Asymmetric Assurances and the Durability of Peace Agreements: Evidence from Armed Self-Determination Conflicts

Allison B. Hodgkins and Hamid E. Ali

The American University in Cairo
School of Global Affairs and Public Policy

Egypt, Cairo
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Abstract

This article investigates the relationship between settlement design and the durability of peace agreements in armed self-determination conflicts. We reviewed the terms of 70 peace agreements reached in armed self-determination conflicts between 1975 and 2007 and determined the majority were based on complex arrangements for territorial, military or political power-sharing. A minority contained third party security guarantees. However, we also found the majority included a series of terms around the timing of concession, security provisions and ratification procedures that have the effect of granting the government a distinct advantage in information, allowances for unilateral action and sanctions on defection. Our findings show that inclusion of these terms is a significant predictor of settlement breakdown, even when the agreement includes offers of territorial, military or political power-sharing. In addition, our results show that third party security guarantees, while rare, also enhance settlement durability. This article further refines our understanding of the requirements for a self-enforcing settlement process and offers new insight into why some otherwise promising peace agreements fail to foster a credible commitment to peace.

Keywords, Conflict, civil war, Peace agreement, power-sharing, power symmetry, credible commitment

Introduction

Are armed self-determination conflicts inherently resistant to settlement by negotiated agreement or are the parties unable to construct an agreement that fosters a credible commitment to peace? When it comes to conflicts that arise from competing claims for self-determination within the boundaries of a sovereign state, there is a persistent belief that the existential stakes at the heart of the dispute makes compromise untenable. However, the post-cold war surge in negotiated agreements in
these cases has both challenged and reinforced the perception that these conflicts will only end on the battlefield; if they end at all. On the one hand, the fact that the parties are able to negotiate agreements that typically entail offers of territorial autonomy or complex power-sharing arrangements suggest that compromise is possible and that parties are willing to risk the audience costs of making far reaching concessions. On the other hand, the collapse of many high profile settlements suggests these offers are insufficient to overcome fears of exploitation or exposure to existential risks during the implementation process.

From this angle, armed self-determination conflicts present a unique opportunity to explore the impact of settlement design on the durability of negotiated agreements. If most agreements are based on offers of power-sharing, does the failure of peace agreements in these cases confirm that identify conflicts are more difficult to settle or that power-sharing must be backed up by external guarantees? Alternatively, are there other aspects in the design of these settlements that either enhance durability or increase the likelihood of break-down? Given the destabilizing influence of these persistent conflicts in many key regions of the world and the increasing resistance of third parties to commit troops to enforce negotiated settlements, identifying ethnicity as a complicating factor in the settlement process is insufficient from a policy perspective. Rather it is important to determine whether there are measures that can be incorporated into these agreements to ameliorate commitment problems or if there are aspects in the design of the power-sharing terms that make these settlements more difficult to carryout.
In our analysis, we found that the majority of negotiated agreements reached in armed self-determination conflicts included offers of military, political or territorial power sharing. Less than a third provided for third party security guarantees. However, we also found that many of these settlements also included measures that we have termed asymmetric assurances; provisions that create an advantage for the government side in terms of timing, information and allowances for unilateral action. In particular, we found a frequent inclusion of terms that require non-concurrent delivery of concessions, make government concessions subject to approval by mechanism of governance that favor the majority on the government side or grant the government unilateral allowances to act in self-defense have a negative correlation with settlement durability. While these provisions appear as benign procedures for ratifying the terms of settlement, or as timetables for implementing reforms or as outlining the division of security responsibilities during the transition, they are at odds with the basic logic of credible commitments in that they prevent, rather than require a reciprocal exposure to risk in order to confirm the value of an exchange relationship (Williamson 1983).

Based on the results of this study, offers of power-sharing are insufficient to foster a credible commitment to peace in armed self-determination conflicts. Despite their increasing frequency in negotiated settlements, they do not appear to enhance over durability or support the implementation process. Instead, the findings presented in this study suggest that the inclusion of these asymmetric assurances may explain the paucity of durable settlements in armed self-determination disputes. Our analysis shows that when settlements include these terms they are more likely to re-
turn to violence or falter during the implementation process within five years of signature. Our analysis also suggests that the inclusion of these terms undermines the positive impact of power-sharing pacts by conditioning their implementation on non-concurrent concessions or imposing one-side sanctions on failure to deliver on signed commitments. Our findings show that third party security guarantees, which are based on a promise of external enforcement of the terms of settlement, do support durability although offers to share power do not, except when controlling for the impact of asymmetric assurances.

By empirically testing the impact of these asymmetric assurances on settlement durability, this article will make a significant contribution to our understanding of why some peace agreements break-down even when they include elaborate power-sharing provisions. In addition, this study highlights the importance of offering credible assurances to both parties that their commitment to peace will not make them vulnerable to either exploitation or opportunism. Credible threats that defection will be punished or promises that power will be shared in the future cannot sustain that commitment if they are neither reciprocal nor mutually binding.

This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews the theoretical literature on the role of settlement design in supporting a credible commitment to peace. Section 3 discusses approaches to the negotiated settlement of armed self-determination conflicts and introduces terms that create asymmetric assurances. Section 4 presents the research design and model specifications. Section 5 presents the empirical results. We conclude with a discussion of the implications of this study for the negotiated
settlement of internal armed conflict.

The Challenge of Settling Armed Self-Determination Conflicts

Of all forms of internal armed conflict, armed self-determination conflicts are considered the most resistant to negotiated settlement. Whether it is existential stakes associated with conflicts over identity or the association of these conflicts with secessionist challenges to state sovereignty, unless armed self-determination conflicts are settled within the first three years of onset, they are likely to drag on for decades. (Quinn 2008; Weller 2009). Moreover, the surprise re-emergence of an armed secessionist conflict in the Katanga province of the DRC in 2013, 50 years after it was settled on the battlefield suggests that even decisive victory is insufficient to permanently curtail these pernicious conflicts (Themnér, & Wallensteen 2014). With as many as 28 armed self-determination conflicts currently unresolved and upwards of 55 groups reported as at risk in 2008 (Quinn 2008), these conflicts are likely to remain a significant driver of global instability in the years to come. The current contest raging in the Donesk region of Ukraine underscores the dangers these conflicts create in terms of refugee flows, spill-over and the potential for state failure.

There is no question that hardened enemy images and concerns around concessions emboldening future challengers increase the difficulty in negotiating comprehensive settlements to these conflicts (Darby 2005; Walter 2009). However, since the end of the Cold War there has been a surge in negotiated peace agreements, including in some of the most intractable cases (Weller 2009). The challenge is that many of these agreements collapsed during the implementation process. High pro-
file failures like the collapse of the 1993 Oslo Process between the Israelis and Palestinians or the inability of the government of Sri Lanka and the Tamil Tigers (LTTE) to get beyond a Norwegian brokered ceasefire in 2002 are stark reminders of the consequences of failed peace agreements in human life and prolonged instability. Nevertheless, there has been minimal attention given to examining why so many of these promising settlements failed beyond treating ethnicity as an independent variable (Sambanis and El-Badawi, 2002; DeRouen and Sobek, 2004; Mattes and Savun, 2009).

The lack of specific attention to the dynamics of the transition from signed agreement to lasting peace in armed self-determination conflicts is surprising from the perspective of the general acceptance that commitment problems; the inability of parties to carry out the terms of mutually beneficial agreement for fear of exploitation by a duplicitous adversary, is well established as a critical barrier to the negotiated settlement of internal armed conflict, ethnic conflict in particular (Fearon 1994; 1998; Walter 1997, 1999, 2002). The fact that the parties in so many of these conflicts are able and willing to assume the costs of entering into an agreement suggests that commitment problems may be a greater barrier to the settlement than indivisible stakes.

Awareness of the deleterious impact of commitment problems on the prospects for sustaining a negotiated agreement have generated a significant number of studies aimed at identifying and testing various means of providing the parties the assurances they need to carry out the high risk obligations necessary to make the transition to a mutually beneficial settlement. Generally speaking, the literature has
identified two principle mechanisms: third party security guarantees (Walter 1997; 2002) and advanced power-sharing pacts (Lijphart 1990; Hartzell and Rothchild 1999; Hartzell and Hoddie 2003, 2005, 2007). Third party security guarantees mitigate annuities around exploitation by introducing a promise of protection from an external party willing to back up the terms of settlement with force into the settlement process. Knowledge that outsider actors will commit troops to protect the combatants during the transition allows the parties to carry out high risk steps like demobilizing forces without fear of sneak attack (Walter 2002).

Power-sharing pacts, on the other hand, establish credibility through an exchange of concessions and carefully calibrated short term moves that effectively institutionalize the terms of settlement (Hartzell and Hoddie 2007; Hartzell 1999). The belief is that the signal generated by making the costly offer, combined with the various opportunities to verify mutual compliance during the implementation process creates a self-enforcing process in which trust is continually reaffirmed with each subsequent step towards implementing the final deal (Hartzell and Hoddie, 2005). The more institutionalized the power-sharing arrangements or the more costly the offer, the more likely the agreement is to succeed (Hartzell and Hoddie 2005, 2007). However, while power-sharing is becoming increasingly popular, its efficacy is still contested. Some studies suggest that only certain types of offers enhance the durability of negotiated settlements, yet disagree whether high costs offers are more effective than offers that the parties can credibly accept to carry-out. For example, Hartzell and Hoddie suggest that offers of territorial or military power-sharing have greater impact because they are high risk and, therefore, signal greater commit-
Asymmetric Assurances

Hodgkins and Ali

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Page 8 of 46

ment (Hartzell and Hoddie 2007). Whereas Dereoun (2009) argues that in contests
over-governance, because offers of political power-sharing entail giving the chal-
lengers a stake in state control, governments may balk at carrying out the deal unless
they have clear information on rebel power. Others argue that it is the actual imple-
mentation of the costly offers, particularly military power-sharing provisions, that
enhance credibility (Jarstaad and Nilsson, 2008).

Overall, empirical studies of the outcome of negotiated settlements in internal
armed conflict give support to both third party security guarantees and offers of
power-sharing as mechanisms for enhancing settlement durability (Hartzell and
Hoddie 2007, Mattes and Savun, 2009, Chatterjee 2005). However, none of these
studies differentiate between armed self-determination conflicts and other grievanc-
es in terms of settlement design or outcome. In a study by Mattes and Savun, which
looked at the impact of settlement design on fostering a credible commitment to
peace, ethnicity was introduced as an independent variable along with settlement
provisions that either reduced long term fears of exploitation or raised the cost of re-
turning to fighting. Their results demonstrated that settlements which specifically
include measures that reduce long term fears, like offers of power-sharing or third
party security guarantees, were more likely to be durable. In addition, their results
also indicated that measures like separation of forces agreements, monitoring
schemes or peace-keepers decreased the likelihood of a resumption of hostilities
(Mattes and Savun, 2009).

However, while identifying policy actionable measures that support durable
settlements in general, their results implicated ethnicity as a complicating factor in-
dependent of the actually terms of the agreement (Mattes and Savun, 2009). While these results confirm earlier studies showing a relationship between ethnic grievances and intractability (Sambanis and El-Badawi, 2002; Fearon 2004), they do little in terms of offering recommendations for how settlements in ethnic disputes in general or armed self-determination conflicts in particular, should be designed.

The few studies that address the nature of the agreements reached in these cases, however, emphasize the prevalence and importance of complex power-sharing arrangements. In particular, studies by Marc Weller (2008, 2009) and Stefan Wolff (2009) indicate that institutionalized arrangements for territorial autonomy or limited self-governance are both widely used and promising means of bringing about a lasting settlement to self-determination disputes. However, in a comparative study of 18 cases, Wolff indicates that the success of territorial power-sharing schemes is also dependent on the degree to which groups are territorially concentrated and the salience of the particular territory to the group as a whole. While his results suggest that political power-sharing maybe more suitable in cases where there is relative ethnic heterogeneity and territorial power-sharing effective in cases where groups are concentrated, he does not offer systematic evidence to support either hypothesis and includes cases of where groups waged largely political contests with those disputes that crossed the threshold for armed conflict (Wolff 2009).

In a review of various agreements reached in armed self-determination conflicts after the Cold War, Marc Weller (2008, 2009) similarly argues that complex power-sharing arrangements are conducive to settling these conflicts, especially when they are based on offers to devolve power to particular groups or to establish
territorial autonomy. However, he specifically cites agreements that outline a clear trade between offers of territorial power-sharing with commitments to end violence structures for a cessation of violence (Weller 2008 xvii). He describes four basic types of exchanges that he credits with the rise in the number of settlements since the end of the Cold War: agreements that compensate dropping the right of secession with guaranteed autonomy; submitting claims to constitutional processes for ratification; affirming the right of independence but making it subject to certain future conditions; and deferring decision on self-determination until after a period of interim power-sharing. All these arrangements involve an exchange of concessions that either forecloses the possibility of either side achieving maximalist gains or defers that choice until after a period of stabilization(Weller 2008, p 387).

While Weller’s discussion of different settlements in conflicts ranging from Moldova, to Papua New Guinea, Indonesia or Northern Ireland generally endorses the idea that offers of power-sharing support a credible commitment, the types of exchanges he describes also raise questions regarding reciprocity. For example, he suggests that the key to breaking the stalemate is an arrangement which balances the challenger’s interests in self-government with the government’s desire to reaffirm its monopoly on force and the territorial integrity (Weller 2008, p xviii). However, he also indicates that this exchange is non-concurrent, suggesting that political reforms are implemented after a period of social stabilization.

The timing aspect is puzzling given that concurrent moves are considered essential to signaling a credible commitment. Building on contract theory and theories of cooperation under the security dilemma (Williamson 1985, Axelrod 1990), Dorina
Bekoe (2008) argues that concurrent timing is essential for the creation of what she terms “mutual vulnerability,” a sense of shared exposure to risk that fosters a sense of credible commitment. In a comparative study of iterative agreements in the civil wars in Liberia, Mozambique and Angola, she finds that concurrent concessions are a key factor in differentiating between agreements that succeeded and those that failed (2008). The idea of a change between future offers of power-sharing and advance commitments to end violence would heighten the challenger's insecurity as to whether the government would fulfill their promises to reform once they lay down their arms (Bekoe 2008, Mattes and Savun 2009). However, Weller does not explore this angle in his study.

Similarly, he does not indicate whether any reassurances or safeguards for government compliance are incorporated into agreements where decisions on self-determination are either deferred, made subject to referendum or submitted to ratification. The Bougainville agreement of August 2001, for example, did include reciprocal commitments that created incentives for both parties to comply with the terms of settlement and subjected them to forfeiture of gains should they renge. In that agreement, in order to trigger a referendum on independence, the challengers would need to disarm within ten years. However, the government also had to implement a series of self-governing reforms in that same time frame that, if enacted, would presumably make independence less attractive (Weller 2009, 145-146). In this case, both parties had incentives to comply but would incur costs if they failed to do so. However, Weller makes no comment on whether these arrangements are commonplace or necessary.
Finally, Weller provides limited insight into how security concerns are managed during the transition except for noting that external enforcement is unlikely to be acceptable to the government party. In his assessment, given existing norms of non-intervention, third party involvement in the form of peace-keeping forces or third party security guarantees would be contingent on government consent. Moreover, because the presence of third party forces would undermine the credibility of the government’s monopoly of force within their overall territory, they would be resisted and probably refused (Weller 2009, p 113-114). Israel’s repeated refusal of PLO requests for peacekeepers during the secret negotiations in Olso were based on the assumption that the Israeli military retained the capacity to defend its borders, whereas internal security would be subject to improved cooperation (Savir, 1997; Querie, 2005). However, when taken in conjunction with the termination of the challengers military campaign as a starting point, this implies that the challengers are expected to give away both their means of protection and their main source of leverage while the government, presumably, remains armed and in control of the coercive apparatuses of the state (Svesson 2007).

In sum, the settlement models in Weller’s discussion suggests that peace agreements in armed self-determination conflicts may be structured in a way that offers of power-sharing are conditioned on government receiving advance payments for future concessions that are contingent on the challengers actual compliance. In addition, security measures favor the government’s control over the territory and offer neither reciprocity in terms of protection nor mutually binding costs on defec-
tion. Although Walter argues that reciprocity is not a necessary component in relation to third party security guarantees, in light of the fact that commitment problems can emerge unilaterally – more often for the rebels than the government, such a conditional structure in the absence of external enforcement raises concern. Simply in terms of the security dilemma, this lack of reciprocity would seem to exacerbate uncertainty and increase fears of exploitation instead of ameliorating them.

Structuring settlements in a way that requires the challengers to make an advance payment on ending violence without reciprocal safeguards or costs on government defection would make it difficult for the government to make its commitment to implement those costly, territorial reforms credibly once the challengers have terminated their military campaign (Walter 1997; Svesson 2007). While offers of autonomy or territorial self-government may break the stalemate over secession, they may breed suspicion and rivalry over time if there is nothing to ensure the government will not simply resume its efforts to reconsolidate control once calm ensues (Rothchild 2005).

However, in the absence of a systematic study of the terms of settlements in armed self-determination conflicts or studies that test for the efficacy of offers of power-sharing in these cases, it is difficult to determine if these measures are effective in enhancing durability, as Weller suggests, or actually contribute to settlement breakdown. Thus, there is merit in determining what measures, if any, enhance the durability of settlements in these conflicts where the overlap of identity issues and secessionist demands would arguably aggravate commitment problems and increase the importance of including measures to reassure the parties they will not be left
worse off by committing to peace. In addition, there is no systematic study of agreements based on power-sharing that considers the impact of measures like concurrent exchanges of concessions or impose mutual limits on self-help or the consequences of their absence. Therefore, there is merit in examining agreements in armed self-determination conflicts in order to evaluate how the timing of concessions, costs on defection and limits on self-help are incorporated into the terms of settlement. Moreover, given the increased resistance to contributing peacekeepers and other forms of third party security guarantees to back up negotiated agreements it is essential to identify whether there are elements of settlement design that contribute to the institutionalization a self-enforcing implementation process such as offers of power-sharing and mechanisms for monitoring compliance and sanctioning defection (Hartzell and Hoddie 2005).

**Asymmetric Assurances: The Frequency and Impact of Non-Reciprocal Provisions in Settlement Design**

In order to determine the extent to which agreements in armed self-determination conflicts incorporated reciprocal safeguards like the 2001 Bougainville agreement or relied on non-concurrent concessions that exchanged challengers commitments to end violence for future, possibly non-binding, promises to reform, it was necessary to collect the text of as many relevant agreements as possible for examination. In addition to Weller’s work, research conducted by Barbara Walter indicates that agreements were signed in at least 28 armed self-determination conflicts since 1955. However, none of these sources provided a comprehensive list of signed
agreements.\(^1\) Therefore, to locate and identify the agreements signed in these disputes, we first searched in the various digital archives of peace agreements, including the United States Institute for Peace’s Digital Peace Agreement’s Library, INCORE (International Conflict Research Institute at the University of Ulster) and the UCDP Peace Agreement Dataset. In other cases, copies of the agreement were obtained from government foreign ministries, such as the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, or complied through different media sources.\(^2\) In total, we identified over 70 negotiated agreements ranging from comprehensive peace treaties to limited ceasefire agreements in 34 armed self-determination conflicts between 1975 and 2007.

Results of an initial examination of the terms of these agreements indicated that, as Weller’s description had suggested, many agreements utilized non-concurrent concessions, in particular a non-concurrent exchange of challengers commitments to curtail violence for future government reforms or promises of territorial self-governance. For example, the 1987 Indo-Sri Lanka Accord stipulates that the LTTE should disarm under Indian supervision as a first step towards national reconciliation. Similar provisions were included in the 1985 Anglo-Irish Agreement, where the IRA was expected to disarm prior to be accepted as a party to negotiations over the future of Northern Ireland. A similar exchange was outlined in the 1993 Letters of Mutual Recognition, in which PLO Chairman Yassir Arafat agreed to re-

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1. Most studies of armed self-determination conflicts begin with the bi-annual reports on Peace and Conflict that were published by the Center for International Development and Conflict Management between 2001 and 2008. While these reports suggest there have been upwards of 55 armed self-determination conflicts that have erupted since 1945, of which approximately 23 were classified as settled or contained by 2008, the reports fail to provide a clear list of which conflicts were settled, in what year and which resumed. For the purposes of this project we cross-checked the CIDCM reports with data provided by Barbara Walter related to her 2009, the Uppsala Conflict Data Projects Peace Agreement Dataset and the IISS Armed Conflict database to identify cases where agreements had been reached. If there was evidence of an agreement in at least two of these sources, additional research was done to locate the actual text of the agreement.

2. When relying on media reports, efforts were taken to cross referenced and verify the terms with at least three different sources (Hoddie and Hartzell 2003; 2005).
nounce all forms of violence and terror in exchange for recognition by the Government of Israel as a party to the subsequent talks on self-government in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. In other words, peace agreements in armed self-determination conflicts frequently begin with an asymmetric entry fee in the form of a challengers commitment to end violence.

In addition, many of the agreements contain provisions that make government concessions contingent on confirmation or ratification through existing procedures of governance that advantage the government side of the dispute. While a call for a referendum on independence or territorial concessions that only polls those in the contested region, such as was included in 2005 agreement on Aceh or in the 2001 Bougainville agreement, would favor the challengers, a national plebiscite creates the risk of deciding against secession by ballot after the challengers have foresworn the bullet; so to speak. This was the case when the Mindanao National Liberation Front (MNLF) rejected an Indonesian brokered statement of understanding that referenced a constitutional requirement to subject any decision to alter the existing self-governing arrangements for the boundaries of the state to a referendum. The arguments, as well as their legal bases, were rejected by the MNLF on the grounds that they had not been a party to the process of amending the constitution in 1987 to include provisions for limited autonomy for Mindanao and demanded full implementation of the autonomy terms agreed to in 1976 (Statement of Understanding, Department Luar Negri Republic of Indonesia, April 17, 1993). A similar issue arose in the settlement for Northern Mali when the agreement failed to include safeguards for the ability of the central government to amend autonomy provisions in the con-
stitution unilaterally (Weller 2009, p 121). While it is clear that the government would have an interest in reinforcing the existing mechanisms of government during the transition, the non-binding nature of government concessions could certainly heighten fears of exploitation on the part of the challengers.

As Weller suggested, external intervention was largely limited to mediation or monitoring of disarmament, such as in the 1987 Indo-Sri Lankan Accord, as opposed to third party security guarantees. However, while as discussed many agreements were predicated on the challengers halting their military campaign, the constants on self-help appear to be unilateral. In fact, some agreements include clauses that actually grant the government specific allowances to exercise self-help in certain cases. For example, Article II of the The August 7, 2001 “Guidelines on the Security Aspect of the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement” grants the government the right to take action to defend against hostile or provocative acts that include “hijackings,” “throwing grenades,” and “other terroristic activities,” military actions such as naval gunfire, artillery shelling or aircraft bombing are only hostile if they are aggressive or “offensive” (Article II.3, 3.1; Implementing Guidelines on the Security Aspect of the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement, August 7, 2001).

These provisions effectively sanction potential government action against challengers at their own discretion. Another example would be the December 2002 Swiss brokered agreement between the Government of Indonesia and GAM, which called for a partial demilitarization of the Aceh province but left responsibility for policing duties and the enforcement of law and order solely in the hands of the Government. In effect, such provisions create the inverse of third party security guaran-
tees in that they provide the government assurances of the right to take unilateral action in self-defense.

Ultimately, we identified three common types of settlement provisions in the agreements we identified that effectively provided asymmetric assurances to the government and disadvantaged the challengers by either requiring they unilaterally ceasefire or accept government commitments that were contingent or subject to amendment or reversal through government procedures. These terms were as follows: asymmetric entry fees, which are non-concurrent challenger concessions that make government concessions contingent on challengers compliance; asymmetric security guarantees, provisions that create allowances for government forces to act in self-defense; and asymmetric veto power, provisions that make government commitments contingent on confirmation or ratification of procedural measures that favor the government majority.

While the vast majority of the agreements also comprised complex offers of territorial, political or even military power-sharing that would be commensurate with the challenger's aims, the uncertainty created by the asymmetric structure of the agreements fear reducing and cost increasing measures could certainly create significant commitment problems. Therefore, we suspect that the incorporation of these asymmetric assurances may explain the relatively high failure rate of peace agreements in armed self-determination conflicts.

**Research Design**

*Operationalizing the Hypotheses*
To systematically test the impact of these measures on the durability of peace agreements, we need to translate these general observations regarding the structure of settlement provisions in armed self-determination conflicts into a series of testable hypotheses. Based on the specific types of asymmetric assurances identified in the agreements, we formed the following hypotheses:

Hypothesis 1: *Agreements that contain asymmetric assurances are less likely to result in sustainable peace.*

This hypothesis is parsed out into operational variables in three sub-hypothesis:

Hypothesis 1.1: *Agreements containing asymmetric entry fees are less likely to result in a sustainable peace.*

Hypothesis 1.2: *Agreements containing asymmetric security guarantees terms are less likely to result in a sustainable peace.*

Hypothesis 1.3: *Agreements containing provisions for asymmetric veto power are less likely to result in a sustainable peace.*

However, it is also important to consider whether any of the conventional methods for fostering a credible commitment increase the prospects of durability in this subset of conflicts. Thus, we included the following additional sub-group of hypotheses to test for the impact of measures that provide the parties assurances of protection during the implementation process or promise future rewards via offers of political, military or territorial power-sharing. These hypotheses are as follows:

Hypothesis 2: *Agreements that contain commitments by a third party to guarantee the parties security during the implementation phase are more likely to result in durable peace.*

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3The nature of the proposed statistical tests is implicit in the wording of the different hypotheses. The use of “less likely” as opposed to unlikely is necessary to convey the meaning of the statistical results which will produce a level of significance for a given variable in comparison to others. In other words, agreements containing these terms are less likely to result in sustainable peace than agreements without these terms or with different terms.
Hypothesis 3: *Agreements that contain offers of power-sharing are more likely to result in durable peace.*

Hypothesis 3.1: *Agreements that contain offers of political power-sharing are more likely to result in durable peace.*

Hypothesis 3.2: *Agreements that contain offers of military power-sharing are more likely to result in durable peace.*

Hypothesis 3.3: *Agreements that contain offers of territorial power-sharing are more likely to result in durable peace.*

**Variable Selection**

In order to test these hypotheses, we constructed a specialized dataset based on the agreements we identified in the 34 armed self-determination conflicts. As the focus of the study is the impact of specific settlement terms on durability, we did not restrict the data to specific conflict dyads and made individual signed agreements the unit of analysis. An agreement was included in the data set if it both (1) was signed by the government and a group or third party representing the challengers and (2) addressed major issues associated with the settlement of the dispute such as security, territory, military or political autonomy (Svensson 2006, 14; Jarstad and Nilsson 2008; UCPD 2009). These criteria include initial ceasefire agreements that also indicated future talks through timetables or included an agenda for subsequent negotiations, as well as interim agreements that set out general principles for settling the dispute. Implementation agreements were also included provided they referenced previous agreements. Ultimately, 70 agreements met the above criteria and were in-
cluded in the data set\textsuperscript{5}. The agreements in the dataset were coded on the basis of the variables identified on the basis of the criteria set out below.

**Dependent Variables**

The dependent variable is durability of settlement, a term that captures both the cessation of armed conflict as well as the level of progress towards implementation. Thus, we included two dependent variables; the first is a binary measure of the status of the conflict post agreement and the second approximates the depth of transition. To be consistent with other studies, we adopted five years post signature as the window to determine an agreement’s outcome (Walter 2002, p. 53, Gledistich, Wallensteen, Erikseen and Sollenberg, 2005; Hoddie and Hartzell 2003). For the first measure, we coded the outcome as not durable (0) if the parties had returned to fighting within five years and as durable (1) if the agreement had, at the very least, deterred active conflict for a five year period. This variable was coded based on whether the conflict was listed as active in the PRIO/UCDP dataset five years post agreement (Gledistich, Wallensteen, Erikseen and Sollenberg, 2005, 2013)\textsuperscript{6}. If no notation for conflict was made in the agreement’s fifth anniversary year, the agreement was coded as durable(1).

\textsuperscript{5}In this study we have included each agreement meeting the criteria as a separate observation even if it was part of a series of agreements. In many cases, the parties sign separate agreements to address different aspects of the dispute, such as completing one agreement on the terms of ceasefire that includes provisions for later demobilization or setting out the agenda for future talks once those steps have been completed. Including only the most comprehensive agreement would exclude key clauses related to the different independent variables, such as excluding provisions related to DDR that are a key part of the process but not referenced in an agreement on political reform. If the independent variable was a measure of years of peace, it would be statistically difficult to separate the impact of agreements within the same five year period. However, because the independent variable is a static, five years post outcome the time dependent relationship between all the observations is the same (Mashawi 2008; Jarstad and Nilsson 2008, Svesson 2006, and Nilsson, Svesson and Sundberg 2006). Moreover, because the negotiations stretched over several years, in some cases encompassed different administrations on the government side, the conditions in which new agreements were negotiated and signed were qualitatively different and the outcome five years post signature was also varied in five of the cases.

\textsuperscript{6}There are multiple datasets providing comprehensive data on the status of wars, civil wars and global conflicts such as Keesing’s Record of World Events and the International Institute for Strategic Studies (ISS) Armed Conflict Database, as well as the Correlates of War project and CIDCM. Because the PRIO/UCPD has the lowest intensity threshold for inclusion, 25 battle-related deaths per year for minor conflicts and lifetime total of 1,000 for a major conflict, it was the best and most comprehensive dataset for the purposes of coding the dummy variable.
However, the transition from a signed agreement to a sustainable settlement is far from a linear process and there is a qualitative difference between simply electing not to resume armed conflict and the difficult work of conflict transformation (Darby 2005). To capture this dynamic we created a categorical variable that approximated the possible stages of transition to peace from active hostility to a full implementation of the agreement’s terms. A fully implemented agreement is coded as (5); an agreement where implementation is progressing with minimal contest on major aspects of the dispute is coded as (4); contested agreements, where the parties continue to uphold terms of ceasefires but are making negligible progress, was coded as (3); a talk/fighting situation where the parties to the negotiation have lapsed into disagreement over the agreement and violence by rejectionist groups was coded (2); finally, the case where the principle parties to the agreement have resumed violence and the conflict is considered active are coded as (1). Having two distinct measures of outcome also serves as robust analysis of the model and reaffirms the integrity of the data.

**Independent Variables**

The next set of variables code for the use of asymmetric assurances as either fear reducing or cost increasing measures in the agreements. Dummy variables were constructed for the following terms: asymmetric entry fees, asymmetric security guarantees and asymmetric veto power. In addition, dummy variables were also constructed for Third Party Security Guarantees, Territorial, Military and Political Power Sharing pacts. This set of dummy variables allows for testing whether asymmetric assurances have an isolated impact on the status of a given agreement after five years.

**Asymmetric Entry Fees**
An agreement was coded for having an asymmetric entry fee if the agreement included clauses requiring the challengers group to renounce violence, demobilize or disarm as an initial confidence measure or recognizing key government positions as a condition of joining the talks. These terms are different from general affirmations to settle all disputes through negotiations or commit to a peaceful resolution based on mutual coexistence that are found in the preamble of many agreements in that they require the rebels to take an initial step or make an initial, verifiable concession as a condition of the government implementing or discussing political or territorial reform. In other words, the provisions must proscribe non-concurrent moves in which the challengers must make unilateral investment and expose themselves to the incumbent risk without assurances of government reciprocation. Obvious examples would be the 1998 Anjua Pact in Spain, which compels the ETA to abandon terror in order to commence the settlement process or the 1987 Indo-Sri Lanka Accord where the LTTE is expected to disarm under Indian supervision as a first step towards national reconciliation. Similar provisions were included in the 1985 Anglo-Irish Agreement, where the IRA was expected to disarm prior to be accepted as a party to the negotiations over the future of Northern Ireland. There were 36 agreements in the dataset (51%) that were coded as containing asymmetric entry fees.

Asymmetric Security Guarantees

An agreement was coded for having asymmetric security guarantees if the terms of settlement explicitly provided allowances for the government to take unilateral ac-

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7Interestingly, while the Sinn Fein did renounce violence as part of the US sponsored peace process, the 1998 Good Friday Agreement had the implementation of power sharing and reconstitution of the RUC as concurrent to disarmament. While beyond the scope of this project, my speculation is that this distinction could explain the durability of this agreement in the face of its highly contentious implementation process.
tion in self-defense. In other words, terms that rendered any constraints created by the agreement on the use of force non-reciprocally binding. The provisions could be phrased as specific exemptions to respond to external threats or to protect its citizens or as a general affirmation that nothing in the agreement should impinge upon the right of the government to exercise its right of self-defense. We identified 43 agreements (61%) as including terms that constituted an asymmetric security guarantee.

Asymmetric Veto Power

The final term, asymmetric veto power, refers to additional provisions that allow the government to reverse or amend promised concessions. Whereas asymmetric entry fees make government concessions contingent on rebel compliance, these are terms that state that government concessions are contingent on parliamentary ratification, cabinet approval or other mechanisms of governance dominated by the government’s constituents. A statement saying the terms of agreement come into force immediately after signature would not preclude provisions creating an asymmetric veto in the agreement. For example a provision calling for a referendum on key reforms would render the government’s commitments reversible where the challengers are a clear minority. However, a referendum in only challengers held provinces would not qualify. There were 41 agreements (59%) with terms suggesting government concessions could be revised or were contingent on majority approval before implementation.

Competing Theories

The next round of independent variables was constructed to include the conventional methods for addressing commitment problems found in the literature. Dummy variables were created for Third Party Security Guarantees and Institutionalized Territorial, Military and Political Power Sharing Pacts. In order to ensure a direct compari-
son, the coding criteria set out in the original studies were observed in the construction of the data-set to the fullest extent possible. An agreement was coded as having a third-party security guarantee if the agreement contained reference to an outside state or organization such as OAS, NATO or the UN to supervise, monitor, verify or otherwise facilitate the demobilization, disarmament, disengagement of forces or maintenance of a ceasefire (Walter 2002, pp 66-68).

For institutionalized power sharing, the criteria for coding the presence of different types of pacts were drawn from the mainstream literature on the subject. Territorial power sharing pacts were coded if the peace agreement included a provision for granting some form of territorial autonomy or territorially defined self-government to the challengers parties (Lake and Rothchild 1996, 62; Hoddie and Hartzell 2005, 87-88; Jarstad and Nilsson 2008, 214). An agreement was coded as having a military power sharing pact if there were terms outlining the restructuring of military forces, integrating challenger's forces into the military, or granting challenger's forces discrete military powers such as policing areas where their ethnic group was concentrated (Hoddie and Hartzell 2005, 89-90, Jarstad and Nilsson 2008, 213). Consistent with Weller's study, 40 agreements (57%) including offers of territorial power sharing. A slight minority of 33 agreements (47%) had specific arrangements for military power-sharing. Finally, peace agreements that offer the challengers regional elections, civil authority, set quotas in the governance or guarantee positions were coded as including an offer of political power-sharing (Hartzell and Hoddie, 2005, Walter, 2002). There were 38 agreements (54%) that had such terms. On the whole, the peace agreements reviewed reflected a high de-

---

8 In her 2002 work Walter also codes for the strength of the security guarantee on a 5 point scale. I did not code for this for two reasons. First, the low intensity of many of these conflicts renders her categories of 500+ and 5,000+ a less meaningful measure of the strength of the commitment. Second, her five point scale would be inconsistent with the other measures.
gree of power-sharing with 39 (56%) having two or more types of power-sharing outlined in the terms of settlement.

**Control Variables**

In order to avoid spurious relationships, control variables suggested by other studies as exogenous factors generally supportive or detrimental of negotiated settlement were included in the dataset as well. A dummy variable was constructed for the presence of mediation. While neither a panacea nor a guarantee of sustainable agreement, the willingness of an external actor to facilitate resolving the dispute is a signal of the support of the international community to a peace process and can bolster moderates as they consider making difficult concessions, even in situations of mediator bias (Hampson 1996; Stedman in Brown ed 1996, 341-376; Bercovitch 1996, Kydd 2003; Svesson 2007; Pospieszna and Schneider, 2011).

In contrast to mediation, which is argued to have a positive effect on settlement durability, the presence of dedicated spoilers is argued as being the single greatest exogenous threat to the viability of a peace agreement. Stedman has argued that no confidence building measures or third party security guarantees are sufficient to counteract the deleterious effect of extremist and rejectionist spoilers determined to use violence to derail a peace agreement (Stedman 1997; 2002). Spoilers are also argued to be dangerous in that they undermine trust in the moderates who signed the agreement (Walter and Kydd, 2005). A second control variable coding for the presence of spoiler factions was included in the dataset. Spoilers were determined by cross-referencing the parties to the conflict in IISS armed conflict database and the Minorities as Risk Project with the

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9 The IISS Armed Conflict database lists the all the major factions, including rejectionist factions for the majority of the cases included in the dataset. For other cases, the Minorities at Risk database were consulted as were general news reports surrounding the agreements signing.
signatories to the agreement. If there were actors listed as combatants who were not signatories, the agreement was coded as having potential “outside” spoilers. We did not consider the possibility of signatories also being spoilers (Stedman 1997) for the purpose of this study.

Table 1: List of Key Variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Indicator</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Asymmetric Entry Fees</td>
<td>Non-concurrent schedule of concessions that requires an initial move by the challengers that involves ending violence or making an irreversible concession.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asymmetric Security Guarantees</td>
<td>Provisions allowing the government to retain sole discretion over the unilateral exercise of the state's defensive or policing capabilities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asymmetric Veto Power</td>
<td>References in the agreement or negotiating record implying power sharing provisions or concessions are subject to governmental or constitutional approval after signature.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Power Sharing Pacts</td>
<td>Agreement provisions for dividing or sharing military or policing power post settlement that precludes a monopoly on control. Includes joint-patrols, regional policing and joint-border checks.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Territorial Power Sharing Pacts</td>
<td>Agreement provisions promising incremental or eventual territorial bound autonomy, diminishment of government authority or outright secession as part of the settlement.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Power Sharing Pacts</td>
<td>Agreement provisions that provide for quotas or proportional allocation of power post settlement that preclude a monopoly on state control.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third Party Security Guarantees</td>
<td>Commitment of Third Party force to enforce or verify post treaty behavior vis-à-vis the agreement.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mediation</td>
<td>Presence of third party mediator as evidenced in signature or contribution of “Good Offices.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spoilers</td>
<td>Existence of factions excluded from the agreements or negotiating process.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Model Specifications

A probit model is used to explain whether asymmetrical security guarantees yields sustainable peace agreement, that is \( Y_i = 1 \),
\[ P[Y_i = 1|X_{i1}, \ldots, X_{ki}; \gamma_0, \ldots, \gamma_K] = \theta(\gamma_0 + \sum_{k=1}^{K} \gamma_k X_{ki}) \] (1)

Where \( \theta(\cdot) \) is the cumulative distribution function of the standard normal distribution. It means conditional on the asymmetrical security guarantees, the probability that the peace agreement \( Y_i \) is 1, is a function of a linear combinations of the regressor. The marginal effect for the probit regression with discrete changes in regressor \( X_{ki} \) that takes values \{0,1\} is:

\[
\Delta X_{ki} \rho[Y_i = 1|X_{i1}, \ldots, X_{ki}; \gamma_0, \ldots, \gamma_K] = \gamma_k \theta(\gamma_0 + \sum_{l=1}^{K-1} \gamma_l X_{li} + \gamma_K + \sum_{l=k+1}^{K} \gamma_l X_{li}) - \\
\gamma_k \theta(\gamma_0 + \sum_{l=1}^{K-1} \gamma_l X_{li} + \sum_{l=k+1}^{K} \gamma_l X_{li})
\] (2)

However as mentioned earlier, to capture this dynamic, the dependent variable was divided into five categories or stages in the implementation process that ranged from active hostility to a full implementation of the agreement’s terms, coded from one to five; where five represents a fully implemented agreement.

The stages of peace implementation as dependent variable rank five to one. The single latent variable \( \bar{y} \) is observable if it crosses certain thresholds for details see (Greene, 2002).

\[ \bar{y} = x' \beta + \varepsilon \]

We do observe \( y = 1 \) if \( \bar{y} \leq 1 \),
\[ y = 2 \] if \( 1 < \bar{y} \leq \mu_1 \),
\[ y = j \] if \( \mu_{j-1} \leq \bar{y} \),

The \( \mu \) is unknown parameters to be estimated with \( \beta \). By normalizing the mean and the variance of \( \varepsilon \) to zero and one we will have the following probabilities (Greene, 2002):

\[ \text{prob}(y = 1|x) = \Phi(-x'\beta) \]
\[ \text{prob}(y = 2|x) = \Phi(\mu_1 - x'\beta) - \Phi(x'\beta) \]
\[ \text{prob}(y = j|x) = 1 - \Phi(\mu_{j-1} - x'\beta) \]

For all the probability to be positive the following constraint should be applied:
\[ 0 < \mu_1 < \mu_2 < \cdots < \mu_{j-1} \]

For the ordered probit model with \( J \) possible outcomes will have the same numbers of marginal effects \( \left( \frac{\text{prob}}{x} \right) = \left\{ (F'(\mu_{j-1} - x'\beta) - F(\mu_j - x'\beta)) \beta \right\} \)

The first round of analysis tested our hypotheses against the dichotomous dummy variable (durable agreement/active conflict) in order to assess the impact of test variables of gross outcome. The second round retested the hypotheses using an ordered probit...
model. This method of analysis allowed an assessment of which test variables impacted the progress or deterioration of the peace-agreement during the implementation phase (Walter 2002, 71). In addition, two additional models were built with interaction variables for third party security guarantees with territorial power sharing pacts and for military power-sharing pacts with asymmetric ceasefire terms to both demonstrate the robustness of the results and to ascertain any significant interaction between the key variables in the design of settlements All tests were run on STATA 10.

**Empirical Findings**

The results of our statistical analysis reported in Table 2 and Table 3 show that asymmetric assurances have a statistically significant and negative impact on the overall durability and implementation of peace agreements in armed self-determination conflicts for all six tests. Third party security guarantees also have a statistically significant effect in enhancing settlement durability and supporting a sustained implementation process. Conversely, offers of power-sharing had ambiguous results, suggesting that when bolstered with third party security guarantees some types may have a positive effect but that others may paradoxically have a negative effect that could reflect their elision with asymmetric security guarantees. In sum, the results suggest that asymmetric assurances are strongly implicated in the breakdown of peace agreements in armed self-determination conflicts and that they undermine the positive signals generated by committing to share political, military and territorial power.

**Table 2: Asymmetric Assurances and Settlement Durability**
Table 2: Asymmetric Assurances and Settlement Durability

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent variable</th>
<th>Model (1)</th>
<th>Model (2)</th>
<th>Model (3)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Asymmetric Entry Fees</td>
<td>-1.349</td>
<td>-1.233</td>
<td>-1.373</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.003)***</td>
<td>(0.009)***</td>
<td>(0.008)***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asymmetric Security Guarantees</td>
<td>-1.847</td>
<td>-2.030</td>
<td>-2.731</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.00)***</td>
<td>(0.000)***</td>
<td>(0.001)***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asymmetric Veto Power</td>
<td>-0.988</td>
<td>-1.186</td>
<td>-1.258</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.023)**</td>
<td>(0.011)**</td>
<td>(0.010)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.012)**</td>
<td>(0.000)***</td>
<td>(0.000)***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Territorial Power Sharing Pacts</td>
<td>0.361</td>
<td>0.929</td>
<td>1.091</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.442)</td>
<td>(0.093)*</td>
<td>(0.069)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Power Sharing Pacts</td>
<td>-0.454</td>
<td>-0.779</td>
<td>-1.994</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.316)</td>
<td>(0.145)</td>
<td>(0.084)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Power Sharing Pacts</td>
<td>0.246</td>
<td>0.333</td>
<td>0.451</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.588)</td>
<td>(0.465)</td>
<td>(0.377)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spoilers</td>
<td>-0.494</td>
<td>-0.402</td>
<td>-0.578</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.236)</td>
<td>(0.370)</td>
<td>(0.235)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mediation</td>
<td>0.175</td>
<td>0.061</td>
<td>0.055</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.707)</td>
<td>(0.890)</td>
<td>(0.903)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.000)***</td>
<td>(0.000)***</td>
<td>(0.000)***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asymmetric Security Guarantees * Military power Sharing Pacts</td>
<td>1.393</td>
<td>1.393</td>
<td>1.393</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.187)</td>
<td>(0.187)</td>
<td>(0.187)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>2.598</td>
<td>2.598</td>
<td>3.227</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.000)***</td>
<td>(0.000)***</td>
<td>(0.001)***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Av. Log likelihood</td>
<td>-22.22</td>
<td>-20.99</td>
<td>-20.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chi-Square</td>
<td>29.57</td>
<td>558.23</td>
<td>562.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo R²</td>
<td>0.53</td>
<td>0.56</td>
<td>0.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Observations</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In table 2, we estimate the effects of asymmetric assurances, as well as individual power sharing provisions and third party security guarantees on the status of the conflict five years after signature. In addition, we include the control variables for mediation and spoilers in all three models. We also estimate the interaction between offers of territorial power-sharing and third party security guarantees in models two and three, and the interaction between offers of military power-sharing and asymmetric security guarantees. The results provide support for hypothesis 1. All three asymmetric assurance terms; asymmetric entry fees and asymmetric security guarantees, show a significant relationship with the likelihood that the parties to a peace agreement will have resumed hostiles within five years of signing a bargain. Hypothesis 2 is also consistently supported by the results across all three models as a predictor of settlement durability.

However, the results for power-sharing are more ambiguous. Offers of territorial power-sharing are significant only in models where we have controlled for the interaction with third party security guarantees. Moreover, the interaction between these two variables is also significant and negative. Intuitively, this finding is logical. Not only would third-party security guarantees provide important protection during the devolution of territorial control, the willingness of the government to accept such external forces may also reinforce the credibility of the territorially based deal. Military power-sharing, on the other hand, only returned a significant and negative result in the model that controlled for the interaction with asymmetric security guarantees. Again, the result is intuitive, suggesting that offers of military power-sharing may be scripted in a way that includes asymmetric security guarantees, as was the case in the 1993 Oslo Ac-
Asymmetric Assurances

10 Political power-sharing had no significant impact on outcome in any of the models. The variables for spoilers and mediation were insignificant but in the expected direction; negative and positive respectively.

Table 3 illustrates the impact of the test variables on the sustainability of the transition to peace. Again, the results of the analysis demonstrate a negative correlation between the inclusion of asymmetric assurances and the implementation process and a positive correlation with third party security guarantees. However, there were also some intriguing results for the power-sharing and mediation variables. The interaction variables were not significant in this set of estimations.

Table 3: Asymmetric Assurances and Stages of Implementation Process

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent variable</th>
<th>Model (1)</th>
<th>Model (2)</th>
<th>Model (3)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Asymmetric Entry Fees</td>
<td>-0.782</td>
<td>-0.788</td>
<td>-0.822</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.007)***</td>
<td>(0.000)***</td>
<td>(0.000)***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asymmetric Security Guarantees</td>
<td>-0.818</td>
<td>-0.818</td>
<td>-1.028</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.009)***</td>
<td>(0.000)***</td>
<td>(0.009)***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asymmetric Veto Power</td>
<td>-0.878</td>
<td>-0.872</td>
<td>-0.891</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.006)***</td>
<td>(0.000)***</td>
<td>(0.000)***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third Party Security Guarantees</td>
<td>0.902</td>
<td>0.870</td>
<td>0.851</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.022)**</td>
<td>(0.000)***</td>
<td>(0.002)***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Territorial Power Sharing Pacts</td>
<td>0.364</td>
<td>0.349</td>
<td>0.334</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.355)</td>
<td>(0.005)***</td>
<td>(0.112)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Power Sharing Pacts</td>
<td>-0.703</td>
<td>-0.698</td>
<td>-1.003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.042)**</td>
<td>(0.026)**</td>
<td>(0.000)***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

10 Article VII of the 1993 Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Governance, mandated the creation of a strong Palestinian police force to manage the internal security of the areas transferred to control of the Palestinian Authority. However, that same article also included the caveat that Israel forces retained overall security responsibility for borders, all remaining territory and Israeli citizens. In other words, this article was both an offer of military power-sharing and evidence of asymmetric security guarantees.
Again, the results indicate that including asymmetric assurances in peace agreements are deleterious for the outcome. The results show a negative and significant correlation between the inclusion of all three terms and outcome. Third party security guarantees appear to support implementation as well, with positive, significant results in all three models. The results for territorial power-sharing are ambiguous, showing a positive result for one model, however, in this estimation; the interaction variable was not significant. Military power-sharing pacts are consistently negative in all three models. This result conforms to DeRouen’s (2009) suggestion that the government may balk at implementing power-sharing offers that are high risk. While he evaluates political power-sharing as risky in conflicts that are about over-all governance of the state, military power-sharing may be risky in armed self-determination conflicts because they require the government to cede coercive control in specific areas.
Political power sharing returns significant results in the second two models, which is in line with Rothchild’s (2005) observation that the governments may extend vague or general offers of political power-sharing to coax the rebels into suspending their military campaign while they negotiate the terms of implementation. While spoilers appear as significant in one model, the sign is expected and consistent with the results for overall durability. However, the most surprising result in Table 3 is the suggestion that mediation has a negative impact on implementation in all three models. While further study is required, these results are in line with Svesson’s (2009) findings that neutral mediators may rush to conclude an agreement that has weak institutional arrangements for verifying compliance, sanction defection and reinforcing signals of mutual credibility. Alternatively, this result may also show that mediators are inadvertently backing peace processes that are based on asymmetric assurances and employing their good offices to keep the process from collapsing instead of facilitating bringing it to fruition. This was certainly the case with the 1993-2000 Oslo process and in Norway’s valiant effort to prevent the collapse of the 2002 ceasefire between the LTTE and the Sri Lankan government and get the parties to re-start actual negotiations on the core issues of the dispute.

To summarize, in each estimation, asymmetric assurances were counter-productive to fostering a credible commitment to peace. Terms that create asymmetries in parties’ exposure to risk or reassurance of reward appear to increase the likelihood of defection and stymie progress towards a sustainable settlement. Provisions that grant the government allowances to continue to take unilateral action in self-defense have the most dramatic impact on settlement durability. This is not surprising given that this exemption could easily translate into the government taking unilateral action against the challengers or in areas ostensibly under challengers control in the name of self-defense.
While the government can point to the agreement as a justification of their actions, they are nevertheless likely to heighten fears of exploitation on the part of the challengers and strain the overall credibility of the agreement.

Similarly, requiring the challengers to make sunk costs as a proof of credible commitment may bolster their credibility in the eyes of the government in the short run, but without a reciprocally binding second move, the temptation for delay may be too great to resist. Again, the result would be increased suspicion and reciprocal foot-dragging on by the challengers that further erode mutual confidence in the credibility of the process. Given that the process of settling armed self-determination conflicts through negotiations begins with a clear government advantage and, by extension, a greater level of risk in opening the door to even modest concessions to the challengers (Walter 2009), it is understandable why the government would insist on such measures as a condition of striking a bargain with their armed adversary. However, on the basis of the findings presented in this study, such measures do not bode well for the prospects of a durable settlement.

**Conclusion**

Overall, our findings are consistent with the conclusions reached by Walter (2002) more than a decade ago: offers of power sharing facilitate the signing of an agreement but are insufficient to support a durable transition to peace in the absence of third party security guarantees. However, what this study adds to the debate on the viability of self-enforcing peace agreements is why this may be the case. Offers of power-sharing may induce parties to sign an agreement, but if those offers are coupled with asymmetric assurances, commitment problems are liable to become worse and the implementation process fraught with distrust,
delay and mutual recriminations over alleged violations of what has been agreed upon. Ultimately, even the most promising peace agreement will collapse under the weight of such mistrust regardless of the support of external mediation.

The prevalence of asymmetric assurances in peace agreements reached in armed self-determination conflicts is a logical reflection of the nature of these conflicts, not in terms of identify but in terms of power-asymmetry and the relationship of self-determination claims to state sovereignty. The government parties in these disputes hold certain rights and privileges that do not accrue to the challengers; particularly around the use of force. Moreover, because in most cases, self-determination claims constitute a challenger by a territorially concentrated ethnic minority, the government must be careful that the process of settling the dispute does not undermine their authority to govern the majority. Thus, in anticipation of the high risks and uncertainties of the implementation process, the government may insist on certain stipulations as a condition of either making particular offers of power-sharing or accepting the challenger as a legitimate party to the negotiations. Asymmetric assurances reflect the government’s core concerns in the implementation process and an intent to protect those rights and privileges that are commensurate with their role as sovereign: will the challengers will cease their campaign of violence, will they be able to act in defense of their constituents or the boundaries of the state while control is being transferred to their erstwhile adversary and will they be able to mollify their own opposition by subjecting concessions to existing levers of governance?

Because the challengers are faced with a choice between accepting such conditions or leaving an offer of self-government, reform or autonomy on the table (Zartman and Rubin, 2002) they may accept despite reservations as to whether the government will credibly commit. However, in the absence of credible assurances, the process is unlikely to endure. Challenger’s will have difficulty sustaining their initial investment in curtailing violence if prom-
yses reforms are not delivered or are revised based on governing processes over which they exercise minimal influence. Moreover, government exercise of its right to defend itself and citizenry from threat may be perceived as an excuse to continue with repressive measures or police crackdowns (Darby 2005). This post settlement dynamic is well documented in studies of the implementation process and the difficulty of sustaining a transition from armed conflict to lasting peace. What our findings suggest is that the seeds of this security dilemma may actually be scripted into the very terms of settlement the parties negotiated and signed.

The results in this study also provide a critical piece of the puzzle regarding the mixed results of studies assessing the impact of advance offers of power sharing. What we have shown, is that in armed self-determination conflicts, there is a dark counter-part to power-sharing pacts that erodes the costly signal of intent the offers were made to create. This also informs why the violence after settlement collapse is often more intense than the round before (Toft, 2010). For offers these high cost offers to be made and then fail to result in a sustainable transition drains support from moderates and strengthens the hands of the rejectionists.

Ultimately, our findings suggest that successful settlements should include provisions to ensure reciprocity in risk and reward or, at least, impose mutually binding costs on defection that would support both parties in credibly committing to peace. Agreements that fail to include safeguards for the challengers after they lay down their arms are likely to suffer from commitment problems and get bogged down in a cycle of delay, mutual recriminations and increasing pressure to defect. Fortunately, there are models of settlement design that include means of incorporating reciprocity in risk and reward into the terms of settlement, even without reliance on external enforcement. Third party mediators can encourage the parties to include
concurrent concessions, such as the model in the 1998 Good Friday agreements where IRA decommissioning ran concomitant to the implementation of reforms in local governance and policing, or provisions that make future rewards contingent on compliance with the terms of settlement like the 2001 Bougainville Agreement. In addition, third party mediators should caution the parties against provisions like non-concurrent concessions that exacerbate uncertainties even if they would enable the swift culmination of a power-sharing agreement.
Appendix 1:

Sample of Status of Conflicts Five Years Post Last Agreement*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Government/ Separatist Group</th>
<th>Status</th>
<th>Outcome</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh/Chittagong</td>
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<td>Sustained Agreement</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Contested Agreement</td>
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<tr>
<td>India/Assam</td>
<td>Resumption of Hostilities</td>
<td>Active Conflict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India/Mizos</td>
<td>Implemented Agreement</td>
<td>Sustained Agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India/Naga</td>
<td>Talk/Fight</td>
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</tr>
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<td>Talk/Fight</td>
<td>Active Conflict</td>
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<td>Israel/Palestinians</td>
<td>Talk/Fight</td>
<td>Active Conflict</td>
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<td>Macedonia/Albania</td>
<td>Implementation In Progress</td>
<td>Sustained Agreement</td>
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<td>Mexico/Chiappas</td>
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<td>Sustained Agreement</td>
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<tr>
<td>Moldova/Transnistria</td>
<td>Implementation In Progress</td>
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<td>Myanmar/Mon</td>
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<td>Myanmar/Wa</td>
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<td>Mynnmar/Shan</td>
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<td>Active Conflict</td>
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<td>Northern Ireland (1994-1998)</td>
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<td>Northern Ireland (1969-1985)</td>
<td>Talk/Fight</td>
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<td>Papua New Guinea/Bougainville</td>
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<tr>
<td>Philippines/ Mindinao (1972-1976)</td>
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<td>Philippines/Mindinao (1977-1994)</td>
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<td>Philippines/MILF(1996-)</td>
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<td>Russia/Chechnya</td>
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<td>Active Conflict</td>
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<td>Senegal/ Casamance</td>
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<td>Serbia/Kosovo</td>
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<td>Spain/Basque</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sri Lanka/Tamil (1995-)</td>
<td>Talk/Fight</td>
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<td>Sudan/ South</td>
<td>Talk/Fight</td>
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<td>Tajikistan/United Tajik Opposition</td>
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<td>Western Sahara</td>
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</table>

*This table only includes the status of the conflict five years after the most recent agreement.
Appendix 2:

Sample: Armed Self-Determination Conflicts Contained or Settled by Agreement 1955-2004

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Status</th>
<th>Year(s)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom: Catholics</td>
<td>Bodos</td>
<td>Contested Agreement</td>
<td>2003</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bosnia: Croats</td>
<td>Mizos</td>
<td>Implemented agreement</td>
<td>1986</td>
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<td>Bosnia: Serbs</td>
<td>Sikhs</td>
<td>Contested agreement</td>
<td>1992</td>
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<td>Chad: Southerners</td>
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<tr>
<td>Macedonia: Albanians</td>
<td>Kachins</td>
<td>Uncontested agreement</td>
<td>1994</td>
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<tr>
<td>Moldova: Trans-Dniester Slavs</td>
<td>Mons</td>
<td>Contested agreement</td>
<td>1995</td>
</tr>
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<td>Serbia and Montenegro: Albanians</td>
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<td>Nicaragua: Indigenous Peoples</td>
<td>Rohingyas</td>
<td>Contested agreement</td>
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<td>Bangladesh: Chittagong Hill Peoples</td>
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<td>Wa</td>
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<td>1989</td>
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Source: Peace and Conflict 2005, Appendix Table 11.2 pp 84-90
References


BijaySankar Bora, "Peace Bid Runs into Wall." *Statesman (India),* September 25pNA.


