Do museums promote reconciliation? A field experiment on transitional justice

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Abstract

Can transitional justice museums promote post-conflict reconciliation? This project draws on evidence from a field experiment studying the Museum of Memory and Human Rights in Santiago, Chile to answer this question. Transitional justice museums present a certain narrative of past events that can both impart knowledge and elicit emotional reactions among their visitors. Our findings suggest that though perceptions of museums vary along ideological lines, visiting them alters political attitudes related to issues documented in the museum. After visiting, we find that Chilean university students display greater support for democratic institutions, are more likely to reject institutions associated with the repressive period, and are more likely to approve of restorative transitional justice policies. Our findings suggest that memorial museums can support processes of reconciliation by influencing the political attitudes of visitors but that most changes in political beliefs wane over time.

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1 Introduction

After periods of political violence, societies often implement transitional justice policies to address the events that transpired. Explicitly or implicitly, these policies seek to shape citizens' political behavior and attitudes in a manner conducive to democratic consolidation and peacebuilding. Despite the substantial resources dedicated to transitional justice policy implementation, we know very little about the individual-level effects they generate. Our lack of understanding is particularly jarring given the high stakes environments in which transitional justice policies are implemented. After periods of political violence, societies face the difficult task of rebuilding the state-citizen relationship while threats of a return to conflict or a coup instigated by those formerly in power loom large. Transitional justice policies and efforts to memorialize the past factor heavily into these processes and are assumed to heighten a society's chances to construct durable peace. But whether and how they do so has rarely been empirically tested. One such policy, constructing transitional justice museums, has become increasingly common and increasingly contentious. In the aftermath of World War II and the Jewish holocaust, hundreds of museums and memorials rose up to commemorate the victims and remember the atrocities that transpired. Since then, similar efforts have been made to address a society's sensitive past, and they attract high numbers of national and international visitors. Museums commemorating political violence in Japan, Rwanda, Germany, Cambodia, and the US each attract more than a million visitors annually. These sites require sizable investments from governments and international supporters, and have also proven capable of generating debate and protest about the way in which the past is reconstructed. As these museums attract additional visitors each year, spark controversy, and require precious investments from transitioning governments, it is critical that their impacts be interrogated, a task we take on in this study.

Transitional justice museums are often constructed as one element of a government's transitional justice initiative. They intend to propagate a version of past events that conforms to the preferences of those in power. In this sense, what is included in the museum and what is not is often a strategic and carefully considered decision. Conventional wisdom suggests that museums and memorials educate publics by highlighting a society's troubled past, recounting human rights abuses that transpired while simultaneously paying tribute to victims. It has often been assumed that visiting such museums encourages respect and tolerance - not only toward those negatively impacted by the past conflict, but in contemporary relationships.[1]

[1]Truth commission have recommended memorialization initiatives, as was the case in Chile, Guatemala, South Africa, and Sierra Leone, because of their assumed propensity to generate these beneficial outcomes (Barsalou and Baxter 2007).

Others have highlighted, however, how these physical spaces can serve as a reminder of a conflictual past, perhaps activating divisive ideologies (Jelin 2007). Our novel study allows us to assess these notions.

To better understand how museums impact societies' propensities for reconciliation, we focus on individuals' political attitudes. If visiting a museum alters how individuals understand their nation's violent past and/or the way they view contemporary politics, these changes should be reflected in individuals' political beliefs. We focus on political attitudes concerning institutions associated with the period memorialized and those concerning transitional justice policies. By analyzing these topics, we are able to draw conclusions about the reconciliatory effects of visiting a museum. Through several follow-up surveys, we probe the durability of these effects.

As such, this project measures whether museums impact visitors' political attitudes, and if in the process, they encourage reconciliation. We carried out a field experiment to evaluate the impact of a visit to a site memorializing victims of General Augusto Pinochet's dictatorship in Chile, the Museo de la Memoria y los Derechos Humanos (Museum of Memory and Human Rights, hereafter MMDH). In March 2017, we randomly assigned Chilean university students to one of two groups: a treatment group that visited the museum for one hour and completed a survey afterward; or a control group, that met at a campus computer lab to complete the same survey as the one completed by those visiting the museum. We leverage our random assignment procedure to causally infer the impact of a museum visit on attitudes toward political institutions and transitional justice.

We find that a visit to the MMDH significantly impacts individuals' perceptions of political institutions. After visiting the MMDH, participants were more supportive of democracy ($\beta = 0.137, p = 0.032$), more opposed to military governments ($\beta = -0.114, p = 0.002$), and more distrustful of the police ($\beta = -0.152, p = 0.066$).[2] With respect to transitional justice policies, we find that visitors to the MMDH are more likely to support victim compensation ($\beta = 0.20, p = 0.009$) and pardoning perpetrators ($\beta = 0.220, p = 0.020$), policies that adhere more closely to a vision that seeks to reconcile and move forward rather than establishing formal legal justice for past crimes.[3] We find support that these results are at least partially driven by the emotional component of a museum visit. These results suggest that museums generate subtle advances toward reconciliation through their ability to increase agreement on divisive political issues. Though many of the attitudinal changes are short-lived, some

[2]Support for democracy and trust in police measured on a 4-point Likert scale; military government support measured as a 0-1 binary indicator.

[3]Both policies measured on a 4-point Likert scale.

display high degrees of durability (two to six months). These results may generalize to other similar museums that recount instances of political violence.

2 Transitional Justice and Museums

Following a transition to democracy or away from violent conflict, states find themselves in a precarious position. Citizens in a post-repression or post-conflict society may demand punishment of former perpetrators to attain acknowledgment of crimes transpired and to hold those who committed them accountable. At the same time, leaders are likely to be hyperaware of the potentially destabilizing effects of doing so. Moreover, those who carried out violations during the period of repression or conflict, who do not always completely cede power, are unlikely to welcome measures intended to expose their guilt and validate their victims. Sometimes these former perpetrators are in a position to threaten the new democratic authorities. These dynamics, according to O'Donnell and Schmitter, develop in an environment characterized by "omnipresent fear" (O'Donnell 1986).[4]

Thus, transitional governments face an initial difficult decision: how will they address past injustices without disrupting a successful democratic transition? Though transitional justice policies, those a society invokes to restore peace and normalcy after periods of conflict or severe repression, are not ubiquitous (Samii 2013), the so-called "third-wave" of democratization (Huntington 1991) ushered in numerous transitioning states, many of which have implemented some or many components of transitional justice. Modern transitioning societies face a series of additional difficult decisions: Which transitional justice policies will they invoke? How will these policies be implemented? And critically, how will these policies impact society?

Transitional justice consists of a set of procedures to deal with atrocities committed by an autocratic regime or during a violent conflict. They can be divided into three overlapping categories: (a) justice measures aimed at punishing former perpetrators for human rights violations or depriving them of illegitimate privileges; (b) policies aimed at providing material and/or symbolic reparation for victims; (c) truth revelation procedures (Aguilar, Balcells, and Cebolla 2011). Accounts of the three categories and their application in transitioning societies abound, describing the policies implemented in Rwanda, Cambodia, Argentina, Chile, Sierra Leone, Peru, and numerous other states. From these analyses, we have learned

[4]Sometimes, citizens are also aware of these risks, and their fear of conflict recurrence motivates conservative actions by political leaders (Aguilar 2002).

about the preferences of citizens in transitioning societies (Aguilar, Balcells, and Cebolla 2011; Grossman, Manekin, and Miodownik 2015; Nalepa 2012; Pham 2010; Rettberg 2016; Samii 2013), the varying policies adopted (Olsen, Leigh and Reiter 2010), and the factors that increase the likelihood of adoption (Dancy 2010; Olsen, Leigh and Reiter 2010). We know less about the effects of transitional justice policies and whether they manage to lead societies towards reconciliation, and ultimately, long-lasting peace.

Several advances have been made in this area recently, investigating the impacts of trials, truth commissions, and reparations. Truth commissions have perhaps been the most studied (Tepperman 2002). Scholars studying the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission have found little support for hypothesized positive effects (i.e., increased sense of truth and reconciliation) among those most harmed by prior repression (Gibson 2006) and evidence that dissatisfaction with the process grows over time (Backer 2010). More recently, a truth and reconciliation intervention with randomly selected conflict-affected villages in Sierra Leone documented the costs and benefits of the policy; they find that participants were more likely to increase trust and forgiveness of perpetrators and develop social capital, but that they were also more likely to suffer harmful psychological effects (Cilliers, Dube and Siddiqi 2016). The evidence concerning post-conflict prosecutions is also mixed. Cross-national evidence suggests that trials can deter would-be human rights violators, thereby decreasing the incidence of crimes against humanity (Sikkink 2011). At the individual level, though some studies suggest that trials appear to increase the perception of justice and pro-democratic attitudes (David 2009), scholars have also documented detrimental psychological effects among those participating in criminal trials (Brounéus 2010). Finally, studies have found that material compensation of victims can increase civic trust (de Grieff 2006) though perceptions tend to vary with degrees of victimization (Sveaass 2015) and victims often feel that the policy does not adequately recompense them for the atrocities they faced (Laplante 2009, Svensson 2000).

Despite a renewed desire to understand the effects of transitional justice policies, still unknown is how engagement with one aspect of transitional justice might impact an individuals' political attitudes, such as views toward certain political issues, trust in institutions, and support for other transitional justice policies. Our lack of knowledge is particularly striking when we consider the societal and individual impact of policies in the symbolic transitional justice category which are often both heavily debated and funded. Symbolic transitional justice, a subset of policies aimed at establishing material or symbolic reparation for victims, seeks to acknowledge victims. Often, symbolic transitional justice policies do so in a collective way, for example, by establishing spaces of memory, memorials, or museums depicting

victims' experiences. As we explain below, symbolic transitional policies frequently strive to educate the public and instill particular values, such as respect for human rights, to deter future conflicts and promote reconciliation.

3 The Effects of Memory Museums

Research concerning symbolic transitional justice has thus far been largely theoretical. Scholars note how monuments, museums, plaques, and other markers can be used for a variety of reasons. First, they might embody memories. In this way, they can reconstruct the past and "serve as vehicles for the intergenerational transmission of historical memory" (Hamber 2006). Many assume that through this process, governments can encourage reconciliation by acknowledging past abuses (ICTJ). However, skeptics posit that by drawing attention to painful pasts, museums might also stir up negative emotions and highlight prior societal divisions (Clark 2013, Neff 2005, Rieff 2011, Rodden 2012). Second, scholars emphasize how politicians or other state actors can use these memory sites as mediums through which to make political affirmations and propagate a certain version of a contested history (Hamber 2006, Jelin 2007). Third, they can commemorate the victims, serving as a form of symbolic reparation for the atrocities they suffered (Hamber 2006, Jelin 2007). Often, memorial sites perform all of these functions simultaneously. In this process, museums and memorials usually explicitly seek to alter visitors' attitudes and perceptions. In some cases, museums have an explicit social pedagogy function and often become integrated in school curricula.[5]

Though we have theoretical notions of the way in which museums are constructed and how they function, we lack an understanding of how they impact visitors in practice. This project seeks to investigate the extent to which visitors to a specific memorial museum alter their political beliefs. The Museum of Memory and Human Rights in Santiago, Chile, was constructed to commemorate the victims of political violence and repression carried out during the dictatorship of Pinochet. Many similar museums share a victim-centered approach, such as the Yad Vashem Holocaust History Museum in Israel which "[emphasizes] the experiences of the individual victims" (Yad Vashem 2017) or the House of Terror in Budapest, Hungary, which was erected as "a fitting memorial to the victims" of the Nazi invasion and Communist era (House of Terror 2017).

The MMDH also intends to promote reconciliation and raise awareness of human rights be-

[5]That is the case, for example, with Holocaust concentration and extermination camps. Visits to these sites have been part of Germany's school curricula for many years.

yond Chile. This is a common approach among transitional justice museums. For instance, the Kigali Genocide Memorial in Rwanda similarly seeks to not only dignify and support survivors, but to "inform and educate visitors about the causes, implementation and consequences of the genocide..." and "to teach visitors about what we can do to prevent future genocides" (Kigali Genocide Memorial 2017) Thus, though we are primarily concerned with identifying the specific effect of the MMDH in contemporary Chilean society, given that it is common for transitional justice museums to focus on victims and strive to promote dialogue and reconciliation, our results are relevant to museums commemorating sensitive pasts elsewhere.

Recent randomized controlled trials have demonstrated how interventions can alter perceptions of social norms of intergroup prejudice in post-conflict societies (Paluck 2009, Paluck and Green 2009), and how reconciliation policies can promote forgiveness, despite sometimes inducing trauma (Cilliers, Dube and Siddiqi 2016). Moreover, in contrast to theories maintaining the persistence of political beliefs (Tesler 2015), recent field experiments draw on theories of active processing (Petty 1995) and perspective-taking to suggest that short-term interventions can induce significant and durable changes in individuals' political attitudes and behavior (Broockman and Kalla 2016). This suggests that an intervention in the form of a visit to a transitional justice museum might generate sizable shifts in visitors' attitudes and preferences.

We posit that museums constitute an experiential and emotive engagement with a particular version of a nation's history. It is experiential in that visitors interact with museum contents through video recordings, images, texts, and victim testimonies; it is emotive because the content calls on visitors to recount graphic horrors committed during the dictatorship period or civil conflict. For example, on its website, the MMDH officially seeks to "dignify victims of human rights violations and their families and stimulate ethical reflection and debate about the importance of respect and tolerance so that these atrocities do not repeat themselves" (MMDH 2017). The intervention encourages reflection on political and intergroup phenomena and may result in varying levels of changes in beliefs and attitudes if successful. At the same time, because the content in the museum necessarily presents one version of the past, a visitors' reaction to its content is likely to depend on their prior perceptions of the events documented.

Concurrently, visiting a museum is a complex experience, likely to generate effects of varying sizes on different outcome measures. Museums act as a sort of framing mechanism, with the potential to reorient thinking on a subject (Chong and Druckman 2007; Nelson, Clawson, and Oxley 1997). This logic has two implications for the way we conceive of the impact of

museums. First, transitional justice museums will not all influence their visitors in exactly the same way, particularly because they proffer different narratives and emphasize different perspectives. Second, though museums have the potential to shape perceptions, these effects are likely to vary along a number of dimensions. We thus consider separately the attitudes toward 1) political institutions and 2) transitional justice. We also suggest that an individual's experience and engagement with a museum is likely to vary according to prior experiences and beliefs, so we examine heterogeneity across pre-treatment ideological preferences and relationship to victims from the repressive period.

3.1 Hypotheses

In contrast to the relative stability of core beliefs, research has documented greater variation among an individual's issue-based political beliefs, particularly those that are not aligned with any particular party platform (Tesler 2015). Considered as such, memorial museums engage with a host of malleable political beliefs. Museums frame and discuss political institutions in certain ways, often implicitly or explicitly condemning the political institutions associated with the time period being memorialized, while venerating those that came about during transition periods. Applied to the Chilean context, the MMDH recounts the human rights violations coordinated by authoritarian institutions while glorifying the transition to democracy. Thus, we hypothesize that by highlighting the negative experiences with authoritarian institutions, the content of the museum is likely to increase support for democracy and other institutions opposed to the authoritarian regime (in this case, the Catholic church). At the same time, visitors are likely to decrease their support for institutions associated with the dictatorship (i.e., the military and police) as well as their general support of military governments. We title this the political institutions hypothesis.

Second, many transitional justice museums aim to reconstruct memory. In doing so, they provide historical accounts of victim experiences in an interactive manner. In line with recent research documenting the sizable changes in attitudes based on active processing and induced empathy, we expect that visiting a transitional justice museum that emphasizes victimization will increase support for transitional justice policies (Broockman and Kalla 2016, Shechter 2007). Extant scholarship has distinguished different types of transitional justice mechanisms. Recent research has found, for example, higher levels of support for symbolic and restorative policies that aim to improve social relations in post-conflict settings versus punitive measures such as trials and truth commissions that often assign blame and emphasize cleavages salient during the period in question (Aguilar, Balcells, and Cebolla

2011; Rettberg 2016). We thus expect to witness greater support for policies that seek to rebuild social fabric and intergroup relationships, especially because like many museums of its type, the MMDH offers hope, emphasizing Chile's ability to unite and restore democracy. Simultaneously, given the MMDH's focus on victim experience, again common among transitional justice museums, we expect that support for victim-oriented transitional justice policies, such as victim compensation, will increase most relative to policies like trials and truth commissions. This is the logic underlying the transitional justice hypothesis.

We expect individuals to experience the museum differently depending on their beliefs and backgrounds. We highlight two sources of heterogeneity: 1) by ideology and 2) by relationship to victim. First, we expect that - among those who visit the museum - participants on the right are more likely to see the museum as biased and to experience smaller attitudinal shifts as a result of treatment. Second, we expect that those with close familial ties to victims will experience smaller attitudinal shifts as a result of treatment. This is because those closely related to conflict victims are unlikely to be shocked by the material inside the museum, are more likely to be familiar with the events recounted, and are less likely to learn new information through the visit. However, it may be the case that these individuals are more traumatized or emotionally impacted by the museum, similar to findings that suggest that transitional justice can be psychologically trying for victims who relive their traumatic pasts (Brounéus 2010; Cilliers, Dube and Siddiqi 2016).

In sum, our hypotheses are as follows:

- **Political institutions hypothesis:** Visiting a transitional justice museum will cause visitors to reject the political institutions associated to the perpetrators of repression and to support political institutions perceived as opposing them.
- **Transitional justice hypothesis:** Visiting a transitional justice museum will increase support for transitional justice policies. This support is likely to be greater for non-retributive policies and for policies focused on victim compensation.

In Chile, the hypothesized effects above will be smaller for individuals at the right of the political spectrum and for individuals with close familial ties to victims.

4 The Chilean Case

4.1 The Military Dictatorship

Because many countries have constructed memorials and museums to commemorate the victims of political violence, our research proposal could be applied widely. Our analysis of the Chilean case provides initial insight to our questions, as Chile underwent a traumatic political episode that was followed by a democratic transition. Nonetheless, we believe that our findings in this case are illustrative of dynamics that take place in other contexts.

In 1970, socialist Salvador Allende was elected president of Chile. With support from the US, the Chilean military staged a coup, overthrowing Allende's administration and installing their own regime, which ruled until 1990. During this time, General Pinochet and a military junta oversaw a period of systematic repression. As in much of the Southern Cone and throughout Latin America during the Cold War, political dissidents were detained, disappeared, tortured, and murdered. In 1978, the military regime passed an amnesty law protecting themselves from future prosecutions for human rights violations - a law which remains in place today. In 1980, Pinochet established a constitution calling for a popular referendum eight years later, granting citizens the opportunity to approve or reject Pinochet in upcoming elections. In the 1987 referendum, 55.99% of Chilean voters voted "NO", initiating a democratic transition. In late 1989, Patricio Aylwin was elected president, though Pinochet remained Commander-in-Chief of the Army.

President Aylwin established the National Commission for Truth and Reconciliation, which released the Rettig Report in 1991, documenting over 2,000 disappearances during the dictatorship. Speculations that abuses were under-reported led to the creation of a second commission, the Valech Commission, which documented 80,000 political prisoners, 30,000 victims of torture, and 3,200 deaths.

Despite an amnesty law blocking most trials, human rights advocates, lawyers, and politicians have circumvented the provision, resulting in numerous trials and sentences for those convicted of human rights violations during the dictatorship (Collins 2016). Alongside these justice measures and truth-finding policies, individuals and the government have also established symbolic transitional justice measures, in the form of museums, memorials, and landmarks.

4.2 Chile Today

Chile is a suitable case to study of transitional justice museums. First, museum and memorial construction has taken place in the years since the democratic transition. Additionally, the transition happened over 25 years ago, ensuring that the issues we seek to study are less sensitive than in a country with a more recent transition. That said, the dictatorship and Pinochet's legacy are still debated among the general public. Many Chileans denounce the dictatorship altogether, while others believe that Pinochet helped their nation evade a communist takeover and instilled an era of economic growth (O'Brien 2013). Chileans are also divided with regard to compensating the victims of the dictatorship (Long 2013, O'Brien 2013). More recently, in 2015, a poll found that one in five Chileans maintained a positive view of Pinochet (Álvarez 2015). This split in public opinion provides an ideal environment where we can measure the impact of memorials and museums on individuals who have differing initial opinions on the subject. This allows us to 1) isolate the role of the museum without fear of ceiling effects and 2) investigate heterogeneity among those with varying perceptions of and relationships to the dictatorship.

4.3 Museum Establishment

Since Pinochet left power, Chile has invoked a number of transitional justice mechanisms, including reparations, two truth commissions, and trials for military officials. In the realm of symbolic transitional justice, several sites have emerged to commemorate the victims of the dictatorship. The history of the specific site we study, the MMDH, dates back to 2003 when President Ricardo Lagos and human rights NGOs agreed to finance a Casa de la Memoria (House of Memory). Newly inaugurated President Michelle Bachelet resurrected the idea and announced the construction of a state-funded transitional justice museum, which she inaugurated in 2010.

Necessarily, the construction of the MMDH confronted difficult decisions considering the information that would be included in the museum, the way it would be presented, and the narrative adopted by the museum itself. One such challenge concerned addressing opposition from Pinochet supporters while satisfying victim demands, resulting in a deliberate strategy to avoid blatantly polarizing material.

The museum's goals are note solely to examine the Chilean past but also to promote reflection on memory, solidarity, and the importance of human rights; in other words, the museum has reparative and public pedagogy objectives (MMDH 2017).

5 Research Design

5.1 Treatment description

To assess the effect of visiting a transitional justice museum, we utilize a field experiment. We randomly assigned university students to a treatment group or a control group. Treatment consisted of a museum visit, while those in the control group completed surveys to allow us to credibly estimate a treatment effect. In this section, we provide a brief description of our treatment - a visit to the MMDH.

To test the effects of this intervention, we recruited a random sample of students from the Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile (UC) in Santiago, Chile. We worked with the Institutional Research Office at UC to administer two surveys to a random sample of first, second, and third year undergraduate students (N=9,000). 1,857 subjects responded to our simple survey, supplying basic covariates. We also listed several museums in Santiago; respondents indicated which they had been to. We excluded participants who responded that they had already visited the MMDH. This left us with a total subject pool of 914.[6]

In March 2017, we emailed a survey to these 914 individuals, asking if they wished to participate in the research project and obtaining their availability during the research period (March 21-28, 2017). A total of 502 indicated that they wished to participate and provided their availability. Based on their responses, we distributed a survey to measure basic covariates as well as pre-treatment views on some of our key dependent variables, with the exception of those addressing Pinochet, human rights, or transitional justice. We opted to measure these variables only after treatment so as not to induce experimenter demand. Our experimental design is graphically depicted in Figure 1.

We invited 502 students to meet at a central location at UC's San Joaquín campus and randomly assigned them to treatment and control groups (251 in each). After arriving, we informed students whether they would visit the museum (i.e., be in the treatment group) or complete a survey in the computer lab (i.e., form part of the control group). While those in the treatment group boarded a bus to the museum, those in the control group completed an endline survey mirroring the one distributed to obtain pre-treatment covariates as well as the instrument administered to the treatment group after visiting the museum. We randomly assigned seating and asked subjects in both groups not to talk to each other during their participation, to mitigate social desirability bias and contamination. Each group was

[6]Despite our efforts to exclude individuals who had already visited the museum, we are aware of a small percentage who visited the museum between the administration of our baseline survey and the intervention.

Figure 1. Experimental design and number of participants at each stage.



accompanied by one of the authors and a research assistant.

On the trip to the museum, we distributed a museum map with highlighted stations [7], to ensure that participants' visits were as similar as possible. Upon arrival, our team gave subjects a Spanish language audio guide and asked them to meet at the entrance in one hour. Immediately after treatment, subjects completed a survey about their experience, which included questions designed to measure our key dependent variables. We emailed this survey to participants during their visit, and after the hour elapsed, they completed the post-treatment survey on their personal telephones or individual tablets we provided. This approach has the virtue of minimizing spillover among treatment groups by limiting the opportunities to discuss the experience before completing the survey. Additionally, the self-administered survey completed on a participant's own device may help to elicit honest responses to sensitive questions (Daly, Paler, and Samii 2017, Tourangeau 2007). To minimize contamination, we asked subjects to remain silent on the bus ride and to not share their experience with others for 10 days following their visit.

Both treatment and control consisted of 251 assigned individuals. 143 individuals assigned to treatment (57%) and 126 individuals assigned to control (50.6%) showed up at their assigned time. Note that both subjects who turned up and those who did not were unaware of their

[7] See Figure A1 in the supporting information (SI)

treatment assignment. In addition, five subjects who were assigned to the treatment group told us after checking in that they did not have time to visit the museum; we thus estimate the complier average treatment effect (CATE) adjusting for non-compliance.

Table 1 presents covariate balance; note that blocking was conducted on gender and ideology. For imbalances (likely arising due to our small sample size), we include control variables in regression estimates. Though attrition occurred *prior* to subjects' receiving their treatment assignment, we analyze average differential attrition rates among treatment and control groups as well as by covariates in the supporting information (Tables A1 and A2).

Table 1. Covariate balance on key demographic measurements.

Variable	Control	Treatment	$p - value$
Age	21.1	20.9	0.59
Female	64 %	63%	0.84
Ideology (1-10 scale)	4.5	5.1	0.03
Most common major	Engineering (10%)	Engineering (16%)	NA
Victim relationship (familial)	28%	20%	0.12
N	126	138	

5.2 Visiting the Museum

Visitors to the MMDH enter by descending a walkway framed by concrete walls displaying the United Nations's Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Upon entering, visitors can choose to use an audio guide (as noted, all our participants used a Spanish language audio guide). The museum's first floor contains the exhibit "Human Rights: A Universal Challenge," which describes cross-national experiences with crimes against humanity and policies invoked to address them. In addition, a map of Chile locates 160 sites commemorating human rights abuses during the dictatorship (Lyon 2011).

After climbing a staircase to the second floor, visitors find an open space with videos, text, and interactive exhibits recounting the events of September 11, 1973, the day of the military coup. Through press reports, fragments of Patricio Guzman's award-winning documentary *La Batalla de Chile*, and radio excerpts, the second floor details the repressive nature of the Pinochet regime. There is also an audio reproduction of Allende's famous radio farewell speech. Visitors are directed towards a dark room that shows how human rights abuses were committed in detention centers and contains accounts of repression and torture described by victims through video.

The second floor also recounts arrests during the Chilean dictatorship, restrictions imposed on freedoms of assembly and speech, and how the press manipulated information. It showcases peoples' search for political asylum at embassies and through exile. It also details Operación Cóndor, the United States' sponsored plan to ensure coordinated action between the leaders of dictatorships of the time in South America. As a whole, the second floor facilitates an emotional and empathic experience and reaction among visitors.

The third floor shifts the focus and describes the growing resistance to the Pinochet dictatorship and its eventual defeat. It details efforts by religious groups to assist victims and their families, documents local artists' resistance movements, and projects student-organized protests. A section recreates the 1988 plebiscite vote, carried out by Pinochet in an effort to validate his regime. By focusing on the actions of the resistance and the defeat of Pinochet, the third floor conveys a message of democratic triumph and hope for Chile's future.

5.3 Estimation

To estimate the CATE of a museum visit, our main specification estimates our post-treatment dependent variable while controlling for its pre-treatment level. This procedure is commonly used in experimental research to lower variance and increase power (Cilliers, Dube and Siddiqi 2016). When defining a complier, we consider all participants except for those five who said they did not have time to complete the museum visit. All calculations adjust for noncompliance.

We thus fit the following regression:

$$Y_{it} = \alpha + \beta T_i + \gamma \mathbf{X}_i + \epsilon_{it}$$

where $Y_{i1}(1)$ refers to the outcome of interest post-treatment for individual i at time t assigned to the treatment group, while $Y_{i1}(0)$ refers to the outcome of interest post-treatment for individual i at time t assigned to the control group.[8] $\mathbf{X}_i$ indicates a vector or pre-treatment covariate controls, including $Y_{i0}(0,1)$, or the pre-treatment outcome where applicable.[9] T_i indicates treatment assignment, and β estimates the treatment effect.

We report heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors to allow for heteroscedastic residuals.

[8] We consider five time periods: pre-treatment ($t = 0$), immediately after treatment ($t = 1$) and three follow-ups ($t = 2, 3, 4$).

[9] We did not obtain pre-treatment measurements of transitional justice dependent variables in an attempt to reduce experimenter demand.

We also recode missing values (which are minimal)[10] to their means.

6 Preliminary Results

6.1 Descriptive Results

We begin by presenting descriptive results of participants' perceptions of the museum. Anecdotally, our qualitative results suggest that an individual's ideological preference conditions his/her experience in the museum. After exiting the MMDH, we asked individuals about their perception of the museum. Two excerpts from these responses are illustrative.

> "Little objectivity, 100% politically charged with a tendency to ignore facts that are relevant for this historical period." - Subject self-scoring 8/10 on the ideological scale

> "Remembering is critical if we are to move forward. But Chile requires more than just remembering. The existence of this museum is fundamental and absolutely necessary for students of all primary and secondary schools and all universities. Everyone should come and remember, but it should be the first step in a longer process of reconciliation." - Subject self-scoring 3/10 on the ideological scale

By and large, our data align with the perspectives of these two respondents. As shown in Table 2, perceptions vary significantly along ideological lines. Those on the right are more likely to believe that the museum has a left bias and that it inhibits societal advancement (by focusing too much on the past). Meanwhile, those on the left are more likely to respond that the museum exceeded their expectations, impacted them emotionally, and that it is important for other Chileans to visit the museum. The difference among left and right individuals reporting that they learned new information in the museum, however, is not statistically significant. Our analyses below will take into account the heterogeneity of effects among individuals depending on their ideological position. Though perceptions clearly vary along ideological lines, our main results suggest that these heterogeneous perceptions do not preclude attitudinal change along our key dependent variables.

[10] For most variables, missing values comprise between 0 and 2% of our total observations. The results are consistent when we drop missing cases; see tables A13 and A14 of the SI.

Table 2. Perceptions of the Museum by Ideology

	Left	Right	$p-value$
The Museo de la Memoria y los Derechos Humanos...			
...objectively presented information	0.86	0.59	0.00
...exceeded my expectations	2.6	2.4	0.095
...impacted me emotionally	2.62	2.35	0.02
...inhibits societal advancement	0.12	0.73	0.00
...is important for Chileans to visit	2.82	2.47	0.00
...contained information new to me	.96	1.06	0.1
Observations	51	87	

6.2 Main Results

We turn now to our main results and consider evidence pertaining to our hypotheses.[11] We find that individuals, after visiting MMDH, are more likely to support institutions that opposed or are not associated with the dictatorship such as the church and democracy. At the same time, they express less support of institutions associated with the period of repression - most notably the police and military governments. We also find that support for victim-oriented and reconciliatory transitional justice increases.

6.2.1 Views toward political institutions

We find sizable support for our political institutions hypothesis, which suggested that after visiting a museum, individuals would be more likely to reject the political institutions associated with the military dictatorship and more likely to embrace those associated with democracy. Figure 2 documents our findings, showing that overall satisfaction with the government increases after visiting the MMDH (β = 0.15, p=0.04) as measured with a 4-point Likert scale where respondents could indicate 0 (no satisfaction/trust) to 3 (full satisfaction/trust).[12]

At the same time, trust and satisfaction in the police decline, particularly among those on the right (β = -0.15 and β = -0.10).[13] These effects, however, are not significant at the .05 level (p = .07 and p= .16 respectively). Decreases in military trust levels (β = -0.09) and

[11] Hypotheses are registered in an EGAP pre-analysis plan with ID number 20170321AB. We also registered additional hypotheses, the results of which may be reported in subsequent publications.

[12] The exact question wording is as follows: 1) Would you say you are very satisfied, satisfied, somewhat satisfied or not at all satisfied with the functioning of the government? 2) Please tell me how much trust you have in the government. Would you say you have a lot, some, a little, or no trust? These questions were repeated for the governmental institutions included in our results.

[13] This is likely due, at least in part, to floor effects among those on the left.

military satisfaction (β = -0.04) are also not significant, though the direction of the effect is in the hypothesized direction.

Importantly, satisfaction with democracy (measured on a 4-point Likert scale) increases following a museum visit by (β=0.14, p=0.03), particularly among those on the left (β=0.16, p=0.10). At the same time, support for a military government drops 11% after visiting a museum, particularly among those on the right, whereas those on the left were unlikely to support it from the start.[14]

After visiting the MMDH, individuals increase their trust in the church (β = .18, p=0.01). These results are particularly interesting because of the way in which the church is portrayed throughout the museum. The museum devotes a sizable exhibit space to resistance organized by religious groups and victim assistance provided by church organizations. In particular, it documents the *Vicaria de la Solidaridad*, a division of the Catholic church created by Pope Paul VI to lend support to the victims of the dictatorship. The organization was deemed threatening by the military government, and a few of its members and a former leader were kidnapped and brutally murdered in what became referred to as Caso Degollados (Slit-Throat Case). This suggests that the way in which the MMDH frames issues does indeed generate significant attitudinal adjustments.

We also investigate conditional average treatment effects based on individuals' pre-treatment ideology scores. We first present findings where we divide our sample into a left and right section according to their responses on a 1-10 ideological placement pre-treatment (with higher numbers indicating ideologies more toward the right). In addition, we run a regression with treatment and ideology interacted as an independent variable (see supporting information). Though our small sample size means that many of these calculations lack the statistical power to detect significant treatment effects, several findings are worth noting.

First, those on the right and the left respond differently to the museum treatment. Compared to their counterparts in the control group, those treated on the right decrease their acceptance of a military government by 17%. Those treated on the right also respond to treatment by reporting lower satisfaction and trust in the police, though their trust and satisfaction with the military remains largely unchanged. Because individuals on the left already had negative views of the police and military governments prior to treatment, this significant change among those on the right suggest increased convergence on these issues. The same phenomenon occurs for trust in the church; the increased trust noted earlier largely results from increases among those on the left, who had more negative views prior to treatment.

[14]Measured before treatment, only 6 individuals on the left agreed with the statement that they would "support a military government in favor of a democratic one if things got very bad."

Figure 2. Political institutions treatment effects.



Notes: Regression coefficients on treatment variable, with the dependent variable measured longitudinally, as indicated by the x-axis. Thick lines represent one standard error. Thin lines represent 95% confidence intervals. All questions measured on 0-3 Likert scale unless otherwise noted (in parentheses).

Figure 2 also considers victims separately. We note that victims who visit the museum increase their trust in the church after treatment, perhaps due to the integral role the church played in assisting victims during and after repression.

Turning now to the evidence concerning transitional justice, our hypothesis that visiting the museum would increase support for transitional justice policies receives mixed support, as shown in Figure 3. After visiting the MMDH, subjects are less likely to report that they believe that dwelling on the past prevents progress in Chile (β=-0.32, $p = 0.03$). They also express greater support for victim compensation (β=0.19, $p = 0.00$) and for a public apology from the military (β=0.18, $p = 0.09$), though the latter is significant at the 10% level. These findings suggest increased empathy with victims, while the lack of significant results concerning judicial action or individualized accountability suggest that policies that advance an "eye for an eye" approach to transitional justice receive less support. In addition, visitors are more likely to say that those who committed crimes during the dictatorship should be pardoned ($\beta = 0.22$, p =0.02). This lends support to the notion that after visiting the museum, individuals adopt a more reconciliatory approach to the events that transpired.

Those on the right experience a significant increase in support for victim compensation while expressing sizable disagreement with the notion that compensation should come from those who specifically committed crimes. At the same time, those on the left significantly increase their support for pardoning perpetrators. Again, these changes represent a convergence in views as a result of visiting the MMDH.

Still, the lack of support for many transitional justice policies is a bit surprising, but it can help to assuage fears that our results are driven by social desirability bias or experimenter demand. We have mentioned several reasons why we do not believe our findings are the result of participants responding to the museum in a way that they felt would be palatable to their peers, society, or the research team. First, we took many precautions to limit individuals' interactions during the experiment so that participants could not infer the preferences of others. Additionally, we allowed participants to complete surveys in privacy, on personal handheld devices, many of which were subjects' own cell phones, and we reminded them that their responses would be kept anonymous. Further, public opinion in Chile remains divided on many of the issues we asked about, and there does not exist a clear, socially desirable response. Additionally, the museum does not explicitly address transitional justice, and it is unclear that some types of transitional justice policies - such as those that we found to be significantly different after a museum visit - would be more socially desirable than others - such as those that were unchanged.

Figure 3. Transitional justice treatment effects.



Notes: Regression coefficients on treatment variable, with dependent variables across the x-axis.Thick lines represent one standard error. Thin lines represent 95% confidence intervals. All items measured on a Likert scale (points denoted in parentheses).

Again, we consider the subset of our sample whose direct family members were victimized during the dictatorship. Of note, those treated in this population disagree with the notion that dwelling on the past makes advancement difficult, likely a result of their positive experience in the museum.

6.3 Durability of Effects

When individuals' attitudes change, a key question concerns the persistence of that change. While some research has shown that effects are fleeting (Gerber et al. 2010) other accounts suggest that changes persist months down the line (Broockman and Kalla 2016, Cilliers, Dube and Siddiqi 2016). We lack a clear understanding, however, of the mechanism that results in durable versus ephemeral change. This makes it fairly difficult to predict whether changes from a museum visit will be durable. We aim to help refine this puzzle by estimating the longevity of shifts resulting from a museum visit.

To test the durability of our results, we administered a follow-up survey one week after treatment.[15] After 8 weeks, we administered a second follow up survey with increased attrition. A final follow-up survey was distributed a full 24 weeks (roughly 6 months) after treatment. Unfortunately, many of our original participants did not respond, limiting our sample size ($n = 131$), but we nonetheless analyzed whether or not our original findings remained strong after the initial intervention.

By and large, the patterns discussed in the previous section are sustained, but their significance levels diminish after one week as shown in Figure 4. This may be because we have a relatively underpowered sample due to attrition. Though many of the results from the follow up suggest substantively similar results to those we obtained immediately after treatment, our small sample precludes us from estimating these results with the same precision. Several results are worth noting. First, we consider individuals' support for pardoning perpetrators; we still note that those in the treatment group are more likely to support pardoning those who were implicated in human rights violations, though the results are no longer statistically significant at conventional levels ($\beta = 0.20$, p=0.16). Similarly, participants were still more likely in the treatment group to report satisfaction with the government, to support victim compensation, to trust the church, and to disagree with the notion that dwelling in the past makes it difficult for Chile to advance. Thus, even six months after the visit, the evidence suggests that participants maintain many of their convictions and in particular, their support

[15] As shown in Table A1 in the supporting information (SI), a small proportion of subjects did not respond to this follow-up.

of victim-centered, restorative solutions. This finding accords with other research that holds that individuals in post-repression or post-conflict settings express desires for restorative - rather than retributive - means to address the past (Aguilar, Balcells, and Cebolla 2011).

6.4 Mechanisms

Thus far, our results suggest that transitional justice museums generate sizable attitudinal shifts with regard to political institutions and views toward modern-day policies. We have argued that museums' narrative of past events can both impart knowledge and elicit emotional reactions among their visitors. In this section, we shed some light on these mechanism. Regarding learning, we asked participants who visited the MMDH to indicate if the information in the museum was new to them, with only 13.14% ($n = 18$) indicating that it was. Thus, while it is certainly likely that students learned some new facts while visiting the museum, most of them had also previously been exposed to the topic.

Regarding the emotional pathway, on both pre-treatment and post-treatment surveys in the treatment and control group, we asked participants to respond to the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS) (Watson 1988). This construct, used often in psychology, asks respondents to consider a slew of positive and negative emotions and indicate how much they feel that way in the present moment. We consider both an aggregate of positive and negative emotions as well as their component pieces.

First, we consider the positive emotions constituting the scale. As shown in Figure 5, those in the treatment group are more likely to feel inspired - perhaps due to the positive message conveyed by the museum or the desire to want to enact change after leaving the MMDH. Additionally, participants are more likely to feel interested and less likely to feel active and enthusiastic, with some differences along ideological lines.

Next, we consider negative emotions in Figure 6. Museum visitors are more likely to feel scared, fearful, embarrassed, hostile, afraid, guilty, disgusted, and tense than those in the control group. Ideological differences are minimal, though it appears that relationships to victims may mute the emotional impact of visiting a museum. These findings warrant future research, as increases in negative emotions such as fear have been hypothesized to impede peace processes (Bar-Tal 2001).

Figure 4. Durability of treatment effects.



Notes: Regression coefficients on treatment variable, with the dependent variable measured longitudinally, as indicated by the x-axis. Thick lines represent one standard error. Thin lines represent 95% confidence intervals. Question scales denoted in plot title.

Figure 5. Positive emotions treatment effects.



Notes: Regression coefficients on treatment variable, with the dependent variable measured longitudinally, as indicated by the x-axis. Thick lines represent one standard error. Thin lines represent 95% confidence intervals.

Figure 6. Negative emotions treatment effects.



Notes: Regression coefficients on treatment variable, with the dependent variable measured longitudinally, as indicated by the x-axis. Thick lines represent one standard error. Thin lines represent 95% confidence intervals.

Taken together, the positive and negative results provide suggestive evidence that the emotional experience of a museum may act as a mediating variable when we consider our dependent variables. This interpretation coheres with existing studies in political psychology that have found that emotional reactions to information drive attitudinal change. Halperin, Porat, Tamir, and Gross (2013) find that when individuals in post-conflict settings are exposed to anger-inducing information concerning the conflict, they are more likely to support aggressive policies. On a more general level, the notion that affect can influence attitudes and behaviors is well supported by psychological research (Clore 2005).

7 Conclusion

This project analyzes the impact of visiting a transitional justice museum in a post-conflict or post-repressive society. To the best of our knowledge, it is the first of its kind. We conducted a field experiment and leveraged random assignment to test the hypotheses that visiting a museum increases support for democratic institutions, and generates meaningful changes in

individuals' propensity to support transitional justice policies. We find that after visiting the MMDH, individuals increase their support for institutions associated with democracy and reconciliatory transitional justice policies. At the same time, they decrease their support for institutions associated with the repression during the Pinochet dictatorship. Taken together, we provide initial evidence that the treatment, the museum visit, constitutes an emotive experience that generates attitudinal changes and convergence on contentious issues.

Now that we have attempted to address whether museums promote reconciliation, we discuss the generalizability of our results on two dimensions. First, can we generalize our findings beyond Chile? Though we believe that our evidence is unlikely specific to Chile, much time has passed since Chile's transition, our study was conducted among non-victims, and the museum commemorates a repressive period rather than a civil war. However, as we highlighted throughout, the museum's construction, content, and approach are not unique, they are similar to those found in transitional justice museums in Cambodia, Peru, Rwanda, and elsewhere. Hence, some of our findings - including the emotional impact of visiting museums and memorials - are likely to travel. Importantly, our research design is highly portable and can be easily implemented in other post-conflict or post-repression societies to further our understanding of the specificity and generalizability of museums as a transitional justice tool.

Second, our findings are based on a sample of university students. From a policy standpoint, findings drawn from this population are particularly informative; most of the museum's visitors are young, and it is a common destination for high school field trips. Thus, our findings are likely to extend to many of the museum's quotidian visitors. For governments constructing transitional justice museums as part of their transitional justice and reconciliation policies, this group is also particularly consequential. For example, in Germany, the government promotes student visits to Nazi concentration and extermination camps; knowing the impacts of these visits is thus valuable in evaluating policy initiatives in other contexts. After all, affecting the beliefs and attitudes of the post-dictatorship generation can yield long-lasting societal benefits.

As a whole, our results point to the effectiveness of transitional justice museums after political violence. The construction of these museums is one policy among many, and future research should investigate the trade-offs and effectiveness of different policies available to transitioning governments, including trials and truth commissions, reparations, and other symbolic measures. Such questions constitute the frontier of future transitional justice research.

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8 Supporting Information (SI)

8.1 Additional results: Divisive political issues

One additional finding not included in the main body of the paper is that a visit to the museum influences visitors' attitudes toward current policies or divisive political issues. As one participant writes:

> "The experience of reliving the events of the past made me realize how much we still lack being an inclusive democracy and guaranteeing the rights of everyone. You could appreciate how the cleavage between rich and poor was very salient during the dictatorship and still today...they still lack employment and they are always hungry which is normal in a country that favors the interests of the businesspeople and not regular people."

In this vein, we find that individuals heighten their concern with economic inequality in Chilean society. The OECD ranks Chile as the country with the second highest level of income inequality (after Mexico) (OECD 2016). Present levels of economic inequality are often linked to the neoliberal policies and the "economic miracle" that characterized the Pinochet dictatorship. Still, modern-day inequality is not a topic covered throughout the content of the museum, so any changes in views concerning this phenomenon would likely stem from an individuals' prior concern with the topic and/or the museum's effort to provoke and influence thinking concerning contemporary social justice topics. Before and after visiting the museum, subjects indicated their agreement with a statement asserting that inequality is a problem in Chilean society. Overall, as Table 3 reports, participants who visited the museum are more likely to believe that inequality is a problem in Chilean society. These effects are higher on the right. Because individuals on the left are more likely to hold views that inequality is problematic, these findings therefore offer preliminary indications that individuals on the right and left might be moving closer together on divisive issues - even those not factoring prominently into the museum content - after visiting a transitional justice museum.[16]

include this as a note in the table: Each row represents a separate t-test on the variable specified in the left-most column. All variables are measured along a 4-point Likert scale

[16] Also, these findings might be supportive of a reconciliatory effect of the museum because, as Tepperman (2002) indicates, a reconciliation process connotes a process of "nation building" that implies addressing fundamental social inequalities.

Table A1. Perceptions of Inequality after visiting the MMDH

Divisive Political Issues	**Total population**		
	β	SE	$p-value$
Inequality is a problem in Chilean society *(0-4 scale)*	0.130	0.065	0.049*
Observations		264	

$^{+}$p<0.1; *p<0.05; **p<0.01

(from 0 = no agreement to 3 = complete agreement (i.e., higher values indicating higher levels of agreement)).

8.2 Full regression results

Table A2. Each row represents a separate regression of the outcome shown in the first column on treatment assignment. All items are measured on a 4 point Likert scale unless otherwise noted. The following variables are not displayed: the baseline outcome variable, and the interaction of the baseline outcome variable with time, ideology, gender, victim relationship, and age. Heteroscedastic consistent robust SEs.

	Total population		
	β	SE	$p-value$
Support for			
Democracy *(0-3 scale)*	0.137	0.063	0.031*
Military government *(0-1 scale)*	-0.113	0.036	0.002**
Satisfaction with			
Government *(0-3 scale)*	0.15	0.071	0.036*
Military *(0-3 scale)*	-0.039	0.072	0.610
Police *(0-3 scale)*	-0.103	0.071	0.155
Trust in			
Government *(0-3 scale)*	0.094	0.072	0.20
Military *(0-3 scale)*	-0.09	0.068	0.193
Police *(0-3 scale)*	-0.152	0.081	0.066*
Church *(0-3 scale)*	0.180	0.070	0.012*
Observations		264	

$^{+}$p<0.1; *p<0.05; **p<0.01

Table A3. Each row represents a separate regression of the outcome shown in the first column on treatment assignment. The following variables are not displayed: the baseline outcome variable, and the interaction of the baseline outcome variable with time, ideology, gender, and age. Heteroscedastic consistent robust SEs. Right and left columns represent regressions subsetted to those falling on each side of the ideological spectrum. The interaction column presents estimates from a regression specification that includes ideology (measured on a 10-point-scale) interacted with treatment assignment.

	Right			**Left**			**Interaction**		
	β	SE	$p-value$	β	SE	$p-value$	β	SE	$p-value$
Support for									
Democracy	0.101	0.089	0.254	0.161	0.095	0.096^{+}	-0.020	0.035	0.590
Military government	-0.170	0.051	0.001^{**}	-0.002	0.044	0.990	-0.010	0.019	0.630
Satisfaction with									
Government	0.079	0.087	0.384	0.255	0.130	0.054^{+}	-0.035	0.037	0.360
Military	0.006	0.095	0.980	-0.136	0.113	0.238	0.011	0.033	0.770
Police	-0.172	0.095	0.075^{+}	0.046	0.112	0.706	-0.003	0.034	0.968
Trust in									
Government	0.066	0.084	0.452	0.137	0.1334	0.319	0.019	0.039	0.645
Military	-0.026	0.086	0.793	-0.153	0.111	0.175	-0.009	0.030	0.780
Police	-0.192	0.103	0.066^{+}	-0.092	0.132	0.510	-0.032	0.039	0.425
Church	0.121	0.094	0.210	0.262	0.126	0.040^{*}	-0.061	0.032	0.058^{+}
Observations		156			108			264	

$^{+}$p<0.1; *p<0.05; **p<0.01

Table A4. Each row represents a separate regression of the outcome shown in the first column on treatment assignment. All items are measured on a 4 point Likert scale unless otherwise noted. The following variables are not displayed: the baseline outcome variable, and the interaction of the baseline outcome variable with time, ideology, gender, and age. Heteroscedastic consist robust SEs.

	Victim family		
	β	SE	$p-value$
Support for			
Democracy *(0-3 scale)*	0.195	0.177	0.285
Military government *(0-1 scale)*	-0.147	0.081	0.077^{+}
Satisfaction with			
Government *(0-3 scale)*	0.120	0.162	0.479
Military *(0-3 scale)*	-0.046	0.192	0.843
Police *(0-3 scale)*	-0.204	0.156	0.203
Trust in			
Government *(0-3 scale)*	0.243	0.170	0.166
Military *(0-3 scale)*	-0.146	0.154	0.359
Police *(0-3 scale)*	0.018	0.200	0.961
Church *(0-3 scale)*	0.414	0.140	0.005^{**}
Observations		62	

$^{+}$p<0.1; *p<0.05; **p<0.01

Table A5. Each row represents a separate regression of the outcome shown in the first column on treatment assignment. All items are measured on a Likert scale with number of points denoted in parentheses. The following variables are not displayed: the baseline outcome variable, and the interaction of the baseline outcome variable with time, ideology, gender, and age. Heteroscedastic consistent robust SEs.

Transitional Justice Dependent Variables	**Total population**		
	β	SE	$p-value$
The obsession with the past makes it difficult for Chile to advance *(0-4 scale)*	-0.320	0.147	0.032*
The military dictatorship has not been held accountable *(0-4 scale)*	-0.011	0.115	0.958
The families of the disappeared should be compensated *(0-3 scale)*	0.187	0.076	0.015**
Those involved in the dictatorship should be investigated and punished *(0-3 scale)*	0.038	0.088	0.685
The military should make a public apology *(0-3 scale)*	0.182	0.105	0.088+
Those responsible for committing crimes should be forced to apologize *(0-3 scale)*	0.153	0.134	0.262
Those responsible for committing crimes should compensate the victims *(0-3 scale)*	-0.040	0.130	0.787
Those responsible for committing crimes should be pardoned *(0-3 scale)*	0.217	0.092	0.020*
Observations		264	

+p<0.1; *p<0.05; **p<0.01

Table A6. Each row represents a separate regression of the outcome shown in the first column on treatment assignment. The following variables are not displayed: the baseline outcome variable, and the interaction of the baseline outcome variable with time, ideology, gender, victim relationship, and age. Right and left columns represent regressions subsetted to those falling on each side of the ideological spectrum. The interaction column presents estimates from a regression specification that includes ideology (measured on a 10-point-scale) interacted with treatment assignment. Heteroscedastic consistent robust SEs.

	Right			**Left**			**Interaction**		
	β	SE	$p-value$	β	SE	$p-value$	β	SE	$p-value$
The obsession with the past makes it difficult for Chile to advance	-0.243	0.179	0.182	-0.349	0.189	0.070^{+}	0.037	0.071	0.612
The military dictatorship has not been held accountable	-0.004	0.142	1.012	-0.013	0.194	0.982	0.008	0.060	0.924
The families of the disappeared should be compensated	0.214	0.104	0.042*	0.178	0.116	0.134	0.019	0.039	0.641
Those involved in the dictatorship should be investigated and punished	0.072	0.114	0.546	0.002	0.133	1.023	0.013	0.040	0.772
The military should make a public apology	0.212	0.148	0.159	0.140	0.155	0.382	0.010	0.047	0.861
Those responsible for committing crimes should be forced to apologize	0.174	0.179	0.344	0.145	0.218	0.527	-0.040	0.066	0.566
Those responsible for committing crimes should compensate the victims	-0.118	0.163	0.489	0.103	0.225	0.672	-0.011	0.066	0.895
Those responsible for committing crimes should be pardoned	0.227	0.134	0.096^{+}	0.244	0.129	0.064^{+}	0.022	0.049	0.674
Observations		156			108			264	

$^{+}$p<0.1; *p<0.05; **p<0.01

Table A7. Each row represents a separate regression of the outcome shown in the first column ontreatment assignment. All items are measured on a 4 point Likert scale. The following variables are not displayed: the baseline outcome variable, and the interaction of the baseline outcome variable with time, ideology, gender, and age. Heteroscedastic consistent robust SEs.

	Victim family		
	β	SE	$p-value$
The obsession with the past makes it difficult for Chile to advance	-0.556	0.340	0.112
The military dictatorship has not been held accountable	0.045	0.217	0.863
The families of the disappeared should be compensated	0.084	0.147	0.591
Those involved in the dictatorship should be investigated and punished	-0.109	0.191	0.592
The military should make a public apology	-0.074	0.223	0.769
Those responsible for committing crimes should be forced to apologize	0.210	0.286	0.492
Those responsible for committing crimes should compensate the victims	-0.143	0.271	0.623
Those responsible for committing crimes should be pardoned	0.097	0.219	0.684
Observations		62	

$^{+}$p<0.1; *p<0.05; **p<0.01

8.3 Attrition

We analyze average differential attrition rates among treatment and control groups, as well as differential rates of attrition by covariates. As Table A1 shows, attrition did not vary significantly by treatment condition. For the administration of treatment, this was expected, as individuals did not know their assignment prior to showing up. Thus, we can rule out the possibility that subjects selected into treatment, or that those who had more favorable views toward the museum were the ones who visited. In follow-up rounds, we note that attrition rates are also stable across treatment conditions.

To measure whether or not attrition patterns differed according to subject covariates and treatment assignment, we run regression results where the dependent variable is an indicator variable reporting whether or not a subject showed up at her assigned time. To test for differential rates by covariates, we run a reduced model, without interaction terms and subsequently interact treatment assignment and subject's ideology and gender. Table A2 presents F-test results testing whether the interaction coefficient terms are equal to 0. As the results show, there does not appear to be differential attrition rates.

Table A8. Number of respondents by condition

Group	Total	Turned Up	Completed	1 week	8 week	24 week
Treatment	251	143	138	126	98	70
Control	251	126	126	106	83	61

Table A9. Differential Attrition by Covariates

	p-value
Experiment	0.67
1 week	0.14
8 week	0.21
24 week	0.85

Note: P-values from F test

8.4 Museum Map

Figure A1. Map distributed to participants prior to treatment. Subjects were instructed to visit only the highlighted sections to ensure a constant treatment.



8.5 Robustness Checks

To test the robustness of our results, we conduct two analyses: 1) we recode ideology and 2) we drop missing variables. Note that neither check jeopardizes the results found in the main paper.

8.5.1 Recoding ideology

In our original analysis, we coded right as those greater than 4 on a 0-10 ideology scale. To test the robustness of our results, we now code those greater than 5 as right and those less than or equal to 5 as left.

Table A10. Each row represents a separate t-test on the variable specified in the left-most column. All variables are measured along a 4-point Likert scale (from 0 = no agreement to 3 = complete agreement (i.e., higher values indicating higher levels of agreement)).

	Left	Right	$p-value$
The Museo de la Memoria y los Derechos Humanos...			
...objectively presented information *(0-4 scale)*	0.83	0.47	0.00
...exceeded my expectations *(0-4 scale)*	2.6	2.28	0.02
...impacted me emotionally *(0-4 scale)*	2.63	2.37	0.00
...inhibits societal advancement *(0-4 scale)*	0.2	0.98	0.00
...is important for Chileans to visit *(0-4 scale)*	2.8	2.3	0.00
...contained information new to me *(0-4 scale)*	1.00	1.13	0.11
Observations	83	55	

Table A11. Each row represents a separate regression of the outcome shown in the first column on treatment assignment. The following variables are not displayed: the baseline outcome variable, and the interaction of the baseline outcome variable with time, ideology, gender, and age. Heteroscedastic consistent robust SEs.

	Right			**Left**			**Interaction**		
	β	SE	$p-value$	β	SE	$p-value$	β	SE	$p-value$
Support for									
Democracy	0.164	0.122	0.192	0.166	0.074	0.027*	-0.020	0.035	0.592
Military government	-0.149	0.079	0.067+	-0.105	0.044	0.019*	-0.010	0.019	0.628
Satisfaction with									
Government	0.100	0.123	0.435	0.213	0.088	0.018*	-0.035	0.037	0.357
Military	−0.015	0.136	0.946	-0.065	0.093	0.506	0.011	0.033	0.771
Police	-0.172	0.156	0.284	-0.092	0.081	0.264	-0.003	0.034	0.968
Trust in									
Government	0.143	0.110	0.206	0.137	0.134	0.320	0.019	0.039	0.646
Military	-0.144	0.114	0.217	-0.075	0.087	0.408	-0.010	0.030	0.780
Police	-0.279	0.139	0.050+	-0.120	0.101	0.246	-0.033	0.039	0.424
Church	0.126	0.120	0.310	0.213	0.091	0.021*	−0.061	0.032	0.058+
Observations		89			175			264	

+p<0.1; *p<0.05; **p<0.01

Table A12. Each row represents a separate regression of the outcome shown in the first column on treatment assignment. The following variables are not displayed: the baseline outcome variable, and the interaction of the baseline outcome variable with time, ideology, gender, and age. SEs are clustered at the section level

	Right			**Left**		
	β	SE	$p-value$	β	SE	$p-value$
The obsession with the past makes it difficult for Chile to advance	-0.289	0.245	0.253	-0.284	0.155	0.071^{+}
The military dictatorship has not been held accountable	0.180	0.206	0.399	-0.098	0.139	0.501
The families of the disappeared should be compensated	0.429	0.156	0.008^{**}	0.132	0.088	0.142
Those involved in the dictatorship should be investigated and punished	0.044	0.158	0.811	0.069	0.103	0.521
The military should make a public apology	0.229	0.206	0.280	0.173	0.125	0.172
Those responsible for committing crimes should be forced to apologize	-0.202	0.236	0.410	0.306	0.165	0.068^{+}
Those responsible for committing crimes should compensate the victims	-0.091	0.236	0.725	0.012	0.1634	0.977
Those responsible for committing crimes should be pardoned	0.435	0.182	0.020^{**}	0.111	0.108	0.314
Observations		89			175	

$^{+}$p<0.1; *p<0.05; **p<0.01

8.5.2 Dropping missing values

Per our pre-analysis plan, we recoded missing values to their means. The following tables reproduce our main results while dropping missing values.

Table A13. Each row represents a separate regression of the outcome shown in the first column on treatment assignment. All items are measured on a 4 point Likert scale unless otherwise noted. The following variables are not displayed: the baseline outcome variable, and the interaction of the baseline outcome variable with time, ideology, gender, and age. Heteroscedastic consistent robust SEs.

	Total population			
	β	SE	$p-value$	Obs
Support for				
Democracy *(0-4 scale)*	0.113	0.062	0.072*	255
Military government *(0-1 scale)*	-0.112	0.037	0.003**	253
Satisfaction with				
Government *(0-3 scale)*	0.157	0.073	0.035*	253
Military *(0-43scale)*	-0.044	0.073	0.562	250
Police *(0-4 scale)*	-0.119	0.072	0.105	253
Trust in				
Government *(0-3 scale)*	0.073	0.073	0.329	253
Military *(0-3 scale)*	-0.119	0.070	0.091+	254
Police *(0-3 scale)*	-0.179	0.083	0.033*	254
Church *(0-3 scale)*	0.189	0.072	0.009**	254

+p<0.1; *p<0.05; **p<0.01

Table A14. Each row represents a separate regression of the outcome shown in the first column on treatment assignment. All items are measured on a 4 point Likert scale. The following variables are not displayed: the baseline outcome variable, and the interaction of the baseline outcome variable with time, ideology, gender, victim relationship, and age. Heteroscedastic consist robust SEs.

Transitional Justice Dependent Variables	**Total population**			
	β	SE	$p-value$	Obs
The obsession with the past makes it difficult for Chile to advance *(0-4 scale)*	-0.330	0.148	0.028*	258
The military dictatorship has not been held accountable *(0-4 scale)*	-0.018	0.117	0.908	257
The families of the disappeared should be compensated *(0-3 scale)*	0.187	0.076	0.015*	252
Those involved in the dictatorship should be investigated and punished *(0-3 scale)*	0.048	0.089	0.613	258
The military should make a public apology *(0-3 scale)*	0.194	0.106	0.071+	259
Those responsible for committing crimes should be forced to apologize *(0-3 scale)*	0.167	0.135	0.226	259
Those responsible for committing crimes should compensate the victims *(0-3 scale)*	-0.023	0.130	0.894	258
Those responsible for committing crimes should be pardoned *(0-3 scale)*	−0.215	0.094	0.023*	258

+p<0.1; *p<0.05; **p<0.01

8.6 Differences between baseline sample and experimental sample

1,172 randomly sampled university students responded to the initial version of our baseline survey. This version contained questions that measured basic demographics and covariates that would later be used for blocking (gender and ideology), as well as some more substantive measures of attitudes concerning the Pinochet dictatorship. We parsed responses to this survey according to whether or not the respondents ended up participating in our study (some were later excluded because they had already been to the museum or because they were unwilling or unable to participate). Table A8 shows that our experimental participants were more likely to be female than our original sample. Our participants were also less likely to approve of prosecuting those who were implicated in human rights violations during the Pinochet regime. We control for gender in all model specifications, and we find no significant results concerning the treatment's impact on views toward judicial action. It is possible that the imbalance in preferences toward prosecution could cause us to underestimate treatment effects on related outcome measures.

Table A15. Table A8 shows balance on measurements collected at baseline among nonparticipants and participants.

Variable	Participants	Nonparticipants	$p - value$
Female	69 %	62%	0.08
Ideology (1-10 scale)	5.03	4.81	0.24
Agreement with the following statement (0-4)			
Pinochet brought prosperity and order to Chilean society	2.84	2.95	0.38
Indicate if you think the event was very bad (0) or very good (4) for Chile			
Pinochet's detention in London in 1998	3.06	3.10	0.67
Prosecuting those implicated in human rights violations	2.38	2.76	0.01