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**Intrastate Armed Conflicts Internationalization:  
the Spatial and Systemic Factors Outcome**

**ABSTRACT**

The paper introduces an intermediate result of a research of an innovative dataset considering various processes that lead to intrastate armed conflicts internationalization. The phenomenon of internationalized intrastate conflict is being disaggregated into a system of variable parameters indicating its international, transnational and cross-border manifestations. Conflict dyad within one year serves a reporting unit within the system, which means every single year of ongoing conflict is considered a separate unit of surveillance.

The preliminary dataset encompasses 89 various conflict data points in Europe and Post-Soviet space within the period of the post-Cold War era (1989-2017). Further enhancement encompassing different regions is in progress within the research. All of the units are codified with 45 variable parameters, 23 of which were elaborated as a part of integrative three-dimensional analytical framework. This framework involves three vectors of their internationalization. The vertical vector of escalation includes traces of direct external military intervention, indirect interference and interstate onset. The horizontal vector represents processes of spatial spread of organized violence affecting other countries' territory. The systemic vector implies

the expansion of international systemic limits of original conflict by systemic relevance, proxy-fication and connectedness.

The paper presents grounds of the parameters disaggregation and validation of the sources of data as well as various ways of the dataset use in the field of international and internationalized intrastate conflict studies.

## **INTRODUCTION**

Conflicts had stopped being just a reflection of the two super powers confrontation on their fringes by the beginning of the Post Cold War era. Local and regional conflicts demonstrated complicated ties of different social and economic development levels as well as elements of conflict counteraction defining their ethnic, confessional and historical modes. Dramatic growth of international interference made them more sophisticated. The end of the 20<sup>th</sup> century was marked by multiplication of intrastate conflicts comparing to the number of interstate ones. Mostly they were the same that had been taking place previously, such as Indo-Pakistani confrontation, and demonstrated escalation circa one or two times a year. According to the UN estimates 82 per cent of international peace-keeping operations took place in 1995 and started from 1992 were increased in the areas of regional conflicts arising from intrastate contradictions. According to SIPRI classification 31 of “full-fledged armed conflicts” in 27 regions in 1994 were based on intrastate contradictions. Likewise, researchers of Uppsala University calculated that 97 of 103 armed conflicts took place in 1989-1997 were intrastate, herewith either struggle for power within state or territorial rearrangement accompanying state collapse were the most widespread types of intrastate conflicts. Moreover, line between internal and interstate conflicts was becoming finer and finer since 1970s, and right after the end of the Cold War it came up to rapid erosion and no civil war was intrastate anymore. All of the internationalized intrastate armed conflicts included features of both international and civil conflicts.

Fragile contexts are increasingly becoming battlegrounds in regional and international geopolitical contests. Full-fledged wars between states remain rare, but the distinction between intrastate and inter-state conflicts is now often badly blurred. 18 (38%) of the 47 intrastate wars recorded by the Uppsala Conflict Data Program in 2016 were internationalized “in the sense that external states contributed troops to one or more sides of the conflict”. This figure is exceptionally high by post-Cold War standards. It may also underrepresent the number of internationalized civil wars as it does not include cases in which outside actors support combatants with arms, money or proxy forces rather than only troops.

Both vertical (intensity growth) and horizontal (expansion and contagion of the other countries and regions) rapid escalation are the most hazardous. Complexity of the threats deriving from these conflicts is tied to their connectedness to vast areas of military tension and sporadic outbreaks of violence, such as the so-called “arch of instability” stretching along the southern borders of Russia from Caucasus to East Turkestan and acceded conflicts in Afghanistan and Kashmir, as well as the vast conflict area including Sudan, Ethiopia, the Great Lakes, Angola and Congo Valley. Violent and persistent essence is one of the most menacing features of armed intrastate conflicts. Moreover, they are the most continuous: if civil war does not come to end during the first year it lasts for decades in most cases as a result of military balance reached by parties. Intensity of armed encounter is usually high and averagely exceeds violence level specific for low intensity of the 70s-80s. The same situation is with gradual erosion of the line between conflicts of low intensity (guerilla wars, outbreaks of terrorist activity etc.) and conflicts of moderate activity (confrontation between regional powers). Moderation of local regional conflicts intensity is explained by possibility of protracted warfare without development into

global conflict. The other factors led to local conflicts expansion are massive arms flow and limited resources of conflict parties.

Thus, the changes occurred in local regional conflicts in the end of the 20<sup>th</sup> century let us assume that the idea of “full-fledged armed conflict” proposed by SIPRI does not perfectly reflect contemporary realities. First, the definition of “full-fledged armed conflict” encompasses conflicts with government as one of parties. However, number and intensity of conflicts between various groupings in local regional conflicts without direct engagement of governmental powers had arisen. Second, including just full-fledged conflicts into analysis does not let get dynamics of conflict potential growth.

Therefore, the main peculiarities of contemporary local regional conflicts are averaging of intensity and erasing of line between internal and international aspects and they are mostly tied to inevitability of relatively rapid internationalization of intrastate contradictions within conditions of ethnopolitical regrouping caused by bipolar system collapse.

Most of the post-Soviet and post-Yugoslavian conflicts transformed from escalation to simmering or frozen phase or even deadlock (such as Transdnestrria, Nagorny Karabakh, Abkhazia, South Ossetia etc.) after the primary extraterritorial regrouping. The flow of armed conflicts triggered by the collapse of the USSR is demonstrated by dynamics of conflicts based on ethnic and territorial contradictions as a result of state collapse and new states emergence. The number of armed conflicts of such a type were in majority over conflicts caused by struggle for power within state (civil wars). For instance, according to SIPRI data, there were 17 armed conflicts caused by territorial tensions and 14 ones caused by struggle for power. Situation in Europe was the most indicative example as it served an arena for bipolar confrontation and therefore was mostly influenced by its collapse (the first half of the 90s was marked by armed conflicts in Europe based only on territorial regrouping, multiethnic states

disintegration and new monoethnic states emergence). However, the number of armed conflicts caused by struggle for power within state exceeded number of territorial intrastate conflicts again by 1997. This lets us assume that the conflict potential caused by the collapse of the USSR and a number of post-Communist bloc states was almost exhausted by the second half of the 90s.

By the way, the mid 90s seems to be out the general logics of armed conflicts potential development of the 20<sup>th</sup> century last decade. Almost two thirds of the armed conflicts escalated during the second half of the 90s are deriving from 1989-1993. However, the number of the new ethnopolitical conflicts drastically reduced (excluding Central and Western Africa, South and South-East Asia). Moreover, de-escalation was demonstrated in a number of armed conflicts for the first time in the mid 90s – active warfare was substituted by negotiations and conclusions of truce. According to some data, 23 of 59 armed conflicts marked in 1998 were at the phase of de-escalation, 7 of 59 armed conflicts were at the phase escalation menace, the other 29 armed conflicts did not demonstrate any expressed tendency. The most significant reduction occurred relating to the most protracted and hazardous types of local regional confrontation – ethnopolitical conflict of separatist nature. The number of separatist conflicts was just 14 by 1997 – this was the lowest figure since 1970.

Most of Western experts tend to assume that the end of territorial regrouping caused by bipolar system collapse was accompanied by military, political and economic measures undertaken by states and governments whose territories faced ethnopolitical conflicts and civil wars as well as increased international efforts of conflict settlement.

The reduction of tensions in the mid 90s was seen for the first time both since the end of the Cold War and during the last decades, when number of escalations and outbreaks of violence was steadily increasing. We may assume that drastic growth

of ethnopolitical conflicts number at the beginning of the 90s was a sort of culmination of a protracted tendency deriving from national liberation wars in the end of 50s. The official end of the Cold War and final collapse of the bipolar system in that sense could serve an accelerator of an already existing tendency co-assisted a process of huge accumulated for decades conflict potential finally coming outside. In this connection, the USSR and Yugoslavia collapse led to 10 new ethnopolitical conflicts as well as global South gave birth to 25 new local regional conflicts at the same period.

In general, in spite of the short period of relative peace in the mid 90s the next years general rate of conflictogenity at local regional level demonstrated neither reduction nor stabilization. At least the most acute conflicts at the territory of relatively calm European continent such as Kosovo 1998-1999 and Chechnya in 1999 occurred after the end of ethnopolitical and territorial regrouping caused by the bipolar system collapse. Herewith, origins of the most armed conflicts outlived the mid 90s were the same old ethnopolitical contradictions that did not occur right after the end of the Cold War, but somehow demonstrated themselves during the entire post-war period (ethnopolitical conflict in Kosovo, Hutu and Tutsi in the Great Lakes etc.). In general, the tendency of regional conflictogenity reduction during the decade appeared to be less evident. If 115 ethnopolitical groups were active parties of internationalized intrastate armed conflicts at the beginning of 90s, by the end of the decade their number reduced to 95. Also more than 90 groups of that type were at edge of armed confrontation in various regions between centuries. Generally, it seemed that within the conditions of post-Kosovo environment most of left federal entities and polyethnic states were threatened with either collapse or internal instability with possibility of further internationalization.

Protracted nature of transitional period in international relations became one of the reasons of local regional conflicts boost maintenance at the beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup>

century. Undoubtly, there was some effect of precedent for certain period – the effect of gaining independence of ethnic groupings status improvement. However, there is good reason to believe that the key to these processes are less local than tied to wider interests of the international community, tendencies of global development, therefore the key is in the sphere of internationalization.

In their turn, international, transnational and cross-border dimensions of internal strife have become a prominent object of both international studies' and conflict studies' inquiry. The body of academic literature addressing various external aspects of civil wars has grown exponentially since early 1990s mostly driven by a dramatic increase in the share of what is often categorized as internationalized internal conflicts spreading mostly across post-Cold War Europe, the post-Soviet space and the MENA. Most of contemporary armed conflicts formally remaining intrastate inevitably gain external dimensions. However, arrangement of these manifestations and cohesion between them still remain underinvestigated. Limitedness of their generally accepted definitions in contemporary social and political science and necessity of a broader academic approach is obvious.

Thus, the fundamental role of the research is to present a running dataset, describing various aspects of intrastate armed conflicts internationalization taken in conjunction with each other. The dataset is a part of a broader research targeted on maintenance of analytical and statistic frameworks of organized violence internationalization, that is not limited by external state actors supporting or mediating role investigation. Moreover, to fully comprehend the nature of this phenomenon it is not sufficient to limit the study of armed conflicts to just the post-bipolar timeframe since many patterns of internationalization had started taking shape since after World War II.

### **THEORETICAL GROUNDS OF THE PRESENTED DATA**

The necessity of the internationalized intrastate armed conflicts phenomenon conceptional revision and renewal dictated the basic premise of the paper. This

purpose is caused by the fact that academically popular established and compromise understanding of internationalization phenomenon proposed by The Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) does not consider the entire existing academic experience and data encompassing the processes promoting intrastate armed conflict structure enhancement and dynamics transformation gaining new external dimensions. According to UCDP/PRIO intrastate internationalized conflict is defined as one between government and opposition with simultaneous interference of states as third parties and supporters of one or both conflict parties. However this academic approach does not consider an entire set of external dimensions that are complicated by nowadays multilayer nature of armed conflicts and difficult to withdraw from external state actors interference. The very interdependence between various manifestations of intrastate coercion makes their observation, description and systematization so vital within frameworks of an integrated conceptual and analytic system.

This is why the authors of the research propose the alternative operationalization of intrastate armed conflicts internationalization in a broader sense. Various academic approaches to civil conflicts are being correlated to prove necessity of consideration of two additional to traditional one dimensions and their incorporation into conceptual and methodological frameworks of internationalized conflict nature investigation. The one is spatial and tied to spread of organized violence (often originated on the sub-state level) and affecting territory of other (usually neighboring) countries leading to consequences (usually destabilizing) for both the source state and the recipient state. It considers coercion expansion and its consequences (spillovers). Another one is systemic dimension (systemic escalation) that denotes the expansion of international systemic limits of original conflict by increased political stake, interest and/or attention of various international actors vis-à-vis the conflict in question. This dimension helps to reveal interconnection

between coercion dynamics at subnational level and international processes at systemic level. The proposed dimensions are conceptual constructs aimed at facilitating the analysis of conflict dynamics and are not intended to be interpreted literally.

The vertical dimension (vertical escalation), in its turn, has traditionally referred to an increase in the intensity of violence, whereas horizontal escalation has been used to imply an increase in the number of actors involved, usually accompanied by inevitable geographic spread of violence. Vertical dimension covers the processes by which either the structure of a conflict gets expanded to involve outside (foreign) actors, normally as secondary (supporting) parties, or (often as a result of the former) the nominal level of conflict gets upgraded from intrastate to interstate. Vertical escalation is enabled either through an attack by a source state on the territory or subjects of one or more of its neighbors (outward-directed vertical escalation), or alternatively through intervention by a state-based external actor into the original internal conflict (inward-directed vertical escalation).

Such an enhanced approach integrating three dimensions enables to consider traditional set of internationalization factors more differently and more broadly and leads to extension of samples of observation within variety of intrastate armed conflicts (for instance, new factors of internationalization could be revealed within traditionally considered intrastate armed conflicts such as one in Northern Ireland, Chechnya etc.).

In the most general sense, we define conflict internationalization as expansion of its structure and dynamics in such a way that it acquires cross-border dimensions that may include but are not limited to geographic spread of hostilities or of its physical and social consequences, direct or indirect involvement of foreign actors (both state-based and non-statebased), as well as any observable growth of the relevance of a given conflict for outside third parties. These and other aspects of consequential

escalation may or may not affect the original intrastate dynamics of the conflict in question, but they nevertheless make it bigger and under some scenarios can even contribute to the onset of other conflicts beyond national borders.

Given this broad interpretation of the conflict internationalization phenomenon, what we strive to achieve in this paper is to integrate the multitude of discernable international, transnational, and cross-border manifestations of internal conflicts into an explanatory system that would reveal how this multi-faceted consequential escalation happens to penetrate established state boundaries and affect a larger international system.

The three-dimensional analytical framework was elaborated to overcome the traditional academic dichotomy international versus transnational as the model enrolls the entire variety of international, transnational and cross-border manifestations of intrastate armed conflict into an integrated conceptual system including spatial, interstate and systemic dimensions as well as multiple interplays between them. As a matter of fact, the framework does not demand any demarcations between international, transnational and cross-border manifestations and describes various channels and mechanisms promoting expansion of intrastate armed conflicts.

The horizontal (spatial) dimension includes the following:

- cross-border spillovers of hostilities and organized violence
- conflict contagion effect in which various transnational identity-based ties such as ethnic, religious and ideological ones, cross-border spill-overs (flows of refugees, arms, mercenaries) and informational processes (demonstration and learning effects) bear a role of transmission channels.

The vertical dimension encompasses the following:

- direct military intervention

- indirect interference (inward-directed vertical escalation, which means voluntary involvement of outside actors in support of one of the conflict parties)
- externalization (outward-directed vertical escalation, which means political decisions of conflict state to initiate interstate conflict with a different state, saying differently, country becomes a victim of an attack by the state where the original internal armed conflict takes place. For instance, when rebels maintain safe havens on neighboring state's territory and use them to retreat, to launch raids and to maintain arms supply lines, the government side of the original conflict may undertake military actions across the border aimed at destroying rebel infrastructure)

The systemic dimension of conflict internationalization, in its turn, refers to expansion of its external systemic limits, or the scope that it occupies within a larger international system. When systemic escalation of intrastate armed conflict takes place, its relevance grows penetrating through the system and affecting international relations, power balances and relationship structures on regional and even global level. The systemic dimension implies the following:

- conflict proxy-fication processes that include incorporation of intrastate armed conflict in broader pattern of strategic rivalry
- establishing of regional conflict systems, cross-border military economies and other manifestations of mutual interdependence between different intrastate conflicts within region.

## **THE DATABASE**

The presented dataset mostly reports the structure of the integrated analytical framework. It codifies and quantitatively describes numerous manifestations of intrastate armed conflict internationalization by a system of variable options. The first being presented part of the dataset encompasses 89 various conflict data points in Europe and Post-Soviet space within the period of the post-Cold War era (1989-2017). Further enhancement encompassing different regions and extending timeframes is in progress within the research . All of the units are codified with 45 variable parameters, 23 of which were elaborated as a part of integrative three-dimensional analytical framework. Conflict dyad within one year serves a reporting unit within the system, which means every single year of ongoing conflict escalation is considered a separate unit of surveillance.

Stemming from the 3D framework dataset implies three dimensions of internationalization manifestations – a horizontal one, a vertical one and a systemic one.

The following processes registered and evaluated within the vertical vector of escalation:

- traces or facts of direct external military intervention
- traces or facts of indirect interference which implies weapon transfers, financial, political or diplomatic support, troops as secondary warring party, access to Territory, access to military or intelligence infrastructure, training/expertise, intelligence data – anything but direct military activity or involvement
- traces or facts of interstate onset, which means start or reescalation of interstate conflict involving conflict-ridden state and some other state

Existence of at least one trace or fact of three implies vertical internationalization of intrastate armed conflict.

The horizontal vector represents varied processes through which the spatial spread of organized violence affects the territory of other countries leading to consequences for both the source state and the recipient state. The following processes registered and evaluated within the horizontal dimension of escalation:

- traces or facts of outcoming refugees influx
- traces or facts of incoming or outcoming arms traffic
- traces or facts of incoming or outcoming foreign fighters
- traces or facts of regional contagion or diffusion, which implies outbreak or new escalation of another armed conflict (recipient of contagion) at territory of different state of same region or subregion within 3 years after initiation or new escalation of described conflict (source of contagion) in case of existing ties between source and recipient.

Existence of at least one trace or fact of four implies horizontal internationalization of intrastate armed conflict.

The following processes registered and evaluated within the systemic vector of escalation:

The systemic dimension implies the expansion of international systemic limits of original conflict by increased political stake, interest and/or attention of various international actors vis-à-vis the conflict in question.

- traces or facts of systemic relevance or systemic significance of intrastate armed conflict, that means evaluation of international society and mass media consideration, international institutions settlement efforts etc.
- traces or facts of systemic proxy-fication – this is a tag reflecting involvement of conflict into strategic dyad whether it is global, regional or interregional. There are two types of proxy-fication within the model. The first one implies that conflict takes place within territory of one state of dyad when the other dyadic state maintains support for conflict party (but not state where conflict

takes place). The second type of proxyfication means that conflict takes place in third state when dyadic states provide support for opposing conflict parties.

- traces or facts of systemic connectedness that implies regional conflict complex or war economies, common resources, cross-border commodities trade etc.

Existence of at least one trace or fact of three implies systemic internationalization of intrastate armed conflict.

Finally, at least one manifestation of any type of escalation whether it's vertical, horizontal or systemic one means intrastate armed conflict internationalization.

## VARIABLE OPTIONS IN THE CURRENT VERSION OF THE DATASET

Code	Notion	Commentary
<i>internationalization</i>	intrastate armed conflict internationalization occurrence/absence	binary variable registering at least one type of internationalization (vertical, horizontal or systemic one) means intrastate armed conflict internationalization
<i>internationalization_dimension</i>		types of internationalization dimensions in case there are records of its occurrence
<b>Variables of the vertical dimension</b>		
<i>vert_dimension</i>	occurrence of vertical dimension of internationalization	binary variable implying at least one manifestation of vertical dimension
<i>dir_interv</i>	fact of direct external military intervention	binary variable describing direct external intervention with use of regular forces

<i>side_a_2nd_dir_interv</i>	direct intervention actor name or names for secondary warring party on side A	implies only state actors and specifies involved states' names
<i>side_b_2nd_dir_interv</i>	direct intervention actor name or names for secondary warring party on side B	
<i>indir_intf</i>	occurrence of indirect interference (voluntary involvement of outside actors in support of one of the conflict parties)	digital variable describing evident or implicit indirect interference by secondary actors with financial support, arms sales, intelligence data access, logistic support 0 – absence 1 – occurrence 2 – alleged
<i>side_a_2nd_indir_intf</i>	indirect interference actor name or names for secondary supporting party on side A	state and non-state actors. Specifies names of actors
<i>side_b_2nd_indir_intf</i>	indirect interference actor name or names for secondary supporting party on side B	
<i>interstate_onset</i>	onset of interstate conflict (during year of observation)	binary variable registering inception or reescalation of interstate conflict involving conflict- ridden state and some other state (side B)
<i>interstate_side_b</i>		country name of side B in the interstate conflict
<b>Variables of the horizontal dimension</b>		

<i>horiz_dimension</i>	occurrence of horizontal dimension of internationalization	binary variable registering at least one manifestation of horizontal dimension
<i>spatial_refugees</i>	refugee outflow (per year of escalation)	binary variable registering at least 90,000 refugees fled from conflict-ridden state to different state
<i>spatial_refugees_min_est</i>	refugee population minimum estimate (per year of escalation)	prudent valuation (specific figure) of refugee population even is does not exceed 90,000 but tops 1,000
<i>spatial_arms</i>	cross-border arms flows to/from the conflict zone	digital variable describing evident or implicit arms flow. Includes both formal and illegal cross-border sales, but excludes common arms trade not targeted to affect conflict 0 – absence 1 – occurrence 2 – alleged
<i>spatial_foreign_fighters</i>	cross-border flows of foreign fighters to/from the conflict zone	digital variable describing evident or implicit flow of mercenaries and volunteer fighters 0 – absence 1 – occurrence 2 – alleged
<i>spatial_cont</i>	contagion or diffusion effect on other conflicts in subregion	binary variable registering contagion effect occurrence in neighborhood within year of observation and three years after
<i>spatial_cont_target</i>	target state of contagion	implies names of states

<i>spatial_cont_target_conf_id</i>	conflict identifier for the target state of contagion	codes provided by the system of UCDP
<b>Variables of the systemic dimension</b>		
<i>syst_dimension</i>	occurrence of systemic dimension of internationalization	binary variable registering at least one manifestation of systemic dimension
<i>syst_relevance</i>	systemic relevance of conflict	digital variable describing systemic relevance of the conflict that can absent, manifest on regional level or both regional and global level. Operationalization is based on consideration of interests of regional and global powers, increased attention of international institutions and mass media and other qualitative evaluations
<i>syst_proxific</i>	proxy-fication of conflict	binary variable registering occurrence the so called proxy-fication, that means incorporation of conflict into broader pattern of strategic rivalry (regional, global and hybrid strategic dyads). Conflict may occur either within territory of dyad party, or within territory of third party with interference of both dyad sides
<i>syst_proxific_strategic_dyad</i>	strategic dyad of conflict proxy-fication	names of dyad states

<i><b>syst_connectedness</b></i>	connectedness of conflict	binary variable registering occurrence of one ore more manifestations of conflict systemic cohesion with other conflicts (mostly in the same region). Manifestations imply ties between actors, regional conflict complex maintenance, shared resource pools (including fighters), incompatible interests of parties in different conflicts, war economies maintenance.
<i><b>syst_connectedness_conf_id</b></i>	conflict identifier(-s) for connected conflict(-s)	codes provided by the system of UCDP

Codification of specific parameters demanded use of various data sources provided UCDP, Correlates of war, PRIO, Small Arms Survey Group, Foreign Fighters Group, SIPRI, the UN High Commission for Refugees etc. Variable secondary sources were also considered especially regarding systemic dimension variables (academic papers, researches etc.)

The described scheme of intrastate armed conflict internationalization revealing was applied to conflicts that escalated in Europe and Former Soviet Union area within the period 1989-2017. As a result of codification presented in a database 86 of 89 observed units of certain intrastate armed conflicts escalation revealed internationalization. 13 of them demonstrated just one type of escalation (vertical and systemic), 36 of them – all of three types of internationalization.

## CONCLUSION

Thus, the proposed evaluation and detailed observation of processes of intrastate armed conflict internationalization served the very first testing of the integrated 3D

analytical framework, that assisted to reveal complicated and mostly concealed ties between conflict contagiousness and external intervention possibility, systemic connectedness and regional diffusion etc. Moreover, figures resulting from the analysis of two regions during specific period confirmed the overwhelming trend of intrastate armed conflict internationalization.

The presented dataset was targeted to serve an analysis tool available for scholars and wide academic audience interested in conducting researches on international, transnational and cross-border manifestations of intrastate armed conflicts. The database could be used both for individual research purposes and as a source of selective data collection and variable codification.

The main direction of the dataset implication is codification of dependent and independent variables in purpose of quantitative researches targeted on evaluation of statistical probability of internationalization manifestations. It could encompass both verification of individual processes within proposed conceptual dimensions dependence on given set of factors and verification of correlation between very processes and dimensions. Statistic modeling targeted on describing specific factors contribution into various external dimensions of intrastate coercion could also rely on the dataset as well as search for cohesions between specific processes of internationalization (contagion and probability of direct intervention, proxy-fication and direct intervention or indirect interference, cross-border spillovers of hostilities and regional connectedness etc.). Finally, comparisons of both individual intrastate armed conflicts and regional groups within given spatial and time frames targeted on revealing similarities and differences.

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