Preface
This paper examines how the Japanese government had sought and realized international contributions since the Gulf crisis in August 1990. After the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August 1990, international and Japanese society interested in international contribution, humanitarian assistance to other countries. There has also been increased criticism of Japan's support for other countries, especially in the United States. On the other hand, criticism arose as to whether support for multinational forces was unconstitutional. In the wake of the Gulf crisis, the discussion turned to how Japan, as an economic power, should contribute to the international community.

After these discussions, the Maritime Self-Defense Force's minesweeper unit was dispatched to the Persian Gulf on April 26, 1991, the first postwar deployment of the Self-Defense Force overseas. On June 15, 1992, the Law on Cooperation for United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (PKO Cooperation Law) was enacted, and a bill to amend the Law on the Dispatch of Japan Disaster Relief Team (JDR), which had been under discussion at the same time, was passed by the Diet. These laws expanded the deployment of the SDF overseas to include peacekeeping operations and international emergency relief activities.

This paper examines the policy-making process of the Japanese government at that time to see how the Japanese government realized its human contribution in the wake of the Gulf crisis. Human contributions in the wake of the Gulf crisis have taken many forms, not just academic research\(^1\). Those involved at the time also left testimony in the form of memoirs and oral histories. However, since the public records of the time were available through disclosure requests under the Freedom of Information Act, we were able to clarify the policy-making process of the formulation of the tribute policy. Although several studies have been conducted on the circumstances leading to the deployment of the SDF overseas, the detailed policy-making process has not been

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clarified due to insufficient disclosure of public documents. This study empirically clarifies this point by using historical documents obtained through disclosure requests and U.S. public records.

1. The Outbreak of the Gulf Crisis and the Seeking International Contribution

August 2, 1990, Iraq invaded Kuwait. The United States took the matter to the United Nations Security Council, which then formed a multinational force and asked for the support of its allies. As a background, Jun Tago\(^2\) points out that the large scale of military action, the lack of civilian evacuation as a goal, the sluggish domestic economy, the fact that it was just before and after the elections and no patriotic utility was necessary, and the fact that it was a divided government had an impact.

The U.S. government's focus on relations with its allies gave the impression that the U.S. government was carrying the burden solely on the point was to avoid giving away the money. Jun Tago\(^3\) was a key figure in the Gulf Crisis, not only in the Democratic Party, which was the majority party at the time, but also in his home party, the Republican Party. It points out that the Bush administration needed to respond to criticism of the cost burden that arose from Secretary of State Baker noted that he needed the support of allies to win public support and they are. President Bush is also having a difficult time negotiating with Congress, which is pressuring the administration for burden sharing. He recalled that the U.S. was the only country in the world to have been able to do so\(^4\). The U.S. needs support from its allies to win domestic support for its response to the crisis in the Gulf.

Immediately after Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, the U.S. put pressure on Iraq together with its allies and other countries. The U.S. asked Japan for cooperation, and this also extended to Japan. On August 14, during a telephone conversation between President Bush and Prime Minister Kaifu, the United States asked Japan for financial cooperation and multinational assistance. They asked for the provision of transportation to the army and the dispatch of minesweeper or supply ship\(^5\).

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\(^3\) Ibid., pp.98-101.


\(^5\) National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies (GRIPS)., Kuriyama Tadakazu (Former Japan Ambassador to United States) Oral History: Wangansenso to
The background to the U.S. request to dispatch minesweepers is that the Japanese government's response to the problem of safe navigation in the Persian Gulf in 1987 was the constitutional interpretation of the deployment of the SDF was influential. The U.S. government believed that Japan's constitution sufficiently precluded the SDF from participating in a multinational force. However, the U.S. government thought it would be possible to dispatch minesweepers to Iraq from the debate on the deployment of minesweepers in 1987. At that time, Prime Minister Nakasone was "on the high seas minesweeping activities were legality".

On the other hand, the government was divided whether or not to require Japan to have a military presence. Michael Hayden Armacost, United States Ambassador to Japan, said, "If Japan is willing to provide non-combat ships that are fine. If not, financial support can be topped up, or non-military support through other means can make up for it. He recalls that "the United States did not consider it important, although it offered to send minesweepers or supply ships. Therefore, he said, the U.S. offered to send minesweepers or supply ships, but did not consider it important.

For response to the U.S. request to dispatch minesweepers, the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) has held a meeting within the Marine Staff Office to discuss the dispatch of minesweepers. In this review meeting, only research was conducted, taking into account public opinion, and the results of the study were presented to the Defense Agency's internal departments and the Joint. The report was presented to the Staff Council. The report stated that, within the scope of current law, maritime security operations (Article 82 of the SDF Law), the removal of mines and other equipment (Article 99), etc., were held to be possible.

Nihongaiko (Gulf War and Japanese Diplomacy). (Tokyo: GRIPS, 2005), p.35,
6 Asahi-Shinbun Wangan Kiki Syuzaihan (Asahi newspaper gulf crisis report group),
7 Proceedings of the 109th Congress Cabinet Committee of House of Representatives 6th
9 Armacost, Michael H., Friends or Rivals?: The Insider's Account of U. S.-Japan
10 Kaijo Jieitai Gojyunenshihensaniinkai (Compilation committee of JMSDF fifty years
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, on the other hand, was negative about the dispatch of minesweepers\textsuperscript{11}. In response to the U.S. request for assistance, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs considered providing support to the multinational force and said that sending minesweepers in relation to the issue of safe navigation in the Persian Gulf, it was arranged that this would be possible under certain conditions, but (1) the mines to be swept are (1) whether it could be limited to items abandoned on the high seas, and (2) whether it could be explained as being for the safety of Japan's vessels' navigation, and there is a high probability that they will be involved in combat activities.

In response to these deliberations, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs responded that it would be difficult to dispatch minesweepers to the United States\textsuperscript{12}. At a meeting between Ambassador Armacost and Tadakazu Kuriyama, Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs, on 15 August, Kuriyama said that without consultation within the government, it would be difficult to dispatch minesweepers to the United States\textsuperscript{13}. He expressed a positive attitude toward financial and other assistance. However, Kuriyama expressed a negative view of the deployment of minesweepers. Prime Minister Kaifu also took a negative approach to the deployment of the SDF. As a result, the Japanese government began to explore what support it could provide under the current constitution.

Japan's refusal to dispatch minesweepers is a result of raising expectations for the U.S. to provide assistance other than humanitarian contributions became. As mentioned earlier, the United States, based on its experience in 1987, thought that a minesweeper could be sent at the same time, he understood that it would be constitutionally difficult to do so. But that did not mean that Japan was willing to provide no support. As Ambassador Armacost recalled above, the United States would have been more likely to do so if Japan had refused the minesweeper. The United States was expected to provide a great deal of assistance to Japan\textsuperscript{14}. Japan's refusal to send minesweepers to the United States raised U.S. expectations of Japan.

In response to the U.S. request for assistance, the Japanese government began to study the matter behind the scenes. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and other ministries have

\textsuperscript{11} “Iraq no Kuwait shinko ni kanrenshita wagakuni no shiensochi: Takokuseki bun eno shien : Bunai Kento Paper (Japanese assistance for Iraq invasion to Kuwait : Study paper)”. 15\textsuperscript{th} August 1990, Information disclosure document from Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2012-0037).

\textsuperscript{12} Armacost, \textit{Friends or Rivals?}, pp.102-103

\textsuperscript{13} Ibid., p.103, GRIPS, \textit{Kuriyama Oral History}, p.50.

\textsuperscript{14} Armacost, \textit{Friends or Rivals?}, p.103.
been working behind the scenes to determine specific assistance measures\textsuperscript{15}. As a result of the task force's deliberation, the Japanese government decided to provide four pillars of assistance: transportation, material, medical, and financial cooperation, which it announced on August 29\textsuperscript{16}.

The U.S. government had expressed support for the Japanese government's response to the Gulf crisis. At a press conference on August 30, President Bush stated that "the financial burden alone is not sufficient\textsuperscript{17}". In addition, Secretary of Defense Richard Bruce Cheney told understanding Japan's domestic political constraints at a meeting of the National Association of Business Economists on September 26\textsuperscript{18}.

On the other hand, some in the government expressed dissatisfaction with the Japanese government's response. On September 19, Richard H. Solomon, Assistant Secretary of State for Asia and the Pacific Affairs, told Congress that he understood the constraints of Japan's constitution, but complained about the delay in presenting the tribute plan\textsuperscript{19}.

Since the outbreak of the Gulf Crisis, members of Congress have repeatedly criticized Japan for its inadequate support in the U.S. Congress. They focused on elected officials from regions that were being squeezed by Japanese exports. For example, Congressman David Bonnier, who on September 12 proposed a resolution that would have required Japan to pay the full cost of the U.S. military presence in Japan, was from Detroit, where the auto industry was thriving. On the other hand, there was little criticism of Japan in areas that did not have industries that competed with Japanese products. Kensaku Hogen, who was serving as Consul General in Boston at the time, later recalled, "There was no criticism of Japan in Boston\textsuperscript{20}". Thus, it can be said that there


\textsuperscript{20} Kensaku Hogen, Hiroaki Kato, Ryuji Hattori, Kei Takeuchi eds., Moto Kokuren
were regional differences in the criticism of Japan's support for the Gulf Crisis. This regional difference was also reflected in the U.S. Congress, where members of Congress from regions affected by Japan's trade offensive were at the center of the criticism of Japan.

This criticism of Japan in the United States left the U.S. government in an unforeseen dilemma: How could the U.S. Congress and public opinion criticize Japan? Criticism of Japan in the U.S. Congress and in public opinion led the Bush administration to believe that anti-American sentiment in Japan could damage U.S.-Japan relations. And this made the U.S. government cautious about pressuring Japan.

The meeting between LDP Secretary General Ozawa Ichiro and President Bush held on March 28, 1991\(^{21}\), after the ceasefire in the Gulf War, highlighted this American attitude. Robert Gates, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, who was present at the meeting, stated that there was no such voice among senior government officials in response to criticism in the United States of Japan's involvement in the post-Gulf Crisis era\(^{22}\). President Bush, who joined the meeting late, said he was "very grateful" for Japan's financial support for the Gulf crisis\(^{23}\). He also expressed concern that anti-American sentiment has emerged in Japan since the Gulf crisis. At the Kaifu-Bush meeting the following week, President Bush also expressed his gratitude for Japan's contribution to the post-Gulf Crisis era. He also expressed concern about the growing anti-American sentiment in Japan.

Behind Gates' and Bush's remarks was concern that the criticism of Japan that has unfolded in the United States since the Gulf crisis could hurt U.S.-Japan relations. Prior to the Kaifu-Bush meeting, Roger B. Porter, Assistant to the President for Economic and Domestic Affairs, reported on the meeting with Naomichi Suzuki, Deputy Director General of the Ministry of International Trade and Industry, that Japan was concerned about the weakening of the U.S.-Japan relationship, and that he believed that Japan in its current state had failed to respond to the Gulf crisis and that if the U.S. shows its support and friendship, it can elicit Japan's cooperation in trade relations in the future, the report said. It could be said that the U.S. government appreciated Japan's response to the Gulf Crisis and tried to allay Japanese concerns about


\(^{22}\) Ibid, p2.

\(^{23}\) Ibid, p4.
anti-Japanese activities at United States in order to further strengthen cooperation between the United States and Japan\textsuperscript{24}.

2. The outbreak of the Gulf War and the decision to provide additional support

When multinational forces launched an attack on Iraq on January 17, 1991, Japan also sought support for the Gulf War, and one week later, on January 24, the Japanese government held a summit meeting of the government and the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), including Prime Minister Kaifu and Secretary-General Ozawa Ichiro, at which it agreed to provide $9 billion in addition to its existing contributions to support the Gulf War. In this decision, it was provided that the funds would be funded through a supplemental budget for 1990 and a temporary tax increase.

At that time, the decision was made to contribute $9 billion for the immediate war effort, but how was the $9 billion calculated? Kaifu later stated that he used the estimates of a congressional committee as the basis for calculating the $9 billion\textsuperscript{25}. On the other hand, Ryohei Murata, then Ambassador to the United States, recalled that he comprehensively analyzed this information in the face of a variety of information and assumed that the duration of the battle would be 90 days and the cost per day would be $500 million, for a total cost of $45 billion\textsuperscript{26}. Since the Japanese government had borne 20\% of the multinational force's costs after the Gulf Crisis, the Japanese government believed that the U.S. government would be asked to bear the same burden in the Gulf War as it had in the Gulf Crisis, and that the U.S. government would be asked to bear $9 billion, or 20\% of the estimate\textsuperscript{27}.

The first time the U.S. government asked the Japanese government to bear the cost of the war was at a meeting between Finance Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto and Treasury Secretary Nicholas Frederick Brady on March 21. At that time, Hashimoto had decided to go with the policy of not bargaining when the US side comes up with a figure\textsuperscript{28}.

\textsuperscript{24} Meeting with Prime Minister Kaifu, April 2, 1991, ID#225929, CO078, WHORM: Subject File, Bush Presidential Records, George Bush Presidential Library.


\textsuperscript{27} \textit{The Asahi Shimbun}, January 20, 1991.

\textsuperscript{28} Ryutaro Hashimoto and Makoto Iokibe, "Nihon Gaiko Interview Series (3) Japanese Diplomacy Interview Series (3) Ryutaro Hashimoto Part I: Sengo no Kiki ni Taijishite
Looking back on that time, Hashimoto said, “In normal times, I would definitely bargain”. Hashimoto recalled, “In normal times, I would never bargain, but when bullets start flying, I won’t”. Hashimoto may be understood as trying to show support as an ally. Hashimoto’s decision to make the agreement without seeking domestic consultation drew criticism from within the Liberal Democratic Party. In the end, however, the Japanese government agreed to the outcome of the Hashimoto-Brady meeting and decided to contribute $9 billion.

Following the decision on January 24, the “Outline of Financial Resources for Japan’s Support for Peace Restoration Operations in the Gulf Region” was decided on January 31, which stipulates the specific method of contribution. The outline stipulated that the contribution would be raised through one-year temporary increases in petroleum, corporate, and tobacco taxes, and that short-term government bonds would be issued as a bridge until tax revenues could be secured. In addition, the government’s proposal envisioned that the contribution would come from the FY1990 second supplementary budget and the FY1991 budget. Additional financial cooperation was originally a matter within the scope of the FY1990 budget. However, some of the measures to be taken in the bill on additional funding for the Gulf Coast would have required an amendment to the FY1991 budget for the Special Account for the Government Debt Consolidation Fund. As a result, it was decided to straddle FY1990 and FY1991. Initially, the government’s plan was to rely on tax hikes to raise the funds, and to contribute from the FY1990 supplementary budget and the FY1991 budget.

At the time, however, the LDP did not have a majority in the House of Councillors and needed the cooperation of the opposition parties, so the decision to contribute an additional $9 billion was not easy. At the time, the LDP had a majority in the House of Representatives, but in the House of Councillors, the LDP lacked a majority. This situation posed a major problem for the additional contributions. Although the supplementary budget itself was approved by the House of Representatives, the bills

(Confronting the Postwar Crisis),” Kokusai Mondai (International Affairs), No. 504 (March 2002), P.73.
29 Ibid., p.74,
32 Ministry of Finance, “Konkai no houan wo yosankanrenhouan (※Houan) to surukotonituite (Regarding This Bill as a Budget-Related Bill (*Bill) (Memo))” (February 1, 1991), Ministry of Finance Information Disclosure Document (Zaikei No. 2030).
related to the financial resources could not be approved without a vote of the House of Councillors. Naturally, there was a possibility that the bills related to financial resources would not be passed. For this reason, the Ministry of Finance also discussed how to make additional contributions in the event that the supplementary budget was approved but the funding bill was not\textsuperscript{33}. First of all, with regard to whether or not additional contributions could be made, the Ministry of Finance stated that there would be no problem with contributions because the Finance Bill provided authority for revenue, and authority for expenditure would be granted by the supplementary budget. It also believed that there was no illegality in making additional contributions even if the bill was not passed at the end of the fiscal year on March 31. If the bill was not enacted, the government would submit a new special bond bill and use the settlement adjustment fund to make up for it. In fact, at this point, it was quite possible that the funding bill would not be passed.

Under these circumstances, the LDP sought the cooperation of the Komeito Party and the Democratic Socialist Party. What was important in this context was the movement of the Komeito Party. Within the Komeito Party, there was a debate within the party about the additional $9 billion contribution to the Gulf Peace Fund\textsuperscript{34}. Although there were strong voices of opposition to the additional support, in the end the Komeito Party voted in favor of the support\textsuperscript{35}. One of the reasons behind the Komeito's decision was that they were concerned about the reaction of the public if the bill was not passed. If the Komeito Party opposes the bill and it is not enacted, it could have a negative impact on Japan-US relations. At that time, public criticism could be focused on the Komeito Party. The Komei Party was concerned about such a situation and voted in favor of the additional support.

Even though they agreed to the additional support, the Komeito Party made a request to the government plan\textsuperscript{36}. The Komeito Party's two requests were that the additional aid not be used to purchase arms and ammunition, and that the additional aid be


\textsuperscript{34} Komei Editorial Board, "Wangannanakagetsu to Komeito: Kenpoyougo to kokurenchushin no torikumi wo hurikaeru (The Seven Months in the Gulf and the Komei Party: Reflections on Constitutional Protection and UN-Centered Efforts)," Komei, No. 351 (April 1991), p. 35.

\textsuperscript{35} Susumu Mizuto, "Wangan Senso to Nihon no Yatou (The Gulf War and the Japanese Opposition)," Kokusai Mondai (International Affairs), No. 377, pp.23-24.

\textsuperscript{36} Kunimasa, WanganSenso toiu Tenkaiten, p.294.
funded outside of the tax increase. The fact that the additional support would be used to purchase ammunition and weapons, and that it would be funded solely by a tax increase, was strongly criticized even within the Komeito Party, partly because of the upcoming local elections. Therefore, at a plenary session of the House of Representatives on January 28, Komeito Party called for raising additional contributions by cutting government bonds and defense spending, rather than by raising taxes.

The Defense Agency and members of the national defense family resisted the Komeito Party’s demand for cuts in defense spending. Koji Kakizawa, head of the Liberal Democratic Party’s National Defense Subcommittee, made a proposal to Policy Research Council Chairman June Kato that cuts to the defense budget were unacceptable. Also, the Director General of the Defense Agency, Yukihiko Ikeda, resisted the defense budget cuts.

There was no change in the situation that the law related to financial resources could not be passed without the cooperation of the Komeito Party. In addition, if we could establish a cooperative system with the Komeito Party, we could expect their cooperation in other pending issues such as the FY1991 budget. For this reason, the LDP, led by Secretary General Ozawa and other LDP officials, accepted the defense spending cuts over the objections of the Defense Agency and members of the national defense family.

However, this decision was unpopular at the United States. United States considered the Defense Budget cut was damaged Japanese defense capability and deterrence of Japan-U.S. alliance. From United States point of view, Japanese government paid for financial support for multinational force from payment for Japan-U.S. Alliance.

At a meeting of the leaders of the ruling and opposition parties held on February 15, the LDP, the Komeito Party, and the Democratic Socialist Party agreed to contribute an additional $9 billion. The agreement states that the additional aid will be funded by about 200 billion yen from spending cuts, 200 billion yen from a reduction in reserve funds, and 100 billion yen from a reduction in defense spending. The shortfall was to be

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37 The 120th session of the National Assembly, House of Representatives, Session No. 7 (January 28, 1991).
38 Kunimasa., WanganSenso toiu Tenkaiten, p.301.
39 Ibid., p.302.
40 Armacost., Friends or Rival?, pp.120-122.
funded by a one-year increase in the oil tax and corporate tax, and by issuing short-term government bonds as a bridge. With the support of the Komeito Party, the House of Councillors passed a supplementary budget and a bill related to financial resources (Act on Temporary Measures for Securing Financial Resources Necessary for Urgent Fiscal Measures to be Taken in Fiscal 1990 to Support Peace Restoration Activities in the Gulf Region), and an additional $9 billion was provided. This three-party agreement formed the so-called LDP, the Komeito, and the Democratic Socialist Party.

A $9 billion aid package was decided upon, but there were still some unresolved issues. The first question was whether Japan’s assistance would be for multinational forces or only for the US. On this point, Secretary of the Treasury Brady stated that the entire amount was for the U.S., but the Japanese government’s policy was to provide assistance for multinational forces, not only for the U.S. In the end, Japan’s position on this issue was accepted, but there was dissatisfaction in the U.S. Congress that the entire $9 billion was not for the United States.

Another issue was the reduction in the amount of money due to exchange rate fluctuations. The Ministry of Finance used to execute its budget in yen. However, the dollar subsequently soared, resulting in foreign exchange gains. The U.S. government demanded that it be compensated for the loss. The Ministry of Finance was aware of the problem of foreign exchange gains from the process of formulating the $9 billion assistance, but the contribution was based solely on the Japanese yen, and it did not consider increasing or decreasing the amount of the contribution in response to changes in the exchange rate. Kuriyama, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs of Japan, also explained the problem of the exchange rate through Ambassador Armacost. Although there was not a lot of pressure from the U.S. Congress to make up the diminished amount, Japan eventually agreed to contribute an additional $500 million, partly due to Prime Minister Kaifu’s decision.

Thus, the decision to provide $9 billion in aid was made by the political decision of Finance Minister Hashimoto, but the details of the agreement were not finalized. As a result, some minor problems arose. In addition, the decision to limit the use of the $9 billion aid to purchases other than arms and ammunition and to contribute $9 billion by

42 Armacost, Friends or Rivals?, pp.122-123.
This article is undecided, so please refrain from quoting it.

cutting defense spending were unpopular with the United States. Armacost later recalled, "For all the generosity of the offer, the problems that subsequently surfaced were too small to matter, and were enough to show the fraying of the multinational force's pretense of unity. The $9 billion aid was different in the sense that it was quickly implemented by a quick political decision. The $9 billion aid was different in the sense that it was implemented quickly by a quick political decision, but that quick political decision resulted in minor problems because of insufficient negotiation with the United States in the process of formulating the funding.

3. Dispatching of mine sweepers to Persian Gulf
After the ceasefire in the Gulf War, the issue of dispatching minesweepers has resurfaced. One of the reasons for the resurgence is the ceasefire in the Gulf War. For example, Mr. Kuriyama, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs of Japan, recalled that "the ceasefire was a precondition for dispatching minesweepers during the Gulf War. The constitutional interpretation issued in 1987 on the issue of safe navigation in the Persian Gulf allowed the dispatch of minesweepers in peacetime, but not in wartime. However, since the ceasefire was achieved, a major impediment to the dispatch of minesweepers disappeared.

Another factor that led to the emergence of the proposal to dispatch minesweepers was Germany. Germany, like Japan, was exposed to criticism from the United States during the Gulf War. After the war ended, on March 6, 1999, Germany dispatched minesweepers to remove mines laid in the Persian Gulf. The German dispatch of minesweepers was also reported in Japan, rekindling the discussion on the dispatch of minesweepers in Japan. At the time, the Japanese government was looking for ways to contribute human resources after the end of the Gulf War. The dispatch of minesweepers by Germany in such a situation made the Japanese government reconfirm the idea of dispatching minesweepers as a human contribution. For example, Prime Minister Kaifu recalled that the German dispatch encouraged Japan to dispatch minesweepers. Vice-Minister Kuriyama also recalled,

47 Armacost., "Friends or Rival?", pp.120-122.
49 For Germany's support in the Gulf War, see Toshiya Nakamura, Doitu no Anzenhososeisaku: Heiwasyugi to Buryokukoshi (Germany's Security Policy: Pacifism and the Use of Force), Itigeisha: Tokyo, 2006, pp. 41-53.
51 GRIPS, Kaifu Toshiki (Moto Naikakusouridaijin Oral History (Former Prime Minister of Japan)), Vol. 2, National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies, 2005, p. 326.
"Germany proposed the idea, and then we talked about what Japan would do.\(^52\) Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary Ishihara also testified that it was "Germany's dispatch that triggered the resurfacing of the minesweeper debate.\(^53\) It can be said that Germany's dispatch of minesweepers triggered Japan to reconsider the dispatch of minesweepers.

Another factor in the dispatch of minesweepers is the appreciation of other countries, especially the United States, for Japan's support after the Gulf crisis. On March 10, 1999, after the ceasefire in the Gulf War, the Kuwaiti Embassy in the U.S. published an advertisement in the Washington Post and the New York Times expressing gratitude to the countries that had supported the U.S. in the Gulf War, but Japan was not mentioned in the advertisement. The reason for this is unclear, but the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was shocked to learn that Japan was not mentioned in the advertisement.\(^54\) On March 12, Ryohei Murata, the Japanese ambassador to the United States, sent an official telegram requesting the dispatch of minesweepers, saying that it was desirable to dispatch minesweepers in order to clear the stigma that Japan had suffered since the Gulf Crisis.\(^55\) This incident may be said to have encouraged the dispatch of minesweepers.

The issue of dispatching minesweepers became the subject of lively debate within the government and the LDP. Senior officials of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Defense Agency spoke positively about the dispatch of minesweepers, and the National Defense Subcommittee of the LDP held discussions on the dispatch of minesweepers.\(^56\) While the issue of dispatching minesweepers resurfaced in Japan, the United States watched the Japanese government's moves from the sidelines. At a meeting of the Policy Research Council and the Policy Council Chairman on March 13, when Policy Research Council Chairman Mutsuki Kato urged each party to consider the proposal to dispatch minesweepers, Kato hinted that the United States had requested the dispatch of minesweepers.\(^57\) However, at a press conference on the morning of the following day, Chief Cabinet Secretary Misoji Sakamoto denied Kato's statement saying that there was no request from the US.\(^58\) According to a report in the Yomiuri Shimbun, a U.S. government source said, "We have never officially or unofficially

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55 Murata, Murata Ryoei's Memoirs, pp. 119-120.
requested Japan to dispatch troops\textsuperscript{59}. When the issue of dispatching minesweepers came up in the meeting between Foreign Affairs Vice Minister Kuriyama and Ambassador Amacost on March 30, Amacost said, "It is better not to talk about this issue until the Japanese side is 100 percent sure\textsuperscript{60}," and expressed his approval of Kuriyama's explanation that "we will continue to study the issue quietly. Regarding the dispatch of minesweepers, Ambassador Amacost said, "Japan took this initiative without being prompted by us\textsuperscript{61}". It should be interpreted that there was no request from the United States to dispatch minesweepers.

In the midst of these developments, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs began to consider the specifics of dispatching minesweepers. On March 22, under the leadership of Vice-Minister Kuriyama, a meeting was held in the office of the Vice-Minister to discuss the dispatch of minesweepers to the Persian Gulf, with the participation of Foreign Affairs Vice-Minister Owada, Chief Cabinet Secretary Sato, and senior officials of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, including directors and vice-ministers of various bureaus\textsuperscript{62}. At the meeting, they discussed (1) the relationship between the dispatch of minesweepers and the official ceasefire, (2) the reaction of Asian countries, (3) requests from Kuwait and other countries, and (4) the timing of the prime minister's visit to the United States and the election of the governor of Tokyo.

First, they discussed the relationship between the dispatch of minesweepers and the official ceasefire, and how to understand the current situation\textsuperscript{63}. In response, Mr. Kawamura, Deputy Director of the UN Department, reported that the conditions for a formal ceasefire were still being worked out, and that fighting would not resume.

Next, regarding relations with Asian countries, Mr. Kawamura said that ASEAN countries would understand, but that China and South Korea would seek a cautious response\textsuperscript{64}. It was then concluded that the question is how to deal with these countries. The third issue discussed was whether or not to ask countries to send minesweepers. Mr. Shunji Yanai, Director General of the Treaty Bureau, asked whether it would be

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{59} 
  \item \textsuperscript{60} 
  Ministry of Foreign Affairs to Ambassador to the U.S., "(Jikan to Armacosttaishi tono Kaidan (Sourihoubei to Shinto) (Meeting between the Vice-Minister and Ambassador Amacost (Prime Minister's Visit to the U.S.; New Law))," March 30, 1991, Ministry of Foreign Affairs Information Disclosure Document (2012-00617).
  \item \textsuperscript{61} 
  Armacost., \textit{Friends or Rivals?}, p.124.
  \item \textsuperscript{62} 
  \item \textsuperscript{63} 
  \item \textsuperscript{64} 
  \textit{Ibid.}, p.2.
\end{itemize}
possible for Kuwait to request the dispatch of minesweepers, since the minesweeping would take place in Kuwaiti territorial waters\textsuperscript{65}. Mr. Makoto Watanabe, Director General of the Middle East and Africa Bureau, replied that it would be possible to obtain Kuwait’s "approval," but that it would be difficult to have Kuwait issue a request because of the history of confusion over the provision of emergency supplies\textsuperscript{66}. Mr. Ryozo Kato, Director of the General Affairs Division of the Minister’s Secretariat, said, "The dispatch of minesweepers should be decided promptly based on independent judgment, and it is not appropriate to have a lending/borrowing relationship with Kuwait in the process of obtaining a request. It is not appropriate to have a lending/borrowing relationship with Kuwait in the process of obtaining a request\textsuperscript{67}". Owada mentioned, “As for Kuwait’s request for the dispatch of minesweepers, it can be said that most of the participants were of the opinion that it would be better to receive such a request, but that it was not so necessary\textsuperscript{68}.

Regarding the fourth point, the timing of the prime minister’s visit to the U.S. and the Tokyo governor’s election, the opinion was expressed that a political decision was needed. Mr. Kato, Director of the General Affairs Division, expressed the view that waiting until April 7, the day of the Tokyo gubernatorial election, would be problematic because the peak of the minesweeping operations in the area would be past and it would conflict with the comments made by Secretary General Ozawa when he visited the United States at the end of March\textsuperscript{69}. On the other hand, Mr. Owada said, "The interval between the prime minister's visit to the U.S. and the Tokyo gubernatorial election is about a week or a few days, so it would be better to discuss the issue privately during the prime minister's visit to the U.S. and make a domestic proposal after the Tokyo gubernatorial election"\textsuperscript{70}. In any case, the prime minister's decision on the dispatch of minesweepers remained unchanged.

The other problem was the legal issue, which was discussed between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Cabinet Legislation Bureau. On March 26, under the direction of Prime Minister Kaifu, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Kuriyama discussed the issue of dispatching minesweepers with Director General Kudo of the Cabinet Legislation Bureau\textsuperscript{71}. At this meeting, Kuriyama explained the background of the dispatch of

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{65} \textit{Ibid.}, p.3.
  \item \textsuperscript{66} \textit{Ibid.}, pp.3-4.
  \item \textsuperscript{67} \textit{Ibid.}, p.4.
  \item \textsuperscript{68} \textit{Ibid.}, p.4.
  \item \textsuperscript{69} \textit{Ibid.}, p.5.
  \item \textsuperscript{70} \textit{Ibid.}, p.5.
  \item \textsuperscript{71} "Wangankikigo no Perusyawan niokeru kiraijyokyo heno jieitai no kyoryoku (Kuriyamajikan to Kudouhouseikyokuchokan tono kyogi) (Self-Defense Forces'
minesweepers and the situation in the Persian Gulf after the ceasefire in the Gulf War, and asked for positive consideration, saying that it was necessary to reach a conclusion as soon as possible after the Tokyo gubernatorial election on April 7. In response, Secretary Kudo said, "There is no need to think so tightly legally, considering the starting point of the government's answer to the problem of safe navigation in the Persian Gulf in 1987". Mr. Masasuke Omori, Director of the First Department of the Cabinet Legislation Bureau, who attended the meeting, said, "The legal basis for dispatching minesweepers is Article 99 of the Self-Defense Forces Law, which stipulates Japan's police action, and using UN resolutions or international cooperation as the basis would be problematic. In the Diet, there may be a problem with the 1954 resolution to prevent the deployment of the SDF overseas." As for the dispatch of minesweepers, based on the government's written response to the Persian Gulf safety navigation issue in 1987, the view was expressed that there was no problem under the Constitution and the SDF Law. What is interesting here is that the Cabinet Legislative Bureau showed a stance of avoiding the use of international cooperation as a basis. The Cabinet Legislative Bureau based its decision to dispatch minesweepers on Article 99 of the Self-Defense Forces Law. The Self-Defense Forces Law only regulates the activities of the Self-Defense Forces in Japan and does not require UN resolutions or requests from other countries to be based on this law.

While the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and other ministries showed positive moves to dispatch minesweepers, Prime Minister Kaifu and other ministers did not explicitly say that they would dispatch minesweepers. At the Budget Committee of the House of Representatives on March 14, Foreign Minister Taro Nakayama stated that the United States had not requested the dispatch of minesweepers. On the other hand, he stated that Japan must think about how to deal with mines laid in the Persian Gulf. Foreign Minister Nakayama indicated the need for the Japanese government to show measures to dispose of the mines, but he still took a cautious stance on dispatching minesweepers. The following day, on the 15th, the House of

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Cooperation in Removing Mines in the Persian Gulf after the Gulf Crisis (Discussion between Vice-Minister Kuriyama and Director-General Kudo of the Legislative Bureau)," March 27, 1991, Ministry of Foreign Affairs Information Disclosure Document (2012-00372).
72 Ibid., pp.1-2.
73 Ibid., pp.2-3.
74 Ibid., pp.5-7.
75 The 120th National Assembly of the House of Representatives (March 14, 1991).
76 Ibid.
Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs discussed the issue of dispatching minesweepers, but Prime Minister Kaifu said that he would consider measures after assessing the situation and did not declare that he would dispatch minesweepers.\(^{77}\)

The political situation at the time had an influence on Prime Minister Kaifu's decision not to dispatch minesweepers. At the time, the Kaifu administration was running the government with the cooperation of the LDP, the DSP, and the Komeito Party. At that time, the DSP expressed its support for the dispatch of minesweepers, while the Komeito was not in favor of the dispatch, but had a policy of tacit approval.\(^{78}\) The Komeito Party was opposed to the dispatch of minesweepers before April 7 and 21, 1999, because of the impact on the local elections scheduled for those days. The Komeito Party had established a cooperative relationship with the Socialist Party in rural areas. After the outbreak of the Gulf War, with regard to the legislation of the PKO policy based on the three-party agreement, Yuichi Ichikawa, then General Secretary of the Komeito Party, agreed with the view that it would be "difficult to move" on the legislation of the three-party agreement until the local elections were over, saying, "Until these elections are over, it will be difficult to move with the Liberal Democratic Party and the Democratic Party because of our relationship with the Socialist Party.\(^{79}\) It is difficult to move with the Liberal Democratic Party because of the relationship with the Socialist Party. Because of its relationship with the Socialist Party, the Komeito Party could not move aggressively until the local elections.

Prime Minister Kaifu also showed consideration for the Komeito Party until the local elections were over. At a meeting between Prime Minister Kaifu and Parliamentary Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs Muneo Suzuki on April 11, Prime Minister Kaifu said, "The Komeito Party is asking us to wait until the 21st,\(^{80}\) suggesting the need to pay attention to the Komeito Party. It can be said that the intentions of the Komeito Party had an impact on the schedule for dispatching the minesweepers.

In the local elections held on April 7, the Socialist Party suffered a disastrous defeat,

\(^{77}\) The 120th Congress of the House of Representatives Foreign Affairs Committee Meeting No. 8 (March 15, 1991).
\(^{78}\) Yomiuri Shimbun, April 12, 1991.
\(^{79}\) Director-General of the United Nations Department, "Kokusaiheiwakyoryoku nikansuru shinhoanmondai (Komeitosyokicho tou no naiwa) (The Issue of the New Bill on International Peace Cooperation (Private Talk by the Secretary-General of the Komeito Party and Others))" (January 26, 1991), Ministry of Foreign Affairs Information Disclosure Document (2017-00013).
\(^{80}\) North American Security Service, "Soukaitehaken (Seimujikan to Souri tono kaiwa) (Dispatch of Minesweepers (Conversation between the Parliamentary Vice-Minister and the Prime Minister))" (April 11, 1991), Ministry of Foreign Affairs Information Disclosure Document (2012-0372).
losing a large number of seats. The results of the local elections led to a change in the stance of the Socialist Party. The leaders of the Socialist Party had analyzed that their previous reluctance to make international contributions may have influenced their defeat in the local elections\textsuperscript{81}. Therefore, some in the Socialist Party were of the opinion that the dispatch of troops would be acceptable if the legal basis and other factors were set. As a result, the Socialist Party was unable to consolidate its opinions and maintained its opposition to the dispatch of minesweepers. However, it can be said that the Socialist Party's stance was shaken by the results of the local elections.

Under these circumstances, the business community also began to call for the dispatch of minesweepers. On April 8, Keidanren Chairman Gaishi Hiraiwa announced at a press conference his "Chairman's View" that minesweepers should be dispatched to the Persian Gulf if the following three conditions were met: the dispatch should be limited to times of peace, Asian countries would understand, and there would be no legal problems\textsuperscript{82}. On April 8, the Japan Shipowners' Association and the All Japan Seamen's Union requested the government to dispatch minesweepers, and on April 10, Eiji Suzuki, chairman of the Japan Federation of Economic Organizations, issued a statement calling for the dispatch of minesweepers. On the 10th, Eiji Suzuki, chairman of the Nikkei Federation, issued a statement calling for the dispatch of minesweepers. On the 12th, the Japan Association of Small and Medium-sized Oceangoing Shipowners submitted a request to the government for the dispatch of minesweepers. Based on the Japan-U.S. relationship at the time and the situation in the Persian Gulf, they thought it was necessary for Japan to show its international contribution as soon as possible\textsuperscript{83}.

As the local elections ended and the momentum for dispatching minesweepers grew in the business world, the LDP's National Defense Subcommittee also began to push for the dispatch of minesweepers. On April 11, the day the ceasefire agreement for the Gulf War came into effect, the LDP's National Defense Subcommittee passed a resolution to dispatch minesweepers and submitted a proposal to Prime Minister Kaifu and the three party officials.

Under pressure from business groups and the LDP National Defense Subcommittee, Prime Minister Kaifu struggled to make a decision on dispatching the minesweepers. On the evening of April 10, Foreign Minister Nakayama, Defense Agency Director-General Ishikawa, and Legislative Bureau Director-General Kudo visited

\textsuperscript{81} Asahi Shimbun, April 1, 1991 (evening edition).
\textsuperscript{82} Asahi Shimbun, April 8, 1991.
\textsuperscript{83} Ibid.
Prime Minister Kaifu to discuss the issue of dispatching minesweepers, but no conclusion was reached. In the afternoon of April 13, Prime Minister Kaifu, Cabinet Secretary Sakamoto Sanjuji, Deputy Cabinet Secretary in charge of political affairs Oshima Yoshimori, and Deputy Cabinet Secretary in charge of administrative affairs Ishihara Nobuo discussed the issue of dispatching minesweepers and decided on the policy of dispatching minesweepers. They decided that (1) the X-Day (the day of dispatch) would be on the 26th, (2) a Security Council meeting and an extraordinary Cabinet meeting would be held on the 24th to make the decision, (3) a meeting of party leaders would be held on the same day to report on Gorbachev's visit to Japan and to discuss measures to deal with the post-Gulf crisis, including this case, (4) the decision would be reported to the Diet on the same day or on the 25th, and (5) on the 16th, the heads of the foreign and defense ministries would be invited to attend the meeting. On the 16th, the ministers in charge of the foreign and defense ministries would be informed and instructed to start preparations for the dispatch of the troops; and (6) The implementation of this matter would be separated from the three-party agreement (PKO). Thus, Prime Minister Kaifu made the decision to dispatch minesweepers on April 24.

In response to Kaifu's decision, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs began laying the groundwork for the dispatch of minesweepers to the countries concerned. Kuwait, Iran, and Iraq were notified. None of these countries showed any opposition to Japan's dispatch of minesweepers.

Japan's dispatch of minesweepers was also reported to countries other than those where the minesweepers work directly. Neighboring countries such as China and South Korea, ASEAN countries, and countries such as India, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka, which are ports of call for the minesweepers, were also notified. China and South Korea expressed concern over the deployment of minesweepers overseas and called for

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a cautious response, while ASEAN countries and South Asian countries such as India welcomed Japan's dispatch of minesweepers, and the countries that would be the ports of call expressed their willingness to accept the minesweepers’ call. On April 24, the Security Council and the Cabinet formally decided to dispatch minesweepers to the Persian Gulf, and on April 26, the 39th anniversary of the founding of the Japan Coast Guard, the predecessor of the Maritime Self-Defense Force, the Persian Gulf minesweepers departed from the home ports of participating naval vessels, including Yokosuka and Kure, for the Amami Islands, which had been the gathering point88. This was the first overseas deployment of the SDF.

Conclusion
So far, this paper examined that Japanese government seek international contributions since the Gulf crisis. What has become clear in this report?
First of all, it became clear that the political situation in Japan at the time caused this situation. At the time, the Liberal Democratic Party did not have a majority of seats in the House of Councillors. Therefore, the government needed the cooperation of the Democratic Party of Japan and the Komeito in order to pass the bill.
Under such circumstances, the Japanese government continued to search for possible human contributions within Article 9 of the Constitution. Since the Gulf Crisis, the Japanese government has sought various forms of assistance. During this period, the issue of consistency with Article 9 of the Constitution became a problem. Time was spent on the interpretation of the Constitution, and the opposition parties continued to pursue this point. However, the Japanese government did not have much time left. The multinational force was moving troops to the Gulf region, and its scale was expanding day by day. In such a situation, the government could not take time to discuss the issue. This was exposed in the International Peace Cooperation Law. Without unity of will within the government, the response was at best ad hoc and at worst ad hoc. However, this may be an unavoidable response to the actual crisis in the Gulf. There was no time to deepen the discussion in the first place.
The reason why the dispatch of the minesweepers was realized so quickly was the result of the discussions that had been held by the Cabinet and the various ministries concerned, including the Foreign Ministry, the Defense Agency, and the Cabinet Legislative Bureau. As we have seen, the Japanese government’s repeated discussions

resulted in the first overseas deployment of the SDF.

The last thing I would like to point out is the U.S. stance on the movement to seek international contributions. Immediately after the outbreak of the Gulf crisis, the US requested Japan to dispatch minesweepers. However, although the U.S. thought that the dispatch of minesweepers after the ceasefire in the Gulf War was desirable, it did not believe that the dispatch could be realized, seeing the setback in human contribution symbolized by the abolition of the UN Peace Cooperation Bill after the Gulf Crisis. He also believed that the bashing of Japan by the US Congress and the media since the Gulf crisis, including President Bush, would damage the Japan-US relationship, and he was negative about the US putting pressure on Japan.

However, we cannot say that the U.S. has no influence at all on the dispatch of minesweepers. It can be pointed out that the criticism of Japan by the U.S. Congress and the U.S. media after the Gulf crisis had an impact on the basis of Japan's argument for dispatching minesweepers. In response to the bashing of Japan by Congress and the media after the Gulf crisis, voices in Japan began to reaffirm the need for human contributions. These voices were particularly strong in the Japanese business community, led by the Nippon Keidanren. The business community was concerned about the impact on the Japanese economy of a deterioration in Japan-U.S. relations. It cannot be ruled out that there was U.S. pressure in the dispatch of the minesweepers. However, it can be pointed out that the Japanese government and business community were aware of the U.S. reaction and that the U.S. had an influence on the dispatch of the minesweepers.

A combination of these three factors led to the dispatch of minesweepers after the Gulf War and international contributions such as the PKO Cooperation Law.