

Diversionsary Cheap Talk: Domestic Discontent and US Foreign Policy, 1945-2006

Erin Baggott*

International Studies Association Conference, Toronto

March 28, 2014

Abstract

This study tests the diversionsary aggression hypothesis that domestic discontent breeds aggression abroad in US foreign policy between 1945 and 2006. It is based on a new, day-level event dataset of over 30,000 US diplomatic actions between 1945 and 2006, drawn from a new corpus of all 1.3 million *New York Times* articles on interstate affairs, 1851-2011. I theorize and confirm that a coalitionary diversion effect exists, with Democratic administrations responding to economic pain faced by labor interests. Republicans do not divert, in keeping with recent findings on differential partisan responsiveness to constituent opinion. Diversion takes the form of increased verbal but not material conflict. Verbal conflict boosts presidential job approval ratings, whereas material conflict does not. I conclude that diversionsary cheap talk allows presidents to garner the public opinion boost from rally around the flag effects without paying the cost of war. These findings advance the literature on the domestic and institutional explanations for foreign policy.

Word Count: 12,363 (including notes and references)

Key Words: diversionsary war, international relations, domestic politics

*The author is a doctoral candidate at the Harvard University Department of Government. For helpful comments and suggestions, I am grateful to Adam Breuer, Ruth Carlitz, Adam Glynn, Alexander Hertel-Fernandez, Stephanie Hofmann, Konstantin Kashin, Robert Schub, Beth Simmons, Brandon Stewart, Arthur Spirling, Dustin Tingley, Yuri Zhukov, two anonymous reviewers, and participants at the 2012 Harvard Weatherhead Graduate Student Associate Workshop, 2013 Swiss Political Science Association Annual Congress, and 2013 UCLA COMPASS Conference. The usual disclaimer applies. Email: ebaggott@fas.harvard.edu.

1 Introduction

Elected leaders require popular support for continued tenure and agenda setting power. Diversionary aggression theory posits that should domestic support flag, leaders may seek to consolidate support by initiating a risky gamble abroad. The theory is therefore situated at the nexus of domestic politics and international relations, with connections to two level games¹ and theories of when leaders make policy initiatives public or private.² Early sociological proponents of the theory found that when conditions are unfavorable within a group, the group leader may provoke aggression toward the outgroup in order to consolidate ingroup support.³ Leader popularity is consolidated through either a “rally around the flag” mechanism in which group members patriotically unite to support the group, or through a “competence” mechanism in which leader ability demonstrated in war increases popular support. The second mechanism has been called “gambling for resurrection.”⁴ Diversionary aggression theory predicts the most external aggression when the ingroup is only moderately cohesive and supportive of the leader. It stands in contrast to many of the leading theories in the field, such as the unitary actor, rationalist explanation of war. It is a second image theory of international conflict, in which domestic pressures drive international behavior. In contrast to (monadic) democratic peace theory which predicts that democracies will be peaceful, the diversionary war hypothesis predicts that democracies are more likely to initiate conflict.⁵

However, the theory of diversionary behavior is incomplete. In particular, sub-state configurations of political power should significantly impact if and how leaders choose to divert. This paper makes three theoretical contributions addressing such domestic configurations.

¹Putnam 1988.

²Baum 2004.

³Coser 1956; Simmel 1955.

⁴Fravel 2010, 312.

⁵Mansfield and Snyder 1995.

I argue first that diversionary behavior will be targeted to satisfy particular domestic audiences. In general, Democrats are supported by and accountable to labor interests, while Republicans are supported by and accountable to capital interests.⁶ Presidents from each party should be most responsive to the coalition that elected them, and which is likely to re-elect them or to support candidates from their party in the future. In contrast to existing accounts,⁷ I therefore argue that Democratic administrations will be likely to divert in response to economic pain faced by labor interests, and Republican administrations will be likely to divert in response to economic pain faced by capital interests. Specifically, Democratic administrations will divert when unemployment is high in order to increase support among labor interests, and Republican administrations will divert when inflation is high in order to increase support among capital interests. However, I note that Democrats are more likely to divert than Republicans due to the “rigidity of the right” and an “issue ownership” bias which slow conservative responsiveness to constituent opinion.⁸

Second, *contra* existing accounts,⁹ I argue that diversion is more likely when government is unified because then leaders can take credit for diversionary successes, whereas under divided government, credit must be shared with the opposition party. We know from American politics that during unified government, blame for bad outcomes and credit for good outcomes are both concentrated for the president.¹⁰ I expect leaders’ propensity to gamble for resurrection to increase with the share of the winnings from gambling they get to keep: hence, more diversion under unified government.

Third, I argue that strategic leaders will exhibit verbal rather than material diversion. That is, they will verbally condemn but rarely physically attack diversionary targets. I expect this “diversionary cheap talk” to gain the benefits of rally around the flag effects

⁶Hibbs 1977.

⁷Brulé and Hwang 2010; Fordham 1998*a*.

⁸Egan 2013; Jost 2006.

⁹Brulé 2008.

¹⁰Edwards 1990; Nicholson, Segura and Woods 2002; Rudolph 2003.

while avoiding payment of the costs of war. I provide evidence that cheap talk does generate rally effects: presidential job approval ratings rise in response to verbal conflict but not in response to material conflict. Therefore, diversionary cheap talk is an inexpensive and effective strategy for US presidents who seek to increase their job approval ratings.

In addition to advancing the theoretical literature on diversionary war, this paper tests these hypotheses with far better data than previously available. The new data for this paper consists of over 30,000 US diplomatic events between 1945 and 2006 drawn from a new corpus of all *New York Times* articles on foreign affairs over this period. Events are classified into 20 specific types (such as praise, threaten, or coerce) and four aggregate categories (material cooperation, verbal cooperation, verbal conflict, and material conflict). Verbal actions are those that occur in speech only (such as appeals or rejections) while material actions are those that involve physical action (such as the provision of aid or the exhibition of force posture). This represents the most detailed and comprehensive event dataset for this period. Its granularity allows for a better examination of domestic coalitional effects, and for an examination of diversionary cheap talk for the first time. Though other datasets like Militarized Interstate Disputes 3.0 under the Correlates of War project¹¹ have greater historical range, they are censored in the sense that they only contain major events. While other day-level international relations event datasets exist, most notably King and Lowe (2003), they lack historical breadth, with most extending back only into the 1990s. Therefore, this new dataset is an advance in terms of detail and range. Modeling choices include fixed effects regression and Bayesian vector autoregression.

I find strong empirical support for the theories outlined above. For Democratic administrations, a one percentage point increase in unemployment is associated with 12.85% more verbal conflicts per month than the baseline average (significant at the 1% level), but no more material conflicts. Unified government is associated with over 25% more verbal and

¹¹Ghosn, Palmer and Bremer 2004.

material conflicts per month than divided government for both Democratic and Republican administrations (significant at the 1% level). Throughout, the estimates presented in this paper are conservative: I operationalize conflict as events the United States participated in, but if the sample is restricted to international events the United States initiated, the point estimates are larger and the statistical significance greater. This paper examines only the US case due to the wealth of data available on events, economic conditions, and public opinion ratings. However, future studies might broaden the analysis to OECD countries more generally. The broadest inference—that elected leaders verbally divert abroad to satisfy their core domestic constituency through rally around the flag effects, while avoiding paying the costs of war—should have theoretical traction in all democratic party systems. In the remainder of this paper, Section 2 reviews the literature, Section 3 advances a theory of diversionary behavior, Section 4 introduces the data, Section 5 presents the empirical analysis, and Section 6 concludes.

2 Existing Literature

Testing the diversionary aggression hypothesis has become somewhat of a cottage industry in political science. A recent review concludes that though the internal logic of diversionary war is “compelling and theoretically well supported,” the empirical evidence is “decidedly mixed.”¹² Several studies have found empirical support for diversionary aggression in US foreign policy.¹³ A commonly cited example is President Reagan’s 1983 invasion of Grenada following the incident in Lebanon in which 200 Marines were killed. Other incidents that have raised scholarly interest are President Clinton’s strikes in Serbia, Sudan, and Afghanistan

¹²Baum and Potter 2008, 48.

¹³Clark 2003; DeRouen 2000; DeRouen and Peake 2002; Fordham 1998*a,b*; Hess and Orphanides 1995; Howell and Pevehouse 2005; James and Hristoulas 1994; James and Oneal 1991; Levy 1989*a,b*; Morgan and Bickers 1992; Ostrom and Job 1986.

in 1998 and 1999 concurrent with his impeachment scandal.¹⁴ Other studies have found support for diversionary aggression in non-US and cross-national contexts.¹⁵

However, skeptics have amassed opposing evidence.¹⁶ Some go so far as to call diversionary aggression a “myth.”¹⁷ Others have piloted a middle course by putting conditions on the situations in which diversionary aggression holds. It is more likely between states with pre-standing rivalries.¹⁸ It is less likely when states foresee aggression from troubled adversaries and avoid provoking them.¹⁹ For example, other states appear to act more peacefully towards the United States when US domestic conditions favor diversionary aggression.²⁰ There is some evidence that mature democracies, consolidating autocracies, and transitional polities are more likely than other regime types to divert.²¹ There is also evidence that US presidents are more likely to use force in response to low approval ratings when faced with low congressional support.²² Finally, findings suggest that diversion can take heterogeneous forms. In the British case, there were rallies in the Falklands War and the Gulf War, but not in other cases in which rallies would be expected, such as the Korean, Suez, or Kosovo wars.²³

Overall, empirical findings on diversionary aggression are cross-cutting. Moreover, all of these studies suffer from problems of data and methodology. Many of the papers use Militarized Interstate Dispute data to test the diversionary aggression hypothesis.²⁴ MID

¹⁴DeRouen and Peake 2002, 192.

¹⁵Bennett 2000; Dassel and Reinhardt 1999; Davies 2002; Enterline and Gleditsch 2000; Gelpi 1997; Heldt 1999; Lebow 1981; Mansfield and Snyder 1995; Oneal and Tir 2006; Russett 1990; Sobek 2007; Tir 2010.

¹⁶Chiozza and Goemans 2003, 2004; Foster and Palmer 2006; Gowa 1998; Johnston 1998; Leeds and Davis 1997; Lian and Oneal 1993; Meernik 2004, 2000; Meernik and Waterman 1996; Moore and Lanoue 2003; Potter 2007.

¹⁷Meernik and Waterman 1996.

¹⁸McLaughlin and Prins 2004.

¹⁹Clark 2003; Leeds and Davis 1997; Miller 1999.

²⁰Fordham 2005.

²¹Pickering and Kisangani 2005.

²²Brulé 2008.

²³Lai and Reiter 2005.

²⁴Enterline and Gleditsch 2000; Oneal and Tir 2006; Tir 2010.

data is appealing because of its impressive time range, from 1816 to 2004. However, as Fordham and Sarver comment, “the MID data are not appropriate for analyses of U.S. decisions to use force, including tests of the diversionary hypothesis. The MID data set excludes several categories of incidents relevant to major theoretical arguments about the use of force and includes many irrelevant incidents.”²⁵ For example, they note, the MID dataset does not include the 1982 deployment of US Marines to Lebanon because the action was not technically part of an interstate dispute. In addition, many studies using MID data include Germany and Japan in their analyses, which have restrictions on the use of force, and Iceland, which has no military.

Perceiving this problem, scholars have used the International Military Intervention dataset coded by Pearson and Baumann (1993).²⁶ This dataset is limited insofar as it captures only the most severe episodes of international conflict, interstate territorial incursions. Other papers use quarterly force levels as a metric of US aggression abroad.²⁷ This is arguably a poor measure, as periods characterized by arms buildups (e.g. the Cold War) sometimes experience little actual conflict. Still other datasets such as Blechman and Kaplan (1978) on US political uses of force are similarly coarse.²⁸ This dataset records 383 presidential uses of force between 1945 and 2000, compared with 7,140 acts of verbal conflict and 6,228 acts of material conflict over the same period in my dataset.

A fundamental problem with all these datasets is the range of incidents that are theoretically relevant. The granularity of the data is significant because if diversionary aggression were to materialize, it might well manifest as saber rattling behavior below the outright invasion level—that is, as cheap talk designed to garner public support but not costly conflict. MID event types are limited to very aggressive military actions, starting with threats to use

²⁵Fordham and Sarver 2001, 455.

²⁶See e.g. Pickering and Kisangani 2005.

²⁷DeRouen and Peake 2002.

²⁸Used by Clark 2003 and Howell and Pevehouse 2005.

force and rising in aggressiveness through 21 categories, including threats to blockade, occupy territory, or declare war; shows of force; military alerts; troop mobilizations; territorial occupations; attacks; and war initiations. The bias towards explicit military action is even more pronounced with the International Military Intervention and political uses of force datasets. Diversionary aggression could manifest in two forms entirely absent from these datasets: less severe material provocations and the full range of verbal provocations. Less severe material provocations might take the form of obstructing another state's initiatives, reducing economic, military, or humanitarian assistance, expelling representatives of another state, or coercion. Verbal provocations might take the form of criticism, blame, disapproval, or condemnation of other nations. Verbal provocation, including cheap talk, is a prevalent and theoretically important form of international diplomacy. For example, criticism of the United States by Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and Hugo Chávez increased domestic support for these leaders and was often not backed by commensurate material measures.²⁹

This paper advances the theoretical proposition that acts of verbal conflict may be appealing to leaders as measures that can garner rally around the flag effects without forcing them to pay the costs of war. Diversionary cheap talk consists of actions designed to make a leader look tough on foreigners without resorting to military force, such as: disapprovals, demands, rejections, the reduction of relations, and protests. All of these theoretically relevant event types appear in my data, but not in MID or the other abovementioned datasets. Overall, the data currently used to investigate diversionary aggression are crude in terms of categories, sparse in terms of observations, insufficient in historical range, and entirely neglect low-level and non-military diplomatic initiatives.

²⁹Similar dynamics can emerge in autocratic regimes. A significant amount of the current Sino-Japanese conflict surrounding the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands takes the form of verbal protest, for instance. Following the publication of nationalist books such as *China Can Say No* by Zhang Zangzang et al. 1996, Beijing has been subject to public pressure to take a hardline stance on many Japan related issues, including the islands. For example, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs commonly receives packets of calcium mailed by citizens encouraging the institution to strengthen its backbone (Shirk 2007, 101). As such, aggressive statements toward Japan are often met with public approval.

3 A New Theory of Diversionary Politics

This study contributes to three theoretical lacunae in the literature discussed above: coalitional incentives for diversion (domestic interest groups), the form diversion would be expected to take (verbal versus material), and differential partisan responsiveness (rigidity of the right).

The Importance of Coalitions

H1: Liberal leaders are more likely to divert in response to unemployment (economic pain for labor), while conservative leaders are more likely to divert in response to inflation (economic pain for capital).

By focusing on unemployment as the main source of diversionary behavior, previous scholars assume that the US government is principally responsive to the labor coalition. I argue that different administrations will favor labor or capital coalitions depending on their partisan orientation. Specifically, liberal administrations are more likely to divert in response to economic pain faced by labor interests, and conservative administrations are more likely to divert in response to economic pain faced by capital interests. Leaders divert in accordance to economic pain faced by their party's core constituents, to whom they have made campaign promises and upon whom they are dependent for their own political capital and reelection as well as their party's seats in Congress.

This hypothesis is consonant with several decades of research in the political business cycle literature that suggest that governments are responsive to class coalitions.³⁰ One well-cited study of 12 Western countries finds that left-wing governments favor macroeconomic policies promoting low unemployment and high inflation, while right-wing and centrist governments favor macroeconomic policies promoting high unemployment and low inflation.³¹

³⁰Seminal studies include Hibbs (1977), Tufte (1980), Bartels (2000), and Hacker and Pierson (2011).

³¹Hibbs (1977).

Other studies find that US foreign economic policy³² and security policy³³ respond to domestic labor capital and coalitions. This study advances the latter category, demonstrating that foreign security policy is broadly responsive to domestic coalitional interests, even in the short term.

Before moving forward, consider the counterargument that my theory has it backwards: constituents should never be satisfied by a diversionary use of force, because they want their major economic concern addressed directly. This is generally the assumption in the diversionary literature. For example, Fordham (1998) argues the precise opposite of my prediction: that Republicans should divert in response to unemployment, and Democrats in response to inflation. This is, he argues, because each party has trouble dealing with these problems directly without offending their core constituency. Below, I show that diversion does work, even for core constituents. While they may remain unhappy about their core interest not being addressed, what is clear from the data is that (a) there is an incentive for presidents to verbally divert, insofar as doing so boosts their overall approval ratings, and (b) presidents do divert when their core constituents face economic pain, rather than the other way around.

This is a perhaps depressing finding for those concerned with citizen engagement with politics—it suggests that constituents can be pacified by foreign adventures in the face of more pressing needs such as jobs or credit. But it is not out of the ordinary: so too can success in American senatorial elections be predicted by candidate facial features rather than policy platforms; consider also low turnout and low knowledge of foreign affairs issues. Why would constituents be satisfied by diversion in the face of pressing economic concerns? The answer, simply, is the rally effect. The theoretical exposition of this effect has already been made many times elsewhere—this paper adds that it is strong enough to pacify even core

³²Frieden (1988).

³³Narizny (2003).

constituents. Liberal leaders are likely to divert in response to unemployment, conservative leaders in response to inflation.

Words, Not Deeds

H2: Strategic leaders are likely to pursue verbal, rather than material, diversion.

The second lacuna this study explores is the form of diversion. The rationalist view that verbal expressions are cheap remains prevalent in international relations.^{34,35} In contrast to the existing literature, I expect theoretical differences between verbal and material diversion. I argue that strategic leaders may choose to divert verbally instead of materially (i.e., engage in cheap talk) in order to gain the rally around the flag benefits of outgroup-demonizing language without paying the actual costs of war.³⁶

Some scholars suggest that citizens are discerning judges of leader performance in foreign affairs.³⁷ My data suggest that citizens are less demanding—not only can they be pacified by rally effects even when their core interests aren't being addressed, but they can be satisfied by lower level verbal threats that do not carry through to material conflict. Section 5.3 shows that citizens do, in fact, reward presidents for verbal threats. Existing studies have not been able to evaluate the difference between material and verbal diversion due to the lack of data on verbal conflict.

Differential Partisan Responsiveness

H3: Liberal leaders are more likely to divert than conservative leaders, all else equal.

³⁴Fearon 1995.

³⁵Aside from, of course, those which generate audience costs; see Baum 2004; Fearon 1994; Schultz 2012; Smith 1998; Tomz 2007; Weeks 2008.

³⁶Recall the two mechanisms at work in diversionary aggression theory: the rally effect and gambling for resurrection. In my explanation of verbal diversion, only the first mechanism is at work. Since verbal diversion balks at physical action, there is necessarily no competence in war that is demonstrated, barring the case in which verbal aggression leads the other side to clearly back down in a way that is visible to the aggressor state's domestic audience.

³⁷Tarar 2006.

I hypothesize that Democrats are more likely to divert than Republicans because of two reasons: differential partisan responsiveness to constituents and issue ownership. A large and growing literature finds that Democrats are more responsive to constituent interests than Republicans. One seminal paper compared the views of party leaders and supporters on a variety of issues, and found that Democratic leaders have “substantial consensus” with their supporters but that Republican leaders are more likely to hold views unpopular with their constituents.³⁸ More recently, political psychologists have found that conservatives are more ideologically rigid than liberals.³⁹ Conservatives are more driven than liberals by norm attainment, rule following, and orderliness,⁴⁰ and are “prone to expedient, closed-minded, and authoritarian solutions.”⁴¹ These findings support Adorno’s early, controversial hypothesis of the “rigidity of the right.”⁴² Indeed, Jost concludes that “The existing data provide very consistent support for the rigidity-of-the-right hypothesis... and contradicts persistent claims that liberals and conservatives are *equally* rigid and dogmatic” (662). Diversion is a method of increasing support among one’s constituents. Insofar as conservatives are less responsive to their constituents than their liberal counterparts, and seem to seek their support less, I expect them to be less likely to divert in response to their constituent’s economic pain.

The second reason liberal leaders are more likely to divert than conservative leaders is issue ownership. In a new book, Egan argues that issue ownership distorts responsiveness in American politics. Republicans “own” national security, crime and taxes, while Democrats “own” education, the environment, and health care. Members of Congress are less responsive to district opinion on issues they own. In particular, Egan finds that “Because party activists are especially ideologically rigid on their owned issues, they are significantly less responsive

³⁸McClosky, Hoffmann and O’Hara 1960.

³⁹Altemeyer 1988, 1998; Cunningham, Nezlek and Banaji 2004; Duckitt 2001; Jr. 1999; Sidanius, Pratto and Bobo 1996.

⁴⁰Carney et al. 2008; Tomkins 1963.

⁴¹Jost 2006, 667. See also Altemeyer 1988, 1998; Kruglanski 2004; Sidanius, Pratto and Bobo 1996.

⁴²Adorno et al. 1950.

to shifts in public opinion on these issues.”⁴³ Thus, conservative leaders should be less likely to be swayed by constituent opinion on national security issues.

Overall, the theoretical contribution of this paper is threefold. First, I theorize that diversion will be coalitional, with Democrats responding to labor interests and Republicans to capital interests. Second, I argue that diversion will be verbal rather than material, because cheap talk allows leaders to claim credit for standing firm against adversaries without paying the costs of war. Third, I note that partisan differences in diversion are likely, with liberal leaders diverting in response to constituent economic pain, and conservative leaders being less likely to take that pain into account when formulating foreign policy.

4 Data

The outcome conflict variable is generated from a new events dataset of 36,281 US diplomatic actions spanning 1945-2006. It is part of a larger dataset of approximately 150,000 global interstate interactions, 1851-2011. The events are drawn from the corpus of all 1.3 million *New York Times* articles with nation states in the title published since the founding of the newspaper in 1851.⁴⁴ The corpus was scraped from the internet using the computer programming language Python. A core script was distributed over 50 Condor servers and took 12 hours to complete. Each document in the corpus is an abstract consisting of a two to four sentence summary of the news article.⁴⁵

After the 1.3 million documents were downloaded, events were extracted from the text using Textual Analysis By Augmented Replacement Instructions (TABARI) 0.8.3b1 software⁴⁶

⁴³Egan 2013.

⁴⁴For a general discussion of the merits and limitations of text as data, see Grimmer and Stewart 2013, Schrodts 2012b, and Schrodts and Brackley 2013.

⁴⁵Article abstracts are used because full text articles are not available back to 1851. Moreover, the vast majority of event coding systems take lead sentences or titles as input. A full article is not necessary and indeed may create noise, as similar sentences tend to generate duplicate events. Abstracts that get to the pith of the news story are preferable.

⁴⁶Schrodts 2012c.

operationalized with the Conflict and Mediation Event Observations (CAMEO) ontology.⁴⁷

⁴⁸ A typical event consists of two nations and a directional verb, e.g. `US praises Canada` or `France condemns US`. The CAMEO ontology⁴⁹ was chosen because it is state of the art in terms of linguistic parsing and because it focuses on interstate behavior.⁵⁰ CAMEO general categories and the scale values assigned to them by Schrodtt are listed in Table 1. The scale of event severity ranges from -10 (most conflictual) to 10 (most cooperative).

Each of the 20 general event codes has 5-30 subcategories. For example, the general event code “engage in diplomatic cooperation” consists of eight subcategories: praise or endorse, defend verbally, rally support on behalf of, grant diplomatic recognition, apologize, forgive, sign formal agreement, and engage in unspecified diplomatic cooperation. “Exhibit force posture” consists of five subcategories: increase police alert status, increase military alert status, mobilize or increase police power, mobilize or increase armed forces, and demonstrate unspecified military or police power.⁵¹ Illustrative examples of event codings and the news stories from which they are generated are shown in Table 2.

Following Schrodtt, events are aggregated into instances of material cooperation, verbal

⁴⁷Gerner, Schrodtt and Yilmaz 2009.

⁴⁸This analysis made use of several workhorse software packages including *kountry* by Raciborski 2008 and *MSBVAR* by Brandt and Appleby 2007.

⁴⁹Schrodtt 2012a.

⁵⁰Students of text analysis generally must choose between three ontologies for coding interstate interaction. First, the World Event/Interaction Survey (WEIS) ontology was developed by Charles McClelland as one of the first systematic ways to code interstate events appearing in the news (McClelland 1984). Second, the Integrated Data for Events Analysis (IDEA) ontology was developed by the private company Virtual Research Associates as a backwards-compatible improvement upon WEIS (Bond et al. 2003). Third, CAMEO was developed by researchers at the University of Kansas and substantially expands the number of categories for the use of force. It has a particular focus upon third party mediation (Gerner, Schrodtt and Yilmaz 2009). CAMEO is chosen over WEIS because it combines WEIS event categories that cannot be systematically distinguished in machine coding, including promise/agree; propose/request; grant/reward; deny/reject; and warn/threaten (Gerner, Schrodtt and Yilmaz 2009). CAMEO is also chosen over IDEA because the former focuses on interstate behavior while the latter contains event codes for a wider range of behaviors (such as citizen direct action, strikes, and protests) (Schrodtt 2012a).

⁵¹A list of all subcategories from Schrodtt (2007) is available at <http://web.ku.edu/~keds/cameo.dir/CAMEO.SCALE.txt>. Note that “reduce relations” is coded as a verbally conflictual event because the general category refers to the reduction of diplomatic relations only. Several subcategories are coded as materially conflictual events, including: reducing aid (-5.6), halting negotiations (-6.5), expelling observers or peacekeepers (-7.0), halting mediation (-7.0), and imposing an embargo, boycott, or sanctions (-8.0).

cooperation, verbal conflict, and material conflict, as indicated in Table 1. An event is defined as materially cooperative if it involves a cooperative *action*, such as providing aid or yielding on a disputed issue. An event is defined verbally cooperative if it involves a cooperative *speech act* but no action, such as appeals and consultations. An event is defined as materially conflictual if it involves an aggressive *action*, such as coercion, displays of military force, and assaults. An event is defined as verbally conflictual if it involves an aggressive *speech act* but no action, such as disapproval, rejection, demands, threats, and protestations. The only event that is not assigned to one of these four categories is making a public statement, as this is a neutral event.

While event observations are at the day level, the data is aggregated into monthly averages because most of the explanatory variables are at the monthly level. Thus, for each month, there are data on the mean conflict score, as well as count data on the number of materially conflictual, verbally conflictual, verbally cooperative, and materially cooperative events. Mean monthly CAMEO scores by party are shown in Figure 3 in the Appendix.⁵² Material and verbal conflict and cooperation count data are plotted by year in Figure 4 in the Appendix.

The primary explanatory variables for international conflict are domestic unemployment (for Democrats) and domestic inflation (for Republicans). Data on the monthly seasonally adjusted civilian unemployment rate and the US Consumer Price Index are drawn from the US Department of Labor Bureau of Labor Statistics.⁵³ For capital interests, several proxies are used in robustness checks: GDP growth and the S&P 500 monthly average as a measure of US stock market performance. Data on GDP growth are from the US Department of Commerce Bureau of Economic Analysis.⁵⁴ The data are quarterly, but the quarterly statistic

⁵²Note however that this average masks many nuances due to the high frequency nature of the data (with over 500 diplomatic events per year) and the fact that most events hover around the zero level of minor statements.

⁵³US Department of Labor Bureau of Labor Statistics 2013*a,b*.

⁵⁴US Department of Commerce Bureau of Economic Analysis 2013.

is assigned to constituent months. Data on the S&P 500 are from Standard & Poor.⁵⁵

This paper adopts the standard controls in the literature⁵⁶, including logged US military capabilities; binary variables for the Cold War, ongoing crisis involvement, second term status, election year status, and unified government; a time trend; and interaction terms for *election* \times *unemployment* and *election* \times *inflation*. The logged Correlates of War Composite Indicator of National Capabilities (CINC) index is used as a measure of US military strength.⁵⁷ This data is annual, but is assigned to constituent months.⁵⁸ Data on US involvement in ongoing crises is drawn from the International Crisis Behavior dataset.⁵⁹ This data is coded as a binary variable indicating whether or not the United States is involved in an ongoing international crisis in any given year. I expect economic variables to be particularly salient in election years, and therefore include interaction terms for *election* \times *unemployment* and *election* \times *inflation*. Descriptive statistics for all variables appear in Table 5 in the Appendix.

5 Empirics

5.1 Fixed Effects Model

The modeling choice for this study is fixed effects with lagged dependent variables. This suitability of this choice for time-series cross-section data has been persuasively demonstrated by Nathaniel Beck and Jonathan Katz in a series of articles.⁶⁰ Fixed effects should be used in studies of US diversionary behavior because there might be administration specific omitted

⁵⁵Standard and Poor 2013.

⁵⁶See e.g. Pickering and Kisangani 2005, 31.

⁵⁷Singer, Bremer and Stuckey 1972.

⁵⁸I expect this not to introduce much post-treatment bias, as military capabilities and perceptions thereof move slowly. It is unlikely that they move in any significant way at the monthly level. Major US assessments of defense capabilities, after all, are quadrennial.

⁵⁹Brecher and Wilkenfeld 1997.

⁶⁰Beck 2001; Beck and Katz 1995, 1996, 2011; Beck, Katz and Tucker 1998.

variable bias—that is, something distinct to individual administrations that influences their conflict behavior, such as presidential priorities, proclivities, political power, and staff. Fixed effects model heterogeneity by allowing each unit (here, the administration) to have its own intercept. Additionally, Beck and Katz (2011, 341) advocate “including appropriate current and lagged values of the x ’s and lagged values of the dependent variable so that the resulting errors appear to be serially independent, enabling easy interpretation and estimation.” This is particularly important in applications in which current values of a variable can be expected to depend upon past values of a variable. This is most likely the case with monthly international conflict, particularly in regards to event data measures of conflict.⁶¹

An ordinary least squares model is employed to examine the relationship between domestic economic conditions and average monthly international conflict on the CAMEO scale. Negative binomial models are used to examine this relationship when the dependent variable is count data on the number of materially or verbally conflictual events per month. A negative binomial model is appropriate for over-dispersed count data (when the conditional variance exceeds the conditional mean, as it does here). The conflict count data is not particularly zero inflated, as only 8.33% of months have zero material conflicts and only 8.20% of months have zero verbal conflicts. Therefore a zero inflated count model is not necessary.

Throughout this paper, the preferred method is to run fixed effects models in split samples of Democratic and Republican years as opposed to in the full sample. Two reasons recommend split sample analysis. First, the interpretation of coefficients in the former method is more straightforward than the interpretation of the interaction terms in the full sample. Specifically, in the latter case, the lower order term on unemployment is occasion-

⁶¹While some scholars such as Angrist and Pischke (2009) and Brandt et al. (2000) caution against using lagged dependent variables in fixed effects models, they are appropriate here because they are significant and improve model fit, and because the data are stationary. Moreover, as Beck and Katz (2011) point out, bias is very small in large- T panels.

ally insignificant. Therefore the effect modifier must be de-meanned to interpret the effect of unemployment for Democrats. While this procedure is statistically sound, split sample analysis is more straightforward and intuitive. Second, in full sample analysis, it is impossible to include lower order terms for parties because they are collinear with administrations. The drawback of split sample analysis is efficiency.

Table 3 reports the association between monthly domestic unemployment and inflation and US conflict abroad. Conflict is measured with three dependent variables, as indicated: the mean monthly CAMEO score (ranging from most conflictual, -10, to most cooperative, 10), the number of materially conflictual events per month, and the number of verbally conflictual events per month.

Note that the appropriate interpretation of negative binomial model coefficients is the difference in the log of expected counts of the dependent variable associated with a one unit change in the explanatory variable. The incident rate ratio, $\exp(\beta)$, can be interpreted as the association between the explanatory and dependent variable, though statistically it is only relevant at its baseline. In this study, the baseline is represented by a monthly mean of 10.27 verbal conflicts and 9.08 material conflicts. In the discussion below, incident rate ratios are cited, simply calculated as $\exp(\beta)$.

Overall, fixed effects models suggest that Democrats exhibit diversionary aggression in response to economic pain faced by labor interests, while Republicans exhibit the opposite of diversionary aggression in response to economic pain faced by capital interests—instead of acting more aggressively, they adopt a more cooperative international stance when capital interests are under stress. In robustness checks, Republicans did not divert in response to labor pain either. Diversion only materializes for Democratic administrations and only takes the form of verbal conflict.

Specifically, for Democratic administrations, a one percentage point increase in unemployment is associated with 1.32 more verbal conflicts per month (significant at the 1%

level). This represents a 12.85% increase over the baseline monthly verbal conflict level of 10.27 events per month. For Republicans, a one index point increase in inflation is associated with 1.08 (11.89%) fewer material conflicts per month and 1.10 (10.71%) fewer verbal conflicts per month (significant at the 5% and 1% levels, respectively).

Thus, Democrats divert significantly and considerably in response to pain faced by labor interests, while Republicans do not divert at all. This divergent partisan finding is consonant with the growing literature on partisan responsiveness. The “rigidity of the right” hypothesis suggests that the conservative emphasis on dogmatism, order, and structure will lead conservative parties to bend to the will of their constituents more slowly than their liberal counterparts, while the “issue ownership” hypothesis suggests that insofar as national security is a Republican-owned issue, the Republican party should be more ideologically rigid and less responsive to public opinion shifts on this topic.

The unified government term is large and highly significant for both Democrats and Republicans. For Democratic presidents, control of Congress is associated with 2.36 (25.99%) more material conflicts and 2.77 (26.97%) more verbal conflicts per month, significant at the 1% level. For Republican presidents, control of Congress is associated with 2.25 (24.78%) more material conflicts and 2.77 (26.97%) more verbal conflicts per month, significant at the 1% level. This makes sense: as earlier scholars pointed out, presidents are less likely to use force under divided government because they are constrained by congressional opposition.⁶² It is interesting to note that if unified government is not controlled for, it appears that Democrats divert verbally and materially in response to unemployment instead of just verbally, as shown in Appendix Table 7. Thus, it is substantively important to include this

⁶²See Howell and Pevehouse (2005). Brulé and coauthors argue the opposite; see Brulé (2008) who argues that during divided government, presidents can only demonstrate competence by gambling abroad; Brulé and Williams (2009) who argue that unified government leads to more cooperative international behavior because leaders are able to demonstrate competence domestically; and Brulé and Hwang (2010) who argue that in bad economic times, leaders divert in order to preoccupy the opposition party and prevent them from passing an economic bill that harms the leader’s constituents.

control.

Additional findings include the following. Second term presidents appear to engage in fewer conflicts. For Republicans these effects are significant at the 1% level, indicating 2.70 (29.74%) fewer material conflicts per month and 2.69 (26.19%) fewer verbal conflicts per month relative to first term presidents. For Democrats the effects do not reach statistical significance, and the sign is only negative for material conflicts. This finding is consonant with a variety of mechanisms suggested in the literature on leaders, including learning, experience, the pressure to make good on hawkish campaign promises in the first term, and the lack of electoral pressures in the second term.⁶³

There is some evidence that the Cold War reduces conflict. For Republican administrations, the Cold War was associated with 3.08 (33.92%) fewer material conflicts per month and 2.61 (25.41%) fewer verbal conflicts per month relative to non-Cold War years (significant at the 1% and 10% levels, respectively). This is consonant with structural realist predictions that bipolarity is the most stable configuration of international power because miscalculation is less likely and there are fewer potential dyadic conflicts than in a multipolar system.⁶⁴ Historians like John Lewis Gaddis have argued that both bipolarity and the new threat of mutually assured destruction contributed to the “Long Peace” of the Cold War.⁶⁵

These results are robust to defining domestic discontent as GDP growth for Republicans. They are not robust to defining domestic discontent as presidential job approval, which is quite interesting insofar as it suggests that presidents look at economic indicators rather than poll data when deciding whether or not to divert. A more restrictive test of the diversionary aggression hypothesis is to define the dependent variable as the number of international events the US initiates rather than participates in. Thus defined, the magnitude of the diversionary effect increases. In eras of Democratic unified government, a one percentage point

⁶³Kahneman and Renshon 2007; Potter 2007; Quandt 1986.

⁶⁴Mearsheimer 2001.

⁶⁵Gaddis 1986.

increase in unemployment is associated with 1.92 more acts of verbal aggression per month (previously 1.32), significant at the 1% level. Results appear in Table 8 in the Appendix. These findings are also generally robust to lower order specifications. Vanilla OLS and negative binomial models are presented in Appendix Table 6. In this table, unemployment and inflation are significant determinants of conflict involvement for Democratic administrations but not Republican administrations. Lower order results are also robust to defining domestic discontent as GDP growth for Republicans.

5.2 Bayesian Vector Autoregression Model

This subsection presents results from Bayesian vector autoregression (BVAR) as a robustness check. The methodological skeptic of international relations data could still mount a critique of assumptions and identification problems at this time. This section is designed to satisfy such a critic with a Bayesian time series approach to modeling the relationship between domestic unemployment and international conflict: the BVAR model developed by Patrick Brandt and John Freeman.⁶⁶ Brandt and Freeman’s modeling approach has many advantages over those currently used in the field. The study of diplomatic processes is complicated by four problems: model scale, endogeneity, persistence, and specification uncertainty.⁶⁷ First, international systems consist of many causal relationships, which require multiple equations to model. Specifically, “students of international relations must account for the behavioral relationships of all important belligerent groups within and between countries. A separate equation is needed for each directed, dyadic behavior.”⁶⁸ Second, endogeneity is a problem because good behavior from one state is both a cause and consequence of good behavior from another. Third, persistence is a problem because some variables in the international system can move together (exhibit cointegration) over the medium and long run. Fourth,

⁶⁶Brandt and Freeman 2006, 2009. Specifically, this is the reduced form Sims-Zha BVAR model.

⁶⁷Brandt and Freeman 2009, 113.

⁶⁸Brandt and Freeman 2009, 114.

specification uncertainty can be a problem because models may overfit the data due to the imprecision of dynamic implications and forecasts created by the above three problems.

Earlier models of dynamic political processes (including autoregressive distributed lag models, time series cross-sectional regressions, reduced form vector autoregression, and simulation models) fail to address these problems, whereas BVAR addresses them all.⁶⁹ BVAR output is commonly depicted in the form of impulse response graphs. These graphs depict how a one standard deviation positive shock to the explanatory economic variable affects monthly conflict outcomes. The x -axis depicts time after the shock in months. The y -axis depicts the level taken by the dependent variable after the shock. This is a bivariate model with lags: there are no other controls in the system.⁷⁰

In the sample of Democratic years, a positive shock to unemployment causes verbal and material conflict to rise in the 24 months after the shock; while in the sample of Republican years, a positive shock to inflation causes verbal and material conflict to rise in the three months after the shock, and then sharply decay. Clear effects emerge in subsets of Democratic versus Republican years, as shown in Figures 1 and 2. For Democrats, a one standard deviation (i.e., 1.51 percentage point) increase in unemployment leads to a slight (0.1 unit) but significant increase in CAMEO cooperation in the four months after the shock (Panel A). This cooperative spike decays to zero in the following months, however. The one standard deviation increase in unemployment causes Democratic administrations to engage in significantly more material conflict in the 24 months following the shock (Panel B). There

⁶⁹Brandt and Freeman 2009, 114-116.

⁷⁰I follow Brandt and Freeman (2006) in adopting their default hyperparameter values for international conflict data (with the exception of a slightly tighter prior) and in using Sims-Zha likelihood-based eigenvector quantiles as the preferred Bayesian shape 95% error bands. Responses are based on an informed prior. These impulse response graphs were generated with the following settings: a 3-month lag, overall tightness of the prior, $\lambda_1 = 0.1$; lag decay, $\lambda_3 = 0.1$ where 1 is harmonic; standard deviation or tightness around the intercept, $\lambda_4 = 0.25$; standard deviation or tightness around the exogenous variable coefficients, $\lambda_5 = 0$; sum of coefficients prior weight, $\mu_5 = 0$, where larger values imply difference stationarity; dummy initial observations or drift prior, $\mu_6 = 0$, where larger values allow for common trends; frequency of the data for lag decay equivalence, $qm = 12$, which matches the lag decay of monthly data; a Normal-Wishart prior; and log-posterior fit measures are not estimated.

is considerable volatility in this effect, but 24 months later, Democratic administrations are engaging in roughly 1.5 more materially aggressive acts per month. Trends in verbal conflict are most clear (Panel C). The unemployment shock causes a clear and persistent increase in verbally conflictual behavior for Democrats over 24 months. At the end of the period, they average 1.5 more verbally conflictual events per month. Overall, Bayesian analysis for Democrats finds that an unemployment shock leads to large, significant, and persistent coalitionary verbal and material diversion.

For Republicans, a one standard deviation increase in inflation produces an initial significant spike in material and verbal conflict between months zero and three, however, this spike quickly decays to zero thereafter (Figure 2 Panels A, B). The effect is also rather small compared to the effect for Democrats; resulting in 0.4 more conflictual events per month at a maximum. As with Democrats, the shock also produces an unexpected increase in CAMEO cooperation (Figure 2 Panel C). This increase is significant but very small in magnitude; 0.035 on the -10 to 10 scale at a maximum. The effect decays to zero by the end of the 24 month period. Overall, inflation shocks produce a significant but small uptick in conflict for Republicans in the three months following the shock, but this effect quickly decays.

5.3 Rewards to Diversion

Finally, I show that presidents have a strategic incentive to behave as they do in the results above: the American public rewards verbal diversion. In Table 4, material conflict and verbal conflict have been added to the standard list of the determinants of presidential approval. Covariates from the literature include unemployment, inflation, GDP growth, time in office, divided government, war and scandal dummies, and administration dummies.⁷¹ The dependent variable is average monthly presidential job approval from Gallup as compiled by

⁷¹Berlemann and Enkelmann 2012.

Gerhard Peters for the American Presidency Project.⁷² The variable indicates the number of respondents answering “approve” to the question, “Do you approve or disapprove of the way [first & last name] is handling his job as President?”

Model (1), without administration dummies, is the preferred specification, on the logic that the strategic consideration of “to divert or not divert” would be formed by a president looking at the entire history of US presidential diversion without considering administration-specific effects. As shown, an increase of one material conflict per month (on a baseline of 9.08 material conflicts per month on average) leads to a 0.516 percentage point decrease in presidential job approval. This association is significant at the 1% level. An increase of one verbal conflict per month (on a baseline of 10.27 verbal conflicts per month on average) leads to a 0.444 percentage point increase in presidential job approval, significant at the 1% level. Thus, there appear to be clear approval benefits to verbal conflict and clear drawbacks to material conflict. When administration dummies are included in Model (2), the material conflict finding becomes insignificant, but the verbal conflict finding persists at the 10% significance level.

Theoretically, this indicates that verbal diversionary aggression—and more broadly, cheap talk at the international level—pays off at the domestic level. To my knowledge, this is the first empirical finding that this is the case. This analysis cannot show that US presidents recognize the benefits to verbal diversion, but it does provide evidence that rally effects materialize. The American public rewards its leaders for challenging other states, but not for engaging in material conflict with them. Thus, the incentive for presidents to verbally divert in order to boost job approval ratings exists.

⁷²Gallup 2013.

6 Conclusion

This analysis finds strong support for what I have termed the coalitionary diversion hypothesis. I find evidence of diversionary cheap talk at the international level motivated by economic pain faced by domestic coalitional interests. Democratic administrations respond significantly to unemployment rates, while Republicans largely fail to respond to inflation rates. This is consonant with findings that Republicans are less responsive to their constituents on national security issues because of ideological rigidity and issue ownership. The study also finds strong evidence that presidents elect for cheap talk (verbal diversion) over war (material diversion). This behavior is likely strategic given that an analysis of public opinion data and presidential approval ratings suggests that the American public rewards verbal diversion but not material diversion. For US presidents, cheap talk pays.

The distinction of verbal and material diversionary responses is an important conceptual advancement because it relates cheap talk to diversionary theory. Diversion stops at verbal behavior: while a one percentage point increase in unemployment causes Democratic administrations to engage in 1.32 more verbal conflicts per month (a 12.85% increase on the baseline rate) significant at the 1% level, it does not significantly cause Democrats to engage in material conflict. This tentatively suggests some reasons that diversionary war has persisted in the public imagination in films like *Wag the Dog*: the American public may hear presidents talk in diversionary language that does not carry through to realized behavior. Leaders find verbal diversion appealing because they are able to reap the benefits of rally around the flag effects without paying the cost of war.

Some additional interesting findings emerge. First, the study finds support for sizeable party differences in international cooperation. As indicated by *t*-tests, Democrats are significantly more cooperative than Republicans. They score 0.56 points (8.04%) higher on the CAMEO scale on average, and engage in 1.98 (19.98%) fewer material conflicts per

month. The only exception is verbal conflict, where Democrats are in the lead, with 2.23 (24.86%) more verbal spats per month. This suggests that matters of political philosophy and party platforms do carry through to international behavior: Democrats may criticize other countries frequently, but when it comes to actually fighting wars, Democrats tend to be doves and Republicans hawks. Second, the study also finds support for term differences in cooperation. Second term presidents are significantly more cooperative (both verbally and materially) than first term presidents. The effect is statistically significant for Republican presidents. This provides evidence that that the variety of mechanisms suggested in the literature (learning, experience, lack of electoral pressure, iterated interaction) do contribute to more cooperative international relations for seasoned presidents. Finally, the absence of one smoking gun is notable. Election season has no impact on whether incumbents decide to take on or shy away from new international conflicts. It is perhaps surprising that US foreign policy proves sensitive to domestic coalitional interests but not to election season.

In summary, this study brings a very large and theoretically motivated dataset to bear on the debate on diversionary aggression. Most importantly, it advances the literature on the domestic and institutional explanations for foreign policy. It finds sizeable second image effects for coalitions, parties, attributional incentives, and second term status. These domestic factors are able to influence US foreign policy considerably—increasing aggression from at least 12.85% to at most 26.97% above average monthly levels—and also in the short term, with spikes in verbal aggression apparent three months after an unemployment shock. The core finding is notable because while domestic coalitions have been shown to influence domestic and foreign economic policy, their ability to shape foreign security policy has been much less clear. Institutions of US foreign policymaking have been designed in many ways to insulate executive decision makers from what the Federalist Papers deemed the fickleness of public opinion.⁷³ The fact that domestic coalitional interests can still influence security

⁷³Madison 1788.

policy in such a system, to such a degree, and so quickly, is impressive.

While this study is limited to an examination of diversionary aggression in an advanced industrialized democracy, an open question is how diversionary aggression varies across the spectra of economic development and electoral accountability. In particular, the propensity to divert in autocracies with unclear channels of public accountability is a promising future research agenda. Another interesting agenda is a more clear explication of how leaders choose between the rally mechanism (in which verbal statements pay off) versus the competence mechanism (in which material conflict may be necessary). Outside of the diversionary war literature, the new dataset of 30,000 US foreign policy events over 1945-2006 constructed for this study is promising for numerous avenues of international relations research.

7 Tables

Table 1: CAMEO General Event Codes

Scale Value	Event Description	
7.0	Provide aid	} Material cooperation
6.0	Engage in material cooperation	
5.0	Yield	
4.0	Express intent to cooperate	} Verbal cooperation
3.5	Engage in diplomatic cooperation	
3.0	Appeal	
1.0	Consult	
0.0	Make public statement	
-2.0	Investigate	} Verbal conflict
-2.0	Disapprove	
-4.0	Reject	
-4.0	Reduce relations*	
-5.0	Demand	
-6.0	Threaten	
-6.5	Protest	
-7.0	Coerce	} Material conflict
-7.2	Exhibit force posture	
-9.0	Assault	
-10.0	Fight	
-10.0	Engage in unconventional mass violence	

Table 2: Illustrative Events

News Story	Source	Event(s)	Target
United States trade with China this year is surging tenfold from the 1972 level. Exports to China will reach \$840 million by year end while imports from China will total \$60 million.	US	cooperates economically	China
Chile's military Government has named a former finance minister to negotiate with United States copper companies over compensation for property nationalized by the previous Marxist Government.	US Chile	cooperates diplomatically cooperates diplomatically	Chile US
Canada Upset Over US Investments: The Canadian Government is increasingly concerned about American corporations.	Canada	makes pessimistic comment	US
Cuba Indicates Interest in Talks If US Ends Economic Blockade.	Cuba	expresses intent to meet or negotiate	US
Iran Due to Buy 30 Jet Fighters: Total Cost of the Grumman Planes Is 900 Million... Iran has reportedly accepted a United States offer.	Iran	agrees to cooperate materially	US
Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko arrives in Washington tomorrow for the first broad Soviet American talks in nearly eight months.	US Russia	cooperates diplomatically cooperates diplomatically	Russia US
Saudi Arabia and Kuwait Give Syria Pledge on Oil Embargo... Saudi Arabia and Kuwait have given President Hafez al-Assad of Syria firm pledges to continue the oil embargo against the United States.	SA Kuwait	imposes embargo, boycott, or sanctions imposes embargo, boycott, or sanctions	US US

Table 3: Unemployment, Inflation, and International Conflict

VARIABLES	Democrat sample			Republican sample		
	(1) Cameo Mean	(2) Material Conflict	(3) Verbal Conflict	(4) Cameo Mean	(5) Material Conflict	(6) Verbal Conflict
Unemployment rate	-0.0658 (0.121)	0.101 (0.0650)	0.121** (0.0573)	0.0577 (0.0824)	-0.0339 (0.0361)	-0.0441 (0.0358)
Inflation	0.0543** (0.0258)	-0.00215 (0.0105)	-0.000940 (0.0102)	0.0555** (0.0258)	-0.0322** (0.0127)	-0.0404*** (0.0128)
Second term	0.325 (0.287)	-0.118 (0.143)	0.0918 (0.129)	0.0285 (0.306)	-0.432*** (0.101)	-0.429*** (0.0940)
Cold War		-7.786 (624.4)	-9.956 (806.3)	0.845* (0.482)	-0.488** (0.227)	-0.416* (0.225)
Log military capabilities	-1.717 (2.488)	-2.340* (1.259)	-3.501*** (1.163)	-0.573 (1.917)	0.494 (0.879)	0.114 (0.870)
Election year	0.960* (0.516)	-0.243 (0.275)	0.164 (0.254)	-0.806 (0.557)	0.293 (0.284)	0.205 (0.266)
Ongoing crisis involvement	-0.116 (0.135)	0.122** (0.0584)	-0.0126 (0.0580)	0.0568 (0.152)	0.0275 (0.0712)	-0.0640 (0.0740)
Time trend	-0.0174** (0.00792)	0.0136*** (0.00286)	0.00871*** (0.00237)	-0.0151 (0.0104)	0.0161*** (0.00428)	0.0164*** (0.00406)
Election × unemployment	-0.158 (0.112)	-0.0195 (0.0552)	-0.0716 (0.0518)	0.139 (0.0981)	-0.0622 (0.0488)	-0.0470 (0.0464)
Election × inflation	-0.00345* (0.00191)	0.00136 (0.000869)	-8.13e-05 (0.000890)	0.00102 (0.00379)	-0.00134 (0.00184)	-0.000618 (0.00176)
Unified government	0.880*** (0.293)	0.373*** (0.130)	0.442*** (0.125)	-0.609** (0.280)	0.353*** (0.133)	0.442*** (0.138)
CAMEO mean _{t-1}	-0.0599 (0.0661)			0.0779 (0.0581)		
CAMEO mean _{t-2}	-0.0854 (0.0603)			0.0564 (0.0579)		
CAMEO mean _{t-3}	-0.0354 (0.0536)			-0.0621 (0.0561)		
Material conflict _{t-1}		0.0255*** (0.00636)			0.0228*** (0.00636)	
Material conflict _{t-2}		0.00379 (0.00648)			0.0283*** (0.00628)	
Material conflict _{t-3}		0.00297 (0.00622)			0.0220*** (0.00629)	
Verbal conflict _{t-1}			0.0370*** (0.00601)			0.0324*** (0.00594)
Verbal conflict _{t-2}			0.00853 (0.00638)			0.00941 (0.00618)
Verbal conflict _{t-3}			0.00223 (0.00593)			0.00941 (0.00598)
Constant	-1.169 (4.076)	3.649 (624.4)	4.642 (806.4)	-0.698 (2.530)	1.800* (0.924)	1.284 (0.897)
Observations	262	288	288	314	330	330
R-squared	0.080			0.055		
Number of administrations	5	5	5	6	6	6

Standard errors in parentheses.

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Conflict is measured with three dependent variables: the CAMEO scale where -10 is most hostile and 10 is most cooperative; material conflict which is an aggregate count from the CAMEO data; and verbal cooperation which is an aggregate count from the CAMEO data. The unit of analysis is monthly.

Table 4: Determinants of Presidential Approval


VARIABLES	(1)	(2)
Material conflict	-0.516*** (0.128)	-0.156 (0.114)
Verbal conflict	0.444*** (0.126)	0.186* (0.109)
GDP growth	-0.842** (0.411)	0.321 (0.360)
Unemployment rate	-0.512 (0.425)	-1.879*** (0.493)
Inflation	0.305*** (0.0383)	0.102* (0.0544)
Cold War	18.55*** (2.604)	19.33*** (3.587)
Vietnam War	15.14*** (1.728)	-6.355** (2.740)
Watergate	-14.36*** (2.715)	-17.06*** (2.797)
Post-9/11	22.12*** (5.431)	24.48*** (5.587)
Second term	-3.336*** (1.145)	-2.386** (1.121)
Log military capabilities	23.69*** (4.632)	-30.26*** (8.473)
Election year	-2.868*** (1.092)	-2.477*** (0.947)
Ongoing crisis involvement	3.243** (1.370)	1.496 (1.171)
Unified government	-1.466 (1.298)	-5.279** (2.071)
Constant	57.81*** (4.985)	-7.057 (9.811)
Administration dummies	No	Yes
Observations	572	572
R-squared	0.354	0.550

Standard errors in parentheses.

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.


8 Figures

Figure 1: Impulse Response Graph of Unemployment and Conflict, Democrat Sample



x -axis represents time elapsed in months. y -axis represents response in Y after a one standard deviation (1.51 percentage point) increase in unemployment. Responses are based on an informed prior. 95% error bands are likelihood-base eigenvector quantiles.

Figure 2: Impulse Response Graph of Inflation and Conflict, Republican Sample



x -axis represents time elapsed in months. y -axis represents response in Y after a one standard deviation increase in inflation. Responses are based on an informed prior. 95% error bands are likelihood-base eigenvector quantiles.

9 Appendix

Figure 3: Mean Monthly CAMEO Score by Party




Figure 4: Trends in Material and Verbal Conflict and Cooperation




Table 5: Descriptive Statistics

Variable	N	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.	Missing
Mean CAMEO score	696	0.39	0.98	-5	7	48
No. material conflicts	744	9.08	5.36	0	24	0
No. verbal conflicts	744	10.27	5.57	0	27	0
No. verbal cooperative acts	744	19.54	7.92	0	31	0
No. material cooperative acts	744	5.90	3.674	0	18	0
Domestic unemployment rate	708	5.61	1.51	2.5	10.8	36
Consumer price index	720	83.82	58.5	21.48	203.8	24
Presidential job approval	651	54.37	12.91	22	91	93
GDP growth	717	1.71	1.13	-1.89	6.12	27
Mean S&P 500 index	600	373.17	420.10	40.33	1485.46	144
National capabilities index	684	0.20	0.07	0.13	0.38	60
Political party	744	0.45	0.50	0	1	0
Election year	744	0.24	0.43	0	1	0
Cold War	744	0.76	0.43	0	1	0

All statistics are at the monthly level.

Table 6: Unemployment, Inflation, and International Conflict (Vanilla Models)

VARIABLES	Democrat sample			Republican sample		
	(1) Cameo Index	(2) Material Conflict	(3) Verbal Conflict	(4) Cameo Index	(5) Material Conflict	(6) Verbal Conflict
Unemployment rate	0.167* (0.0915)	0.133*** (0.0442)	0.148*** (0.0377)	-0.00392 (0.0744)	0.00497 (0.0323)	0.000473 (0.0325)
Inflation	0.0203* (0.0117)	-0.0268*** (0.00560)	-0.0222*** (0.00487)	0.00347 (0.00894)	-0.00339 (0.00372)	-0.00265 (0.00392)
Second term	-0.0208 (0.237)	0.459*** (0.117)	0.414*** (0.101)	-0.0255 (0.116)	-0.0593 (0.0511)	-0.0428 (0.0507)
Cold War	1.897* (1.092)	-0.929* (0.563)	-0.498 (0.472)	0.401 (0.369)	-0.162 (0.167)	-0.0791 (0.173)
Log military capabilities	1.213 (1.800)	0.216 (0.931)	0.720 (0.793)	0.441 (1.816)	-0.115 (0.783)	-0.00640 (0.811)
Election year	0.808* (0.435)	0.278 (0.237)	0.282 (0.195)	-0.529 (0.484)	0.530** (0.221)	0.328 (0.218)
Ongoing crisis involvement	-0.0322 (0.135)	0.0387 (0.0651)	-0.0620 (0.0583)	0.0427 (0.151)	0.0548 (0.0657)	-0.0520 (0.0692)
Time trend	-0.00152 (0.00360)	0.00598*** (0.00183)	0.00596*** (0.00156)	-0.00176 (0.00480)	0.00116 (0.00203)	0.000786 (0.00214)
Election × unemployment	-0.142 (0.0886)	-0.0383 (0.0459)	-0.0397 (0.0388)	0.0974 (0.0875)	-0.0832** (0.0409)	-0.0461 (0.0403)
Election × inflation	-0.00348* (0.00182)	0.000481 (0.000882)	-0.000347 (0.000823)	0.000343 (0.00274)	-3.96e-05 (0.00125)	-0.000256 (0.00128)
CAMEO mean _{t-1}	-0.0101 (0.0655)			0.107* (0.0581)		
CAMEO mean _{t-2}	-0.0416 (0.0596)			0.0765 (0.0581)		
CAMEO mean _{t-3}	-0.00366 (0.0534)			-0.0444 (0.0561)		
Material conflict _{t-1}		0.0459*** (0.00664)			0.0277*** (0.00592)	
Material conflict _{t-2}		0.0192*** (0.00681)			0.0312*** (0.00581)	
Material conflict _{t-3}		0.0147** (0.00648)			0.0241*** (0.00579)	
Verbal conflict _{t-1}			0.0499*** (0.00574)			0.0434*** (0.00550)
Verbal conflict _{t-2}			0.0165*** (0.00623)			0.0118** (0.00587)
Verbal conflict _{t-3}			0.00759 (0.00565)			0.0142*** (0.00537)
Constant	-0.747 (1.137)	1.594*** (0.618)	1.855*** (0.517)	1.117 (1.523)	1.167* (0.634)	1.586** (0.655)
Observations	262	288	288	314	330	330
R-squared/Pseudo R-squared	0.190	0.153	0.1672	0.168	0.1375	0.0807

Standard errors in parentheses.

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Conflict is measured with three dependent variables: the CAMEO scale where -10 is most hostile and 10 is most cooperative; material conflict which is an aggregate count from the CAMEO data; and verbal cooperation which is an aggregate count from the CAMEO data. The unit of analysis is monthly.

Table 7: Unemployment, Inflation, and International Conflict (Fixed Effects, No Unified)

VARIABLES	Democrat sample			Republican sample		
	(1) Cameo Mean	(2) Material Conflict	(3) Verbal Conflict	(4) Cameo Mean	(5) Material Conflict	(6) Verbal Conflict
Unemployment rate	0.124 (0.105)	0.200*** (0.055)	0.221*** (0.050)	0.017 (0.081)	-0.037 (0.036)	-0.036 (0.036)
Inflation	0.044* (0.026)	-0.005 (0.010)	-0.006 (0.010)	0.029 (0.023)	-0.019* (0.012)	-0.024** (0.011)
Second term	0.095 (0.281)	-0.216 (0.139)	-0.014 (0.124)	-0.132 (0.299)	-0.431*** (0.099)	-0.411*** (0.094)
Cold War			-8.755 (340.985)	0.616 (0.474)	-0.460** (0.228)	-0.307 (0.225)
Log military capabilities	2.513 (2.083)	-0.404 (1.085)	-1.388 (1.033)	-1.079 (1.915)	0.406 (0.883)	0.293 (0.883)
Ongoing crisis involvement	-0.065 (0.136)	0.138** (0.059)	0.003 (0.059)	0.027 (0.152)	0.039 (0.072)	-0.050 (0.075)
Election year	0.984* (0.524)	-0.129 (0.271)	0.256 (0.252)	-0.650 (0.555)	0.196 (0.276)	0.067 (0.259)
Election × unemployment	-0.167 (0.113)	-0.043 (0.054)	-0.087* (0.052)	0.098 (0.097)	-0.044 (0.048)	-0.023 (0.046)
Election × inflation	-0.004* (0.002)	0.001 (0.001)	-0.000 (0.001)	0.001 (0.004)	-0.002 (0.002)	-0.001 (0.002)
Time trend	-0.012 (0.008)	0.016*** (0.003)	0.011*** (0.002)	-0.006 (0.010)	0.012*** (0.004)	0.012*** (0.004)
CAMEO mean _{t-1}	-0.026 (0.066)	0.027*** (0.006)		0.086 (0.058)		
CAMEO mean _{t-2}	-0.060 (0.061)	0.005 (0.007)		0.060 (0.058)		
CAMEO mean _{t-3}	-0.017 (0.054)	0.002 (0.006)		-0.063 (0.056)		
Material conflict _{t-1}					0.024*** (0.006)	
Material conflict _{t-2}					0.028*** (0.006)	
Material conflict _{t-3}					0.023*** (0.006)	
Verbal conflict _{t-1}			0.040*** (0.006)			0.035*** (0.006)
Verbal conflict _{t-2}			0.010 (0.006)			0.010* (0.006)
Verbal conflict _{t-3}			0.003 (0.006)			0.012** (0.006)
Constant	4.529 (3.665)	-1.844 (1.345)	6.046 (340.989)	-2.322 (2.433)	1.839** (0.934)	1.465 (0.909)
Observations	262	288	288	314	330	330
R-squared	0.046			0.039		
Number of administrations	5	5	5	6	6	6

Standard errors in parentheses.

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Conflict is measured with three dependent variables: the CAMEO scale where -10 is most hostile and 10 is most cooperative; material conflict which is an aggregate count from the CAMEO data; and verbal cooperation which is an aggregate count from the CAMEO data. The unit of analysis is monthly.

Table 8: Unemployment, Inflation, and International Conflict (Fixed Effects, US Initiated)

VARIABLES	Democrat sample			Republican sample		
	(1) Cameo Mean	(2) Material Conflict	(3) Verbal Conflict	(4) Cameo Mean	(5) Material Conflict	(6) Verbal Conflict
Unemployment rate	0.282 (0.275)	0.166 (0.143)	0.284** (0.118)	0.118 (0.164)	-0.162* (0.0863)	-0.0998 (0.0819)
Inflation	0.0269 (0.0549)	0.0207 (0.0237)	0.0360* (0.0217)	0.0615 (0.0504)	-0.0370 (0.0282)	-0.0879*** (0.0276)
Second term	-0.183 (0.627)	-0.0273 (0.292)	0.0603 (0.265)	-0.00890 (0.605)	0.120 (0.327)	-0.429* (0.234)
Cold War		8.706*** (3.179)	-5.253 (824.2)	0.550 (0.931)	-1.070** (0.459)	-0.496 (0.456)
Log military capabilities	4.530 (5.989)	-2.183 (2.491)	-2.939 (2.293)	0.698 (3.765)	-2.027 (1.997)	3.338* (2.015)
Election year	1.308 (1.189)	-0.310 (0.551)	0.402 (0.549)	-1.111 (1.095)	1.154* (0.679)	0.834 (0.602)
Ongoing crisis involvement	0.142 (0.295)	0.0721 (0.137)	0.222* (0.119)	0.387 (0.300)	-0.0321 (0.172)	-0.0732 (0.172)
Time trend	-0.00823 (0.0169)	0.0131** (0.00573)	0.00428 (0.00489)	-0.0220 (0.0200)	0.0113 (0.0116)	0.0370*** (0.0101)
Election \times unemployment	-0.256 (0.254)	-0.0613 (0.117)	-0.168 (0.111)	0.115 (0.191)	-0.0876 (0.117)	-0.0856 (0.108)
Election \times inflation	0.00438 (0.00417)	-2.57e-05 (0.00201)	-0.00111 (0.00206)	0.00199 (0.00731)	-0.00576 (0.00366)	-0.00435 (0.00357)
Unified government	0.125 (0.637)	0.185 (0.306)	0.549** (0.266)	-1.067* (0.573)	0.961*** (0.289)	0.514* (0.298)
CAMEO mean $_{t-1}$	-0.118* (0.0645)			-0.160*** (0.0585)		
CAMEO mean $_{t-2}$	-0.0763 (0.0649)			-0.00275 (0.0594)		
CAMEO mean $_{t-3}$	-0.0734 (0.0647)			-0.111* (0.0594)		
Material conflict $_{t-1}$		0.00634 (0.0269)			-0.0101 (0.0319)	
Material conflict $_{t-2}$		0.00546 (0.0277)			0.102*** (0.0301)	
Material conflict $_{t-3}$		-0.0147 (0.0276)			0.0430 (0.0317)	
Verbal conflict $_{t-1}$			0.0562** (0.0268)			0.0412 (0.0337)
Verbal conflict $_{t-2}$			0.0240 (0.0272)			0.0392 (0.0332)
Verbal conflict $_{t-3}$			-0.00786 (0.0274)			0.00186 (0.0336)
Constant	8.277 (10.02)	-13.52*** (4.882)	-0.992 (824.2)	4.784 (5.000)	13.21 (851.0)	4.466** (2.072)
Observations	253	288	288	307	330	330
R-squared	0.052			0.077		
Number of admincode	5	5	5	6	6	6

Standard errors in parentheses.

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Conflict is measured with three dependent variables: the CAMEO scale where -10 is most hostile and 10 is most cooperative; material conflict which is an aggregate count from the CAMEO data; and verbal cooperation which is an aggregate count from the CAMEO data. The unit of analysis is monthly.

References

- Adorno, T.W., E. Frenkel-Brunswik, D.J. Levinson and R.N. Sanford. 1950. *The Authoritarian Personality*. New York: Harper.
- Altemeyer, R.A. 1988. *Enemies of Freedom: Understanding Right-Wing Authoritarianism*. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.
- Altemeyer, R.A. 1998. "The Other 'Authoritarian Personality'." *Advances in Experimental Social Psychology* 30:47–91.
- Angrist, Joshua D. and Jorn-Steffen Pischke. 2009. *Mostly Harmless Econometrics: An Empiricist's Companion*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Bartels, Larry M. 2000. "Partisanship and Voting Behavior, 1952-1996." *American Journal of Political Science* 44(1):35–50.
- Baum, Matthew. 2004. "Going Private: Public Opinion, Presidential Rhetoric, and the Domestic Politics of Audience Costs in US Foreign Policy Crises." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 48(5):603–631.
- Baum, Matthew A. and Philip B.K. Potter. 2008. "The Relationships Between Mass Media, Public Opinion, and Foreign Policy: Toward a Theoretical Synthesis." *Annual Review of Political Science* 11:39–65.
- Beck, Nathaniel. 2001. "Time-Series-Cross-Section Data: What Have We Learned in the Past Few Years?" *Annual Review of Political Science* 4:271–293.
- Beck, Nathaniel and Jonathan N. Katz. 1995. "What To Do (And Not To Do) With Time-Series Cross-Section Data." *American Political Science Review* 89(3):634–647.

- Beck, Nathaniel and Jonathan N. Katz. 1996. "Nuisance vs. Substance: Specifying and Estimating Time-Series-Cross-Section Models." *Political Analysis* 6:1–36.
- Beck, Nathaniel and Jonathan N. Katz. 2011. "Modeling Dynamics in Time-Series-Cross-Section Political Economy Data." *Annual Review of Political Science* 14:331–352.
- Beck, Nathaniel, Jonathan N. Katz and Richard Tucker. 1998. "Taking Time Seriously: Time-Series-Cross-Section Analysis with a Binary Dependent Variable." *American Journal of Political Science* 42(4):1260–1288.
- Bennett, D. Scott. 2000. "Foreign Policy Substitutability and Internal Economic Problems." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 44(1):33–61.
- Berlemann, Michael and Soren Enkelmann. 2012. "The Economic Determinants of U.S. Presidential Approval – A Survey." CESifo Working Paper No. 3761.
- Blechman, BM and SS Kaplan. 1978. "Force Without War: U.S. Armed Forces as a Political Instrument." Washington: Brookings Institution.
- Bond, Doug, Joe Bond, Churl Oh, J. Craig Jenkins and Charles Lewis Taylor. 2003. "Integrated Data for Events Analysis (IDEA): An Event Typology for Automated Events Data Development." *Journal of Peace Research* 40(6):733–745.
- Brandt, Patrick T. and John R. Freeman. 2006. "Advances in Bayesian Time Series Modeling and the Study of Politics: Theory Testing, Forecasting, and Policy Analysis." *Political Analysis* 14:1–36.
- Brandt, Patrick T. and John R. Freeman. 2009. "Modeling Macro-Political Dynamics." *Political Analysis* 17:113–142.

- Brandt, Patrick T., John T. Williams, Benjamin O. Fordham and Brian Pollins. 2000. "Dynamic Modeling for Persistent Event-Count Time Series." *American Journal of Political Science* 44(4):823–843.
- Brandt, Patrick T. and Justin Appleby. 2007. "MSBVAR: Bayesian Vector Autoregression Models, Impulse Responses and Forecasting." Rpackage version 0.3 1.
- Brecher, Michael and Jonathan Wilkenfeld. 1997. *A Study of Crisis*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. Data available at <http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/icb/data/>.
- Brulé, David J. 2008. "Congress, Presidential Approval, and U.S. Dispute Initiation." *Foreign Policy Analysis* 4(4):349–370.
- Brulé, David J. and Laron K. Williams. 2009. "Democracy and Diversion: Government Arrangements, the Economy, and Dispute Initiation." *Journal of Peace Research* 46(6):777–798.
- Brulé, David J. and Wonjae Hwang. 2010. "Diverting the Legislature: Executive-Legislative Relations, the Economy, and US Uses of Force." *International Studies Quarterly* 54:361–379.
- Carney, Dana R., John T. Jost, Samuel D. Gosling and Jeff Potter. 2008. "The Secret Lives of Liberals and Conservatives: Personality Profiles, Interaction Styles, and the Things They Leave Behind." *Political Psychology* 29(6):807–840.
- Chiozza, Giacomo and Hein Goemans. 2003. "Peace Through Insecurity: Tenure and International Conflict." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 47(4):443–467.
- Chiozza, Giacomo and Hein Goemans. 2004. "International Conflict and the Tenure of Leaders: Is War Still Ex Post Inefficient?" *American Journal of Political Science* 48(3):604–619.

- Clark, DH. 2003. "Can Strategic Interaction Divert Diversionary Behavior? A Model of U.S. Conflict Propensity." *Journal of Politics* 65:1013–1039.
- Coser, Lewis A. 1956. *The Functions of Social Conflict*. Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press of Glencoe.
- Crawford, Vincent P. 1998. "A Survey of Experiments on Communication via Cheap Talk." *Journal of Economic Theory* 78:286–298.
- Crawford, Vincent P. 2003. "Lying for Strategic Advantage: Rational and Boundedly Rational Misrepresentation of Intentions." *American Economic Review* 93:133–149.
- Crawford, Vincent P. and Joel Sobel. 1982. "Strategic Information Transmission." *Econometrica* 50(6):1431–1451.
- Cunningham, W.A., J.B. Nezlek and M.R. Banaji. 2004. "Implicit and Explicit Ethnocentrism: Revisiting the Ideologies of Prejudice." *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin* 30:1332–1346.
- Dassel, Kurt and Eric Reinhardt. 1999. "Domestic Strife and the Initiation of Violence at Home and Abroad." *American Journal of Political Science* 43(1):56–85.
- Davies, Graeme A.M. 2002. "Domestic Strife and the Initiation of International Conflicts." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 46(5):672–692.
- Davis, James W. 2000. *Threats and Promises: The Pursuit of International Influence*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- DeRouen, Karl. 2000. "Presidents and the Diversionary Use of Force: A Research Note." *International Studies Quarterly* 44(2):317–328.

- DeRouen, Karl Jr. and Jeffrey Peake. 2002. "The Dynamics of Diversion: The Domestic Implications of Presidential Use of Force." *International Interactions: Empirical and Theoretical Research in International Relations* 28(2):191–211.
- Duckitt, J. 2001. "A Dual-Process Cognitive-Motivational Theory of Ideology and Prejudice." *Advances in Experimental Social Psychology* 33:41–113.
- Edwards, George C. 1990. *Presidential Approval*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Egan, Patrick J. 2013. *Partisan Priorities: How Issue Ownership Drives and Distorts American Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Enterline, Andrew J. and Kristian S. Gleditsch. 2000. "Threats, Opportunities and Force: Repression and Diversion of Domestic Pressure." *International Interactions* 26(1):21–53.
- Epstein, David and Sharyn O'Halloran. 1996. "Divided Government and the Design of Administrative Procedures." *Journal of Politics* 58(2):373–398.
- Farrell, Joseph. 1995. "Talk is Cheap." *American Economic Review* 85:186–190.
- Farrell, Joseph and Robert Gibbons. 1989. "Cheap Talk Can Matter in Bargaining." *Journal of Economic Theory* 48:221–237.
- Fearon, James D. 1994. "Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes." *American Political Science Review* 88:577–592.
- Fearon, James D. 1995. "Rationalist Explanations for War." *International Organization* 49(3):379–414.
- Finnemore, Martha and Kathryn Sikkink. 2001. "Taking Stock: The Constructivist Research Program in International Relations and Comparative Politics." *Annual Review of Political Science* 4:391–416.

- Fordham, Benjamin O. 1998a. "Partisanship, Macroeconomic Policy and U.S. Uses of Force." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 42(4):418–430.
- Fordham, Benjamin O. 1998b. "The Politics of Threat Perception and the Use of Force: A Political Economy Model of U.S. Uses of Force."
- Fordham, Benjamin O. 2005. "Strategic Conflict Avoidance and the Diversionary Use of Force." *The Journal of Politics* 67(1):132–153.
- Fordham, Benjamin O. and Christopher C. Sarver. 2001. "Militarized Interstate Disputes and United States Use of Force." *International Studies Quarterly* 45(3):455–466.
- Foster, Dennis M. and Glenn Palmer. 2006. "Presidents, Public Opinion, and Diversionary Behavior: The Role of Partisan Support Reconsidered." *Foreign Policy Analysis* 2(3):269–287.
- Fravel, M. Taylor. 2010. "The Limits of Diversion: Rethinking Internal and External Conflict." *Security Studies* 19:307–371.
- Frieden, Jeffrey A. 1988. "Sectoral Conflict and Foreign Economic Policy, 1914-1940." *International Organization* 42(1):59–90.
- Gaddis, John Lewis. 1986. "The Long Peace: Elements of Stability in the Postwar International System." *International Security* 10(4):99–142.
- Gallup. 2013. "Presidential Job Approval." Compiled by Gerhard Peters for the American Presidency Project. Available at <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/data>.
- Gelpi, Christopher. 1997. "Democratic Diversions: Governmental Structure and the Externalization of Conflict." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 41(2):255–282.

- Gerner, Deborah J., Philip A. Schrodt and Omur Yilmaz. 2009. Conflict and Mediation Event Observations (CAMEO): An Event Data Framework for a Post Cold War World. In *International Conflict Mediation: New Approaches and Findings*, ed. J. Bercovitch and S. Gartner. New York: Routledge.
- Ghosn, Faten, Glenn Palmer and Stuart Bremer. 2004. "The MID3 Data Set, 1993-2001: Procedures, Coding Rules, and Description." *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 21:133–154.
- Gowa, Joanne. 1998. "Politics at the Water's Edge: Parties, Votes and the Use of Force." *International Organization* 52(2):307–324.
- Grimmer, Justin and Brandon M. Stewart. 2013. "Text as Data: The Promise and Pitfalls of Automatic Content Analysis Methods for Political Texts." *Political Analysis* Forthcoming:1–31.
- Hacker, Jacob S. and Paul Pierson. 2011. *Winner-Take-All Politics: How Washington Made the Rich Richer—And Turned Its Back on the Middle Class*. New York: Simon & Schuster: .
- Heldt, Bigger. 1999. "Domestic Politics, Absolute Deprivation and the Use of Armed Force in Interstate Territorial Disputes, 1950-1990." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 43(4):451–478.
- Hess, Gregory D. and Athanasios Orphanides. 1995. "War Politics: An Economic, Rational Voter Framework." *American Economic Review* 85(4):828–847.
- Hibbs, Jr., Douglas A. 1977. "Political Parties and Macroeconomic Policy." *American Political Science Review* 71(4):1467–1487.
- Horowitz, Michael, Rose McDermott and Allen C. Stam. 2005. "Leader Age, Regime Type, and Violent International Relations." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 49(5):661–685.

- Howell, WG and JC Pevehouse. 2005. "Presidents, Congress, and the Use of Force." *International Organization* 59:209–232.
- James, Patrick and Athanasios Hristoulas. 1994. "Domestic Politics and Foreign Policy: Evaluating a Model of Crisis Activity for the United States." *Journal of Politics* 56(2):327–348.
- James, Patrick and John R. Oneal. 1991. "The Influence of Domestic and International Politics on the President's Use of Force." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 35(2):307–332.
- Johnson, Jesse C. and Tiffany D. Barnes. 2011. "Responsibility and the Diversionary Use of Force." *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 28(5):478–496.
- Johnston, Alastair Iain. 1998. "China's Militarized Interstate Dispute Behaviour 1949-1992: A First Cut at the Data." *The China Quarterly* 153:1–30.
- Jost, John T. 2006. "The End of the End of Ideology." *American Psychologist* 61(7):651–670.
- Jr., B.E. Whitley. 1999. "Right-Wing Authoritarianism, Social Dominance Orientation, and Prejudice." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 77:126–134.
- Kahneman, Daniel and Jonathan Renshon. 2007. "Why Hawks Win." *Foreign Policy* 158:34–38.
- Karol, David. 2000. "Divided Government and U.S. Trade Policy: Much Ado About Nothing?" *International Organization* 54(4):825–844.
- King, Gary and Will Lowe. 2003. "10 Million International Dyadic Events." <http://hdl.handle.net/1902.1/FYXLAWZRIA> UNF:3:dSE0bsQK2o6xXlxeaDEhcg== IQSS Dataverse Network [Distributor] V3 [Version].

- Kisangani, Emizet F. and Jeffrey Pickering. 2011. "Democratic Accountability and Diversionary Force: Regime Types and the Use of Benevolent and Hostile Military Force." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 55(6):1021–1046.
- Kruglanski, A.W. 2004. *The Psychology of Closed Mindedness*. New York: Psychology Press.
- Lai, Brian and Dan Reiter. 2005. "Rally 'Round the Union Jack? Public Opinion and the Use of Force in the United Kingdom, 1948-2001." *International Studies Quarterly* 49:255–272.
- Lebow, Richard Ned. 1981. *Between Peace and War: The Nature of International Crisis*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Leeds, Brett Ashley and David R. Davis. 1997. "Domestic Political Vulnerability and International Disputes." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 41(6):814–834.
- Levy, Jack. 1989a. The Causes of War: A Review of Theories and Evidence. In *Behavior, Society and Nuclear War*, ed. Phillip Tetlock. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Levy, Jack. 1989b. The Diversionary War Theory: A Critique. In *Handbook of War Studies*, ed. Manus Midlarsky. Boston: Unwin Hyman.
- Lian, Bradley and John R. Oneal. 1993. "Presidents, the Military Use of Force and Public Opinion." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 37(2):277–300.
- Lohmann, Susanne and Sharyn O'Halloran. 1994. "Divided Government and U.S. Trade Policy: Theory and Evidence." *International Organization* 48(4):595–632.
- Madison, James. 1788. Federalist No. 10. In *The Federalist*, ed. Alexander Hamilton and James Madison. J. and A. McLean.
- Mansfield, Edward D. and Jack L. Snyder. 1995. "Democratization and the Danger of War." *International Security* 20(1):5–38.

- Mayhew, David R. 1991. *Divided We Govern: Party Control, Lawmaking, and Investigations, 1946-1990*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- McClelland, Charles. 1984. "World Event/Interaction Survey (WEIS) Project, 1966-1978." Inter-University Consortium for Political Research Study No. 5211.
- McClosky, Herbert, Paul T. Hoffmann and Rosemary O'Hara. 1960. "Issue Conflict and Consensus Among Party Leaders and Followers." *American Political Science Review* 54(2):406–427.
- McLaughlin, Sara and Brandon C. Prins. 2004. "Rivalry and Diversionary Uses of Force." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 48(6):937–961.
- Mearsheimer, John. 2001. *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*. New York: Norton.
- Meernik, J. 2004. *The Political Use of Military Force in US Foreign Policy*. Aldershot, UK: Ashgate.
- Meernik, James. 2000. "Modeling International Crises and the Political Use of Military Force by the USA." *Journal of Peace Research* 35(2):547–562.
- Meernik, James and Peter Waterman. 1996. "The Myth of the Diversionary Use of Force by American Presidents." *Political Research Quarterly* 49(3):573–590.
- Miller, Ross A. 1999. "Regime Type, Strategic Interaction, and the Diversionary Use of Force." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 43(3):388–402.
- Milner, Helen V. and B. Peter Rosendorff. 1996. "Trade Negotiations, Information, and Domestic Politics: The Role of Domestic Groups." *Economics and Politics* 8(2):145–189.
- Moore, WH and DJ Lanoue. 2003. "Domestic Politics and US Foreign Policy: A Study of Cold War Conflict Behavior." *Journal of Politics* 65:376–396.

- Morgan, T. Clifton and Kenneth N. Bickers. 1992. "Domestic Discontent and the Use of Force." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 36(1):25–52.
- Narizny, Kevin. 2003. "Both Guns and Butter, or Neither: Class Interests in the Political Economy of Rearmament." *American Political Science Review* 97(2):203–220.
- Newman, Brian and Kevin Lammert. 2011. "Divided Government and Foreign Relations Approval." *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 41(2):375–392.
- Nicholson, Stephen P., Gary M. Segura and Nathan D. Woods. 2002. "Presidential Approval and the Mixed Blessing of Divided Government." *Journal of Politics* 64:701–720.
- O'Halloran, Sharyn. 1994. *Politics, Process, and American Trade Policy*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
- Oneal, John R. and Jaroslav Tir. 2006. "Does the Diversionary Use of Force Threaten the Democratic Peace? Assessing the Effect of Economic Growth on Interstate Conflict, 1921-2001." *International Studies Quarterly* 50(4):755–779.
- Ostrom, Charles W. and Brian L. Job. 1986. "The President and Political Uses of Force." *American Political Science Review* 80(2):541–566.
- Pearson, FS and RA Baumann. 1993. "International Military Intervention, 1949-1988." Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research, Data Collection 6035, University of Michigan.
- Pickering, Jeffrey and Emizet F. Kisangani. 2005. "Democracy and Diversionary Military Intervention: Reassessing Regime Type and the Diversionary Hypothesis." *International Studies Quarterly* 49(1):23–43.
- Potter, Philip BK. 2007. "Does Experience Matter? American Presidential Experience, Age, and International Conflict." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 51(3):351–378.

- Putnam, Robert D. 1988. "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games." *International Organization* 42(3):427–460.
- Quandt, William B. 1986. "The Electoral Cycle and the Conduct of Foreign Policy." *Political Science Quarterly* 101(5):825–837.
- Raciborski, Rafal. 2008. "kountry: A Stata utility for merging cross-country data from multiple sources." *Stata Journal* 8(3):390–400.
- Risse, Thomas. 2000. "'Lets Argue!': Communicative Action in World Politics." *International Organization* 54(1):1–39.
- Rudolph, Thomas J. 2003. "Who's Responsible for the Economy? The Formation and Consequences of Responsibility Attributions." *American Journal of Political Science* 47(4):698–713.
- Russett, Bruce. 1990. Economic Decline, Electoral Pressure, and the Initiation of Interstate Conflict. In *Prisoners of War?*, ed. Charles S. Gochman and N. Sabrosky. Lexington, MA: Lexington Books.
- Schrodt, Philip A. 2007. "Draft 0.5B1 of a CAMEO Scale." Available at <http://web.ku.edu/keds/cameo.dir/CAMEO.scale.html>, accessed November 2012.
- Schrodt, Philip A. 2012a. "CAMEO Event Data Codebook." Available at <http://web.ku.edu/keds/data.dir/cameo.html>, accessed November 2012.
- Schrodt, Philip A. 2012b. "Precedents, Progress, and Prospects in Political Event Data." *International Interactions: Empirical and Theoretical Research in International Relations* 38(4):546–569.
- Schrodt, Philip A. 2012c. "TABARI: Textual Analysis by Augmented Replacement Instructions." Version 0.8.3b1.

- Schrodt, Philip A. and David Van Brackle. 2013. Automated Coding of Political Event Data. In *Handbook of Computational Approaches to Counterterrorism*, ed. V.S. Subrahmanian. New York: Springer.
- Schultz, Kenneth A. 2012. “Why We Needed Audience Costs and What We Need Now.” *Security Studies* 21(3):369–375.
- Shirk, Susan L. 2007. *China: Fragile Superpower*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Sidanius, J., F. Pratto and L. Bobo. 1996. “Racism, Conservatism, Affirmative Action, and Intellectual Sophistication: A Matter of Principled Conservatism or Group Dominance?” *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 70:476–490.
- Simmel, Georg. 1955. *Conflict and the Web of Group Affiliations*. New York: Free Press.
- Singer, J. David, Stuart Bremer and John Stuckey. 1972. Capability Distribution, Uncertainty, and Major Power War, 1820-1965. In *Peace, War, and Numbers*, ed. Bruce Russett. Beverly Hills: Sage.
- Smith, Alastair. 1998. “International Crises and Domestic Politics.” *American Political Science Review* 92(3):623–638.
- Sobek, David. 2007. “Rallying Around the Podesta: Testing Diversionary Theory Across Time.” *Journal of Peace Research* 44(1):29–45.
- Sobel, Joel. 1985. “A Theory of Credibility.” *The Review of Economic Studies* 52:557–573.
- Standard and Poor. 2013. “S&P 500 Stock Price Index (SP500).” Accessed via FRED Economic Data, St. Louis Federal Reserve Bank.
- Tarar, Ahmer. 2006. “Diversionary Incentives and the Bargaining Approach to War.” *International Studies Quarterly* 50:169–188.

- Tingley, Dustin and Barbara Walter. 2011. "Can Cheap Talk Deter? An Experimental Analysis." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 55(6):994–1018.
- Tir, Jaroslav. 2010. "Territorial Diversion: Diversionary Theory of War and Territorial Conflict." *Journal of Politics* 72(2):413–425.
- Tomkins, S.S. 1963. Left and Right: A Basic Dimension of Ideology and Personality. In *The Study of Lives*, ed. R.W. White. Chicago: Atherton.
- Tomz, Michael. 2007. "Domestic Audience Costs in International Relations: An Experimental Approach." *International Organization* 61(4):821–840.
- Tufte, Edward R. 1980. *Political Control of the Economy*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- US Department of Commerce Bureau of Economic Analysis. 2013. "Gross Domestic Product (Growth), 1 Decimal (GDP)." Accessed via FRED Economic Data, St. Louis Federal Reserve Bank.
- US Department of Labor Bureau of Labor Statistics. 2013a. "Civilian Unemployment Rate (UNRATE)." Accessed via FRED Economic Data, St. Louis Federal Reserve Bank.
- US Department of Labor Bureau of Labor Statistics. 2013b. "Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers: All Items (CPIAUCSL)." Accessed via FRED Economic Data, St. Louis Federal Reserve Bank.
- Weeks, Jessica L. 2008. "Autocratic Audience Costs: Regime Type and Signaling Resolve." *International Organization* 62(1):35–64.
- Zhang Zangzang, Zhang Xiaobo, Song Qiang, Tang Zhengyu, Qiao Bian and Gu Qingsheng. 1996. *China Can Say No: Political and Emotional Choices in the Post-Cold War Era*. Beijing: China Industrial and Commercial Joint Publishing House.