The Effects of External Engagement on Statebuilding

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Abstract: In the pursuit of sustainable peace in post-conflict developing countries, scholars and practitioners alike have concluded that international efforts must focus on building state capacity. It is not necessarily the case, however, that the goals of peacebuilding and statebuilding are mutually reinforcing. This paper advances a causal framework for understanding the effects of external engagement on statebuilding, in the context of a broader theoretical investigation into how peace is delivered in conflict-affected states. It devotes particular attention to disaggregating the concept of external engagement in post-conflict countries. In so doing, it builds a bridge between scholarship on state capacity-building and public service delivery, rooted in the political economy of development, and the peacebuilding literature, based in international relations. With illustrations from initial case material from Cambodia, Laos, and Uganda, the paper argues that a more finely-grained apprehension of the effects of external engagement on state capacity is crucial to explaining the dynamics of statebuilding and its relationship to peacebuilding. In particular, we posit that too much of certain types of international assistance diminishes the building of state capacity and constrains the ability of post-conflict states to channel and resolve societal grievances. In turn, we discuss the implications of this insight for the design of international statebuilding and peacebuilding interventions in post-conflict states.
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International peacebuilding interventions in post-conflict countries have become widespread since the end of the Cold War and have especially captured public and scholarly attention in the aftermath of the American interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq. The ultimate goal of international peacebuilding interventions is typically defined as creating a sustainable or lasting peace under a legitimate government. This expansive definition generally employed by the international community signifies a socio-political transformation that has wiped away the root causes of conflict. Scholars and practitioners alike have largely concluded that to achieve this goal of sustainable peace, international efforts must focus on building state capacity. In turn, the manner in which statebuilding is typically pursued in conflict-affected countries is through a large international presence pouring financial and human resources into government agencies. Assisting governments to carry out their basic functions and deliver public services, the logic goes, helps to build state capacity, which in turn enhances the prospects for sustainable peace.

Yet this relationship between state capacity and lasting peace has, over the last three decades, simply been asserted without much examination of the merits of the causal logic. In turn, these assertions have been acted upon, at great expense—and most often with disappointing outcomes. Does external engagement to assist governments with service delivery actually help to build state capacity? And does such an approach to statebuilding actually contribute to the prospects for and attainment of sustainable peace? This paper is among the first steps in a larger project that seeks to answer these two inter-linked questions on the basis of empirical research. It advances a causal framework for understanding the effects of external assistance on statebuilding, in the context of a broader theoretical investigation into how peace is delivered in
conflict-affected states. We begin with a brief literature overview intended to demonstrate the extent to which scholars and practitioners tend to conflate statebuilding and peacebuilding, as well as their causal processes. Next, we present our conceptual framework, which seeks to shed greater conceptual clarity on the processes through which differing degrees and types of external engagement might lead to various outcomes in terms of stateness and the depth of peace.

We devote particular attention to disaggregating the concept of external engagement in post-conflict countries and elaborating the causal mechanisms through which these forms of international assistance affect the building of state capacity. In so doing, we build a bridge between scholarship on state capacity-building and public service delivery, rooted in the political economy of development, and the peacebuilding literature, based in international relations. With illustrations from initial case material from Cambodia, Laos, and Uganda, the paper argues that a more finely-grained apprehension of the effects of external assistance on state capacity is crucial to explaining the dynamics of statebuilding and its relationship to peacebuilding. In particular, we posit that too much of certain types of international assistance diminishes the building of state capacity and constrains the ability of post-conflict states to channel and resolve societal grievances. In turn, we discuss the implications of this insight for the design of international statebuilding and peacebuilding interventions in post-conflict states.

I. Internationalized Statebuilding and Peacebuilding: The Logic and its Contradictions

The international peacebuilding agenda encompasses initiatives that use military force to end conflict (peace operations), diplomatic efforts to negotiate peace settlements (peacemaking), and efforts that aim to rebuild states, economies and societies (post-conflict reconstruction). All of
these activities fall under the rubric of “peacebuilding,” yet each is a distinct enterprise.² In this paper, we focus on the last set of efforts, those that constitute the post-conflict reconstruction aspect of peacebuilding.³ United Nations Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali articulated the international approach to peacebuilding in the seminal *An Agenda for Peace* as “action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid relapse into conflict.”⁴ Following Boutros-Ghali, most peacebuilding scholars understand peacebuilding as an internationally-driven effort in which international and local actors work together to foster a situation in which the threat of force is not necessary to maintain the peace.

Peacebuilding, in this understanding, is an activity, comprising a concrete set of efforts aimed at laying the groundwork for sustainable peace. In particular, peacebuilding aims to transform and expand the institutional arena in which a government interacts with its citizens and other political groups, so that a society can peacefully process various types of tension and conflict. Thus, one common measure of the success of peacebuilding is whether the normal inter-group tensions that are present in any society can be routinely and productively channeled through administrative and political governance institutions. Call, for example, asks whether post-conflict peacebuilders have managed to establish a political process that allows for the resolution of everyday disputes, which, if left to fester, might form the basis of violent conflict.⁵ Similarly, the “New Deal” for engagement in fragile states, endorsed by the g7+ group of fragile and conflict-affected countries and their development partners, lists fostering inclusive political

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² For more on this, see Chetail 2009, chapter one.
³ Following a somewhat misleading convention in the subfield, many scholars label this phase peacebuilding, while others use the label for all three aspects. We will use the term in this paper to refer to the post-conflict reconstruction phase, and will use both peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction to refer to activities that aim to rebuild societies in the wake of war and conflict.
⁴ Boutros Ghali 1992, para. 21
⁵ Call 2008
settlements and conflict resolution as one of its five major peacebuilding and statebuilding goals.\textsuperscript{6}

In turn, scholars and practitioners alike have converged on institution-building as the key to peacebuilding success, focusing on internationally-managed initiatives to build and strengthen governance institutions.\textsuperscript{7} There is now widespread acceptance that international interventions must focus on building state capacity in post-conflict and fragile states. The New Deal, for example, lists managing revenues and delivering services as another of its five core peacebuilding and statebuilding goals. Building state capacity to enable post-conflict countries to better govern themselves has become the single most integral element of international peacebuilding interventions. As Mac Ginty notes, such operations have actually been described as “peace by governance.”\textsuperscript{8}

The logic connecting statebuilding to peacebuilding seems straightforward: endowing governments with the capacity to perform their basic governance functions, including the unbiased delivery of core public services and collective public goods, lays an essential foundation for stable, peaceful societies. Yet our contention in this project is that there are also important and often overlooked contradictions between the dynamics of statebuilding and peacebuilding, especially when they are internationalized through a high volume of external engagement. A large body of work explores the difficulties raised by simultaneous political and

\textsuperscript{6} International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding 2011

\textsuperscript{7} Paris 2004; Doyle and Sambanis 2006; Call and Cousens 2008; Paris and Sisk 2008. The focus is on official state organizations, partly because these are the institutions over which governments can grant jurisdiction for assistance from the United Nations and other sources of external peacebuilding assistance. The practice of peacebuilding has, however, widened considerably in the last decade to also cover civil society organizations and community groups. Newer scholarship on peacebuilding reflects this local turn.

\textsuperscript{8} Mac Ginty 2011, pp. 15-16
economic transition, especially in a post conflict setting.\textsuperscript{9} Our focus here in on an equally important source of challenges generated by the nature of the peacebuilding enterprise that have been less well studied: those that stem from its \textit{internationalized} nature.

Additionally, challenges to state sovereignty seem to be deeply ingrained in the nature of international peacebuilding, especially in the context of large-scale peacebuilding interventions.\textsuperscript{10} International, or liberal, peacebuilding is an enterprise conceived by the international community and implemented by external actors within a sovereign state. International peacebuilders must go to great lengths to create “local ownership” of these processes, and much practice and scholarship has debated just how to accomplish this. In East Timor, for example, the degree of UN intervention led the scholar and UN-practitioner Jarat Chopra to call it “The UN’s Kingdom in East Timor.”\textsuperscript{11} The inherent contradiction is clear, when cast in this light: this is an attempt to build local sovereignty through an international exercise. Some critics of external statebuilding go so far as to claim that such peacebuilding efforts constitute a new form of imperialism or colonialism.\textsuperscript{12}

While these are all important points, we take from the debate a different implication: the very fact of external engagement in peacebuilding can create big and enduring challenges for the building of both coherent, capable, sovereign states, and a durable, deep peace at all levels. In particular, we expand below upon the sometimes perverse dynamics that emerge when statebuilding is pursued through a high degree of external engagement. Contrary to conventional peacebuilding expectations, we posit that the more the international community involves itself in

\textsuperscript{9} Inter alia, Snyder 2000; Paris 2004; Guttieri and Piombo 2007; Manning 2007; Paris and Sisk 2009; Barma 2012. Other elements of the present project delve into these issues more thoroughly.

\textsuperscript{10} Chandler 2000; Krasner 2004; Fearon and Laitin 2004

\textsuperscript{11} Chopra 2000; also Croissant 2007

\textsuperscript{12} Chandler 2007; Pugh 2008
the process of creating a viable state and building a sustainable peace, the more evident—and, eventually, even damaging—is the lack of the local autonomy necessary to own and operate that state. In this regard, we build directly on the rich literature on aid dependence, which has turned a critical eye to the ways in which development aid can all too often undermine the very goals it is attempting to achieve.\(^\text{13}\)

II. A New Conceptual Framework

In the search for more conceptual clarity, our project draws a firm distinction between statebuilding and peacebuilding and, even more importantly, critically analyzes the consequences of internationalizing these processes. Statebuilding and peacebuilding may intimately affect one another but they follow separate pathways and contribute to different outcomes: improvements in state capacity and the prospects for lasting peace. Because much of the peacebuilding literature focuses on external efforts to foster sustainable peace through the building or strengthening of state institutions, these works rarely analyze the extent to which recovery efforts are driven by external actors and the effects of that internationalization. We argue that a number of potentially perverse dynamics emerge when these processes are internationalized, rather than domestically driven. Statebuilding in particular is deeply affected when it is conducted by external agents for reasons that we will enumerate below.

The peacebuilding scholarship has wrestled with the question of how international interventions actually assist societies in achieving improvements in state capacity and sustainable peace. The focus in this literature has been on the countries that are on the receiving end of comprehensive international interventions that, in addition to providing peacekeeping functions,

\(^{13}\) Knack 2001; Van de Walle 2001; Easterly 2006; Ear 2007; Moyo 2009; Woodward 2013
deliver significant financial aid, policy advice, and technical assistance. Bosnia-Herzegovina, Cambodia, East Timor, and Kosovo, for example, are some of the most highly aided and internationally controlled peacebuilding efforts ever to have occurred. In examining the ways in which international interventions succeed or fail in achieving their mandates, a great deal has been written about the effect of different types of peacebuilding operation.\textsuperscript{14}

Much less has been said about the consequences of the degree of intervention. Even countries that do not have large-scale international interventions receive varying degrees and forms of multilateral, regional, and bilateral assistance—and this can vary over time. Uganda after its civil war ending in 1986 was an example of recovery without significant international assistance, but by the mid-1990s and into the 2000s it became a highly aided and aid-dependent country. There are also examples where governments receive significant external assistance but are very controlled and deliberate in how they direct and use that assistance, representing a form of autonomy even in a highly-aided context. Laos and Rwanda are good examples of a high degree of local control and decision making autonomy, even when significantly aided. In reality, too, there are instances of more fully autonomous or indigenous post-conflict recovery, in which internal decision-makers and actors pursue reforms to achieve sustainable peace and improvements in state capacity in the relative absence of coordinated international intervention.\textsuperscript{15}

Our project posits that it is essential to consider the degree of external engagement in a country’s statebuilding and peacebuilding efforts. It varies the nature and degree of external engagement in order to examine the effects of this variation on state capacity and sustainable peace. We question whether high degrees of internationalization or external engagement can create true state capacity or a quality peace on the ground. We do not see this as a binary, yes /

\textsuperscript{14} Chesterman 2004; Caplan 2005
\textsuperscript{15} As Weinstein (2005) has noted, surprisingly little research has been undertaken on the similarities and differences between international peace operations and autonomous processes of statebuilding and peacebuilding.
no question—instead, we seek to systematically analyze the ways in which internationalization helps or hinders the development of state capacity and a sustainable peace, and what hybrid forms of governance may result from different mixtures of various aid modalities.

The conceptual framework and research design underpinning this project have been crafted to enable an examination of the systematic causal mechanisms and outcomes generated when the statebuilding and peacebuilding enterprises are internationalized to different degrees. As represented in the causal framework presented in Figure 1, we examine statebuilding and peacebuilding as two distinct—i.e., not conflated—post-conflict recovery processes. This allows us to assess the impact of the degree of external engagement in peacebuilding and statebuilding efforts on two distinct outcomes, which are potentially related to each other: (1) “stateness,” a variable that gauges the functioning of the state apparatus; and (2) “depth of peace,” which measures the degree to which a country has built a stable, lasting, and sustainable peace.
Our project thus aims to understand how statebuilding and peacebuilding actually operate by viewing these processes through the lens of a causal model, with external engagement as the primary independent variable and two dependent variables: stateness and depth of peace. Each of these variables is non-dichotomous, ranges in value, and can be measured across multiple dimensions and at different levels of analysis, as follows.

**External Engagement.** The “external engagement” variable gauges the extent to which and the manner in which—or how much and in what ways—the international community provides assistance and direction in the provision of public services as part of statebuilding and peacebuilding efforts. This external engagement can vary on three core dimensions—colloquially, how much assistance there is, what it is intended for, and how it is implemented.

1. The **level** of engagement can vary, in terms of the volume of financial assistance, the share of overall assistance targeted to public service delivery, and the predictability and continuity of assistance over time.

2. The **purpose** of the engagement can vary, in terms of the degree to which external engagement is intended to shape government policy and priorities in terms of service delivery, the source of assistance, and the sequencing of assistance.

3. The **administration** of engagement can vary, in terms of the recipient government’s overall systems for aid management, the manner of direct external involvement in the day-to-day functioning of governance organizations, and the extent of direct external involvement in actual service provision.

These three dimensions capture different aspects of how international interventions influence local contexts: they can vary in terms of volume of aid; they can be more or less dominant in
setting the substance of policy; and they can complement (and therefore support) or substitute for (and therefore compete with or supplant) the business of the state and service provision in different ways.

External engagement varies along a continuum ranging from almost no international presence to wholesale and direct external involvement and even dominance. There are instances of autonomous or indigenous post-conflict statebuilding and peacebuilding, in which local decision-makers and actors pursue reforms to achieve sustainable peace and improvements in state capacity in the relative absence of external engagement. By contrast, interventions with a high degree of external engagement attempt to implement statebuilding and peacebuilding programs through the direct and coordinated involvement of international actors and significant international resources—financial, policy, and technical—in these processes. The external engagement of statebuilding and peacebuilding efforts is a continuous variable that fluctuates not just at the country level, but also over time, across sub-national localities, and across public service delivery sectors.

Stateness. The “stateness” variable gauges the strength of the formal, modern state. It aims to capture the variation in how well state institutions are able to carry out the tasks of governance and achieve the state’s goals. The “state” refers to the formal, juridical institutions of government: executive and policy making bodies, bureaucratic and military apparatus, and rule of law institutions and structures. Our measure of stateness defines stateness as varying along three inter-related dimensions.

16 While informal systems of power may undergird or compete with these formal structures, the distinction between them remains important—thus the classic distinction between juridical and empirical statehood (Jackson and Rosberg 1982). The state is distinct from the administration or regime that runs it, and is also different from the
1. The **authority** of the state can vary, in terms of its ability to maintain public order through the rule of law or otherwise, secure its borders, collect the revenue it needs to pay for its activities, and maintain a monopoly on the legitimate use of violence.

2. The **effectiveness** of the state can vary, in terms of its ability to achieve its desired outcomes, especially in the areas of policy-making and public service delivery.

3. The **legitimacy** of the state can vary, in both normative (process) and empirical (outcome) terms, and in both bottom-up (individual citizens’ perceptions) and top-down (elites’ perceptions) terms.

These dimensions capture the variation in the degree of control states wield within their societies; the differences in their abilities to draft and carry out their visions and policies; and in the extent to which they are viewed by society as legitimate.

Stateness varies along a continuum ranging from weakness to strength. State weakness is characterized by a lack of authority, an inability to provide basic public services or set coherent policies, and widespread questioning of state legitimacy. Strong states, by contrast, broadcast their authority, satisfy the social contract, and are widely viewed as legitimate. The variation in stateness can manifest differently across these dimensions—states are not wholly “strong” or “weak.” State strength can also vary across the different sectors of its activity. Often, states are selective about the sectors in which they build strength and capacity—choosing, for example, to privilege the security or extractive sectors over the social services, thus being able to maintain order and broadcast authority effectively even while being wholly ineffective in providing basic public services. Finally, there may be important sub-national variation in this variable, across geographic or demographic units within a country.

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specific regime type—the form of that administration and the nature of how it comes to and exercises power. A state is recognized by the international community as the sovereign ruler of a given territory.
This conceptualization views stateness akin to what most discuss as “governance,” absent the emphasis on participation or democratic regime type.\textsuperscript{17} Rather than adopting the expansive conception that the United Nations Development Program articulated in 1997, “the exercise of political, administrative and economic authority to manage a nation’s affairs,” we focus on stateness as the ability of a state to set policy goals, implement those goals, and to do so with a degree of effectiveness and legitimacy. This conception also comes closer to Fukuyama’s recent work on governance than to his earlier work on statebuilding.\textsuperscript{18} Hence we focus less on scope, or the range of activities in which the state engages, as a measure of stateness and instead emphasize the authority of the state, its effectiveness in carrying out the duties it has chosen to execute and services it provides, and its perceived legitimacy in the eyes of those whom it purports to serve.

Depth of Peace. The “depth of peace” variable measures the extent to which a society has developed a degree of resilience to channel conflict and prevent large-scale violence.\textsuperscript{19} As a concept, depth of peace captures the “peacefulness” of a society and is similar to the concept of “sustainable peace” in that it gauges the extent to which a society can channel and resolve

\textsuperscript{17} Englebert\textsuperscript{(2000, p. 5), too, defines good governance as a state with accountable and efficient institutions, which he, like us, explicitly does not tie to democratic institutions.}
\textsuperscript{18} Fukuyama\textsuperscript{2004, 2013}
\textsuperscript{19} As with the other variables in this study, the concept of peace has a long history and a contested set of definitions. Here, we utilize a conception of “depth of peace” in a form closely related to the “positive peace” advanced by the peace studies literature. The iconic statement is Galtung\textsuperscript{1969}. Rather than focus on the three elements of “structural,” “cultural,” and “direct violence” that characterized that literature, we work with a more pragmatic, less system-focused variation of the term.
tensions and conflicts without resorting to violence. The depth of peace has two core dimensions: degree of violence and conflict resilience.

1. The **degree of violence** captures the “negative peace” concept and measures levels of violence in society at multiple levels, from organized to routine, daily (some would stay structural) violence.

2. **Conflict resilience**, captures the conflict management aspects of society—mechanisms that prevent tensions from erupting into violence, or that help to contain violence once it breaks out and to restore peaceful relations. In incorporating the notion of resilience, we follow the Global Peace Index, which defines resilience as “the capacity of social systems to absorb stress, adapt and repair.”

When combined, these two dimensions create a continuous variable that ranges from no peace (high degrees of violence), to negative peace (cessation of hostilities), to a full, broad and sustainable peace. In the deepest peace, multiple mechanisms work to channel tensions and reduce the likelihood that violence or armed conflict will erupt from routine tensions or external events. The deepest peace will not only reflect a minimal degree of both organized and casual violence, it will also foster conditions that promote human security. In a post-conflict situation, this type of peace represents “conflict transformation,” in which the relationships between the parties in conflict have fundamentally changed from one of conflict and violence to one of arbitration, management, and even resolution.

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20 In this sense it is very similar to the “sustainable peace” concept advanced by Galtung 1969, pp. 167-191. Our use of the term “sustainable peace” differs from that of Doyle and Sambanis 2006 in that we do not include, as they do, the existence of a democratic, participatory government.

21 IEP, 2013, p. 2. The creators of the GPI, however, consider resilience to be a consequence of peace. We argue that societal resilience and the ability to process conflict is part of what creates a durable, positive peace at all levels of a society.
A deep peace is not one where no conflict exists, but where conflict does not lead to violence in most instances. Instead, political, economic and social tensions and competition are processed through various institutions within society. This conception of peace does not rely on formal state institutions, nor is it keyed to a particular regime type. Political tensions will be processed and managed by institutions of governance, whether formal or informal; economic tensions may be handled either by the market or state-mediated mechanisms (or some combination), and societal tensions by civil society, state institutions, or traditional/informal mechanisms, as appropriate. When these mechanisms break down or do not exist, society is less resilient, meaning that the normal tensions and conflicts within society are more likely to resolve themselves by escalation into violence. This type of resilience is an especially important aspect of peace in a country that has emerged from war and large-scale violence, as the mechanisms to manage tension may have been eroded during the violence and are one of the key elements of reconstructing post-conflict society and a durable, sustainable peace. Finally, a true situation of deep and sustainable peace is one that transforms the conflict and the relationship between individuals and groups who previously interacted through violence.\textsuperscript{22}

\textit{A Note on Research Design}

Our investigation proceeds inductively using data collected from three post-conflict states: Cambodia, Laos and Uganda. Our country case selection provides variation in the extent to which statebuilding and peacebuilding efforts have involved international intervention. Cambodia has experienced one of the most extensive international peace operations ever

\textsuperscript{22} This aspect of the concept emphasizes the outcome of forging new relationships in societies recovering from conflict, which entails a change in beliefs, attitudes, motivations and emotions (Rosoux 2009, pp. 544-546). In reality there is a time dimension to attaining a state of sustainable peace: the first phases focus on terminating the conflict and moving towards resolving fundamental grievances, while later stages a behavioral and attitudinal shift occurs (Kriesberg 2007, p. 39).
mounted, in the form of the United Nations Transitional Administration in Cambodia. In contrast, neighboring Laos has experienced a more autonomous form of statebuilding and peacebuilding since the Lao People’s Revolutionary Party established the Lao People’s Democratic Republic in 1975. Together these countries offer a distinct comparison in terms of the extent of external engagement, while selecting countries that experienced similar types of conflict and share a border and colonial history helps to control for other potential explanatory factors. Uganda offers an interesting intertemporal comparison, since external engagement toward statebuilding and peacebuilding efforts there has varied over time. After Yoweri Museveni came to power and the country stabilized in the mid-1980s, it autonomously underwent considerable improvements in sustainable peace and state capacity, with gradually increasing levels of international aid in particular sectors. Subsequently, significant international intervention has been devoted to statebuilding and peacebuilding in northern Uganda after the conflict involving the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA).

In each country, we examine external engagement through the lens of public service provision in three sectors: health, education, and public works. We examine service delivery for several reasons. First, the provision of services is one of the most direct ways in which states interact with their citizens. In the post-conflict context, this can take on a particular salience as some states use public services to “buy the peace”—providing services as a way to help quell discontent, reduce grievances, and build loyalty. Second, as much as the provision of public service can serve as a method to build peace, it can also create tensions over issues such as service distribution, access, quality, and so on. Finally, international assistance efforts often focus on helping states to provide services—or they directly provide those services on behalf of states. Public service delivery offers an arena for examining both how states interact with their
citizens, and how international agencies interact with states. In short it serves as the site at which our three core variables—external engagement, stateness, and depth of peace—can be examined together.

In each public service delivery sector, we examine the degree of external engagement and the nature of government interactions with the development partner community. Specifically, we examine who sets the agenda in the sectors, the forums in which policies are created, and how policies are implemented. Even in a situation of high aid dependence, there are various ways that governments can either cede their responsibilities or exert control over international actors. “Autonomy” does not mean that a country does not receive aid, but reflects the degree of control that national agents exert over the assistance. To measure stateness, we focus on the quality of public policy processes and of the services that are actually delivered in each sector. To assess the depth of peace, we focus on the manifestation and management of incipient or actual conflicts at the local level, those that emerge in a general sense as well as those specifically pertaining to each service sector. This framework allows for an independent investigation of the effects of variation in external engagement on the strength of the state and the depth of the peace. Moreover, it allows us to study the ways in which these statebuilding and peacebuilding outcomes might influence each other.

III. The Effects of External Engagement on Statebuilding

In order to understand the causal processes by which statebuilding and peacebuilding activities might lead to particular outcomes, our key independent variable is the degree of “external engagement,” a concept that captures how much and in what ways statebuilding and peacebuilding efforts are internationally aided. The first phase of our fieldwork has focused on
better understanding and collecting data on the causal mechanisms through which external engagement affects the statebuilding process and the outcome of state capacity. On the basis of this first round of empirical research, we propose that—as the result of a number of underlying factors we discuss further below—the causal relationship between external engagement and state capacity can range from being a pro-developmental, positive mechanism to an anti-developmental, negative mechanism.

A pro-developmental causal mechanism manifests when external engagement strategies are intended to and do create state capacity and enhance government systems or when they provide complementary parallels or supplements to government efforts. Pro-developmental engagement occurs when it is coordinated with government policies and strategies. It can represent a deliberate and successful attempt to build state authority, effectiveness, and legitimacy. It can also come in the form of direct service provision or filling other governance gaps without the intent of creating capacity or developing systems, in which case the engagement can impact the quality of public service provision (and, potentially, depth of peace on the ground) without actually influencing stateness.

An anti-developmental causal mechanism manifests when external engagement strategies perversely undermine the very objectives they are intended to achieve. We know from the broad and well-evidenced literature on aid dependence that this is not a rare phenomenon and we also know much about the fundamental principal-agent problems that make it so. Maladaptive outcomes occur when external engagement substitutes for and even competes with the building of state capacity, delivering public services through parallel systems that fail to contribute to and, worse, undermine state authority, effectiveness, and legitimacy. Worse still are the forms of

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23 Fieldwork was undertaken in Vientiane, Laos, in July 2014; Kampala, Uganda, in September 2014; and Phnom Penh, Cambodia, in October 2014.
24 Easterly 2006
external engagement that create a rentier state, one that suffers the ill institutional and accountability effects of not raising a good proportion of its own revenue. The most perverse outcomes of all come, in turn, when stateness and governance quality are even further diminished as a result of inter-elite battles for control over aid rents and the institutions through which they are channeled.

How do the elements of external engagement—recalling our three core dimensions of level, purpose, and administration—cause or combine to cause either pro-developmental or anti-developmental effects on stateness? Here we offer some preliminary research findings, emerging from the iterative process of developing theoretical expectations and testing them against empirical illustrations from our first round of fieldwork. We note, at the outset of this section, that some elements of external engagement in practice certainly overlap across the three main sub-dimensions; here we discuss the dynamics we have observed where they appear to best fit at this stage of our research.

**Level of Engagement**

The *volume of assistance* captures the degree of government dependence on aid flows in contrast to its ability to raise its own revenue. High volumes of assistance can have an adverse, substitutive effect on the development of financial management systems, and the ability to efficiently allocate and utilize financial resources. In addition, a high volume of assistance can lead to a rentier effect that hinders the development of certain types of government capacity, specifically the ability to raise and administer revenue. As we see in Cambodia, for example, too

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26 Tornell and Lane 1999 model this “voracity effect” in the context of natural resource rents.
much donor assistance may reduce government incentives to develop taxation and other revenue generation functions and capabilities.27

In turn, because they have not raised the funds themselves, these governments may be less careful with how the finances are managed and spent, and thus may not develop the financial, regulatory, or management mechanisms that otherwise would have developed more organically. By the late 1990s and early 2000s, Uganda was thought to have developed sufficient financial management and institutional capacity to “graduate” to budgetary support, because it could use the funds without these issues. Yet, even there, a rapid increase in the volume of international financial assistance after 2005 led to problems with corruption and maladministration of pooled donor funds in 2010–2012; this in turn has led the donor community to re-assess the readiness of Uganda’s internal systems for this level and type of assistance. Laos, with a relatively lower volume of assistance, has come some way in the past decade in strengthening its public financial management (PFM) system, moving, in particular to a centralized system of revenue collection that strengthened financial controls.28 International partners can attempt to influence governments to develop these mechanisms, exemplified by the World Bank’s emphasis on PFM systems and PFM reforms, but if the assistance is very predictable and/or donors are unwilling to suspend assistance, the donors can only exert so much pressure on this front.29

The share of assistance targeted to public service delivery speaks to donor and government priorities. It can also indicate a substitution effect if the government chooses not to put its resources into sectors in which external actors are heavily engaged. This substitution can

27 Ear 2012
28 World Bank 2007
have follow-on effects on state capacity and peace. It may also extend donor dependence: when heavily engaged in supporting public or social services, donors may feel they need to remain engaged if governments choose to concentrate on other aspects, because of the humanitarian and moral impacts of withdrawing assistance. This would enable governments to continue to choose not to spend on social services, allowing them to spend their own resources on sectors that promote regime maintenance, such as the security apparatus, or public infrastructure, which delivers collective goods but is also a spending channel amenable to patronage dispensation.

When development partner priorities do not match government priorities, the effects are indeterminate. The effects could be neutral, or they could be detrimental for the building of state capacity. For example, if government priorities change because of external engagement, this may not directly affect stateness. By contrast, if the government activities and institution building substitute away from certain sectors because of high external engagement in them, this is more likely to inhibit the development of stateness. The government may not develop policy, regulatory or implementation capacity in these fields and, in turn, it could eventually develop a legitimacy problem. Whether these dynamics manifest will also depend on the administration of the assistance. For example, if external agents provide money that the government then uses itself to develop the sector, then stateness is likely to be enhanced. If external actors directly provide the services themselves, or are overly directive of policy and implementation of government-provided services in the sector, the government’s own authority, effectiveness, and legitimacy will be developed less.

An over-reliance on external engagement, particularly through a dynamic of substitution, can, in turn, impair the ability of service provision to help with peacebuilding at the community level. External actors often engage in development assistance with priorities that resonate with their home audiences, which tends to lead them into more heavy investments into the social sectors.
level. If external actors are the primary funders of and/or implementing agents in a sector, and the local populations are conscious of this, it could sap the government’s legitimacy at the local level. There were signs of this phenomenon in the education and health sectors in Cambodia, where a large proportion of citizens across the country seek social services from a combination of private and non-governmental providers. In Laos, by contrast, the government and its development partners more deliberately ensure that project implementation and hence service provision occurs directly through the sector line ministries and their subnational branches. In Uganda, citizens' awareness of the high levels of external engagement did not seem to sap the legitimacy generated by service provision. Instead, they tended to credit the government for procuring international assistance on their behalf.

The predictability and continuity of assistance over time matters a great deal to the supported programs and initiatives. If external engagement, whether financial or technical, is unstable or unpredictable, it can create gaps in service delivery, problems paying civil servants, difficulties in enacting a coherent sectoral approach, and so forth. More variable aid could increase uncertainty and shorten time horizons, which could worsen some of the rentier effects.31 If the state is reliant on external assistance to finance the delivery of services, and that assistance does not arrive on time or in the amount pledged, gaps in service delivery, under-performance of service delivery targets, and possibly delays or disruptions in the payments of civil service salaries will ensue.

Our research in Uganda revealed a clear dynamic here: when central budget support was halted in 2012, the government could not pay salaries because approximately 25 percent of the

31 Knack 2001, on the other hand, finds that more variable general aid flows can sometimes temper the negative effects of aid dependence, when the volatility itself means that the government must invest in the administrative capacity to raise revenue to smooth budgets.
government budget was at that point based on external support. Losing a quarter of its projected income meant that the government could not execute its yearly budget and spending plan, which resulted in interruptions in programming and service delivery at all levels. When sector budget support (external assistance targeted at a specific sector) or project-based support arrives months late, the salaries of front-line service providers—such as teachers, and nurse and physicians in health clinics and regional hospitals—that are dependent on that assistance get suspended for months at a time. This then creates trickle-down effects: the teachers and clinic workers begin to charge user fees to make up lost revenue; their morale declines because of unpredictable pay, so the quality of care and efficiency of education suffers. In the case of the medical staff, many opt to spend more time at their private clinics than in the public ones, which are supposedly their main jobs. Because their official salaries are so low and often interrupted, in both Uganda and Cambodia most physicians operate private clinics and drive patients who can pay from the public to these private clinics. Sometimes they try to drive even those who cannot pay, with disastrous results. In Cambodia, some teachers make students pay a daily fee to attend their classes. All of these factors significantly impair service delivery.

Unreliable and oft-interrupted external support for recurrent budgets also means that states cannot create and implement reliable and accurate spending plans, because they never know if the development partners will deliver the promised funds on time, or in the amount pledged. If the government cannot (or will not) make up the shortfall, then there are gaps in the service and the functioning of the sector. The extensiveness of the effects of aid unpredictability depends on the degree to which the government and its specific sectors are reliant on external engagement. All of these outcomes will affect the efficiency of public service delivery, the

morale of workers in the service sector, and the quality of services provided to the public. The government may thus experience shortfalls in stateness as a result of sporadic or under-funding by external actors.

**Purpose of Engagement**

The purpose of engagement—the fundamental issue of *for what* it is intended—is crucial in conditioning the potential causal effects described immediately above. In particular, the degree to which external engagement is intended to shape government policy and priorities in terms of service delivery—versus being more focused on capacity building and direct service provision—is a crucial factor determining whether external engagement can and will lead to improvements in stateness. Policy-making and priority setting capabilities are an essential feature of stateness—and policy engagement can support a government’s internal processes, or it can replace them. Donors can assist in enhancing these capabilities to some extent; yet it is a slippery slope to substitution away from domestic government policy-making and prioritization.

This tension in terms of policy engagement was evident in both Cambodia and Laos, where donor-funded international consultants play an outsized role in assisting line ministries in drafting their policy and planning documents. Yet, given that high level of external engagement in policy, the two countries still show interesting differences. The Lao government carefully and thoroughly directs even high volumes of assistance, influencing heavily how it is employed in Laos through hierarchical and controlled relationships with development partners and all policy decisions made on the basis of the National Socio-Economic Development Plan. By contrast, the Cambodian government is much more likely to simply allow donors to follow their own objectives, with less attention paid to the match with the national development plan and
government priorities. The Ugandan government falls somewhere in-between these poles. It develops five-year National Development Plans (NDPs), and all the sectors develop sectoral strategic plans that follow both the overall contours of the NDP and their own priorities that are generated via inputs from subnational units. Development partners are asked to generate plans and programs in accordance with both of these, but if a development partner with enough influence and money comes with its own plan that deviates from the NDP and the sectoral plans, the government is likely to allow it.

Uganda seems generally more autonomous; here it was clear that the country has developed enough home-grown capacity both within the government’s central and line-ministries and in its non-governmental sectors to develop the NDP and the sectoral plans through its own processes. External actors provide input through an elaborate working group structure and informal consultations, but they do not drive the process. In Uganda, however, there was a clear difference between the northern part of the country and the rest; in the north, post-2005 the international community was much more in control than the government. The LRA effectively exited the territory in 2005, at which point international actors began to heavily engage in reconstruction activities. The government took two additional years to develop a reconstruction plan for the northern region, the Peace and Recovery Development Plan (PRDP); but it did not implement this until 2009. The turning point in government-international community relations came in the 2009 – 2012 timeframe, during which the Government of Uganda began to exert more control over the policymaking process that governed reconstruction in the post-LRA context. While the government has increased its authority and autonomy vis-à-vis the various reconstruction initiatives, external engagement in the north remains relatively un-coordinated and un-regulated, and many services and state functions (aside from security) are carried out by
non-state actors. There is thus an inconsistent level of adherence to the existing policy for coordinated reconstruction.

It is instructive to consider what happens when, sometimes, the priorities of government and development partners are not aligned. In Uganda, and to some extent in Cambodia, the government appears to have a tendency to cede territory to development partners if it is clear that the development partners hold particular elements of policy or service delivery goals to be important. If the government is relatively hands off in terms of policy engagement, there is a serious risk of a lack of prioritization of sector policies and programs, creating plans that are laundry lists instead of being strategic development visions. This is characteristic of the sectoral plans developed in Uganda and Cambodia in both education and health—two of their most externally-funded sectors. The tendency is exacerbated by the volume of aid—the more aid dependent a sector, the worse the problem of prioritization. While the line-ministries in Uganda exhibit greater autonomy in generating sectoral plans, they do not prioritize them because they know that donors will fund what they want to, and the government will then choose from what is left to finance. The health sector in Uganda is particularly emblematic of this dynamic, especially in the realm of HIV/AIDS and antiretroviral provision—two programs very robustly funded by the United States government. Similar dynamics surfaced in Cambodia as well.

The source of assistance might also be important in determining the effects of engagement on stateness, in that different development partners do things in very different ways. Some bilateral development partners only fund grants; some always pool funds, others do not; some insist on project implementation units while others emphasize the use of country systems. Perhaps most importantly, different development partners fund different priorities, with different mission objectives determined by their home constituencies and political mandates.
The manner in which the sequencing of assistance affects the purpose of engagement and hence its potential impacts on stateness has to do with the evolution of engagement from basic to more advanced, or from an operating posture akin to one of emergency response in the immediate post-conflict period to longer term development assistance. Most development partners enter a post-conflict country in crisis-response mode, assuming direct intervention in the wake of a conflict that often will have destroyed state institutions. They enter with a plan to transition to a developmental operating paradigm over time as the situation improves and the local government assumes responsibility and gains capacity. Functionally, this is similar to the way that the World Bank will sequence assistance as a country “graduates” from basic to more complex programs and reforms.

If external actors remain in the immediate post-settlement mindset—if they do not sequence their engagement strategies—they remain in a mode where they operate similarly to humanitarian assistance organizations, providing essential services without consulting government authorities, government regulations, or government priorities. This might be necessary in a situation where a catastrophe has completely overwhelmed the ability of a state to respond to its citizens’ needs. It is frequently the operating environment in the immediately post-conflict or post-settlement phase.33

It is rarely a posture that should characterize external engagement in the medium- to long-term, yet it is exactly the operating posture that many of the development partners in Cambodia assume today, more than 20 years after UNTAC. Similarly, many development partners’ engagement in the Ugandan health sector, particularly in AIDS prevention and

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33 In part, this aspect of sequencing also has an impact on whether external programs are appropriate to local needs. If an external engagement strategy remains mired in the emergency response mode for too long, it may address needs that no longer exist. This in and of itself does not have a direct impact on government capacity. More important for the question of how external engagement impacts stateness is how this dynamic speaks to the operating orientation of the external actors engaged in assistance.
treatment, operates from in this sort of humanitarian mode. When the external actors do not shift, they remain in this mindset and do not sequence their engagement strategies to gradually work with the government, and they often continue to engage in direct service provision and provide very high volumes of assistance in specific sectors, without an exit strategy. This allows the substitution effects to take hold, and in its most inimical form, brings external engagement into direct competition with government services. When this occurs, all of the dynamics discussed in the other parts of the external engagement variable will come into play.

Administration of Engagement

How external engagement is administered captures both the modality by which external engagement is delivered and the degree to which governments direct the way that external engagement is used in the country. Some governments are very deliberate and controlled about the modalities of development aid, including the extent to which external engagement can be involved in the day-to-day functioning of governance organizations, and the extent of direct external involvement in actual service provision.

The administration of external engagement is shaped foremost by the recipient government’s overall systems for aid management. One important element in this regard is the extent to which government has regulatory capabilities and mechanisms to govern highly aid-dependent sectors. In Cambodia, a relative lack of this sort of regulatory effectiveness stemmed, in part, from a feeling of not wanting to “scare off” the donors. In Uganda, the difficulty of monitoring, organizing, coordinating, and regulating the activities of multiple donors was frequently described as creating high transaction costs that taxed the capacity of the state. The lack of regulatory capabilities leads to problems with state effectiveness in terms of how and
which services are delivered, since provision mechanisms can overlap. It might also compromise state authority, if and when citizens know that the state is not providing the services itself, as often happens.

In contrast to Cambodia (the most extreme) and Uganda, the Lao government very tightly controls how international actors engage in the local environment: it regulates the sectors in which external actors are active, how they can operate, where they can invest funds, and mandates that all programs be in accordance with national priorities and sector strategies. The Lao government goes so far as to demand that all external projects have local counterparts, and that international actors cannot visit provinces without being accompanied by representatives of the central government. There is a strong element of control and oversight to the relationship here, despite high levels of international assistance in many sectors. Neither Cambodia nor Uganda exhibited anything close to this degree of control over the activities and movements of international actors. Unlike in Laos, external actors can directly fund subnational governments in Cambodia and Uganda; they can develop agreements directly with provincial governments and enact projects solely at that level; and they can operate at the local level with only vague agreements with provincial or national government authorities. The Ugandan government has been slowly changing this and attempting to enact laws that force NGOs to register their activities, so that it is able to learn what is going on in the country, though in this effort the goal is oriented more towards controlling their political activities than gaining regulatory control.

In its ideal form, external involvement in the day to day functioning of government institutions would be geared towards building up the institutional and human capacities of those institutions to run programs themselves. There may be a substitution effect instead, however, in which case the external agencies do not work enough with local counterparts to train them and to
build to a transfer of responsibilities to the local authorities. This can happen with technical assistance, depending on how it is designed, and speaks to the administration aspect that determines the developmental impact of technical assistance. Technical assistance can help build capacity by providing international experts that provide various forms of educational and training opportunities, on the job training, and project management functions. But project-specific technical assistance will not deliver developmental results unless it is designed to do so—without a specific training component, this type can focus only on providing international experts to run a project, not work with, educate and train their government counterparts. Project-based support, where the assistance is designed to work only for the duration of the project, has been particularly criticized for the substitution effect and minimal transfer of knowledge and expertise.\(^\text{34}\) The design of the assistance could mitigate these effects, if local capacity training is built into the project from the beginning. For example, if the technical assistance is conducted through local actors and is designed in a way that the expert is used to train the local counterparts, then stateness may increase. In Uganda, we heard tales of both outcomes. Improvements in state capacity seemed to result when the local agencies who were receiving the technical assistance were able to request assistance in learning particular skills and when they participated in the selection of their technical advisors.

Mechanisms of sequencing external engagement and the manner of donor oversight over project implementation likely has similar potential problems in terms of substitution effects: the more dominant the external agents, the less state authority, effectiveness, and legitimacy will

\(^{34}\) For example, international interventions tend to hire international rather than local experts, and many question whether these international actors work with or transfer any knowledge or skills to local counterparts. “Between 40 and 70 percent of all aid to post-conflict countries goes to salaries for foreign consultants (Kahler 2007: 15). Only 10 percent of the budget of a UN peacekeeping operation is spent locally (Carnahan et al. 2006). The result is what the literature now calls the ‘aid-institutions paradox’ (Moss et al. 2006) whereby aid actually undermines the capacity and quality of government institutions.” (Woodward 2013)
develop within the government. This is tied to the “ownership” idea common in the development studies literature, but it is less about projects being appropriate to the local environment or wanted by the government (the classic sense of ownership) and more focused on whether or not the government develops autonomous capacity to plan and implement its sectoral policies and programs. When assistance is given all at once, with less conditionality, there is more chance of financial substitution, but potentially less of policy and autonomy substitution because donors tend to exert less control over the mechanics and specifics of how assistance is implemented. This does not mean there is no donor influence or oversight. The project design may have been very tightly controlled in its design phase, which increases donor influence, but giving the funding in one disbursement means the government has more latitude to decide how to implement and can change the agreement during the period of set funding. As assistance moves to a scheduled disbursement, external influence over how the funds are spent and projects implemented increases.

As external oversight of implementation increases, gains in stateness tend to decrease. If assistance is provided in response to “triggers” within government (performance triggers, service provision triggers, spending triggers, etc.), the effects of this type of strategy depend on how it is designed. On the one hand, trigger sequencing of aid disbursements is a way to re-introduce donor conditionalities without calling them such. This method provides the most control to the donors over how a sector or program is managed by the government, which leads to a negative impact by which the government does not develop autonomous program direction. On other hand, these triggers can be tied to increases in stateness such as the development of financial regulation mechanisms, increased domestic capacity, and better service delivery target achievements. As such, triggers can be used to increase state authority, effectiveness and
legitimacy. This is a form of substantive, technocratic sequencing and is characteristic of World Bank engagement strategies, where countries “graduate” from one type of assistance to the next.

The level of direct external involvement in direct service provision could be benign if external service provision follows a national and sectoral strategy designed by the government. In this case, it could take a complementary form that is supportive and gap-filling. In other cases, external agents engage in service provision without coordinating with the government, or with only nominal attention to a national strategic plan or sectoral policy plan. In these cases, substitution and competition are more likely. Finally, unless the intervention is designed with transition in mind from the beginning, external agents may find themselves locked into service provision if they become directly involved in providing services in sensitive sectors like health care. When the U.S. government first announced the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief, critics immediately worried that providing such a high level of assistance for providing antiretroviral drug therapy would lock the United States into funding the program into perpetuity, due to the dependence caused by the program and the impact of halting it.35

IV. Conclusion

This paper is a small part of an overall research project that seeks to disentangle the causal mechanisms by which statebuilding and peacebuilding efforts result in their various outcomes. This particular paper has devoted attention to developing a nuanced conception of external engagement in post-conflict countries, and tracing its potential causal impacts on state authority, effectiveness, and legitimacy. We believe an important theoretical contribution is represented by

35 Lyman and Wittels 2010. The concern was that the beneficiary governments would never be able to bear the cost of providing the ARVs themselves, and that even if they could, they would not choose to because they knew that if they did not substitute for the U.S.-funded initiative, the United States would not halt it.
our effort to incorporate insights from the aid dependence literature into research on statebuilding and peacebuilding.

Our analytical attention has thus focused on how the degree of external engagement and the manner in which it is implemented might be thought to affect stateness. In this regard, we have outlined a number of emerging patterns, illustrating them with initial observations from the field where possible. In this brief conclusion we consider what appear, in a very preliminary fashion, to be the most pro-developmental causal mechanisms as well as the most egregious anti-developmental causal mechanisms in order to propose a handful of policy prescriptions suggested by our work thus far.

A crucial pro-developmental mechanism linking external engagement and positive outcomes in stateness appears to emerge when development partners do their utmost to ensure that their programs follow the lead that recipient governments have set in terms of policy priorities. This “goodness of fit” appears to reinforce the policy planning and prioritization capacity within government, a crucial dimension of state authority and effectiveness. It also helps to ensure that governments can indeed deliver on their promises to their citizens, which in turn boosts state legitimacy. Achieving a good fit, however, appears to be a delicate task. Development partners often provide technical assistance to government ministries for policy planning and prioritization purposes—and the goal of this technical assistance must be to support instead of supplant the government’s own capacity and processes, as seems promising in Uganda.

Technical assistance as part of development aid has long been both a predominant and fraught strategy for state capacity-building. In our research, it appears that technical assistance can be pro-developmental when it is long term and programmatic. These goals have indeed been
achieved in all three countries by international consultants sitting in government offices for up to three years at a time, working closely with government counterparts on the day-to-day business of governing, from planning to implementation. At the same time, in all three countries, we heard multiple stories of technical assistance consultants simply doing government officials’ work for them, with little to no transfer of skills. This seems to be an issue on which development partners have learned a number of important lessons and attempt to apply them through more deliberate terms of reference for technical assistance consultants.

Volatile and unpredictable assistance flows appear to be a fairly clear anti-developmental mechanism—compromising government salaries, supplies, service delivery, and so on. Thus, anything that development partners can do to smooth their disbursements would seem to enhance outcomes in stateness. In part, this could possibly be achieved by more concerted pooling of funds (such that at a given point in time any one donor’s financing gaps could be filled by other donors); an initiative that seems to have yielded good outcomes in the Cambodian health sector. Another way of smoothing volatility in assistance is to move to budget support instead of project-based support; but this, as Laos demonstrates, can come only on the heels of considerable successful investment in country systems.

Until central budget support was halted in 2012, Uganda also showed clear benefits of moving to budget support, in terms of the planning reliability and capacity building introduced by reduced financial volatility and increased budgetary autonomy. However, there is an additional consideration that is introduced with budget support that can undermine these positive dynamics: while aid volatility can be reduced, budget support can be more open to political manipulation because it is less directly tied to sensitive humanitarian outcomes. The Government of Uganda discovered the central budget support was more prone to being suspended for political
and diplomatic issues, such as international condemnation of legislation criminalizing homosexuality, than was project-based support – introducing a new source of volatility into a type of external engagement long thought to be less volatile than project support.36

Supplanting government’s role in direct service provision would also appear to be a relatively obvious anti-developmental mechanism—and yet this is a tactic resorted to surprisingly often by development partners, as seen in all three countries examined. In particular, the legitimacy of the state is often compromised when citizens receive, and know they receive, services from non-governmental (including donors) or private providers in lieu of the government. There was a slight difference between Laos and Cambodia, on the one hand, and Uganda, on the other, in this respect. External service provision was less legitimacy-reducing in Uganda, because there the government is very careful to portray non-state service provision to its citizens as a government initiative, essentially telling them, “see how we procure services for you?” One thing development partners might be able to do to strengthen the state’s hand in this regard is to help build the state’s regulatory capacity to govern non-state public service provision (thus enhancing one dimension of state authority and effectiveness) while also working to build the state’s ability to deliver the services itself (thus contributing to state effectiveness and legitimacy).

Such implications can only be preliminary at this stage of our research project. Much conceptual and empirical work remains to be done to continue to test such findings and assess the extent to which they are generalizable. As noted at the beginning of this paper, here we have focused only on one dimension of our project, that linking the degree of external engagement to outcomes in stateness. We will devote similar attention to connecting the degree of external engagement to outcomes in stateness.

36 As previously discussed, mismanagement of the budget support for Northern reconstruction was the main reason that central budget support was halted in 2012, but the anti-homosexuality legislation also played a role in the decisions not to renew the funds once the investigations had been completed and the funds repaid.
engagement to outcomes in the depth of peace and, also, to understanding how statebuilding and peacebuilding are truly linked.
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