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Resume

The impact of the 2008 Great Recession has been a key factor to understand the new 2013 Spanish National Security Strategy. The reduction of resources and a declining position in the EU and in the international scenario put Spanish governments in a difficult situation on security and defense alternatives. Although it sets a clear continuity with the 2011 Spanish Security Strategy showing a political consensus on a fundamental national policy for Spain, however, it tends to be more a political document and a declarative consensus than a security strategy with greater depth and width. In this sense, the National Security Strategy presents questionable conceptions and perceptions about the structure of the international system and the behavior of the great powers, which can create narratives, strategies and policies in a situation of decreasing capabilities. All this can lead to trigger a security dilemma. In this sense, reinforcing alliances and strategic policies of Spain, including more realistic strategic planning, could be seen as clear option. A review of the Agreement on Defense Cooperation and the 2001 Joint Declaration Statement could be a first-class strategic option for the security policy of Spain and a lesson to take into account.


There are a number of narratives and strategic positions in many contemporary analyzes (and even strategies and security policies) that currently assume a clear position of multipolarity in the structure of the international system, which would be produced by several factors, including above all the 2008 Great Recession: this involved a relative decline of the West and the US, and the international order that has promoted and maintained for at least since the end of the Cold War. However, these analyzes are based on a number of factors, which basically refer to related aspects of US policies, the problems of some of its allies (Europe and Asia) as well as the rise of other powers produced in the last 10-15 years, and changes in the international system’s
alignments. However, neither these factors nor especially certain expectations or narratives seem to produce, in the light of these expectations, the lines of action and expected results, at least at short or medium term. Factors such as the redistribution of capabilities or devolution of power (for some diffusion of power) have been producing greater perception of anarchy and uncertainty in the international system, and a series of realignments at different levels, whether large, medium or small powers (although in other cases there has been a reaffirmation of existing alignments). Importantly, certain visions of multipolarity, no polarity, apolarity, polycentric system or other grounds (that privilege certain discourses of legitimization), leading to errors by a lack of deep strategic analysis and conclusions to be drawn "in common places."

This confusion of realignments and regional competition with multipolarity, whose may also occurs in unipolarity; and even a certain confusion of multipolarity with uncertainty. Actually, according to structural theories, the number of poles select and could "socialized" the actors toward certain forms of behavior. If we admit a situation of multipolarity (or polycentrism), different forms of behavior could occur. The first case could be defined as a Chain-Gang trend, maintaining alliances as there is a belief that one's safety is integrated with that of the Allies. If a conflict that leads to support allies occurs because the security relationship, leads to a loss of security ally / s own means. In the second, the Buckpassing, means failure to rebalance alignments (balancing) the international system because there are actors who take advantage of the efforts of other partners for various reasons such as reducing costs or improving their current or future position. These behaviors depend on structural variables and perceptions of position, capabilities and threats. The system structure impacts the interactions of actors, ie it has a systemic impact of indeterminacy. Thus an uncertainty about possible behavior occurs, so it is necessary to use the perceptions of strategic incentives in the view of the different capacities of the actors. Thus the 2013 Spanish National Security Strategy (2013 ESN) provides:

"Un mundo como el actual, en el que países con intereses diversos, opuestos en ocasiones, buscan su prevalencia regional o global; un mundo multipolar, en definitiva, resulta más complejo y difícil de gestionar."

(Our current state of affairs, in which countries with diverse interests, sometimes opposite, seek their regional or global prevalence; a multipolar world, in short, is more complex and difficult to manage).

The regional competition does not correspond directly with multipolarity. In fact, in both bipolar and unipolar there has also been regional competition. Why this term is chosen when


even part of the IR Theory considers insufficient or not useful to describe the structure of the international system? Still, there would be various definitions of multipolarity that could be used:

- A Multipolar system is a system in which power is distributed between at least 3 major centers of concentration of wealth and / or military capabilities, and can block or disrupt major political agreements that threaten its main interests;

- Multipolarity in international politics describes a distribution of power in which more than two nation-states have nearly equal military, cultural and economic influence quantities.

- Also a pole is an actor capable of producing order or to create disorder or a pole can be defined as an actor who has influence on the overall results beyond their own borders.

From other point of view, polycentrism could be defined: “Polycentric” connotes many centers of decision making that are formally independent of each other. Whether they actually function independently, or instead constitute an interdependent system of relations, is an empirical question in particular cases. To the extent that they take each other into account in competitive relationships, enter into various contractual and cooperative undertakings or have recourse to central mechanisms to resolve conflicts, the various political jurisdictions …… may function in a coherent manner with consistent and predictable patterns of interacting behavior. To the extent that this is so, they may be said to function as a “system”

From this point of view, military, economic and normative power would be distributed between the US, the EU, China, Japan, India and Russia mainly (Brazil, Indonesia, Turkey and South Africa, despite having regional impact are far from these capabilities and influence although could “soft bandwagoning” to the superpower). However, is multipolarity or polycentrism currently the situation? It could be found a time of uncertainty where there are trends in the system towards a possible transition from a unipolar system. Even with an analysis using Susan Strange’s theory of structural power although she also argued the inadequacy of the methods of analysis estimated the decline of the US at her time), the transition in the structure of the system could lead to bipolarity, although questionable from the point of military, technological and regulatory perspective. Despite the thorough discussion of US policy from both an externally and even the internal debate within the country, it would be unwise to

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perform an analysis of the structure of the international system and the global strategic
framework from this perspective, and that the findings should be set from the structure of the
system and, from another point of view, since the mechanisms of legitimation/de-legitimation of
international order. The policy changes, realignments and uncertainty caused by the Great
Recession, the US withdrawn of Iraq and Afghanistan, the rise of China and other powers, and
the process of attrition of US leadership during the Bush administration\(^5\) (and hence, the
international order promoted and protected by the US), has been accompanied by a campaign of
de-legitimization of that order. Thus, decentralization of power, along with the process of de-
legitimization has offered a narrative of multipolarity. However, this would only be a step in a
process towards the end of that unipolarity, but that would not have occurred yet, we do not
know long it will take, and you have to see to what extent discredits and really creates a
multipolar system\(^6\).

Paradoxically, the US itself has carried out a series of strategic, political and even
narrative reviews that favor the perception of decline and status of multipolarity, even
acknowledging the existence of other centers of power such as in the 2010 National Security
Strategy. However, this vision was already beginning at the end of the Bush Administration,
with a review of US policy toward Asia, the report of the CSIS (Center for Strategic and
Alliance: Getting Asia Right Through 2020"\(^7\). However, it is not the first time that the US
carried out such policies, even considering the existence of a strategic parity or even a situation
tripolarity or pentapolarity as conducted the Nixon Administration policy of distension\(^8\) during
the 70s that resulted in the "declinists" theories\(^9\). Indeed, the Soviet reinforcement, the Vietnam
War, the Great Society project and the end of economic growth model produced under the

to Decline. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012; also The American Era: Power and Strategy
Primacy. La Administración Bush, La política exterior de EE.UU y las bases de una Primacía Imperial”.
About the debate on the nature and effects of Unipolarity see for instance Jervis, Robert. “Unipolarity: A Structural Perspective,” World
\(^6\)Schweller, R and Xiaoyu Pu. “After Unipolarity: China's Visions of International Order in an Era of
\(^7\) García Cantalapiedra, David. “El despliegue estratégico de EEUU, la República Popular de China y la
seguridad en Asia 2001-2010”. UNISCI Discussion Papers No 24. 2010
\(^8\) García Cantalapiedra, David. “The Obama Doctrine, the Irak Syndrome and US Foreign Policy: toward
a Neo- Nixonian Policy?” 2012 ISA-BISA International Conference. University of Edimburg, 20-22 June
2012.
\(^9\) Kennedy, Paul. The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from
1500 to 2000. UnwinHyman. 1988; Keohane, R. After Hegemony: Co-operation and Discord in the
umbrella of the Bretton Woods system from the 50s, in addition to the oil crisis during that decade, led to the US strategic changes to such an extent that at the end of the 70s was thought in defeat in the Cold War and the decline of the US. Although from an economic point of view, the crisis is deeper now, and there is a relative decline in major US allies as well (especially Europe), and a significant shift from central Asia international gravity, both political settings outside and inside the US may enter the field of discussion, but should analyze their long-term impact on the global context, not only from a standpoint of short or even medium term. However, you have to analyze the devolution process and de-legitimization that is occurring, especially from the point of view of the "legitimacy" of revisionism emerging powers like China, Russia or India and Brazil. Thus, from a political-strategic level there are a range of views among the great powers that reinforce this situation of multipolarity as the own EU, China, Russia, India, Brazil and France; in the academic field, in positions as diverse as structural realism and constructivism. In particular, structural realism (authors such as Kenneth Waltz, Stephen Walt and John Mearshimer) in its different variants establishes this rebalancing process in the international system. However, although a possible process, we can say that in different areas has not yet occurred, and may lead to other unwanted results or unexpected\(^{10}\).

2- "Our" Strategic Environment, domestic policies and the US strategic posture.

This general conception is dangerous to both the EU and Spain as it results in a situation of relative decline (or pronounced) EU/Spain, for further analysis produced by certain types of narrative and analysis of the real strategic options of the ones available, especially given the impracticality of certain erroneous or illusory alignments, and even irrelevant considerations about autonomy. Certainly, these positions come from a very specific situation in the domestic politics of the member states and the EU in general, and from a social and economic crisis, but also of values and goals, unprecedented in Europe since the Great Depression and World War II. For the EU and Spain it is vital, to the point of being able to produce strategic irrelevance, an analysis of the international system based on an understanding of the structure of the system as one of the basic factors when developing policies and strategies. The other key factor is the creation of domestic policies and decision making. Given limited space, this last factor will not be discussed in depth. However, the analysis is mainly structural and systemic, and how this might affect the construction of a policy and strategy of the EU and Spain, especially considering some scenarios and strategies such as the so-called Strategic Neighborhood to EU or the Euro-Atlantic area for the 2013 ESN.

2.1. Budgetary Defense Constraints, and Domestic Policy.

Due to the 2008 formidable crisis, the Spanish National Budget 2008-2013 suffered a different treatment, with a sharp decline since 2011: $314,522$ b. (2008); $329,896$ b (2009); $350,213$ b (2010); $315,666$ b (2011); $309,825$ b (2012); $319,460$ b (2013). This includes a sharp expansion of National debt toward the 100% of the GDP for 2013. ($1, 5$ trillion); in 2006, these figures were 67% and EUR 862 billion. Thus, after a slightly increase since 2002 to 2008 in the Spanish defense budget, this has been decline until today a 32% during the past six years. In 2014, the Spanish Ministry of Defence at least not diminished its budget, of which slightly more than 75 percent (EUR 4.396 Billion) will be allocated to pay payroll. The sequence of reduction has been the following: in 2002 the budget was EUR 6.158 billion; then $6.201$, $6.499$, $6.758$, $7.123$ and $7.696$ in 2007. From 2008, the Spanish Defense budget has fallen down to numbers not seen before 2000: $8.149$, $7.847$, $7.357$, $6.868$, $6.316$ and $5.937$ in 2013. The most important material effects have been the scrapping of the aircraft carrier Principe de Asturias; the reduction to 75,000 troops, 5,000 lower than that fixed by law; the reduction in the order of 73 infantry fighting vehicles Pizarro, whereby two armored regiments Leopard will not have mechanized infantry battalion; reducing transport helicopter NH-90 45-22; overall reduction of the time to ships, aircraft and armored to save fuel and maintenance. The construction of a future nuclear aircraft carrier Carlos III (42.000 tons), to substitute the Principe de Asturias, is a matter of discussion if the works will start in 2019.

In 2014 the Ministry of Defense will cut a 3.2% the budget, which represents a total of EUR 5,745,769 billion, more than € 191 million less than in 2013. Really, most of the budget goes to (about 77%) staff costs (EUR 4,421 billion) while the amount devoted to capital investment remains at EUR 443.80 million. With these assumptions, MoD accumulates five consecutive years of cuts since 2008. Meanwhile, the investment chapter experienced a decline of 8.4%, going from 484.67 million in 2013 to 443.80 million. What it will keep 2014 investment allocations are special weapons programs, with EUR 6.84 million euros, as well as those related to the maintenance of peace, who stay at 4 million. For special programs, the MoD continues to give priority to the payment of the Eurofighter program, which will dedicate the next year of €4.94 million. It also plans to spend 1.16 million, Airbus Military aircraft program A400M military transport while 736,000 euros will go to investments in the Tiger attack helicopters. In late July, the government approved an extraordinary credit of EUR 877 million to repay
debts accumulated in previous years were also set. With this budget, the government intends to keep the defense policy in 2014 "minimal and essential operational capabilities of the armed forces to complete missions and executing its commitments."

All this, says the Defense Budget Project, "in line with the effort from the Central Government is doing to reduce the deficit and achieve compliance with the goal of fiscal stability". To achieve this, the Minister of Defense Pedro Morenes adds, that over the next year "will continue to work on the line to advance the unification of common logistics and deal comprehensively addressing the material needs of the Armed Forces, for the best use of available resources". One of the main objectives of this budget is "continuously improving the recruitment, selection, training and preparation of staff of the Armed Forces," so that "it will continue to drive global staff training and joint training of the units ". The general accounts for 2014 continue to reflect a drop in drills and exercises in staff training, although less than last year, when they experienced a reduction of more than 7.5%. On this occasion, 387,211 euros will become 373,278 euros, 3.6% less. The MoD declared that “Spain should maintain and enhance their participation in various international organizations on security and defense and to assume, within its capabilities, new obligations and capabilities in the context of the Common European Security and Defence Policy for best safeguard of international peace and probation office, or at the request of the United Nations”. Thus, "the National Defense must face armed conflict which may arise as a result of both the advocacy or exclusively national values, and the defense of shared interests and values."

But he stressed also that understanding that “the main role of the armed forces is the defense of Spain and its interests above other objectives". In this regard, he stressed that the geographical location of Spain led him to have "its own challenges and threats, so its defense policy must be vigilant and carefully analyze what happens in the Mediterranean as well as in areas upcoming affecting the countries of the southern shore". It is in this context that Spain recalls, assumed the presidency of the 5 + 5, during the celebration of its tenth anniversary. This forum was created following an agreement between the defense ministers of Spain, Algeria, France, Italy, Libya, Malta, Mauritania, Morocco, Portugal and Tunisia with the aim of developing multilateral cooperation to strengthen mutual understanding and trust with in order to promote

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safety in the Western Mediterranean. However, the chapter on military investment experienced a decrease of 5.1% from 443.19 million to 420.66 million euros to be divided between logistical support modernization of the Armed Forces, research and operating expenses. What it will remain in 2015 will be the special endowment investments weapons programs, with 6.84 million euros, as well as those related to the maintenance of peace, who stay at 4 million. However, apart from the provisions of the State Budget each year the MoD is benefited by extraordinary credits to pay its obligations in special weapons programs.\textsuperscript{12}

2.2. Perceptions, Conceptions and the Strategic Scenario in the 2013 ESN

In this economic and international framework, the 2013 ESN establishes a set of principles that creates the basis for the development of the document, which are some of them a matter of discussion. For instance, it defines a state of uncertainty in the international system: "the uncertainty also increases, while the trends that are defining the emerging world are not running yet clear outlines for the new international community".\textsuperscript{13} This approach produces a number of issues and carries a series of doubts:

- If there is more uncertainty, does this impact on the structure of the system, actors and their interactions?
- If trends do not create sharp outlines, how to qualify the international system as multipolar?
- What means for the authors multipolarity?
- Absence of non-state actors in the analysis: for example, from the top 150 economies in the world, 87 are MNC. And how many are SOE and really tools of states?

However, uncertainty would not mean linearly multipolarity. Uncertainty generally refers to how to deal with the lack of information about the intentions of other actors and the power of the actors with whom they interact, that is, strategic uncertainty; usually they will face it through gathering capabilities or through alliances. Uncertainty also exists in unipolar and bipolar, as it refers to a parameter that is fed from a structural factor of the system, which is

\textsuperscript{12} The figures would be higher if the payments for acquisition system and for the Armed Forces Modernization program are included for 2014: 2.7 million for the F100 frigate; 371.5 million for the fighter EF2000; 2.42 million for the battle tank Leopard; 46.6 million to the new military transport aircraft A-400M; 88.2 million for the Tiger combat helicopter; BAC 28.2 million for the ship; 32.4 million for the 155/52 howitzer; 15 million for the Taurus missile; 69.8 million for the F-105 frigate, one million for the BAM-1 ship; 34.5 million for the missile C/C Spyke; 75.19 million for the NH-90 helicopter; 5.96 million for CIS EMU nodes and 10 million for the EC-135 helicopter. See Ministerio de Defensa. Presupuesto del Ministerio de Defensa 2014. http://www.defensa.gob.es/Galerias/presupuestos/presupuesto-defensa-2014.pdf

\textsuperscript{13} 2013 ESN, p. 10
basically anarchy, and perceptions of the actors on the system in terms of its position in this system. It is the combination of these factors that lead to indeterminacy of behavior, as well as constructivist theories say. This can lead to regional alignments, although it seems that there is no clear global realignment yet, including classic rebalancing options (balancing, at least external balancing, even if internal balancing by some actors) with mild attempts beyond rebalancing (soft balancing). Multipolarity as a structural factor impacting on the actors, not as a description of the behavior of actors in the international system, would increase the uncertainty to include more actors, the strategic incentives, calculations and perceptions. In this sense, there would be a number of systemic effects and interdependencies between the courses of action chosen and how they affect the actions of other actors, and how actions at the systemic level are produced by domestic factors or even lower levels. The problem is that these effects were not provided or are going to have systemic effects. The interpretation of the effects of interdependence is also questionable, as it is attributed linearly reduced probability, the classic conflict between states. It is supposed to mean "classic conventional" wars between states. The 2013 ESN says: "At present the global interdependence has decreased the likelihood of classic confrontations between states, but armed conflicts continue to pose a capital security threat". Really the defining feature of interdependence is uncertainty: too many objectives, all varying for attention; there is no agreement on how best to achieve them; understanding of the causes is subject to ideological dispute, no consensus; which is a cause for an actor is one effect to another. The interdependence creates the strategic dilemma, namely, that state responses depend on the decisions of others. The interdependence also means that the issues that states must deal interrelated and involve an increasing number of actors, making them much more difficult to handle. The effort is less about getting what you want in a strategic trading environment, and how the states have added an increasing number of objectives that inevitably must be balanced against each other and performed with others.

Although the ratio of international conflicts (especially “classic” inter-state war) has been declining since the end of the Cold War, this same interdependence could easily cause conflicts between states, for example, highly interdependent spaces with low institutionalization.

14 Brooks, Stephen and Wohlforth, William C. “Hard Times for Soft Balancing,” International Security 30, no. 1, (Summer 2005); Pape, Robert, “Soft Balancing against the United States,” International Security 30, no. 1. (Summer 2005); Paul, T.V. “Soft Balancing in the Age of U.S. Primacy,” International Security 30, no. 1. (Summer 2005). “In some cases, the states are not powerful enough to face directly the power of the adversary and use a non-violent diplomatic insurgency that calls soft balancing, a term coined recently for “organized diplomatic harassment of the United States”, that like any other balancing, must be “linked causally to the systemic concentration of power in the U.S.” and must be motivated by the concern that “the concentration of power in the United States” could become “a direct security threat” (Brooks and Wohlforth, pág. 78–79; Paul, pág. 47).
15 Christensen and Snyder, p.14.
such as Asia, Europe, or cases like pre-WWI\textsuperscript{17}. Dependencies are attributes highly questionable positive effects, and the effect of the existence of nuclear weapons, the US conventional military superiority, or the existence of NATO as mechanisms of maintaining stability are not even named. Likewise, to attribute to global interdependence the peace between the great powers could also be confusing globalization with interdependence. But stability rather than peace could be an effect of unipolarity. And although unipolarity does not have to determine the overall peace, if stability: no "classic" conflicts between the great powers and the superpower; but this does not inhibit the international system of conflicts between the superpower and other powers, or between medium, or between major powers and / or medium and small powers.

Thus, for a correct analysis of alliance options and conduct of states in terms of policy, it should be clear to both the polarity of the system, such as perceptions of strategic incentives and the creation of security dilemmas; this will allow us to observe the conduct of foreign policy actors considering the structural impact. Misperceptions and identification of the structure of the system can lead to strategic errors and unwanted effects. For example, errors in considering scenarios where multipolar or bipolar are tripolar\textsuperscript{18} or misperceptions about the advantage of the offense or defense in the first and second world wars\textsuperscript{19}. The change in the distribution of capabilities can lead to an increased perception of anarchy (structural impact), which together with the changes in US policy (in terms of priorities, not abandonment of interests or global presence) creates a perception of multipolarity. However, it would have to wait for the realization in terms of distribution of power and regional realignments, rebalancing alliances (rebalancing) or clear regional/global aspirants. In this sense, the shift to Asia from the center of world affairs involves regional realignments. However, despite the expansion of Chinese interests, there is an interests to keeping the structure of alliances that created the US as security architecture, although there have been changes in the behavior of the PRC, initiatives such as the strengthening of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization or initiative the East Asia Summit. In fact there has been a reaffirmation of the network of alliances that the US has, with strong responses to Chinese movements. There is an answer to US policy, but there are positions that argue that it does not mean a breaking aspect of this situation of unipolarity, as it


is not because US policy, but because of the structure of the system\textsuperscript{20}. However, such movements shows above all a relative decline of Western Europe (more than American), and along the changes in US strategic priorities, does produce a change in the global status quo of the relative position of Europe. The devolution of power, the dynamics of interdependence and interconnectedness create a cyber-environment is unfavorable potential for security if you are in a position of vulnerability or reduced capacity to deal with a highly dynamic international system processes. This should, for example, lead to the creation of a complex, new and credible security concept. However, in the European and Spanish case, it appears not to be a clearly defined, feasible and operational design.


The first problem for the establishment of a security strategy and Spanish defense is that there is no definition of vital interests and strategic interests of Spain. The only definition that can be considered so that makes the strategy to define national security: "to protect the freedom and welfare of its citizens, to ensure the defense of Spain and its constitutional principles and values, and to contribute with our partners and allies to international security in meeting their commitments"\textsuperscript{21}. It can be assumed that the order of its utterance is the priority or hierarchy of such interest. From here we could not draw a real assessment of the significance of the relationship with the US, and then the strategy performs in the following sections, an instrumental view, which identifies the interests of Spain based on the value of the relationship with the US, not the other way round; establishing the interests of Spain and saying why it is important the relationship with the United States to defend those interests. Yet there are references that specify interests of Spain, as the Euro-Atlantic area (although it is not defined in the strategy) which specifies that the relationship with the US is vital to defend (so is the statement NATO). It also seems that one could find an interest in maintaining a bandwagoning to the US in some areas (especially in Latin America and to avoid competition between them) before the decline of the Spanish position and capabilities\textsuperscript{22}. At the same time, there is a high overall rating as a partner and ally robust and reliable (although it appears better defined in the


\textsuperscript{21} 2013 ESN, p.1

\textsuperscript{22} 2013 ESN, p. 15-17
2011 Spanish Security Strategy)\textsuperscript{23} in these vital areas: international security; the Euro-Atlantic area; and the case of the Non-proliferation and referring to NATO.

The 2013 ESN calls also for a comprehensive approach to security, multidisciplinary and multilateral, with a number of factors that affect it but are not clear:

- "The constant evolution of the centers of power, with new rising powers," (refers to multipolarity, polycentrism or other system?)
- The consolidation of new international players (which ones?)
- The greater influence acquired by individuals (thanks to information technology?)
- Demographic change,
- Increased competition for energy, food and economic resources,
- And the role of technology in the knowledge society
- Or the greater economic interdependence, political and legal (Is it positive or negative?).

There is a surprising confusion between factors, challenges, dynamics and actors. They seem to want to go to a comprehensive definition of security with an integrated approach (comprehensive approach), but it remains unclear: "response to the risks and threats that compromise security today requires cooperation both nationally and multilaterally. Unilateral and isolated responses are not effective, for being incomplete and partial, facing challenges that require a multidisciplinary approach and joint action". Only this perspective encompasses all potential issues or actually affected. "In this regard, the position of the ESN 2013 is that organizations such as NATO or the EU will only be a defense mechanism of shared interests and values, without reference to who ultimately are mechanisms for collective defense and mutual defense (Articles V, and 42.7 TEU in NATO and in the Treaty of Lisbon respectively), not only for expeditionary capability, "Coping with conflict that may occur as a result of both the defense of purely national interests or values-in which it would intervene so individually, and the defense of shared interests and by virtue of our membership of international organizations such as the UN, NATO and EU values, "which intervene in accordance with their constitutional treaties with other allies and partners".\textsuperscript{24}

-There is confusion between unilateralism and multidisciplinary approach: for example, may be unilateral actions multidisciplinary and multilateral military only (uni-
disciplinary). Moreover it contradicts paragraphs (p.12) in that "Finally, it is a strategic priority to maintain proper preparation and ability of our country to address those threats they have to deal autonomously". Or on page 24, "On the one hand, keep a proper, credible and effective defense capability, given the geographical location of Spain".

- In defining Security Policy only talks about challenges, and nothing about threats or risks. It is not surprising that no reference is made hybrid conflicts\(^2\). It is also arguably the identification of threats, risks, challenges and global priority and especially which priorities for Spain are. It seems that there is also this lack of identification and prioritization due to the need for Spain to stay in multilateral structures to respond to certain challenges and threats to vital interests cannot be addressed individually, so they "adopt" visions do not necessarily suitable for Spain. This also does not make alignments and alliances established Spain respond to these vital interests: for example, North Africa not covered by NATO and with few options for solidarity from EU despite the Treaty of Lisbon. That makes for a move towards stronger alliance with the US, although there is no automatic mechanism in this case with such a scenario.

- Although there is a list of risks and threats (which is not defined in each category), there is a lack of references and analysis produced military threats in cyberspace and its integration with other dynamics such as nuclear deterrence, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, BMD, advanced conventional weapons (Prompt Global Strike for example)\(^2\), the robotization of the battlefield and the militarization of space, which is causing a structural change in the strategic stability.

But the most surprising from the point of view of safety and the relationship with the US, it is the absolute silence of the ESN 2013 about the 1988 Cooperation Agreement on Defense between Spain and the US\(^2\), in addition to the 2001 Joint Declaration in terms of the role of both and its content and the institutional structure created to operate jointly (such as the High Level Bilateral Defense Committee created by the Protocol of Amendment of 2002), and what really is the role of the alliance between Spain and the United States in terms of security in


\(^{27}\) Relly the 2002 modification (with 54 new articles) gave a new meaning to the US-Spain alliance in the framework of the 2001 Joint Declaration. See also Garcia Cantalapiedra, David. “Spanish Foreign Policy, the Unites States and Soft Bandwagoning”, in Garcia, D. and Pacheco, R. Contemporary Spanish Foreign policy. Routledge. 2014.
accordance with the objectives of the 2013 ENS: how does the Article 1.1 of 1988 Convention about the objectives of the strategy and the US role in it: "Both parties reaffirm that maintaining full security and integrity respective territorial, and the continuation of a strong defense relationship between them, serve the common interest, contribute to the defense of the West, and assist in the preservation and development of their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack". In this sense, the only current aspect referred to the Convention would be the second protocol amendment of 2012\textsuperscript{28}, which provides for amending the agreement to allow parking on Rota naval base of the four ships AEGIS system to contribute to NATO ballistic missile defense. However, the 2013 ESN says nothing in his section on weapons of mass destruction or delivery systems, although references to support the deployment of an "autonomous" missile defense system\textsuperscript{29}.


The European Union and Spain as a member state, has tried, in a difficult and tortuous path, defining itself and its role in an evolving international system which hardly respond to international cadre of Western countries since the end of World War II and after the end of the Cold War. This has also had a profound impact on Spain as well as the progressive \textit{Europeanisation} of Spanish policy, in this case, strategic and security, also conditions on their dependency, options and choices of Spain. In this regard, it is essential to understand the strategic position and vision of EU security to understand in what sense could all of this to condition the Spanish options. This position still reflects some assumptions that are highly questionable, even some are outdated because they still insist on certain positions on advantages of normative power, or respond to a correct reading of the dynamics of the international system. From this point of view, the 2003 European Security Strategy, the changes made in 2008, or the conclusions of the European Council in December 2013\textsuperscript{30}, still refuses to recognize basic realities of the international system and maintain a stance that affects and will affect European security. Notwithstanding there is a strong regional vision with a commitment to the Strategic Neighbourhood, taking responsibility for their safety. These would be some of the strategic objectives of the EU, which respond to a strategic vision established in the Neighbourhood Policy of the EU (Europen Neighbourhood Policy, ENP), with a number of more specific strategies through the European Neighbourhood Instrument (European Neighbourhood

\textsuperscript{28} Segundo Protocolo de enmienda del Convenio de Cooperación para la defensa entre el Reino de España y los Estados Unidos de América, de 1 de diciembre de 1988, revisado, hecho en Bruselas el 10 de octubre de 2012. \url{http://www.ieee.es/Galerias/fichero/Varios/BOE_ConvenioCooperacion_Espana-EEUU_jun2013.pdf}

\textsuperscript{29} 2013 ESN, pp. 31 and 46.

Instrument). From these positions, and when the ENP joined the policy pursued in the Mediterranean with the old new neighborhood policy towards Eastern Europe and the Caucasus, as it included Russia in those relationships meant de facto some rebalancing of vision EU eastwards and marginalization of certain Mediterranean. Thus, this position directly affects the vital interests of Spain focused on the Mediterranean and North Africa, and posing a problem of over-extension of this policy (making this integration since 2004), which brings together two areas with various problems, and also responded to interests and preferences of different EU member states. At the same time, and from an external point of view to the EU, it seems that the strategic projects of other great powers had no effect or were not considered essential for the creation of perceptions and certain long-term strategic options: first, to Russia despite cooperation policies and reinsurance. It would be very difficult for Russia to accept the loss of control or influence on his old "Near Abroad" (Near Abroad) or "Spheres of Influence", a factor but not the only one that has had an impact on Russia's actions in Georgia in 2008 and now in Ukraine. At the same time, other major powers have established their strategic visions for the area such as the US, the Greater Middle East, which largely overlaps with the ENP. Strategic visions as Pivot or the "Greater Middle East" in the US, the Russian "Near Abroad" or Chinese "Strategic Frontier," are instruments of power projection and global capacity. If this conception of a Strategic Neighborhood responds to a long-term vision, seems to have helped bring insights and unforeseen actions, at least in the Russian case, due to the overlapping areas of interest (and friction) with other powers (including China) in the Middle East - Persian Gulf, the Caucasus - Central Asia and even the Mediterranean, Sahel - Horn of Africa. In the case of China, it does not adhere to Western Westphalian concept of nation states with fixed borders. Rather, the concept is based on the "strategic frontier" of the geopolitical landscape, whose territorial boundaries flexibility will expand or contract according to the projection of national power. Clearly the vision sets out in the 2003 European Security Strategy called Strategic Periphery, including the Balkans, the Caucasus, the Middle East and the Mediterranean has tried to be updated. But the European Union would not be based primarily or largely on its ability to project power: thus forgets that this mechanism acts as deterrent system in certain situations and scenarios, being an instrument whose utility in an international system as the current has a value of the first order. Instead, the EU is proud to be a model for prosperity and peaceful mechanism

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for problem solving and reconciliation. Europe leads this model as an example for the rest of the world and this is therefore a powerful logic behind this notion, as it acts as a mechanism of projection through initiatives influence. The problem is that the influence of European leadership in other countries decreases rapidly with any increase in geographical distance and reduced economic capacity, and paradoxically, states on its borders present a wide range of strategic problems of first order, which are not solved only normative power. This position in vital areas such as the Middle East or Persian Gulf Caucasus-Central Asia (source of 70% of oil imports from the EU, including imports from Russia) is not sustainable, or from a strategic point of view resilience: Does the EU capacity to hold 600,000 million per year to pay for energy imports from the EU and its future growth? The lack of actual capacity in the area, as demonstrated during the Arab Spring, the civil war in Syria and the crisis in Crimea and Ukraine with Russia, is a lack of correlation between the vital interests of the EU, the concept of Strategic Neighbourhood and the skills and tools. This can make entering the EU in the security dilemma, maybe not in the short or medium term, but long term. But while the idea of renewing the alliance with the US (strengthening the transatlantic relationship would be much more effective) option is a choice that has effects on the Allied and opponents, and would also make a new strategic environment. The 2013 ESN states that "peace, stability and security in the Euro-Atlantic area are part of the security of Spain" (p.16), and declares: "the relationship with the US, the other pillar of our relationship with the Americas, is basic in the management of this space". But what is the management of this area? What is really this Euro-Atlantic area: it is defined as Europe, the Mediterranean, Africa and the Americas? These terms should be specific and create a different analysis for this area. If Africa is included in the Euro-Atlantic area, is it referring to North, Sahel, Gulf of Guinea (priority for Spain and the EU, or more areas of Africa, including the Horn of Africa and South Africa, also a priority for the US)? However there are "vital" security interests to Spain in North Africa, which may be incompatible, or not covered by our defense agreement with the US, NATO, or the EU.

4. Conclusions

The 2013 ESN sets a clear continuity with the 2011 EES regarding treatment of the partnership and relations with the US, something very positive, as it shows an agreement on a state policy, although its limited development also denotes a problem that can be seen throughout the development of the strategy: it is the tendency to be more of a consensual, political, declarative/informative document that a security strategy with greater depth and width.
General Factors

1. In some ways this lack of in-depth analysis marks the absence of key factors and the use of "widely accepted conceptions" denoting sometimes in the document. We have seen that the assumptions made about the interdependence of the elections have probably had a negative impact on the global and regional strategic dynamics, and probably in certain outcomes. In this sense, the analysis of such factors as the Great Recession and the relative decline of the US, affecting the structure of the system, along with its policy change, and the rise of new powers with the decline of other offers, along with its realignment in the international system, have created an idea or polycentric or multipolar system. As we have seen, conceptions and misconceptions can promote policies and strategies which could provoke at least the decline and irrelevance, or at worst, conflict and war.

2- At the same time, the strategic framework and conceptualization establishes highly debatable conclusions or concepts from theoretical and practical point of view. In this context of regional competition and transformation of the security environment, the behavior of allowing Spain to face the security dilemma caused by the loss of skills, could fall into a dangerous buckpassing, to evaluate the strategic and security environment erroneously, as does not perceive the transition process on strategic stability. Probably the crisis with Russia will reconsider this stance toward a search for a strengthening of partnerships more along the lines of a chain gang.

3- There are also external conditions such as the linkage to the EU and NATO that definitively impact on the document. If the international system has changed or is in the process of change, or there is a perception with the conditions we have seen before, there should be a general incentive to create alliances, and some states will ally with other states in accordance with the logic of the security dilemma. However, the alignments are the result of a process which is generally indeterminate. This uncertainty can be reduced, but not eliminated, because of the general and particular interests. From this point of view, the alliance between the US and Spain has been undergoing a process of structural adjustment. Current alliance, however, is not entirely new and persist some features of the alliance of the Cold War, as they reflect certain general and particular interests that predispose to the US and Spain to align with each other. The US extended deterrence in Europe was not necessary because there was no spiral of insecurity and
Europe was no longer at the center of US strategic policy. However, the dynamics of the international system and the factors that affect the security dilemma created a general incentive to form (or maintain) a partnership. There is a core of precedents and relationships (democratic ideology and political systems, NATO support, shared values) that influence the negotiation process of the alliance, which predisposes certain alliances and against others.

4. There are innovative concepts and a key strategic depth as the Euro-Atlantic area, but the document still denotes uncertainty of what this is even as geographical space and the interactions of the actors (the US, Europe, Latin America and Africa), although both strategies (2011 and 2013) talk about "an expanded vision of transatlantic relations". However, it is clear that both strategies are considered vital to the security dimension of Spain and as a partner to the US globally.

a. This concept should be developed as a vital objective in some way, replacing the historic trends of Spain, that is, Europe, Mediterranean, Latin America and the US. It is of utmost urgency integrated our strategic vision to update our interest review, construction and interaction; for example, and in this direction is striking that the Spanish Foreign Ministry has a general direction that brings North America with Asia.

b. Second, to reduce our ambitions to the minimum necessary in some areas because of our abilities; other areas of interest should be reconsider in the long term; probably, despite our excellent relations, Spain today has little influence in the Middle East. At the same time, you could do a selective approach in some areas with new opportunities, concentrating our resources in states where Spain has more long-term options and/or share the historical, political and economic ties with great potential, as might be the case Philippines, Singapore and Australia in Asia.

c. Finally reconsider our policy of alliances, considering a rising due to the lack of skills, approaches and changing dynamics of the international system over the long term. Thus, special approaches to states such as Portugal, Italy, Britain, Algeria, Canada, Brazil and states of the Pacific Alliance should be enhanced.

**Particular Factors.**
Surely there are two aspects of the development of the document that are most appealing and unfortunately skew your expectations:

1- Relative to the consideration of the transformation of strategic stability and security policy. With respect to security concepts found in the Spanish and European approaches, the main problem is not the definition of the structure of the international system as multipolar. This is highly debatable, in theory and in practice, but it is urgent to recognize that the security environment has changed dramatically, not only because of several challenges, threats and different actors, but because the main factor in this environment in terms of security is the possibility of an Offense Dominance World, due mainly, but not only, to the cyberwarfare, but their integration and interaction of this domain with space systems, weapons of mass destruction, defense missile, conventional Global Strike capabilities, and robotization of the battlefield. This has changed, for example, the meaning (or utility) of deterrence and the ability to keep the offense-defense balance and differentiation. This, in a very dynamic international system, with new alliances and alignments, lack of incentives and reducing convergence of interests and increased competition, makes the international system prone to visions and aggressive offensive actions and postures even from economically and technologically points of view (for instance in terms of Hybrid Conflicts)

2- The silence of the document about the 1988 US-Spain Defense Cooperation Agreement. It does not make sense considering the alliance with the US as one of our most important international values, with the absence of the general framework of this relationship as the basic factor in the analysis of the document and the relationship with the US. From one point of view, the absence of the 1988 agreement seems to denote a political backdrop that reflects, not an equal distance from the US in relation to the EU in terms of the importance and depth of the relationship (which would not make sense in terms of what it says the ESN 2013), but rather in a reading in terms of domestic politics to avoid a too "Atlanticist" vision, which could be related to the positions of the Spanish governments between 1996 and 2004.

**Final Thoughts**

Spain now has no skills or a strong regional position and firm enough (in the EU, NATO and the Mediterranean) to buckpassing to allies of these organizations. Also if we had a disagreement on how to deal with the formation of the interests of the
partnership and also with the problem of the adversary, the weakest relative position of Spain in these organizations leads to establish a behavior of bandwagoning and generally chain gangs (exception is for Gibraltar and Kosovo). However, these organizations do not cover necessarily the vital security interests of Spain. Indeed, a vital factor to compensate for this problem is the alliance with the US. The European vision, paradoxically reinforced European fears was about being caught or be drawn into a conflict only for US interest that they do not share or share only partially. Paradoxically, there were presumed chances of being caught in a conflict in an area that was a priority for the Neighbourhood Policy and Strategic Neighborhood because of NATO enlargement to Ukraine and Georgia, or an aggressive US policy in the Greater Middle East, but not for the policy of the EU itself there: then came the Russian invasion of Georgia and the crisis in Ukraine. The Europeans have tried to escape or minimize the risks of this undertaking without serious risk of neglect by the US, although accepting partial abandonment in the form of withdrawal of troops, or secondary US role in Libya. Affecting the position and policy of Spain, the EU has been discussed between cooperation and defection in the alliance negotiations mainly due to the influence of certain aspects of the structure of the international system (i.e, the absence of a perceived existential threat that would create a stronger spiral of integration within the alliance), a perceived reduction in the US commitment, and above all, the influence of the opponent's play in the secondary alliance dilemma (reflecting different perceptions of threats ). Since the end of the Cold War, with a clear unipolarity, peace dividend and the lack of perception of the main threats, there was no clear perception of needed change and adjustment, but inevitably the dilemma of the alliance it is more acute in a situation of high uncertainty and its negative impact on the international system, along with the factors that cause more severe security dilemma. Members of the alliance between the US and Europe have responded differently in the adversary game based on the perceived threat, since no structural factors posed a fundamental impact on the security dilemma, and this creates different results in the game of strategic alliance with different incentives. According to the model of the security dilemma in alliances, new strategic incentives in terms of the structure of the international system, perceptions and behavior of actors could promote policy convergence towards positions of Chain Gang, but still there are buckpassing positions in some European allies. In this situation a strategy for Spain is facing the need to strengthen or rebuild alliances with the United States and other states. In this sense,
Spain would have to set a broader and deeper meaning of the alliance with the US; strategic incentives to Spain; and a number of previous options that could be introduced in the Spanish security policy, especially concerning the Euro-Atlantic area. This would be most useful to promote a reform of the 1988 Convention, in addition to other agreements in other areas of the US, in a deeper line of the 2001 Joint Declaration: for example it could be an option to establish AFRICOM in Spain, and reinforcing a series of steps taken by the US and Spain regarding the strategic importance of the area in relation to the Euro-Atlantic space.