Sievement: Japan’s ‘Containment’ of China

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ABSTRACT

This paper hypothesizes that under the leadership of Prime Minister Shinzō Abe, Japan is pursuing a foreign policy with China which is a revised version of containment. Rather than 'contain' China, Japan is 'sieving' the elements of power coming out of China. ‘Sieve-ment’ seeks to promote bilateral economic relations with China to the point of dependency as a deterrent to outright war. Meanwhile, Tokyo is solidifying and expanding interpersonal, diplomatic, and security relations with states along China’s periphery in order to leverage regional hegemony from China and contain an expansion of its political power. The systemic methodology for geopolitical analysis is employed to measure distributions and trends in regional hegemonic power in peripheral states. Four peripheral states, the Philippines, Thailand, India, and Kazakhstan are analyzed as disciplined interpretative case studies, as these states represent sub-systemic linchpins with varying ethnicities, geographies, degrees of democracy, and diplomatic histories with China and Japan. Via synthesis, the resultant trend of power for Japan is revealed on a final systemic scale for each peripheral state, then the sum of all four. The empirical results indicate which regional power has stronger hegemony, trends in power, and fields where expansion of hegemony can be made.

KEY WORDS

Foreign Policy, Japan, China, Regional Hegemony, Containment, and Geopolitics

WORD COUNT

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In 2010 China surpassed Japan to become the second largest economy in the world, a position Japan had held for 40 years (The Economist 2010, 53a). It was the first Asian country to modernize, to reach economic development, and to stand on the world stage as an equal partner with the Western powers. Japan is a founding member of the G7, and remains the Asian member today. Indeed, China’s economy surpassing Japan’s is symbolic if anything, yet a tumultuous history between these two powers results in even symbolism carrying great significance.

Since the 1990s, Japan has constantly received encouragement from the U.S. to increase its involvement in security operations overseas (Leheny 2013, 143). Japan sent troops to Iraq and Afghanistan in non-combat support roles (Calder 2009, 137-8). Japan has also actively engaged in the operations to limit Somali piracy in the Arabian Sea (Hughes 2009, 853). Japan has taken modest steps to engage in collective security, yet any military operations raise questions about Article 9 in the Japanese Constitution. Article 9 states “the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes” (1947). Furthermore, “To accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained” (1947). To circumvent this clause, Japan’s ‘military’ is called the Self Defense Forces (SDF), and members are civilians. Debate exists in Japan whether Article 9 includes responding in collective security. Those on the right want to abolish Article 9, while those on the left maintain a strict interpretation of its
meaning. In July 2014, Prime Minister Shinzō Abe’s cabinet compromised these two positions (albeit, a right-leaning compromise) by adopting a resolution to ‘reinterpret’ Article 9, with Abe citing the “increasingly severe” security environment in the region (Slavin 2014).

Despite the longstanding rivalry between China and Japan, economic relations have continued to strengthen to become one of the strongest bilateral economic relationships in the world. In 2004, China replaced the United States as Japan’s largest trading partner (Blustein 2005, E1). Similarly, Japan is China’s second largest trading partner (JETRO 2014). Following decades of economic development, China is beginning to exercise hegemonic assertiveness in Asia (Hughes 2009, 837). Meanwhile, Abe has outlined a new vision for the role Japan will play in the region: “Japan no longer considers itself the ‘Far’ East; rather, we are at the very center of the Pacific Rim” (2014c).

China and Japan are the second and third largest economies in the world. They have the second and fifth largest military budgets, and this figure does not include the U.S. presence in Japan (Perlo-Freeman and Solmirano 2012). They have long considered themselves more than just regional hegemons, but the fountainheads of Asian society (Okakura 1904, 3; Huntington 1996, 234). When regional or ethnic disputes emerge in China, the State government utilizes

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1 Currently, the Sino-Japanese bilateral trade relationship is the fourth largest in the world by volume, and the largest of any two countries excluding the United States (WITS 2014).

2 Regional ‘hegemony’ is defined throughout this paper in accordance with the Greek ἥγεμονία, “leadership,” in terms of economics, development, security, information, and culture. It is not intended to be interpreted as the threat of force, military dominance, or in the Gramscian variation.
anti-Japanese fever to unify the populous (Kahn 2005, A6). While more justifiable in most cases, Japanese officials frequently call into question the quality and safety of Chinese imports which make their way onto the Japanese market (Cho and Park 2011, 278). Indeed, both states utilize distrust and animosity as political tools in domestic situations, but this rivalry between the two powers has now reached beyond the bounds of domestic politics, and even bilateral politics, as China appears to be rising into a regionally hegemonic role.

This paper advances a new concept which can be utilized to grasp a very important international relations problem: what happens when strong trading partners become hegemonic adversaries? Recent empirical evidence is analyzed in order to reconcile the apparent bipolarity of Japanese foreign policy with China, and test the degree to which the new concept contributed applies to a current situation in international relations. This paper analyzes Tokyo’s reaction to the emergence of China as a regional hegemon, and how the two are competing for that position, while maintaining strong bilateral economic relations.

A discussion of relevant theoretical literature follows, which is tied together by the theoretical framework introduced in this paper, sievement. The paper proceeds with a brief discussion of the methodology employed, then the results of four case studies are presented and synthesized. The paper concludes with speculation on the applicability of sievement in other contexts, and areas for further research on the topic.
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

More than any other state, Japan has the capability to hinder the expansion of Beijing’s hegemony in Asia, and meanwhile solidify its own regional hegemony through a policy which is essentially a revision of Cold War-era containment. While George F. Kennan’s containment policy was based on the 1904 Heartland Thesis by Sir Halford Mackinder and the 1944 Rimland revision by Nicolas Spykman, it involved the containment of expansionism through the economic aid and defense of allies (Gray 2004, 9). Through time and application in varying contexts, the term evolved to including an economic stranglehold and enclosure of political and military power. The containment policy would be achieved through economic and defense cooperation among the allies (Gerace 1991, 359).

Economic constraint was a key factor to Mackinder’s Heartland Thesis and Spykman’s Rimlands revision, yet Kennan’s Containment Policy contains no instruction on trade relations or embargos (Hatcher 1990, 194). Trade between the West and the Soviet Union was negligible at the time and not a significant sanctioning tool, like it is today. Nevertheless, economic constraints were soon tied to Washington’s Soviet Policy, via 1940s acts “aimed at restraining Soviet military power by inhibiting the USSR’s overall economic growth” (Montgomery 1990, 39). In 1979, such acts were codified in the Export Administration Act (EAA). The EAA controlled U.S. exports to the Soviet Union to “protect our national security” and “further
significantly the foreign policy of the United States” (Montgomery 1990, 39). The President can “restrict the export of goods and technology which would make a significant contribution to the military potential of any other country or combination of countries which would prove detrimental to the U.S.” (Montgomery 1990, 39). This illustrates the linking of economic policy with the diplomatic policy of containment in American foreign policy, emerging at a time when the U.S.’s global hegemony was waning.

The Coordinating Committee on Multilateral Export Controls (CoCom) was an expansion of EAA to all the NATO allies, plus Japan and Australia. While CoCom was never codified as a treaty or charter, the United States encouraged strengthening the agreement and served as the largest contributor both financially and diplomatically (Mastanduno 1990, 75). CoCom was a strategic embargo, but the member states could never completely agree on the degree to which trade embargos would be implemented to the Soviet Union (Mastanduno 1992, 13). The United States usually took the most hard-lined approach in CoCom, at times pushing CoCom members to practice economic warfare. Economic warfare differs from strategic embargo in that it is “aimed to weaken the military capabilities of a target state by weakening that state’s economy” (Mastanduno 1992, 13). More than the strategic embargo which was judged appropriate by most Western allies, economic warfare was the “logical economic counterpart to the more confrontational political and military strategy of containment”
There is a deep intellectual history to the theoretical concept of trade acting as a deterrent to conflict. Montesquieu wrote that “the natural effect of commerce is to lead to peace. Two nations that trade together become mutually dependent if one has an interest in buying, the other has one in selling; and all unions are based on mutual needs” (Hirschman 1977, 80). Kant clearly agreed: “The commercial spirit cannot co-exist with war, and sooner or later takes possession or every nation” (1917: 157). In 1909 Norman Angell put forth the idea that economic activity leads to peace between states in his book *The Great Illusion* (1909). While Angell’s idea was ridiculed by E.H. Carr in *The Twenty Years’ Crisis* (1939), the idea has resurfaced on several occasions and been revised in the form of ‘commercial liberalism.’ In 1939, Eugene Staley elaborated upon commercial liberalism, stating that if “large, important countries controlling substantial portions of the world’s resources refuse to carry on economic relations with the rest of the world, they sow the seeds of unrest and war” (1939: 103). Reevaluating Staley’s work from a different angel, Robert Keohane concluded Staley’s theory was otherwise stating “commerce on a nondiscriminatory basis within an orderly political framework promotes cooperation on the basis of enlightened national conceptions of self-interest that emphasize production over war” (2002: 49).

In 1993, Arthur Stein provided a theoretical sub-category of commercial liberalism
called “binding commercial liberalism” (1993: 253). As summarized by Pevehouse,

Open trade encourages specialization in the production of goods and services, rendering private traders and consumers dependent on foreign markets. These actors have an incentive to avoid wars with key trading partners, since disruptions in commercial relations would be costly. Governments, which have reason to respond to demands made by key constituents and to enhance a country’s economic performance, face similar incentives (2004: 249).

The results of Pevehouse’s rigorous methodology show that while the effect of economic interdependence on political relations is inconclusive, “trade may not have a strong influence on the prospects for cooperative political relations,” which is congruent with the commercial liberal argument (2004: 263).

In 2009, self-declared ‘symbiotic realist’ Nayef Al-Rodhan wrote “When states have a high dependency on trade and foreign investment, conquest or expansion by force is no longer a lucrative way for states…to increase their economic might due to the broad dispersal of the value chain of modern production” (2009: 40). He continued “A state engaged in military conquest will suffer economic setbacks, as their actions might provoke an international embargo and will certainly discourage foreign direct investment” (2009: 40).

In this brief review of the literature, two primary theories are presented, each representing differing schools of thought; containment and commercial liberalism. Sievement combines elements of both theoretical approaches, and can describe the China policy actively being developed in Tokyo. Applying geopolitical security realities of East Asia, the rise of China
is disturbing existing security complexes in the region. According to Barry Buzan, “A distinctive territorial pattern of security interdependence must exist that marks off the members of a security complex from other neighboring states” (1998: 14). In the same paragraph, Buzan points out among its neighbors, “China [is] looming as an intervening great power” (1998: 14). Buzan envisions the possibility of East Asia moving towards a “balance-of-power regional system,” where “habits of cooperation are weak; historical memories are long, active, and mostly negative; and apart from ASEAN, regional institutions are remarkably underdeveloped” (1998: 66). While Buzan points out the potential for expanded securitization in the region, he also emphasizes

[all that stands against such a process are strong domestic resistance to it in Japan (which ironically could increase the threat others perceive from China), a few rather feeble-looking transregional institutions, and a shared interest in maintaining the momentum of economic development” (1998: 66).

Written nearly two decades ago, Buzan’s analysis is uncannily accurate in light of current developments in the region.

Setting aside economics, it is clear that Japan is not only maintaining a push for regional hegemony in East Asia, but increasingly formulating a strategy to do so under Prime Minister Abe and the Liberal Democratic Party (Carpenter 2013). In June 2014 Abe wrote, “Japan is in a better position than ever before to play a larger and more proactive role in ensuring peace in Asia and the world. We enjoy the explicit and enthusiastic support of our allies and other friend
countries, including every ASEAN member country” (2014b). In order to maintain, strengthen, and expand a regional hegemony in Asia, Japan must pursue a containment policy which traps the possibility of China expanding its influence in the region, while maintaining the strong bilateral trade relationship (Carpenter 2013). Rather than a Cold War-era containment strategy, broadly defined as “an ongoing effort to maintain a quiet stranglehold on the Soviet economy…and its influence abroad” (Keller 2010), Japan is pursuing a sievement strategy, thus sieving out the economic trade from China, while containing the political influence. In the case of Japan’s policy with China, a ‘stranglehold on the economy’ is not only futile, but counterproductive.

In sievement, economic relations are not only permitted, they are encouraged strategically. In this sense, sievement vastly contrasts with containment. The framework of sievement is based on the assumption that a state’s economic interdependency will serve as a deterrent to outright war with another state. An asymmetrical power struggle can emerge, whereby the stronger state is paralyzed by its economic interdependencies, and a weaker state can meanwhile strengthen its diplomatic, political, military, and economic alliances along the stronger state’s periphery. What is necessary, though, is an extremely high degree of interdependence, such as transnational “horizontal network structures” (Robinson 2004, 19). Bilateral interdependency today is much different qualitatively than when Keohane theorized it
before. There is now a vast amount of functional integration in the production of good and services multi-nationally. Robinson calls the process “transnationalization,” in contrast to internationalization or globalization (2004: 14). Components for transnational corporations are produced in one country, and assembled in the other (then, perhaps sold in the country of origin). Many Japanese companies export equipment and components such as “electronic equipment, machinery, medical and technical equipment, [and] vehicles” to their factories in China, which contributes considerably to China’s industrial development (West 2014). It was estimated that more than half of the parts and components used in the iPhone 5 were made by Japanese manufacturers, yet assembled in southern China (West 2014). Japan has roughly 23,000 companies operating in China, employing over 10,000 Chinese workers (West 2014).

Beyond the transnational nature of the bilateral economic relationship is the know-how being transmitted; “Japan…possesses special expertise in technologies that China badly needs for its future development, such as energy efficiency and other eco-friendly know-how that could help China contend with the environmental damage” (Schuman 2013). To gain this knowledge, the number of Chinese students in Japanese universities has dramatically increased over the last decade. To offset the natural population decline in Japan and maintain operation, Japanese universities have invited more international students. In 2013 there were approximately 136,000 international students in Japanese universities, with 60 percent of this total coming from China
Chinese authorities are dependent on this knowledge in order to cope with the side-effects of rapid industrial development, which in Asia only Japan has experienced and in many regards overcome, and can provide assistance in a similar regional-cultural context.3

While Pevehouse’s findings may appear to counter sievement, they in fact do not because Pevehouse’s research does not differentiate the aforementioned qualitative characteristics which define Sino-Japanese economic relations and a new version of economic interdependence. China’s foreign import purchases match nearly a quarter of its GDP, and Japan exports more to China than any other state at nearly a tenth of the total (OECD 2011 and WITS 2012). Contrast that with Japan, where foreign import purchases make up only 12.3 percent of its GDP (OECD 2011). China’s percentage is substantially high for a non-EU country with such a sizable economy. Similarly, China’s foreign exports are 26.7 percent of its GDP (OECD 2011). Japan’s are 12.6 percent (OECD 2011). Japan can maintain China’s dependency on Japanese exports4 to deter military confrontation while containing political, diplomatic, and military expansion by strengthening its alliances along China’s periphery. China is thus constrained by the economic

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3 Taiwanese engineers, scientists, and managers have also made a noteworthy and significant contribution in mainland China.
4 To further complicate this interdependence, a significant portion of Japanese imports to China is parts for products to be exported by China as white label OEM. This works to Tokyo’s advantage, but due to increasing wages for Chinese blue-collar workers, corporations have already started to relocate assembly work to Vietnam, Bangladesh, and Indonesia (Zeng and Fang 2014, 1021-22). On one hand some observers are claiming this is evidence that China will fall into a 'middle-income trap' (Zeng and Fang 2014, 1015). Yet strategically, Tokyo must address a foreseeable decrease in component exports to China, as a significant element to bilateral trade.
interdependence while Japan has the opportunity to maneuver to strengthen and expand alliances in Asia. In the long-term, this is the only way Japan can develop a regional hegemony, ensure the freedom of its vital shipping lanes through Southeast Asia, and safeguard itself from falling into the Sinitic sphere of influence, something Japan has been able to avoid for millennia.

Examining current events in Sino-Japanese relations, and Japan’s foreign relations with Southeast, South, and Central Asian states, a hypothesis is offered that the current Japanese foreign policy can be described by the neologism, ‘sievement,’ a theoretical concept which entails the containment of a state’s political and military power, while ‘sieving’ out economic relations to the point of dependency as a deterrent to outright war. Sievement cannot be universally applied. Its success is based on a list of assumptions. Firstly, Japan has to maintain its favorable status above China in the significant peripheral states. By ‘significant peripheral states,’ this includes Taiwan, all ten ASEAN member states, Bangladesh, Nepal, India, Mongolia, and as an extension, the five former-Soviet Central Asian republics. To date, Beijing’s attempts to exert political and military power in and near these states have largely resulted in suspicion and confrontation. The territorial disputes in the South China Sea, distrust of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) among overseas Chinese populations, and longstanding disputes between China and India have helped make sievement a viable option for Japan.

[Figure 1 about here]
Japan has been able to build its favorable status among these states by providing a model for *modernization without Westernization* in Asia. Additionally, generous aid donations and the efforts of an official development assistance agency called Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) have focused efforts in these states, and have not gone unnoticed. Lastly, while not all peripheral states are stable democracies, there is the possibility for a shared ideological basis for an alliance which counters the Chinese single-party state, yet is also distinct from the Western-style democracies as well. These favorable relations for Tokyo are a necessity in order to carry out a sievement policy.

Additionally, mention should be made of the U.S.’s role, and its 2012 ‘pivot’ to Asia. In the last two years, the U.S. State Department and Defense Department has done little to no action which indicates the “pivot” has begun. Within the State Department, the entire Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs was allowed only eight percent of the 2015 budget – the second least of the six regional bureaus (Mead 2014). Moreover, funding for the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs has continuously dropped since 2011 (Mead 2014). Granted unforeseen international events in the Ukraine and Iraq in 2014 are partly to blame for the delay in the Pivot to Asia, but in the meantime the U.S. is likely to rely on Japan as a ‘proxy’ to establish order, favorable to Japanese and American interests in Asia. To date, the U.S. has consistently encouraged Japan to pursue a more aggressive foreign policy in the post-Cold War era (Packard
While Japan has been slow to do so, Abe’s foreign policy along with his cabinet’s reinterpretation of Constitution Article 9 to permit the right of collective security has increased the reliability of Tokyo in the eyes of a preoccupied Washington. Sievement is not only in line with the U.S.’s pivot towards Asia, but it is more viable in succeeding due to Japan’s proximity, Asian cultural ties, and the vested interest Japan has in the freedom of its shipping lanes.

**RESEARCH OBJECTIVE**

This paper will research the question; *what is Japan doing to counter China’s expanding power, and solidify, increase, and extend its regional hegemony in Asia?* It is hypothesized that sievement is the policy Japan is pursuing in order to leverage regional hegemony from China. Sievement was illustrated by the statement made by Chinese, Japanese, and South Korean finance ministers at the September 2014 G20 Summit, in which they agreed to “work together to ensure that geopolitical tensions will not threaten the region’s economic recovery” (Kihara 2014). Sievement differs from containment in that economic trade is largely not being constrained or overlooked; rather, it is encouraged as a deterrent to war. In contrast to commercial liberalism, in sievement economic trade does not lead to cooperation; rather, it neutralizes the actors from engaging directly in warfare when there is a *qualitatively* deep transnational interdependency.

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5 A notable exception would be the ongoing rare earth fracas. Tokyo has been able to strategically diversify its rare earths sources after Beijing began restricting exports in 2009, including rare earths from India, Kazakhstan (discussed later in this paper), and below the seabed in the Pacific (Paul and Obayashi 2014).
China can confront Japan at sea, as it has in the last four years, yet China’s economic dependency on Japan will prevent full military action (Strategic Comments 2013, x). Meanwhile, Japan is solidifying and expanding political and security relations with states along China’s periphery.

Sievement is the theoretical marriage of traditional realism and Stein’s (1993) binding commercial liberalism. Mutual benefit from economic trade is a neoliberal argument, but in sievement, the dependency on trade is a strategic defensive tool to constrain China from acting militarily. Sievement does, however, fall shy of aiming to topple the Communist leadership in Beijing, and therefore is more aligned with the balance of power theory. In fact, the existence and distrust of Beijing’s single-party Communist government among neighbors plays into the Japanese hands. Sievement is a realist theory in terms of viewing powers as competitors, but it falls short of any competitive strategy which seeks the demise of the Beijing government. Rather, it is a policy to contain China’s political power, and ensure a regional hegemony in Asia.

CONTRIBUTION TO SURVEYED CORPUS

In November 2013 Yuichi Hosoya described Japan’s current policy in Asia as two disjointed policies (2014: 154). The first policy is the East Asian Community (EAC), which is an ‘interest-oriented’ form of diplomacy, and was articulated by Prime Minister Junichirō Koizumi in 2002. The plan would emphasize cooperation with countries sharing the values of freedom and
democracy with Japan, yet China would be included. The second is the Arc of Freedom and Prosperity, which is a ‘value-oriented’ form of diplomacy. The Arc of Freedom and Prosperity was designed by Foreign Minister (and later Prime Minister) Tarō Asō in 2006, to strengthen cooperation based on shared values. Asō called it an “additional pillar” to Japanese diplomacy; “there are the successfully budding democracies that line the outer rim of the Eurasian continent, forming an Arc” (Hosoya 2014, 149).

The Arc of Freedom and Prosperity can be identified as the first value-oriented diplomacy elaborated by Japan in the post-War era. While there are similarities between EAC and the Arc of Freedom and Prosperity, a key difference is that EAC included China, encouraging all Asian states to “act together and advance together” (Hosoya 2014, 150). Hosoya notes the two strategies “are not necessarily contradictory,” but he stopped short of reconciling the two strategies with the current policy under Prime Minister Abe (2014: 147). Sievement is the reconciliation of these two policies and can serve as a substantial conclusion from Hosoya’s observations.

This paper will contribute a theoretical explanation for the Abe administration’s Asia policy, which is chiefly characterized by its struggle for regional hegemony with a rising China. Beyond historical rivalries and symbolism, for Japan regional hegemony is a necessity⁶. Nearly

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⁶ Most certainly, an argument can be made that regional hegemony is ‘a necessity’ for China, too.
90 percent of Japan’s oil imports come through the Straits of Malacca, from the Middle East or Africa (Burrett 2014, 164). Given the debate over the use of nuclear power in Japan since the 11 March 2011 disasters, Japan has already become even more reliant on crude oil and natural gas imports than before. From 2011 to 2012, crude oil imports rose 2.7 percent while liquefied natural gas skyrocketed 12.2 percent (Burrett 2014, 164). Beyond energy imports, the shipping lanes through the South China Sea and the Straits of Malacca are essential for Japanese imports of other commodities, and exports to South Asia and European markets. Given this geopolitical situation, for Japan regional hegemony is equivalent to ensuring its own survival. What complicates this matter even further is that China is also greatly dependent on the same sea lanes.

METHODOLOGY

In order to isolate the levels for analysis to identify the distributions of power and maximize clarity in results, Ioannis Mazis’s “systemic methodology for geopolitical analysis” will be employed (2008: 53). Mazis’s methodology is a qualitative analysis beneficial toward grasping distributions, interactions, and trends in power. Levels of analysis will intentionally vary from political leadership to grassroots levels in order to attempt a thorough and sweeping analysis in a given sub-system.

The expansion of regional hegemony necessitates analysis of the powers’ relations with
neighboring states. Therefore, the scope\textsuperscript{7} of this project will include Japan, China, and the states around China’s periphery. The peripheral states are essential to the system as they are the points where conflicts for regional hegemony take place. Meanwhile, the two powers are also significant systems of research, yet for different reasons; here, the bilateral economic relations are a crucial element to sievement. The sub-system of analysis constitutes the individual states peripheral to China. The supra-system involves outside players; the US, the EU, Russia, the UN Security Council, BRICS, SCO, ASEAN, and any other outside powers or international organizations which have the potential to impact, or be impacted by sievement.

With the system scales defined, fields under study within the system will be the four pillars of power: defense, economy, politics, and culture (Mazis 2008, 57). Each of these pillars will be examined in four selected case studies of peripheral states: the Philippines, Thailand, India, and Kazakhstan. These cases are selected as disciplined interpretive case studies, because for various reasons, these four states are intrinsically significant. Of course, thorough analyses of all peripheral states are possible, but excessive for the scope of this paper. The four states selected as case studies represent sub-regional linchpins with varying ethnicities, religions, geographies, and degrees of democracy.

Within each of these states, operating as analytical sub-systems, trends of the four pillars

\textsuperscript{7} Mazis uses the term “system of analysis” for “scope.”
will be determined for both Japan and China. From these trends, a zero to positive sub-systemic component trend of power will be revealed for each Japan and China. Through synthesis, the resultant trend of power for both Japan and China will be revealed on a final systemic scale for all four case study states. Through this analysis and comparison of the two powers, the effect of sievement as a push for power within the system will be understood.

ANALYSIS

There is a wide variance in what may constitute the peripheral states which could align with Japan in order to contain the expansion of Beijing’s political and military power, but in particular, Japan has the potential to exercise regional hegemony over the ASEAN states, Taiwan, and Mongolia, based on strong cultural and interpersonal relations. With regards to the South Asian states, the alliance would probably be viewed as a partnership with India, which is undoubtedly the regional hegemon. In Central Asia, Japan is a minor player in the ‘Great Game’ of the twenty-first century, together with other powers including China. This is an area with the potential for expansion of alliance, and will be examined as such.

Notably absent from this list are Russia, South Korea, and Pakistan. These three states have the potential to be part of Japan’s alliance to counter China, but the current outlook that any of these states would align with Japan rather than China is bleak. While much diplomatic progress in Russo-Japanese relations has been made in the post-Soviet era, the southern Kurile
Islands dispute remains a significant point of contention between the two powers, which still have not signed a peace treaty officially ending World War II (Burrett 2014, 161). Additionally, Russia’s military actions in Chechnya, Ossetia, and Crimea in the last decade have resulted in a strong distrust among the Japanese, who find Russia to be unstable and unattractive for business. Lastly, the strengthening of Sino-Russian relations with a border delineation agreement, the creation of SCO and BRICS, and the 2014 natural gas pipeline deal have essentially solidified Moscow’s alliances in Asia. Russia is currently not making any effort to counter China’s expansion of power, though this could change in the future (Sutter 2012, 277). Moreover, Russia is a regional hegemon in its own right, and will not adhere to a Japan-led alliance, or allow Siberia or the Russian Pacific to be considered within Japan’s ‘sphere of influence.’

South Korea is certainly closer with Japan politically, economically, and culturally, but relations remain strained due to Japan’s lack of admission to, and compensation for wartime forced prostitution of Korean women, and the ongoing Liancourt Rocks (“Dokdo” in Korean, “Takeshima” in Japanese) dispute in the Sea of Japan. Despite these issues, the geopolitical reality of the Korean Peninsula dictates that for a sievement policy, South Korea is mostly insignificant. The Korean Peninsula lacks the natural resources or waters used for shipping resources to Japan. The peninsula is insulated by China on one side, and the Japanese archipelago on the other, thus not particularly contributing to the confinement of China by Japan.
and its allies.

It would be practically impossible at this time for Japan to interfere with the strong relations between China and Pakistan, which have their roots in the Sino-Indian War of 1962. The low-point in Pakistani-Japanese relations was in 1998 when Pakistan conducted the Chagai-I underground nuclear tests. Of all states Japan imposed the harshest sanctions, recalled its Ambassador from Pakistan, and suspended all of its foreign aid (the most of any foreign government); a clear illustration of the values-based diplomatic position Japan takes with regards to nuclear proliferation (Pattanaik 2008, 886). While relations between Pakistan and Japan today are cordial and Japan is again a significant source of foreign aid for Pakistan, disbursing $6.7 billion from 2008 to 2012, the need to counter Indian power in South Asia necessitates Pakistan and China to remain close (MOFA 2014). Nevertheless, any turn in Sino-Pakistani relations could create an opportunity for Japan to act and build a regional hegemony in Pakistan.

Sub-system Case Study 1: the Philippines

The Philippines have a geo-strategically significant locale, as a link between the Pacific Ocean and Southeast Asia, and contain vast marine territory containing significant shipping lanes. With a population of 100 million and a rapidly growing economy, it is an important member to ASEAN and link to the Southeast Asian economy. The Philippines also has the largest Catholic population of any state in Asia. This can contribute to a distrust of the Chinese Communist Party,
as the Roman Catholic Church has consistently been one of its strongest critics (*The Economist* 2011, 40).

Looking at the first of the four pillars of power, defense, Japan-Philippines defense relations have certainly flourished, particularly over the last couple of years, in part reacting to Beijing’s aggressive claims to territories in the South China Sea (Sutter and Chin-Hao 2011, 1; Cruz De Castro 2013, 163). Tokyo has responded by deploying its Self-Defense Force to conduct joint maritime security exercises with the Philippines (Cruz De Castro 2013, 159). The Japanese Self-Defense Force has additionally offered, and was accepted by Manila to patrol Philippine waters and provide communication equipment and technical assistance for the Philippine Coast Guard (Cruz De Castro 2013, 160). Japan’s security relationship with the Philippines is strong, as the latter relies on the former for support to balance China’s emerging power and aggressiveness. Both countries are key allies of the US, but grasp similarities in their geopolitical realities which have created mutual interest (Cruz De Castro 2014, 163). Due to the maritime territorial conflicts in the South China Sea, “the littoral Southeast Asian states slowly gravitate toward Japan on account of their apprehension over China’s assertiveness in expanding its maritime domain” (Cruz De Castro 2014, 165). In 2012, Tokyo agreed to provide Manila with ten new patrol vessels, worth $11 million each, which will more than double the current fleet of the Philippines Coast Guard (International Business Times 2012; Esplanada 2014). In June 2014, Prime Minister
Abe wrote, “Japan will offer its utmost support for efforts by ASEAN member countries to ensure the security and free navigation of the seas and skies” (2014a).

Looking at the second pillar of power, economic, Japan is the Philippines’ largest trading partner, with over $17 billion traded in 2012, and increasing (WITS 2012). China is the Philippines’ third largest trade partner, with just over $13 billion traded in 2012 (WITS 2012). An additional indicator of economic influence in the Philippines was the aid donations provided after Typhoon Haiyan in November 2013. While China initially donated $100,000, then raised the total to $1.6 million, Tokyo initially donated $10 million, then after noting Beijing’s modest donation, raised its total to $30 million in emergency grant aid (Agence France-Presse 2013).

Examining the third pillar of power, political influence, Japan and the Philippines share similar ideological interests as democracies. Manila has expressed its support for Tokyo’s participation in regional collective security, while Japan has taken an active diplomatic role in seeking a peaceful resolution to the separatist movement in the Philippines’ Muslim-majority region in southwest Mindanao (Cesar 2013). Tokyo has created the Japan-Bangsamoro Initiatives for Reconstruction and Development (J-BIRD) and has provided $136 million in socio-economic infrastructure in the region with the intention of maintaining peace (Cesar 2013). In his visit to the Philippines in July 2013, Japanese Prime Minister Abe made clear Japan’s commitment to “strengthening assistance for the Mindanao Peace Process” (MOFA 2014).
The Japan International Cooperative Agency (JICA) is an independent governmental agency which coordinates official development assistance (ODA) for the government. Similar to the Peace Corps in the United States, JICA dispatches volunteers to developing nations around the world, called Japan Overseas Cooperation Volunteers (JOCV). To date, more JOCVs have been dispatched to the Philippines than any other Asian country (JICA 2014). Moreover, with 44 JOCVs currently dispatched to the Philippines, it is the second-largest contingent at present in any Asian country (JICA 2014). Near 14 percent of all JOCV dispatches in Asia have been to the Philippines (JICA 2014).

The fourth pillar of geopolitical power, cultural power, reveals a wealth of interpersonal relations. There are registered over 200,000 Filipinos living in Japan in 2013, and over 12,000 Filipinos living in mainland China8 (Kalatas 2011). There are nearly 29,000 Chinese citizens residing in the Philippines and nearly 12,000 Japanese citizens (PSA 2012).

Out of 11 countries, 31 percent of surveyed Filipinos identified Japan as the most reliable ally (second highest to U.S.) (Lui and Cheung 2014). In the same survey, only two percent identified China (Lui and Cheung 2014). Seventy-six percent of Filipinos identified Japan as an “important partner” for ASEAN today, while 32 percent indicated China was an

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8 It is worth noting that in Hong Kong there are nearly 169,000 Filipinos, more than fourteen times the number of Filipinos on the mainland (GovHK 2014). This number is excluded from the China total due to separate immigration procedures and administration.
“important partner” today (Lui and Cheung 2014). Regarding future relations, 64 percent said Japan will be an “important partner” while 25 percent indicated China will be (Lui and Cheung 2014). China operates three Confucius Institutes on university campuses in the Philippines while Japan has a Japan Foundation center in Manila (Confucius Institute 2014; Japan Foundation 2014).

It is increasingly clear that “Manila…is poised to play a vital role in Tokyo’s nascent strategic realignment” (Cesar 2013). Despite some minor contrary indicators, the case is overwhelmingly clear that Japan has a hegemonic advantage over China in the Philippines. While Japan is not predominantly a Catholic nation like the Philippines, some prominent politicians such as current Deputy Prime Minister Tarō Asō are Catholics and can take advantage of an ideologically-based anti-Communist stance which would solidify the bilateral alliance more so, and create more distance between China and the Philippines (Reynolds 2008).

[Table 1 about here]

Sub-system Case Study 2: Thailand

Thailand represents an interesting case study because the country serves as a regional linchpin in the Indochinese economy, it has a sizable and politically powerful ethnic-Chinese populace, and yet it lacks maritime significance. It has been noted that in general the peninsular
Indochina states in ASEAN are less inclined to align against China than the island states, such as the Philippines, due to the maritime territory disputes with China in the South China Sea (Cruz De Castro 2014, 165). This creates the possibility for a rift within ASEAN if these alliances are solidified in the future.

In 2012, Chinese Defense Minister met with Thai Army Commander-in-Chief, expressing views to develop military cooperation between the two countries in order to “strengthen bilateral ties between the two armies” (BBC Monitoring 2012). While nothing substantive has come from this agreement, the following year the vice chairman of China’s Central Military Commission reiterated Beijing’s intentions to strengthen military cooperation with Thailand; “China is willing to join hands with Thailand to deepen the friendly cooperation between their military forces and contribute to regional peace and prosperity” (BBC Monitoring 2013). Meanwhile, Japan has also shown interest in military cooperation with Thailand. In 2010 Thai and Japanese defense ministers pledged to strengthen military relations (Kyodo 2010). In 2012, Thai military trained together with U.S. military and Japanese SDF on evacuation drills (BBC Monitoring 2012). Insignificant in itself, it illustrates that more collaboration has been achieved by Japan than China with the Thai military, yet progress towards defense collaboration has not occurred with either power.

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Vietnam is a noteworthy exception.
Economically, Sino-Thai trade relations are strong at $64 billion, making China Thailand’s second largest trade partner, and occupying 13 percent of Thailand’s total trade (WITS 2012). Japan maintains stronger trade relations with Thailand, with $73 billion in bilateral trade, making 15 percent of total trade (WITS 2012). Through President Thaksin Shinawatra’s business-driven economic model, trade relations with both China and Japan have flourished under his and his sister, Yingluck’s administrations (Fei 2012, 4). Both China and Japan have bilaterally negotiated free-trade agreements with Thailand (Fei 2012, 4). Meanwhile, Japanese corporations continue to locate factories in Thailand (*The Economist* 2013, 44). Honda expects to build nearly half a million cars a year in Thailand by 2015 (*The Economist* 2013, 44). Thailand has become known as the “Detroit of Asia” due to its role as a manufacturing center for Japanese automakers in Southeast Asia (Roberts 2011).

After the devastating monsoon flooding across Thailand in 2011, Japan pledged $10 million while China offered $7.3 million in total relief aid and materials (States News Service 2011; Xinhua 2011). Japan’s pledge came six months after Japan, itself, experienced the most expensive natural disaster in world history, costing $235 billion in damages (Kim 2011).

Political alliances with Thailand have been difficult due to the ongoing cycle of government corruption, followed by military juntas, with which neither Beijing nor Tokyo want to associate. While symbolic, Japan and Thailand do share deeply institutionalized constitutional
monarchies, but Thailand’s political system is too fragile for an ideologically based alliance.

Meanwhile, Chinese ethnic ties between Thai Chinese and their ethnic homeland are weak, as the assimilation of the Chinese population in Thailand has been relatively successful (Murphy 2010, 15). Thai Chinese, who used to be discriminated as “pariah entrepreneurs,” are today considered the “privileged Thai” (Murphy 2010, 15). While there remains a distinction in the social class, discrimination and suspicion has decreased. There is little reason to believe Thai Chinese would accept a pan-Sinic alliance with PRC at the core.

One example of China extending cultural power in Thailand is the Confucius Institutes, Beijing’s primary international cultural promotion organization. Beijing has placed 23 Confucius Institutes in Thailand, more than any other country (Confucius Institute 2014). Japan’s counter organization, the Japan Foundation, is a more modest operation, typically placing one center per country (Japan Foundation 2014). There is one located in Bangkok (Japan Foundation 2014).

Despite ethnic ties and soft power efforts by China, Japan seems to maintain greater cultural hegemony among Thais. Out of 11 countries, eight percent of surveyed Thai identified China as the most reliable ally (Lui and Cheung 2014). In the same survey, 35 percent identified Japan as the most reliable ally – the highest in the survey (Lui and Cheung 2014). Sixty percent of Thai identified China as an “important partner” for ASEAN at present, while 74 percent identified Japan as an “important partner” for ASEAN at present (Lui and Cheung 2014). In
regards to the future, 56 percent identified China while 68 percent identified Japan, again, the highest in the survey (Lui and Cheung 2014). There are currently 32 JOCVs in Thailand – the third-highest number in dispatches to Asia, though there has been a recent surge in the number of JOCVs in Thailand when compared to dispatches in the past (JICA 2014).

While little progress has been made by China or Japan in the field of defense, it is clear both powers have the intention to collaborate with Thailand, and will continue to compete for a more exclusive hegemony. Both countries show strong economic ties with Thailand, with Japan edging out China in this field. Political alliance has been difficult for both powers, as coups have thwarted such efforts. Nevertheless, civil society is an active agent in Thailand, and can serve as an area where inroads can be made (Albritton and Bureekul 2002, 5). While China has more ethnic ties to Thailand, most view Japan as a more significant and trustworthy regional power.

[Table 2 about here]

*Sub-system Case Study 3: India*

Relations between China and India were particularly strained since the border war in 1962. During the Cold War China built an alliance with Indian-rival Pakistan while India moved closer to the Soviet Union. Since then, Sino-Indian relations could be described as “limited cooperation” (Sutter 2003, 116). The greatest issues between the two states are trilateral relations with Pakistan and ongoing border skirmishes. Both China and India have agreed to settle the
border dispute peacefully, though India has complained that Chinese troops have ventured into the disputed zone (States News Service 2013). Both are members of BRICS and have increased dialogue through the organization.

Indo-Japanese relations have progressed rapidly in recent years. Since April 2007, both countries frequently hold joint military exercises together with the U.S. Navy (Chellaney 2008). In January 2014 Prime Minister Abe negotiated the sale of Japanese-made amphibious aircraft to India (Mahr 2014). In 2008, India and Japan affirmed their defense commitment in a Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation. The document outlined among other items, a common interest in “the safety of sea lines of communications” (MOFA 2008).

India’s trade relations with both China and Japan are strong. Bilateral trade with China totals $68.8 billion, making up nearly nine percent of India’s total trade and making China India’s largest trading partner. Indo-Japanese trade totals $18.8 billion, or 2.5 percent of India’s total trade. While significantly less than China, Japan is one of the top sources of foreign direct investment in India, investing $16.6 billion since 2000 (DIPP 2014). In the same period, China has invested $410 million in India (DIPP 2014). Additionally, Japan has been one of the greatest sources of direct foreign aid to India, providing $796 million in 2011 (MOFA 2012).

In 1998 Japan responded strongly to India’s 1998 Pokhran-II nuclear weapons test, “leading international condemnation” with sanctions and the suspension of all political
exchanges and the cutting off of economic assistance (Brewster 2010, 112). Since this low point, political relations have considerably strengthened between New Delhi and Tokyo. In 2013, Japan’s Emperor and Empress visited India for the first time (Sharma 2014). One month later Prime Minister Abe visited, joining as guest of honor at the Republic Day parade in New Delhi (Mahr 2014). Abe has described Indo-Japanese relations as the “confluence of the two seas,” quoting Mughal prince Dara Shikoh in 1655 (Sharma 2013). Abe has been called an “Indophile,” and had indicated he is willing to overlook differences with India on nuclear weapons in order to cooperate on civilian nuclear energy (Panda 2014).

Political relations between China and India have warmed considerably since the 1990s. Both states are members of BRICS, which has facilitated dialogue between the leaders. Several potential issues remain which can frustrate the warming of relations. Firstly, China has shown a lukewarm response to India’s bid to become a permanent member of the UN Security Council (Sutter 2012, 242). Secondly, India continues to host the Tibetan Government and Dalai Lama in exile. Last is the forming of a potential military alliance among India, Japan, the U.S., and Australia.

Interestingly, only five percent of Indians surveyed identified China as India’s “most significant partner” (Center for Media Studies 2013). In the same survey, 17 percent identified Japan as India’s “most significant partner” (Center for Media Studies 2013). While the United
States and Russia were viewed as the first and second “most significant partners,” it is remarkable that nearly one of five Indians identified Japan as their “most significant partner,” and is telling of a pan-Asian alliance which obviously counters Chinese regional hegemony.

China has two Confucius Institutes in India, in Mumbai and the southern state of Tamil Nadu (Confucius Institute 2014). Japan has a Japan Foundation center in New Delhi (Japan Foundation 2014).

Synthesizing the geopolitical pillars of power within India, it is obvious Japan is succeeding in advancing a defensive alliance through active military training with India’s Navy, and the offer to sell military equipment. Although China and India have made numerous cooperative defense and security pledges in the twenty-first century, none have come to fruition.

In the economic sphere, trade relations with China are remarkably greater than with Japan, but Japanese direct investment and aid overshadows China in this regard. Additionally, Sino-Indian trade relations are currently $40 million imbalanced in China’s favor, which could cause animosity in India (WITS 2012). Politically, China is at an advantage by diplomatic opportunities within BRICS, but longstanding issues prevent the two powers from more than cordial relations. Survey data shows remarkable interest to further develop relations with Japan by the Indian public, and moreover, a rejection to the emergence of China as a regional hegemon.

While India has long been a regional hegemon in its own right in South Asia, it still
lacks the diplomatic, economic, and cultural clout to serve as a regional hegemon across a wider Asia. By aligning with Japan, India can ensure it is part of an alliance countering the emergence of Beijing’s political and military power, and thereby maintain its regional hegemony in South Asia.

[Table 3 about here]

*Sub-system Case Study 4: Kazakhstan*

Kazakhstan represents potential expansion of regional hegemony for both China and Japan into a region neither power has historically controlled. With a wealth of natural resources and emerging economy, Kazakhstan is at the center of the twenty-first century Great Game. The U.S., Russia, and Turkey have all taken part in the twenty-first century Great Game, jockeying for a favorable relationship in Central Asia. Meanwhile, dependent on energy imports, China and Japan have done the same.

Applying the first pillar of geopolitical power, defense, we see little collaboration between Kazakhstan and China or Japan. In 2002 the Sino-Kazakhstani border was settled and the two sides agreed to cooperate with guarding and management of the border region (Xinhua 2002). In 2012, on the sidelines of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) the Kazakhstani Defense Minister met with the Chinese Defense Minister, stating “Kazakhstan intends to deepen a strategic partnership within the SCO based on collective military and

Unsurprisingly, Beijing has requested closer collaboration within SCO for collective defense, though Beijing and Moscow balked at intervention when ethnic violence erupted in Kyrgyzstan in June 2010 (McDermott 2012, 59). It has been argued by Murat Laumulin that the Beijing-Moscow dual-powers dynamic in SCO is problematic for Kazakhstan. “If there is excessive rapprochement between the powers or a flare-up of their rivalry in the region, the Central Asian states risk facing a double diklat or problems linked to Sino-Russian competition (2007: 82). Moreover, “Kazakhstan is not reaping any real benefit from its membership in the SCO, for the organization has practically no bearing on Kazakhstan’s bilateral relations with either Russia or China, nor does it help advance any particular issue” (2007: 82).

Defense will be the most challenging field for both China and Japan to make hegemonic inroads into Kazakhstan. Neither China nor Japan can compete with the U.S. and Russia, which both are currently providing arms for Kazakhstan’s military (Blank 2014). With Kazakhstan being a sparsely-populated, landlocked state of mostly steppe landscapes, and Japan a densely-populated island nation of mountainous landscapes, there is very little commonality in military interests and geo-strategic training tactics. China and Kazakhstan, however, share some
topographical similarities and an extensive frontier border, so Beijing is at an advantage in this regard.

Within the pillar of economics, “China has achieved a significant advantage over any potential competitors” in Kazakhstan (Ibrahimov 2009, 54). Currently in Kazakhstan, “[a]nyone that decides to build a house, start a business, or simply furnish his apartment looks primarily to Xinjiang, the border region” with China (Syroezhkin 2009, 29-30). China is an important trading partner for Kazakhstan, at $24 billion in bilateral trade (WITS 2012). China’s share of Kazakhstan’s foreign trade nearly doubled from 1996 to 2004 from 4.8 to 8.3 percent (Ibrahimov 2009, 52). By, 2012 China became Kazakhstan’s biggest trading partner (slightly edging out Russo-Kazakhstani trade), and made up nearly a fifth of Kazakhstan’s total trade (WITS 2012). In 2006, an oil pipeline was launched, transporting 20 million tons of oil from Kazakhstan’s Caspian Sea coast into China (Ibrahimov 2009, 53). In 2011, Chinese direct investment in Kazakhstan totaled $1.62 billion, thus more than doubling the $700 million invested just three years earlier in 2008 (O’Neill 2014, 146). China’s total FDI to Kazakhstan has totaled nearly $10 billion since it began investing in 1999 (O’Neill 2014, 146). Japan’s FDI in Kazakhstan has totaled over $4 billion (Weitz 2013). It is now estimated that Kazakhstan is so dependent on Chinese products that the disappearance of such would “spell disaster, as this product shortage could not be covered by any supply from Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, or India”
Japan’s bilateral trade with Kazakhstan is a more modest $2 billion, but Japan is investing in essential industries in Kazakhstan, such as rare earths processing factories to help break-up China’s monopoly in the industry (WITS 2012; Rakhimov 2014, 80). Additionally, from 2013 Kazakhstan’s national nuclear energy company Kazatomprom began supplying Japan with atomic fuel elements (Xinhua 2012).

Initially upon independence, Kazakhstan and Japan remained distant, without recognition of what could be mutually offered. President Nursultan Nazarbayev was initially reluctant to accept Japanese economic assistance, which for Tokyo was one of the few diplomatic tools at its disposal (Rakhimov 2014, 78). Since the turn of the twenty-first century, Japan has taken to a variety of active roles in foreign assistance in Kazakhstan. Aid donations have contributed to cleanups in the Semipalatinsk nuclear test area and the preservation of the Aral Sea (Rakhimov 2014, 80). Additional aid projects have contributed to railways, bridges, airports, roads, and waters supplies (Rakhimov 2014, 80). Japanese ODA to Kazakhstan by far surpasses any other Asian donor, and from 2007 until 2009 was only surpassed by that from the United States (MOFA 2014). Since independence, Japan has provided around one billion dollars in ODA to Kazakhstan, making it one of the largest donors to the country (Weitz 2013). In 2004 Central Asia plus Japan dialogue was created as part of Japan’s ‘Silk Road Diplomacy,’ the name of
Japan’s Central Asia policy. At the outset, Japan had dreamed of building roads and pipelines from Central Asia to the India Ocean via Afghanistan\textsuperscript{10}, yet a decade later this has not materialized (Hisane 2006). While viewed as a counter to SCO, Central Asia plus Japan dialogue has amounted to little more than a formality for Japanese aid to the five republics (Hisane 2006).

Examining the political pillar, Kazakhstan has backed Japan’s bid for permanent membership to the UN Security Council, much to Beijing’s chagrin. There is also potential to utilize the strong ideological stance both Tokyo and Astana take with regards to nuclear weapons as a point for alliance for global nuclear non-proliferation. In 2010, this commonality was alluded to by both Tokyo and Astana’s foreign ministers. The two agreed to promote cooperation for a “nuclear-free world” (BBC Monitoring 2010). Through Kazakhstan’s experiences at Semipalatinsk and Japan’s at Hiroshima and Nagasaki, both countries have experienced horrors of nuclear weapons in vastly differing capacities, and thus, can spearhead from their experiences a widely-engaging value-based alliance.

In an autumn 2005 poll, 40 percent of Kazakhstanis indicated that Japan has a positive influence on their country (Dadabaev 2008, 138). This was the second highest rating after Russia (Dadabaev 2008, 138). It is worthy of noting that a Kazakhstani scholar has mentioned that “ordinary citizens of Kazakhstan do not know much about the modern Japan, its culture, moral

\textsuperscript{10} Japanese leadership never clarified whether this pipeline from Afghanistan to the Indian Ocean would cross Pakistan, or Iran.
system and far less about its current foreign policy priorities and modern diplomacy”

(Nurgaliyev 2008, 31).

The same conclusion, however, has been said regarding Kazakhstani views on China;

“the Kazakh public is little informed about China” (Syroezhkin 2009, 33). “In general awareness of China, its traditions, and customs remains very weak” (Syroezhkin 2009, 34). With regards to China, the political leadership in Astana is welcoming a relationship of economic and strategic partners (Sadovskaia 2007, 22). In 2008, Nazarbaev indicated that “the strengthening of relations with China is one of the main strategic priorities of Kazakhstan’s foreign policy” (Ibraimov 2009, 52). This position on China, however, is not shared with the populace. In a survey, 26 percent of Kazakhstani indicated a positive attitude towards Chinese migrants (Sadovskaia 2007, 22).

Kazakh press has often reported on a wave of Han Chinese flooding Kazakhstan, but officially it appears the Han Chinese migrant population in Kazakhstan is only a few thousand (Syroezhkin 2009, 41). Beijing’s 2009 proposal to lease one million hectares of steppe in Kazakhstan sparked protests in Almaty, Kazakhstan’s largest city and commercial center (The Economist 2010b, 61).

Meanwhile, potential ethnic conflicts exist between the two regarding the Uighurs of China’s Xinjiang Province, Turkic Muslim peoples the Kazaks consider ethnic brethren (Syroezhkin 2009, 36).

China has five Confucius Institutes on five different university campuses across
Kazakhstan (Confucius Institute 2014). While Japan does not have Japan Foundation centers in Central Asia, they have instead JICA-operated Japan Centers for Human Development which are specialized for countries “in the process of changing to market economies” (JICA 2012). Like the Japan Foundation centers, the Japan Centers for Human Development have cultural exchange opportunities and language classes, but also focus on management and business training (JICA 2012). In Kazakhstan, there are two Japan Centers for Human Development in Astana and Almaty (JICA 2012).

Kazakhstan is on one hand welcoming Asian powers China and Japan to take interest in the region and compete with Russia and the U.S. for influence, but on the other hand there is concern in Kazakhstan about China’s overwhelming economic presence (Syroezhkin 2009, 29). In defense policy, China is closer than Japan to hegemonic influence due to its participation with Kazakhstan in SCO, but within this international organization the interests of Russia and the other Central Asia republics have to be taken into consideration, thus significantly scaling back the opportunity for China to unilaterally exert influence. Japan has no such defense agreements or activities in Central Asia.

China’s economic presence in Central Asia is overwhelmingly strong while Japan’s is relatively small. The Central Asia plus Japan dialogue has not measured up to the SCO in cooperative activity or scale, though even the SCO has stopped short of serving as a collective
defense regime. Japan enjoys slightly higher approval by the Kazakhstani populace than China, but these results could be skewed by the sensationalized belief that there is a mass migration of Han Chinese across the border into Kazakhstan. Japan is at an advantage by being distant, and thus not seen as a threat.

[Table 4 about here]

RESULTS

Through the methodology carried out, the distribution and redistribution of hegemonic power is revealed. What is also revealed through examining the indicators are fields whereby the exertion of hegemonic power is not being maximized. In other words, this methodology can also explore fields for potential expansion of hegemonic power, unknown or not attempted by the actors.

This project hypothesized that Japan is carrying out a policy with regards to China which can best be described by the theoretical framework of sievement. All four sub-system case study states have very strong trade relationships with China and Japan. Moreover, all indicators show that China’s economic power will continue to grow, thus deepening these trade relationships. Japan, however, is forging ahead in other fields to contain the expansion of Beijing’s political and military power. Given this project is a qualitative study, the results must be explained with their complexities and nuances. All four sub-systems are discussed below:
1) The Philippines is strongly influenced by Japan’s policy, and is seeking leadership from Tokyo in all of Southeast Asia. The Philippines serves as a linchpin for the island nations in Southeast Asia, many of whom share in the same geopolitical realities and attitudes towards China and Japan.

2) Thailand is mostly influenced by Japan’s policy, but China is competing with some success for regional hegemony. Thailand represents the peninsular Indochina states which lack the geostrategic significance of island nations, but still remains significant due to its economy, population, and role in the sub-region.

3) India is influenced by Japan’s policy, but does not fall into either China or Japan’s region of hegemony due to its own economic, military, and cultural strengths. Essentially, India and Japan can coexist as collaborating counter-balance partners, but most likely Japan’s potential sphere of regional hegemony will end where the Indian Subcontinent begins.

4) Japan does not have hegemonic power in Kazakhstan, but is noteworthy in its aid donations, strategic trade, and cultural exchange efforts. China currently dominates in economic hegemony, yet does not have extensive hegemonic power either. There are areas where Japan has the potential to cultivate collaboration and possibly expand hegemony in Central Asia, such as advancing nuclear nonproliferation together with Kazakhstan.

The resultant trend of power shows the possibility for Japan to deepen regional hegemony in Southeast Asia, particularly the island states, and build an equal alliance with India, which would be sufficient to ensure Indian Ocean and South China Sea shipping lanes remain free and open. Expansion of hegemony into Central Asia would be an overextension, particularly given the unlikelihood of a pipeline or road to carry resources from Central Asia to the Indian Ocean, and Japan would be competing with more powers than just China in the Great Game.

Based upon the results of the research, the hypothesized theoretical framework, sievement, is foremost serving as a means to economic security of the vital maritime shipping lanes, and not particularly taking shape along land borders. Essentially, Tokyo can pursue
hegemony among the ASEAN states and Taiwan, but pursuits into South Asia should always pay heed to India as the regional hegemon. Furthermore, pursuits into Central Asia are more challenging due to the geopolitical realities, and will necessitate strategic reevaluation and innovation in order to make inroads in the region.

[Table 5 about here]

CONCLUSION

In 1994, founder of modern Singapore, Lee Kuan Yew commented on the expansion of China’s economy; “the world must find a new balance in 30 or 40 years. It is not possible to pretend that this is just another big player. This is the biggest player in the history of man” (Buzan and Segal 1995, 83-84). China has developed at a speed and size unlike anything the world has ever seen, but what is emerging is the opportunity for a historic adversary to lead a counterbalance strategy which is innovative in international relations thought.

In the case studies analyzed there are variations in all indicators, yet in all cases Chinese bilateral trade is strong and growing. Meanwhile, Japanese cultural favorability outranks Chinese in every cases. Yet, neither Beijing nor Tokyo can gain regional hegemony based solely on one pillar of power, alone. Strength in all four pillars is essential. As long as Japan can maintain its strong economic trade ties with China, thus maintaining a degree of Beijing’s dependence on the Japanese exports, and maneuver to strengthen all four pillars of power along China’s periphery,
an unforeseen situation of dual isolation-engagement\textsuperscript{11} of a potential superpower will occur.

As a theoretical framework, sievement can be applied to other cases of competition for regional hegemony in historical context, but more so in current affairs given the necessity for a qualitatively deep transnational economic relationship between powers. Such interdependencies are a rather new phenomenon of globalization. Further research could make an attempt to more solidly define the thresholds whereby qualitatively, bilateral economic interdependencies are strong enough to deter warfare. One would be remiss, however, to make the assumption there would be a universal threshold, given all the variables to be considered, such as culture, the prioritization of economics and the private sector in decision-making, nationalism, and military capacity just to name a few. Nonetheless, further research could tease out more clarity.

With the case of Sino-Japanese relations in this paper, applying the same methodology to additional sub-systems would no doubt enrich the results. Taiwan would prove interesting, given its complex relationship with both powers. Vietnam, too, would prove interesting given its tumultuous relations with China, yet with similar government structures. Resource-rich Mongolia would additionally provide insight, as a key state for Japanese economic aid and cultural exchange, yet with an extensive border and long, shared history with China. Nepal, too, would be an interesting case, given the tremendous amount of aid it receives from Japan, its

\textsuperscript{11} As opposed to the contain-engage strategy key to the ‘congagement’ concept.
complex relationship with China, and its strong interpersonal and cultural ties with India.

Nevertheless, it is hoped that the case studies in this paper illustrate just the beginning to the applicability of sievement in world politics.


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Table 1: Sub-system of Analysis Case 1: The Philippines

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<th>China</th>
<th>Japan</th>
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<tr>
<td>Defense</td>
<td>• No cooperation; confrontation regarding territorial claims in the South China Sea.</td>
<td>• Coast Guards conduct joint maritime security exercises</td>
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<td>• Japanese coast guard patrols Philippine waters, provides communication equipment &amp; technical assistance</td>
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<td>• Tokyo plans to provide the Philippines with ten new patrol vessels</td>
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<td>Economy</td>
<td>• $13.3 billion in bilateral trade makes China the 3rd largest trade partner</td>
<td>• Total trade exceeds $17 billion; Japan is the Philippine’s top trade partner, and comprises around 35% of total foreign direct investment in 2012</td>
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<td>• Provided $1.6 million worth of relief supplies after November 2013 typhoon</td>
<td>• Provided a total $30 million in monetary aid after November 2013 typhoon</td>
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<td>Politics</td>
<td>• Slight potential for pan-Sinic alliance including the Chinese Filipino population</td>
<td>• Mediated dialogue between Manila and the separatist Muslims in Mindanao; has provided $136 million in aid to the region</td>
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<td>• Potential for an anti-communist alliance with Filipino Catholic community and Japanese Catholic leadership</td>
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<td>Culture</td>
<td>• Out of 11 countries, 2% of surveyed Filipinos identified China as the most reliable ally</td>
<td>• Out of 11 countries, 31% of surveyed Filipinos identified Japan as the most reliable ally (2nd highest)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• 32% of Filipinos identified China as an “important partner” for ASEAN today, and 25% for the future</td>
<td>• 76% of Filipinos identified Japan as an “important partner” for ASEAN (highest in survey), 64% for the future</td>
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<td>• 12,000Filipino residents of China, and 29,000 Chinese residents in the Philippines</td>
<td>• 200,000Filipino residents of Japan, and 12,000 Japanese residents in the Philippines</td>
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<td>• Largest contingent of JOCVs dispatched in Asia</td>
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<td>Table 2: Sub-system of Analysis Case 2: Thailand</td>
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<td>- Has frequently reiterated intention to strengthen bilateral ties between militaries</td>
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<tr>
<td>- In 2012, joint military evacuation drills conducted together with U.S. military</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Economy</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>- $64 billion in bilateral trade makes China Thailand’s 2nd largest partner, with 13% of total trade</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Free-trade agreement</td>
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<td>- $7.3 million in relief aid after 2011 flooding</td>
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<tr>
<td>- $73 billion in bilateral trade makes Japan Thailand’s largest partner, with 15% of total trade</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Hub for SE Asian supply-chains for automakers</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Free-trade agreement</td>
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<tr>
<td>- $10 million in relief aid after 2011 flooding</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Politics</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>- Distance has been maintained due to corrupt governments and military coups</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Slight potential for pan-Sinic alliance including the Thai Chinese population</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Commonality with constitutional monarchies</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Culture</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>- Out of 11 countries, 8% of surveyed Thai identified China as the most reliable ally</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Out of 11 countries, 60% of Thai identified China as an “important partner” for ASEAN at present, and 56% in the future</td>
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<tr>
<td>- 23 Confucius Institutes placed – more than any other country</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Out of 11 countries, 35% of surveyed Thai identified Japan as the most reliable ally (highest in survey)</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Out of 11 countries, 74% of Thai identified Japan as an “important partner” for ASEAN at present (highest in survey), and 68% for the future (highest, again)</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Currently 32 JOCVs in Thailand – third-highest number of dispatches in Asia</td>
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<td><strong>Table 3: Sub-system of Analysis Case 3: India</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Defense</strong></td>
<td><strong>China</strong></td>
<td><strong>Japan</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Border skirmishes continue, though both sides are committed to a peaceful solution</td>
<td></td>
<td>• Frequently hold joint military exercises since 2007</td>
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<td>• In 2008 a security pact was signed</td>
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<td>• In 2014 Japanese-made amphibious aircraft sold to India</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Economy</strong></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>• $68.8 billion in bilateral trade makes China India’s largest trading partner, and nearly 9% of total trade</td>
<td></td>
<td>• $18.8 billion in bilateral trade, or 2.5% of total trade</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Foreign direct investment since 2000 is $410 million</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>• Top aid donor to India, totaling nearly $1 billion in 2010</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Politics</strong></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Dialogue facilitated through BRICS summits</td>
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<td>• Willing to overlook nuclear weapons program in order to cooperate on civilian nuclear energy</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Has refrained from supporting India’s bid to permanent membership on the UN Security Council</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Hosting of Dalai Lama remains a source of contention</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Beijing arms sales to Pakistan also a source of contention</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Culture</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>• 5% of Indians surveyed identified China as India’s “most significant partner”</td>
<td></td>
<td>• 17% of Indians surveyed identified Japan as India’s “most significant partner”</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 4: Sub-system of Analysis Case 4: Kazakhstan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>China</th>
<th>Japan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Defense</strong></td>
<td>• Border management and guarding agreed in 2002</td>
<td>• No collaboration; military structures are vastly different</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Limited defense collaboration within SCO, including occasional joint military exercises, once bilaterally</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Economy</strong></td>
<td>• $24 billion in bilateral trade makes China its biggest trading partner, and nearly 18% of total trade, and increasing</td>
<td>• $2 billion in bilateral trade, but includes vital industries such as a rare earths processing factory built in 2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• 2006 significant oil pipeline launched, from Caspian Sea to China</td>
<td>• 2013 Kazatomprom supplies Japan with atomic fuel elements</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Total FDI is nearly $10 billion</td>
<td>• Total FDI is over $4 billion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Politics</strong></td>
<td>• SCO member states</td>
<td>• Dominant-party in Central Asia plus Japan dialogue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Backs Japan’s bid for permanent membership to the UN Security Council</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Potential for global nuclear non-proliferation alliance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Culture</strong></td>
<td>• 26 percent of surveyed Kazakhstanis indicated China has a favorable influence on their country</td>
<td>• 40 percent of surveyed Kazakhstanis indicated Japan has a favorable influence on their country</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Potential ethnic conflicts exist regarding the Uighurs in Xinjiang Province</td>
<td>• Japan Center for Human Development in Astana and Almaty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Beijing’s 2009 proposal to lease one million hectares of steppe sparked protests in Almaty</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Five Confucius Institutes dispersed regionally</td>
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<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>China</td>
<td>Japan</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>Hegemonic trend is weak, with little potential for increase unless concessions are made in maritime territorial disputes</td>
<td>Hegemonic trend is strong and increasing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>Hegemonic trend is somewhat strong; can potentially be a hotspot for hegemonic competition</td>
<td>Hegemonic trend is somewhat strong; can potentially be a hotspot for hegemonic competition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>Hegemonic trend is neutral, with little potential for increase</td>
<td>Alliance is being strengthened, but not hegemony</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kazakhstan</td>
<td>Negligible hegemony, disadvantaged by competition and distrust</td>
<td>Negligible hegemony, disadvantaged by competition and distance</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure 1: Possible Sievement Alliance with Japan’s Primary Maritime Shipping Lane Indicated.