postcolonial' society due to the Japanese imperial domination that it had experienced. Hence, in the initial phase of reconstruction after the war, the ROC, aware of its unique dual status, worked to extend its geopolitical influence beyond its cultural and political boundaries and 'used its post-war agency to construct a distinctive worldview regarding how Asia should be reimagined'.⁵² Therefore, Nanjing endorsed the *Asian Relations Conference* and sent a delegation to participate. Many of the ROC officials, such as Hang Liwu (杭立武) and Ye Gongchao (葉公超, George Yeh), thus became key witnesses to this initial step in India's effort to take a leadership role in postcolonial Afro-Asia.⁵³

Nevertheless, Nehru did not foresee the CCP's sweeping defeat of the KMT on Chinese mainland, which he realized would 'become a very heavy factor in shaping future Asian problems'.⁵⁴ He then recognized the PRC in 1950 because he was convinced that Communist China rather than Nationalist Taiwan was now the new center of gravity in Asian affairs. While Taipei was struggling for its survival, the CCP in Beijing was capable of improving the status of postcolonial Asia in international affairs. The KMT was surprised. The Nationalists' quasi-official newspaper *Hong Kong Times* (*xianggang shibao*) sourly labelled Nehru as 'an opportunist' who had underestimated 'the tyrannical nature of Mao's regime', which could fatally destroy his own project.⁵⁵ After initially supporting India's aspiration to play a leading role in decolonizing Asian politics, this condemnation marked the early breakdown of the ROC-India relationship.

In the first half of the 1950s, Asian-African Internationalism had generally been perceived by both the East and the West an independent geopolitical as well as ideological movement

attempting to cut a path between the United States and the Soviet Union. Taiwan had always been reticent of this movement, and particularly of its neutralist image. It worried that the PRC could manipulate the movement to further its cause in the ongoing fight for 'representational legitimacy'. Since 1953, the ROC Foreign Ministry had been closely tracking Communist involvement in Afro-Asia, and they redoubled these efforts in the lead up to the Bandung Conference. The Colombo Conference in late 1954, which was a preparatory meeting for the subsequent Asian-African Conference in Bandung, had ruled in favor of excluding the non-Communist halves of 'divided nations', including Taiwan, South Korea and South Vietnam. This exclusion had increased the KMT's hostility towards the Bandung Conference and Asian-African Internationalism more generally. Later in Bandung, the CCP delegation pursued diplomacy and improved relations with other Third World representatives by drawing on the 'Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence'.⁵⁶ The PRC Premier, Zhou Enlai, used this Conference to drive a wedge between the United States and its allies, and successfully delivered a message to the Americans regarding relaxation of Taiwan Strait tensions. Although Taipei was frustrated and angered by Beijing's diplomatic performance, due to its absence from Bandung it was unable to respond or counter its attacks.

Furthermore, the ROC Foreign Ministry recognized that the CCP delegation at Bandung had put itself forward as a role model of decolonization by arguing that they had successfully freed China from Western imperialists by decisively defeating the KMT in 1949.⁵⁷ Thus, the CCP incorporated its armed struggle against the KMT into a larger discourse of national liberation and postcolonial independence that appealed to many Afro-Asian countries. The PRC repeatedly worked to demonstrate that its hoped-for 'liberation of Taiwan' was essentially in alignment with the ideological interest in postcolonial state building held by other participants, such as India, Indonesia and Burma.⁵⁸ It successfully made the argument that the 'liberation of Taiwan' was an integral component of the unfinished agenda of decolonization, and that the recognition of the PRC rather than the ROC would profoundly strengthen the global status of Asian-African Internationalism. To the KMT, it seemed that the CCP had made themselves politically and culturally integral to the so-called Bandung movement. Hence, if Taipei showed its support for the movement that grew out of Bandung, it would have implied that the KMT also acquiesced to, if not acknowledged, the CCP's 'representational legitimacy' within this movement. Such recognition would have been suicidal for the ROC's own 'representational legitimacy'.

Therefore, the best strategy for Taiwan to maintain its legitimacy was *not* to attempt to break *into* the Bandung group in order to compete with the PRC. It was to break *with* the Bandung group. The KMT swiftly developed an anti-Bandung position, which it continued to pursue throughout the entire 1950s. Taiwan began its offensive by criticizing the 'neutralism' of the Bandung movement. In a report to Vice-President Chen Cheng (陳誠), ROC Foreign Ministry official Zhao Xuecheng (趙學誠) initially defined Bandung as a 'Third Force' (*di san shili*) which sought to position Afro-Asia between the Capitalist and Communist camps.⁵⁹ But as the Nationalists saw it, a genuine 'Third Force' could not exclude the ROC's presence in the Conference.⁶⁰ Hence, Taiwan's absence would only invalidate Bandung's claim to neutralism. As another pro-KMT newspaper *China Times* (*zhongguo shibao*) emphasized, it was impossible to cultivate an authentic 'Third Force' balanced between Washington and Moscow, and the Bandung movement was 'internally fragile'.⁶¹ Picking up on the theme of anti-colonialism at the heart of the Bandung movement, *China Times* went further and argued that the old and declining European empires were responsible for the menace of Communist aggression in post-war Asia. The newly independent Asian states 'were so fervent in their rejection of the West' that they often overlooked the more imminent danger from the PRC and the Soviet Union.⁶² The Bandung movement was not a solution to the persistent colonial presence, but instead exposed budding postcolonial states to the 'Red Offensive' which would fundamentally harm their cherished newfound sovereignty.⁶³

The ROC Foreign Ministry echoed aforementioned arguments in claiming that the CCP's call for 'self-determination' and 'peaceful coexistence' at Bandung was dangerous conspiratorial

propaganda, which exploited the movement to further its aggressive geopolitical interests.⁶⁴ Drawing on these arguments, Nationalist diplomat He Fengshan (何鳳山) warned Gamal Abdel Nasser, the Egyptian Prime Minister, about India's 'hypocrisy' in Third World politics in the lead up to the Bandung Conference.⁶⁵ During the conference, Taiwan dispatched lobbyists to encourage the non-Communist and anti-Communist participants, such as Iraq, Egypt and Thailand, to level public accusations of underground subversion against the PRC.⁶⁶ In this way, Taipei hoped it could subtly provoke tensions and thereby disrupt the smooth running of the Conference.⁶⁷ The Foreign Ministry official Zhao Xueyuan (趙學淵) wrote to Vice-President Chen Cheng (陳誠) to argue that the ROC government ought to convince the Bandung nations to develop concrete plans for postcolonial modernization which drew on economic and technological cooperation. Such plans would require these countries simply not buying into the PRC's empty rhetoric.⁶⁸ He also suggested that Foreign Ministry should dedicate to persuading Western powers to respect the desire for national liberation in postcolonial Afro-Asia. Otherwise, the newly independent states would be seduced by the CCP's ideological deception.⁶⁹

These attempts to weaken the PRC's position in Bandung were far from sufficient. Taipei needed an institution to resist and challenge both Beijing's manipulation of Bandung and the perceived neutralist tendency of Afro-Asia, which it deemed perilous to its 'representational legitimacy' in the Third World. The previously-established APACL seemed an ideal venue for the pursuit of these objectives. From 1955, Taiwan began to cultivate an alternative, anti-Bandung discourse through the venue of the APACL that also spoke to postcolonial solidarity in Afro-Asia. As part of this effort, the ROC government looked to rebuild its relationship with Japan, as a matter of postcolonial reconciliation. However, Japan was still a former imperialist power in the eyes of many newly independent Asian countries.

Following the Korean War armistice in 1953, officials within the ROC government began to speak more favorably of Japan, viewing the Japanese as an anti-Communist ally rather than a former colonizer. General He Yingqin (何應欽), who had accepted Japan's surrender at the ceremony in Nanjing on 9 September 1945, referred to Sun Yat-sen's call for pan-Asian solidarity in order to argue for collaboration with Japan in the name of consolidating and defending 'Oriental Civilization' in the face of the existential Communist threat. The Nationalist executive dean (*xingzheng yuanzhang*), Yu Hongjun (俞鴻鈞), also contended that 'Japan deserved a place' at the center of the APACL.⁷⁰ Since the San Francisco Peace Conference in 1951, which officially terminated Japan's status of war with the Allied powers, the United States had been urging Japan to negotiate a separate peace treaty with the ROC.⁷¹ On 18 June 1951, Chiang Kai-shek officially announced a settlement whereby the Japanese would recognize the Nationalists in Taipei as the 'only rightful government representing China' in any sort of international agreement with Tokyo.⁷² On 28 April 1952, the ROC-Japan Peace Treaty was signed. It voided the state of war between the two countries that had existed since 9 December 1941, and forced Japan to 'relinquish its rights to Taiwan and Penghu'.⁷³ This treaty, as Hans van de Ven has noted, gave '(the Republic of) China a central position in international and East Asian affairs'.⁷⁴

However, this icebreaking diplomacy with the Japanese prompted the Nationalists to reconceptualize their former enemy's geopolitical role in post-war Asia. Given the fact that during World War II, Japan had conquered and governed territory spanning from Northeast to Southeast Asia, post-war Japan was both a defeated nation-state and an dismantled *empire*.⁷⁵ At the time of surrender, the Japanese Empire still had 'more than 1 million soldiers in China (in the form of the China Expeditionary Army under the leadership of General Okamura Yasuji), not including those in Taiwan or Korea'.⁷⁶

Political reconciliation between the ROC and Japan was a crucial step in this process of imperial disintegration and geopolitical realignment, and it led to Taipei's active recruitment of Tokyo into an expanded APACL. However, the collapse of the Japanese Empire had also had a significant impact on the KMT's geopolitical perception of the country, as Taiwan came to recognize Japan as a central player in postwar Asian international affairs. Taipei believed that, because of

its imperial past, the participation of Japan in the APACL could shift the gravity of Asian politics to the side of anti-Communism. Since the Communist takeover of the Chinese mainland, the Nationalists had been marginalized in the Asian diplomatic sphere. To attract Japan into the APACL would strengthen the KMT's position in the region, which was vitally important for its own 'representational legitimacy'. This aspiration grew even stronger after the Bandung Conference. Over the course of the Conference, the CCP delegation intentionally worked to make Japan less of a diplomatic pariah in postcolonial Afro-Asia drawing by on its developmental model of industrial modernization, despite strong criticism of the history of Japanese imperialism.⁷⁷

Influenced by this shift in the diplomatic perception of Japan, the ROC chapter of APACL (founded 1 August 1954) enthusiastically announced that a key agenda item for the second conference was to convince other member states to accept Japan's entry into the organization.⁷⁸ However, Taiwan's enthusiasm was quickly met by vehement opposition from South Korea.⁷⁹ After their visit to Saigon, the APACL chairman Lee Pon Nyong and the ROK Army lieutenant-general, Ch'oe Töksin (崔德新), issued a statement in Hong Kong accusing Japan of using American aid to collaborate with the CCP. They contended that the APACL should also unite against Japan's rearmament, in addition to resisting the growth of Communism in East Asia.⁸⁰

There were several reasons for Seoul's antagonism towards the suggestion to allow Tokyo to join the APACL. First, in the minds of South Korean leaders, defeating Communism in the Cold War was deeply interwoven with the struggle for decolonization. Having Japan in the APACL would run contrary to this conceptualization of the organization's goals, as Japan was not only a wartime enemy but also a former colonial master.⁸¹ Secondly, the ROK government had to galvanize and exploit nationalist sentiment in order to strengthen its own legitimacy, and Japan was the primary target for Korean nationalistic propaganda. Following the Japanese surrender, the US occupation forces asked Syngman Rhee, then in exile, to return to the Korean Peninsula, and used his reputation as a Korean patriot to convince the Korean public to accept his pro-Western leadership in the Cold War. Hence, Rhee's personal power came directly from the reputation he had built up during the struggle against Japan. Because the post-war authoritarian South Korean regime had limited popularity overall, Seoul frequently needed to arouse the fervor of nationalism among Korea's population to dampen opposition and unite the country around the new regime.⁸² Thirdly, 'anti-Japanese' sentiment was crucial to South Korea's rejuvenation of national identity. When Japan occupied Korea from 1910 to 1945, it attempted to extinguish Korean identity and to replace it with its own.⁸³ In the aftermath of the war, the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers (SCAP) was uncertain whether Korea should be recreated as a post-war nation-state.⁸⁴ From its establishment in 1948, the ROK was thus anxious to 'recover' its 'lost identity' as quickly as possible and to erase the memory of Japanese occupation. A hostile stance towards Tokyo would help Seoul to rebuild its sense of belonging and identity.

Hence, the ROC's efforts to reach consensus with the ROK on the issue of Japan were destined to be a frustrating business from the very beginning. Gu Zhenggang hence postponed the Japanese visit to Taipei until after Taiwan could get approval from South Korea regarding Japan's presence (at the very least as an observer) at the Second APACC.⁸⁵ At first, the ROK agreed to Japan's status in the APACL as an observer, but it quickly changed its mind and on 18 May 1955 it came out strongly against all Japanese involvement. While visiting Gu, Lee suggested that South Korea had reversed its previous decision to accept Japanese involvement because the Yoshida cabinet in Japan 'had become increasingly partial to the Chinese Communists', especially since the Bandung Conference.⁸⁶

By rebutting the ROC's arguments for the incorporation of Japan, Lee put Gu into an embarrassing position. Gu had already sent out the invitation to the Japanese Foreign Ministry, and the Japanese delegation was already on their way to Taipei.⁸⁷ On 22 May 1955, the South Korean ambassador to the ROC, Kim Hong'il (金弘一), told reporters from the KMT's official newspaper *Central Daily* that the fundamental reason that Seoul had backtracked on its previous agreement regarding Japan was that it suspected Taipei would allow Tokyo to quickly move

from being an observant in the APACL to being a full and active member.⁸⁸ Kim argued that the 'white imperialism' of Japan was the same evil as the 'red imperialism' of the Soviet Union and the PRC. He threatened that the ROK might consider withdrawing its registration in the Second APACC in order to rebuke the ROC for its rash decision to invite Japan.⁸⁹

The Foreign Ministry in Taipei then announced that the Japanese side had picked their chief representative for the Conference, Watanabe Tetsuzō (渡辺鉄蔵), who was a staunch anti-Communist intellectual with non-governmental background.⁹⁰ The ROC Chapter also expressed its wish that South Korea would keep its earlier promise and accept Japan's participation in the Conference. Gu Zhenggang was particularly dissatisfied by the fact that the Korean Chapter, in order to put pressure on Taiwan, often claimed to speak on behalf of Ryukyu Islands, South Vietnam and Thailand. Gu telegrammed the ROC ambassador to Seoul, Wang Dongyuan (王東原) that he 'had never heard of' any explicit disagreement from the RVN or Thailand regarding Japan's APACL entry, which is what the ROK was persistently asserting.⁹¹ The pro-KMT media also launched propaganda in order to put pressure on the South Korean side. For example, the *Free China* journal contended that Seoul should learn from Taipei's principle of 'repaying malevolence with benevolence (*yi de bao yuan*)' when it came to post-war reconciliation with Tokyo. Despite the fact that the Yoshida cabinet had shifted towards the PRC, the Taiwanese journal argued that South Korea could 'still win over the Japanese public' as well as Japanese non-governmental elites, who could then push Japan to alter its foreign policies.⁹²

Nevertheless, Gu eventually adopted a more conciliatory tone, inviting Lee Pon Nyong to further discuss the 'Japan Question' with the ROC Chapter.⁹³ Because Taiwan and South Korea were the two major powers leading the APACL the Second APACC fell into limbo as their relationship broke down. Lee blamed Japan for 'sabotaging' the progress of the conference, while the ROC Chapter made it clear that they held the ROK responsible for the breakdown of discussions.⁹⁴ For the first time, the ambitious expansion of the APACL had encountered a serious setback. This was particularly demoralizing to Taipei, as Beijing had achieved positive results from the Asian-African Conference earlier in the same year. In the following years, the KMT's determination to revive the APACL would lead not only to the rewriting of the organizational principles of the institution, but also the redefinition of its essential character in the context of the growing wave of solidarity for decolonization across Asia.

Befriending the enemy: Taiwan's endeavour to transform the APACC

The Second APACC was supposed to have met in Taiwan. Once it was cancelled, the ROC Chapter transformed the meeting into parallel informal forums so that the visits of anti-Communist Asian leaders to Taipei would not be wasted. The Nationalists were particularly afraid of losing their close relationship with the Japanese. Hence, the ROC Chapter organized a special symposium with Japanese delegates such as Funada Naka (船田中), Watanabe Tetsuzō, and Odachi Shigeo (大達茂雄).⁹⁵ Some of these Japanese representatives liaised directly with leading officials in the Yoshida government. Others had experience serving the imperial Japanese government during the Second World War. However, none of them actually worked for the Japanese Foreign Ministry at the time. They represented the viewpoint of anti-Communist forces within Japanese society rather than that of the government. The decision of the ROC Chapter to invite them revealed that the KMT envisioned the APACL as a transnational, quasi-governmental organization, with abundant non-governmental affiliations and connections. This distinguished the APACL from the U.S.-led security institutions like soon-to-be created SEATO that focused almost entirely on high politics. During the forum on 30 May 1955, Watanabe expressed concerns about Japan's apparent desire to normalize its trade relations with the PRC. The Nationalist participant in the forum, Hu Qiuyuan (胡秋原), concurred with Watanabe's statement and attacked the Nehruvian principles of 'neutralism' and 'peaceful-coexistence'. Hu argued that

these principles gave both the PRC and the Soviet Union extra time 'to prepare to launch another war'.⁹⁶ Gu Zhenggang chaired a follow-up forum the next day, and suggested that the Nationalists' recovery of the Chinese mainland would also solve other 'divided nation' problems in Asia to the advantage of anti-Communists, including those in Korea and Indochina.⁹⁷

The KMT was well aware of the deep animosity felt across Asia towards all forms of imperialism. Gu argued that Soviet imperialism was even more insidious than its European or Japanese predecessors and posed an even greater threat to decolonizing Afro-Asian states. Soviet imperialism 'would destroy indigenous traditional culture' by infecting the lives of every family in the Third World. In comparison, European colonialism had trapped Afro-Asian colonies in poverty but 'would never have destroyed their cultural spirit'.⁹⁸ Concurrently with these forums, Gu had also arranged generous touristic activities for the foreign visitors who had come to Taipei to participate in the Second APACC. These tours took the visitors to view military exercises and attend an exhibition on Taiwan's land reform and industrial projects. He intended to showcase the Nationalists' version of nation-state modernization, which he believed would be appealing to other postcolonial Afro-Asian countries.⁹⁹

The Korean Chapter soon opened discussions about restarting the Second APACC. On 12 July 1955, Lee Pon Nyong telegraphed Gu Zhenggang and suggested switching the conference venue to the Philippines. Lee also requested a new mechanism being established for deciding future participation in the APACL, which was that any non-Communist state must have to pass a unanimous vote from current APACL members in order to obtain an official invitation.¹⁰⁰ In September, Chiang Kai-shek instructed the ROC Chapter that if the Nationalist delegates failed to get the incorporation of Japanese membership accepted by other members in the preparatory discussion, they ought to 'reject hosting any future APACCs in Taipei'.¹⁰¹ After two months of deadlock over the issue, Gu Zhenggang resorted to private negotiations with the South Korean counterpart. As a final effort, he sent Chinese Nationalist delegates Hang Liwu and Bao Huaguo (包華國) to meet Lee Pon Nyong and Kim Hong'il in Seoul from 1 to 8 November.

Tensions escalated immediately from the first day of the meeting. Lee and Kim insisted on a unanimous vote before any future APACL members were recruited or admitted. Hang worried that such a deal would be seen to discriminate against Japan, and thus would discourage them from active involvement. He proposed a compromise, suggesting that for the second APACC, 'Japan could attend as an observer', but would only be able to join the APACL membership after official approval *via* a unanimous vote.¹⁰² At first, Lee acquiesced to this suggestion, but moments later reversed his position and even threatened to resign from the Korean Chapter. Hang was further surprised when Lee, on behalf of Syngman Rhee, put forward the hardline argument that the Second APACC should only allow members of the First APACC to attend.¹⁰³

In their reports, Hang and Bao complained that the South Korean attitude was volatile and emotional. However, they surrendered yet again to the Korean demands and agreed not to invite Japan to the Second APACC. They clarified that the ROC had not given up on Japan, and that the Japanese admittance to the organization would be publicly debated and decided at the Third APACC. Hang felt that Lee could not be trusted to keep his word, as he had frequently backtracked on his previous verbal commitments to allow the admission of Japan. As a result, Hang transcribed their conversations *secretly*, and presented these transcriptions whenever Lee denied his previous statements. By the end of the meetings on 8 November, the only thing Taipei and Seoul could agree on was to convene the Second APACC the following spring.¹⁰⁴

The ROK President Syngman Rhee resented the ROC-Japan rapprochement and was increasingly determined to halt its progress. On the afternoon of 22 January 1956, at a meeting with the Nationalist ambassador Wang Dongyuan (王東原), Rhee accused Japan of 'indulging' political fugitives from the Taiwan Independence Movement in Tokyo.¹⁰⁵ Rhee knew that the ROC government was very concerned about the political activities of indigenous-Taiwanese activists, such as Liao Wenyi (廖文毅) and Chen Zhixiong (陳智雄). Chen had attended the Bandung Conference on behalf of the *Taiwan Democratic Independence Party*. Liao Wenyi was working to

promote his vision for a 'Republic of Taiwan' outside of the ROC's control. In making this pitch, Liao co-opted the Bandung narrative of decolonization and postcolonial state formation.¹⁰⁶ Rhee attempted to strike fear into the hearts of the Nationalists 'informing' them of Japanese 'support' for these threatening and subversive political actors. However, Wang responded by downplaying the threat, stating that the exiled independence activists 'were now insignificant' and not among the Taipei's political concerns.¹⁰⁷

The Second APACC, in March 1956, marked the zenith of the ROC-South Korea confrontation. Seoul forcefully rejected Taipei's initiative that any future amendment to the APACL Charter could be made by a three-fourths approving vote. The Korean Chapter feared that this rule provided the ROC with enough flexibility to override the ROK's objections and admit Japan to the next conference. Nevertheless, following Filipino and South Vietnamese persuasion, Lee Pon Nyong accepted a complicated scheme that partially accepted Taiwan's reform initiative while still retaining the requirement of a 'unanimous vote' for new membership. Gu Zhenggang did not want to push Lee too far. Therefore, he advocated the establishment of a membership committee composed of four countries: Taiwan, South Korea, South Vietnam and the Philippines. He believed that such a committee, based on collective decision-making, could make the open rejection of Japanese membership more difficult at future conferences.¹⁰⁸ Alarmed by the constant quarrels over the 'Japan Question', Gu could not help but worry that the APACL's institutional fragility would be exposed, and that both the PRC and Soviet Union would take full advantage of the situation to tear the alliance apart.

With full authorization from the Foreign Ministry, the ROC Chapter skilfully narrowed the remit of the Second APACC's to countering and rebutting the CCP's propaganda at the Bandung Conference.¹⁰⁹ During the Second APACC, Gu hoped to eliminate for once and for all any remaining hope among Asian postcolonial nations for 'neutrality' between Soviet Communism and Western democracy.¹¹⁰ He denounced the Bandung movement in Afro-Asia, which in his opinion allowed the Communists 'to exploit the anti-colonial feelings of the Asian peoples and to engage in armed rebellion under the cloak of national liberation'.¹¹¹ Gu claimed that the APACL also aimed to fight against 'imperialism' and supported pressure for decolonization, but argued that the present enemy was now 'Communist imperialism' which had succeeded where European imperialism had left off. 'Communist imperialism is more vicious than Western imperialism,' said Gu Zhenggang, 'because the latter aims only at political subjugation and economic exploitation, whereas the former, besides political subjugation and economic exploitation, brings with it disintegration of the whole social structure, the destruction of religious culture, and the complete denial of human decency.'¹¹² Hence, anti-colonial states could achieve and maintain true emancipation only by tirelessly resisting any advancement of Communist oppression in their decolonizing regions.

The Second APACC also held workshops on anti-Communist methodologies and strategies. In those workshops, the Nationalist delegate, Zeng Baosun (曾寶蓀), suggested several measures to counter the ideological offensive from the Socialist Bloc, including the dissemination of posters, cartoons, magazines, radios, and pamphlets which depicted the 'vileness of Communism'.¹¹³ Due to the efforts of the Nationalists, the APACL had thus transcended its original purpose as a military defensive network modeled on NATO. It had come to integrate ideological, cultural, political, journalistic and even artistic dimensions of knowledge production and information circulation for the sole purpose of promoting the cause of anti-Communism. The workshops on 'Communism and Mass Media' reveal that the Second APACC had innovatively incorporated modern ideological concepts such as 'national liberation', 'self-determination' and 'universal human rights' into its own political language.¹¹⁴ These concepts were at the heart of the anti-colonial struggle led by the Bandung nations. Yet, the conference here concluded that *only* anti-Communism (through the vessel of the APACL), rather than 'neutralism', could genuinely realize these goals.¹¹⁵ Throughout the Second APACC, I argue that the ROC Chapter hoped to demonstrate that a transformed APACL was a more *legitimate* and *committed* platform than Bandung for the

promotion of Asian solidarity in the postcolonial era. In much the same way, the ROC government believed that it was a more *legitimate* representation of China than the PRC equivalent.

The Second APACC had left many outstanding issues that the APACL hope to be able to quickly solve at the next conference. Upon the invitation by South Vietnamese president, Ngo Dinh Diem, the membership committee that had been founded during the Manila meeting gathered in Saigon on 13 September 1956 in order to lay the groundwork for the Third APACC. In addition to scheduling March 1957 as the time for the third conference, the membership committee also decided to establish the APACL Council to further institutionalize the organization.¹¹⁶ In addition to their continuing aspiration to invite Japan, the ROC Chapter also planned to invite as many anti-Communist politicians from the Bandung nations as possible, including politicians from Cambodia, Laos, Nepal, Afghanistan, Ceylon (Sri Lanka), Indonesia and India.¹¹⁷ Many of the official governments of these Bandung nations had already recognized the PRC. However, Taiwan did not want to entirely cut off its ties with the Bandung nations, especially those which claimed to be 'neutralist', even though it vehemently opposed their official endorsement of the PRC. Therefore, under the ROC's direction the APACL also aimed to incorporate anti-Communist forces from Bandung nations into the organization, despite their official presence in the Asian-African Conference. The ROC Chapter expected the invitation to and involvement in the APACC would help increase the political strength of anti-Communist forces within Bandung nations, which would in turn gradually tilt their diplomatic position towards the APACL side and away from neutralism.¹¹⁸ In this sense, the APACL was also an active participant in Asian-African Internationalism, as it drew on shared objectives of decolonization, but strictly confined within the ideological framework of anti-Communism.¹¹⁹

The Second APACC also decided that the third conference would open around the time of the 11th UN General Assembly. Taipei was anxious about the Assembly, as it believed that Beijing would seek UN admission. Hence, Gu added the subject of the UN onto the proposed core agenda for the Third APACC in order to push for APACL support in rejecting the CCP's admission. During the Saigon visit, Gu managed to make a deal with Ngo Dinh Diem that allowed the ethnic Chinese in South Vietnam to freely choose either ROC or ROV citizenship.¹²⁰ This policy was an imitation of the deal that the PRC made with Indonesia during the Bandung Conference, and was part of a further assertion of 'representational legitimacy' as the 'real China'. However, the preparatory meetings failed to resolve the 'Japan Question'. The Korean Chapter again threatened to withdraw from the APACL if Taiwan persisted in trying to invite Japan. This time Gu responded harshly, stating that Taipei 'would dissolve' the organization if Seoul continued to disrespect 'the principle of expansion' as enshrined in the APACL Charter.¹²¹ The Philippines abstained from the dispute, while other countries such as Thailand and South Vietnam again attempted to mediate between South Korea and Taiwan. The South Korean delegates ultimately 'agreed to lobby Syngman Rhee again' for Japan's entrance once they returned to Seoul.¹²²

The ROC Chapter had learnt a lesson from these endless negotiations. Without the power and authority to command the direction of the APACL, the Nationalists' proposal to admit Japan would continue to go nowhere. The founding of the APACL Council provided a good opportunity to change these dynamics. During the Third APACC, participants were eager to elect a chair for the Council and to choose its permanent location for the organization's headquarters. South Vietnam was particularly interested in hosting the organizational headquarters in Saigon. The Nationalist delegation decided to abandon its claim to host the headquarters in Taipei as a bargaining chip in their fight to admit Japan. Instead of pursuing the headquarters, the ROC Chapter would vie for the role of chair. However, Gu Zhenggang would face intensive competition from the Filipino candidate for chairmanship, who was supported by South Korea. The Filipinos had actively approached lieutenant-general Ch'oe Töksin, one of the ROK's representatives, a few days prior to the election, to obtain Korean support for the Filipino candidacy. Instead of running their own candidate, Ch'oe assisted the Filipinos in the electoral campaign

because he was certain that they could ensure that the APACL continued to take an anti-Japan position.¹²³ However, due to the high profile he had developed over the previous two conferences, Gu eventually secured the most votes, winning support from a variety of attendees including Pakistan, Burma and Australia.¹²⁴ By the end of the Third APACC, the APACL had officially determined that the headquarters of the Council would be in Saigon, and had appointed Gu Zhenggang as chairman and Ngayen Hwm Thong from South Vietnam as the General Secretary. The location of central operations was henceforth settled, though the APACL continued to rotate its conference venues between Taiwan, South Korea and Vietnam over the following decade.

In the meantime, the ROC Chapter looked beyond Asia and noticed that a very similar anti-Communist alliance had been developed in Latin America. Upon invitation, Gu Zhenggang attended the third conference of the Latin American Anti-Communist League (LAAC) in April 1957. In Lima (Peru), Gu established extensive contacts with representatives from more than twenty Latin American countries and promoted the prospect of the LAAC and the APACL working together in order to build a worldwide anti-Communist movement.¹²⁵ He brought back this idea to the APACL, and attempted to convince his colleagues of the need for a global conference promoting anti-Communism in the postcolonial world. In the first meeting of the newly formed APACL Council, Gu claimed that the KMT's representational competition with the CCP 'had now reached a more advanced stage'. Now, the struggle for legitimacy would be all-consuming, and 'affected all aspects of life', from thoughts to actions, high politics to everyday life, and from individual behavior to group planning.¹²⁶ He then broadened the argument from the ROC's specific anti-Communist struggle (against the PRC) to what he saw as the unavoidable expansion of the anti-Communist struggle to all aspects of life all across the world. Hence, he pleaded with the APACL Council that they should overcome geographic and cultural constraints, and seek intercontinental coordination and even a prospective coalition with the LAAC.¹²⁷

In response to Gu's statement, the APACL Council promulgated a declaration announcing its formal support for the LAAC in the service of building a global anti-Communist league that united all peoples 'regardless of nationality, race, or confessional and religious beliefs'.¹²⁸ It then authorized Gu to act as the APACL's chief representative in all communication with the LAAC. By the time the Council meeting was over, the APACL was no longer a loose regional constellation but a mature organization with stable structure based on a solid ideology. It was able to reuse the same procedure of transnational alliance building in the years to come. The ROC Chapter, which had strategically orchestrated this development, had reaped considerable benefits from it. In 1957, thanks to the APACL, the Nationalists began to feel that their position as the *legitimate* representative of China was becoming more secure, despite the fact that they only effectively controlled Taiwan.

Conclusion

From the idea of an Eastern NATO to an internationalist, postcolonial, anti-Communist institution, the transformation of the APACL went well beyond anyone's expectations. Growing out of its own concern to strengthen its 'representational legitimacy' as both a decolonizing power and post-war Chinese nation-state, the ROC made a greater contribution to this metamorphosis than other members of the alliance. These efforts demonstrated that the Nationalists also took postcolonial Asian-African countries and their desire for national liberation seriously. In the KMT narrative, the CCP and the Soviet Union were the neo-imperial archenemy whom the Bandung nations should really be resisting. Following logically from this position, Taiwan argued that in order to truly defeat and destroy colonialism, one must aggressively fight against Communism. Therefore, the ROC helped to develop the APACL into an institution that opposed both the PRC's exploitation of Asian-African Internationalism and its neutralist stance in the Cold War. In the meantime, throughout the Second and Third APACC, Taipei had made enormous efforts to

demonstrate that the APACL also shared the objectives of decolonization and postcolonial nation-building that were so dear to the newly independent Afro-Asian countries. Taipei argued that the APACL, rather than the Bandung Conference, was the ‘truly legitimate’ platform for realizing such goals. Drawing on this argument, the ROC appealed to postcolonial Afro-Asia, including the so-called neutralist states, to join the APACL as the *only* route to national emancipation and postcolonial development.

The new APACL focused more on ideas, culture and civil society, rather than being limited to military co-ordination and technology, and it also allowed Taiwan to pursue political reconciliation with post-imperial Japan by incorporating them into the core of the Asian anti-Communist front. These efforts prompted a strong backlash from the ROK, resulting in a series of unresolved negotiations. However, it was in this process of struggling over Japan’s entrance that many of the APACL’s critical organizational principles and collective decision-making mechanisms were enacted and implemented. Following the Third APACC, Taiwan assisted in transforming the APACL into a mature, ideological-grounded institution for postcolonial unity. Reaching beyond the orbit of East and Southeast Asia, the ROC Chapter then opened the way for potential inter-continental collaboration with the LAAC. This transformation eventually paved the way for the Nationalists’ initiation of intimate cooperation with other anti-Communist regimes in non-Asian regions, including the Middle East and Southern Africa, during the 1960s and the 1970s.

Notes

1. ‘Asian-African Internationalism’ is a contested scholarly term and can be used to refer to a constellation of interrelated political as well as social programs. In this article, I adopt the definition put forward by Lorenz Luthi in his latest monograph, *Cold Wars: Asia, The Middle East, Europe*. Luthi conceptualized Asian-African Internationalism as a movement that ‘tried to promote formal decolonization, economic development of the Global South, international justice, and peace.’ The phrase ‘Asian-African’, in Luthi’s monograph, ‘denotes the Bandung Conference and the associated movement, and Afro-Asian the geographic space of the two continents’, even though ‘only three countries from sub-Saharan Africa participated’. See: Lorenz M. Luthi, *Cold Wars: Asia, The Middle East, Europe* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press), 266.
2. Before 2005, the most well-known analysis of the Bandung movement was that of Roeslan Abdulgani. His nuanced study describes the tensions among the participants in the Bandung Conference and argues that the decision to include the PRC in the conference was one of the sources of these tensions. See: *Roeslan Abdulgani, The Bandung Connection: The Asia-Africa Conference in Bandung 1955* (Singapore: Gunung Agung, 1981). Following the 50th anniversary of the Bandung Conference, the scholarship on the conference blossomed and flourished to an unprecedented extent. Between 2005 and 2015, many reputable works were produced on the First Asian-African Conference. These include: Jamie Mackie, *Bandung 1955: Non-Alignment and Afro-Asian Solidarity* (Singapore: Editions Didier Millet, 2005); Ampiah Kweiku, *The Political and Moral Imperatives of the Bandung Conference of 1955: The Reactions of US, UK and Japan* (London: Global Oriental, 2007); Vijay Prashad, *The Darker Nations: A People’s History of the Third World* (New York: The New Press, 2007); Tan See Seng & Amitay Archarya, ed., *Bandung Revisited: The Legacy of the 1955 Asian-African Conference for International Order* (Singapore: National University of Singapore Press, 2008); Christopher J. Lee, ed., *Making a World after Empire: The Bandung Movement and Its Political Afterlives* (Athens, Ohio: University of Ohio Press, 2010); Derek McDougall & Antonia Fiannane, eds., *Bandung 1955: Little Histories* (Caulfield: Monash University Press, 2010). Most recently, both *Critical Asian Studies* and *World History* have published special issues on continuous debates regarding the Asian-African movement. In contrast to the 2005-15 literature, which largely concentrated on the Conference itself, these newer studies examine the Bandung moment within a broader timeframe that includes the *Asian Relations Conference* (1947), *Asia-Pacific Peace Conference* (1952), *Asian Socialist Conference* (1953), *Bandung Conference* (1955), *Asian-African Peoples’ Solidarity Organization* (AAPSO) conferences (1957-1965), and the ill-fated *Second Asian-African Conference* (1965). See: Su Lin Lewis & Carolien Stolte, ed., “Other Bandungs”, *Journal of World History (Special Issue)*, 30, 1-2 (2019); Zhou Taomo & Liu Hong, ed., “Bandung Humanism: Towards a New Understanding of the Global South”, *Critical Asian Studies (Special Issue)*, 51, 2 (2019).
3. This is particularly the case for Chinese mainland scholars. For example: Li Hong, “‘Ke shi mi er gongzhu hao’ an’jian zhenxiang (The Truth behind the “Kashmir Princess” Incident)”, *Dangdai Zhongguoshi Yanjiu (Contemporary Chinese History Studies)*, 19, 4 (2012). However, non-China based historians like Steve Tsang have also argued that the KMT organized this assassination, though without the involvement of the CIA. See:

- Steve Tsang, 'Target Zhou Enlai: The "Kashmir Princess" Incident of 1955', *China Quarterly*, 139, 9 (1994), 782; Wendell L. Minnick, 'Target Zhou Enlai: Was America's CIA Working with Taiwan Agents to Kill Chinese Premier', *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 158, 28 (1995), 54. Many other scholars such as Chen Jian and Nancy Bernkopf Tucker have also accepted this interpretation. See: Chen Jian, 'Bridging Revolution and Decolonization: The "Bandung Discourse" in China's Early Cold War Experience', *Chinese Historical Review*, 15, 2 (2008), 207-41; Nancy B. Tucker, *Taiwan, Hong Kong, and the United States, 1945-1992: Uncertain Friendships* (New York: Twayne Publishers, 1994).
4. Tsang, 'Target Zhou Enlai', 766.
 5. Chiang Kai-shek, *Su'e zai Zhongguo (Soviet Russia in China) in Zongtong Jianggong sixiang yanlun zongji (General Works of President Chiang Kai-shek's Thoughts and Speeches)*, vol.9 (Taipei: Zhongyang wenwu gongying she, 1984), 301.
 6. Lü Fangshang, 'Zongcai de "shounao wajiao": 1949 nian Jiang Zhongzheng chufang fei han (Diplomacy from Supreme Leader: Chiang Kai-shek's Visits to Philippines and South Korea in 1949)' in *Jiang Zhongzheng yu minguo wajiao (Chiang Kai-shek and Nationalist China's Diplomacy)*, ch.1 (Taipei: Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Hall Foundation, 2013), 12-3.
 7. Syngman Rhee Institute (Yonsei University), *A Brief History of the Asian Peoples' Anti-Communist League* (Washington D.C.: Wilson Centre Digital Archive, 1956), 7.
 8. Timothy A. Sayle, *Enduring Alliance: A History of NATO and the Post-War Global Order* (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 2019), 11.
 9. Ben C. Limb, 'The Pacific Pact: Looking Backward or Forward', *Foreign Affairs*, July (1951).
 10. Ibid.
 11. Lü Fangshang, 'Zongcai de "shounao wajiao"', 13.
 12. Amita Acharya, *Whose Ideas Matter? Agency and Power in Asian Regionalism* (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 2010), 3 & 44-5.
 13. Wang Tao, 'Neutralizing Indochina: The 1954 Geneva Conference and China's Efforts to Isolate the United States', *Journal of Cold War Studies*, 19, 2 (2017), 30.
 14. Xiao Xiqing, *Zhong Fei wajiao guanxi shi (A History of Sino-Philippines Diplomatic Relations)* (Taipei: Zhengzhong shuju, 1995), 186-7.
 15. Ibid.
 16. 'Chen Zhiping dianchen Ni'he lu ju canjia Yameng ji Ji'linuo jue ding yu xuanju hou jiji jinjin jue jixu chengren Zhongguo deng shi (Chen Zhiping Telegraphed Nehru's Rejection of Invitation to Participate in the Anti-Communist Alliance & Quirino Decided to Continue Active Recognition of the ROC after Domestic Election)', *President Chiang Kai-shek Archives (PCKS)*, Taipei, Academia Historica (AH), 002-090103-00010-197.
 17. 'Luo Jialun dian Jiang Zhongzheng yindu taidu ke wei hanxin yinwei yazhou lingxiu yu deng' (Luo Jialun's Telegram to Chiang Kai-Shek: About Frustrating Response from India who Desired to be the Leader of Asia', *PCKS*, Taipei, AH, 002-020400-00049-076.
 18. Qin Xiaoyi, *Zongtong Jianggong dashi changbian chugao (Preliminary Draft of President Chiang Kai-shek's Major Chronicle)*, vol.9 (Taipei: Zhongzheng wenjiao jijin hui, 2003), 108.
 19. Ngoei Wen-Qing, *Arc of Containment: Britain, the United States and Anticommunism in Southeast Asia* (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 2019), 5.
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 29. 'Memorandum of Conversation: Activities of Asian Peoples' Anti-Communist League', 11 May. 1957, National Archives and Record Administration (NARA), Decimal Files (DF) 1954-57, Record Group (RG) 59, P225, Box 25.

30. 'American Embassy, Taipei No. 449: Report of Conversation with Foreign Ministry Official on a "Pacific Pacts"', 10 February. 1954, NARA, Classified General Records (CGR, US Embassy Taipei), 1939-1964, RG84, UD3528, Box 14.
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33. Leszek Buszynski, *SEATO: The Failure of an American Strategy* (Singapore: National University of Singapore Press, 1983), 44.
34. Lin Hsiao-ting & Xiao Ruping, 'Inside the Asian Cold War Intrigues: Revisiting the Taiwan Strait Crisis', *Modern Asian Studies*, 52, 6 (2018), 2113.
35. In the late 1960s, SEATO's successor organization, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) was created, arguably to ensure that the sovereignty of anti-Communist Asian states was more respected and more emphasis placed on their own agency. However, this was not the case in SEATO right after the Korean War. See: Dylan M. H. Loh, 'The Disturbance and Endurance of Norms in ASEAN: Peaceful but Stressful', *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, 72, 5 (2018).
36. A day earlier (8 March 1954), Lee held a press conference in Hong Kong, declaring that Indochina, Singapore and Malaya were "facing the same perilous situation" as the ROC and the ROK in their struggle against the 'common Communist enemies'. See: 'Han youhao fang'wentuan jin zaidu lai tai, zuo zai xianggang zhaodai jizhe fenxi yazhou xingshi (The Second Visit of the ROK's Representative Group to Taiwan, and the Journalist Reception in Hong Kong Yesterday focused on Anti-Communist Analysis in Asia)', *Central Daily*, 9 March. 1954, *General Archives (GA)*, Taipei, Kuomintang Party History Archive (KPHA), 586/209.
37. "Guanyu han guo renmin zhenhai fangong huiyi shuotie (Memo on the APACC in Jinhae)." *APACL Series*, Taipei, IMH, AS, 715.3/0001.
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40. *ibid*, 334.
41. Chen Canghai & Yang Zhijie, *Guomin dahui mishuzhang Gu Zhenggang zhuanji (Gu Zhenggang: The Secretary of National Council)* (Taipei: Lifayuan yizheng bowuguan, 2013), 71–73.
42. *ibid*, 180.
43. 'Zhonghua minguo chuxi yazhou renmin fangong huiyi daibiaotuan baogaoshu (The ROC Representative's Report on the APACC)', *APACL Series*, Taipei, IMH, AS, 647/0005.
44. *ibid*.
45. Syngman Rhee Institute (Yonsei University), 'Asian Peoples' Anti-Communist Conference, Minutes of the Opening Session', 15 June. 1954, Washington D.C., Wilson Center Digital Archive.
46. 'A speech delivered by Mr. Ku Cheng Kang, Chief Delegate from the Republic of China to the Asian Peoples' Anti-Communist Conference, at Chinhae, Korea', 17 June. 1954, *APACL Collection*, Taipei, IMH, AS, 715.3/0002.
47. 'Zhonghua minguo chuxi yazhou renmin fangong huiyi daibiaotuan baogaoshu (The ROC's Representative Report on the APACC)', *APACL Series*, Taipei, IMH, AS, 647/0005.
48. The "State of Vietnam" later became the "Republic of Vietnam (ROV)" after the 1955 referendum that deposed Emperor Bao Dai.
49. Some of these representative works are listed here: Robert Accinelli, *Crisis and Commitment: United States Policy toward Taiwan, 1950-1955* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1996); David M. Finkelstein, *Washington's Taiwan Dilemma, 1949-1950: From Abandonment to Salvation* (Fairfax, VA: George Mason University Press, 1993); John W. Garver, *The Sino-American Alliance: Nationalist China and American Cold War Strategy in Asia* (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1997); Nancy B. Tucker, *Dangerous Strait: The US-Taiwan-China Crisis* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005), etc.
50. Lü Fangshang. 'Zongcai de shounao wajiao', 29–32.
51. Jawaharlal Nehru, *Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru (SWJN)* vol.1, (New Delhi: Jawaharlal Nehru Memorial Fund, 1984), 483 & vol.9, 152.
52. Rana Mitter, 'State-Building after Disaster: Jiang Tingfu and the Reconstruction of Post-World War II China, 1943–1949', *Contemporary Studies in Society and History*, 61, 1 (2019), 178–79.
53. Hang Liwu, 'Ziyou yazhou de zhongyaoxing (The Significance of Free Asia)', *Free China*, 10 (1955), 9.
54. Nehru, *SWJN*, vol.9, 175.
55. 'Ni'helu wang hechu qu (Where Should Nehru Go)', *Hong Kong Times*, 13 January. 1950; 'Ya fei huiyi zhi zhanwang (Vision for the Afro-Asian Conference)', *Asian-African Materials (AAM003)*, *Vice-President Chen Cheng Archive (VPCC)*, Taipei, AH, 008-010602-00010-003.

56. Five Principles: 1) Mutual respect for each other's territorial sovereignty and integrity; 2) Mutual non-aggression; 3) Mutual non-interference in each other's affairs; 4) Equality and cooperation for mutual benefit; 5) Peaceful Coexistence.
57. 'Dui zhonggong liyong ya fei huiyi jinxing wajiao huodong de celue yinmou zhi fenxi (An Analysis of the CCP's Diplomatic Conspiracy in the Asian-African Conference)', AAM002, VPCC, Taipei, AH, 008-010602-00010-002.
58. Ibid.
59. 'Yazhou feizhou huiyi qianzhan (Prospect of an Asian-African Conference)', AAM002, VPCC, Taipei, AH, 008-010602-00010-001. In fact, countries seeking to act as a Cold War 'Third Force' were rather common in the 1960s. As Su Lin Lewis pointed out, 'Third Force' movements were also prevalent in French-led Western Europe and in the post-war British Labour Party, in addition to the movement founded at Bandung. See: Su Lin Lewis, 'Asian Socialism and the Forgotten Architects of Post-Colonial Freedom, 1952–1956', *Journal of World History*, 30, 1–2 (2019), 61.
60. 'Yazhou feizhou huiyi qianzhan (Prospect of an Asian-African Conference)', AAM002, VPCC, Taipei, AH, 008-010602-00010-001.
61. 'Yazhou renmin fan gong yu xiandaihua de daolu (Asian People's Anti-Communism and the Road to Modernization)', *China Times*, 19 March. 1956.
62. Ibid.
63. Ibid. As Cindy Ewing argued, 'state sovereignty was paramount' to the worldview of postcolonial Afro-Asian states. See: Cindy Ewing, 'The Colombo Powers: Crafting Diplomacy in the Third World and Launching Afro-Asia in Bandung', *Cold War History*, 18, 2(2018), 2–5.
64. 'Wo dui Kelunpo guojia zhaokai ya fei huiyi suo cai lichang zhi xuanchuan zhishi yaodian (Instructions for Propaganda regarding the ROC's Position against the Convening of the Asian-African Conference by the Colombo Powers)', *Asian-African Conference File*, Taipei, AH, 649/88020; 'Ya fei huiyi yu gong fei huo qiao yinmou (Asian-African Conference and the Communists' Conspiracy to Damage Overseas Chinese)', *Afro-Asian and Asian Conferences*, Taipei, AH, 413.2/0037.
65. He Fengshan, *Wajiao shengya sishi nian (Forty Years of Diplomatic Career)* (Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, 1990), 329.
66. 'Guan yu ya fei huiyi de duice (Solutions to the Problem of the Asian-African Conference)', Taipei, AH, 649/80039; 'Telegraph from Iraqi Embassy (0693)', 17 January. 1955, 649/88020; 'The ROC Embassy in Thailand to Foreign Ministry', 4 May. 1955, 649/88020; 'The ROC Ministry of Foreign Affairs to Iraqi Embassy (Baghdad)', 5 April. 1955, 649/88039; He Fengshan, *Wajiao shengya*, 333.
67. Like Beijing, Taipei did not treat the Bandung movement as a monolithic entity. See: Gregg A. Brazinsky, *Winning the Third World: Sino-American Rivalry during the Cold War* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2017), 96.
68. 'Ya fei huiyi zhi zhanwang (Visions of Asian-African Conference)', AAM003, VPCC, Taipei, AH, 008000000811A. Zhao's proposal was reviewed and accepted by the ROC Foreign Ministry and Vice-President Chen Cheng. Taiwan's anti-PRC persuasion might convince the anti-Communist nations participating in the Bandung Conference. But its impact on other countries was limited.
69. Ibid.
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71. Jay Taylor, *Generalissimo: Chiang Kai-shek and the Struggle for Modern China* (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2009), 451; Antony Best, 'Japan and the Cold War: An Overview' in *Oxford Handbook of the Cold War* (New York & Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 4; Jennifer M. Miller, 'The Struggle to Rearm Japan: Negotiating the Cold War State in US-Japan Relations', *Journal of Contemporary History*, 46, 1, 2011, 82-3; John W. Garver. *The Sino-US Alliance: Nationalist China and American Cold War Strategy in Asia* (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1997), 55.
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73. Hans van de Ven, 'The 1952 Treaty of Peace between China and Japan' in *Negotiating China's Destiny in World War II* (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2014), 230.
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78. 'Choukai xiajie yazhou renmin fangong huiyi shishi yaodian cao'an (Draft Proposal for Convening the Second APACC)', *APACL Series*, Taipei, AS, 647/0005.
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81. Charles Kraus, "'The Danger is Two-Fold": Decolonization and Cold War in Anti-Communist Asia, 1955-7', *International History Review*, 39, 2 (2017), 257.
82. Gregg Brazinsky, *National Building in South Korea: Koreans, Americans and the Making of Democracy* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2007), 16; Masuda Hajimu, *Cold War Crucible: The Korean Conflict and the Post-war World* (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2015), 78-9.
83. Antony Best, 'Japan and the Cold War: An Overview', 10.
84. Kwang-Yeong Shin, 'The Trajectory of Anti-Communism in South Korea', *Asian Journal of German and European Studies*, 2, 3 (2017), 2.
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86. 'Wang Dongyuan zhi waijiaobu (Wang Dongyuan to the Foreign Ministry)', *Ibid.*
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90. 'Yameng Gu Zhenggang huixin hancheng dashi Wang Dongyuan (1611) (Gu Zhenggang's Reply to Wang Dongyuan)', 22 May. 1955, *APACL Series*, Taipei, AS, 647/0009.
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92. 'Yameng huiyi de liuchan yu yazhou tuanjie fangong (The Abortion of the APACC and the Anti-Communist Solidarity of Asia)', *Free China*, 12, 11 (1955), 3.
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118. Ibid. Some of the anti-Communist participants in the Bandung Conference, such as Ceylon and Thailand, had already engaged in the APACL and had attended the Second APACC. The ROC Chapter intended to invite and woo anti-Communist forces from the more neutralist and even pro-Communist countries which had taken part in the Bandung movement.
119. For example, the APACL echoed the arguments of Filipino diplomat Carlos Romulo, who also participated in the Asian-African Conference. As historian Lisandro Claudio has argued, Romulo cultivated his vision for an anti-imperialist and anti-Communist Asia. Represented by Romulo, anti-Communist powers in Bandung often explained that the resistance to Communism could and should co-exist with anti-colonial nationalism, and did not lead to an 'automatic endorsement of imperialism'. See: Lisandro E. Claudio, 'The Anti-Communist Third World: Carlos Romulo and the Other Bandung', *Southeast Asian Studies*, 4, 1 (2016), 127–38.
120. 'Yameng si danwei tongguo jueyi (Four Countries Committee Made Their Decisions in the APACL)', *Central Daily*, 20 September. 1956.
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122. Ibid.
123. Ibid.
124. 'Chuxi yameng di san jie huiyi baogao (Reports on the Third APACC)', 29 September. 1957, *Ibid*.
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127. Ibid.
128. Ibid.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

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