

## **An Evolving Host-Citizen Contract**

### **The Notion of Duty toward Host Citizens in the U.S. Military Quest for Legitimacy in Afghanistan\***

**Lisa Karlborg**

Department of Peace and Conflict Research  
Uppsala University  
[lisa.karlborg@pcr.uu.se](mailto:lisa.karlborg@pcr.uu.se)

U.S. military quest for local legitimacy in Iraq and Afghanistan has placed unprecedented political emphasis on the need for U.S. forces to interact with and protect foreign host citizens. Yet, to-date, we have limited knowledge of how the U.S. military conceptualizes the relationship between U.S. forces and host citizens in the context of these new missions. The paper argues that the duty a U.S. forces is conceptualized within the framework of a host-citizen contract. In a qualitative comparison of the 2006 and 2014 versions of the U.S. Army and Marine Corps counterinsurgency manual FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5, the paper discerns three main obligations, which are perceived to regulate the legitimacy of host-nation authorities and their partnership with U.S. forces: defeating the insurgency while supporting or building host-nation agency without harming host citizens. However, the study finds that the notion of legitimacy has changed in ways that impose new limitations on the scope and impact of U.S. forces' influence in the host nation. In the 2006 manual, legitimacy is treated as a zero-sum, strategic objective that is, ultimately, achievable with support of extensive influence and involvement of U.S. forces. Conversely, the 2014 manual conceptualizes legitimacy as a means rather than a strategic end state, which ultimately subordinates the influence of U.S. forces to host-nation authorities and their willingness and capability of to uphold legitimate rule. This evolved notion of legitimacy and conceptualization of military duty is arguably thought-provoking in light of the ongoing drawdown of U.S. forces from Afghanistan because it rationalizes the decision to 'opt-out' of the host-citizen contract.

Keywords: U.S. Armed Forces, Counterinsurgency Field Manual, Military Doctrine, Legitimacy, Host Citizen, Afghanistan

In the context of irregular warfare, and counterinsurgency operations in particular, the relationship between deployed forces and the host population is at the center of gravity of military efforts. The main objective of these population-centric missions is to influence the perceptions and behavior of the host population, which arguably requires a different mindset and capabilities other than those associated with conventional warfare.<sup>1</sup> After a more than two-decades long lull in the development of counterinsurgency doctrine, the U.S. Army and Marine Corps issued their first joint counterinsurgency field manual FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 *Counterinsurgency* in 2006, which was recently superseded by *Insurgencies and Countering Insurgencies* (2014). Not surprisingly, the decision to adopt a comprehensive counterinsurgency approach in Iraq and Afghanistan, in many ways, turned conventional military-thinking about the relationship between troops and host citizens on its head. Both versions of the manual lead with the assumption that U.S. military gains and socio-political reforms are futile without bolstering popular legitimacy of host authorities. In doing so, they have placed unprecedented emphasis on the duty of regular U.S. forces to build relationships with, and protect, foreign host citizens.<sup>2</sup>

However, the inherent irony of counterinsurgency –that the performance of U.S. forces is not sufficient for securing military victory– is increasingly tangible after five years of extensive military efforts to bolster the legitimacy of the Afghan government and its continued partnership with U.S. forces. The promises and perils of counterinsurgency remain widely debated among scholars, policymakers, and practitioners.<sup>3</sup> Some argue that efforts taken by U.S. forces to increase local

---

\* This paper was first presented at the 2014 Biennial Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society (IUS)/Canada conference, Ottawa, Canada, 17–19 October 2014.

legitimacy, such as minimizing Afghan civilian casualties, exposed troops to unnecessary risks in exchange for certain tactical successes and limited, if any, strategic gains. Others maintain that troop interaction and relationship-building with host citizens is critical to make headway in the operational environment and to ensure security and well-being of host citizens, as well as the safety of mission personnel.<sup>4</sup> In 2012, the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) issued a strategic guidance, which underscored the continued importance of relationship-building and the need to “retain and continue to refine the lessons learned, expertise, and specialized capabilities that have been developed over the past ten years of counterinsurgency and stability operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.”<sup>5</sup>

While policymakers provide the political context and set the broader legal, moral, and ethical framework for U.S. military engagements, it is the task of U.S. Armed Forces to define the specific principles, techniques, and tactics intended to make these political aspirations a reality. Despite ongoing debate on counterinsurgency, there is surprisingly limited reflection on how the mantra of ‘bolstering local legitimacy’ in the host nation has shaped the sense of military duty toward host population.<sup>6</sup> In an attempt to address this gap, this paper explores if the conceptualization of duty is different today than it was at the outset of counterinsurgency campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan. For the purpose of pinpointing, and fleshing out, the main obligations embedded in the relationship between U.S. forces and host citizens, it conducts a qualitative analysis that compares and contrasts the 2006 and 2014 versions of the U.S. Army and Marine Corps counterinsurgency manual FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5. In particular, the study focuses on how these obligations are conceptualized in relation to the main mission objective, namely the quest for local legitimacy. The 2006 manual had paradigmatic impact on U.S. operations as it provided the blueprint for the ‘surge’ in Iraq (2007-2008) and Afghanistan (2009-2012), while the 2014 manual conveys the most up-to-date framework, and new precedent, for future U.S. population-centric engagements.<sup>7</sup>

In the analysis, three main obligations of U.S. forces surface as perceived determinants of the legitimacy of host-nation authorities and their partnership with U.S. forces: defeating the insurgency while supporting or building host-nation agency without harming host citizens. However, in the notion of legitimacy has evolved in ways that impose fundamental limitations on the scope of U.S. forces’ influence. In the 2006 manual, legitimacy is treated as a zero-sum, strategic objective that can be achieved with extensive influence and involvement of U.S. forces. Conversely, the 2014 manual conceptualizes legitimacy as a means rather than a strategic end state, which ultimately subordinates the influence of U.S. forces to the willingness and capability of host-nation authorities to uphold legitimate rule. This evolved notion of legitimacy and conceptualization of military duty is arguably thought-provoking in light of the ongoing drawdown of U.S. forces from Afghanistan because it provides strategic justification for ‘opting-out’ of the host-citizen contract.

The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. In the next section I present the analytical framework guiding the study. Here, I draw on previous contributions that demonstrate the fruitfulness of applying the notion of a perceived contract to explore military thinking on host-citizen relations. Thereafter, I present the results from the qualitative analysis before concluding with a brief discussion on the possible implications of these empirical findings.

### **Host-Citizen Contract: Local Legitimacy of Foreign Military Troops**

For centuries, social contract theory has preserved its relevance in philosophical and scholarly debate. The parsimonious idea that people’s sense of moral or political obligations are dependent upon perceived, or hypothetical, contracts has found its way into the growing strand of research that explores the relationship between foreign troops<sup>8</sup> and host citizens<sup>9</sup> in the context of external peace and state-building operations.

For long, the relationship between interveners and those “intervened upon” was confined to the dyad of the intervening state and the host nation state.<sup>10</sup> Similarly, the notion of mission legitimacy was firmly rooted in the peacekeeping principle of acquiring national consent from the host government prior to mission deployment.<sup>11</sup> It was not until the blatant failures of international interventions in intrastate armed conflicts during the 1990s that this exclusively top-down, state-centric and legalistic understanding of host-nation relations and mission legitimacy was declared inadequate and the relationship between foreign troops and host citizens soared to the top of the international policymaking agenda. Over the two past decades, the notions of host citizen protection and local ownership have evolved into international norms that have reshaped the perceived roles of host citizens and foreign troops, and their interrelationship. Host citizens are no longer only the main casualties of war, but also widely recognized as key stakeholders in the peace process whose active participation and influence is increasingly recognized as crucial to mission success. At their end, foreign troops are increasingly expected to strike a balance between the traditional warrior role and the new responsibility to not only protect, but also empower host citizens as agents for societal and political change.<sup>12</sup>

At first, Christopher Dandeker and James Gow stressed the need to study the relational and subjective dimensions of mission deployment. Mission success, they argued, demands more than robust mandates, troop contributions, and sufficient resources; it also requires foreign troops to bolster their own legitimacy through building alliances with a vast number of different actors, not least host citizens.<sup>13</sup> A decade later, Michael Mersiades tailored Dandeker and Gow’s concept of “peacekeeper legitimacy” to focus exclusively on the relationship between foreign troops and host citizens.<sup>14</sup> Leaning on social contract theory, Mersiades argued that host citizens hold a number of expectations on what obligations foreign troops must fulfill during deployment, mainly relating to security concerns and quality of life for the host populace. These expectations form the basis of a perceived contract, which in turn provides each individual with a frame of reference for evaluating troop performance and, ultimately, mission legitimacy.

According to Mersiades, the process of fulfilling these contracts is, however, constrained by two main limitations. First, there are likely to exist numerous and, to various degrees, competing perceived contracts. In other words, what some host citizens expect may stand in conflict with the expectations held by other host citizens. Ultimately, this requires foreign troops to prioritize some contracts at the expense of others. Second, there is likely a discrepancy between locally perceived contracts and ‘top-down’ conceptualization of troop obligations, which are conveyed in mission mandates and objectives.<sup>15</sup> Adding to the complexity, some point to the circular nature of this relationship; how legitimate troops are perceived influences also to what extent they are perceived to fulfill the contract. To illustrate, if there is great skepticism prior to mission deployment, this legitimacy deficient at the outset of a mission may lead to a more punitive understanding of mission performance.<sup>16</sup> Conversely, if host citizens have unrealistically high hopes on the mission, this may generate feelings of disillusionment if foreign troops are unable to fulfill these expectations in face of the often complex and protracted realities of the operational environment.<sup>17</sup>

In terms of local perceptions of mission legitimacy, the evolving dynamics between foreign troops and host citizens has revealed various areas of tension and conflict that have been argued to hinder mission success. A growing critique in literature on intervention and statebuilding states that the ‘intervener’ commonly fails to engage with host population without at the same time imposing ‘external’ ideas, processes, and systems perceived that may stand in conflict with customary norms, values, and practices salient within the host population.<sup>18</sup> In this vein of thought, David A. Lake argues that the reason why the United States have failed to bolster local legitimacy of host

governments in the context of external state-building operations is that U.S. forces struggle with the statebuilder's dilemma: host-nation authorities association with U.S. forces does not necessarily strengthen local legitimacy of the host government, but rather undermines it. Not least because U.S. forces are instructed to establish effective and legitimate governance in the host nation through supporting local leaders who are sympathetic to U.S. national interests. These leaders are, however, not necessarily those that are perceived most legitimate by the host populace.<sup>19</sup>

The statebuilder's dilemma grew salient with U.S. interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan, which reconceptualized the traditional American (or 'Western') notion of legitimacy, from being conferred onto an external intervention by top-down processes and legal institutions (such as the UN) to a mainly relational, population-centric phenomenon.<sup>20</sup> With this shift, Lake points out that the intellectual premise for host-citizen relations is reconceptualized. U.S. forces are no longer solely warriors (who occasionally conducted humanitarian or peacekeeping missions), but social engineers with power to exert salient influence over local incentive structures in the host nation and, ultimately, shape perceptions of the legitimacy of the host government and its partnership with U.S. forces.<sup>21</sup> Problematically, in the quest for local legitimacy of host-nation authorities, U.S. troops will, at times, prioritize bolstering their own legitimacy over that of the host government.<sup>22</sup> Relatedly, Perez reflects on the tensions between U.S. Army soldiers' traditional role of serving the American people and their new role of increasingly serving indigenous populations. Perez finds that despite the last decade of population-centric operations, the U.S. "professional military ethic" fails to specify the nature, scope and impact of U.S. soldiers' ethicopolitical duty toward the host population residing in the areas of operation.<sup>23</sup> Instead, the notion of military duty appears firmly rooted in the soldier's obligation to protect the American people, nation state and constitution.<sup>24</sup>

### Exploring the U.S. Host-Citizen Contract

Building on these previous scholarly contributions, I explore how the notion of a perceived contract resonates with the how the U.S. military conceptualizes the relationship between U.S. forces and host-citizens. Intuitively, the notion of a contract lends itself easily to the study of military thinking because it resonates with the core purpose of military doctrine, namely to "establish a framework of common understanding and action" within the military organization.<sup>25</sup> Given that military doctrine sets out the ways, means, and ends of 'armed servants' to achieve broader politico-strategic objectives entrusted by policymakers, it is also widely recognized to have salient influence on the identity, structure, and conduct of U.S. Armed Forces.<sup>26</sup> A key element of doctrine, field manuals are specifically written to provide a shared framework on what principles, techniques, and tactics for implementation of foreign military missions. As such, they provide fruitful insights to how U.S. military defines the nature, scope, and impact of U.S. forces-host citizen relations.<sup>27</sup> Aiming for broad applicability, they are not intended to address all idiosyncrasies of a specific missions, which is why they are apt for discerning central themes and variation in the basic principles on how to, ideally, regulate U.S. host-citizen relations in the field. Even though doctrinal guidance is not binding, it conveys information about how the U.S. military's understands its tasks and proposed solutions at a given point in time.<sup>28</sup> Thereby, field manuals do not only represent important benchmarks in the U.S. military's process of 'sensemaking' of past experiences, they also tap into the professional *ethos* of the U.S. military and provide observable implications of evolving norms and values within the organization.

In terms of irregular warfare and counterinsurgency operations, the U.S. Army and Marine Corps have developed doctrine for more than a century. Despite great variation in political contexts and circumstances of these missions, the inherently political nature of this form of warfare promp-

ted the need, early on, for guidance on how U.S. forces should interact with indigenous populations. However, the U.S. Army and Marine Corps have, historically, developed their doctrines within two fundamentally different frameworks.<sup>29</sup> The U.S. Army has leaned heavily on conventional metrics to evaluate mission success, such as supreme military force and combatant-to-combatant deaths, while the Marine Corps has recognized the relative importance of political considerations and employing a lighter footprint in these operational environments.

Against this backdrop, the issuance of two versions of field manual FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 in less than a decade arguably represents a rare phase of doctrinal ‘consensus’ in U.S. military-thinking on population-centric warfare as it merged U.S. Army and Marine Corps different strands of counterinsurgency doctrine.<sup>30</sup> Furthermore, after its issuance, the 2006 manual became lead doctrine for U.S. military engagements in Iraq and Afghanistan. For the past eight years, it has provided guidance to U.S. forces on how to understand and approach host citizens within contemporary, complex operational environments. Recently, the field manual was superseded by its substantially revised successor, which articulates the most up-to-date military-thinking on how troop interaction with host citizens. To this end, in-depth analysis of these two manuals is warranted because it enables us to identify and flesh out how the U.S. Army and Marine Corps conceptualized the duty of U.S. forces at the outset of the U.S. quest for local legitimacy, and whether the notion of duty has evolved during the nearly eight consecutive years of the U.S. counterinsurgency agenda, five of them in Afghanistan.

Keeping with the notion of a perceived contract, a qualitative comparison of the two manuals is structured around three main focal points: What obligations form the basis for U.S. forces’ duty toward the host population? How are U.S. forces instructed to fulfill these obligations? And, lastly, what impact does U.S. forces’ fulfillment of these obligations have on the overall legitimacy process?

### **A Tale of Two Manuals: The Evolving U.S. Host-Citizen Contract**

Throughout the two versions of the counterinsurgency manual, three main obligations are consistently associated with U.S. forces and the process of bolstering legitimacy in the host nation: suppressing the insurgency, building host nation agency and capabilities, and ensuring the protection of host citizens throughout this process. These obligations are conceptualized as highly interdependent and entwined, and the degree to which U.S. forces are perceived to fulfill these obligations is believed to influence the overall process of bolstering the legitimacy of the host government and its partnership with U.S. forces. Interestingly, in the new manual the notion of legitimacy has changed in ways that impose new limitations on the scope of U.S. forces’ positive influence over the legitimacy process. Based on analytical findings, I argue that this loss of positive influence, and greater recognition of a plausible negative impact of U.S. forces, follows from a new way of thinking about local legitimacy and, in particular, its place as a military end state for U.S. forces. Ultimately, the new manual clarifies that the scope of U.S. forces’ positive influence on the quest for legitimacy is beyond the control of U.S. Armed Forces: mission objectives are at the hands of U.S. policymakers, while principal responsibility for bolstering legitimacy resides with host-nation authorities, not U.S. forces.

#### **U.S. Quest for Local Legitimacy: A Zero-Sum to Open-ended Process**

In the 2006 field manual, the notion of legitimacy is introduced as the main objective of counterinsurgents, including U.S. forces. They are instructed to plan, prepare, and execute all actions with an eye to bolstering the legitimacy of the host government and external counterinsurgents: to fight

and suppress the insurgency with legitimate means, engage directly with the host population in a legitimate fashion, and build and support the development of legitimate host-nation authorities.<sup>31</sup> Legitimacy is the strategic end state of U.S. operations. Although the manual recognizes legitimacy as inherently perception-based and shaped within different cultural context and sets of values and beliefs,<sup>32</sup> it still adopts a mainly rational-legal understanding of legitimacy as, ultimately, a zero-sum phenomenon; an increase in the perceived legitimacy of insurgents automatically translates into a decrease of the perceived legitimacy of counterinsurgents, and vice versa.<sup>33</sup> In this vein of thought, legitimacy is quantifiable and measurable in the manifestation of passive and active support from a “solid majority” of host citizens.<sup>34</sup> Ultimately, legitimacy is a strategic choice; it does not require host citizens to form emotional bonds with, or necessarily “like” U.S. forces. Rather, if U.S. forces execute and communicate the objectives of the mission in ways that resonate with local understandings of “self-interest”, legitimacy is expected to follow as the rational response for most host citizens.<sup>35</sup>

Relatedly, strengthening the host government’s legitimacy is assumed symbiotic with “achieving U.S. political goals”.<sup>36</sup> Eventually, U.S. forces will successfully facilitate the local transition to legitimate host governance. Part of this confidence is rooted in the idea that counterinsurgents hold a higher moral ground than the insurgents. Echoing this thought, the manual instructs U.S. forces to set “an example for the local populace” and shoulder “the responsibility to serve as a moral compass that extends beyond the COIN force and into the community. It is that moral compass that distinguishes Soldiers and Marines from the insurgents.”<sup>37</sup> Representing the more legitimate alternative, it is believed that U.S. forces will ultimately win the battle for legitimacy against the insurgents; what is needed is the provision of a sufficient degree of security and governance in accordance to local values and norms, and to convey these gains accordingly to the host populace.

Identified as the least costly way to influence and control a population, popular legitimacy is deemed the preferred alternative also for insurgents. Nevertheless, it is not the only option. Unlike U.S. forces that must abide by the law of war, and professional legal and ethical codes of conduct, insurgents may curb opposition and enforce either obedience or active support through means of coercion.<sup>38</sup> Thus, an insurgency that is widely perceived illegitimate may still be considered tolerable, which may be sufficient to expand on its influence and control over the host population.<sup>39</sup> In the 2014 manual, it is clarified that insurgents do not necessarily seek to impose control onto the population; instead they may seek to “impose an ideological (or religious) system on an unwilling population.”<sup>40</sup> Ultimately, what both manuals capture is an inherent asymmetry in the relationship between the counterinsurgents and insurgency, as the latter seeks to “attack the legitimacy of the host-nation government while attempting to develop its own credibility with the population”, while domestic and external counterinsurgents are obligated to attack the “credibility of the insurgency”, while simultaneously strengthening the legitimacy of the host government.<sup>41</sup>

In the 2014 manual, legitimacy is reiterated as the main objective of counterinsurgency operations. In fact, the new manual, explicitly, refers even more extensively to legitimacy than its predecessor.<sup>42</sup> Interestingly, it attributes a fundamentally different meaning to the notion of legitimacy. The current understanding of legitimacy appears to have evolved from an attainable, and largely rational, zero-sum strategic objective into a more open-ended, elusive phenomenon.<sup>43</sup> Instead of portraying legitimacy as rooted in rationality, it highlights the normative, or *ideational*, features of the phenomenon. In fact, it recognizes that an actor locally perceived more legitimate in an ideational sense may be more effective than an actor that is objectively more efficient in performing public services. If not perceived legitimate, “effective and credible” governance is not sustainable. Problematically, an efficient government may be less effective than a government that

has legitimacy “in the minds of the population”.<sup>44</sup> Thus, even though the ideal scenario for U.S. forces remains to foster the effectiveness of a *legitimate* host government, legitimacy is not necessarily gained through increased professionalism and resources.<sup>45</sup> Rather, legitimacy is conferred to *whomever* the host population accepts as “providing legitimate authority to govern their actions is that group’s legitimate authority.”<sup>46</sup> Thereby, the guidance in the new manual implies a complex, contextual, and interlinked relationship between rational and normative dimensions of legitimacy.<sup>47</sup> This new understanding has strategic consequences to U.S. forces because the manual presumes that host-nation forces, in general, are perceived more legitimate than their U.S. counterparts; ideationally, they resonate better with local notions of identity, culture, and religion, even though they may initially perform less efficiently.<sup>48</sup>

Recognizing the ideational dimension as potentially decisive creates a more tangible ambiguity surrounding the origins and manifestations of legitimacy, as well as it ultimately problematizes U.S. forces ability to positively influence the legitimacy process. The moral superiority of ‘American’ ideals asserted in the preceding manual is no longer perceived to carry decisive positive strategic weight.<sup>49</sup> Despite the sanctity of U.S. forces’ ideals and cultural preferences, the host nation must ultimately find its own way to secure popular legitimacy. Nevertheless, U.S. forces are still obligated to uphold “the ideals of the profession of arms” to appease the “American people”; the previous role of U.S. forces as the “moral compass” of the host population no longer applies.

#### *U.S. Forces in the Role of Counterinsurgents*

In the 2006 manual, the role and responsibilities of U.S. forces are largely conflated under the banner of ‘counterinsurgents’, a term that refers to the government(s) conducting the counterinsurgency operation (including both civilian and military actors).<sup>50</sup> The lack of distinction between primary and secondary counterinsurgents (and their interrelationships) makes it difficult to tease out the specific role and obligations of U.S. forces in relation to/complementary of/or distinct from other counterinsurgents. Instead, the 2006 manual paints a picture of these diverse actors as forming a collective, unified, front in the fight against insurgents. U.S. forces are broadly conceptualized as “nation builders as well as warriors”<sup>51</sup> whose principal role is to facilitate “coordination, communication, and consensus”<sup>52</sup> between all counterinsurgents, military and civilian actors through-out the operational environment to create unity around U.S. mission objectives and policy goals.<sup>53</sup> Ultimately, fulfillment of these goals is perceived in symbiosis with bolstering the legitimacy of the host government, U.S. forces and other counterinsurgents.<sup>54</sup>

Conversely, in the 2014 manual, the division of labor between host-nation counterinsurgents, U.S. counterinsurgents, and other external counterinsurgents is more clearly chiseled out.<sup>55</sup> The previously overstrained, all-inclusive role of U.S. forces is now more limited in scope and their positive influence on the broader legitimacy process is identified as subordinate to, and dependent upon, the actions of host-nation counterinsurgents. Up front, the introductory chapter of the new manual states that “[t]he purpose of counterinsurgency operations, from the viewpoint of the U.S., is to support or enable the host nation to defeat an insurgency. In the *worst case* situation, this may require the U.S. becoming the primary counterinsurgent”.<sup>56</sup> Nonetheless, “even in the worse case, the goal is still for the host nation and its forces to defeat an insurgency” because despite their best efforts, U.S. forces cannot compensate for a lack of will from the host government or host population.<sup>57</sup> Ultimately, if host actors are unwilling to cooperate with the U.S. mission, it is beyond the control, and thus obligation, of U.S. forces to provide host citizens with a solution to the host nation’s problems.<sup>58</sup>

### *Core Pillars of U.S. Military Duty under the Host-Citizen Contract*

The interrelationship between U.S. forces three main obligations toward host citizens is clarified in the logic behind the (*shape*)-*clear*-*hold*-*build*-(*transition*) approach. This has been the main operational framework used for U.S. counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan to progressively “destroy insurgent capacity and empower host-nation capacity”.<sup>59</sup> The *shape* phase and transition phase are new additions to the framework, detailed in the 2014 manual. Nonetheless, they were implicitly present already in the 2006 manual. Broadly defined, the *shape* phase refers to U.S. forces “making changes to the environment, through information operations or other methods, that create the conditions for success of the other phases.”<sup>60</sup> As such, it captures the core of U.S. forces’ interdependent and overlapping obligations, namely to cultivate, or shape, realistic local expectations on what U.S. and host-nation counterinsurgents ostensibly can achieve in the host nation. The *transition* phase underscores the increased attention in the 2014 manual on transitioning from U.S. forces’ involvement in counterinsurgency to self-sufficient host-nation authorities. However, prior to this final stage, U.S. forces are expected to first *clear* an area of insurgents at minimal cost to civilian life and property. Once the threat of the insurgency has been suppressed, U.S. forces are instructed to *hold* these gains and further expand on them by creating conditions for host-nation governance and economic development. As overall security and governance improves, U.S. troops support or *build* host-nation capabilities to ensure that the host government acts self-sufficiently and is perceived by host citizens to conduct “effective governance”.<sup>61</sup>

Human dynamics are an essential element of counterinsurgency operations and protecting host citizens from physical harm takes precedence over other salient preferences and concerns among the population. U.S. forces are essentially fighting a “war of perceptions”, wherein the main weapon is not the demonstration of superior military force, but effective use of “information, influence, presence”.<sup>62</sup> As the threat against host citizens extends beyond the insurgency, military means and war-fighting skills alone cannot resolve the underlying tensions that spurred the insurgency in the first place.<sup>63</sup> Thus, to win local support from host citizens, U.S. forces are obligated to be mindful of their own impact on host citizens’ livelihood and sense of security, while actively addressing local “legitimate grievances”, broadly defined to concern “people’s well-being in all its manifestations”.<sup>64</sup> To make host citizen perceptions “*feel* protected, not threatened”<sup>65</sup> requires improved knowledge about the host populace.<sup>66</sup> To this end, intelligence operations are essential to population management.<sup>67</sup> Knowledge gained about local “perceptions –more than reality– drive a commander’s decision making” and informs the ways in which U.S. forces are obligated to interact with host citizens.<sup>68</sup>

That said, targeted and measured combat operations are still considered necessary to defeat resilient and violent insurgents. In places such as Afghanistan, where the distinction between insurgents and civilians (noncombatants) is easily blurred and insurgents “blend well with the populace”,<sup>69</sup> demonstrating restraint in the use of force is an essential responsibility of U.S. forces. If the insurgency is able to convey that U.S. attacks, purposely, targeted civilians, they may successfully beat U.S. forces at their own game.<sup>70</sup> Perceptions of an excessive use of violence – force that is not clearly linked to stipulated mission objectives or the “host nation’s essential political goals”– is damaging to the legitimacy of the U.S. mission and host-nation authorities and a common source of contention in the relationship between U.S. forces and host citizens.<sup>71</sup> Relatedly, U.S. forces are instructed to avoid any behavior that may intimidate civilians.<sup>72</sup> This includes mistreatment or abuse against civilians, prisoners, or detained persons, which is deemed both unethical and illegal, and in clear violation of the U.S. military’s professional code.<sup>73</sup> U.S. forces are never allowed to intentionally harm noncombatant and are obligated to accept increased risk to their

own safety and use escalation of force procedures “to minimize unnecessary loss of life or suffering” and avoid “damage to civilian objects”.<sup>74</sup>

Striking the balance between coercive and consensual methods of maintaining population control, while at the same time, bolstering host government legitimacy is a complicated task for host-nation counterinsurgents. The process is further complicated when including U.S. forces and other external forces. On the one hand, U.S. forces are instructed to operate in accordance with a normative framework rooted in the law of war, military professionalism, and various codes of conduct.<sup>75</sup> On the other hand, to successfully support and legitimize host-nation institutions to the host population, U.S. forces are instructed to avoid acting on cultural biases toward the values and norms of the host population.<sup>76</sup> Instead, U.S. forces must actively show “[g]enuine compassion”, “[k]indness” and empathy with the host population<sup>77</sup> and seek to understand how host citizens think, feel, and respond to different actions by learning about their “cultures, perceptions, values, beliefs, interests and decision-making processes”.<sup>78</sup> Ultimately, “[a]ll interactions between security forces and the population directly impact legitimacy”,<sup>79</sup> which underlines the importance of the nature of day-to-day communication and interaction with host citizens.<sup>80</sup> This includes widely publicizing what counterinsurgents have done to address local concerns,<sup>81</sup> while avoiding making promises about future accomplishments; a promise unfulfilled may be interpreted as a deliberate attempt at deception, which is damaging to the “long-term credibility and legitimacy of the host national government”.<sup>82</sup>

It is important that U.S. forces build an image of themselves as trustworthy human beings, “rather than as aliens who descended from armored boxes”.<sup>83</sup> For example, if mistakes are made, clarity, accuracy, and transparency are keywords that should shape the dialogue with host citizens.<sup>84</sup> U.S. forces need to build “trusted networks” within the host community to convince host citizens that it is in their best strategic interest to support U.S. and host-nation authorities.<sup>85</sup> To this end, U.S. forces’ obligation to suppress the insurgency is entwined with their obligation to develop and support local agency and governance that can provide an efficient *and* legitimate alternative to the insurgency. The 2014 manual underlines that the “local population and local government officials should view any project as their own and not one that has been imposed on them by outside agencies” because if it “has been conceptualized, funded, and constructed at the local level”, this “legitimizes the local government in the eyes of the population and further contributes to stability.”<sup>86</sup> U.S. forces have a responsibility to transfer agency to the host government and host-nation authorities as soon as deemed feasible.<sup>87</sup> Their presence in the host nation is a temporary response to a more complex and lengthier problem. Although the host population “must have confidence in the staying power of both the affected government and any counterinsurgency forces supporting it”; eventually, U.S. forces are likely to become a source of contention among host citizens.<sup>88</sup> A protracted foreign military operation is commonly perceived occupational, and if so, the presence of foreign troops no longer strengthens the statebuilding process but lead host citizen to “question the legitimacy of their own forces and government”.<sup>89</sup> A crucial aspect of enabling transition to host-nation ownership of sovereign responsibilities involves U.S. forces’ training, advising, and fighting with host-nation forces to turn them into sufficiently capable and sustainable security guarantors.<sup>90</sup>

However, developing host-nation forces “is a slow and painstaking process”.<sup>91</sup> Before U.S. forces are able to transition their own responsibility to host nation authorities, they must ensure that host-nation forces are able to provide “reasonable levels” of internal and external security in accordance with the rule of law and without compromising civil liberties of the local populace.<sup>92</sup> Transitioning too soon, “may ultimately have the effect of undermining the legitimacy of the host

nation as the host nation fails to meet the basic expectations of the population.”<sup>93</sup> When host-nation forces are capable to implement their responsibilities “tolerably”, host-nation lead is conceptualized as preferred over that of U.S. forces.<sup>94</sup> What, more precisely, is considered tolerable with respect to ensuing U.S. troop withdrawal? This question is left unanswered in both versions of the manual, and existing guidance to U.S. forces appears ambivalent. On the one hand, U.S. troops must accept that host-nation forces may not wholeheartedly adopt the “American” way, and should therefore not be tempted to try and shape host-nation forces into replicas of themselves. On the other hand, U.S. forces are obligated to resist adopting “HN [host-nation] positions contrary to U.S. or multinational values or policy.”<sup>95</sup> Similarly, U.S. forces are told to respect local idiosyncrasies, as long as host-nation authorities do not engage in practices deemed “dysfunctional” or threatening to the local populace; in such case U.S. troops have an obligation to intervene to safeguard the political, legal and moral framework the mission.<sup>96</sup> At the same time, U.S. forces are told that learning “what normalcy looks like” in the host nation takes time,<sup>97</sup> and that they should critically evaluate their own criteria for success, and question whether “Western or American values” or being “embedded American beliefs” are not, in fact, blocking an accurate understanding of the host population, and what it perceives legitimate.<sup>98</sup>

Problematically, counterinsurgency is understood as the process leading up to “an end state acceptable to the host-nation government, the populace, and the *governments providing forces*”; in other words, a political context that fulfills “U.S. policy goals”.<sup>99</sup> Consequently, U.S. forces are faced with the challenging task of implementing a mission that reconciles U.S. strategic objectives with “the host nation’s essential political goals.”<sup>100</sup> On the one hand, U.S. forces are obligated to bolster the legitimacy of the host government, but on the other hand, they must also assure that governance itself is ‘tolerable’ in accordance with the political, legal, and moral framework of the mission. Even though the new manual recognizes an inherent tension in stating that both “U.S. national ends determine the criteria for success” as well as “the host nation often determines the criteria for success”,<sup>101</sup> it does not provide a clear military solution to the problem. Ultimately, the 2014 manual assigns the problem to the political level and briefly states that U.S. policymakers decide upon the scope of “commitment of U.S. forces” to providing “assistance, advice, and reform” in the host nation based on the assumed ‘receptiveness’ of host-nation authorities.<sup>102</sup>

## **Conclusion**

“The conclusion of any counterinsurgency effort is primarily dependent on the host nation and the people who reside in that nation. Ultimately, every society has to provide solutions to its own problems.”<sup>103</sup>

Comparing the two versions of the U.S. Army and Marine Corps counterinsurgency field manual, we find that three main objectives appear to make up the core of the U.S. military’s conceptual host-citizen contract. Although the duty to protect host citizens, suppress the insurgency, and support capable host authorities is consistently linked to the process of bolstering local legitimacy, the very notion of legitimacy appears to have changed in ways, which imposes new caveats on the scope and impact of U.S. forces’ influence in the host nation. In the 2006 manual, legitimacy is treated as a zero-sum, strategic objective that is, ultimately, achievable with support of extensive U.S. military efforts. Conversely, the 2014 manual conceptualizes legitimacy as an elusive means to an end, rather than *the* strategic end state of U.S. involvement. Ultimately, it subordinates the influence of U.S. forces to host-nation authorities and their willingness and capability of to uphold legitimate rule.

This variation between the two manuals is intriguing in light of the ongoing drawdown of U.S. forces from Afghanistan and unfolding crises in Iraq and Syria (to which the U.S. has clearly expressed a reluctance to put boots on the ground). It indicates the development of an increasingly cautious approach to host-citizen relations, which more strongly voices limitations to the role, scope and impact of U.S. troops on the host-nation legitimacy process. Problematically, this reevaluation generates a new form of ambiguity in U.S. host-citizen relations, a dilemma to which the new manual fails to provide a solution. Despite recognizing the limitations of U.S. forces influence, the 2014 manual still conveys an underlying expectation on U.S. forces to reconcile tensions between U.S. policy goals and those of the host nation, but provides little guidance on how they are to strike a ‘tolerable’ balance between nascent host-nation capabilities and the political, legal, and moral framework of the U.S. mission

In terms of future U.S. population-centric efforts, the new manual provides a point of departure that favors no more than limited ‘direct’ military involvement by U.S. forces. As U.S. efforts are deemed likely futile without a ‘receptive’ host-nation population, it emphasizes the need to shape the operational environment in preparation for U.S. forces and maintain focus on transferring responsibilities to host nation authorities already at the outset of operations. Although the host-citizen contract is conceptualized to carry less strategic weight in shaping the traditional social contract between the host government and its constituents, it does appear to reflect a more realistic understanding of U.S. forces duty toward host citizens as ‘first, do no harm’.

## Notes

- <sup>1</sup> The principal focus of military engagements in operational environments is not to conquer an adversary in the conventional sense through combat operations, but rather to gain or maintain control or influence over –and the support of– the indigenous population using “political, psychological, and economic methods” rather than brute force, U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Operations*, Joint Publication 3-0 (2006), 1-6b.
- <sup>2</sup> David H. Ucko, *Counterinsurgency and Its Discontents: Assessing the Value of a Divisive Concept* (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, 2011).
- <sup>3</sup> Remi M. Hajjar, “A New Angle on the U.S. Military’s Emphasis on Developing Cross-Cultural Competence: Connecting In-Ranks’ Cultural Diversity to Cross-Cultural Competence,” *Armed Forces & Society* 36, 2 (2010): 247–263.
- <sup>4</sup> See e.g. Amitai Etzioni, “Rules of Engagement and Abusive Citizens,” *Prism* 4, 4 (2014): 87-102; Fred Kaplan, “The End of the Age of Petraeus: The Rise and Fall of Counterinsurgency,” *Foreign Affairs* (January/February 2013), accessed on 5 November, 2014, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/138459/fred-kaplan/the-end-of-the-age-of-petraeus>; Rowan Scarborough, “Shades of Vietnam: Spike in U.S. Troop Deaths Tied to Stricter Rules of Engagement,” *The Washington Times* (December 5, 2013), accessed on November 6, 2014, <http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/dec/5/increase-in-battlefield-deaths-linked-to-new-rules/?page=all>.
- <sup>5</sup> Department of Defense, *Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense* (2012), accessed on November 6, 2014, [http://www.defense.gov/news/defense\\_strategic\\_guidance.pdf](http://www.defense.gov/news/defense_strategic_guidance.pdf), 6.
- <sup>6</sup> For the purpose of this paper, the terms “host citizens” refers to civilian citizens, namely the people living in the recipient state of a foreign military operation, who are affected by (but not actively participating in) the armed conflict. This includes individuals who are neither formally associated with central government, nor non-state parties to the armed conflict. It thus excludes armed stakeholders such as the national army and police, militia, insurgents, and rebel groups.
- <sup>7</sup> FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 applies to the United States Marine Corps, the Active Army, Army National Guard/Army National Guard and United States Army Reserve.
- <sup>8</sup> From the perspective of armed forces, see e.g. Deborah Avant and James Lebovic, “U.S. Military Attitudes Toward Post-Cold War Missions,” *Armed Forces & Society* 27, 1 (2000): 37–56; Christopher Dandeker and James J. Gow, “Military Culture and Strategic Peacekeeping,” in Jean Callaghan & Mathias Schönborn (Eds.), *Warriors in Peacekeeping: Points of Tension in Complex Cultural Encounters* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishing, 2004), 11–28; Remi M. Hajjar, “Military Warriors as Peacekeeper–Diplomats: Building Productive Relationships with Foreign Counterparts in the Contemporary Military Advising Mission,” *Armed Forces & Society* 40, 4 (2014): 647–72; Sabine Mannitz, “Redefining Soldierly Role Models in Germany,” *Armed Forces & Society* 37, 4 (2011): 680–700; Laura L. Miller and Charles Moskos, “Humanitarians or Warriors?: Race, Gender, and Combat Status in Operation Restore Hope,” *Armed Forces & Society* 21, 4 (1995): 615–37; Charles C. Moskos, “UN Peacekeepers: The Constabulary Ethic and Military Professionalism,” *Armed Forces & Society* 1, 4 (1975): 388–401; Celestino Perez, Jr, “The Soldier as Lethal Warrior

- and Cooperative Political Agent: On the Soldier's Ethical and Political Obligations toward the Indigenous Other," *Armed Forces & Society* 38, 2 (2012): 177–204; Chiara Ruffa, "What Peacekeepers Think and Do: An Exploratory Study of French, Ghanaian, Italian, and South Korean Armies in the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon," *Armed Forces & Society* 40, 2 (2013): 199–225; Brian J. Reed and David R. Segal, "The Impact of Multiple Deployments on Soldiers' Peacekeeping Attitudes, Morale, and Retention," *Armed Forces & Society* 27, 1 (2000): 57–78; David R. Segal, Jesse J. Harris, Joseph M. Rothberg, and David H. Marlowe, "Paratroopers As Peacekeepers," *Armed Forces & Society* 10, 4 (1984): 487–506; Liora Sion, "'Too Sweet and Innocent for War'? Dutch Peacekeepers and the Use of Violence," *Armed Forces & Society* 32, 3 (2006): 454–74; Anders McD Sookermany, "What Is a Skillful Troop? An Epistemological Foundation for Understanding Skill Acquisition in (Post) Modernized Armed Forces," *Armed Forces & Society* 38, 4 (2012): 582–603.
- <sup>9</sup> For studies on the perspective of the local population, see e.g. Lisa Karlborg, "Enforced Hospitality: Local Perceptions of the Legitimacy of International Forces in Afghanistan," *Civil Wars* 16, 4 (forthcoming, 2014); Laura Neack and Roger M. Knudson, "Multitextual Analysis in the Service of Peace: Local People and Peacekeeping," *Qualitative Inquiry* 5, 4 (1999): 525–40; Béatrice Pouligny, *Peace Operations Seen From Below: UN Missions and Local People* (Bloomfield, CT: People Kumarian Press Inc., 2006); Andrea K. Talentino, "Perceptions of Peacebuilding: The Dynamic of Imposer and Imposed Upon," *International Studies Perspectives* 8, 2 (2007): 152–71.
- <sup>10</sup> Linnéa Gelot and Fredrik Söderbaum, "Interveners and Intervened Upon: The Missing Link in Building Peace and Avoiding Conflict," in Hanne Fjelde and Kristine Höglund (Eds.) *Building Peace, Creating Conflict?: Conflictual Dimensions of Local and International Peacebuilding* (Lund: Nordic Academic Press 2012), 73–88.
- <sup>11</sup> Chiyuki Aoi, *Legitimacy and the Use of Armed Force: Stability Missions in the Post-Cold War Era* (New York: Routledge 2011): 525–40; Nicholas Tsagourias, "Consent, Neutrality/Impartiality and the Use of Force in Peacekeeping: Their Constitutional Dimension," *Journal of Conflict & Security Law* 11, 3 (2006): 465–82.
- <sup>12</sup> Norms of civilian protection and local ownership are manifested in the growing number of UN Security Council Resolutions, which are calling for measures of civilian protection in the context of foreign military operations and burgeoning international policy on post-conflict reconstruction and peacebuilding, which strongly emphasizes the need to strengthen and build local capacity within host populations to ensure local ownership and sustainability of peace and development efforts without future dependence on a foreign military presence, see e.g. Angus Francis, Vesselin Popovski and Charles Sampford (Eds.), *Norms of Protection: Responsibility to Protect, Protection of Civilians and Their Interaction* (United Nations University Press, 2012); United Nations, *Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines* (New York, NY: United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Department of Field Support, 2008).
- <sup>13</sup> Christopher Dandeker and James Gow, "The Future of Peace Support Operations: Strategic Peacekeeping and Success," *Armed Force & Society* 23, 3 (1997): 327–48.
- <sup>14</sup> Michael Mersiades, "Peacekeeping and Legitimacy: Lessons from Cambodia and Somalia," *International Peacekeeping* 12, 2 (2005): 205–21.
- <sup>15</sup> Mersiades, "Peacekeeping and Legitimacy".
- <sup>16</sup> On Haiti, where the UN had deployed several missions that "all failed or left prematurely", the poor track record of the United Nations generated widespread distrust in the capability of the UN to act as an intervening force, Carlos Chagas Vianna Braga, "MINUSTAH and the Security Environment in Haiti: Brazil and South American Cooperation in the Field," *International Peacekeeping* 17, 5 (2010): 711–22, 713.
- <sup>17</sup> Talentino, "Perceptions of Peacebuilding," 160; See also Karlborg, "Enforced Hospitality".
- <sup>18</sup> For a critique of the role of 'external' peace and state-building agenda, see Michael Barnett and Christoph Zürcher, "The Peacebuilder's Contract: How External Statebuilding Reinforces Weak Statehood," in Roland Paris and Timothy D. Sisk (Eds.), *The Dilemmas of Statebuilding: Confronting the Contradictions of Postwar Peace Operations* (New York, NY: Routledge, 2009), 23–52; Simon Chesterman, "Transitional Administration, State-building and the United Nations" in Simon Chesterman, Michael Ignatieff, and Ramesh Thakur (Eds.), *Making States Work: State Failure and the Crisis of Governance* (Tokyo, JPN: United Nations University Press, 2005), 339–58; Robert Egnell, "Winning 'Hearts and Minds'? A Critical Analysis of Counterinsurgency Operations in Afghanistan," *Civil Wars* 12, 3 (2010): 282–303; Robert Egnell, "Winning Legitimacy? Counterinsurgency as the Military Approach to Statebuilding" in Robert Egnell and Peter Haldén (Eds.), *New Agendas in Statebuilding: Hybridity, Contingency and History* (New York: Routledge, 2013), 210–31; Roger Mac Ginty, "Hybrid Peace: The Interaction Between Top-Down and Bottom Up Peace," *Security Dialogue* 41, 4 (2010): 391–412; Roland Paris, "Saving Liberal Peacebuilding," *Review of International Studies* 36, 2 (2010): 337–65; Astri Suhrke, "The Dangers of a Tight Embrace: Externally Assisted Statebuilding in Afghanistan" in Roland Paris and Timothy D. Sisk (Eds.) *Dilemmas of Statebuilding: Confronting the Contradictions of Postwar Peace Operations* (New York: Routledge, 2009); Astri Suhrke, "Exogenous State-building: The Contradictions of the International Project in Afghanistan" in Whit Mason (Ed.), *The Rule of Law in Afghanistan* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 225–48; Oliver P. Richmond, "Beyond Local Ownership in the Architecture of International Peacebuilding," *Ethnopolitics: Formerly Global Review of Ethnopolitics* 11, 4 (2012): 354–75; Oliver P. Richmond, "The Dilemmas of A Hybrid Peace: Negative or Positive?," *Cooperation and Conflict* (June, 2014): 1–19, DOI:10.1177/0010836714537053; David Roberts, "Post-conflict Peacebuilding, Liberal Irrelevance and the Locus of Legitimacy," *International Peacekeeping* 18, 4 (2011): 410–24.
- <sup>19</sup> Lake, "Why Statebuilding Fails"; David A. Lake, "Building Legitimate States After Civil Wars: Order, Authority, and International Trusteeship", unpublished manuscript, version 2.0 (April 17, 2007). *C.f.* Lake's argument with Barnett and Zürcher's "Peacebuilder's Contract" argument, which seeks to explain the limitations of external peacebuilding efforts in shaping local conditions for positive local peace as a result of strategic interactions between peacebuilders, national elites, and local elites, or Paris, "Saving Liberal Peacebuilding," which refers to the difficulty of squaring the

- ”two competing imperatives” of peacebuilders, namely the dual pressures to ”expand the scope and duration of operations in order to build functioning and effective governmental institutions in war-torn states, and ... to reduce the level of international intrusion in the domestic political processes of the host states”, 343; and David Edelstein’s discussion on the dual “footprint” and “duration” dilemmas of statebuilding in David Edelstein, “Foreign Militaries, Sustainable Institutions and Postwar Statebuilding,” in Roland Paris and Timothy D. Sisk (Eds.), *The Dilemmas of Statebuilding: Confronting the Contradictions of Postwar Statebuilding* (New York, NY: Routledge, 2009), 81–104.
- 20 Lake, “Why Statebuilding Fails”; Bruce Gilley, “Putting State Legitimacy at the Center of Foreign Operations and Assistance,” *Prism* 4, 4 (2014): 67–85; David Lake, “Why Statebuilding Fails: The Social Origins of State Weakness and the Limits of External Intervention,” Osher UCSD Distinguished Lecture Series, October 21, 2013, University of California, University of California Television (UCTV), accessed on November 5, 2014, <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5O4pusNMQ-Y>; Paul D. Miller, *Armed State Building: Confronting State Failure, 1898-2012* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2013).
- 21 Lake, “Building Legitimate States After Civil Wars”. See also Angstrom, “Inviting the Leviathan”. However, in retrospect, U.S. forces seem less successful than at first anticipated. Aside from the propensity to support loyal rather than de facto legitimate rulers, the current U.S. statebuilding model also introduced a number of new problems. Furthermore, even if U.S. forces have had relative success at bolstering popular legitimacy at the local level, the effect tapers off as we move from the bottom-up, much due to pervasive corruption by ‘loyal’ leaders at the national level.
- 22 Jan Angstrom, “Inviting the Leviathan: External Forces, War, and State-building in Afghanistan,” *Small Wars & Insurgencies* 19, 3 (2008): 374–96, 382.
- 23 Perez, “The Soldier as Lethal Warrior,” 179.
- 24 Perez, “The Soldier as Lethal Warrior,” 178. Perez contrasts the lack of thought on soldiers’ duty toward the “indigenous other” with the counterinsurgency approach advocated by General Petraeus, in which U.S. soldiers are also asked to serve the host population. General Petraeus, together with General James Mattis (Marine Corps) was the mastermind behind the 2006 counterinsurgency field manual and later commanded U.S. forces in both Iraq and Afghanistan.
- 25 Department of Defense, *Joint Publication 1-02: Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms* (2010, amended through 15 August 2014); Cassidy, *Peacekeeping in the Abyss*, 3-4. Italics added.
- 26 See e.g. Peter D. Feaver, “The Civil-Military Problematique: Huntington, Janowitz, and the Question of Civilian Control,” *Armed Forces and Society* 23, 2 (1996), 149–78; Peter D. Feaver, *Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight, and Civil-Military Relations* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003).
- 27 Cassidy, *Peacekeeping in the Abyss*, 3-4; Harald Høiback, “What is Doctrine?,” *The Journal of Strategic Studies* 34, 6 (2011): 879–900; Stephen Biddle, “The New U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual as Political Science and Political Praxis,” *Review Symposium* 6, 2 (2008): 347-60; Lt. Colonel John A. Nagl, “The Evolution and Importance of Army/Marine Corps Field Manual 3-24, *Counterinsurgency*,” accessed on November 5, 2014, <http://press.uchicago.edu/Misc/Chicago/841519foreword.html>.
- 28 In the two manuals, it is explicitly stated that any doctrinal guidance requires careful and educated interpretation and contextualization by the force commander and deployed troops to support the implementation of a given mission.
- 29 See e.g. Steven Casey, *When Soldiers Fall: How Americans Have Confronted Combat Losses from World War I to Afghanistan* (Oxford University Press, 2014); Robert M. Cassidy, *Counterinsurgency and the Global War on Terror* (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2006); Olof Kronvall, *Finally Eating Soup with A Knife? A Historical Perspective on the US Army’s 2006 Counterinsurgency Doctrine*, Oslo Files on Defence and Security (Tollbugt: Institutt for Forsvarsstudier, 2007). For a more critical stance on the idea that the U.S. Army mindset was limited to fighting only big wars, see e.g. Gian P. Gentile, “A Strategy of Tactics: Population-centric COIN and the Army,” *Parameters* (Autumn 2009).
- 30 U.S. Army and Marine Corps, *Counterinsurgency* (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Army and U.S. Department of the Marine Corps, 2006) and U.S. Army and Marine Corps, *Insurgencies and Countering Insurgencies* (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Army and U.S. Department of the Marine Corps, 2014). Also referred to as Army Field Manual 3-24 and Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 3-33.5.
- 31 U.S. Army and Marine Corps, *Counterinsurgency*, sections 1-150, 1-151 and 1-152.
- 32 U.S. Army and Marine Corps, *Counterinsurgency*, section 3-77.
- 33 U.S. Army and Marine Corps, *Counterinsurgency*, section 3-83.
- 34 U.S. Army and Marine Corps, *Counterinsurgency*, sections 1-14, 1-108, 1-130 and 3-64. The first manual links the notion of legitimacy to the concept of authority, and in Weberian fashion refers to three different kinds of authority out of which rational-legal authority, rooted in “law and contract” and associated with “developed Western societies”, and traditional authority, which is rooted in historical “tribal and religious forms of organization” commonly salient in “non-Western societies”.
- 35 U.S. Army and Marine Corps, *Counterinsurgency*, section A-26 (Appendix A).
- 36 U.S. Army and Marine Corps, *Counterinsurgency*, section 1-123.
- 37 U.S. Army and Marine Corps, *Counterinsurgency*, section 7-9.
- 38 U.S. Army and Marine Corps, *Counterinsurgency*, section 3-76.
- 39 U.S. Army and Marine Corps, *Counterinsurgency*, sections 1-2, 3-76, 3-86, and 3-87.
- 40 U.S. Army and Marine Corps, *Insurgencies and Countering Insurgencies*, section 1-27.
- 41 U.S. Army and Marine Corps, *Insurgencies and Countering Insurgencies*, section 1-31.
- 42 As a point of comparison, unlike *Counterinsurgency*, the new manual mentions different constellations of the word “legitimacy” more frequently than words traditionally associated with military operations. “Legitimacy” is mentioned 111 times and “il/legitimate/ly” occurs on 51 occasions. This can be compared to “authority” (82), “power” (107),

- and “il/legal/ly” (80). This is an increase from the previous substantially heftier manual, which mentions “legitimacy” only 79 times and “il/legitimate/ly” 39 times, while mentioning “authority” (91), “power” (174) and “il/legal/ly” (94).
- <sup>43</sup> U.S. Army and Marine Corps, *Insurgencies and Countering Insurgencies*, section 1-28.
- <sup>44</sup> U.S. Army and Marine Corps, *Insurgencies and Countering Insurgencies*, section 1-32.
- <sup>45</sup> U.S. Army and Marine Corps, *Counterinsurgency*, sections 5-68, 5-77, 5-78 and 5-79. Tactically, the manual identifies numerous overt and nonmilitary actions that U.S. forces could take to seek to bolster the legitimacy of the host government, such as conducting operations, building schools and improving local infrastructure.
- <sup>46</sup> U.S. Army and Marine Corps, *Insurgencies and Countering Insurgencies*, section 1-28.
- <sup>47</sup> U.S. Army and Marine Corps, *Insurgencies and Countering Insurgencies*, section 1-29.
- <sup>48</sup> U.S. Army and Marine Corps, *Insurgencies and Countering Insurgencies*, sections 1-27 and 1-39. Consistent with the previous manual, it is reiterated that the host population is the ultimate judge of who has legitimate authority in their society. Legitimacy is broadly defined perception-based phenomenon rooted in the norms and values of the people
- <sup>49</sup> U.S. Army and Marine Corps, *Insurgencies and Counterinsurgencies*, section 1-40.
- <sup>50</sup> U.S. Army and Marine Corps, *Counterinsurgency*, section 5-2.
- <sup>51</sup> Lt Gen. David H. Petraeus and Lt. Gen James F. Amos, “Foreword,” in U.S. Army and Marine Corps *Counterinsurgency*, FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Army and U.S. Department of the Navy, 2006).
- <sup>52</sup> U.S. Army and Marine Corps, *Counterinsurgency*, sections 2-8, 2-36, 7-10, and sections A-46 (Appendix A), B-17 and B-18 (Appendix B).
- <sup>53</sup> See “commander’s visualization” and “commander’s intent” in U.S. Army and Marine Corps, *Counterinsurgency*, sections 4-21, 7-9, and Glossary-4.
- <sup>54</sup> Petraeus and Amos, “Foreword”.
- <sup>55</sup> U.S. Army and Marine Corps, *Insurgencies and Countering Insurgencies*, see e.g. section 9-37.
- <sup>56</sup> U.S. Army and Marine Corps, *Insurgencies and Countering Insurgencies*, section 1-60. Italics added. In such a case, U.S. forces can, “for a time, take the role of primary counterinsurgent force while host-nation forces become better able to take on that role themselves”, Ibid, sections 1-2, 1-5, and 1-60.
- <sup>57</sup> U.S. Army and Marine Corps, *Insurgencies and Countering Insurgencies*, section 1-60.
- <sup>58</sup> U.S. Army and Marine Corps, *Insurgencies and Countering Insurgencies*, section 1-6.
- <sup>59</sup> U.S. Army and Marine Corps, *Insurgencies and Countering Insurgencies*, section 9-7.
- <sup>60</sup> U.S. Army and Marine Corps, *Insurgencies and Countering Insurgencies*, section 9-7.
- <sup>61</sup> U.S. Army and Marine Corps, *Counterinsurgency*, sections 3-68, 5-4, 5-5, 5-6 and 5-68, table 5-1 and 5-5.
- <sup>62</sup> U.S. Army and Marine Corps, *Counterinsurgency*, sections 1-138, 3-19, 5-2, 5-26, and 7-58. In this respect, the process of “intelligence preparation of the battlefield” supports commanders with a systemically and continuously updated understanding of different features of the area of operation, such as the nature of local attitudes and actions.
- <sup>63</sup> U.S. Army and Marine Corps, *Counterinsurgency*, section 1-4.
- <sup>64</sup> Including a variety of different security and livelihood needs, U.S. Army and Marine Corps, *Counterinsurgency*, sections 1-51 and 2-6.
- <sup>65</sup> U.S. Army and Marine Corps, *Counterinsurgency*, sections 1-149, 7-5, and 7-37. Italics added.
- <sup>66</sup> U.S. Army and Marine Corps, *Counterinsurgency*, sections 3-3, 3-328, and 7-10.
- <sup>67</sup> U.S. Army and Marine Corps, *Counterinsurgency*, sections 3-1 and 3-138.
- <sup>68</sup> U.S. Army and Marine Corps, *Counterinsurgency*, sections 3-18, 3-163, 3-164, 3-165, 3-170, 3-175, 3-184, and section B-23 (Appendix B).
- <sup>69</sup> U.S. Army and Marine Corps, *Counterinsurgency*, section 3-158. To the host population, “U.S. forces are the outsiders” while many of the insurgents are known in the community “since they were young”, Appendix A, section A-7.
- <sup>70</sup> U.S. Army and Marine Corps, *Insurgencies and Countering Insurgencies*, sections 1-36 and 1-38.
- <sup>71</sup> Employing violence discriminately principally refers to the act of evaluating a target and determining the “acceptable risk to noncombatants and bystanders”, U.S. Army and Marine Corps, *Counterinsurgency*, section 7-35.
- <sup>72</sup> U.S. Army and Marine Corps, *Counterinsurgency*, section 7-40, and A-4, A-31, A-50 (Appendix A), and B-12 (Appendix B).
- <sup>73</sup> U.S. Army and Marine Corps, *Counterinsurgency*, section 7-43.
- <sup>74</sup> To this end, U.S. commanders are responsible for instilling a shared ethical framework among subordinate troops, and ensuring that all U.S. forces conduct themselves properly when interacting with host citizens, U.S. Army and Marine Corps, *Counterinsurgency*, sections 1-138, 3-8, 3-19, 5-2, 7-10, 7-11, 7-21, 7-23, 7-30, 7-32, 7-33, 7-48, and A-7, A 16, A-20 (Appendix A), D-22 and D-24 (Appendix D); U.S. Army and Marine Corps, *Insurgencies and Countering Insurgencies*, section 1-38.
- <sup>75</sup> U.S. Army and Marine Corps, *Insurgencies and Countering Insurgencies*, section 1-33. Italics added.
- <sup>76</sup> U.S. Army and Marine Corps, *Insurgencies and Countering Insurgencies*, section 1-25.
- <sup>77</sup> U.S. Army and Marine Corps, *Counterinsurgency*, sections 5-2, 5-38, and 7-8, and Appendix A, sections A-35 and A 36, Appendix D, sections D-36 and D-37. Troops can offer payments to host nationals if they have suffered “losses, injury, or death caused by service members or the civilian component of the U.S. forces” or if the local custom expects solatia payments to be made out an expression of sympathy in times of loss.
- <sup>78</sup> U.S. Army and Marine Corps, *Counterinsurgency*, section 3-2.
- <sup>79</sup> U.S. Army and Marine Corps, *Insurgencies and Counterinsurgencies*, section 1-38.
- <sup>80</sup> U.S. Army and Marine Corps, *Counterinsurgency*, sections 5-19 and 5-22.

- 
- <sup>81</sup> U.S. Army and Marine Corps, *Counterinsurgency*, section 5-27, table 5-1, and Appendix A, sections A-28 and A-29.
- <sup>82</sup> U.S. Army and Marine Corps, *Counterinsurgency*, sections 1-138 and 5-22.
- <sup>83</sup> U.S. Army and Marine Corps, *Counterinsurgency*, sections 3-133, 3-140, 3-180, and A-24 (Appendix A).
- <sup>84</sup> U.S. Army and Marine Corps, *Counterinsurgency*, sections 2-52, 3-97, 3-120, 5-24, 5-28, 5-32, and sections A-50, A-51, and A-58 (Appendix A).
- <sup>85</sup> U.S. Army and Marine Corps, *Counterinsurgency*, section A-23 (Appendix A).
- <sup>86</sup> U.S. Army and Marine Corps, *Insurgencies and Counterinsurgencies*, section 10-64.
- <sup>87</sup> U.S. Army and Marine Corps, *Counterinsurgency*, sections 1-147 and 1-151.
- <sup>88</sup> The negative impact of lingering U.S. and friendly forces on the legitimacy of host authorities was recognized early on in U.S. Marine Corps, *Small Wars Manual* (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1940).
- <sup>89</sup> U.S. Army and Marine Corps, *Counterinsurgency*, sections 1-138, 1-154 and 6-6.
- <sup>90</sup> U.S. Army and Marine Corps, *Counterinsurgency*, section 6-107, 6-1, and 6-12. Tasks traditionally referred to as foreign internal defense (FID); U.S. Army and Marine Corps, *Insurgencies and Counterinsurgencies*, section 10-65.
- <sup>91</sup> U.S. Army and Marine Corps, *Counterinsurgency*, section 6-29.
- <sup>92</sup> U.S. Army and Marine Corps, *Counterinsurgency*, section 6-29, table 6-2.
- <sup>93</sup> U.S. Army and Marine Corps, *Insurgencies and Countering Insurgencies*, section 7-36.
- <sup>94</sup> U.S. Army and Marine Corps, *Counterinsurgency*, section 1-154.
- <sup>95</sup> U.S. Army and Marine Corps, *Counterinsurgency*, section 6-88.
- <sup>96</sup> U.S. Army and Marine Corps, *Counterinsurgency*, sections 6-10, 6-60, and 6-78.
- <sup>97</sup> U.S. Army and Marine Corps, *Counterinsurgency*, sections A-25 and A-40 (Appendix A).
- <sup>98</sup> U.S. Army and Marine Corps, *Counterinsurgency*, sections 5-116 and B-25 (Appendix B).
- <sup>99</sup> U.S. Army and Marine Corps, *Insurgencies and Countering Insurgencies*, sections 1-6 and 1-7. Italics added.
- <sup>100</sup> U.S. Army and Marine Corps, *Insurgencies and Counterinsurgencies*, section 1-40.
- <sup>101</sup> U.S. Army and Marine Corps, *Insurgencies and Countering Insurgencies*, section 1-25.
- <sup>102</sup> U.S. Army and Marine Corps, *Insurgencies and Countering Insurgencies*, section 1-26.
- <sup>103</sup> U.S. Army and Marine Corps, *Insurgencies and Countering Insurgencies*, section 1-6. Eventually, “the host nation has to win on its own. ... External assistance can help, but host-nation authorities must accept responsibilities to achieve real victory”, *ibid*, section 1-92.